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PETITIONER: KU. SONIA BHATIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/03/1981

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA VARADARAJAN, A. (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION:  1981 SCR  (3) 239        1981 SCC  (2) 585  1981 SCALE  (1)491

ACT:      U.P. Imposition  of Ceiling  on Land Holdings Act 1960- Section  5(6)-Scope   of-Gift  of   property  for  love  and affection-If  could   be  said   to  be   a   transfer   for consideration.      Words  and  phrases-"Consideration."-’Adequate"-"Gift"- "Transfer"-Meanin of.      Interpretation-Words of everyday use-How interpreted.

HEADNOTE:      Sub-section 6  of section  5 of  the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on  Land Holdings  Act, 1960  as  it  stood  at  the relevant time  provided that in determining the ceiling area any transfer  of land made after January, 24, 1971 should be ignored and  not taken  into  account.  Clause  (b)  of  the proviso to  sub-section 6  which  carves  out  an  exception states that  the sub-section  shall not  apply to a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good  faith  and  for  adequate  consideration  under  an irrevocable  instrument.  Explanation  II  to  this  proviso places the  burden of  proof that  a case fell within clause (b) of the proviso is on the party claiming its benefit.      On January 28, 1972 the donor gifted away certain lands in favour  of his grand-daughter, the appellant, daughter of a pre-deceased son.      The gift  having been  made after  the prescribed date, the Prescribed  Authority ignored  the gift  for purposes of section 5 (6) of the Act.      On appeal,  the District Judge gave a finding in favour of the  appellant holding that the gift was bona fide having regard to the circumstances in which it was made and that it could not  be held  invalid merely  because it  was executed after the due date of January 24, 1971.      Purporting to  follow one of its earlier decisions, the High Court  held that  a  gift  not  being  a  transfer  for consideration, had to be ignored under the provisions of the Act and  that a gift being a gratuitous transfer made out of love and affection fell outside the purview of clause (b) of the proviso.      On behalf of the appellant it was contended that a gift could not  be said  to be  a transfer  without consideration

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because even love and affection may 240 provide sufficient  consideration and  hence  the  condition regarding adequate consideration would not apply to a gift.      Dismissing the appeal ^      HELD: It  is a  well settled  rule of  construction  of statutes that  where the  definition of  a word has not been given in  an enactment  it must  be construed in its popular sense if  it is  a word of every day use, that is, the sense in which  people conversant  with  the  subject-matter  with which it  deals would  attribute to  it.  Similarly  if  the language used is clear and explicit, the provision cannot be reduced to  a nullity  by reading into it a meaning which it does not carry. [246B]      In the  instant case  therefore,  the  word  "transfer" being a  term of  well-known legal  significance  with  well ascertained incidents  the legislature  did not  consider it necessary to  define it  separately. It is used in the sense in which it is used in the Transfer of Property Act. [245 G]      C.I.T.,  Andhra   Pradesh  v.  M/s.  Taj  Mahal  Hotel, Secunderabad [1972]  1 S.C.R.  168 and  Union  of  India  v. Sankal Chand  Himatlal Sheth  and Anr.  [1978] 1  S.C.R. 423 applied.      Keats v. Lewis [1911] A.C. 641 referred to.      A conspectus  of the meaning of the term "gift" is that it is  a transfer  which does  not  contain  an  element  of consideration in  any shape  or form.  Where in respect of a gift there  is a  benefit measurable  in terms  of money the transaction ceases  to be  a gift  and assumes  a  different colour. Yet  another salient feature of a gift is that love, affection and  many other  factors may constitute the motive for the  gift and  may enter into the intention of the donor making a  gift, but  none of  these can  be held to be legal consideration, as understood by law. [251 G-H; 252F]      "Consideration" means  a reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit  passed on  by the promisor to the promisee or by  the transferor  to  the  transferee.  When  the  term consideration is  qualified by  the word "adequate" it makes it sufficient  and valuable  having  regard  to  the  facts, circumstances and necessities of the case. [251 F]      The word  "transfer for adequate consideration" used in clause (b)  of the  proviso excludes a transaction, which is in the  nature of a gift and which is without consideration. [252 E]      The  argument  that  if  the  legislature  intended  to exclude gifts clause (b) of the proviso would have expressly said so  and by  not excluding  it must  be deemed  to  have included a gift is without force particularly in the face of the clear  and unambiguous  language of  the proviso.  Every legislature has  its own  technical device  to  express  its intendment. Express  exclusion is  not the  only  method  of conveying the  legislative intent there may be other methods or devices  by which  a legislature  expresses  its  intent; namely,  by   using  expressions,   which  would  exclude  a particular transaction by necessary intendment. This is what is done in enacting clause (b) of the proviso. [252 G-H] 241      The legislature  has made  its intention  clear that  a gift is excluded by qualifying the word "consideration" with the adjective "adequate". [252 H]      By using  the  word  "adequate"  to  qualify  the  word "consideration" the legislature has ruled out gifts from the ambit of clause (b) of the proviso. [253 C]      The words  "adequate consideration"  clearly  postulate

