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PETITIONER: KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI KANPUR, ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GANGA DAL MILL AND CO. AND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/09/1984

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) KHALID, V. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR 1870            1985 SCR  (1) 787  1984 SCC  (4) 516        1984 SCALE  (2)518

ACT:      U.P. Krishi  Utpadan Mandi  Adhiniyam 1964, Secs. 2 (a) and 2  (t) & State Government Notification dated January 20, 1982.      Legume’  notified-’Specified  agricultural  Produce-Dwi Daliya Utpadan-Whether  comprehends both  the whole grain of legumes and its split part that is dal.      Words and  Phrases ’Legume’-’Dwi  Daliya Utpadan’-’Such items of  produce of  agriculture as  are specified  in  the Schedule’- Meaning  of Secs.  2 (a)  and 2  (t) U.P.  Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964.      Practice and  Procedure:  Disputed  question  of  fact- Decision by Supreme Court-When permissible.

HEADNOTE:      The Appellant-Market Committee levied market fee on the transaction of  sale  of  dal  of  various  legumes  by  the respondents,  on   the  ground  that  they  were  ’specified agricultural  produce’  and  the  transactions  of  sale  in respect of  them by the respondents in the Market Area would be exigible to the levy of market fee.      The respondents  opposed the  aforesaid levy contending that they  were manufacturing  in  their  factory  dal  from various legumes  and  therefore,  not  only  they  were  not producers of  agricultural commodities,  but in  view of the description of  legumes set  out in the Schedule of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964, the dal of such legumes in the  Processed form  was  not  a  specified  agricultural produce and  therefore, a  transaction of sale in respect of them at  the hands of the respondents even if it takes place in the  Market Area would not permit the Market Committee to levy market  fee on  such transaction and that they were not liable to buy the same. It was further contended that unless the agricultural  produce specified  in the  Schedule to the Act was  notified as  a specified  agricultural  produce  in respect of  a particular  Market Area,  the Market Committee having jurisdiction in the Market Area would not be entitled to levy  market fee  on the  transaction  of  sale  of  such agricultural produce.      The respondents  approached the  High Court  by  filing writ petitions  under Art.  226 contending  that the  Market

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Committee continue to levy fee on the transaction of dal and that it had no authority to do so. 788 The High  Court held  that lengume in its split form was not the same  thing as  legume specified  in  the  Schedule  and therefore, in  the absence of a specification, dal of any of the legumes  enumerated in the Schedule cannot be said to be specified   agricultural    produce   and   therefore,   any transaction of  sale in  respect of them was not exigible to the levy of market fee.      During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions the State Government  issued in  exercise of the power conferred by Sec.  4A of  the Act,  a notification dated 20th January, 1982 which  substituted the  split form  of legume  for  the legume whole grain as specified agricultural produce.      After the  issuance of  the aforesaid  notification,  a fresh batch  of writ  petitions were  filed challenging both the validity  of the notification as also the eligibility of the Market  Committee to  levy market fee on the transaction of sale  in respect  of dal  of legumes. It was contended in the writ  petitions that  merely amending  or adding  to the list of  agricultural produce  set out  in the  Schedule  by itself without  any thing  more would  not enable the Market Committee  to   levy  market   fee  on   the  sale  of  such agricultural produce  because before  levying market fee the agricultural  produce   has  to  be  notified  as  specified agricultural produce  by issuing either a notification under Sec. 6  or addition  or alteration  in exercise of the power under Sec. 8 of the Act. It was further contended that after the amendment  of the Schedule by the impugned notification, fresh notification  either under  Sec 6 or Sec. 8 having not been issued,  the agricultural  produce  introduced  in  the Schedule namely,  dal of  various legumes  have  not  become specified agricultural  produce and  therefore any  sale  in respect of such agricultural produce even in the Market Area will not  enable the market Committee to levy market fee nor would it  oblige persons  or parties  to the  transaction of sale to pay the same.      The aforesaid  contentions found  favour with  the High Court which  allowed the  writ  petitions  and  quashed  the notice issued by the Market Committee raising the demand for market fee.  It further  held  that  till  the  agricultural produce under  the heading  ’II  Legumes’  set  out  in  the Schedule  since  the  amendment  of  January  20,  1982  are notified  as  specified  agricultural  produce,  the  Market Committee was not entitled to levy and collect market fee on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce.      In the appeals to this Court, on the question : whether legume,  whole   grain  were   notified   as   a   specified agricultural produce within the meaning of the expression in Sec. 2  (t) of  the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964 would also comprehend its split folds or parts, commercially called dal  so as  to enable the Mandi Samiti to levy market fee under  Sec. 17  of the Act on the transaction of sale of dal of legumes specified in the Schedule to the Act.      Allowing the Appeals: ^      HELD :  1. The  High Court was in error in holding that the legume  whole grain  as set out in the Schedule does not include its split form i.e. dal and therefore, no market fee was leviable  on the  transaction of sale of legume in split form. [805D] 789      Rumesh Chandra etc. v. State of U.P. etc., [1980] 3 SCR 109, Kawai  Krishna Puri  & Anr.  v. State of Punjab & Ors.,

