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PETITIONER: KRISHAN PRASAD GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CONTROLLER, PRINTING & STATIONERY

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/10/1995

BENCH: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) BENCH: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  408            1996 SCC  (1)  69  JT 1995 (7)   522        1995 SCALE  (6)89

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.Saghir Ahmad. J.      Fate of  this appeal  hinges on  the  answer  which  we ultimately give  to the  short question "whether the appeals pending in  the Court of the District Judge under Section 17 of the  Payment of  Wages Act, were liable to be transferred to the  Administrative Tribunals  under Section  29  of  the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for disposal on merits or the jurisdiction  of the Authority under Section 15 and that of the  District Judge  under Section  17 of  the Payment of Wages Act  to hear  and  decide  Claim  Cases  and  Appeals, respectively remain undisturbed."      The appellant  was an  employee of  the respondent.  On November 23,  1987 he  filed an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for recovery of an amount of Rs. 48,274.50  P.  on  the  allegations,  inter-alia,  that  the respondent  had   illegally  withheld   and  had  also  made unauthorised deductions  from his wages progressively over a considerable period of time. This application was registered as Case  No.407 of  1987, notice  whereof was  issued to the respondent, who  after putting  in appearance, absented on a number of dates and ultimately the Authority passed an order that the  case  would  proceed  ex-parte  against  him.  The respondent filed an application for setting aside that order but the  application was  rejected by  order dated  June 23, 1988 against  which the  respondent filed  an  appeal  under Section 17(1)  of the  Payment of Wages Act on July 15, 1988 before the  District Judge  during the pendency of which the Tribunal was  constituted and  consequently, in  view of the provisions contained  in Section  29 of  the Act, the appeal was transferred  to the  Tribunal and  the Tribunal,  by its order dated August 31, 1990, rejected the appeal.      In the  meantime, appellant’s  main  application  under Section 15  of the Payment of Wages Act was allowed by order dated July  20, 1988  for a  sum of Rs. 43,092.50 p. against

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which the  respondent filed an appeal under Section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act in the Court of the District Judge, Chandigarh, which  was also  transferred to the Tribunal and the Tribunal  by its  judgment and  order dated July 4, 1994 allowed the  appeal and set aside the order dated 20th July, 1988 passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. It is  this order  which is  Challenged  before  us  on  the grounds, inter alia, that the appeal pending in the Court of the District  Judge under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act could  not have been legally transferred to the Tribunal under Section 29 of the Act and the Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction to dispose it of on merits.      Administrative Tribunals  have been  constituted  under the Act  made by  the Parliament under Articles 323 A of the Constitution for  providing an  exclusive machinery  for the adjudication  or  trial  of  disputes  and  complaints  with respect to  recruitments, as  also conditions  of service of persons appointed to public services and posts, so as to cut down the  time spent  by public  servants in  litigation  in ordinery courts  and to  provide them relief at the hands of persons hearing and deciding service litigation exclusively.      The vires  of the  Act has  already been upheld by this Court in S.P. Sampath vs. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1987 SC 386) with  the finding  that with  effect from  the date  on which the  Tribunals were  constituted, the  jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the Writ Petitions in service matters came to an end. Whether the above view is correct or not  and   whether  the   abrogation  of   the  High  Court’ jurisdiction in  entertaining writs in service matters under Art.226 of  the Constitution amounts to a destruction of the basic character of the Constitution are questions which have since been referred to the Constitution Bench hose answer is still awaited.      In S.P.  Sampath’s  case  (supra),  it  was  held  that Tribunal was  a substitute  for the  High Court. In order to confer exclusive  jurisdiction in  service  matters  on  the Tribunal, it has been provided in Section 14 of the Act that the Tribunal  shall exercise,  on and from the appointed day (1.11.85)  all   the  jurisdiction,   powers  and  authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts except the  Supreme   Court  in  respect  of  cases  pertaining  to recruitment and  matters concerning recruitment to All India services as  also disputes  relating to  "service  matters". (defined in Section 3(q)).      Section 19  to 21  of the  Act, read together, indicate that the  jurisdiction of  the Tribunal  can be invoked by a "person aggrieved"  by  making  an  application  against  an "order" made by the Government or a local of other authority etc. subject  to the  condition that  all other remedies, if available, under  the service  rules have been availed of by him and  that too  within the period of limitation indicated in Section  21 in  which the starting point of limitation as also the  period which  would commence  from that point have been specified.      Section 14  which confers,  or, we  may be permitted to say,  transfers   jurisdiction  of  all  the  regular  Court including High  Courts all  over the country to the Tribubal in respect  of "service  matters", provides, in its relevant part, as under:-      "14. Jurisdiction, powers  and authority      of the  Central Administrative Tribunal-      (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided      in this  Act, the Central Administrative      Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the      appointed  day,  all  the  jurisdiction,