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that consideration  must be  capable of  being  measured  in terms of  money, having  regard to  the market  price of the property, the  value that it may fetch if sold, the value of similar lands situate in the vicinity and so on. [253 B]      The argument  that since in the case of a gift there is no  question  of  consideration,  the  words  for  "adequate consideration" in  the 3rd part of clause (b) of the proviso are  inapplicable  and  should,  therefore,  be  ignored  is opposed to  the  well  known  rule  of  interpretation  that Courts, while  interpreting statutes,  must not legislate. A legislature does  not use  words without  any intention  and every word  used by  the legislature  must be  given its due import. The  intention of the legislature in using the words "adequate consideration" is to exclude any transaction which is not  for adequate  consideration. Even  if a sale is bona fide if  to but consideration is inadequate, the transaction would fall  beyond the  protection  of  clause  (b)  of  the proviso. [253 E-F]      Debi Saran  Koiri and  Anr. v. Nandlal Chaubey and Ors. A.I.R. 1929  Patna 591  and Kulasekaraperumal  v. Pathakutty Thalevanar and Ors. A.I.R. 1961 Madras 405 approved,      The words  "adequate consideration"  carry a well-known legal significance  and, therefore,  convey the same meaning and import  in whichever  statute they  are  used  unless  a contrary intention appears from the language employed by the legislature in a particular Act. [256 E-F]      Tulsidas Kilachand  v. The  Commissioner of  Income-tax Bombay City I, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 351, referred to      Fateh Mohammed  v. District  Judge [Civil Writ Petition No. 915 of 1975, decided on 10-7-78] overruled.      An explanation  merely widens  the scope  of  the  main section and is not meant to carve out a particular exception to the  main section.  The words  admission, acknowledgment, relinquishment or  declaration used in Explanation I, do not absolve the  party concerned  from proving that the transfer should  be   executed  in   good  faith   and  for  adequate consideration. [256 E-F]      However laudable the object of the donor in gifting the property  to   his  grand-daughter   (particularly  in   the circumstances of  this case)  may be  and whatever  hardship might ensue to the donee by applying the provision, the gift fails if it does not fulfil the other essential requirements of the  section. The act was enacted to implement one of the Directives contained  in Part  IV of the Constitution and if in this  process a  few individuals  suffer that  cannot  be helped, for,  individual interests  must yield to the larger interests of the community. [258 D-F] 242

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 775 of 1981.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 21.12.78  of the  High Court  of Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 12602/77.      S. N. Kacker and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.      O. P. Rana and S. Dikshit for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a  judgment dated December 21, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court  allowing the writ petition filed by the State of U.P. before the Court.      The case arose out of an order passed by the Prescribed

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Authority under  the U.P.  Imposition  of  Ceiling  on  Land Holdings Act,  1960 (hereinafter  referred to as the ’Act’), as amended  uptodate, by  which the  said Authority rejected the claim  of the  petitioners on  the basis of a gift which had  been  executed  by  her  grandfather  by  a  registered document dated  January 28,  1972. The Act was passed as far back as  1960 but  by virtue of an amendment, being U.P. Act No. 18  of 1973,  section 5  was introduced  which placed  a ceiling on  any tenure  holder to hold land in excess of the ceiling area  fixed  under  the  Act.  Section  5  contained various  sub-sections   but  in  the  instant  case  we  are concerned only  with sub-section  (6) as  also clause (b) of the proviso  to the  said sub-section. By another amendment, being U.P.  Act No. 2 of 1975, which was given retrospective operation with effect from 8.6.1973 Explanation I, alongwith its sub-clauses, was added to sub-section (6) of section 5.      The  decision  in  the  present  case  turns  upon  the interpretation of  sub-section (6)  of s.  5 and the proviso therein in  order to  determine the  validity of the deed of gift said  to have  been executed by Chunni Lal Bhatiya, the grandfather of  the petitioner  Sonia and  respondent No.  4 before the District Judge.      To begin  with, we  might like  to state  here that the facts of  the case undoubtedly reveal that if the provisions of the  said sub-section  (6) were  to apply  it would  work serious hardship  to the  petitioner but as we are concerned with interpretation  of an  important statute  the mere fact that a correct interpretation may lead to hardship would not be a  valid consideration for distorting the language of the statutory provisions. 243      Before we  proceed to  examine the relevant provisions, it may  be necessary  to give  a resume  of the facts of the case. Chunni Lal Bhatiya had two sons, Sudesh and Mahesh and a daughter  Smt. Sarla,  On 14.9.1969  Chunni Lal executed a registered deed  of gift  in respect of 110 bighas in favour of his  son, Sudesh. A month later, another deed of gift was executed in  favour of  his son, Sudhir. So far as these two gifts are  concerned, as they were made before the amendment of the  Ceiling Act,  their validity was beyond question and they are  not the  subject-matter  of  any  dispute  in  the present case. On January 28, 1972 Chunni Lal executed a gift in respect  of 80  bighas in  favour of  his grand-daughter, Sonia (daughter  of  Mahesh.)  It  appears  that  a  serious misfortune had  befallen Chunni  Lal in that he lost his two sons, Sudesh  and Mahesh,  who were serving in the Air Force and died  in two different air crashes. As Chunni Lal wanted to make  sufficient provision  for his  grandsons and grand- daughter, he executed the three gifts.      The gift  executed in  favour of  Sonia is the subject- matter of  the dispute  in the  instant case. The Prescribed Authority held that as the gift was made after the due date, i.e. 24.1.1971,  as prescribed  by sub-section  (6) of s. 5, the transfer  would have to be ignored. Against the decision of the  Prescribed Authority,  the appellant filed an appeal before the District Judge being the Appellate Authority, and assailed  the  finding  of  the  Prescribed  Authority.  The District Judge,  after hearing  the parties, came to a clear finding that  the gift  was a bona fide one having regard to the circumstances  in which the transfer was made and merely because it  was executed  after the  due date (24.1.1971) it could not  be held  to be  invalid. Thereafter, the State of U.P. filed  a writ  petition in  the High  Court  which  was allowed following  a Division Bench decision of its Court in Fateh Mohammad  v. District Judge which had held that a deed