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[1979]  3  SCR  1217  and  State  of  Gujarat  v.  Sakarwala Brothers, [1967] 19 STC 24, referred to.      M/s Ganesh  Trading Co.  Karnal etc.  etc. v.  State of Haryana &  Anr. etc.,  A.I.R. 1974  S.C. 1362  and Babu  Ram Jagdish Kumar & Co. etc. etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors. etc. etc., [1967] 3 SCR 952, in applicable.      Modi Spinning  and Weaving  Mills Co. Ltd., Modinagar & Ors. etc.  v. State  of U.P.  & Anr., [1980] All. L.J. 1137, reversed.      2. The  entries under  the  heading  ’legumes’  in  the Schedule of  Sec. 2  (a) of  the U.P.  Krishi Utpadan  Mandi Adhiniyam 1964 as it stood prior to the amendment of January 20, 1982  through the  notification  issued  under  Sec  4-A comprehend both  the whole  grain of  legumes and  its split part that  is dal.  What was implicit has been made explicit and  therefore  no  fresh  notification  under  Sec.  8  was necessary. [798 D-E]      3. It  is an  indisputable canon  of construction  that where an  expression is defined in the statute, unless there is  anything  repugnant  in  the  subject  or  context,  the expression has  to be  construed as  having the same meaning assigned to  it in  the dictionary  clause of  the  statute. [798G]      4.  The  definition  of  the  expression  ’agricultural produce’ as  set out  in Sec.  2 (a)  of the  Act cannot  be construed by  resort to  decisions under  entirely different statutes such  as the Sales Tax Laws to find out whether the whole grain  and split  folds constitute the same product or two  different  and  independent  products  commercially  so recognised. Analysing  the definition  of the  expression it would mean not only those items of produce of agriculture as specified  in   the  Schedule  but  will  also  include  the admixture of two or more of such items as also any such item in its processed form. [798 F; H]      5. ’Agricultural produce’ mean a produce of agriculture such as  Gram as  specified in  the Schedule  and would also include Gram in its processed form. Therefore, not only Gram is an agricultural produce but Gram in its processed form is equally and agricultural produce. [799B]      6. When  it is  said in  the definition  ’such items of produce of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule’, it means that  not only all those items of agricultural produce which  are   set  out   in  the   Schedule  will  constitute agricultural produce  but also  the admixture of two or more of such  items of  produce of  agriculture as set out in the Schedule as well as any such items of agriculture produce in their processed form. [799B-C]      7. Legislative enactments in the State of Uttar Pradesh are enacted  in the  Hindi language  and  its  official  and authentic translation in English is primarily simultaneously published. The  notification dated  April 11, 1978 specified the legumes  therein enumerated  as  specified  agricultural produce for various 790 Market Areas.  The heading  under which  various legumes are enumerated is  ’Dwi Daliya Utpadan.’ This tongue-twister was explained to  mean that  legume itself is Dwi Daliya Utpadan i.e. the  whole grain  is made of two folds. Ek daliya grain is without  a fold.  Dwi Daliya  is a  grain composed of two folds  and   certainly  not   many  folds.   On   a   strict construction, the  two dals i.e. two parts forming the whole grain both  are comprehended  in the  expression ’Dwi Daliya Utpadan’. [799G-H; 800A]      8.  While  enumerating  legumes  in  the  Schedule  and reproduced in  the 1978  notification to make them specified

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agricultural produce,  the farmers  intended to include both the grain  as a  whole and its split parts the dal. And when the agricultural  produce enumerated in the Schedule such as Gram including  its processed  part  is  reproduced  in  the notification as  Dwi Daliya  Utpadan, the dal of each of the legumes  therein  mentioned  became  specified  agricultural produce. [800D-E]      In the  instant  case,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the respondents-factory owners  not being agricultural producers and not  being in  search of  any protection  of the  Market Committee could  not be subjected to the levy of market fee. In fact, the primary object of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam 1964 as far as the State of U.P. was concerned was regulation of  sale and  purchase  of  agricultural  produce irrespective  of   the  character   of  the   party  to  the transaction save  and except  that as set out in sub-clauses (1) to  (4) of  Sec. 17  (iii) (b).  It is  not  a  relevant consideration whether the factory owners need any protection but the  real question  is whether  people dealing with them need protection. [802F-H]      9. Redress  of a  grievance depending  upon deciding  a disputed question  of fact  cannot be rendered in this Court when there  is want of a pleading in this behalf and want of a decision by the High Court on the point.      Ramesh Chandra etc. v. State of U.P. etc., [1980] 3 SCR 104, referred to.      Writ Petitions remitted to the High Court for examining contentions other  than those  dealt  with  by  this  Court. [807E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 10072- 73 of 1983, 2283/84, 10074-76/83, 2281-82 of 1984, 2284-87 & 2525-27 of 1984      Appeals by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated the  28th January,  9th September, 20th December, 19th Dec. 1983 & 23rd February, 28th March, 1984 of the Allahabad High Court  in C.M.W. Nos. 4275, 4523, 10343, 10228 of 1981, 6758/83, 2066/81,  12388, 12785,  12400, 12874,  1470, 6681, 1490 of 1983, 68 & 1475 of 1984. 791      A. K.  Sen, R.P.  Bhatt, E.  C. Agarwala & V.K. Pandita for the Appellants.      Dr. Y.S.  Chitale, Y.K.  Jain and P.R. Agarwala for the Respondents in C.A. Nos. 10072-73/84.      F.S. Nariman  and D.K.  Garg for  Respondents  in  CAs. 2286, 3919 & 5342/84.      Shanti Bhushan  and Pankaj  Kalra for Respondent in CA. 2283/84.      S.N. Kacker,  R.K.  Jain,  Suman  Kapur,  Ms.  Sangeeta Agarwal and P.K. Jain, for Respondents in CA. 10076/84.      N.C. Talukdar  and Ms.  Maya Rao for RR. in CA. 2581 of 1984.      Sudama Jha and Ms. Maya Rao for RR. in CA. 2525/84.      H.K. Puri for Respondent in CAs. 10074-75/83.      Mrs. Sobha Dikshit for the State of U.P.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI, J.  Whether the  whole includes the parts is the core question. Whether legume, whole grain, when notified as a ’specified agricultural produce’ within the meaning of the expression in  Sec. 2(t)  of the  U.P. Krishi  Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964  (’Act’ for short) would also comprehend its split folds  or parts,  commercially called  dal  so  as  to

