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PETITIONER: KISHAN LAL AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/03/1990

BENCH: SAHAI, R.M. (J) BENCH: SAHAI, R.M. (J) SHETTY, K.J. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR 2269            1990 SCR  (2) 142  1990 SCC  Supl.  742     JT 1990 (1)   553  1990 SCALE  (1)555

ACT:       Rajasthan  Agricultural  Produce  Markets  Act,  1961: Section 40 and Schedule--Market fee--Levy of--On  Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar as agricultural produce--Validity of.     Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 19, 301,  304, 246,  254(2),  Seventh  Schedule, List I Entry  52,  List  H Entries  28,  66  and List 111  Entry  33--Market  Fee--Levy of--On  Khandsari,  Shakkar, Gur and Sugar  as  agricultural produce--State  Legislature--Competency of--Rajasthan  Agri- cultural   Produce   Markets  Act,  1961  Section   40   and Schedule--Repugnancy and validity of. Words and Phrases: ’Sugar’--’Agricultural produce’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     In  the Writ Petition flied in this Court, the  validity of Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, levying market-fee on sale and purchase of agricultural produce  was challenged for lack of legislative competence, and arbitrary inclusion  of Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar as  agricul- tural produce in the Schedule. It was contended that  inclu- sion of sugar was arbitrary inasmuch as it being a  declared commodity  of public importance under Entry 52 of List I  of Schedule  VII,  the  State Legislature  was  precluded  from legislating on it and that being a mill or factory  produce, it could not be deemed to be agricultural produce, which was basically confined to produce of or from soil. Dismissing the Petitions, this Court,     HELD:  1.1 Sugar is one of the items which was  included in  the Schedule to the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce  Mar- kets Act, 1961, statutorily, right from the inception.  Such inclusion  is  found in many States. Whether it  was  subse- quently  deleted  or re-included or regrouped or  was  added later  was  immaterial, as Section 40 of the  Act  empowered State Government to amend or include any item in the  Sched- ule  of  agricultural produce. Existence of  such  delegated power is 143 usual  feature of the statutes. No illegality  or  infirmity could be pointed out in it. Any challenge, therefore, round- ed on excessive delegation of legislative power was  miscon-

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ceived. [144H, 145A-B]     1.2 The definition of the word "agricultural produce" in the Act includes all produce whether agricultural, horticul- tural,  animal  husbandry or otherwise as specified  in  the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive, neither excludes any item produced in  mill or factories nor it confines its width  to  produce from soil. Nor switch over from indigenous method of produc- ing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes  its character.  To say, therefore, that sugar being produced  in mill  or  factories could not be deemed to  be  agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and  judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in  statutes of other States. [145C-D, F]     Kewal  Krishan  Puri v. State of Punjab,  [1979]  3  SCR 1217;  Ramesh  Chandra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3  SCR  166; Rathi  Khandsari Udyog v. State of U.P., [1982] 2  SCR  966; Sreenivisa  General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh,  AIR 1983 SC 1264; Ramesh Chandra v. U.P. State [1980] 3 SCR  194 and  State of U.P. v. Ganga Das Mill, [1985] SCR 87-88,  re- ferred to. Halsbury’s  Law of England, Vol. I and Paragraph  1845,  re- ferred to.     2.  In  view of the settled position of law  that  sugar legislations are within the scope of Entry 33 of  Concurrent List,  no  further discussion on clash between Entry  52  of List  I of Vllth Schedule and Entry 28 of List II is  neces- sary. There is no repugnancy in the Central and State legis- lation.  Even if there would have been any, the  Act  having received  assent  of  the President is  fully  protected  by Article 254(2) of the Constitution. [146B-D]     Choudhary  Tika Ram and Others v. State of U.P.,  [1956] SCR 393, followed.

JUDGMENT:     ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No.  1555 of 1979 etc. etc. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India). 144 D.N. Dwivedi and Sarwa Mitter for the Petitioners.     Dr.  L.M,  Singhvi, B.D. Sharma,  Shri  Narain,  Sandeep Narain, Shrid Rizvi and D.K. Singh for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     R.M.  SAHAI, J. Validity of Rajasthan Agricultural  Pro- duce  Markets  Act,  1961  (for  brevity  the  Act)  levying market-fee  on sale and purchase of agricultural produce  in market-yard or sub-marketyard was challenged by dealers  for lack  of legislative competence, violation of  Articles  14, 19,  30 1 and 304 of Constitution, absence of any  quid  pro quo in the fee paid and service rendered, illegal and  arbi- trary inclusion of manufactured articles such as  Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar as agricultural produce in the sched- ule etc.     Acts  of other States, for instance, Punjab and  Haryana and U.P. were also assailed for similar infirmities. Whether these petitions, which appear to be identical, are reproduc- tion  of any of those petitions, which were pending in  this Court  from  before  is not relevant but  various  group  of petitions of Punjab and Haryana dealers challenging  consti- tutionality and legality of Act and its provisions including Gut,  Khandsari and Shakkar as agricultural produce  in  the schedule  of  Punjab Act have been  dismissed  by  different

