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PETITIONER: KRISHAN LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/04/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1252            1980 SCR  (3) 305  1980 SCC  (3) 159  CITATOR INFO :  F          1983 SC 911  (9)

ACT:      Indian Penal  Code 1860  (XLV of 1860) Section 376-Rape on  young   girl-Necessity  of   corroboration   of   girl’s testimony-Nature and extent of corroboration necessary.

HEADNOTE:      The prosecution  alleged that  a girl below 16 years of age was  sleeping outside her house with her family and that the petitioner in the company of another (acquitted accused) carried her away under intimidation to a neighbouring godown belonging to  another acquitted accused and in that secluded venue committed  rape on  the young woman and afterwards put her back on her cot.      The trial court convicted the petitioner but on grounds of benefit  of doubt  acquitted the  other accused. The High Court affirmed this order.      In the  special leave  petition to  this Court,  it was contended on  behalf of  the petitioner that the evidence of the  prosecutrix   without  substantial  corroboration,  was inadequate to rest a conviction under section 376 IPC.      Dismissing the special leave petition, ^      HELD 1.  To  forsake  vital  consideration  and  go  by obsolete  demands   for  substantial   corroboration  is  to sacrifice commonsense  in favour of an artificial concoction called ’judicial’ probability. [308A]      2. Human psychology and behavioural probability must be borne in  mind when assessing the testimonial potency of the victim’s version.  What girl  would foster rape charges on a stranger unless  a  remarkable  set  of  facts  or  cleanest motives are made out? The inherent bashfulness, the innocent naivete and  the feminine tendency to conceal the outrage of masculine sexual  aggression are  factors which are relevant to improbabilise  the hypothesis  of false  implication. The injury on  the person of the victim has corroborative value. [307G]      3. The court loses its credibility if it rebels against realism. The law court is not an unnatural world. [308 B]      4. Merely  because the trial court has ultra-cautiously acquitted someone,  the higher  court must, for that reason,

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cannot acquit everyone. [308C]      5. A  socially sensitized  judge is  a better statutory armour against gender outrage than long clauses of a complex section with all the protections writ into it. [308C]      6. Observation  on probative force of circumstances are not  universal  laws  of  nature  but  guidelines  and  good counsel. [307 F]      Gurcharan Singh  v. State  of Haryana  AIR 1972 SC 2661 referred to. 306

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Crl.) 2599 of 1979.      From the  Judgment and  Order  dated  9-7-1979  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl.A. 1228/1976.      S. K Sabharwal and R.C. Kohli for the petitioner.      The order of the Court was delivered by,      KRISHNA IYER, J, A rapist-if the concurrent findings of the courts  below were  correct has  chosen to  seek special leave to challenge his crime and punishment, and his counsel has attacked the verdict of culpability as wholly unfounded. Indeed,   it    is   redundant,   and   absent   exceptional circumstances, out of bounds, for this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under  Art. 136,  to launch upon an exploration and re-appreciation  of  the  evidence,  its  strengths  and weaknesses with  a view to sit in judgment over the holdings of the High Court in affirmance of those of the trial Court.      Briefly, we  will touch  upon one  or two circumstances without claiming  to be exhaustive in any manner. One Shashi Bala of  Ambala was  sleeping, with  her  mother  and  other children,  outside   her  house  in  hot  July  (1975).  The petitioner, in  the company  of another (acquitted accused), carried her away under intimidation to a neighbouring godown belonging to  one Tilak  Raj (another acquitted accused) and in that  secluded venue  committed rape  on the young women. After subjecting  her to these beasteal acts of lust, Shashi Bala, who  by then  was nearly  unconscious, was put back in her cot from where she had been removed. In the morning, the mother of  the victim  found blood  on the daughter’s salwar and  thereupon   she  complainingly  narrated  the  criminal assault of  the previous night. On the return of the father, P.W. 7,  who had been away, the victim went, in his company, to the police station, lodged a report which was followed by investigation and  charge-sheet. The  Court, after  a trial, convicted the  present petitioner but, on grounds of benefit of doubt,  acquitted the  rest. Medical evidence showed that the raped  girl was  below 16  years of  age. We are not too happy about the acquittal but since the State has not chosen to come  up in appeal against the acquittal, we do not probe the matter further.      Counsel for  the petitioner persistently urged that the evidence   of    the   prosecutrix,    without   substantial corroboration, was  inadequate to rest a conviction under s. 376 I.P.C.  He relied  on  observations  of  this  Court  in Gurucharan Singh v. State of Haryana for the pro- 307 position that  although a  prosecutrix is not an accomplice, her evidence,  as a  rule of  prudence, is  viewed by courts unfavourably unless  reinforced by  corroboration "so  as to satisfy its  conscience that  she is  telling the  truth and that the present accused of rape on her has not been falsely implicated". It  is true that old English cases, followed in

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British Indian  courts, had led to a tendency on the part of judge made law that the advisability of corroboration should be present  to the  mind of  the  Judge  "except  where  the circumstance make  it safe  to dispense  with it". Case-law, even in  those days,  had clearly  spelt out  the  following propositions:           "The tender years of the child, coupled with other      circumstances appearing  in the case, such, for example      as its  demeanour,  unlikelihood  of  tutoring  and  so      forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that is      a question  of fact in every case. The only rule of law      is that  this rule  of prudence  must be present to the      mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be      understood and  appreciated by him or them. There is no      rule of  practice that  there must,  in every  case, be      corroboration before  a conviction  can be  allowed, to      stand."           "It  would  be  impossible,  indeed  it  would  be      dangerous to  formulate  the  kind  of  evidence  which      should, or  would, be  regarded as  corroboration.  Its      nature  and   extent   must   necessarily   vary   with      circumstances of  each case  and also  according to the      particular circumstances of the offence charged." Observations on  probative force  of circumstances  are  not universal laws of nature but guidelines and good counsel.      We must  bear in  mind human psychology and behavioural probability when  assessing the  testimonial potency  of the victim’s version.  What girl  would foist a rape charge on a stranger unless  a  remarkable  set  of  facts  or  clearest motives  were   made  out?  The  inherent  bashfulness,  the innocent naivete  and the  feminine tendency  to conceal the outrage of masculine sexual aggression are factors which are relevant  to   improbabilise   the   hypothesis   of   false implication.  The  injury  on  the  person  of  the  victim, especially her  private parts,  has corroborative value. Her complaint to  her parents  and the  presence of blood on her clothes are  also testimony  which warrants  credence.  More than all,  it baffles  belief in  human nature  that a  girl sleeping with her mother and other children in the open will come by  blood on  her garments  and injury  in her  private parts unless  she has been subjected to the torture of rape. And if rape has been committed, 308 as counsel more or less conceded, why, of all persons in the world, should the victim hunt up the petitioner and point at him  the   accusing   finger?   To   forsake   these   vital considerations and go by obsolescent demands for substantial corroboration is  to sacrifice  commonsense in  favour of an artificial concoction called ’Judicial’ probability. Indeed, the  court  loses  its  credibility  if  it  rebels  against realism. The law court is not an unnatural world.      We are  not satisfied  that merely  because  the  trial court has  ultra-cautiously acquitted  someone,  the  higher court must,  for that reason, acquit everyone, Reflecting on this case we feel convinced that a socially sensitised judge is a  better statutory  armour against  gender outrage  than long clauses  of a  complex section with all the protections writ into it. N.V.K.    Petition dismissed. 309