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enable Mandi  Samiti (Market  Committee for  convenience  of reference) to  levy market  fee under  Sec. 17 of the Act on the transaction  of sale  of dal of legumes specified in the schedule to the Act, is the narrow question that falls to be determined in this group of appeals.      Appellant Market  Committee levied  market fee  on  the transaction of  sale  of  dal  of  various  legumes  by  the respondents, asserting that they were specified agricultural produce and  the transactions  of sale in respect of them by the respondents in the Market Area 792 would be exigible to the levy of market fee. The respondents contended that  they were manufacturing in their factory dal from various  legumes and  therefore, not only they were not producers of  agricultural commodity  but  in  view  of  the description of  legumes set  out in the Schedule, the dal of such legumes  in the  processed  form  is  not  a  specified agricultural produce and therefore, a transaction of sale in respect of  them at  the hands of the respondents even if it takes  place  in  the  Market  Area  would  not  permit  the appellant to  levy market  fee on  such transaction and they were not  liable to  pay the  same. The  respondents contend that  unless  the  agricultural  produce  specified  in  the Schedule to  the Act is notified as a specified agricultural produce in  respect of  a particular Market Area, the Market Committee having jurisdiction in the Market Area will not be entitled to  levy market  fee on  the transaction of sale of such agricultural  produce. In  short they  say that even if legumes set  out in  the Schedule are specified agricultural produce, the  dal processed  therefrom in  the factory could not become  specified agricultural  produce unless  it is so specified  and   therefore,  the  Market  Committee  had  no authority to  levy market  fee on the transaction of sale of dal. The  respondents approached the High Court of Allahabad by filing  writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution raising myriad  contentions including  the one as herein set out.      The High  Court by  its judgment dated January 28, 1983 held that legume in its split form was not the same thing as legume specified  in the  Schedule  and  therefore,  in  the absence of  a specification,  dal  of  any  of  the  legumes enumerated in  the Schedule  cannot be  said to be specified agricultural produce  and therefore, any transaction of sale in respect  of them  was not  exigible to the levy of market fee. In  reaching this  conclusion, the High Court took note of the  fact that  apart from  anything else  the subsequent conduct of  the Government  of U.P.  in issuing Notification No.   383/12-5-600   (401)/81   dated   January   20,   1982 substituting the  entry under  the heading  ’II  Legumes’  a description in  the bracket  against the name of each legume (Saboot Aur  Dala Hua) dispelled doubt, if any, lingering on the subject.      During the  pendency of  the writ petitions in the High Court, it  appears that  the Govt.  of U.P.  probably out of panic or  as contended  before us  out of  abundant  caution issued in  exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 4A of the Act the Notification No. 383/12- 793      5-600(401)/81 dated  January 20,  1982 which  reads  as under:      "In exercise  of the  powers conferred  upon him  under      Section 4A  of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam,      1964 (U.P.  Act No.  25 of 1964) the Governor is hereby      pleased to  notify that  with effect  from the  date of      publication in  gazette of  this Notification, in place

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    of items  mentioned under  column (1) under the Heading      (legume) in  the Schedule of Section 2(a) the following      items shall be substituted, namely-      Legumes             Amended Krishi Utpadan Legume  1. Chana                1. Chana (Saboot Aur Dala Hua)  2. Matar                2. Matar (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)  3. Arhar                3. Arhar (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)  4. Urad                 4. Urad  (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)  5. Moong                5. Moong (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)  6. Masoor               6. Masoor (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)  7. Lobhia (seeds)       7. Lobhia (Saboot Aur Dali Hui)  8. Soyabeen             8. Soyabeen  9. Khosari              9. Khosari (Saboot Aur Dali Hui) 10. Sanai (seeds)       10. Sanai (seeds) 11. Dhencha (seeds)     11. Dhencha (seeds) 12. Gwar                12. Gwar 13. Moth                13. Moth (Saboot Aur Dali Hui) 14. Kulthi              14. Kulthi."      After taking  note of this notification, the High Court observed that  by the  amendment of the relevant part of the Schedule to  the Act,  the Government  recognised and almost admitted that  legumes whole and legumes split two different commodities and  as now by the notification both have become specified agricultural  produce,  earlier  only  the  legume whole grain  and not  in the  split form  was the  specified agricultural produce  and therefore,  till the  issue of the notification the  Market Committee  was not entitled to levy market fee  on the  transaction of  sale of  dal of  various legumes.      After the  notification  dated  January  20,  1982  was issued,  a   fresh  batch   of  writ  petitions  were  filed challenging both  the validity  of the  notification as also the eligibility of the Market Committee to levy 794 market fee  on the  transaction of sale in respect of dal of legumes. It  was contended that merely amending or adding to the list  of agricultural produce set out in the Schedule by itself without  anything more  would not  enable the  Market Committee  to   levy  market   fee  on   the  sale  of  such agricultural produce  because before  levying market fee the agricultural  produce   has  to  be  notified  as  specified agricultural produce  by issuing either a notification under Sec. 6  or addition or alteration in exercise of power under Sec. 8 of the Act. It was contended that after the amendment of  the   Schedule  by   the  impugned   notification  fresh notification either  under Sec.  6 or Sec. 8 having not been issued the  agricultural produce introduced in the Schedule, namely, dal  of various  legumes have  not become  specified agricultural produce since the amendment of the Schedule and therefore, any  sale in respect of such agricultural produce even in the Market Area will not enable the Market Committee to levy market fee nor would it oblige persons or parties to the transaction  of sale  to pay  the same.  This contention equally found  favour with  the High Court. It was held that till the agricultural produce under the heading ’II Legumes’ set out  in the  Schedule since the amendment of January 20, 1982 are  notified as  specified agricultural  produce,  the Market Committee was not entitled to levy and collect market fee on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce. The High Court accordingly allowed the petitions and quashed the notice issued by the Market Committee raising the demand for market fee.      Hence these appeals by special leave.      If the  contention raised on behalf of the appellant in the first  batch of appeals is accepted, the judgment of the