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of gift  not being  a transfer  for consideration  had to be ignored under  the provisions of the Act. Hence, this appeal before us.      The finding  of the  District Judge that the gift was a bona fide one has not been challenged by Mr. Rana, appearing for the  respondent, who  however argued  that the said gift itself was  not covered by the Explanations laid down in the proviso to the said sub-section (6) of s. 5 of the Act. Thus the only  question for  determination in the instant case is the legal effect of the prohibition contained in sub-section (6) and clause (b) of its proviso. In order to 244 understand the  scope and  ambit of  sub-section (6) and its proviso,  it  may  be  necessary  to  extract  the  relevant portions of sub-section (6) and Explanations concerned:-           "6. In  determining the ceiling area applicable to      a tenure-holder,  any transfer  of land  made after the      twenty fourth  day of  January, 1971, which but for the      transfer would  have been  declared surplus  land under      this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account:           Provided that  nothing in  this sub-section  shall      apply to:-           ...       ...       ...       ...           "(b) a  transfer approved  to the  satisfaction of      the prescribed  authority to  be in  good faith and for      adequate  consideration   and  under   an   irrevocable      instrument  not  being  a  benami  transaction  or  for      immediate or  deferred benefit  of the tenure-holder or      other members of his family.           Explanation  I-For   the  purposes  of  this  sub-      section, the expression transfer of land made after the      twenty fourth day of January, 1971, includes:-      (a)  a declaration  of a  person as  a  co-tenure  made           after the  twenty-fourth day of January, 1971 in a           suit or  proceeding irrespective  of whether  such           suit  or   proceeding  was   pending  on   or  was           instituted after the twenty fourth day of January,           1971;      (b)  any admission,  acknowledgement, relinquishment or           declaration in  favour of  a person  to  the  like           effect, made in any other deed or instrument or in           any other manner."           "Explanation II-The  burden of proving that a case      falls within  clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with      the party claiming its benefit."      The substantive  provision which  is contained  in sub- section (6)  clearly provides  that any  transfer after  the 24th of  January 1971 would have to be ignored and not taken into account  in determining the surplus area. Clause (b) of the proviso  to sub-section  (6) (hereinafter referred to as ’clause  (b)   of  the  proviso’)  however,  carves  out  an exception to  the general  rule contained in sub-section (6) and 245 Explanation II  places the  burden of proving the fact, that the case  falls within  the protection  of clause (b) of the proviso, on  the party  relying on the transfer and claiming its benefit. A careful analysis of clause (b) of the proviso would reveal that it requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a transfer can seek its protection:      (1)  that the transfer must be in good faith,      (2)  that it  must be proved to be in good faith to the           satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority,      (3)  that it  should be  for adequate consideration and           under an irrevocable instrument, and

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    (4)  that it  should not  be in  the nature of a benami           transaction for  immediate or  deferred benefit of           the tenure holder or other members of his family.      It is  manifest that  if these conditions are satisfied and proved  to the  satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority then the burden which lies on the claimant under Explanation II would  have been discharged and the transfer would not be ignored  but   would  fall  under  the  protective  umbrella contained in  clause (b)  of the  proviso. It may be noticed that the  legislature in  its wisdom has neither defined the word ’transfer’ in any of the definitions of the Act nor has clarified it.  The primary  object of  the Act is to prevent the tenure holders from evading the Law of Ceiling by making fictitious transfers  even by  registered  documents  either before or  after the  due date so as to evade the provisions of the Act and thus frustrate the very object and the social purpose  for  which  the  Act  had  been  passed.  In  these circumstances, therefore,  the word ’transfer’ has obviously been used  by the  legislature in  the general  sense of the term as  defined in  the Transfer  of Property Act, which is the  statute  that  governs  all  transfers  of  movable  or immovable properties.  In other  words, the  word ’transfer’ being a  term of  well-known legal  significance having well ascertained incidents,  the legislature  did  not  think  it necessary  to   define  the   term  ’transfer’   separately. Similarly,  the  word  ’consideration’  also  being  a  term commonly used  to denote  contracts, sales and transactions, has been  used in the same sense, that is to say, as defined by s. 2(d) of the Contract Act.      It is  well settled  that whenever the legislature uses certain   terms   or   expressions   of   well-known   legal significance or  connotation the  courts must interpret them as used or understood in the popular 246 sense. In  the case  of C.I.T.  Andhra Pradesh  v. M/s.  Taj Mahal  Hotel,  Secundrabad  this  Court  while  laying  down guidelines for  holding how a particular expression has been defined, observed as follows:-           "Now it  is well settled that where the definition      of a  word has  not been given, it must be construed in      its popular  sense if  it is  a word  of every day use.      Popular sense means "that sense which people conversant      with the  subject matter  with  which  the  statute  is      dealing, would attribute to it". Lord Atkinson in Keats v. Lewis observed as follows:           "In the  construction  of  a  statute  it  is,  of      course,  at  all  times  and  under  all  circumstances      permissible to  have regard  to  the  state  of  things      existing at the time the statute was passed, and to the      evils, which  as appears  from its  provisions, it  was      designed to  remedy. If  the words  are capable  of one      meaning alone  then it must be adopted, but if they are      susceptible of  wider import,  we have to pay regard to      what the statute or the particular piece of legislation      had in view."      These observations  are fully applicable to the present Act which  has for  its object remedying the evil of evading the ceiling  law by  the large landholders by executing sale deeds or  other instruments so as to escape the consequences of the law. In Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth &  Anr.  Chandrachud,  J.,  as  he  then  was,  observed  as follows:-           "The normal  rule of  interpretation is  that  the      words used  by the  legislature are  generally  a  safe      guide to  its intention.  Lord Reid in Westminster Bank

