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PETITIONER: KM. NEELIMA MISRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DR. HARINDER KAUR PAINTAL AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/03/1990

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II

CITATION:  1990 AIR 1402            1990 SCR  (2)  84  1990 SCC  (2) 746        JT 1990 (2)   103  1990 SCALE  (1)596

ACT:     Uttar  Pradesh  State Universities Act,   1973:  Section 31(8)(a)    University--Procedure    for    selection     of teachers--Recommendation  of Selection  Committee--Executive Council’s  disagreement  with  recommendation-Reference   to Chancellor--Chancellor’s decision final-Nature and scope  of Chancellor’s  function--Held administrative in  nature--Does not  require  application of principle of  natural  justice- Section 31 confers no right to make representation to Execu- tive Council or to the Chancellor against the recommendation of selection Committee-But eligible candidate has a right to have his case considered.     Service      Law--Judicial    review     of     academic appointments-Academic appointments based on  recommendations of  Experts--In  the absence of mala fides Court  should  he slow to interfere with experts opinion.     Administrative  law--Quasi-judicial   function--Adminis- trative function--Distinction between--Power to make binding and  conclusive orders--Is not by itself a  decisive  factor that  power is judicial-Existence of  other  characteristics necessary.     Constitution   of   India,   1950:   Article   14--State action--Legislative,  executive or  quasi-judicial--Must  be guided by principle of equality.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant and the respondents applied for the  post of  Reader  in Psychology in Lucknow University.  Under  the University  Statute, the minimum qualification for the  post was a Doctorate degree or a published work of high  standard in  the  subject. The respondents  possessed  Ph.D.  degree, while the appellant’s thesis was nearing completion.     On  the  basis  of her experience,  performance  at  the interview and published work, which was found to be of  high standard on the subject, the Selection Committee recommended the appellant’s appointment by grading her No. 1. 85     By a split of the majority, the Executive Council  disa- greed with the recommendation of the Selection Committee  on the ground that the appellant did not possess the  essential qualification  for the post of Reader and it  preferred  the

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appointment of respondent No. 2.     In  view of the Council’s disagreement, the  matter  was referred  to the Chancellor for his decision  under  Section 31(8)(a)  of  the  U.P. State Universities  Act,  1973.  The Chancellor  rejected  the opinion of Executive  Council  and accepted the recommendations of the Selection Committee  and directed that the appellant should be appointed as a Reader.     Respondent  No. 1 challenged the Chancellor’s  order  by filing  a writ petition in the High Court,  which  following its earlier Full Bench decision wherein it was held that the Chancellor  must explicitly state the reasons for his  deci- sion  and  was enjoined by the Act  to  act  quasijudicially quashed the Chancellor’s order with a direction to reconsid- er the matter.     In  the  appeal  to this Court on the  question  of  the nature  of the Chancellor’s power under Section 31(8)(a)  of the  U.P. State Universities Act, 1973: Allowing the  appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court, this Court,     HELD: 1. Three authorities are involved in the Selection of University teachers’ (i) Selection Committee, (ii) Execu- tive Council and (iii) The Chancellor. The Selection Commit- tee for appointment of University teachers is a  recommenda- tory body the composition of which has been prescribed under section  31(4)(a).  The Executive Council is  the  principle executive body of the University. Subject to the  provisions of  the Act, it has power to appoint officers, teachers  and other employees of the University. Section 31(8)(a) seems to suggest  that if the Executive Council wants to  agree  with the  recommendation and appoint candidates in the  order  of merits,  no  reasons  are to be given. But if  it  wants  to disagree  with  the recommendations made  by  the  Selection Committee,  it  must give reasons for disagreement.  It  has however, no power to override the recommendation and appoint a  candidate of its own choice. It may disagree, but  should give  reasons  for disagreement and refer the  matter  under section 31(8)(a) to the Chancellor. Then the decision of the Chancellor  shall be binding on the Executive  Council.  The Chancellor  is  not  an appellate authority  in  matters  of appointment.  His decision is called for when the  Executive Council  disagree with the recommendation of  the  Selection Committee. What is referred to him 86 under  section  31(8)(a)  of the Act, is  therefore,  not  a dispute  between the Selection Committee and  the  Executive Council on any issue. Nor it is a dispute between two  rival candidates on any controversy. It is indeed a decision  with regard  to appointment of a particular person or persons  in the  light of the recommendation and opinion if any, of  the two statutory authorities. [94H; 95A, IL F-G; 99F-H]     1.1  The power of the Chancellor under Section  31(8)(a) is  purely  of administrative character and is  not  in  the nature  of judicial or quasijudicial power. No  judicial  or quasi-judicial  duty  is imposed on the Chancellor  and  any reference  to judicial duty, seems to be irrelevant  in  the exercise of his function. Such a power cannot be  considered as quasi-judicial power. [101 F-H]     L.N.  Malhur  v.  The  Chancellor,  Lucknow  University, Lucknow  &  Ors., A.I.R. 1986 All. 273; Dr. U.N.  Roy  v.G.D Tapase, [1981] UPLBEC, 309, disapproved.     2. Section 31 confers no right to make representation to the  Executive  Council  or to the  Chancellor  against  the recommendation  of  the  Selection Committee.  There  is  no provision  in the Section for hearing any candidate  or  the Executive Council. There is also no provision for  receiving evidence. The decision of the Chancellor in the exercise  of

