REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1500         OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5440 of 2009)

Kishan Singh (D) through L.Rs. …Appellants

Versus

Gurpal Singh & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. Leave granted.   

2. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  Judgment  and  

Order  dated  13.02.2009  of  the  Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court  at  

Chandigarh in  Criminal  Misc.  No.  4136 of  2003,  wherein the First  

Information Report (for short, “FIR”) dated 23.07.2002 lodged by the  

appellant  under  Sections  420/423/467/468/471/120-B of  the  Indian  

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as, “IPC”) has been quashed  

placing  reliance  on  the  decree  of  Civil  Court  between  the  same  

parties in respect of the same subject matter.

3. The only question for our consideration involved in this appeal  

is as to whether criminal proceedings can be quashed by the High  

Court  relying upon a finding of Civil  Court  on an issue involved in  

criminal proceedings in respect of the same subject matter.   

4. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that one  

Kishori Lal executed an Agreement to Sell dated 4.1.1988 in favour of  

Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 for land measuring 114 Kanals, 2  Marlas  

situate in the revenue estate of Mauza Jadali, Tehsil Khanna, Punjab,  

at the rate of Rs. 11000/- per bigha.  Kishori Lal had received a sum  

of Rs. 1 Lakh as Earnest Money from the said respondents.  The said  

land had already been mortgaged with the said respondents for Rs.  

52000/-.  As per the terms of the said Agreement dated 4.1.1988, the  

sale deed was to be executed and registered by 10th June, 1989.   

Kishori Lal entered an Agreement to Sell dated 22.10.1988 with  

Kishan Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, in respect of  

the same land at the rate of Rs. 15300/- per bigha and received a  

sum of Rs. 54000/- as earnest money.  As per the said agreement,  

the sale was to be executed and registered by 15.06.1989.   

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5. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed suit No. 60 of 1989 against Kishori  

Lal  in  Civil  Court,  Ludhiana  for  specific  performance  and  got  an  

interim relief restraining Kishori Lal to alienate the suit land in favour  

of  anyone else by any manner.    Sh.  Kishan Singh,  father  of  the  

appellants,  filed  Civil  Suit  No.  81  of  1996  against  Kishori  Lal  for  

specific  performance  on  6.2.1996,  however,  the  suit  filed  by  the  

respondent Nos. 1 to 4 against Kishori Lal was decreed in their favour  

vide Judgment and decree dated 8.5.1996 and in pursuance thereof,  

the sale has been executed by Kishori Lal in favour of the respondent  

Nos. 1 to 4 on 17.05.1996.   

6. Being aggrieved, Kishan Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the  

appellants,  filed suit  No. 1075 of  1996 seeking cancellation/setting  

aside of the decree dated 8.5.1996 passed in favour of respondent  

Nos. 1 to 4.  The said Civil Suit stood dismissed by the Civil Court  

vide  Judgment  and  decree  dated  10.06.2002  against  which,  the  

appellants have preferred Regular First Appeal (for short, “RFA”) No.  

2488 of 2002 before the High Court, which is still pending.   

7. Kishan  Singh,  predecessor-in-interest  of  the  appellants,  filed  

FIR No.144 dated 23.07.2002 under Sections 420/423/467/468/120-B  

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IPC at Police Station Division No. 8, Ludhiana alleging forging of the  

signatures of Kishori Lal on the agreement to sell dated 4.1.1988.   

8. The respondents preferred a Criminal Misc. No. 4136-4 of 2003  

before  the  High  Court  for  quashing  of  the  FIR  No.  144  dated  

23.07.2002 and proceeding subsequent thereto, on the ground that  

appellants had lodged it after losing the civil case and with inordinate  

delay.  Findings on factual issues recorded in civil proceedings are  

binding on criminal proceedings.  The High Court, vide its Judgment  

and  order  dated  13.02.2009,  allowed  the  said  application  and  

quashed the FIR on the ground that the appellants could not succeed  

before the Civil Court and findings have been recorded by the Civil  

Court to the effect that the document i.e. agreement to sell was not  

forged or fabricated.  Hence, this appeal.   

9. Sh.  K.T.S.  Tulsi,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellants,  has  submitted  that  there  is  no  prohibition  in  law  for  

simultaneously  pursuing  the  civil  as  well  as  criminal  remedies  

available in law.  Both the proceedings have to take course and to be  

decided according to the evidence adduced therein.  Findings of fact  

recorded by the Civil Court are not binding on the criminal courts or  

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vice-versa.  The High Court committed a grave error in quashing the  

FIR only on the basis of findings of fact recorded by the Civil Court.  