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    Ltd.  v.   Zang  [1966  A.C.  182]  observed  that  "no      principle of  interpretation of statutes is more firmly      settled than  the rule  that the  Court must deduce the      intention of  Parliament from  the words  used  in  the      Act." Applying  such a  rule, this Court observed in S.      Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam (AIR 247      1972 SC 2284 at 2290) that "where the statute’s meaning      is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated."           ...       ...       ...       ...           "But, if  the provision  is clear and explicit, it      cannot be  reduced to  a nullity  by reading  into it a      meaning which it does not carry."      Against this  background we  have now  to consider  the real  intention   of  the   words  "transfer   for  adequate consideration" as  used in  clause (b)  of the  proviso. The High Court  has held  that although  the deed  of gift  is a transfer but  as it is a transfer without any consideration, therefore such  a  transfer  does  not  fulfil  one  of  the essential  ingredients   mentioned  in  clause  (b)  of  the proviso, namely,  that it  should be  for consideration. The High Court  has further  held that its view is reinforced by the word ’adequate’ which qualifies the word ’consideration’ which completely  rules out  a transfer  in the  nature of a gift. The  High Court  was of  the view  that a  transfer of property by way of a gift being a purely gratuitous transfer made out  of love and affection or for the spiritual benefit of the  donor, falls  completely beyond  the ambit of clause (b) of  the proviso  and, therefore, has to be ignored under the provisions  of the  said sub-section  (6) of s. 5 of the Act.      Mr. Kacker,  appearing for  the appellant, assailed the view taken  by the  High Court  on the  ground that the High Court has  given a  very  restricted  meaning  to  the  term ’transfer for adequate consideration’ by limiting the import of the  word ’consideration’.  He argued  in the first place that a  gift  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  transfer  without consideration because  even love  and  affection,  spiritual benefit or  other factors  of  similar  nature  may  provide sufficient consideration  for the  gift.  Secondly,  it  was argued  that   even  if   a  gift  was  a  transfer  without consideration and  was intended to be excluded by clause (b) of the  proviso, then  there should  have  been  an  express indication of  the same  in the  provisions of clause (b) of the proviso  by expressly  excluding gifts. Another facet of this argument  advanced before  us by Mr. Kacker was that as gift has  not been  expressly excluded  by clause (b) of the proviso, we  should be persuaded to hold that the conditions regarding adequate  consideration would  not apply to a gift as a gift, was a transfer without consideration and if other conditions were  satisfied a gift would also fall within the purview of  clause (b)  of the  proviso. We  have given  our anxious consideration to the arguments put forward 248 by Mr.  Kacker and  although  the  arguments  are  extremely attractive yet  we find  ourselves unable  to agree with the same.      To begin  with, it  may be  necessary to  dwell on  the concept of  gift as contemplated by the Transfer of Property Act and  as defined in various legal dictionaries and books. To start  with,  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  (Fourth  Edition) defines gift thus:-           "A voluntary transfer of personal property without      consideration. A parting by owner with property without      pecuniary  consideration.  A  voluntary  conveyance  of

