http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

PETITIONER: KSHITISH CHANDRA PURKAIT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SANTOSH KUMAR PURKAIT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       07/05/1997

BENCH: A. S. ANAND, S. P. BHARUCHA, K. S. PARIPOORNAN

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: Present:                Hon’ble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand                Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.P. Bharucha                Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.S. Paripoornan P.K. Chatterjee,  Dr. Shankar  Ghosh,  Sr.  Advs.,  Abhijeet Chatterjee, Ranjan Mukherjee, Sukumar Ghose, Girish Chandra, Rathin  Das,   D.P.  Mukherjee,  Advs.  with  them  for  the appearing parties.                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: PARIPOORNAN, J.      The plaintiff  in title suit No. 89 of 1958, Munsif 1st Court, Diamond  Harbour, is the appellant. The defendants in the suit  are  the  respondents.  The  suit  was  filed  for declaration of  plaintiff’s title and recovery of possession of the suit land (1.80 acre of land of Mouja Durganagar P.S. Diamond Harbour).  Incidentally,  there  was  a  prayer  for declaration  that   the  entries  in  the  R.S.  record  are erroneous. The  Plaint-property originally belonged to Haran Chandra Halader  and Barada  Prasad Halder,  and by  various gifts or  other documents, Kshirodamani Dasi Became the full owner of the suit property. The plaintiff purchased the suit property from  Kshirodamani Dasi by registered Deed dated 12 Baisakh, 1365.  The plaintiff’s  vendor had  sole  occupancy right in  1.80  acres  of  land  in  Mauja  Durganagar.  She possessed such  land during  the material period through the 4th defendant  with whom  the land  was settled  annually on advance rent.  On 30th  June, 1954, the principle defendants (defendants Nos.  1 and 2) trespassed into the suit land and dispossessed   the    4th   defendant.   Subsequently,   the trespassers got their names recorded as Korfa tenants of the suit land  at different fictitious jamas under Kshirodamani, the plaintiff’s  vendor, in the R.S. record. The Plaintiff’s vendor Kshirodamani  never settled the suit land by granting Patta to  or accepting  any Kabuliyat from such trespassers. On  these  and  other  averments  the  suit  was  filed  for declaration of  plaintiff’s title  to the  suit property and for recovery of the same from the defendants. 2.   The main contesting defendants are defendant Nos. 1 and 2.  They  put  forward  the  plea  that  the  suit  was  not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

maintainable, that  they were  cultivating tenants  as thika tenants, under  the plaintiff’s vender on payment of advance rent and  the land  was settled  with them  on  a  permanent basis. The  third defendant is the State of West Bengal. The State pleaded  that the  suit was  not maintainable and they have been  unnecessarily impleaded.  The trial court decreed the suit.  It was  found that the plaintiff has title to the suit land  and the  defendants have  no tenancy right in the property.  The   plaintiff  was  held  entitled  to  recover possession with  mesne profits.  The  suit  was  decreed  on 28.2.1961. In  the appeal  filed by defendant No. 1 in Title Appeal No.  362 of  1961 before  the Sub-ordinate Judge, 8th Court, Alipore,  the judgment  and decree  of the Munsif was set aside  and the  suit was  dismissed. The plaintiff filed S.A. 993/62 and assailed the judgment and decree of the Sub- ordinate Judge  rendered in  Title  Appeal  No.  362/61.  By judgment and  decree dated 26.2.1976, the appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the lower appellate court for a fresh disposal, in accordance with law. After remit, Title Appeal No. 362/61 was disposed of by Sub-Ordinate Judge, 8th Court, Alipore  on 12.2.1977  . The  appeal  was  dismissed, affirming the  judgment and  decree of the trial court dated 28.2.1961 except regarding the grant of declaration that the R.S. record  of raiyat is incorrect. The defendants assailed the concurrent  judgments and decrees of the courts below by filing Second  Appeal No.  871/81 before  the High  Court of Calcutta.  The   plaintiff  filed   a  memoranda  of  cross- objections in the said Second Appeal against the deletion of the declaration that the R.S. record regarding the suit land is incorrect.  The Second  Appeal and the Memoranda of Cross objection were  disposed of by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High  Court by  his judgment  dated 30.11.1982. The High Court allowed the Second Appeal filed by the contesting defendants and held that the suit for recovery of possession of  the   disputed  land,   i.e,  the   suit  land,  is  not maintainable  and   the  suit  obtained  and  the  suit  was dismissed. It  is thereafter,  the  plaintiff  in  the  suit obtained special  leave in  S.L.P.(Civil)  No.  10083/83  by order  passed   by  this   Court  dated  4.11.1986  and  the consequent Civil Appeal is before us. 3.   We heard  counsel. It  is evident  from the judgment of the High  Court impugned  herein, that  the High  Court  set aside the  concurrent judgments  and decrees  of  the  lower courts on  the  basis  of  a  new  plea  raised  before  it. Appellant’s counsel  submitted that  the  High  Court  acted illegally  and   committed  an   error  of  jurisdiction  in entertaining a  new plea in Second Appeal, without complying with the  provisions  of  Section  100  C.P.C.  as  amended. Counsel for  the respondents  submitted that  the  new  plea raised before  the High  Court was a question of law and the Court acted within its jurisdiction in entertaining the said question of  law and  in disposing  of the  Second Appeal on that basis. 4.   In order  to appreciate the rival pleas urged before us regarding the  legality and propriety of the disposal of the Second appeal by the High Court, few broad facts of the case should be  borne in  mind. As  stated, the  suit was one for declaration of  title and  for recovery of possession of the suit property.  The plaintiff in the suit possessed the land through the  4th defendant  with whom  the land  was settled annually. The  contesting (principle)  defendants trespassed into the  suit land  and dispossessed  the 4th  defendant on 30.6.1954. The  West Bengal  Estates Acquisition  Act. 1953, hereinafter referred  to as  ‘the Act’  came into  force  on 10.4.1956. The  trial court  decreed the  plaintiff suit. It