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High Court  in the  second batch  of appeals will have to be quashed and set aside without anything more. In view of this inter-connection between  the two  batches of  appeals, they were heard together though one after the other and are being disposed of by this common judgment.      To appreciate  the very  narrow contention  arising  in these appeals,  a glance  at the  relevant provisions of the Act is indispensable.      The Act was enacted as its long title shows ’to provide for the  regulation of  sale and  purchase  of  agricultural produce  and  for  the  establishment,  superintendence  and control of markets therefore in 795 Uttar Pradesh.’  ’Agricultural produce’  is defined  in Sec. 2(a) as under:           ""agricultural  produce"   means  such   items  of      produce  of   agriculture,  horticulture,  viticulture,      apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry      or  forest  as  are  specified  in  the  Schedule,  and      includes admixture  of two  or more  of such items, and      also includes  any such  item in  processed  form,  and      further  includes  gur,  rab,  shakkar,  khandsari  and      jaggery;"      ’Market Area’  is defined in Sec. 2(k) to mean ’an area notified as  such under  Section 6,  or  as  modified  under Section 8.’  ’Specified agricultural  produce’ is defined in Sec. 2(t)  to mean  ’agricultural produce  specified in  the notification under  Sec. 6  or as modified under Section 8.’ ’Sub-Market Yard’ is defined in Sec. 2(w) to mean ’a portion of a Market Area, declared as such under Section 7.’ Sec. 4- A which  was introduced  in the  Act by  U.P. Act 10 of 1970 conferred power on the State Govt. to amend the Schedule. It reads as under:           "4-A. The  State Government may by notification in      the Gazette,  add to, amend or omit any of the items of      agricultural produce  specified in  the  Schedule,  and      thereupon   the    Schedule   shall    stand    amended      accordingly."      Sec. 5  provides that  a declaration  of  intention  to regulate and  control  sale  and  purchase  of  agricultural produce in  any area.  Where the  State Government is of the opinion that  it is  necessary or  expedient in  the  public interest  to   regulate  the   sale  and   purchase  of  any agricultural produce  in any  area, and  for that purpose to declare that  area as  a Market Area it may, by notification in  the  Gazette,  and  in  such  other  manner  as  may  be prescribed, declare  its intention  so  to  do,  and  invite objections against the proposed declaration. Sec. 6 provides for  the   declaration  of   Market  Area   in  respect   of agricultural produce  set out  in  the  notification  issued under Sec.  5 after  considering the  objections. A combined reading of Section 5 and 6 would show that in order to be an effective declaration,  the notification  must set  out  the Market Area  that is its geographical boundaries as also the agricultural produce  in respect of which the Market Area is so declared.  Sec. 7  confers power to carve out Market Yard and Sub-Market Yards in a Market Area. 796 Sec. 8 confers power on the State Government to alter Market Area as  also  modification  of  the  list  of  agricultural produce in  respect of  each Market Area. If a change in the geographical limits  of a  Market Area  becomes necessary or addition or  omission in the list of agricultural produce in respect of a Market Area is desired, Sec. 8 confers power on the State Government by a notification to that effect in the

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Gazette to  so alter  the Market  Area or modify the list of agricultural produce.  Every agricultural produce set out in notification  declaring  a  Market  Area  under  Sec.  6  or alterations made under Sec. 8 becomes specified agricultural produce for  the purposes  of the  Act. Sec.  9 sets out the effects of  a declaration  of a  Market Area,  the principal being that  no one  within  the  Market  Area  can  set  up, establish or  continue or  allowed to be set up, established or continue,  any place  for the sale-purchase, storage etc. of the  specified agricultural  produce, except under and in accordance with  the conditions  of a licence granted by the Committee.  Sub-sec.   (2)  confers   power  on  the  Market Committee to  give licence  to carry on business as a trader etc. in  the Principal  Market Yard or Sub-Market Yard. Sec. 17 enumerates  the powers  of the Market Committee which has to be  set up  for each  Market Area as required by Sec. 12, which inter  alia includes  the power  to levy  and  collect market fee  in  the  circumstances  therein  mentioned.  The relevant portion of it reads as under:      "17. A  Committee shall,  for the  Purposes of the Act,      have the power to-      ...............................................      (iii) levy and collect:      (a)..........................................      (b)  market fee, which shall be payable on transactions           of sale  of specified  agricultural produce in the           market area at such rates, being not less than one           per  centum   and  not  more  than  one  and  half           percentum of the price of the agricultural produce           so sold,  as the  State Government  may specify by           notification, and  such fee  shall be  realised in           the following manner:-      (1)  If the  produce is sold through a commission agent           the commission  agent may  realise the  market fee           from the  purchaser and shall be liable to pay the           same to the Committee 797           if the  produce is  purchased directly by a trader           from a  producer the trader shall be liable to pay           the market fee to the Committee;      (3)  if the  produce is  purchased  by  a  trader  from           another trader, the trader selling the produce may           realise it  from the purchaser and shall be liable           to pay the market fee to the Committee; and      (4)  in any  other case  of sale  of such  produce, the      purchaser shall  be liable to pay the market fee to the      Committee;      Provided  that   no  market  fee  shall  be  levied  or      collected  on   the  retail   sale  of   any  specified      agricultural produce  where such  sale is  made to  the      consumer;............"      The schedule  appended to  the Act  enumerates  various species of agricultural produce as required by Sec. (2) (a). Under the  heading "II Legumes’ in the Schedule 14 different legumes such  as (1)  Gram (2)  Peas (3) Arhar (4) Urad etc. are specified for the purpose of Sec. 2(a) and Sec. 4A.      On the  date on which the first batch of writ petitions were filed  in the  High Court,  the  relevant  notification under Sec. 5 read with Sec. 6 provided that with effect from May 1, 1978 the agricultural produce mention in the Schedule ’kha’ shall  be included in the list of agricultural produce of the  Market Area  mentioned  in  Schedule  ’ka’.  Amongst others at plecitum (2) following entries are to be found:      "(2) Dwi Daliya Utpadan:           (1) Channa  (2) Matar (3) Arhar (4) Urad (5) Moong