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    powers   and    authority    exercisable      immediately  before   that  day  by  all      courts (except  the  Supreme  Court)  in      relation to -           (a)  recruitment,    and    matters           concerning recruitment,  to any All           India  Service   or  to  any  civil           service of  the Union  or  a  civil           post under  the Union  or to a post           connected with  defence or  in  the           defence services,  being, in either           case, a post filled by a civilian:           (b)  all service matters           concerning-                (i)  a member of any All-India                Service; or                (ii) a  person  [not  being  a                member of an All-India Service                or a  person  referred  to  in                clause (c)]  appointed to  any                civil service  of the Union or                any  civil   post  under   the                Union; or                (iii)     a   civilian    [not                being a member of an All-India                Service or  a person  referred                to in clause (c)] appointed to                any defence services or a post                connected with defence,      and pertaining  to the  service of  such      member,   person    or   civilian,    in      connection with the affairs of the Union      or of any State or of any local or other      authority within  the territory of India      or under  the control  of the Government      of  India  or  of  any  corporation  [or      society]  owned  or  controlled  by  the      Government;      (c)...................................."      Section 29  provides for  the transfer  of all  pending cases to  the Tribunal  while Section  29A provides  for the filing of  appeals in  such cases  as  were  decided  either before or  after the  establishment of  Tribunals on 1.11.85 before the Tribunal instead of the regular appellate forum.      Section 29 and 29A are reproduced below:      "29. Transfer of pending cases-(1) Every      suit or  other proceeding pending before      any court or other authority immediately      before the  date of  establishment of  a      Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or      proceeding the  cause of  action whereon      it is  based is  such that it would have      been,  if   it  had  arisen  after  such      establishment, within  the  jurisdiction      of   such    Tribunal,    shall    stand      transferred  on   that  dated   to  such      Tribunal:           Provided that  nothing in this sub-      section  shall   apply  to   any  appeal      pending  as   aforesaid  before  a  High      Court.      (2)  Every  suit   or  other  proceeding      pending  before   a   court   or   other      authority immediately  before the  dated      with effect  from which  jurisdiction is

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    conferred on  a Tribunal  in relation to      any  local   or   other   authority   or      corporation [or  society], being  a suit      or  proceeding   the  cause   of  action      whereon it  si based  is  such  that  it      would have  been, if it had arisen after      the said  dated, within the jurisdiction      of   such    Tribunal,    shall    stand      transferred  on   that  date   to   such      Tribunal:           Provided that  nothing in this sub-      section  shall   apply  to   any  appeal      pending  as   aforesaid  before  a  High      Court.      (3)  Where immediately  before the  date      of    establishment     of    a    Joint      Administrative Tribunal  any one or more      of  the   States   for   which   it   is      established,  has   or  have   a   State      Tribunal or  State Tribunals,  all cases      pending before  such State  Tribunal  or      State Tribunals  immediately before  the      said  date  together  with  the  records      thereof shall  stand transferred on that      dated  to   such  Joint   Administrative      Tribunal.      (4)  Where any  suit,  appeal  of  other      proceeding stands  transferred from  any      court of  other authority  to a Tribunal      under sub-section (1) sub-section (2),-           (a)  the court  or other  authority      shall, as  soon as  may  be  after  such      transfer, forward  the records  of  such      suit, appeal  or other proceeding to the      Tribunal; and           (b)  the Tribunal  may, on  receipt      of such  records, proceed  to deal  with      such suit,  appeal or  other proceeding,      so far  as may be, in the same manner as      in the  case  of  an  application  under      Section 19  from  the  stage  which  was      reached before such transfer of from any      earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal      deem fit.      (5)  Where any  case stands  transferred      to a Joint Administrative Tribunal under      sub-section     (3),      the      Joint      Administrative Tribunal  may proceed  to      deal with such case from the stage which      was   reached   before   it   stood   so      transferred.      (6)  Every   case   pending   before   a      Tribunal    immediately    before    the      commencement   of   the   Administrative      Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1987, being a      case the  cause of  action whereon it is      based is  such that  it would have been,      if   it    had   arisen    after    such      commencement, within the jurisdiction of      any  court,  shall,  together  with  the      records thereof,  stand  transferred  on      such commencement to such court.      (7)  Where any  case stands  transferred      to a  court under  sub-section (6), that      court may proceed to deal with such case