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    land, or  transfer of goods, from one person to another      made gratuitously,  and not  upon any  consideration of      blood or money." A similar  definition has  been given in Webster’s Third New International  Dictionary   (Unabridged)  where  the  author defines gift thus:           "Something that  is voluntarily transferred by one      person to  another without  compensation;  a  voluntary      transfer of  real  or  personal  property  without  any      consideration  or  without  a  valuable  consideration-      distinguished from sale."      (Emphasis ours) Volume 18  of Words  & Phrases  (Permanent Edition)  defines gift thus:           "A ’gift’  is a  voluntary  transfer  of  property      without compensation  or any  consideration.  A  ’gift’      means a  voluntary transfer of property from one person      to another without consideration or compensation."      (Emphasis ours) In Halsbury’s  Laws of  England  (Third  Edition-Volume  18) while detailing  the nature and kinds of gift, the following statement is made:           "A gift  inter vivos (a) may be defined shortly as      the transfer of any property from one person to another      gratuitously. Gifts  then, or  grants,  which  are  the      eighth method  of transferring  personal property,  are      thus to  be distinguished  from each  other, that gifts      are   always   gratuitous,   grants   are   upon   some      consideration or equivalent." 249      Thus,  according   to  Lord  Halsbury’s  statement  the essential distinction  between a  gift and  a grant  is that whereas a  gift is  absolutely gratuitous, grant is based on some consideration  or equivalent. Similarly in Volume 38 of Corpus Juris  Secundum, it  has been  clearly stated  that a gift  is  a  transfer  without  consideration  and  in  this connection while defining the nature and character of a gift the author states as follows:           "A  gift   is  commonly  defined  as  a  voluntary      transfer of  property by  one to  another, without  any      consideration or  compensation therefor.  Any piece  of      property which is voluntarily transferred by one person      to another  without compensation  or  consideration.  A      gift is  a gratuity,  and an act of generosity, and not      only does  not require a consideration but there can be      none; if  there is  a consideration for the transaction      it is not a gift."      It is, therefore, clear from the statement made in this book that  the concept  of gift  is diametrically opposed to the presence  of any  consideration or  compensation. A gift has aptly  been described  as  a  gratuity  and  an  act  of generosity and  stress has  been laid  on the  fact that  if there is any consideration then the transaction ceases to be a gift.  Before closing  this aspect  of the matter we might also refer  to the  definition  of  consideration  given  in various    books.    Black’s    Law    Dictionary    defines ’consideration’ thus:           "Consideration"  is  not  to  be  confounded  with      motive. Consideration means something which is of value      in the  eye of  the law,  moving  from  the  plaintiff,      either of  benefit to  the plaintiff or of detriment to      the defendant"." This is the view expressed in 2 Q.B. 851. Similarly, at p.61 in the  same volume, the words ’adequate consideration’ have been defined thus:-

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         "One which  is equal,  or reasonably proportioned,      to the  value of  that for  which it is given. Fair and      reasonable under circumstances."      (Emphasis ours)      Webster’s   Third    New    International    Dictionary (Unabridged) defines, consideration’ thus:           "Something  that   is  legally   regarded  as  the      equivalent or  return given  or suffered by one for the      act or promise of another." 250 And the  word ’adequate’ has been defined in the same volume at page 25 thus:           "Legally  sufficient:  such  as  is  lawfully  and      reasonably sufficient" Similarly, in words and Phrases (Permanent Edition-volume 2) the word ’adequate’ has been defined at p.545 thus:           ’Adequate’ means  fully equal  to requirements  or      occasions, commensurate,  but in  its primary  and more      popular  significance   nothing  can   be  said  to  be      ’adequate’ which  is not  equal to  what  is  required,      suitable to  the case  or occasion,  fully  sufficient,      proportionate, and satisfactory." And when  used to qualify consideration, it has been defined thus: in the same volume at p.545:           "Fair consideration  in money or money’s worth" is      consideration which  under all circumstances is honest,      reasonable, and  free from  suspicion, whether  or  not      strictly ’adequate’ or ’full’."      (Emphasis supplied) ’Adequate Consideration’ has been further defined as follows in the same volume at p.553:-           "Adequate consideration" generally is one which is      a   fair    equivalent    in    value    for    benefit      obtained................           ’Adequate consideration’  required in  action  for      specific performance  merely means  that contract price      must be substantially just and fair valuation under all      circumstances."      (Emphasis supplied)      In Volume  17 of  Corpus Juris  Secundum (p.420-421 and      425) the  import of  ’consideration’ has been described      thus:-           "Various definitions  of consideration  are to  be      found  in   the  textbooks  and  judicial  opinions.  A      sufficient one, as 251      stated in  Corpus Juris  and which  has been quoted and      cited  with  approval  is,  "a  benefit  to  the  party      promising, or  a loss or detriment to the party to whom      the promise is made...............           At  common  law  every  contract  not  under  seal      requires a  consideration to  support it,  that is,  as      shown in  the definition  above, some  benefit  to  the      promisor,     or      some     detriment     to     the      promisee.................           There is  a sufficient consideration for a promise      if  there  is  any  benefit  to  the  promisor  or  any      detriment to  the promisee..........It may be laid down      as a  general rule,  in accordance  with the definition      given above,  that there  is a sufficient consideration      for a  promise if  there is any benefit to the promisor      or any loss or detriment to the promisee."      The gist  of the  term ’consideration’  and  its  legal significance has  been clearly  summed up  in s. 2(d) of the Contract Act which defines ’consideration’ thus:

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         "When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee      or any  other person  has done or abstained from doing,      or does  or abstrains  from doing, or promises to do or      to  abstain   from  doing,   something,  such   act  or      abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the      promise."      From  a   conspectus,  therefore,  of  the  definitions contained in the dictionaries and the books regarding a gift or an  adequate consideration,  the  inescapable  conclusion that follows  is that  ’consideration’  means  a  reasonable equivalent or  other  valuable  benefit  passed  on  by  the promisor to  the  promisee  or  by  the  transferor  to  the transferee. Similarly,  when  the  word  ’consideration’  is qualified by  the word  ’adequate’, it  makes  consideration stronger so  as to  make it  sufficient and  valuable having regard to  the facts,  circumstances and  necessities of the case. It  has also  been seen  from the  discussions of  the various  authorities   mentioned  above   that  a   gift  is undoubtedly a transfer which does not contain any element of consideration in  any shape or form. In fact, where there is any equivalent  or benefit  measured in  terms of  money  in respect of  a gift  the transaction  ceases to be a gift and assumes a  different colour. It has been rightly pointed out in one of the books referred to above that we should not try to confuse  the motive  or the purpose of making a gift with the consideration  which is  the subject matter of the gift. Love, affection, spiritual benefit and many other 252 factors may  enter in  the intention  of the donor to make a gift but  these filial  considerations cannot  be called  or held to  be legal considerations as understood by law. It is manifest,  therefore,   that   the   passing   of   monetary consideration is completely foreign to the concept of a gift having regard to the nature, character and the circumstances under which  such a  transfer takes place. Furthermore, when the legislature  has used  the word  ’transfer’ it  at  once invokes the  provisions of  the Transfer  of  Property  Act. Under section  122 of  the Transfer of Property Act, gift is defined thus:           "’Gift’  is   the  transfer  of  certain  existing      movable or  immovable  property  made  voluntarily  and      without consideration, by one person, called the donor,      to another,  called the  donee, and  accepted by  or on      behalf of the donee.           Such acceptance  must be  made during the lifetime      of the donor and while he is still capable of giving.           If the  donee dies  before acceptance, the gift is      void."      Thus, s.  122 of  the Transfer  of Property Act clearly postulates   that   a   gift   must   have   two   essential characteristics-(1) that  it must  be made  voluntarily, and (2) that  it should  be without consideration. This is apart from the other ingredients like acceptance, etc. Against the background of  these facts  and the  undisputed position  of law, the  words, ’transfer  for adequate consideration’ used in clause (b) of the proviso clearly and expressly exclude a transaction which  is in  the nature  of a gift and which is without consideration.  Love and  affection,  etc.,  may  be motive for  making a  gift but is not a consideration in the legal sense  of the  term. As  regards the  argument of  Mr. Kacker that  if the  legislature intended  to exclude gifts, clause (b) of the proviso should have expressly said so; the answer  is  very  simple.  Every  legislature  has  its  own technical or  legal device  to express  its intendment. Some legislatures may  have chosen  to expressly  exclude gift as

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Mr. Kacker says but that is not the only method of conveying the legislative  intent.  There  may  be  other  methods  or devices by  which the  legislative intent  can be expressed, namely, by  using such  expressions which would expressly or by necessary  intendment exclude  a particular  transaction. This method seems to have been adopted by the legislature in enacting clause (b) of the proviso. In fact, the legislature has made  its intention  clear  that  gift  is  excluded  by qualifying  the   word  ’consideration’   by  the  adjective ’adequate’. Assuming that love and affec- 253 tion, spiritual  benefit or similar other factors may amount to a  consideration for  the gift,  the word  ’adequate’  is wholly inapplicable  to and inconsistent with the concept of a  gift  because  it  is  impossible  to  measure  love  and affection, the  sentiments or  feelings of  the donor by any standard  yardstick   or  barometer.   The  words  ’adequate consideration’ clearly  postulate that consideration must be capable of  being measured  in terms  of money  value having regard to  the market  price of the property, the value that it may fetch if sold, the value of similar lands situated in the vicinity,  so on  and so  forth. In  the  instant  case, therefore, in our opinion, the legislature by using the word ’adequate’  to   qualify  the   word   ’consideration’   has completely ruled  out and  excluded gift  from the  ambit of clause  (b)   of  the   proviso.  In   these  circumstances, therefore, the  argument of Mr. Kacker that by not expressly excluding gift,  clause (b)  of the  proviso  includes  gift cannot be accepted particularly in the face of the clear and unambiguous language  used by  clause (b)  of the proviso in describing the nature of the transaction as one for adequate consideration.      We now deal with the second limb of the argument of Mr. Kacker that as in the case of a gift there is no question of a consideration,  we should hold that the 3rd part of clause (b) of  the proviso  which contains  the words ’for adequate consideration’ is  inapplicable and  ignore the  same.  This argument is  diametrically opposed to the well-known rule of interpretation that courts in interpreting statutes must not interpolate  or   legislate.  It  is  well  settled  that  a legislature does  not waste words without any intention, and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import  and significance. In the instant case, the words ’adequate consideration’  have undoubtedly a well recognised concept and,  as  indicated  above,  the  intention  was  to exclude  any   transaction  which   is  not   for   adequate consideration. Not  to speak of a gift but even if a sale is found to  be bona  fide but the consideration is inadequate, for instance, where the property has been sold for a nominal price or  below the market value, the transaction would fall beyond the  protection given  by clause  (b) of the proviso. Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Kacker to a single Bench decision by  Banerji, J,  in Fateh  Singh v.  State of Uttar Pradesh &  Ors where  the learned  Judge had  taken the view that the definition of a transfer given in clause (b) of the proviso included  a gift  because a  gift also  could not be said to be a transfer without consideration even though 254 consideration may  not be  weighed in  terms of  money.  The learned Judge  in taking this view had obviously fallen into error of confusing what was the motive or the reason for the gift as  being a  legal consideration  of it. It has already been pointed  out that  in considering  the nature of a gift one should  not confuse  the motive,  which may  be love and affection, or spiritual benefit, with valuable consideration

