01 December 1998
Supreme Court
Download

KISHORI Vs STATE OF DELHI


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6  

PETITIONER: KISHORI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF DELHI

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       01/12/1998

BENCH: G.T.  NANAVATI, S. RAJENDRA BABU

JUDGMENT:

Rajendra Babu, J.

       When  the  country was mourning the assassination of Smt.  Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, on that  night  and for  the  next  two  days,  nets broke out In several places including Delhi  when  several  persons  belonging  to  sikh community were  killed.  Three persons, viz., Kishori, Mohd. Abbas and Dull Chand were charged with having committed  the murder  of  Sajjan  Singh, his younger brother Hoshiar Singh and several other sikhs including Kishan Singh.  An  Enquiry Committee   was   constituted   and  on  the  basis  of  the recommendations made by the Enquiry Committee,  a  complaint was  registered  In  terms  of  Section  173  of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  In an affidavit filed, Smt.  Bhakti Bai w/o Sajjan Singh had stated that a mob attacked her  husband with  meat  chopper  on November 1, 1984 killing him and his younger brother, Hoshiar Singh on the next day.   Thereafter Investigation was done by the police and the accused persons were charged under Sections 147 IPC,302 IPC, 395 lPC and 436 lPC read with Section 149 IPC attributing them with the acts of  noting, burning and looting of the houses of victims and killing of Sajjan Singh  and  Inder  Singh.    Charges  were framed  by  the  Sessions  Court  on  the  same line and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to  be  tried.    The prosecution examined 14 witnesses of whom the testimonies of PW3,  Asaudi  Kaur,  PW4, Burfi Kaur, wife of Hoshiar Singh; PW5 Bhakti Bai, wife  of  Sajjan  Singh;  PW6,  Vidya  Kaur, daughter  of  Sajjan  Singh; PW7, Hari Singh; PW9 Ganga Kaur and other witnesses are relevant  for  consideration.    The Sessions  Court  believed  the eye witness account of Asaudi Kaur, Bhakti Bai and Burfi Kaur and held that their  version was  trustworthy even after considering the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 CrPC and  convicted  them of  the  offences  under  Section 148 lPC, 302 lPC read with Section 149 lPC and passed the sentence of death on Kishori, while  life  imprisonment  was  imposed  on  the  other  two accused.

       The  appellant  and other accused carried appeals to the High Court apart from the reference made by ^^  Sessions Court  for  confirmation  of the death sentence and the High Court allowed the criminal appeal filed by  Dull  Chand  and Mohd.   Abbas and acquitted them in their respective appeals while confirming the sentence of  death  of  Kishori.    The present appeals are before us by special leave.

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6  

       The  trial  court  and  the  High  Court  critically examined the evidence tendered and  were  convinced  of  the guilt of the appellant.  The appreciation of evidence by the High  Court and the trial court is based on cogent reasoning and, therefore, detailed examination  by  us  in  appeal  by special leave is not called for.  The fact that Inder Singh, Sajjan  Singh and Hoshiar Singh met with the homicidal death is not in serious dispute.  On that part of the  case  there are  clear  statements  made by Asaudi Kaur, PW3 that on the first day of November, 1984 at about 12 mid night a huge mob came to her house and pelted stones on the door of my  house and they  all entered into the house.  Her husband concealed himself in the ’tand’ that; he was given knife blows on  his stomach/belly  and his both hands were cut; that at the same time certain other persons were also killed;  that  the  mob put  the  quilt  on the body of her husband and others; that they set fire to the bodies and pushed her out of the house.

       Burfi Kaur, PW4, also stated in similar  terms  that in the  morning  at  about  3  or  4  a.m.   in the month of November 1984 when she was staying with her husband, Hoshiar Singh and children in the house,  a  large  mob  armed  with chhuras,  lathis’  dandas,  kerosene oil came to their; that her husband who was standing in front of  the  house,  after seeing  the  mob  she had gone to their neighbor in front of their house and she called her husband to the house  of  one Atul  Singh  where she had gone for concealing herself; that her husband had come to the house of the said Atul Singh and the members of the mob entered that  house  and  looted  the entire  goods  of  their house and by the time it had become dark at about 8 p.m.; that when her husband was  sitting  in the  house  of  one Nathu Singh, the members of the mob came their and surrounded him.  in spite of the appeals  made  by him  that  he  should be spared as he was their brother, the mob inflicted on him blows with lathi and knife and she  was not able to identify the members of the mob and that was how her husband was killed.