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    from the  stage which was reached before      it stood so transferred."      "29-A.    Provision   for    filing   of      certain appeals  - Where  any decree  or      order has  been made  or passed  by  any      court (other  than a  high Court) in any      suit   or    proceeding    before    the      establishment of  a  Tribunal,  being  a      suit or  proceeding the  cause of action      whereon it  is based  is  such  that  it      would have  been, if it had arisen after      such    establishment,     within    the      jurisdiction of  such Tribunal,  and  no      appeal has  been preferred  against such      decree    or     order    before    such      establishment   and    the   time    for      preferring such appeal under any law for      the time  being in force had not expired      before such  establishment, such  appeal      shall lie -                (a)  to      the       Central           Administrative   Tribunal,   within           ninety days  from the date on which           the    Administrative     Tribunals           (Amendment) Bill, 1986 receives the           assent of  the President, or within           ninety  days   from  the   date  of           receipt of  the copy of such decree           or order, whichever is later, or                (b)  to  any  other  Tribunal,           within   ninety   days   from   its           establishment or within ninety days           from the  date of  receipt  of  the           copy  of   such  decree  of  order,           whichever is later." It is  then provided  by Section  33 that the Act shall have overriding effect.      Transfer of  jurisdiction of  regular Courts to another Court or  Tribunal has  never been  liked by  litigants  and lawyers as  noticed by  Viscount Simonds  in Smith  Vs. East Elloe R.D.C. ( 1956 A.C. 736) who observed that:-      "    Any one  bred in  the tradition  of      the law, is likely to regard with little      sympathy  legislative   provisions   for      ousting the  jurisdiction of  the Court,      whether in order that the subject may be      deprived  altogether  of  remedy  or  in      order that his grievance may be remitted      to some other Tribunal."      Since the  matter involved  in this case relates to the ouster of  jurisdiction of all regular Courts, including the High Court, we shall adopt a rule of interpretation which is most appropriately  applicable to  the circumstances  of the present case  and the  only Rule  which can be most suitably applied is  the rule  of  construction  of  giving  ordinary meaning to  the various  expressions used in the legislation and to  construe various  Sections of  the  enactment  as  a whole, each  provision, [in  the words  of  Lord  Wright  in jennings Vs.  Kelly [1939  (4) All  ER  464  (HL)]  throwing light, if  need be,  on the  rest. This  rule has since been accepted by  this Court in Tahsildar Singh Vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1959  SC 1012)  in which  Subba Rao, J.(as he then was) speaking for the Court said:-      "    The cardinal  rule of  construction      of the  provisions of  a section  with a

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    proviso is  to apply  the broad  general      rule of  construction, which  is that  a      section or  enactment must  be construed      as a  whole, each portion throwing light      if need be on the rest.           The true  principle undoubtedly  is      that  the   sound   interpretation   and      meaning of the statute, on a view of the      enacting  clause,   saving  clause,  and      proviso, taken  and construed  together,      is to prevail."      In Madan  Lal Fakir  Chand Dudhediya Vs. Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1543) Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed:-           "The  first  rule  of  construction      which is  elementary , is that the words      used in  the section must be given their      plain grammatical  meaning. Since we are      dealing with  two sub-sections  of S.76,      it is  necessary that  the said two sub-      section must  be construed  as  a  whole      "each portion  throwing light,  if  need      be, on the rest."      Reverting back to Section 14, we may immediately notice the striking feature that this Section begins with the words "Save as  otherwise expressly  provided in  this Act"  which constitute  an  extremely  significant  expression  as  they purport to  construed a "Saving Clause". This expression has also been  used in  the opening  part of  Sub-section (3) of Section 14.      What is intended to be saved is indicated in Section 28 which,  incidentally,   also   purports   to   exclude   the jurisdiction of  almost all  the Courts  in service matters. Section 14  and Section  28  have,  therefore,  to  be  read together to  find out  the real intent of the legislature as to the extent of jurisdiction retained or excluded.      The jurisdiction  which is transferred to and vested in the Tribunal  is the jurisdiction of a the Courts except the Supreme Court which is expressly excluded.      The "matters"  in respect  of which this "jurisdiction" is to  be exercised are also indicated in this Section. That is why  it  is  provided  in  Section  19  that  any  person aggrieved by an "order" (defined in the Explanation appended to Sub-section  (1)  of  that  Section)  pertaining  to  any "matter" within  the  "jurisdiction"  of  the  Tribunal  may approach the  Tribunal for  the redressal  of his grievance. While Section  19 operates  "subject to  other provisions of the Act", the field of operation of Section 14 is limited by the use  of the  words "save as otherwise espressly provided in this  Act". These words control and regulate whole of the Section not  only in  respect of "jurisdiction" but also the "matters" specified  therein. This  constitutes the original jurisdiction of the Tribunal.      The appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal is indicated in Section  29 and 29A of the Act. While all appeals pending in various Courts, except those pending in the high Court on the  date   from  which  Tribunal  became  functional  stand transferred to  the Tribunal  by the  force of  the Act, the appeals in  all  cases  which  were  decided  prior  to  the establishment of  Tribunals, are required to be filed before the Tribunal,  if they  had not  already been filed provided the  cause  of  action  on  which  the  case  was  based  is cognizable by the Tribunal.      The appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal is extremely limited and  was conferred  on  the  Tribunal  so  that  the