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which has  to be either in the shape of a money compensation or equivalent of the same. It is true that in every gift the donor has  a particular  motive and objective or a reason to part with  his property  in favour  of the donee, the reason being, in  some cases,  love and affection where the gift is in favour  of a  relation or friend, or spiritual benefit in other cases but this will be the immediate motive for making the gift  and cannot  be regarded as a consideration for the gift because  the very  concept of gift is based on a purely gratuitous  consideration.   The  Division   Bench  of   the Allahabad High  Court in  the case  referred  to  above  has rightly overruled the view of Banerji, J,, on this count. In fact the matter has been considered by other High Courts who have consistently  taken the  view that a gift is a transfer without consideration,  love and  affection being  only  the motive for  making the  transfer. In Debi Saran Koiri & Anr. v. Nandalal  Chaubey and  Ors. while  elucidating the nature and character  of  a  gift  Sahay,  J.  made  the  following observations:           "Now,  S.  122,  T.P.  Act  defines  "gift"  as  a      transfer  of  certain  existing  movable  or  immovable      property made voluntarily and without consideration, by      one person,  called the  donor, to  another, called the      donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee."           "To my  mind consideration  in S.  122, T.P.  Act,      means valuable  consideration and  not consideration in      the shape of conferring spiritual benefit to the donor.      If valuable  consideration  be  not  the  consideration      referred to  in S.  122, I  fail to  understand how any      gift can  be made  without consideration  at all. There      must be  some sort  of consideration in every gift, for      instance,  a   consideration  of   an  expectation   of      spiritual or moral benefit or consideration of love and      affection. Such  considerations are  not considerations      contemplated  in   S.  122.   The  consideration  there      contemplated must  be valuable  consideration, that  is      consideration either of money  of money’s worth".      (Emphasis supplied) 255      In Kulasekaraperumal  v. Pathakutty  Thalevanar &  Ors. Jagadisan, J.  made the  classic observations  which may  be extracted thus:-           "A gift  is  essentially  a  gratuitous  transfer.      Complete absence of consideration marks the transfer as      a gift and differentiates it from a grant."      The learned Judge has rightly pointed out that complete absence  of   consideration  is   the  main  hallmark  which distinguishes a  gift from  a grant or for that matter other transactions  which   may  be   for  valuable   or  adequate consideration. We  find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by Jagdisan, J. in Kulasekaraperumal’s case (supra)  and Sahay,  J. in  Debi Saran’s  case  (supra) which correctly  represent the  character and  nature of the gift as  contemplated by  law. Banerji,  J. in Fateh Singh’s case (supra)  seems to  have relied heavily on Explanation I of sub-section  (6) of  s. (5)  of the Act which refers to a declaration of  a tenure  holder  made  in  a  suit  or  any admission, acknowledgement,  relinquishment, etc.,  made  in any other  deed or  instrument in  order  to  reinforce  his conclusion that  clause (b) of the proviso did not exclude a gift. With  due respect,  here the  learned Judge completely failed to  appreciate the scope of clause (b) of the proviso and Explanation  I. It  is well  settled that an Explanation merely widens the scope of the main section and is not meant to carve  out a  particular exception to the contents of the

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main section.  Thus,  even  if  the  words  ’relinquishment, admission or declaration’ are used in Explanation I. the use of such  words do  not  absolve  the  party  concerned  from proving the essential ingredients laid down in clause (b) of the proviso, namely, that the transfer should be executed in good  faith   and  should  be  for  adequate  consideration. Whatever be  the nature of the declaration, acknowledgement, relinquishment, adequacy  of consideration  has to be proved in any case. Thus, in our view, the Division Bench was fully justified in overruling the view of Banerji, J. in regard to the interpretation of the Explanation also.      Finally, we would like to mention that the matter is no longer res  integra but  is fully  covered in principle by a decision  of   this  Court  in  Tulsidas  Kilachand  v.  The Commissioner   of   Income-tax,   Bombay   City   1,   where Hidayatullah J, speaking for the Court observed as follows:-           "It  remains  to  consider  whether  there  was  a      adequate consideration  for the  transfer. Reliance has      been placed 256      only upon  love  and  affection.  The  words  "adequate      consideration" denote  consideration  other  than  mere      love and affection which, in the case of a wife, may be      presumed. When  the law  insists that  there should  be      "adequate consideration"  and not "good consideration",      it excludes  mere love  and affection. They may be good      consideration  to  support  a  contract,  but  adequate      consideration to  avoid tax is quite a different thing.      To insist  on the  other meaning  is really to say that      consideration must  only be  looked for,  when love and      affection cease to exist."                                          (Emphasis supplied)      It would thus, appear that this Court clearly held that the words  ’adequate consideration’  completely exclude  the concept of  love and  affection and this decision appears to be on  all  fours  with  the  facts  of  the  present  case. Realising this  predicament Mr.  Kacker submitted  that  the words ’adequate  consideration’ used  in the  Income Tax Act denote a different texture. Mr. Kacker argued that it is not permissible to  interpret or use an expression in one Act as having the  same meaning  in  another  Act  which  is  of  a different kind. Of course, there can be no dispute with this proposition but then the Act as also the Income Tax Act have both used  the words  ’adequate consideration’  which, as we have  already   held,  are   terms   of   well-known   legal significance having  a well  recognised  popular  sense  and hence they would convey the same meaning and import whenever used in  other statutes  unless a contrary intention appears from  the  language  employed  by  the  legislature  in  the statute. Moreover,  the object of the Income Tax Act as also the present  Act seems to be more or less identical. Whereas the object  of the  Income Tax  Act in  enacting s. 16(3)(b) which is  extracted below,  is to  circumvent and  prevent a growing tendency  on the  part of  the assessees to avoid or reduce tax liability by means of settlements:      "16(3)....      (a)      (b)  so much of the income of any person or association           of  persons  as  arises  from  assets  transferred           otherwise than  for adequate  consideration to the           person or  association by  such individual for the           benefit of his wife or a minor child or both." 257 In the  instant case  also the  avowed object of sub-section (6) of  section 5  of  the  Act  is  to  prevent  the  large