10. Per  contra,  Sh.  Abhinav  Ramkrishna,  learned  counsel  

appearing for the respondents, has vehemently opposed the appeal  

contending that Kishan Singh filed the FIR at a much belated stage,  

i.e. after dismissal of the civil suit by the Trial Court on 10.06.2002.  In  

case, the agreement in their favour provided that sale deed was to be  

executed by 15th June, 1989, there could be no justification for them  

to wait and file suit No. 81/1996 for specific performance on 6.2.1996.  

Thus, FIR has been filed with inordinate delay of about 14 years and  

even if, it is presumed that they were not aware of pendency of suit  

No.  60/1989.   Kishan  Singh  had  become  fully  aware  of  all  the  

relevant facts at the time of filing the suit no. 1075 of 1996.  There is  

no explanation of delay even after 1996.  Thus, the Judgment and  

Order  of  the  High  Court  does  not  warrant  any interference.   The  

appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.   

11. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel  for  the parties  and perused the  record.   The issue as to  

whether the findings recorded by Civil Court are binding in criminal  

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proceedings between the same parties in respect of the same subject  

matter, is no more Res Integra.   

12. In  M/s Karamchand Ganga Pershad & Anr.  Vs.  Union of  

India & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1244, this Court, while dealing with the  

same issue, held as under :-

“It is well established principle of law that the  decisions of the civil courts are binding on the   criminal courts.  The converse is not true.”    

13. The said Judgment was delivered by a three-Judge Bench of  

this Court without taking note of the Constitution Bench Judgment in  

M.S. Sherrif Vs. The State of Madras & Ors.,  AIR 1954 SC 397 on  

the same issue, wherein this Court has held as under :-

“As  between  the  civil  and  the  criminal   proceedings  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  criminal matters should be given precedence.   There  is  some  difference  of  opinion  in  the  High Courts  of  India  on this  point.  No hard  and fast rule can be laid down but we do not   consider  that  the  possibility  of  conflicting  decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a  relevant  consideration.  The  law  envisages  such an eventuality when it expressly refrains  from making the decision of one court binding  on  the  other,  or  even  relevant,  except  for  certain limited purposes, such as sentence or   damages.  The  only  relevant  consideration  here  is  the  likelihood  of  embarrassment.   Another factor which weighs with us is that a  

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civil  suit  often  drags  on  for  years  and  it  is   undesirable that a criminal prosecution should  wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all   about the crime. The public interests demand  that criminal justice should be swift and sure;   that the guilty should be punished while the  events are still  fresh in the public mind and  that the innocent should be absolved as early   as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial.   Another reason is that it is undesirable to let   things slide till memories have grown too dim  to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast   rule.  Special  considerations obtaining in any  particular  case  might  make  some  other  course more expedient and just.”  

14. In V.M. Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC  

767, this Court has held as under :-

“As seen that the civil court after full-dressed  trial  recorded  the  finding  that  the  appellant  had  not  come  into  possession  through  the  Company but had independent tenancy rights  from the principal landlord and, therefore, the  decree for eviction was negatived. Until  that  finding  is  duly  considered  by  the  appellate   court after weighing the evidence afresh and if   it so warranted reversed, the findings bind the  parties. The findings, recorded by the criminal   court,  stand  superseded  by  the  findings  recorded  by  the  civil  court.  Thereby,  the  findings of the civil court get precedence over   the  findings  recorded  by  the  trial  court,  in   particular,  in  summary  trial  for  offences  like  Section  630.  The  mere  pendency  of  the  appeal does not have the effect of suspending  the operation of the decree of the trial Court   

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and neither the finding of the civil court gets   disturbed  nor  the  decree  becomes  inoperative.”   