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this  statutory  function does not  expressly  or  impliedly require the application of the principle of natural justice. [ I 01 B- 1)]     Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow and Ors.,  [1976] 3 SCC 585; held inapplicable. R.S.  Dass  v. Union of India. [1966] (Supp.) SCC  617;  re- ferred to.     2.1 The Chancellor, however, has to act properly for the purpose  for  which the power is conferred. He must  take  a decision  in accordance with the provisions of the  Act  and the Statutes. He must not be guided by extraneous or irrele- vant consideration. He must not act illegally,  irrationally or  arbitrarily. Any such illegal. irrational  or  arbitrary action or decision, whether in the nature of a  legislative, administrative or quasi-judicial exercise of power is liable to be quashed being violative of Article 14 of the Constitu- tion. [102B-C]     2.2  The order of the Chancellor impugned in  this  case indicates very clearly that he has considered the  recommen- dation  of the question Committee and the opinion  expressed by the Executive Council. The 87 minimum qualification prescribed for the post is a Doctorate in  the  subject of study concerned or a published  work  of high  standard  in the subject. The appellant was  found  to have  an alternate qualification though not a  Doctorate  in the subject. The Selection Committee has accepted the alter- nate  qualification  as  sufficient and did  not  relax  the essential qualification prescribed for the post. The  Execu- tive  Council appears to have committed an error in  stating that  the appellant has lacked the  essential  qualification and the Selection Committee has relaxed the essential quali- fication.  The Chancellor was, therefore, justified  in  re- jecting  the opinion of the Executive Council. His  decision gets support from the Statute I 1.01 of the First Statute of the Lucknow University. Accordingly the judgment of the High Court  and the consequential order made by the Registrar  of the  University reverting the appellant to  her  substantive post of Lecturer are set aside. Her original appointment  as Reader  pursuant  to the decision of  the  Chancellor  shall remain  undisturbed with all consequential benefits.  [102E, 103B-C, G]     3.  An administrative function is called  quasi-judicial when  there is an obligation to adopt the judicial  approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice.  Where there is no such obligation, the decision is called  ’purely administrative’ and there is no third category. 197G-H]     Ridge  v. Baldwin, [1963] 2 All. E.R. 66; G.  Nageshwara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation, [1959]  1 SCR 319; Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade 6th Ed. p. 46-47, referred to.     3.1 The conclusiveness of the decision without the  need for  confirmation  or  adoption by any  other  authority  is generally regarded as one of the features of judicial power. But the order made by a statutory authority even it is given finality  does  not thereby acquire judicial quality  if  no other characteristic of judicial power is present. Power  to make  orders  that  are binding and conclusive  is  not,  by itself a decisive factor to hold that the power is judicial. [101 E-F]     Prof.  Desmith, ’Judicial Review of  Administrative  Ac- tion’ 4th Ed., p. 82; referred to.     3.2 An administrative order which involves civil  conse- quences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the  Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. The  person  concerned

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must be informed of the case against him and the evidence in support thereof and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. [98G-H] 88     State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 625; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1963] 2 All. E.R. 66; referred to.     3.3 So far as the administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act  fairly. For this concept of fairness, adjudicative settings are  not necessary,  nor it is necessary to have lis  inter  parties. There need not be any struggle between two opposing  parties giving rise to a ’lis’. There need not be resolution of  lis inter  parties. The duty to act judically or to  act  fairly may  arise in widely different circumstances. It  may  arise expressly  or impliedly depending upon the context and  con- siderations. All these types of non-adjudicative administra- tive  decision  making  are now covered  under  the  general rubric of fairness in the administration. But then.even such an administrative decision unless it affects one’s  personal rights or one’s property rights, or the loss of or  prejudi- cially  affects something which would juridically be  called atleast a privilege does not involve the duty to act  fairly consistance with the rules of natural justice. [99A-E]     Keshva  Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1973]  3  SCR 22;  Mohinder  Singh Gill v.  Chief  Election  Commissioner. [1978]  1 SCC 405; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of  India, [1981] 1 SCC 664; Management of M/s M.S. Nally Bharat  Engi- neering Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors., Civil  Appeal No. 1102 of 1990 decided on 9.2.1990;’ referred to.     4.  In matters of appointment in the academic field  the Court  generally  does not interfere. The Courts  should  be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by the  experts in  the  absence of mala fide alleged against  the  experts. When  appointments are based on recommendations  of  experts nominated  by the Universities, the High Court has got  only to see whether the appointment had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance. The High Court should show due regard to the opinion expressed by the experts  constituting the Selection Committee and its recommendation on which  the Chancellor has acted. [103D-E]     University of Mysore & Anr. v.C.D. Govinda Rao, [1964] 4 SCR 575;  Dr.  J.B.  Kulshreshtha  &  Ors.  v.   Chancellor, Allahabad  University, Raj Bhavan & Ors., [1980] 3 SCR  902; Dalpat  Abasaheb  Soluke v.B.S. Mahajan, [1990] 1  SCR  305; followed.     5.  The  principle of equality enshrined in  Article  14 must  guide every state action, whether it  be  legislative, executive or quasi-judicial. [102C-D] 89        E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1974]  2 SCR 348; Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Ant., [1978] 1  SCC 248; Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid Mujib  Sehravardi  & Ors., [1981] I SCC 722; Som Raj & Ors. v. State Of  Haryana, JT 1990 1 SC 286; referred     5.1 In matters relating to public employment whether  by promotion  or  direct recruitment, only  requirement  to  be complied  with is the mandate of Articles 14 and 16  of  the Constitution. There shall be equality of opportunity and  no discrimination only on ground of religion, race, caste, sex, dissent,  place  of birth or residence or any of  them.  The eligible  candidate has a right to have his case  considered in accordance with law. [100F]