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landholders  from  evading  the  ceiling  law  by  executing transfers, instruments  or  gifts  so  as  to  reduce  their surplus area.  Where the  two statutes  have  a  common  and identical object  then the  legal terms  used in one statute must be  given the  same meaning  in the other. It cannot be said that  the words  ’adequate consideration’  appearing in sub-section (6)  of s. 5 of the Act do not take their colour from the  context but are in conformity with the main object of the  Act, to  prevent evasion of the ceiling law by large tenure holders in anticipation of the passing of the Ceiling Law. For  these reasons,  therefore,  the  argument  of  Mr. Kacker on  this score  must be rejected. We, therefore, hold that in  view of  the interpretation placed by this Court on the words  ’adequate consideration’  which fully  applies to the present  case and  to the same language employed in sub- section (6) of s. 5 of the Act, a gift is not only impliedly but expressly excluded by the Act.      In the  Division Bench  decision of  the Allahabad High Court referred  to above,  after a  consideration of a large number of authorities the following observations were made:           "The   Legislature   while   enacting   the   U.P.      Imposition of  Ceiling on  Land Holdings Act, was alive      to the  provisions of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act      dealing with  the transfer  of immovable  property. the      terms ’transfer’, sale, ’mortgage’ and ’lease’ have not      been defined  in the  Act. Therefore,  these terms must      have been  used only  in the  sense in  which they have      been  used   in  Transfer   of  Property  Act.  If  the      Legislature intended  to use those terms in a different      sense and  with a  different connotation, it would have      defined those  terms in  the Act. But that has not been      done....           The legislature,  however, thought  that there may      be genuine  and bona  fide transfers for consideration.      To protect  such tenure  holders and  other  transfers,      proviso (b)  to sub-section (6) of section 5 of the Act      was  enacted.   It   saved   transfers   for   adequate      consideration. Gift  is a gratuitous transfer and there      is no  consideration  which  obviously  means  valuable      consideration. If  transfer for  love and  affection is      taken to  be a  transfer  for  consideration  then  the      purpose of the Act would be 258      completely  defeated   as  the   tenure  holders  would      transfer their land by gift after 24th January 1971."      We fully  endorse the observations made by the Division Bench which  lay down  the correct law on the subject and we overrule the  decision of  Banerji, J. in Fateh Singh’s case (supra).      Lastly, it  was urged  by Mr.  Kacker that  this is  an extremely hard  case where  the grand-father  of  the  donee wanted to make a beneficial provision for his grand-daughter after having  lost his  two sons  in the prime of their life due to  air crash  accidents while serving in the Air Force. It is  true that  the District  Judge has  come to  a  clear finding that  the gift in question is bona fide and has been executed in  good faith  but as the gift does not fulfil the other ingredients of the section, namely, that it is not for adequate consideration,  we are afraid, however laudable the object of  the donor  may have  been, the  gift has  to fail because the  genuine attempt  of the  donor to  benefit  his granddaughter  seems   to  have   been   thwarted   by   the intervention of  sub-section (6) of s. 5 of the Act. This is undoubtedly a  serious hardship  but it cannot be helped. We must remember  that the  Act is  a valuable  piece of social

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legislation with  the avowed  object of  ensuring  equitable distribution of  the land  by taking  away land  from  large tenure holders  and distributing  the  same  among  landless tenants or  using the  same for public utility schemes which is in the larger interest of the community at large. The Act seems to  implement one of the most important constitutional directives contained  in Part  IV  of  the  Constitution  of India. If  in this  process a  few individuals suffer severe hardship that  cannot be  helped, for  individual  interests must yield  to the  larger interests of the community or the country as indeed every noble cause claims its martyr.      As this was the only point raised before us, we find no merit in the same.      For the  reasons given  above, we  hold that  the  High Court was  right in allowing the writ petition in respect of the gift  in question.  The appeal  fails and is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 259