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PETITIONER: KISHANCHAND NARSINGHDAS BHATIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE AUTHORITY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/03/1968

BENCH: GROVER, A.N. BENCH: GROVER, A.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) BACHAWAT, R.S. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. HEGDE, K.S.

CITATION:  1968 AIR 1461            1968 SCR  (3) 605  CITATOR INFO :  F          1978 SC 949  (2,5)

ACT: Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136- Decision on  question of  fact  by  State  Transport  Authorities-Interference  by Supreme Court in appeal by special leave.

HEADNOTE: The  Regional Transport Authority renewed a  stage  carriage permit  in  favour  of the  appellant  The  State  Transport Appellate  Authority  set  aside the order  in  appeal,  and granted  the  permit  to the 3rd  respondent.   One  of  the considerations  that prevailed with the Appellate  Authority was that the 3rd respondent had offered to put into  service an  air  cooled  1965-model  vehicle.   The  order  of   the Appellate  Authority  was confirmed by the High Court  in  a writ petition. In  appeal  to this Court under Art. 136, it  was  contended that  after the renewal of the permit in his favour  by  the R.T.A.  the appellant acquired a 1966-model bus which  would have been equally serviceable; but this fact of  acquisition of a new bus was not relied upon by the appellant before the Appellate  Authority.   It  was  also  contended  that   the appellant  was  entitled  to preference  in  the  matter  of renewal on the facts established in the present case. HELD  : This Court would be reluctant to interfere  with  or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act, especially when  the legislature  has entrusted the task of granting or  renewing the  stage  carnage permits to such  authorities  which  are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and prac- tice  and the matters relevant under the provisions  of  the Act.  This Court will not decide a matter brought before  it by special leave, under Art. 136, as if it were an appellate court.   It  will  not examine or review  findings  of  fact unless it can be shown that they are perverse or shocking to the judicial conscience.  The power being of an  exceptional and overriding nature has to be exercised sparingly and with caution  and  only in special and  extraordinary  situations

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when justice so requires. [608 F-H; 609 A-B].

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 740 of 1968. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment -and order  dated December 19, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in  Misc. Petition No. 225 of 1967. M.   C. Chagla, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for  the appellant. S. V. Gupte and S. K. Gambhir for respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. Ibis appeal by special leave is from the judgment of  the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing  a  petition filed under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution  challenging an 606 order  made  by the State Transport Appellate  Authority  in respect  of a stage carriage permit for the route,  Digthan- Indore via Ghata Billod. The appellant had applied for renewal of his stage  carriage permit for that route.  Respondent No. 3 and another  person of  the  name of Balwantrao Gaikwad and the  Madhya  Pradesh Road Transport Corporation filed applications for grant of a fresh  permit  for the same route.  As  the  application  of Balwantrao  Gaikwad  was  not  ripe  for  hearing  and   the Corporation withdrew its application, the Regional Transport Authority  considered the rival claims of the appellant  and respondent  No. 3. The latter made an offer at  the  hearing that  he  would run an air-cooled 1965 model  vehicle.   The Transport  Authority, however, took the view that the  offer had  been made by way of a competitive bid.  In its  opinion both  the applicants were at par in the matter  of  coverage and  adverse  remarks,  but the appellant  was  superior  in experience and provision of facilities for passengers.   The permit  of the appellant was renewed for- a period of  three years  from  the date of its expiry on the  existing  terms. Respondent  No.  3 preferred an appeal under s.  64  of  the Motor  Vehicles  Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to  as  the Act) which was disposed of by the State Transport  Appellate Authority.  The Appellate Authority gave weight to the  fact that  whereas  respondent No. 3 had offered to run  an  air- cooled vehicle of 1965 model, no such offer had been made by the appellant who was operating the route with a vehicle  of 1957  model.   It further found that the appellant  had  not been  running  the  bus on the kachha portion  of  the  road during  the rainy season in the years 1962 and  1963.   This was  taken  to  amount to "adverse  record  of  considerable significance"   against   the  appellant.    The   Appellate Authority  therefore  decided  that  respondent  No.  3  was entitled  to the grant of the permit as against the  renewal of  the  permit  in  favour of the  appellant.   It  made  a direction that a permit be issued to respondent No. 3 for  a period  of three years provided be put into service an  air- cooled vehicle within four months. The appellant moved the High Court by means of a writ  peti- tion.  It appears from the order of the Division Bench  that the following points were pressed on behalf of the appellant :  (1) Respondent No. 3 had not applied for the grant  of  a fresh  permit for the same route for which renewal had  been applied  for by the appellant. (2) The  Appellate  Authority had  taken into account an extraneous consideration when  it regarded respondent No. 3’s offer of operating an air-cooled bus as giving material superiority. (3) The finding that the