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

was also found that the defendants failed to establish their case, that they took settlement of the land in the suit from the plaintiff’s vendor, Kshirodamani. Kshirodamani was found to be  in possession  of the suit land. The decree so passed by the  trial court  was affirmed  in appeal  by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge  who also held that the defendants failed to prove  their tenancy  raiyats in  the suit  land and  the first  defendant  never  possessed  the  suit  land  in  the previous years,  as alleged.  The Courts  concurrently found that the  suit is  not maintainable  and  the  State  is  an unnecessary party  to the  suit. But,  in Second  Appeal the contesting defendants  raised a  new plea.  It  was  to  the effect that  the Act  came into  force on 10.4.1956. on that day, the  right and interest of the plaintiff which was only as and occupancy raiyat, vested in the State. On the date of vesting neither the plaintiff’s vendor nor the plaintiff was in possession  of  the  suit  land.  Since  the  plaintiff’s vendor, as occupancy raiyat, was a deemed intermediary under Section 52  of the  Act and  she was not n possession of the suit land.  Since the  plaintiff’s vendor  nor the plaintiff was in  possession of  the suit  land. Since the plaintiff’s vendor, as occupancy raiyat, was a deemed intermediary under Section 52  of the  Act and she was not in possession of the suit land  on the  date of  vesting,  i.e.,  10.4.1956,  her interest in  the suit  property vested  in the State of West Bengal. So, neither the plaintiff’s vendor nor the plaintiff was entitle  to retain the property under Section 6(1)(d) of the Act  and, therefore, the suit for recovery of possession of such land is not maintainable. Admittedly, this was a new plea which  was never  raised by the defendants at any stage of the  suit. It should be remembered that the State of West Bengal, the  3rd defendant  in the  suit, never urged a plea that  the   interest  of   Kshirodamani  in  the  suit  land (plaintiff’s vendor)  vested in  the State  Government under the provisions of the Act. 5.   Before the High Court the only point urged on behalf of the defendant (appellant) was, since the plaintiff’s vender, an occupancy raiyat and deemed intermediary under section 52 of the  Act, was  not in  possession of the suit land on the date of vesting, her interest in the suit land vested in the State and  the plaintiff  was not  entitled to  maintain the suit. it  appears that  the  plaintiff,  respondent  in  the Second appeal, submitted before the Court that this new plea raised on  behalf of the defendants, was never raised in the pleadings or  at any  prior stage of the proceedings and the Second Appeal  was the  5th hearing  of the  suit and such a plea raised only at the time of hearing, cannot be permitted to be  raised. The  learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court adverted to the above aspect and has opined thus:-           "......... the  plea  of  non-      maintainability  of   the  suit  is      essentially a legal plea and if the      suit on  the  face  of  it  is  not      maintainable,  the   fact  that  no      specific  plea   was  taken  or  no      precise issues  were framed  is  of      little consequence.  In the present      case the  suit on  the face  of  it      appears to  be not  maintainable in      law and therefore, the point raised      on   behalf   of   the   appellants      although it was not agitated in any      of the two court below should in my      view, be  entertained. I  am unable      to accept  the submissions  made on