       PW5, Bhakti Bai, stated that on November 1, 1984, at about II p.m., a mob of about 5-7 persons which entered  her house  noticed the presence of her husband who had concealed himself beneath the cot and  certain  other  persons  joined them  who  were 40-50 in number and they removed the charpai (cot) and her husband appealed to them with folded hands for mercy to spare his life.  However, the members  of  the  mob gave lathi  blows  to  him.  On account of this he fell dawn and thereafter he was given knife blows and  the  mob  after having  seen  that  her  husband  was still alive set him on fire.   The  evidence  of  other  witnesses  corroborate  in material  particulars  the  evidence tendered by these three witnesses.  Therefore, there was enough material  on  record before  the  court  to  cyme  to  the conclusion that Sajjan Singh, Hoshiar Singh and  Inder  Singh  met  with  homicidal death.

       Next  question  that  arises  for  consideration  is whether  the  appellant  was  part  of  the  mob  and was he responsible in any manner for the death of the said parsons, Sajjan Singh, Hoshiar Singh and Inder Singh.   Asaudi  Kaur, PW3,  is  clear  in  her  evidence  that  she could identify Kishori and one lambu as members of the mob.  She  was  able to identify the said Kishor).  She, in fact, stated that her husband  cried  addressing  Kishori  "Kishori,  you  were my friend and  why  you  are  killing  me".    Though   certain

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6  

discrepancies  are  sought to be attributed in the course of cross examination as to her  husband,  Inder  Singh,  having concealed  himself  in  ’tand’  in  the room and her husband having cried out Kishori, being his friend, should not  kill him or that quilt being rolled upon her husband she has been firm in stating that death of her husband, Inder Singh, took place  in  her  presence on account of injuries inflicted by the mob and she is also equally clear as to the presence  of the appellant, Kishori, in the mob having Khanjarm his hand. Evidence  of  PW4, Burfi Kaur, wife of Hoshiar Singh, is not that clear and there are many discrepancies in her statement and, in fact, she was treated as hostile by the  prosecution and she was not able to mention the marries of the accused.

       The  evidence  tendered  by  PW5,  Bhakti  Bai,   is categorical  in stating that Kishori, appellant, was present at the time of attack by the members of the mob and she  was able to  identify  him  in  the court as well.  She is clear that several blows were inflicted on her husband.    She  is not  able  to  state as to what happened to her husband when she was  asked  to  leave  her  husband  on  the  threat  of dishonoring  her  but  she  is definite that her husband was killed.  Her version appears to be natural and probable when she stated a mob attacked her house and there was threat  to the  lives and honour of women, it is quite natural that she had to go out of the house.  Though the learned counsel  for the  accused sought to bring out that in the statements made before the police Kishon’s name had  not  been  included  in some of the documents, the name of the Kishori was mentioned in  Exhibit PW 5/DA which is the original Gurmukhi affidavit filed at the earliest point of time and Kishori was known to everyone in the area, he being a meat seller.    Thus  there was  ample  material  on  record  to bring home guilt to the accused that he had been responsible as a member of the  mob for the  death  of  the  said persons.  However, the learned counsel for the appellant, sought to plead that  there  were several  discrepancies  in  the  evidence  tendered by these witnesses.  We have carefully and  thoroughly  examined  the record and do not find any such discrepancy which would have a  bearing  on the evidence tendered by the eye witnesses to the effect that death of their respective  husbands  and  in identifying  the  presence  of  the accused in the mob which indulged in their killing.  Matters  of  detail  as  to  the roles  attributed  to  the  several  persons  in  the mob or narration as to the succession of events that took place may not be of much relevance.  Therefore, in our view, the  High Court and the Sessions Court were justified in affirming the conviction of the accused, Kishori.

       Now   the   crucial   question   which   arises  for consideration is as to what should be the  sentence  imposed upon  accused  whether  we  should affirm the death sentence imposed upon him or a lesser sentence should be given.   The learned counsel for the appellant has sought to bring to our notice several  mitigating  circumstances.  He has contended that the  offence  was  committed  under  the  influence  of extreme  emotional  disturbance  and  is  a  state of frenzy following the unfortunate gruesome and tragic  assassination of Smt.   Indira  Gandhi.    When  the  entire  country  was engulfed in sudden and tremendous shock and distress,  which also  ignited anger and violence amongst a section of people showing their anger which led to the acts  of  riots,  arson and killing  of the members belonging to sikh community.  He submitted that the appellant is not habitual criminal;  that he  was  probably  instigated to indulge in riots by leaders