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judgment, if  any passed,  for example, by a Munsif or Civil or Subordinate  Judge in  a Civil Suit relating to a service matter (decided  before the  establishment of  the tribunal) may be  challenged before  the Tribunal notwithstanding that the judgment  passed in that suit is not covered by the word "order" defined  in the  explanation appended to sub-section (i) of Section 14. Except the appeals, which are transferred to the Tribunal or the appeals which may be filed before the Trubunal in  the above circumstances, no other appeals would lie before the Tribunal.      The "Saving  Clause" or the "Saving Phrase" (not in the sense of  "Repeals and Savings") divides "jurisdiction" into two classes,  namely, "jurisdiction" which is transferred to and vested  in the  Tribunal and "jurisdiction" which is not so transferred  and is,  on the  contrary, saved.  When  the jurisdiction thus became exercisable by the Tribunal, it was provided by  Section 28  that no  court shall  exercise  the jurisdiction, powers and authority on and from the date from which  such   jurisdiction,  powers  and  authority  becomes exercisable by a Tribunal. It, however, excepts-      (a)  the Supreme Court; or      (b)  any  Industrial   Tribunal,  Labour           Court    or     other     authority           constituted  under  the  Industrial           Disputes Act,  1947  or  any  other           corresponding  law   for  the  time           being in force.      It is,  therefore, apparent that in spite of Section 14 of the  Act, the  jurisdiction of  the Industrial  Tribunal, Labour Courts  or other  Authorities, under  the  Industrial Disputes  Acts   or  Authority   created  under   any  other Corresponding Law  remains unaffected.  The original, or for that matter,  the Appellate  Authority under  the Payment of Wages Act  is neither  an Industrial  Tribunal nor  a Labour Court  nor  are  they  "Authorities"  under  the  Industrial Disputes Act,  1947 but  if the  Payment  of  Wages  Act  is ultimately  found   to  be   a  "Corresponding   Law",   the jurisdiction of  the Authorities  under the Payment of Wages Act would also be saved. Let us take up this exercise.      Payment of  Wages Act,  1936 is  an Act to regulate the payment of wages to certain classes of person employed in an industry. The  Act was  amended from  time to  time and  was ultimately amended  in 1982  by Act  38  of  1982  with  the following objects and reasons:-           "The Payment  of  Wages  Act,  1936      regulates  the   payment  of   wages  to      certain classes  of persons  employed in      industry. It  was enacted to ensure that      the wages  payable to  employees covered      by  the   Act  are   dispersed  by   the      employers  within  the  prescribed  time      limit and  that no deductions other than      those authorised  by law are made by the      employers.  The   Act  applies   proprio      vigore  to   the  payment  of  wages  to      persons employed  in any  factory or  to      persons employed in railway by a railway      administration   either    directly   or      through a  sub-contractor. Further,  the      State Government are empowered to extend      the  provision   of  the  Act  to  cover      persons  employed   in  any   industrial      establishment or  any class  or group of      Industrial establishments  as defined in