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

    behalf of  the respondent  that the      said  point   of  law   cannot   be      canvassed for the first time before      this Court by the appellants."              (emphasis supplied)      Holding that  on the  date of  vesting the  plaintiff’s vendor was  not in  possession of  the  suit  land  and  the defendants trespassed  in the suit land and dispossessed the fourth defendant  much earlier  on 30th  June, 1954  and so, Section 6(1)(d)  of the  Act does  not  apply,  the  learned single Judge  held that  the present  suit for  recovery  of possession  of   the  suit  land  is  not  maintainable  and dismissed the  suit. it is not discernible from the records, whether  the  High  Court,  at  any  stage,  formulated  any "substantial question  of law"  involved in  the appeal; nor does it appear that the opposite side had any notice thereof or otherwise aware of it. 6.   We are  of that  view that  the learned  Judge  of  the Calcutta  High   Court  totally   overlooked  the  mandatory provisions of  Section 100  C.P.C as  amended by  Act 104 of 1976.      Prior to the amendment a second appeal could lie to the High Court  on the  grounds set out in Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 100(1), namely:      (a)  the decision being contrary to           law or  to some  usage  having           the force of law;      (b)  the decision  having failed to           determine some  material issue           of law  or  usage  having  the           force of law;      (c)  a substantial  error or defect           in the  procedure provided  by           this Code  or by any other law           for the  time being  in force,           which   may    possibly   have           produced error  or  defect  in           the decision  of the case upon           the merits.      However, by the amendment Act of 1976, vital change was introduced by  the legislature  in Section  100  C.P.C.  The amended Section (100 C.P.C.) reads thus;           "100  (1)  Save  as  otherwise      expressly provided  in the  body of      this Code  or by  any other law for      the time  being in force, an appeal      shall lie  to the  High Court  from      every decree  passed in  appeal  by      any Court  from every decree passed      in appeal  by any Court subordinate      to the  High  Court,  if  the  High      court is  satisfied that  the  case      involves a  substantial question of      law.      (2)  An appeal  may lie  under this      section from  and appellate  decree      passed ex parte.      (3)  In  an   appeal   under   this      section, the  memorandum of  appeal      shall    precisely     state    the      substantial   question    of    law      involved in the appeal.      (4)  Where  the   High   Court   is      satisfied   that    a   substantial      question of  law is involved in any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

    case,  it   shall  formulate   that      question.      (5)  The appeal  shall be  heard on      the question  so formulated and the      respondent shall, at the hearing of      the   appeal, be  allowed to  argue      that the case does not involve such      question :           Provided that  nothing in this      sub-section shall be deemed to take      away or  abridge the  power of  the      Court to  hear, for  reasons to  be      recorded, the  appeal on  any other      substantial question  of  law,  not      formulated  by   it,   if   it   is      satisfied that  the  case  involves      such questions."              (emphasis supplied)      The Amendment  Act of  1976 has  drastically restricted the scope  of second  appeals and  the jurisdiction  of  the Court  to   entertain  second   appeals  is   hedged  in  by limitations. 7.   Delivering the  judgment  of  a  two  member  Bench  in Panchugopal Barua  & ors.  Vs. Umesh  Chandra Goswami & Ors. (Civil Appeal  No. 3631/930 one of us (Dr. Anand, J.) in his judgment dated  12.2.1997 has lucidly explained the scope of Section 100 C.P.C. as amended, thus:-      "A bare  look at Section 100 C.P.C.      shows that  the jurisdiction of the      High Court  to entertain  a  second      appeal after  the 1976 amendment is      confined is  confined only  to such      appeals as  involve  a  substantial      question of  law, specifically  set      out in the memorandum of appeal and      formulated by  the High  Court.  Of      course, the  proviso to the Section      shows that  nothing shall be deemed      to take  away or  abridge the power      of the  Court to  hear, for reasons      to be  recorded, the  appeal on any      other substantial  question of law,      not formulated  by it, if the Court      is satisfied that the case involves      such  a   question.   The   proviso      presupposes that  the  court  shall      indicate   in    its   order    the      substantial question  of law  which      it proposes  to decide even if such      substantial question of law was not      earlier  formulated   by  it.   The      existence   of    a    "substantial      question of law" is thus, the sine-      qua-non for  the  exercise  of  the      jurisdiction  under   the   amended      provisions of Section 100 C.P.C.           Generally     speaking,     an      appellant is  not to  be allowed to      set up  a new case in second appeal      or raise  a  new  issue  (otherwise      than  a  jurisdictional  one),  not      supported  by   the  pleadings   or      evidence on  the record  and unless      the appeal  involves a  substantial      question of  law, a  second  appeal