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         (6) Masoor  (7) Lobhia  (seed)  (8)  Soyabeen  (9)           Sanai (seed) (10) Dhencha (seed) (11) Ganwar." set out  in the Schedule which became specified agricultural produce by  being included  in the  notification dated April 11, 1978  could only be legume whole grain and not its split portions  which  is  the  end  product  of  a  manufacturing process. It  was said  that the  dal which  is  obtained  by applying a process of manufacture to the 798 whole grain  of legumes  is neither  an agricultural produce and at  any rate it is not a specified agricultural produce. The High Court charted an easy course by merely referring to the subsequent  notification dated  January 20,  1982  which substituted entry under heading ’II Legumes’ in the Schedule by putting  into bracket  words ’Saboot  Aur Dala  Hua’  and concluded that  if an  amendment by  a  notification  became necessary to bring split folds of legume in the Schedule, by necessary implication  they could  not have been included or deemed ever  to have  been  included  in  the  Schedule  "II Legumes’ prior  to the  amendment and  therefore market  fee could not  be levied  on the  transaction of  sale of  split folds of  legume dal  in a  Market Area.  We propose for the time being  to ignore  this notification  and concentrate on the  entry  in  the  Schedule  as  it  stood  prior  to  the notification dated  January 20,  1982 and  the definition of the expression  ’agricultural produce’  to ascertain whether any of  the enumerated  legumes in  the condition  of  whole grain or  in the  split folds  were  specified  agricultural produce  comprehended  with  the  terminological  exactitude described as  Gram, Peas, Arhar Urad etc. In other words, if Gram, Peas,  Arhar  Urad  etc.  is  mentioned  as  specified agricultural produce in the notification either under Sec. 5 read with  Sec. 6  or under  Sec. 8,  would it mean only its whole grain  or would  it also taken in the product known as dal obtained  by splitting  the whole  grain  into  its  two folds.      To resolve  this controversy,  one will  have  to  seek light  from   the  definition  of  expression  ’agricultural produce’ as  set out  in Sec.  2(a) of  the Act and not by a resort to  decisions under  entirely different statutes such as the  Sales Tax  laws to  find out whether the whole grain and its  split folds  constitute the  same  product  or  two different   and   independent   products   commercially   so recognised. It  is an  indisputable can-on  of  construction that where  an expression  is defined in the statute, unless there is  anything repugnant  in the subject or context, the expression has  to be  construed as  having the same meaning assigned to it in the dictionary clause of the statute. This canon of  construction is  to well-recognised to necessitate any reference to precedent.      Analysing   the    definition   of    the    expression ’agricultural produce’,  it would  mean not only those items of produce  of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule, but will  also include  the admixture of two or more of such items as also any such item in its 799 processed  form.   Let  us   re-write  the   definition   by substituting one  of the  items  in  the  Schedule  to  make explicit what  is implicit  therein.  Agricultural  produce’ means a  produce of agriculture such as Gram as specified in the Schedule  and would  also include  Gram in its processed form. Therefore,  not only  Gram is  an agricultural produce but Gram  in its  processed form  is equally an agricultural produce. When  it is  said in  the definition ’such items of produce of  agriculture as are specified in the Schedule, it

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means that  not only all those items of agricultural produce which  are   set  out   in  the   Schedule  will  constitute agricultural produce  but also  the admixture of two or more of such  items of  produce of  agriculture as set out in the Schedule as well as any such items of agriculture produce in their processed  form. Suppose a producer sells neither Gram nor Peas  each by  itself but mixes Gram and Peas, according to the  contention canvassed  on behalf  of the respondents, this mixture  would be  not  an  agricultural  produce.  The contention can  be negatived  by referring to the definition which says  agricultural produce means such items of produce of agriculture  (omitting the  words which are not necessary for the present purpose)... as are specified in the Schedule such as Gram and Peas as also an admixture of two or more of such items  i.e. admixture  of Gram and Peas. A further step can  be   taken  as  flowing  from  the  definition  itself. Agricultural  produce   means  such  items  of  agricultural produce namely,  Gram as  specified in  the Schedule  and it shall include  any such  items i.e.  Gram in  its  processed form. Even  the respondents did not contend, on the contrary it was  the sheet  anchor of  their submission  that a split legume is obtained by a manufacturing process of whole grain of legumes, ’Saboot’ as it is now described, and that dal i. e. the  whole grain  split into  two folds  is its processed form acquired  by manufacturing  process. Even  on their own submission dal  of legume  enumerated in the Schedule is any agricultural produce.      This very  conclusion can  be  reached  by  a  slightly different  route.   As  is   well-known,   the   legislative enactments in  the State  of U.P.  are enacted  primarily in Hindi language and its official and authentic translation in English is  simultaneously published.  Bearing this in mind, we turn  to the notification dated April 11, 1978 specifying legumes therein enumerated as specified agricultural produce for various  Market Areas.  The heading  under which various legumes are  enumerated is  Dwi Daliya Utpadan.’ This tongue twister was  explained to  us to  mean that legume itself is Dwi Daliya 800 Utpadan i.e. the whole grain is made of two folds. Ek daliya grain is  without a  fold. Dwi Daliya is a grain composed of two folds  and certainly  not  many  folds,  Concise  Oxford Dictionary specifies  the meaning  of legume  to  be  fruit, edible part  pode, of  leguminous plant;  vegetable used for food, ’and leguminous’ to mean’ like of the botanical family of pulse. And in common parlance ’pulse’ connotes legume and denotes dal  of legume.  Reverting however,  to the  heading under which  legumes are enumerated in 1978 notification, it must be confessed that it clearly connotes the meaning to be given to the whole grain and denotes dal i.e. split folds as specified agricultural  produce. The Hindi protagonists used the expression  ’Dwi Dalia  Utpadan’ meaning  thereby double folded grain  called Gram,  Peas, Arhar,  moong, etc.  On  a strict construction, the two dals i.e. two parts forming the whole grain  both are  comprehended in  the expression  ’Dwi Dalia Utpadan’.  Therefore, it  is crystal  clear that while enumerating legumes  in the  Schedule and  reproduced in the 1978  notification   to  make  them  specified  agricultural produce, the framers intended to include both the grain as a whole  and   its  splits   parts  the   dal.  And  when  the agricultural produce enumerated in the Schedule such as Gram including  its   processed  part   is  reproduced   in   the notification as  Dwi Dalia  Utpadan, the  dal of each of the legumes  therein  mentioned  became  specified  agricultural produce.