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    the  Act.   The  wage   limit  for   the      applicability of  the Act  is Rs.  1,000      per mensem.  it is proposed to amend the      Act  with   a  view   to  extending  its      protection to a larger number of persons      and making  the provisions  of  the  Act      more effective and beneficial."      While  the  Act,  to  begin  with,  was  applicable  to industrial establishments  so as  to ensure payment of wages to workmen  or persons  employed in  an industry  at regular intervels without any unauthorised deduction, the amendments introduced by  Act 38  of 1982  widened  the  scope  of  the original Act as many "other establishments" could be brought within its  purview on  a Gazette Notification issued either by the Central Government or the State Government.      Section 2 contains definition of various terms, namely, "Employed person",  "Employer",  "Factory",  "Industrial  or other establishments",  "Railway Administration" and "wages" etc.  Almost  all  these  terms  are  also  defined  in  the Industrial Disputes  Act. In  order  to  understand  whether payment of  Wages Act  is part  of  the  legislative  scheme governing Industrial  Law, we  would, by way of illustration concentrate on  "Wages" and  its recovery  from the employer through judicial  process.  The  definition  of  "Wages"  in Section 2(vi)  is an  exhaustive definition which is in very wide terms. Its relevant portion is quoted below:-      "2(vi).   "Wages" means all remuneration      (whether by way of salary, allowances or      otherwise) expressed  in terms  of money      or capable  of being  so expressed which      would,  if   the  terms  of  employment,      express or  implied, were  fulfilled, be      payable to  a person employed in respect      of his  employment or  of work  done  in      such employment, and includes-           (a)  any remuneration payable under           any award or settlement between the           parties or order of a Court;           (b)  any remuneration  to which the           person  employed   is  entitled  in           respect   of   overtime   work   or           holidays or any leave period;           (c)  any  additional   remuneration           payable   under    the   terms   of           employment (whether  called a bonus           or by any other name);           (d)  any sum  which  by  reason  of           termination of  employment  of  the           person employed  is  payable  under           any  law,  contract  or  instrument           which provides  for the  payment of           such sum,  whether with  of without           deductions but does not provide for           the time  within the  payment is to           be made;           (e)  any sum  to which  the  person           employed  is   entitled  under  any           scheme framed under any law for the           time being in force;           but does not include -           (1).........................           (2).........................           (3).........................           (4).........................           (5).........................

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         (6).........................      Under the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947,  the  term "Wages" has been defined in Section 2(rr) as under:-      "2(rr).   "Wages" means all remuneration      capable of  being expressed  in terms of      money, which  would,  if  the  terms  of      employment,  express  or  implied,  were      fulfilled, be  payable to  a workman  in      respect of  his employment  or  of  work      done in such employment, and includes-      (i)  such allowances (including dearness      allowance [20] as the workman is for the      time being entitled to;      (ii) the    value     of    any    house      accommodation, or  of supply  of  light,      water,  medical   attendance  or   other      amenity or  of any  service  or  of  any      concessional  supply  of  foodgrains  or      other articles;      (iii)     any travelling concession;      (iv) any  commission   payable  on   the      promotion of sales or business or both;      but does not include-      (a).....................................      (b).....................................      (c).....................................      If the  "Wages" are not paid within the prescribed time limit or deductions, other than those authorised by law, are made by the employers, the employee can recover it under the Payment of  Wages Act  for which  an elaborate machinery has been provided  in Section  15 relevant  portion of  which is quoted below:-      "15. Claims arising  out  of  deductions      from wages  or delay in payment of wages      and penalty  for malicious  or vexatious      claims:-      (1)  The  State   Government   may,   by      notification in  the  official  Gazette,      appoint  [a  presiding  officer  of  any      Labour  Court  of  Industrial  Tribunal,      constituted   under    the    Industrial      Disputes Act,  1947  (14  of  1947),  or      under any  corresponding law relating to      the  investigation   and  settlement  of      industrial  disputes  in  force  in  the      state or] any Commissioner for Workmen’s      compensation  or   other  officer   with      experience as  a Judge  of a Civil Court      of as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the      authority to  hear and  decide  for  any      specified area all claims arising out of      deductions from  the wages,  or delay in      payment  of   the  wages   [of   persons      employed  or   paid  in   that   areal],      including all matters incidental to such      claims:           Provided  that   where  the   State      Government considers  it necessary so to      authority for  any  specified  area  and      may,  by   general  or   special  order,      provide   for    the   distribution   or      allocation of  work to  be performed  by      them under this Act.      (2)  Where contrary to the provisions of      this Act  any deduction  has  been  made