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benches  presumably  because of decisions in  Kewal  Krishan Puri  v. State of Punjab, [1979] 3 SCR 1217; Ramesh  Chandra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR 166; Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State  of  U.P.,  [1982] 2 SCR 966  and  Sreenivisa  General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1264.     Despite  these decisions spelling out  basic  principles for  determining validity of marketing legislations  dealing with  agricultural produce the petitioners were not  willing to  take it lying down probably because none of these  deci- sions dealt with sugar. It was urged that inclusion of sugar in the Schedule of the Act was arbitrary., primarily because it  being  a declared commodity of public  importance  under Entry 52 of List I of Schedule VII the State legislature was precluded  from  legislating  on it. Its  inclusion  in  the Schedule  was  also assailed as it being a Mill  or  Factory produce  it could not be deemed to be  agricultural  produce which is basically confined to produce of or from soil.     Sugar  is  one of the items which was  included  in  the Schedule to the Act, statutorily, right from its  inception. Such inclusion is found in 145 Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Bihar etc. Whether it was subsequently deleted or re-included or re-grouped or it  was added  later was immaterial as Section 40 of the Act  empow- ered  State Government to amend or include any item  in  the Schedule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegat- ed power is usual feature of the statutes. No illegality  or infirmity could be pointed out in it. Any challenge,  there- fore,  rounded on excessive delegation of legislative  power was misconceived.     Inclusion  of  sugar  in the Schedule was  urged  to  be arbitrary  as  it  was not produced out of  soil  the  basic ingredient  of agricultural produce. Fallacy of the  submis- sion is apparent as it was in complete disregard of  defini- tion  of  the word "agricultural produce" in the  Act  which includes  all produce whether  agricultural,  horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the  Schedule. The  legislative power to add or include and define  a  word even  artificially, apart, the definition which is  not  ex- haustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce  from soil.  If that be the construction then all items of  animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks expanse of  the expression "or otherwise as specified in the  Sched- ule."  Nor switch over from indigenous method  of  producing anything  to  scientific or mechanical  method  changes  its character.  Khandsari sugar, which is produced by  open  pan process  and is not different from sugar produced by  vacuum pan process except in composition, filterability and conduc- tivity as held in Rathi Khandsari Udyog, (supra) was held to be  agricultural produce in some decisions.  No  distinction was  made on method of production, namely, by  modern  plant and machinery. To say, therefore, that sugar being  produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be  agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and  judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in  statutes of  other  States. Rice or dal produced in mills  have  been held  to  be agricultural produce in Ramesh  Chandra  v.U.P. State, [1980] 3 SCR 194 and State of U.P. v. Ganga Das Mill, [1985]  SCR 87-88. Even in Halsbury Law of England,’ Vol.  I the  word agricultural produce for purpose  of  agricultural marketing  schemes is understood as, ’including any  product of  agriculture or horticulture and any article of  food  or drink wholly or partly manufactured or derived from any such product  and fleeces (including all kinds of wool)  and  the

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skins  of animals’. In the same volume products  covered  by the  provisions of EEC Treaty as to agriculture  (classified according  to  the Brussels Nomenclature of 1965)  are  men- tioned in paragraph 1845. Sugar is one of them. 146     Another  legalistic  challenge regarding  inhibition  of State  to  legislate  on sugar or of  repeated  argument  of occupied  field was more attractive than of  any  substance. Reliance  on  Article 246 of the Constitution  was  academic only.  As far back as 1956 Constitution Bench of this  Court in  Choudhary Tika Ram and others v. State of  U.P.,  [1956] SCR 393 examined the matter in detail and held sugar  legis- lations  to  be within the scope of Entry 33  of  concurrent list.  It was observed that all ’Acts and the  notifications issued  thereunder  by  the Centre in regard  to  sugar  and sugarcane  were enacted in exercise of concurrent  jurisdic- tion’.  Effect  of it was described  thus,  ’The  Provincial Legislature  as  well as the Central  Legislature  would  be competent  to enact such pieces of legislation and no  ques- tion  of  legislative competence would arise’.  Any  further discussion on clash between Entry 52 of List I of VII Sched- ule with Entry 28 of List II in the circumstances is  unnec- essary. As regards the submission of occupied field  suffice it  to  say that there is no repugnancy m  the  Central  and State legislation. At least none was made out. Even if there would  have been any the Act having received assent  of  the President it is fully protected by Article 254(2). For  these  reasons these petitions fail and  are  dismissed with costs. N.P.V.                               Petitions dismissed. 147