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    It was  however, urged  that if the legume in the split form is  the same  as legume  as a  whole grain,  the Market Committee would  not be  entitled to  levy any market fee on the transaction  of sale  of legume  in split  form  because market fee  already having  been once  levied in the form of the whole  grain, a  second  levy  on  the  product  is  not contemplated by  the Act.  Reference in  this connection was made to the decision in Ramesh Chandra etc. v. State of U.P. etc. in  which levy  of market  fee under the Act by various Market Committee  was challenged on diverse grounds, on such being that  if market fee is paid on the transaction of sale of  paddy  though  rice  is  separately  enumerated  in  the Schedule, no  market fee  could be livied on the transaction of sale  of rice.  This Court has observed at page 130 that, if paddy  is purchased in a particular market area by a rice miller and  the same  paddy is  converted into rice and sold then the rice miller will be liable to pay market fee on 801 his purchase  of paddy from the agriculturist-producer under sub-clause (2)  of section  17 (iii) (b). He cannot be asked to pay  market  fee  over  again  under  sub-clause  (3)  in relation to  the transaction of rice. Nor will it be open to the Market  Committee to choose between either of the two in the example  just given  above. Market  fee has to be levied and collected in relation to the transaction of paddy alone. Reliance was  also placed  on the  observation at  page  132 where the  court observed  ’if Catechu  is a product of khar trees by some processing, as prima facie it appears to us to be so,  then it is plain that market fee can be charged only on the  purchase of  khar  wood  and  not  on  the  sale  of Catechu.’ Reliance  was also  placed on M/s Ashok Industries and Ors  v. State  of Bihar  and Ors(1)  where similar  view appears to  have been taken. We fail to see the significance of this  submission in these appeals because this contention was not  canvassed before the High Court and the respondents merely invited  the High Court to decide that dal of legumes enumerated in  the Schedule  are not  specified agricultural produce. If  the respondents  are entitled  to any relief on the view  of the  matter taken in Ramesh Chandra’s case they may obtain  appropriate relief,  but  as  has  been  rightly observed by this Court that redress of the grievance in this behalf depending  upon deciding  a disputed question of fact cannot be  rendered here for want of pleading in this behalf and for  want of a decision by the High Court on this point. But on  this account  it  is  not  possible  to  accept  the submission of  the respondent  that legume in the split form is not comprehended in the Schedule to the Act as well as in the notification dated April 11, 1978.      Mr. Shanti  Bhushan for  some of  the respondents urged that  the   respondents  have   set  up  their  factory  for processing whole  grain of  legumes into its split folds and the commodity known as dal is a well recognised identifiable commercial commodity  distinct from  the legume  whole grain from which  it is  derived by a manufacturing process and as the Act was enacted for protecting the interest of producers of agricultural produce, the factory owners being in no need of such protection cannot be subjected to the levy of market fee on  the transaction of sale of legume in split form. The submission does  not commend to us because it proceeds on an erroneous assumption  that the Act was primarily enacted for the  protection   of  producers  of  scheduled  agricultural produce. In fact, as 802 pointed out  earlier, the  Act was enacted primarily for the regulation of  sale and purchase of agricultural produce and

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for  the   establishment,  superintendence  and  control  of markets therefor.  In the  Statement of  objects and reasons accompanying the  Act,  it  is  in  terms  stated  that  the proposed measure  to regulate  the market  in the  State has been designed  with a  view to achieving the objects therein enumerated, only  one of  them  being  to  ensure  that  the agricultural producer  has his  say in  the  utilisation  of market funds  for the  improvement of the market as a whole. Agricultural produce  has nowhere been mentioned in the nine objects set  out therein  except as  mentioned above. On the other hand,  the Constitution Bench in Ramesh Chandra’s case noticed that the ’Act was enacted for the development of new market  areas   and  for   efficient  data   collection  and processing of  arrivals in  the Mandis  to enable  the World Bank to  give a  substantial help  for the  establishment of various markets  in the  State of U.P.’ The Act was compared with similar  statutes in  force in  different States  and a distinguishing feature  was pointed out that in other States the  Act  is  mainly  meant  to  protect  the  agriculturist producer from  being exploited  when he  comes to the Mandis for selling his agricultural produce. This Court observed in agreement  with   the  High   Court   that   certain   other transactions also  have been roped in the levy of market fee in which  both sides  are traders  and neither  side  is  an agriculturist and  this has  been  done  for  the  effective implementation of  the scheme  of establishments  of markets mainly  for   the  benefit   of  producers.   Approving  the observation in Kewal Krishna Puri & Anr v. State of Punjab & Ors.(1) the  Court further  observed that  the fee  realised from the  payer has by and large to be spent for his special benefits and for the benefit of other persons connected with the transaction  of purchase  and sale  in  various  Mandis. Therefore, it  cannot be  said that  the respondents-factory owners not  being agricultural  producers and  not being  in search of  any protection  of the Market Committee could not be subjected to the levy of market fee. In fact, the primary object of  the Act  as far as the State of U.P. is concerned is regulation  of sale  and purchase of agricultural produce irrespective  of   the  character   of  the   party  to  the transaction save  and except  that character  is relevant as set out  in sub-clauses  (1) to (4) of Sec. 17 (iii) (b). It is not  a relevant  consideration whether the factory owners need any  protection but the real question is whether people dealing with them need pro- 803 tection. Viewed  from either  angle, we find no merit in the submission.      Dr. Y.S.  Chitale referred  to M/s  Ganesh Trading  Co. Karnal etc.  etc. v.  State of Haryana & Anr. etc., Babu Ram Jagdish Kumar  and Co.  etc. etc.  v. State of Punjab & Ors. etc. etc.  State of Karnataka v. B Raghurama Shetty etc. and M/s Laxmi  Chand Badri  Narain v.  The Commissioner of sales Tax. M.P.  and urged  that dehusked  paddy which is rice has been held  to be  not the  same or  identical goods  but  to distinct  commercially   known  commodities   and  they  are separately enumerated  and therefore,  one does  not include the other.  In all  the four  judgments, the  question arose under the  relevant Sales Tax law. The contention raised was whether paddy  and rice can be considered as identical goods for the  purpose of  imposition of  sales tax  ?  Under  the relevant Sale Tax Act exemption from payment of sales tax is provided if  the very paddy in respect of which purchase tax was levied  was sold and not if that paddy is converted into rice and  sold. The  contention was  that paddy and rice are identical goods  and  therefore,  when  the  law  grants  an