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    from the wages of an employed person, or      any payment  of wages  has been delayed,      such  person   himself,  or  any;  legal      practitioner  or   any  official   of  a      registered  trade  union  authorised  in      writing to  act on  his behalf,  or  any      inspector under  this Act,  or any other      person acting with the permission of the      authority  appointed  under  sub-section      (1), may  apply to  such authority for a      direction under sub-section (3):           Provided    that     every     such      application shall  be  presented  within      [twelve months]  from the  date on which      the deduction from the wages was made or      from the  date on  which the  payment of      the wages  was due  to be  made, as  the      case may be:           Provided    further     that    any      application may  be admitted  after  the      said period  of [twelve months] when the      applicant satisfies  the authority  that      he had  sufficient cause  for not making      the application within such period.      (3)  When  any  application  under  sub-      section   (2)    is   entertained,   the      authority shall  hear the  applicant and      the   employer    of    other    persons      responsible for  the  payment  of  wages      under  Section   3,  or   give  them  an      opportunity of  being heard,  and, after      such further  inquiry (if any) as may be      necessary, may, without prejudice to any      other penalty  to which such employer or      other person  is liable  under this Act,      direct the refund to the employed person      of the  amount deducted,  or the payment      of the  payment of  such compensation as      the  authority   may  think   fit,   not      exceeding ten  times the amount deducted      in the  former case  and [not  exceeding      twenty-five rupees  in the  latter,  and      even  if  the  amount  deducted  or  the      delayed  wages   are  paid   before  the      disposal of  the application, direct the      payment of  such  compensation,  as  the      authority may  think fit,  not exceeding      twenty-five rupees]:           (a)  a bona fide error or bona fide           dispute as to the amount payable to           the employed person, or           (b)  the    occurrence     of    an           emergency,  or   the  existence  of           exceptional   circumstances,   such           that the person responsible for the           payment of  the wages  was  unable,           thought    exercising    reasonable           diligence, to  make prompt payment,           or           (c)  the failure  of  the  employed           person  to   apply  for  or  accept           payment.      (4) .................................      (4-A) ...............................      (4-B) ...............................

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    (5) ................................."      Before proceeding  further, we may point out that there have been  many local  amendments made  almost  by  all  the States in the Act but for purposes of the question under our consideration, will  refer to  the text  of the  Central Act which is the parent Act.      A perusal  of Section  15(1) would  indicate  that  the State  Government   has  to  constitute  an  "authority"  by appointing either the Presiding Officer of a Labour court of Industrial  Tribunal   or  any  commissioner  for  Workmen’s Compensation or  a Judge  of a  Civil Court  or  Stipendiary Magistrate to  hear and  decide all  claims arising  out  of deductions from  the wages  or delay  in  payment  of  wages including all  matters incidental  thereto. If  an  employee does not get his wages in time and its payment is delayed or deductions are  made from  the wages  unauthorisedly, he may either personally  or through  a legal  practitioner or  any official of  a  registered  Trade  Union  or  any  Inspector appointed under  the Act,  may,  apply  to  the  "Authority" constituted  under  the  Act  and  the  latter  namely,  the "Authority", after  hearing the employer or any other person responsible for  payment of  wages, may direct the refund of the amount deducted or payment of delayed wages, as the case may be,  together with  compensation as  indicated  in  Sub- section(3) of Section 15 without prejudice to the penalty to which the  employer or  the other person may be liable under the Act.  The amount  so  awarded  is  recoverable  as  fine imposed by  a Magistrate  as indicated in Sub-section (5) of Section 15.      Under section  33 C  of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act, there is  an altogether  different  machinery  provided  for recovery of wages etc. It provides as under:-      "33C.     Recovery of  money due from an      employer- (1)  Where any money is due to      a  workman  from  an  employer  under  a      settlement or  an  award  or  under  the      provisions of  [Chapter V A or Chapter V      B], the  workman himself  or  any  other      person authorised  by him  in writing in      this behalf,  or, in  the  case  of  the      death of  the workman,  his assignee  or      heirs  may,  without  prejudice  to  any      other  mode   of   recovery,   make   an      application    to     the    appropriate      Government of  the recovery of the money      due  to  him,  and  if  the  appropriate      government is  satisfied that  any money      is so  due, it shall issue a certificate      for that  amount to  the  Collector  who      shall proceed to recover the same in the      same  manner   as  an   arrear  of  land      revenue:           Provided    that     every     such      application shall  be  made  within  one      year from  the date  on which  the money      became  due  to  the  workman  from  the      employer:           Provided  further   that  any  such      application may be entertained after the      expiry of  the said  period of one year,      if   the   appropriate   Government   is      satisfied   that   the   applicant   had      sufficient  cause  for  not  making  the      application within the said period.      (2)  Where any  workman is  entitled  to