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JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 16 16-17 of 1990.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  22.5.1989  of  the Allahabad  High Court in Writ Petition No. 2777/78  &  dated 5.7.89 Review Petition No. 68(W)/89 in W.P. No. 2777/78.     K.  Parasaran,  Amitabh  Misra, S.  Murlidhar  and  M.S. Ganesh for the Appellant.     P.P. Rao, Raja Ram Aggarwal, E.C. Aggarwala, Atul  Shar- ma,  Ms. Purnima Bhatt, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit,  Lokesh  Kumar, R.D. Kewalramani and M.K. Garg for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Special Leave granted.     The Chancellor of the Lucknow University while  exercis- ing power under Section 31(8)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh  State Universities  Act,  1973 ("The Act") has directed  that  Km. Neeliam  Misra, the appellant herein should be appointed  as Reader in Psychology in the University. That order has  been quashed  by  the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow  Bench  in Writ  Petition  No.  2777 of 1978 ,at the  instance  of  Dr. Harinder  Kaur Paintal, respondent (1). This appeal is  from that judgment of the High Court. 90     The background of the case in the barest outline may  be stated as under.     The Lucknow University invited applications for appoint- ment  of Reader in Psychology from candidates who  possessed the prescribed qualifications. In response to the advertise- ment,  several  candidates  filed  their  applications.  The appellant  and  respondents  I to 5 were some  of  them  who offered  themselves as candidates. The Committee  which  was constituted  for  selection of candidates  called  them  for interview  along with some others. After  considering  their qualifications,  experience and relative performance in  the interview, the Selection Committee graded them as follows: "All the candidates who appeared for the interview possess a Ph.  D. degree. Km. Neelima Misra does not possess a Ph.  D. degree.  Her thesis is nearing ’completion. Her thesis  work alongwith her publication were scrutinised and it was  found that she satisfies the condition of published work of a high standard  in the subject, provided as an alternative to  Ph. D.  degree.  All  the candidates have  a  consistently  good academic record and more than 54% marks in the M.A. Examina- tions,  except Dr. C.B. Dwivedi, who has a 3rd  Division  in the  High  School, Dr. Ratan Singh who has 3rd  Division  in High School and B.A. 2. All the candidates possess the requisite teaching experi- ence of post graduate classes. 3. And the basis of the research work, publications, experi- ence and performance at the interview, the Committee  graded the candidates as follows: 1. Ms. Neelima Misra 2. Dr. (Km.) Mukta Rani Rastogi 3. Dr. (Smt.) Harinder Kaur Paintal 4. Dr. S.N. Rai The  rest of the candidates were found unsuitable. The  view of the above Committee recommended that Km Neelima Misra  be appointed to the post of Reader in Psychology." 91     Km.  Neelinia  Misra was found to have to her  credit  a published work of high standard in the subject of Psychology though she had no Ph. D. degree. Besides she was  considered to be more suitable on the basis of research work,  publica- tion,  experience  and  performance at  the  interview.  The Selection Committee, therefore, recommended her for appoint-