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exemption  in  respect  of  paddy  that  exemption  is  also available to  rice. It  was urged  that rice  is nothing but dehusked paddy  and when  the paddy is dehusked, there is no change in  the identity  of the  goods. This  contention was negatived in all the four cases depending upon provisions of the relevant  Sales Tax  Law. It  was however  said that the ratio of  the decision would assist us in understanding what is the  processed form of a particular agricultural produce. Approaching the  matter from  this angle,  it was urged that though rice  is produced  out of paddy, this Court held that it is  not true to say that paddy continued to be paddy even after dehusking,  and  they  are  two  different  things  in ordinary parlance.  This ratio cannot assist us at all for a very good  reason. It  was not  pointed out  to us  that the various provisions  of the relevant Sales Tax Law which came for consideration  of this Court in those four decisions did or  did   not  have   a  definition   such  as  we  have  of ’agricultural produce’ in Sec. 2(a) of the Act.      In  this  connection,  however  specific  reliance  was placed on  the decision  of Modi  Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Modi- 804 nagar &  Ors. etc.  v. State  of U.P.  & Anr. wherein in the context of  the Act,  it was  held that  ’cotton ginned  and unginned, ’and therefore, it was held that no market fee was leviable on  the transaction  of sale  of cotton  waste.  In reaching this  conclusion, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court  held that  if ’cotton  ginned and  unginned’ was specified as  an agricultural produce yet cotton waste which is a  processed form  of cotton  was not  so specified,  the Legislature  indicated  not  to  include  the  same  in  the specified agricultural  produce. The Court posed to itself a question: whether  cotton waste  is processed from of cotton while posing to itself another question: is cotton processed for manufacture  of cotton  waste ? The Court than proceeded to observe  that in  Sec. 2(b)  of the  Cotton  Ginning  and Pressing Factories  Act, 1925 ’cotton’ is defined as "cotton ginned or  unginned or  cotton waste". While in Sec. 2(b) of the Cotton Transport Act, 1923, ’cotton’ has been defined to mean  every   kind  of  unmanufactured  cotton,  ginned  and unginned  cotton,   cotton  waste  and  cotton  seed.  After referring to  these definitions,  the Court held that cotton waste is not included in ’cotton ginned or unginned.’ In our opinion, the  court has  strained the  language to  reach an unsustainable conclusion,  holding that  cotton waste is not the processed  form of  cotton but  it is a by-product quite different form  of cotton  though  containing  cotton  fibre which cannot  be  used  as  ordinary  cotton.  As  its  name indicates, cotton  waste appears  to be droppings, stripping and other  waste product  while ginning cotton. It cannot be said to  be a  bye-product of  cotton but it is cotton none- the-less minus  the removed  seed.  In  other  words  it  is residue of ginned cotton. We therefore, find it difficult to agree with  the view  of the High Court that cotton waste is not comprehended in the item ’cotton ginned and unginned.’      Lastly a  reference was made to the State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala  Brothers.(2)   The  question  that  came  up  for consideration before  this Court  was: whether Sales tax was payable in  respect of sales of patasa, narda and alchidana? The  contention  arose  in  the  context  of  the  provision contained in  Sec. 5(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 in its application  to the State of Gujarat which provided that ’notwithstanding anything  contained in the Act, but subject to the  conditions or  exceptions (if  any) set  out against each of  the goods  specified in  column 3 of Schedule A, no