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    receive from  the employer  any money or      any benefit  which is  capable of  being      computed in  terms of  money and  if any      question arises  as  to  the  amount  of      money due  or as  to the amount at which      such benefit  should be  computed,  then      the question  may, subject  to any rules      that may  be made  under  this  Act,  be      decided by  such Labour  Court as may be      specified  in   this   behalf   by   the      appropriate Government  [within a period      not exceeding three months].           [Provided that  where the presiding      oifficer of  a Labour Court considers it      necessary or  expedient so to do he may,      for reasons  to be  recorded in  writing      extend  such   period  by  such  further      period as he may think fit.]      (3)  For the  purposes of  computing the      money value  of a  benefit,  the  Labour      Court may,  if it so thinks fit, appoint      a commissioner  who shall,  after taking      such  evidence   as  may  be  necessary,      submit a  report to the Labour Court and      the Labour  Court  shall  determine  the      amount after  considering the  report of      the commissioner and other circumstances      of the case.      (4)  The decision  of the  Labour  Court      shall  be   forwarded  by   it  to   the      appropriate Government  and  any  amount      found due  by the  Labour Court  may  be      recovered in  the manner provided for in      sub-section (1).      (5)  Where workmen  employed  under  the      same employer  are entitled  to  receive      from  him   any  money  or  any  benefit      capable of  being computed  in terms  of      money, then,  subject to  such rules  as      may be  made in  this behalf,  a  single      application  for  the  recovery  of  the      amount due  may be  made on behalf of or      in  respect   of  any   number  of  such      workmen."      Under Sub-section  (i) of  Section 33  C the amount for the recovery  of which  proceedings may  be initiated  by  a workman,  may  also  consist  of  the  amount  due  under  a settlement or  an award.  This  may  be  compared  with  the definition of  "wages" as  contained in Section 2(vi) of the Payment of  Wages Act,  which  also  includes  "remuneration payable under  any Award  or Settlement". It is obvious that if any  part of  this amount  is withheld  or its payment is unreasonably delayed,  the employee can recover it under the Payment of Wages Act.      In Town  Municipal Council,  Athani  Vs.  Labour  Court (1969  (2)   Labour  Law  Journal  651),  this  Court  while affirming the  decision of  the  Mysore  High  Court,  since reported in  1968(1) Labour  Law Journal 779, laid down that questions relating  to  payment  of  minimum  wages  to  the employee at  the agreed rate or any amount for overtime work or for  work on  off-days can  be considered and decided not only under  the Payment  of wages Act but also under Section 33 C(2)  of the  Industrial  disputes  Act  1947,  and  that jurisdiction of  the Labour  court under  Section 33C (2) is not in the Payment of Wages Act.

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    This decision  has been  cited only  as  an  effort  to indicated that  claim for  wages can be entertained not only under the payment of Wages Act bu also under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.      Thus, the  character and  function of  the Labour Court under the  Industrial Disputes  Act as  also  the  Authority under the  Payment of  Wages Act  are similar in purpose and both are designed to produce the same result particularly as some of the provisions under both the Act prescribe the same thing to be done.      The Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947 and  the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 are, therefore, "Corresponding Law" qua each other particularly  as both  are part  of  the  same  social legislative canopy  made by  the  Parliament  for  immediate amelioration of workmen’s plight resulting from non-payment, or delayed  payment or,  for that  matter, short  payment of their wages.      The word  "corresponding" is  defined in Shorter Oxford Dictionary as  "answering  to  in  character  and  function; similar to."  This meaning  has been  adopted in  Winter Vs. Ministry of  Transport (1972  NZLR 539) in which it has been observed as under:-      We  read  "corresponding"  in  s.20A  as      including a new section dealing with the      same subject matter as the old one, in a      manner or  with  a  result  not  so  far      different from  the old as to strain the      accepted    meaning    of    the    word      "corresponding" as  given in the Shorter      Oxford English  Dictionary -  "answering      to in  character and  function;  similar      to". The  new [section]  answers to  the      old one... in character and function; it      is similar  in purpose,  prescribes  the      same thing  to be  done, and is designed      to produce  the same  result. We hold it      to  be  a  "corresponding  section".[See      Words & Phrases 3rd Edition Vol.1]      Our conclusion,  therefore, is  irresistible  that  the "Authority", constituted  under section 15 and the Appellate Authority under Section 17 of the Payment of wages Act, fall within  the   exception  indicated  in  Section  28  of  the Administrative Tribunal Act and this Act, namely, Payment of Wages  Act,   is  positively   covered  by  the  connotation "Corresponding Law"  used in that section. consequently, the jurisdiction of  the Authority to entertain and decide claim cases under  Section 15  of the  Payment of  Wags Act is not affected  by   the  establishment   of  the   Administrative Tribunals.      Learned counsel  for the respondent then contended that since Clause  (b) of Section 2 has been deleted by Act No.19 of 1986  and the  Act has ben made applicable to all persons employed in  Industrial establishments and factories to whom the Act,  as originally enacted did not apply, and since the jurisdiction of  all Courts  has come  to be  vested in  the Tribunal, an appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act cannot be legally filed before a "Court" and, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in the instant case to dispose of the appeal  on merits  after receiving  it on transfer under Section 29  from the  court  of  the  District  Judge.  This contention, too, has no substance.      While deleting  Clause (b) from Section 2 so as to make the Act  applicable to  workmen etc.,  the Parliament by the same Amending  Act, namely,  Act No.19  of 1986,  introduced Clauses (a)  and (b)  in Section  28 so  as to  preserve the