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ment to the post of Reader in Psychology.     That  recommendation came before the Executive  Council. The  Executive Council, by a split majority  disagreed  with the recommendation and preferred the appointment of respond- ent  (5)  Dr. (Km) M.R. Rastogi. It has expressed  the  view that the appellant did not possess the essential  qualifica- tions  prescribed for the post of Reader and therefore,  not suitable  for  appointment.  The opinion  expressed  by  the Executive Council is as under:           perusal of the bio data of Km. Neelima Misra shows that she does not possess Ph.D. degree nor has she submitted her  thesis so far. Yet it is strange to say that  her  pub- lished work is of a high standard. Thus she does not  fulfil requirement of essential qualifications and not suitable for the post.           The  bio data of Dr. (Km) M.R. Rastogi shows  that she possesses 11 years teaching experience of  post-graduate classes.  She  has a consistently good academic  record  and should  be  appointed Reader in Psychology as she  has  been graded No. 2 by the Selection Committee. Dr. (Smt.)  Harmder Kaur Paintal is a Lecturer since November 1972 and has  also a consistently good academic record and is suitable for  the post.           As  a consequence there is no question of  relaxa- tion  of essential qualification as candidate  of  requisite merit are available."     When there is thus disagreement with the  recommendation of  the Selection Committee, the matter must be referred  to the  Chancellor  for  his decision. That  is  the  mandatory requirement of Section 31(8)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the Executive Council referred the matter to the Chancellor. The Chancellor, however, by order dated August 16, 1978 did  not approve  of the Executive Council’s opinion to  appoint  Dr. (Km)  M.R. Rastogi. The Chancellor rejected the  opinion  of the Executive Council and accepted the recommendation of the 92 Selection  Committee and directed that the appellant  should be appointed as Reader. The Chancellor observed: "The  Selection Committee has unanimously  recommended  that Km.  Neelima  Misra be appointed to the post  of  Reader  in Psychology.  Instead of accepting this  recommendation,  the Executive  Council  held  by a majority of  6:5  votes  that Kumari  Neelima  Misra does not fulfil  the  requirement  of essential  qualifications and is not suitable for the  post. It  was of opinion that Dr. (Km) M.R. Rastogi who  has  been graded No. 2 by the Selection Committee should be  appointed and  that  Dr. (Smt) H.K. Paintal is also suitable  for  the post.          Km.  Neelima Misra does not possess a Doctorate  in the  subject of study, but the Selection Committee  has  re- corded  that  her  thesis alongwith  her  publications  were scrutinised  and it was found that she satisfies the  condi- tion  of published work of a high standard on  the  subject, which is an alternative to the Doctorate degree, as provided in Statute 11.01 read with Statute 11.02 of the First  Stat- utes  of Lucknow University. Thus Km. Neelima Misra  possess the essential prescribed minimum qualification. She has also been adjudged to be the most suitable candidate on the basis of  research work, publications and experience and  perform- ance  at interview, among all the candidates, by the  Selec- tion  Committee which was in a better position to Judge  the merits of the suitability of the appointment.          After  considering all the facts and  circumstances of the case, I approve the report of the Selection Committee and direct that the appointment order be issued accordingly.

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                                          Sd/- G.D. Tapase,                                                  Chancellor"     As per the decision of the Chancellor, the appellant was appointed as Reader in Psychology.     Dr. (Smt) Harmder Kaur Paintal, respondent 1, moved  the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the  Chancellor’s order. The Writ Petition was filed  on  17 August  1978 before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad  High Court and it was admitted on 93 30  March 1979. Ten years later i.e. on 3 May 1989 the  writ petition was listed for hearing before the Division Bench of the  High Court. On 22 May 1989, the judgment was  delivered by allowing the writ petition and quashing the  Chancellor’s order  with d direction to reconsider the matter.  It  seems that  learned Judges had little discretion in the matter  in view of an earlier decision of the High Court on the  nature and  scope of the Chancellor’s power under Section  31(8)(a) of  the Act. In L.N. Mathur v. The chancellor, Lucknow  Uni- versity,  Lucknow & Ors., AIR 1986 All. 273, the Full  Bench of the High Court by majority, inter alia, has held that the Chancellor  must state explicitly the reasons for his  deci- sion. The Chancellor in order to arrive at a decision has to make a judicial approach to the question and he is  enjoined by  the Act to act quasi-judicially. To reach  that  conclu- sion, the Full Bench has relied upon the observations in the Division  Bench judgment in Dr. U.N. Roy v.  His  Excellency Sr. G.D. Tapase, (The Ex-Governor, State of Uttar  Pradesh), Chancellor Allahabad University (1981 UPLBEC 309.) Following those  authorities, the learned Judges in the  present  case have  set  aside  the Chancellor’s order  making  some  more observations: "When difference of opinion between the Selection  Committee and  Executive  Council is referred to the  Chancellor,  his position  is  that of an Arbitrator and there is a  sort  of ’lis’  before  him and in case the Chancellor has  to  agree with the Selection Committee with which the Executive  Coun- cil has differed assigning particular reason, the Chancellor has  to  assign  reasons as to why he has  agreed  with  the recommendation made by the Selection Committee. The  dispute having  been raised, was to be decided atleast like  a  dis- pute"     At  this point, we may interrupt the narration and  ana- lyse  Section  1  of the Act which  provides  procedure  for selection   of  University  eachers.  Omitting   unnecessary clauses, the Section reads: "31(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the teachers of the University and the teachers of an affiliated or  associ- ated college (other than a college maintained exclusively by the  State Government) shall be appointed by  the  Executive Council  or the Management of the affiliated  or  associated college,  as  the case may be, on the  recommendation  of  a Selection Committee in the manner hereinafter provided. XXXX         XXXXX         XXXXX 94 (4)(a)The  Selection  Committee  for the  appointment  of  a teacher  of  the University (other than the Director  of  an Institute and the Principal of a constituent college)  shall consist of-- (i) the Vice-Chancellor who shall be the Chairman thereof,; (ii)the head of the Department concerned: XXX        XXX        XXX (iii)  in the case of a Professor or Reader, three  experts, and  in  any  other case, two experts be  nominated  by  the Chancellor;