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tax shall be 805 payable on  the sales or purchases of any goods specified in the Schedule.’  The relevant  entry is the ’sugar as defined in Item  No. 8  of the  First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt  Act, 1944.’  Affirming the decision of the Gujarat High Court  this Court held that patasa, harda and alchidana were exempt  from any tax payable under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959  because they  are comprehended  in the expression ’sugar’ in the entry granting exemption. This conclusion was reached holding  that the  expression ’sugar’  in  Entry  47 granting exemption  will comprehend  within  its  ambit  all forms of  sugar that  is to  say,  sugar  of  any  shape  or texture, colour  or density  and  by  whatever  name  it  is called. If  this line  of reasoning is adopted, legume whole grain will  necessary comprehend  both folds  of  the  whole grain. But  we do  not propose  to rest  our decision on the approach  to  various  commodities  commercially  recognised distinct under relevant Sales Tax Law.      To sum  up, for  the reasons  herein stated,  the  High Court was in error in holding that the legume whole grain as set out in the Schedule does not include its split form i,e. dal and  therefore,  no  market  fee  was  leviable  on  the transaction of sale of legume in split form. This conclusion disposes  of  first  batch  of  appeals  arising  from  writ petitions filed  prior to  the issue  of notification  dated January 20, 1982.      In the  other batch of petitions which came to be filed after  the  notification  of  January  20,  1982,  Mr.  F.S. Nariman, learned counsel appearing in C.A. No. 2286/84 urged that even if under Sec. 4-A of the Act, the State Government had the  power to  add to, amend or omit any of the items of agricultural produce specified in the Schedule and if by the notification dated  January 20,  1982, the  State Government purported to  substitute  the  Schedule  under  the  Heading ’legumes’ by  putting into  bracket  by  the  side  of  each enumerated legume ’Saboot or Dala Hua’, that by itself would not make  such agricultural  produce ’specified agricultural produce’. It  was urged  and in  our opinion,  rightly  that before a  transaction of sale, as set out in Sec. 17(iii)(b) of the  Act, of an agricultural produce becomes exigible for the levy of market fee, the agricultural produce has to be a ’specified agricultural  produce’ and that can be done by an appropriate notification  under Sec.  5 read  with Sec. 6 or under Sec.  8  of  the  Act  and  until  that  is  done  the agricultural produce  even if  it is  so enumerated  in  the Schedule does  not become  ’specified agricultural  produce’ and no  market fee  can be levied on the transaction of sale of such agricultural produce. It 806 was urged  that  for  steps  have  to  be  taken  before  an agricultural  produce   becomes  a  ’specified  agricultural produce’ in  respect of  a Market Area. Undoubtedly, when in exercise of  powers conferred by Sec. 5 the State Government publishes its  intention to  set  up  a  Market  Area  by  a notification in  the Official  Gazette, the State Government is simultaneously  under an  obligation to  specify not only the  Market   Area  that   is  its  geographical  limits  or boundaries but  must specify  the agricultural  produce quay such Market  Area. After inviting objections both in respect of the  Market Area  and the agricultural produce, a further notification is  required to  be issued  under Sec. 6 making the requisite declaration both in respect of the Market Area as well  as the  agricultural produce.  When these two steps are  taken,   the  agricultural   produce  set  out  in  the

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notification  issued   under  Sec.   6   becomes   specified agricultural produce  in relation to Market Area notified in the notification.  Sec. 8  confers power to alter the Market Area or  the agricultural  produce in respect of the altered Market Area.  When these  steps are  taken then  alone those agricultural produces  enumerated in  the notification under Sec. 6  or under Sec. 8 would assume and acquire the mark or character of  ’specified agricultural  produce,’ on the sale transaction of  which market fee can be levied by the Market Committee. Proceeding  along it was urged that even though a notification was  issued under  Sec. 4-A on January 20, 1982 amending the  Schedule in respect of legumes, in the absence of a  notification under  Sec.  8  making  the  agricultural produce  so   introduced  in   the  Schedule   as  specified agricultural produce,  those agricultural produces would not acquire the  character of  specified  agricultural  produces qua-Market Area  and  therefore,  the  respondents  are  not liable to  pay  any  market  fee  thereon.  If  the  amended Schedule introduced  by the  notification dated  January 20, 1982 introduces fresh agricultural produces in the Schedule, the contention  of Mr. Nariman must carry conviction because it was  conceded that  a fresh  notification under Sec. 8 in respect of  the legumes  has not  been issued.  But the view which we  have taken  is that  the entries under the heading ’legumes’ in the Schedule as it stood prior to the amendment of January  20, 1982  comprehended both  the whole  grain of legumes and  its split  part that  is dal. What was implicit has been  made explicit and therefore, no fresh notification under Sec. 8 was necessary. Therefore, the contention has to be negatived.  As that  was the  only  contention  canvassed before this  Court in the second batch of appeals as we find no merit  in it,  the second batch of appeals will also have to be allowed. 807      Lastly, the  respondents contended  that  if  the  view taken by  the High Court on the question that split grain of legume, that  is dal was not comprehended in the whole grain of legume as set out in the Schedule and therefore, the same was not  a specified  agricultural is held not to be correct and accordingly the judgment of the High Court would have to be upset,  all the matters may be remitted to the High Court for disposing  of other  contentions canvassed  on behalf of the respondents  who were  petitioners in  the High Court as the High  Court  declined  to  examine  them,  as  the  writ petitions were  allowed on  this one narrow contention which according to the High Court went to the root of the matter.      Before the  High Court,  the respondents raised various contentions. Most  of them  were repelled by the High Court, but the  petitioners succeeded  on the  narrow contention as herein set  out. It was said by Mr. Shanti Bhushan referring to the  writ petition  in which  he appeared that there were other contentions  which the  respondents wanted  to canvass but which the High Court declined to examine. It may be that there might  be some other contentions which the respondents wanted the  High Court  to examine and the High Court having held in  favour of  the respondents  on one  point may  have declined to  examine the same. Therefore, while allowing the appeals, all the matters are remitted to the High Court. The High Court  may examine  contentions other  than those which were dealt  with in  the judgment  from  which  the  present batches of  appeals were  preferred. All  those  contentions which have  been negatived  by the High Court and in respect of each  one of  them no  attempt was  made to  support  the judgment  of   the  High   Court  before  this  Court  those contentions may  not be permitted to be reopened. The remand

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is limited  to those questions which find their place in the writ petitions and which the High Court declined to examine.      But as  the respondents have failed on almost all major contentions,  they   need  not   have  the   benefit  of   a discretionary order  of any  stay against levy of market fee any more. With these limitations the matters are remitted to the High Court.      All the  appeals accordingly succeed and are allowed to the extent herein indicated with costs N.V.K.    Appeals allowed. 808