10 October 2007
Supreme Court
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KISHAN CHAND Vs STATE OF U.P.

Bench: S.B. SINHA,HARJIT SINGH BEDI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001411-001411 / 2007
Diary number: 20321 / 2006
Advocates: Vs ANIL KUMAR JHA


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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1411 of 2007

PETITIONER: Kishan Chand & Ors

RESPONDENT: State of U.P

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/10/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA,  J :

1.      Leave granted.          2.      Phool Chand (Accused No. 1) was a retired Army Officer.  He was  allegedly allotted some land bearing plot No. 596 at village Paigamberpur  Hamlet, Jarganwan, title whereof was in dispute.  He was in possession  thereof but his right to make any construction thereupon was in dispute.  His  earlier attempt to raise constructions on the said land had met with resistance  by the villagers.  They made a complaint to the officers of the Tehsil.   Before the police authorities, Phool Chand is said to have given an  undertaking not to make any construction.   

       We may place on record that he had also intended to put up  constructions earlier but did not succeed.  Villagers were claiming their right  to make common use the land in question, viz., for keeping \021Ghoor\022 of the  village folks.   

3.      On 3.02.1978 at about 9 a.m., the said Phool Chand armed with a  double barrel gun, his brother Kishan Chand (Accused No. 2) armed with a  single barrel gun in the company Bhagauti (Accused No. 3), Badadin  (Accused No. 4) and Sheo Prasad (Accused No. 5) who were said to have  been armed with lathis came to the land in question.  They started  construction thereupon with the help of hired labourers.  A large number of  villagers assembled at the place.  Accused were requested not to make any  construction till the disputes between them were determined by the  competent court.

4.      Amongst the villagers, Ram Asrey (since deceased), his son Mishri  Lal (first informant), Hardev, Suraj Lal, Ram Singh, Ram Dass, Vishram,  Ram Saran, Shiv Pal, Mohan Lal, Shiv Prasad, Umrao, Pyare, Ram Lakhan,  Karam Ali and Ram Prasad were present.  Allegedly, Phool Chand and  others started abusing them.  Mishri Lal and his co-villagers asked him not  to do so.  Accused Nos. 3 to 5, viz., Bhagauti, Badadin and Sheo Prasad,  allegedly exhorted Phool Chand and Kishan Chand to shoot Mishri Lal and  others whereupon Phool Chand ran towards the roof of the nearby \021Kothri\022  owned by Mishri Lal and from the roof thereof, he started firing.  Kishan  Chand is also said to have fired from his gun.  Ram Asrey standing at the  Galiyara received a gun shot injury.  He died at the spot.  Mishri Lal and  others also received firearm injuries.  One of the persons, viz., Ram Harak  who had also sustained gun shot injuries breathed his last in the hospital.  On  receipt of such gun shot injuries, the condition of Suraj Lal, Hardev, Mahan  Lal, Ram Dass and Ram Singh allegedly became serious.

       Mishri Lal son of the deceased Ram Asrey lodged a First Information  Report at about 11.30 a.m. on the said date alleging death of Ram Asrey and

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Ram Harak at the hands of the accused persons and receipt of injuries by as  many as 15 persons, viz.,  Mishri Lal, Pyare, Shiv Pal, Mohan Lal, Ram  Dass, Suraj Lal, Ram Singh, Hardev, Karam Ali, Shiv Prasad, Umrao,  Vishram, Prem Prasad, Ram Saran and Ram Lakhan.

5.      The defence version in regard to the incident was that the \021Patta\022 of  the disputed land was executed in the name of Phool Chand in the year 1973.   He allegedly had raised constructions on eastern and western wall.   However, in the year 1977, i.e., after his retirement when he was going to  construct his house thereupon, his attempt to do so was opposed by Mishri  Lal, Hardev, deceased Ram Asrey and others.  An undertaking was said to  have forcibly been taken by Lekhpal and Station House Officer of the police  station.  However, at a later stage, the Tahsildar of the area allegedly  directed the Station House Officer of police station Asandra to render all  help to him.  However, the said order was not complied with.  In the written  statement filed by the accused persons, the incident that the had taken place  on 3.02.1978 at about 9.00 a.m. was accepted but it was contended that  while the said Phool Chand with the help of others including hired labourers  started constructions, the deceased Ram Asrey and Ram Harak along with a  large number of persons being armed with guns and lathis reached there and  caused obstructions.  Upon protest having been lodged, all of them advanced  towards him with a view to kill him.  He then ran to the roof of his father\022s  Baithaka but Ram Asrey and his companions surrounded his house.  They  also entered therein.  An attempt was also made to molest Smt. Shakuntala  Devi, sister of Phool Chand.  Only at that time, with a view to save the  modesty and honour of his sister as also save the life of other members of  the family, they caused injuries to various persons.  It was alleged that an  endeavour was made to lodge a First Information Report by Smt. Shakuntala  Devi but the same was not registered.  It was further alleged that Smt.  Shakuntala Devi came to Barabanki with her father, uncle and brother Gokul  Chand and all of them were medically examined by a private doctor  whereafter a report was sent to the District Magistrate.   