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XXX         XXX         XXX (6) No recommendation made by a Selection Committee referred to in sub-section (4) shall be considered to be valid unless one of the experts had agreed to such selection. XXX         XXX         XXX (7-A) It shall be open to the Selection Committee to  recom- mend  one  or more but not more than three  names  for  each post. (8)(a)  In the case of appointment of a teacher of the  Uni- versity,  if the Executive Council does not agree  with  the recommendation  made by the Selection Committee, the  Execu- tive Council shall refer the matter to the Chancellor  along with  the  reasons of such disagreement,  and  his  decision shall be final. Provided  that  if  the Executive Council does  not  take  a decision  on the recommendations of the Selection  Committee within  a period of four months from the date of meeting  of such Committee, then also the matter shall stand referred to the Chancellor, and his decision shall be final."     Three  authorities  are  involved in  the  selection  of University teachers; (i) Selection Committee, (ii) Executive Council and (iii) Chancellor. 95     The  Selection Committee for appointment  of  University teachers  is a recommendatory body the composition of  which has  been  prescribed under section 31(4)(a). It is  a  high power  Committee of which the Vice-Chancellor shall  be  the Chairman.  The Head of the department concerned shall  be  a member. There shall also be expert members in the particular subject. The experts shall be drawn from outside the Univer- sity  and the Chancellor must nominate them. In the case  of appointment  of  Professor or Reader, there shall  be  three experts  and in any other case two experts in the  Selection Committee.  In  the  case of selection of  teachers  of  the University,  the recommendation of the  Selection  Committee shall not be valid unless atleast one of the experts  agrees to  such selection. The Selection Committee has the  liberty to recommend one or more candidates but not more than  three names for each post.     The Executive Council is the principal executive body of the  University whose powers and duties are  provided  under Section 21 of the Act. Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Executive Council has power to appoint officers,  teach- ers  and other employees of the University. The  appointment shall  be  made on the basis of recommendation made  by  the Selection  Committee, which means in the order of  merit  of candidates  arranged by the Selection Committee. The  Selec- tion Committee has expert members and it has thus the exper- tise  to judge the relative suitability of competing  candi- dates.  The  Executive Council has no such  experts  on  the subject  for  selection. Therefore,  the  Executive  Council shall  make  appointments  as per the  position  or  ranking obtained  in the recommendation, unless any other  rule  re- quires otherwise. Section 31(8)(a) seems to suggest that  if the Executive Council wants to agree with the recommendation and  appoint candidates in the order of merits,  no  reasons are to be given. But if it wants to disagree with the recom- mendations  made  by the Selection Committee, it  must  give reasons for disagreement. It has however, no power to  over- ride the recommendation and appoint a candidates of its  own choice.  It may disagree, but should give reasons for  disa- greement and refer the matter under section 31(8)(a) to  the Chancellor.  Then  the decision of the Chancellor  shall  be binding on the Executive Council.     The  nature  of  the Chancellor’s  power  located  under

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Section 31(8)(a) is now to be considered. The High Court has held that the Chancellor’s power is quasi-judicial. There is a  ’lis’ before the Chancellor for determination and he  has to decide the dispute as an arbitrator. 96     The suggested analogy with the position of an arbitrator was  not even supported by counsel for the respondents.  The essence of the attack of Mr. Parasaran, learned counsel  for the  appellant is that there is no legal or equitable  fight of parties or any dispute relating thereto for determination by  the  Chancellor and therefore, there is no duty  to  act judicially.  The Chancellor has only to consider the  recom- mendation  of the Selection Committee in the light of  disa- greement  if  any, expressed by the  Executive  Council  and direct  appointment of a candidate in the select  list.  The order  of the Chancellor, and his function, it  was  argued, are  purely administrative in nature. Mr. K.P. Rao  for  re- spondent (3) was indeed very fair in his submission. He  did not  say  that there is a ’lis’ before  the  Chancellor  for determination.  He urged that the Chancellor is required  to exercise his powers properly and not improperly even  though there is no ’lis’ before him for adjudication. The  argument of  Mr. Agarwal for the respondent No. 5, however, ranged  a good  deal under than his counter part appears to have  done in the High Court. The power of the Chancellor, he  contend- ed, is quasijudicial and he must determine the issue that is referred to him with reasons in support of his conclusion.     The question raised is of considerable importance and it has general application in Universities governed by  similar pattern  of statutory provisions. Reference may be  made  to some  of  such enactments. Section 27(4) of  the  Jawaharlal Nehru  University Act, 1966 provides that if  the  Executive Council  is  unable  to accept any  recommendation  made  by Selection Committee, it may remit the same for  reconsidera- tion and if the difference is not resolved, it shall  record its  reasons and submit the case to the Visitor for  orders. Similar  are  the provisions under the  Calcutta  University Act, 1979. Section 32(2) therein provides that if the Syndi- cate  does  not accept the recommendation of  the  Selection Committee it shall refer back the matter for reconsideration and if the Syndicate does not accept the reconsidered views, the  matter shall be referred to the Chancellor whose  deci- sion shall be final. Section 57(2)(e) of the Bombay  Univer- sity Act, 1974 is almost parallel and it states that if  the Executive  Council does not choose to appoint  from  amongst the persons recommended by the Selection Committee, it shall for reasons recorded refer to the Chancellor whose  decision shall  be final. The Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920  by Section 27(5) also provides that if the Executive Council is unable  to accept the recommendations made by the  Selection Committee,  it shall record its reasons and submit the  case to  the Visitor for final orders. Section 49(2) of the  M.P. Vishwavidhayalaya  Adhiniyam, 1973 likewise  requires  where the Executive Council pro- 97 poses  to make the appointment otherwise than in  accordance with the order of merit arranged by the Select Committee  it shall  record its reasons and submit its proposal for  sanc- tion of the Kuladhipati.     The  pattern  in  the Kerala  University  Act,  1974  is slightly different. The First Statute under that Act  empow- ers the Syndicate to make appointments contrary to recommen- dation  of the Committee but With the sanction of the  Chan- cellor.  The First Statute under the Delhi  University  Act, 1922  by clause 6 provides that the Executive Council  shall