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6  

belonging to political parties; that there is no  motive  or the  acts have been done as a result of pre-meditation; that the deaths were the result of cumulative effect of different types of injuries inflicted by members of riotous mob by use of different weapons such as lathis, iron bars,  daggers  in their  hands; that in the absence of any medical evidence to establish that the deaths were caused only on account of the injuries stated to have been inflicted by each one  of  them cannot be guilty but to each member of the mob and therefore the appellant  should  not  be  Imposed  death sentence.  He further pleaded that there ?   every  probability  that  the appellant would not commit criminal act of violence as would constitute  a  continuing  threat  to  society and he can be reformed and rehabilitated.  He pointed out that the accused had not been convicted in several other  cases  and  he  had been  acquitted  by  the  High  Court  in  those  cases and, therefore,  the  basis  upon  which  the  trial  court   has proceeded  to  impose  the  extreme  penalty of death merely because he has already been awarded death sentence in  other cases would  not be justified.  He pointed out that it was a chain of several incidents relating to one action only  that took place  in  the  wake of Smt.  Indira Gandhi’s death and therefore that ground should not be  treated  as  a  special reason  for  awarding  sentence  of  death  when  there is a requirement of  law  that  the  capital  punishment  can  be imposed  in  the  rarest of rare cases and it cannot be said that in a situation of the present kind death  sentence  was called for.    The  learned  counsel  drew  our attention to several  decisions  of  this  Court  to   support   of   the contentions put  before  us which are :  Machhi Singh & Ors. v.  State of Punjab.  1983 (3) SCC 470:  Ajmer Singh &  Org, vs.  State  of  Punjab.  1977 (1) SCC 659; State of U.P, VS. Bhoora & Ors..  1998 (1) SCC 128; Hardayal  vs.    State  of U.P.  1976 (2)  SCC 812; Balrai vs.  State of U.P.  AIR 1995 SC 1935; Kesar Singh vs.  State of Punjab.    1974  (4)  SCC 278, Ediga Anamma  vs.    State of Andhra Pradesh.  1974 (4) SCC 443; Shivaji Genu Mohite  vs.    State  of  Maharashtra. 1973 (3) SCC 219; Sarwan Singh & Ors.  vs.  State of Punjab, 1978 (4)  SCC  III;  Shankar alies Gauri Shankar & Ors.  vs. State of T.N 1994 (4) SCC 478.

       The law is well settled by reason of  the  decisions of  this  Court  as  to  the  circumstances in which capital punishment can be imposed.  It is held therein that  capital punishment  can  be  imposed in the rarest of the rare cases and if there are any aggravating circumstances such  as  the accused  having  any criminal record in the past; the manner of committing the crime; delay in imposing the sentence  and so on.    In  the  present  case,  the  prosecution case, as unfolded before the court indicates that the riot  in  Delhi broke out  as  a result of the death of Smt.  Gandhi and her death appears to be the  symbol  or  web  around  which  the violent emotions were  released.   The death of Smt.  Gandhi became a powerful symbolic image as a result  of  which  the crowds  were  perpetrating violence in the height of frenzy. It is common  experience  that  when  people  congregate  in crowds  normal  defenses  are  lowered  so  that  the  crowd instinct  assaults  on  the  sense   of   individuality   or transcending  one’s  individual  boundaries  by  offering  a release from inhibitions from personal doubts  and  anxiety. In  such  a situation, one can well imagine that a member of such a group loses one’s self and  the  normal  standard  or sense of  judgment  and  reality.   The primary motivational factor in the assembly of a violent mob may result in murder of several persons.  Experts in  criminology  often  express

5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6  

that  when there is a collective action, as in the case of a mob, there is a diminished individual responsibility  unless there   are   special   circumstances  to  indicate  that  a particular individual had acted with  any  pre-determination such as by use of a weapon not normally found.  If, however, a  member  of  such  a crowd picks up an article or a weapon which is close by and joins  the  mob,  either  on  his  own volition  or at the instigation of the mob responding to the exhortation of the mob playing no role of leadership, we may very well say that such a person did not  intend  to  commit all  the  acts which a mob would commit left to himself, but did so under the influence of  collective  fury.    All  the witnesses  in  this  case  speak that there was a mob attack resulting In the death of the three  persons.    Though  the appellant is stated to be responsible for inflicting certain knife  injuries,  yet it is not clear whether those injuries of themselves would have been sufficient to  result  in  the death of  the  deceased.    In  the  absence  of any medical evidence in these cases it has become very difficult to draw any inference as to the injuries inflicted by the appellant. We are conscious of the fact that when an accused person  is charged  with  an offence not only under Section 302 IPC but also read with  Section  34  IPC  or  Section  149  IPC  the culpability of such an accused resulting in the death of the person  will  not be less than that of homicide amounting to murder.  But what  we  are  weighing  now  Is  whether  such culpability  is  of such a nature which should result in the capital punishment to the accused.