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appellant  had  been guilty of  non-maintenance  having  not operated  service on the kachha section of the route  during the rainy season for two years was not well-founded.                             607 (4)The  Appellate Authority did not give due weight  to  all the relevant considerations. The High Court found that the Appellate Authority had right- ly regarded the application of respondent No. 3 as one  made for  the same route and that the offer of operating an  air- cooled bus was a perfectly relevant consideration and  could not  be  regarded as extraneous vide : Samrathmal  v.  State Transport  Appellate Authority & Ors(1).  It was further  of the  opinion  that the Appellate Authority had  rightly  not accepted  the explanation of the appellant that  the  kachha section  of  the  route was not operable  during  the  rainy season,  because  respondent No. 3, who held  a  permit  for Indore-Digthan  route  (which was the same as  the  Digthan- Indore  route), had maintained the service even  during  the rainy  season without finding it risky to do so.   The  High Court  repelled  the  last contention raised  before  it  by relying   on  Sri  Rama  Vilas  Service  (P)  Ltd.   v.   C. Chandrasekaran & Others(2) according to which it was for the Transport Authority to appreciate how public interest  would be  best served and in doing so it was entitled to take  the view that one consideration was more likely to effectuate it than the other. Mr.  S.  V.  Gupte for respondent No. 3 sought  to  ask  for revocation  of the special leave on the ground that  it  had been obtained by a misstatement of material facts, but it is alto,-ether  unnecessary  to  go into that  matter  as  this appeal cannot succeed for other reasons. Mr. M. C. Chagla for the appellant laid a great deal of  em- phasis on the acquisition of a vehicle of 1966 model by  the appellant  after the renewal of his permit had been  ordered by  the  Regional Transport Authority.  It was  pointed  out that respondent No. 3 had been hitherto running a vehicle of 1957 model and had only made an offer to put into service an air-cooled  1965  model  vehicle at  the  time  of  hearing. According  to Mr. Chagla the 1966 model vehicle  would  have been equally, if not more, convenient and serviceable and it was  wholly  unjust to deprive the appellant of  the  permit which  he had held for the past several years.   He  further sought  to  attack the finding of  the  Appellate  Authority about the adverse record of the appellant and the route  for which  the application for the permit had been made  by  the contending  parties.   Finally,  he  forcefully  raised  the question  whether under the second proviso to sub-s. (2)  of s.  58 of the Act, the appellant was entitled to  preference in  the  matter of renewal on the facts established  in  the present  case.   According  to him  the  appellant’s  permit should  have  been  renewed, although it  was  open  to  the Authority concerned to impose a condition under cl. (ix) (1)  C.A. 503 of 1965 decided on 25th August 1965. (2)  [1964] 5 S.C.R. 869. 608 of sub-s. (3) of s. 48 of the Act that the appellant  should acquire an air-cooled bus within a specified period.  It was maintained  that  the  High  Court  failed  to  approach   a consideration  of the case by keeping in view the  aforesaid provisions  of the Act which were of  material  consequence. It may be mentioned that the second proviso to sub-s. (2) of S.  58  of the Act is to the effect  that  other  conditions being  equal an application for renewal shall be given  pre- ference  over  new applications for permits.   According  to sub-s.  (3)(ix) of S. 48 of the Act the  Regional  Transport

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Authority   while  granting  the  permit  may   attach   the condition,   among  other  conditions,  that   vehicles   of specified  types fitted with bodies, conforming to  approved specifications shall be used. It  is significant that the acquisition of a 1966 model  bus by  the  appellant  found no mention in  the  order  of  the Appellate  Authority which would show that either that  fact was not brought to its notice or was not stressed before it. The  findings  or  conclusions on questions  of  fact  could hardly  be re-examined or disturbed by the High Court  since the decision rendered by the appropriate authority under the Act  could not be interfered with under Art. 226 unless  the well  recognised tests in that behalf were satisfied vide  : Sri Ram Vilas Service(1). The other question which according to Mr. Chagla is of  wide importance and relates to the scope and ambit of the  second proviso to s. 58(2) of the Act does not appear to have  been canvassed  before the High Court and has not been raised  in an appropriate manner in the petition for special leave  and even  in the additional grounds sought to be  introduced  by means of Civil Misc.  Petition No. 934 of 1968.  We did  not permit Mr. Chagla to address us at any length on the point. In  cases of the present kind this Court would be  naturally reluctant  to  interfere  with or disturb  the  decision  of specially  constituted  authorities or tribunals  under  the Act, especially when the legislature has entrusted the  task of  granting or renewing the stage carriage permits  to  the aforesaid authorities or tribunals which are expected to  be fully  conversant  with the procedure and practice  and  the relevant  matters which should engage their attention  under the provisions contained in the Act. The present case has not been shown to contain any such  in- firmity as would justify interference under Art. 136 of  the Constitution.  The limitation on the exercise of power under that  Article cannot be defined with any precision; but  -as observed in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner  of Income tax, West Bengal(1) the power being of an exceptional and  overriding nature it has to be exercised sparingly  and with caution and only in special ( 1) [1964] 5 S.C.R.869. (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 941. 609 aid extraordinary situations.  It is well known by now  that this  Court  will not decide a matter brought before  it  by special  leave is if it were an appeal court and examine  or review findings of fact unless it can be shown that they are perverse or are such as are shocking to judicial  conscience or  the like, the paramount consideration always  being  the perpetuation of justice. For  all  these  reasons,  this  appeal  must  fail  and  is dismissed with costs. V.P.S.           Appeal dismissed. 610