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appoint from time to time Professors and Readers etc. on the recommendations  of the Selection Committee constituted  for the purpose.     Under  the Act and Statute with which we are  concerned, the  Executive  Council has no power to  ask  the  Selection Committee  to  reconsider the recommendation.  It  must  for reasons recorded refer the matter under Section 31(8)(a)  to the Chancellor for decision.     The  Full  Bench  of the Allahabad High  Court  in  L.N. Mathur,  case  (supra) had analysed the  concept  of  quasi- judicial  function with reference to the power of the  Chan- cellor  under Section 31(8)(a) and expressed the  view  that the  reference to the Chancellor showed the existence  of  a disagreement between two University Authorities with respect to the claims of competing candidates. The Chancellor has to decide  the  issue  by examining the reasons  given  by  the Executive  Council  and the records of  the  candidate.  The decision  of the Chancellor is final and not subject to  any appeal/revision  and his power is quasi-judicial.  The  fact that the Chancellor is not required to follow any set proce- dure  or  sit in public or take evidence does not  make  his function  administrative.  Such are the reasonings  for  the conclusion  of  the High Court to hold that  the  Chancellor must act as a quasi-judicial authority.     We find it difficult to accept the reasoning  underlying the  aforesaid view. Before we consider the  correctness  of the proposition laid down by the High Court we must, at  the expense  of  some space, analyse  the  distinctions  between quasi-judicial and administrative functions. An  administra- tive  function  is called quasi-judicial when  there  is  an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the  basic requirements of justice. Where there is  no  such obligation.  the decision is called ’purely  administrative’ and  there is no third category. This is what was  meant  by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1963] 2 All E.R. 66, 75-76: 98 "In  cases  of the kind with which I have been  dealing  the Board  of Works  .....  was dealing with a  single  isolated case. It was not deciding, like a judge in a law suit,  what were the rights of the persons before it. But it was  decid- ing  how  he  should be  treated-something  analogous  to  a judge’s duty in imposing a penalty  ......  " "So  it  was easy to say that such a body  is  performing  a quasi-judicial  task  in  considering and  deciding  such  a matter  and to require it to observe the essentials  of  all proceedings of a judicial character the principles of  natu- ral  justice. Sometimes the functions of a minister  or  de- partment may also be of that character and then the rules of natural justice can apply in much the same way  ......  "     Subba  Rao, J., as he then was, speaking for this  Court in  G.  Nageshwara  Rao v. Andhra  Pradesh  State  Transport Corporation, [1959] 1 SCR 3 19 put it on a different  empha- sis (at 353): "The concept of a quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not  wholly judicial, it describes only a duty cast  on  the executive body or authority to conform to norms of  judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its  execu- tive power  ......  "     Prof.  Wade says "A judicial decision is made  according to  law.  An administrative decision is  made  according  to administrative  policy.  A  quasi-judicial  function  is  an administrative  function which the law requires to be  exer- cised  in  some respects as if it were  judicial.  A  quasi- judicial decision is, therefore, an administrative  decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure, such

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as  the principles of natural justice." (Administrative  Law by H.W.R. Wade 6th Ed. p. 46-47).     An  administrative  order which  involves  civil  conse- quences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the  Latin  Maxim  audi alteram partem. It  means  that  the decision  maker should afford to any party to a  dispute  an opportunity to present his case. A large number of  authori- ties are on this point and we will not travel over the field of  authorities.  What  is now not in  dispute.is  that  the person  concerned must be informed of the case  against  him and  the evidence support thereof and must be given  a  fair opportunity  to meet the case before an adverse decision  is taken. Ridge v. Baldwin, (supra) and state of 99 Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 625.     The  shift now is to a broader notion of  "fairness"  of "fair procedure" in the administrative action. As far as the administrative  officers are concerned, the duty is  not  so much  to act judicially as to act fairly (See: Keshva  Mills Co. Ltd. v: Union of India, [1973] 3 SCR 22 at 30;  Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, [1978] 1 SCC  405 at  434; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India,  [1981]  1 SCC 664 and Management of M/s M.S. Nally Bharat  Engineering Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1102 of  1990  decided on February 9, 1990. For this  concept  of fairness, adjudicative settings are not necessary, not it is necessary  to have lis inter partes. There need not  be  any struggle  between  two  opposing parties giving  rise  to  a ’lis’. There need not be resolution of lis inter partes. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in  widely differing circumstances. It may arise expressly or impliedly depending  upon  the context and considerations.  All  these types of non-adjudicative administrative decision making are now  covered  under the general rubric of  fairness  in  the administration.  But then even such an administrative  deci- sion  unless  it  affects one’s  personal  rights  or  one’s property  rights,  or the loss of or  prejudicially  affects something which would juridically be called atleast a privi- lege  does not involve the duty to act  fairly  consistently with  the rules of natural justice. We cannot  discover  any principle contrary to this concept.     In  the light of these considerations, we revert to  the central  issue,  that is with regard to the  nature  of  the Chancellor’s  power under Section 31(8)(a). It may be  noted that  the Chancellor is one of the three authorities in  the Statutory Scheme for selecting and appointing the best among the eligible candidates in the academic field. The  Chancel- lor is not an appellate authority in matters of appointment. He is asked to take a decision, because the Executive  Coun- cil  who is the appointing authority has no power to  reject the  recommendation  of the Selection Committee and  take  a decision  deviating therefrom. The Chancellor’s decision  is called  for  when the Executive Council  disagree  with  the recommendation of the Selection Committee. What is  referred to  the  Chancellor under Section 31(8)(a) of  the  Act,  is therefore, not a dispute between the Selection Committee and the  Executive  Council on any issue. Nor it  is  a  dispute between  two  rival candidates on any controversy.  What  is referred  to  the Chancellor is the  recommendation  of  the Selection  Committee  with  the opinion,  if  any,  recorded thereon by the Executive Council. In fact, even without  any opinion of the Executive Council, the matter stands automat- ically 100 remitted  to the Chancellor if the Executive Council  delays