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

    shall not  lie to  the  High  Court      under the  amended  provisions.  In      the present  case, no such question      of  law   was  formulated   in  the      memorandum of  appeal in  the  High      Court and  grounds (6)  and (7)  in      the memorandum of the second appeal      only which  reliance is  placed did      not   formulate   any   substantial      question of law. The learned single      Judge of the High Court also, as it      transpires from  a perusal  of  the      judgment  under   appeal,  did  not      formulate any  substantial question      of law in the appeal and dealt with      the  second   appeal,  not  on  any      substantial question  of  law,  but      treating it  as if  it was  a first      appeal, as  of right,  against  the      judgment   and    decree   of   the      subordinate Court.  The  intendment      of  the   legislature  in  amending      Section  100   C.P.C.  was,   thus,      respected in  its breach.  Both the      trial court and the lower appellate      court had decided the cases only on      questions of  fact, on the basis of      the pleading  and the  evidence led      by the  parties  before  the  Trial      Court. No  pure question of law nor      even a  mixed question  of law  and      fact was  urged  before  the  Trial      Court or  the First Appellate Court      by the  respondent. The  High Court      was, therefore,  not  justified  in      entertaining the  second appeal  on      an altogether  new  point,  neither      pleaded  nor   canvassed   in   the      subordinate courts  and that too by      overlooking  the   changes  brought      about in  Section 100 C.P.C. by the      Amendment Act  of 1976 without even      indicating     that     substantial      question of  law was required to be      resolved in  they second appeal. To      say the  least, the approach of the      High Court  was not  proper. It  is      the obligation of the courts of law      to further  the  clear  intendments      legislature and  not for  frustrate      it  by   ignoring   the   same.   "              (emphasis supplied)      The  above   statement  of   law  has   our  respectful concurrence.      We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast upon the High Court  to formulate  the substantial  question  of  law involved in the case even at the initial stage; and (b) that in   (exceptional) cases, at a later point of time, when the Court exercised  its jurisdiction  under the proviso to sub- section  (5)   of  Section  100  C.P.C  in  formulating  the substantial question  of law,  the opposite  party should be put on  notice thereon  and should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to hear the appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the  appeal is illegal and is an abnegation of abdication

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

of the  duty cast on Court and even after the formulation of the substantial  question  of  law,  if  a  fair  or  proper opportunity is  not afforded  to the  opposite side, it will amount to  denial of  natural justice.  The above parameters within which  the High  Court has  exercise its jurisdiction under Section  100 C.P.C  should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to state that the above aspect are seldom borne in mind in  may case  and second appeals are entertained and/or disposed of without conforming to the above discipline.      The  guidelines   to  determine   as  to   what  is   a "substantial question  of law" within the meaning of Section 100  C.P.C.,  have  been  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  a Constitution Bench  decision in  Sir Chunilal  V. Mehta  and sons Ltd.  Vs. Century  Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., [AIR 1962  SC   1314 =  (1962) Supp.  (3) SCR 549]. There is also a later decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd Vs.  The Union  of India and another. (AIR 1979 SC 798). It is  unnecessary to  deal at  length with  that aspect any further. 8.   In the light of the legal position  stated above we are of the  view that  the High  Court acted  illegally  and  in excess of  jurisdiction in  entertaining the new plea, as it did, and  consequently in  allowing the  Second Appeal. Even according to the High Court the point urged on behalf of the appellant was  only a  "legal plea" thought no specific plea was taken  or no  precise issue  were framed in that behalf. The High  Court failed  to bear in mind that it is not every question of  law that  could be  permitted to  be raised  in second appeal.  The parameters within which a new legal plea could be  permitted to  be raised are specifically stated in sub-section (5)  of Section 100 C.P.C Under the proviso, the Court  should  be  "satisfied"  that  the  case  involves  a "substantial   question of  law" and  not mere  "question of law". The  reason for  permitted the substantial question of law to  be raised,  should be "recorded" by the Court. It is implicit therefrom,  that on  compliance of  the above,  the opposite  party  should  be  afforded  a  fair  or  properly opportunity to  meet the same. It is not any legal plea that could be  raised at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial  question of  law. The  reasons for permitting the plea  to be  raised should also be recorded. Thereafter, the  opposite  party  should  be  given  a  fair  or  proper opportunity to  meet the  same. In  the present case, as the extracts from  the judgment  quoted hereinabove  would show, the High  Court has totally ignored the mandatory provisions of Section  100 C.P.C. The High Court proceeded to entertain the new  plea and rendered it decision without following the mandatory provision  of Section  100 C.P.C.  On  this  short ground we  are of  the view  that judgment and decree of the High Court  dated 30th  November, 1982  are illegal  and  in excess of  jurisdiction and  so unsustainable and deserve to be set  aside. We  hereby do  so. The appeal is allowed with cost, including  advocates fee  which  we  estimate  at  Rs. 10,000/-.