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jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Labour  Courts, Industrial Tribunals  and ,  as we  have already  found, the Authorities under  the Payment  of Wages  Act which  we have further found  to be  "Corresponding Law" within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 28.      it appears  strange that  although Act has been applied to persons  working in  factories etc.,  the jurisdiction to try their cases has not been given to the Tribunal. This is, indeed, an incongruity. But then incongruity is the habit of legislative drafting.      In this  connection, we  may, refer again to Section 29 and 29A as under both the section, the emphasis is on "cause of  action".   Under  Section  29,  an  appeal  shall  stand transferred to,  and under  Section 29A,  an appeal  can  be filed before,  the Tribunal  if the cause of action on which "suit  or   proceedings"  were  initiated  would  have  been cognisable by  the Tribunal.  Since on the original cause of action, a claim under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act could not  have been  made to the Tribunal, the appeal would not stand  transferred to  nor can  appeal contemplted under Section 17  of the  Payment of Wages Act be filed before it. The Appellate  Authority is  part of  the  Justice  Delivery System constituted  under Section  17 of the Payment of Wage Act.  Its   jurisdiction  will   not  be   affected  by  the establishment of  Administrative Tribunals  particularly  as appeal has  always been  treated to be a continuation of the original proceedings.  Consequently, the  two tier  judicial system, original as well as appellate, constituted under the "Corresponding Law",  like the Payment of Wages Act, are not affected by the constitution of the Tribunals and the system shall continue  to function  as before, with the result that if any  case is  decided under  Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act,  it will  not be  obligatory to  file  an  appeal before the  Tribunal as  required by  Section 29A of the Act but the  appeal shall lie under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act  before the  District Judge.  The pending  appeals shall also, therefore, not stand transferred to the Tribunal under Section  29 of the Act. If it were a mere matter under general or common law and an appeal arising from a suit in a service matter decided by the Trial Court and pending in the Court of  the District  Judge under  Section 96 C.P.C. would have ben  the subject  of controversy  whether it  would  be transferred to  the Tribunal  or not,  our answer would have been an  instant "eye"  but the matter involved before us is different  as   it  relates   to  the  exercise  of  special jurisdiction by  the District  Judge under  Payment of Wages Act, which is a protected jurisdiction.      Any other  view will  be destructive  not only  of  the "Saving Clause"  in the  opening part of Section 14 but also of the exceptions carved out in Section 28 together with the "cause of  action" theory contained in Section 29 and 29A of the Act.      Learned counsel  for the respondent has placed reliance on  a   Full  Bench   decision  of  the  Chandigarh  Central Administrative Tribunal  in Union  of India  Vs. Sarup Chand Singla (1)  [1989 (1)  All India  Services Law  Journal  491 (CAT)] in  which it  has been  held that  since the District Judge is a Court within the meaning of Section 14(1) as also Section 28  of the  Act, it  is left with no jurisdiction to hear and  decide the  appeals pending  before it on and from the  date   on  which  the  Tribunals  were  established  as jurisdiction,  power  and  authority  of  all  Courts  stood transferred to  the Tribunal. This decision, in our opinion, is erroneous and does not lay down the correct law. The Full Bench did  not consider  the impact  of the  words  Save  as

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otherwise provided in the Act" used in Section 14 nor did it consider the  significance of  the words "Corresponding Law" occurring in Section 28 of the Act.      We wind  up this  discussion with  the last  words that though the  Tribunal has ben constituted as a substitute for the High  Court under  Article 323  A, the Labour Courts and Industrial  Tribunals   etc.  over   which  the  High  Court exercises supervisory jurisdiction continue to function with the incongruous  result that  though the  High Court  cannot quash their  judgments, it  must continue to supervise their functioning. Let  us await  the decision of the Constitution Bench.      For the  reasons set out above, we allow the appeal and set aside  the judgment  and order  dated 04.07.94 passed by the Administrative  Tribunal, Chandigarh and direct that the appeal papers shall be transmitted forthwith to the District Judge, Chandigarh for disposal on merits.