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its decision on the recommendation of the Selection  Commit- tee.  The  proviso  to Section 31(8)(a)  provides  for  this contingency. It reads: "Section 31(8)(a)     xxxxx     xxxxx Proviso:  Provided  that if the Executive Council  does  not take  a  decision  on the recommendation  of  the  Selection Committee  within a period of four months from the  date  of the  meeting of such Committee, then also the  matter  shall stand referred to the Chancellor, and his decision shall  be final."     The  matter  thus goes to the  Chancellor  for  decision since the Executive Council could not take a decision on the recommendation of the Selection Committee. The Chancellor in the circumstances has to examine whether the  recommendation of the Selection Committee should be accepted or not. If any opinion  by  way of disagreement has been  recorded  by  the Executive Council on that recommendation, the Chancellor has also  to  consider  it. He must take a decision  as  to  who should be appointed. It is indeed a decision with regard  to appointment  of a particular person or persons in the  light of the recommendation and opinion if any, of the two  statu- tory authorities. Such a decision appears to be of an admin- istrative character much the same way as the decision of the Executive Council with regard to appointment.     In  matters  relating to public  employment  whether  by promotion  or  direct recruitment, only  requirement  to  be complied  with is the mandate of Articles 14 and 16  of  the Constitution. There shall be equality of opportunity and  no discrimination only on ground of religion, race, caste, sex, dissent,  place  of birth or residence or any of  them.  The eligible  candidate has a right to have his case  considered in  accordance with law. In the instant case, that  require- ment  has  been complied with by  the  Selection  Committee. There is no further right with the candidates to make repre- sentation  to  the Executive Council and much  less  to  the Chancellor.  Reference however, was made to the  observation of this Court in Dr. G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow  and Ors.,  [1976]  3 SCC 585 at 592. While dismissing  the  writ petition  challenging the recommendation made by the  Selec- tion Committee of the Lucknow University for appointment  of a  candidate  as Professor, it was observed  that  "the  ag- grieved candidate has remedy by way of representation to the Executive Council and an application for re- 101 ference  under Section 68 of the Act to the Chancellor".  We have carefully perused the decision and that observation. We find that it is of little assistance to the present case. We are concerned with the scope of Section 31(8)(a) of the  Act which  was  not considered in that case.  Apart  from  that, Section  31 confers no such right to make representation  to the  Executive  Council  or to the  Chancellor  against  the recommendation  of  the  Selection Committee.  There  is  no provision  in the Section for hearing any candidate  or  the Executive Council. There is also no provision for  receiving evidence.  The  material in respect of every  candidate  has already been collected and collated by the Selection Commit- tee. Every material is on the record and the Chancellor  has no power to take further evidence. The Chancellor is  autho- rised  to take a decision and he must take it on the  avail- able  records  since the Executive Council has not  taken  a decision  on the recommendation of the Selection  Committee. The  decision  of  the Chancellor in the  exercise  of  this Statutory  function does not, in our opinion,  expressly  or impliedly  require  the  application of  the  principles  of natural  justice. See also the observations of  K.N.  Singh,