15. The  correctness  of  the  aforesaid  judgment  in  V.M.  Shah  

(supra) was doubted by this Court and the case was referred to a  

larger Bench in K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police & Anr.,  

AIR 2002 SC 3372.   In the said case, the Judgment in  V.M. Shah  

(supra) was  not  approved.   While  deciding  the  case,  this  Court  

placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Privy Council in Emperor  

Vs.  Khwaja Nazair Ahmad,  AIR 1945 PC 18 wherein it  has been  

held as under :-

“It  is  conceded that  the findings in  a  civil   proceeding  are  not  binding  in  a  subsequent prosecution founded upon the  same or similar allegations.  Moreover, the  police investigation was stopped and it cannot   be said with certainty that no more information  could be obtained.  But even if it were not, it is  the  duty  of  a  criminal  court  when  a  prosecution for a crime takes place before it   to  form  its  own  view  and  not  to  reach  its   conclusion  by  reference  to  any  previous  decision  which  is  not  binding  upon  it.”   (Emphasis added)   

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16 In Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah &  

Anr., (2005) 4 SCC 370,  this Court held as under :-

“Coming to the last contention that an effort   should be made to avoid conflict  of  findings  between  the  civil  and  criminal  courts,  it  is   necessary  to  point  out  that  the  standard  of  proof  required  in  the  two  proceedings  are  entirely different.  Civil  cases are decided on  the basis of preponderance of evidence while   in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the  prosecution  and  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt has to be given. There is neither any  statutory provision nor any legal principle that   the findings recorded in one proceeding may  be treated as final or binding in the other, as  both  the  cases  have  to  be  decided  on  the   basis of the evidence adduced therein.”

17. In P. Swaroopa Rani Vs. M. Hari Narayana alias Hari Babu,  

AIR 2008 SC 1884, this Court has held as under :-

“t  is,  however,  well  settled  that  in  a  given  case,  civil  proceedings  and  criminal   proceedings  can  proceed  simultaneously.   Whether  civil  proceedings  or  criminal   proceedings  shall  be  stayed  depends  upon  the fact and circumstances of each case…… Filing of an independent criminal proceeding,   although  initiated  in  terms  of  some  observations  made by the  civil  court,  is  not   barred under  any statute……It  goes without   saying that the respondent shall be at liberty   to take recourse to such a remedy which is   

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available to him in law.  We have interfered   with the impugned order only because in law  simultaneous  proceedings  of  a  civil  and  a  criminal case is permissible.”  

18. In  Syed Aksari Hadi Ali  Augustine Imam & Anr. Vs.  State  

(Delhi  Admn) & Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 528, this Court considered all  

the earlier Judgments on the issue and held that while deciding the  

case in  Karam Chand (supra), this Court failed to take note of the  

Constitution Bench Judgment in M.S. Sherrif (supra) and, therefore,  

it remains per incuriam and does not lay down the correct law.   

A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Vishnu Dutt  

Sharma Vs. Daya Prasad, (2009) 13 SCC 729, wherein it has been  

held by this Court  that the decision in  Karamchand (supra) stood  

overruled in K.G. Premshankar (supra).     

19. Thus,  in  view  of  the  above,  the  law  on  the  issue  stands  

crystallized to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the Civil  

Court  do  not  have  any  bearing  so  far  as  the  criminal  case  is  

concerned and vice-versa.  Standard of proof is different in civil and  

criminal  cases.   In  civil  cases  it  is  preponderance  of  probabilities  

while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt.  There is  

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neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by  

the  court  either  in  civil  or  criminal  proceedings  shall  be  binding  

between the same parties while dealing with the same subject matter  

and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence  

adduced therein.  However, there may be cases where the provisions  

of Sections 41 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with  

the relevance of previous Judgments in subsequent cases may be  

taken into consideration.   

20. In view of the above, the Judgment and order of the High Court  

dated 13.02.2009 is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to  

be set aside.  However, the facts and circumstances of the case do  

not warrant so.  The agreement to sell  in favour of the appellants’  

father is dated 22.10.1988 and sale deed was to be executed and  

registered by 15.06.1989.  The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed Civil suit  

No. 60/1989 in 1989.  It is difficult to believe that the appellants’ father  

was not aware of the pendency of that suit.  No explanation has been  

furnished as to why after expiry of the date of execution of the sale  

deed in favour of Kishan Singh, i.e. 15.06.1989, the appellants’ father  

did not file the suit for specific performance which was subsequently  

filed on 6.2.1996 as Civil Suit No. 81/1996.  Even if it is presumed  

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that  Kishan Singh was not  aware of  pendency of  suit  filed by the  

respondent  Nos.  1 to 4,  no explanation could be furnished that  in  

case,  the  appellants’  father  filed  another  suit  No.  1075/1996  for  

setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996 in Civil Suit no.60/1989, why  

did he wait till the decision of that suit for lodging FIR, as the civil and  

criminal proceedings could have proceeded simultaneously.  The FIR  

has  been  filed  only  on  23.07.2002  i.e.  after  filing  the  RFA  No.  