       The  trial  court  is of the view that the appellant before us deserves death sentence in this  case  as  he  has been  convicted  for murders for the seventh time and he had killed innumerable number  of  sikhs  in  a  brutal  manner. While  affirming  this sentence, the High Court took note of the fact that, though there has  been  long  lapse  of  time between the date of commission of the offence and conviction of  the appellant, the acts attributed to the appoint affect the basic feature of  our  Constitution,  viz.,  secularism; that the appellant indulged in riots resulting in killing of innocent  persons looting and burning their properties would send shivers to any person; that mob caused havoc  of  which the  appellant  was  a  member;  that  no leniency, mercy or sympathy should be shown- Relying upon the decision of  this Court in Surja  Ram  vs.    State of Rajasthan.  1997 Cr.LJ. 51, the High Court opened that the court has also to keep in view the society’s reasonable  expectation  for  appropriate deterrent  punishment  commensurate  with the gravity of the offence,  the  public  abhorrence  for  the  heinous   crime committed by the appellant and thus the High Court concluded that this was one of the rarest of the rare cases where such sentence should be imposed.

       Though  the appellant had been charged with offences in seven cases and he had been convicted in all those cases, on appeal he had been acquitted in four cases and it is only in three cases his conviction has been affirmed, of them two are before us in appeal by special leave.    Therefore,  the basis  upon  which  the Sessions Court concluded that he had been convicted in a number of cases, thereby indicating that the appellant is a hard boiled criminal, may  not  stand  to reason.   On the other hand, what could be seen is all these killings had taken place in a chain of events  occurring  on one night and day and, therefore, pertained to one incident. Looked  from  that  angle,  it  could not be stated that the appellant was indulging in  criminal  activities  one  after

6

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6  

another.  None of the witnesses has stated that Kishori, the appellant,  was  the  leader  of  the mob or he exhorted the members thereof to do any particular act.  His role  appears was only as a member of the mob.

       It  is  no  doubt  true  that the high ideals of the Constitution have to be borne in mind, but when normal  life breaks  down  and groups of people go berserk losing balance of mind, the rationale that the ideals of  the  Constitution should be upheld or followed, may not appeal to them In such circumstances,  nor  can  we expect such loose heterogeneous group of persons like a mob to be alive to such nigh ideals. Therefore, to import the ideas or Idealism to a mob in  such a situation  may not be realistic.  It is no doubt true that courts must be have and in tune with the  notions  prevalent in  the  society and punishment imposed upon an accused must be commensurate with the heinousness of the crime.  We  have elaborated  earlier  in the course of our judgment as to how mob psychology works and it is very difficult  to  gauge  or assess  what  the  notions  of  the  society  are In a given situation.  There may be one section of  the  society  which may  cry for a very deterrent sentence while another section of the society may exhort upon the court to  be  lenient  in the matter.    To  gauge such notions is to rely upon highly slippery imponderables and,  in  this  case,  we  cannot  be definite about the views of the society.

       We may notice that the acts attributed to the mob of which   the  appellant  was  a  member  at the relevant time cannot be stated to be a result of any organized  systematic activity leading  to  genocide.    Perhaps, we can visualise that to the extent there was unlawful assembly  and  to  the extent  that  the  mob  wanted  to teach stern lesson to the sikhs there was some organisation; but in that  design  that they  did  not  consider  that  women and children should be annihilated which is a redeeming feature.  When an amorphous group of persons come together it cannot be said  that  they indulge in any systematic or organized activity.  Such group may indulge in activities and may remain cohesive only for a temporary period  and  thereafter  would  disintegrate.  The acts of the mob of which the appellant was a  member  cannot be  stated to be the result of any organisation or any group indulging in violent activities formed with any  purpose  or scheme so  as  to call an organised activity.  In that sense we may say that the acts of the mob of which  the  appellant was a member was only the result of a temporary frenzy which we have  discussed  earlier.   He did not play the role of a leader of the mob as noticed earlier,

       On the totality of the circumstances, we are of  the opinion  that  this  is not a case where courts below should have imposed a capital  punishment.    While  affirming  the conviction  of  the  appellant on the charges Framed against him, we reduce the sentence from that of capital  punishment to life  imprisonment.   With this modification, the appeals stand dismissed.