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J., in R.S. Dass v. Union of India, [1966] Suppl. SCC 617 at 633.     It  has  been argued that the order  of  the  Chancellor becomes  final and binding which is one of the  features  of judicial  power. It is true that the conclusiveness  of  the decision  without the need for confirmation or  adoption  by any  other  authority is generally regarded as  one  of  the features  of judicial power. But it must be added  that  the order made by a statutory authority even it is given finali- ty  does  not thereby acquire judicial quality if  no  other characteristic  of judicial power is present. Power to  make orders  that are binding and conclusive is not, by itself  a decisive factor to hold that the power is judicial. Prof. De Smith makes a similar point in his book ’Judicial Review  of Administrative Action’ (4th Edition p. 82).     Taking  all these factors into consideration,  we  would sum  up our opinion m this way. The power of the  Chancellor under Section 31(8)(a) is purely of administrative character and  is  not  in the nature of  judicial  or  quasi-judicial power. No judicial or quasi-judicial duty is imposed on  the Chancellor  and any reference to judicial duty, seems to  be irrelevant in the exercise of his function. The function  of the  Chancellor is to consider and direct appointment  of  a candidate on the basis of the relative performance  assessed by  the Expert Selection Committee and in the light  of  the opinion,  if  any, expressed by the Executive  Council.  His decision nonetheless is a decision on the recommendation  of the  Selection Committee. Such a power cannot be  considered as  a  quasi-judicial power. And we see nothing in  that  to justify our thinking 102 that  it must conform to the principles of natural  justice. The  contention urged to the contrary is,  therefore,  unac- ceptable to us. We also do not agree with the contrary  view taken  by the High Court in the Full Bench decision in  L.N. Mathur, case (supra).     The  Chancellor,  however, has to not properly  for  the purpose  for  which the power is conferred. He must  take  a decision  in accordance with the provisions of the  Act  and the Statutes. He must not be guided by extraneous or irrele- vant consideration. He must not act illegally,  irrationally or  arbitrarily. Any such illegal, irrational  or  arbitrary action or decision, whether in the nature of a  legislative, administrative or quasi-judicial exercise of power is liable to be quashed being violative of Article 14 of the Constitu- tion.  As  stated in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil  Nadu  & Anr., [1974] 2 SCR 348 "equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic  while the  other to the whim and caprice of an absolute  monarch". The principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 must guide every state action, whether it be legislative executive,  or quasijudicial.  See Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of  India  & Anr.,  [1978]  1  SCC 248 at 283-84; Ajay Hasia  &  Ors.  v. Khalid  Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., [1981] 1 SCC 722 at  740-41 and  Som Raj & Ors. v. State of Haryana, JT 1990 1SC 286  at 290.     The order of the Chancellor impugned in this case  indi- cates very clearly that he has considered the recommendation of the Selection Committee and the opinion expressed by  the Executive  Council. He has stated and in our  opinion,  very rightly that the appellant possesses the prescribed qualifi- cation for appointment as Reader. The decision of the  Chan- cellor  gets  support from the Statute 11.01  of  the  First Statute. The Statute 11.01 is in these terms: "11.01.  (1) In the case of the Faculties of Arts,  Commerce

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and  Science, the following shall be the minimum  qualifica- tions for the post of Lecturer in the University, namely-- (a)  a  Doctorate  in the subject of study  concerned  or  a published work of a high standard in that subject; and (b)  Consistently good academic record (that is to say,  the overall  record  of all assessment throughout  the  academic career  of  a candidate), with first class  of  high  second class  (that is to say, with an aggregate of more  than  54% marks Master’s Degree in the subject concerned or equivalent Degree of a foreign University in such subject .) 103 (2) Where the selection committee is of the opinion that the research  work  of a candidate, as evidenced either  by  his thesis or by his published work, is of a very high standard, it  may  relax  any  of  the  qualifications  specified   in sub:clause of clause (1)."     The  minimum qualification prescribed for the post is  a Doctorate  in the subject of study concerned or a  published work of high standard in the subject. The appellant then was found  to have an alternate qualification though not a  Doc- torate in the subject. The Selection Committee has  accepted the alternate qualification as sufficient and did not  relax the  essential  qualification prescribed for the  post.  The Executive  Council  appears to have committed  an  error  in stating that the appellant has lacked the essential qualifi- cation and the Selection Committee has relaxed the essential qualification.  The Chancellor was, therefore, justified  in rejecting the opinion of the Executive Council.     It  is not unimportant to point out that in  matters  of appointment  in the academic field the Court generally  does not  interfere.  In the University of Mysore &  Ant.  v.C.D. Govind  Rao, [1964] 4 SCR 575, this Court observed that  the Courts  should  be slow to interfere with  the  opinion  ex- pressed  by the experts in the absence of mala fide  alleged 2against the experts. When appointments based on recommenda- tions  of  experts nominated by the Universities,  the  High Court  has got only to see whether the appointment had  con- travened  any  statutory or binding rule or  ordinance.  The High  Court should show due regard to the opinion  expressed by the experts constituting the Selection Committee and  its recommendation  on which the Chancellor has acted. See  also the decisions in Dr. J.P. Kulshreshtha & Ors. v. Chancellor, Allahabad University, Raj Bhavan & Ors., [1980] 3 SCR 902 at 912 and Dalpat Abasahed Solunke v.B.S. Mahajan, [1990] 1 SCR 305 at 309-310.     In the result, tile appeals are allowed, the judgment of the  High Court is set aside. We also set aside  the  conse- quential order dated June 16, 1989 made by the Registrar  of the  University reverting the appellant to  her  substantive post  of Lecturer in Psychology. Needless to state that  her original  appointment as Reader pursuant to the decision  of the Chancellor shall remain undisturbed with all the  conse- quential benefits.     In  the circumstances of the case, however, we  make  no order as to costs. T.N.A.                                     Appeals allowed. 104