2488/2002 before the High Court on 15.07.2002.  Therefore, there is  

an inordinate delay on the part of the appellants’ father in filing the  

FIR and there is no explanation whatsoever for the same.   

21. Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the informant  

with  all  its  vivid  details  gives  an  assurance  regarding  truth  of  its  

version.   In  case,  there  is  some  delay  in  filing  the  FIR,  the  

complainant must give explanation for the same.  Undoubtedly, delay  

in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant’s case improbable  

when such delay is properly explained.  However, deliberate delay in  

lodging the complaint is always fatal.  [vide:  Sahib Singh Vs.  State  

of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 3247].    

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22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court has  

to look for a plausible explanation for such delay.  In absence of such  

an explanation,  the delay may be fatal.   The reason for  quashing  

such proceedings may not  be merely that  the allegations were an  

after  thought  or  had given a coloured version of  events.   In  such  

cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the  

reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil  

Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side  

with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance  

on the other party.  Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be  

permitted to  give vent  to  their  frustrations by cheaply invoking the  

jurisdiction of the criminal court.  The court proceedings ought not to  

be  permitted  to  degenerate  into  a  weapon  of  harassment  and  

persecution.  In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a  

view  to  spite  the  other  party  because  of  a  private  and  personal  

grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal  

proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of  

the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (vide :  

Chandrapal Singh & Ors. Vs. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR 1982 SC  

1238;  State of  Haryana & Ors. Vs.  Ch. Bhajan Lal  & Ors.,  AIR  

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1992 SC 604;  G. Sagar Suri & Anr. Vs.  State of U.P. & Ors., AIR  

2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. & Ors., (2008)  

12 SCC 531).

23. The case before us relates to a question of the genuineness of  

the  agreement  to  sell  dated  4.1.1988.   The  said  agreement  was  

between Kishori Lal and respondents and according to the terms of  

the said agreement, the sale deed was to be executed by 10.6.1989.  

As  the  sale  deed  was  not  executed  within  the  said  time,  suit  for  

specific performance was filed by the other party in 1989  which was  

decreed in 1996.  So far as the present appellants are concerned,  

agreement to sell dated 22.10.1988 was executed in favour of their  

father and the sale deed was to be executed by 15.6.1989.  No action  

was  taken  till  1996  for  non-execution  of  the  sale  deed.   The  

appellants’  father approached the court  after  7 years by filing Suit  

No.81/1996 for specific performance.  However, by that time, the suit  

filed  by  the  present  respondents  stood  decreed.   The  appellants’  

father filed another Suit  No.1075/96 for setting aside the judgment  

and decree passed in favour of the respondents 1 to 4.  The said suit  

was  dismissed  by  the  Additional  District  Judge  (Senior  Division),  

Khanna on 10.6.2002.  Subsequently, the appellants preferred RFA  

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No. 2488/02 on 15.7.2002 against the aforesaid order, and the said  

appeal is still pending before the Punjab & Haryana High Court.

24. It is to be noted that the appellants’ father Kishan Singh lodged  

FIR  No.144/02  on  23.7.2002  through  his  attorney  Jaswant  Singh  

Mann under  Sections  420/323/467/468/471/120-B IPC,  against  the  

respondents.   The allegations  made in  the  FIR were  substantially  

similar  to  the  allegations  made  by  the  appellants  in  Civil  Suit  

No.1075/96, which had been decided against them.    It is evident  

that the aforesaid FIR was filed with inordinate delay and there has  

been no plausible explanation for the same.  The appellants lodged  

the aforesaid FIR only after meeting their Waterloo in the Civil Court.  

Thus, it is evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of  

harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in long and arduous  

criminal proceedings.  We are of the view that such an action on the  

part of the appellants’ father would not be bona fide, and the criminal  

proceedings initiated by him against the respondents amount to an  

abuse of the process of law.     

25. In view of the above, and to do substantial justice, we are not  

inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High Court quashing  

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the criminal proceedings against the respondents in spite of the fact  

that  the  impugned judgment  dated  13.02.2009  passed in  Criminal  

Misc. No. 4136 of 2003 is not sustainable in the eyes of law.

26. With these observations, the appeal stands disposed of.  

…………………………….J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

……………………..……..J. New Delhi, (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) August 12, 2010

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