6.      The prosecution in support of its case examined 13 witnesses.  Mishri  Lal (PW-1), Suraj Lal (PW-2) and Ram Saran (PW-3) examined themselves  as eye-witnesses to the occurrence.  They proved the genesis of the  occurrence as also the manner in which it took place.  Other witnesses  examined by the prosecution were the doctors who had conducted post  mortem examination on the body of the deceased Ram Asrey and Ram  Harak as also examined the injuries on the body of 15 injured persons.   

7.      The defence examined Dr. L.K. Shukla (DW-1) who allegedly had  examined Smt. Shakuntala Devi, Sri Dutt, Ramfal and Gokul Chand.  Smt.  Shakuntala Devi examined herself as DW-2.

8.      The defence story was disbelieved both by the learned Trial Judge as  also the High Court.  They came to the conclusion that all the five accused  were present at the place of occurrence and participated therein and used  their respective weapons to inflict injuries upon the victims in execution of  their common object and for the said purpose they had formed an unlawful  assembly.  The plea of right of private defence raised by the accused was  also negatived.  The purported injuries found on the person of the defence  witnesses and others were held to be self-inflicted ones.

9.      On the aforementioned findings, Phool Chand and Kishan Chand were  convicted under Sections 148, 302/149 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code  and Bhagauti, Badadin and Sheo Prasad were convicted under Sections 147,  302/149 and 307/149 thereof. They were sentenced to undergo rigorous  imprisonment for life, four years rigorous imprisonment for attempt to  murder, two years rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 of the Indian  Penal Code and one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 147 thereof.   

10.    Indisputably, Accused No. 1 Phool Chand died during pendency of  the appeal in the High Court.  Accused No. 3 also is said to have died about  three years back.  Kishan Chand, Badadin and Sheo Prasad are before us.

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11.     Ms. Sandhya Goswami, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  appellants, took us through the evidences of Mishri Lal (PW-1), Suraj Lal  (PW-2) and Ram Saran (PW-3) and submitted that from the deposition of  the said witnesses, it would appear that the injuries having been caused only  by Phool Chand (since deceased), the appellants cannot be said to have  formed a common object so as to attract the provisions of Section 149 of the  Indian Penal Code.   

       The learned counsel would point out that a large number of villagers  took part in the incident.  Had the appellants been present, they would have  also sustained some injuries and, thus, their presence and participation in the  occurrence becomes doubtful.   

       It was urged that Phool Chand (since deceased) had exercised his right  of private defence inasmuch as from the prosecution case itself it would  appear that there were at least 16 persons who intended to cause bodily harm  to the accused persons apart from outraging the modesty of Smt. Shakuntala  Devi.  In the event, it is found, it was urged, that the said Phool Chand  exceeded his right of private defence, other accused persons could not have  been convicted under Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code particularly  when it has been brought on record that Phool Chand alone had climbed up  the roof and fired causing the deaths.

       Ms. Goswami submitted that the courts below committed a manifest  error in passing the impugned judgments insofar as they failed to take into  consideration that the injuries had been sustained by the family of the  accused.   

       It was further urged that in view of the finding of the High Court that  the accused Phool Chand was in possession of the site and the side walls.  It  was brought to our notice that the Superintendent of Police Shri Jangi had  passed an order (Ex. Kha-1) dated 27.01.1978 validating the possession of  Phool Chand after he had given an undertaking to the officer incharge.  

12.     Mr. Shail Kumar Dwivedi, learned Additional Advocate General for  the State of U.P. appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand,  took us through the judgments of the learned Trial Judge as also the High  Court and submitted that for determining the question as to whether the  accused shared common intention or common object, the backdrop of events  including the fact that they had tried to raise constructions earlier which had  been resisted by the villagers, the fact that the accused were armed with  deadly weapons whereas the prosecution parties were absolutely unarmed,  the undertaking of Accused No. 1 not to make any construction and the  prejudice which would be caused to the villagers if such constructions are  allowed to be made, viz., it will take away the right of some of the villagers  to take their carts through the pathway concerned, the false defence raised by  the accused persons are the determination factors.

13.     The land in question was allotted to Phool Chand.  He indisputably  was in possession thereof.  The ownership of the land was, however,  disputed.  Whether allotment in his favour was valid keeping in view the fact  that the villagers in general had been claiming user of the said land for a  particular purpose is not in dispute.  It is furthermore not in dispute that the  accused persons had made several attempts to raise constructions thereupon.   Such attempts on their part had been foiled.    Accused No. 1 had also given  an undertaking that he would not make any construction.

14.     From the materials brought on record, it is evident that the villagers  never intended to dispossess Phool Chand.  They were only resisting his  right to raise any constructions thereupon.  When the appellants together  with Phool Chand and Accused No. 3 went to raise constructions, they were  armed with deadly weapons.  Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were armed with a  double barrel gun and a single barrel gun respectively, the others were  having lathis in their hands.  They had hired labourers also with them.  Only

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when they started raising constructions, the deceased and the prosecution  witnesses objected thereto.  It had come on record that they were not  required to raise construction till the lis is determined.  The accused persons  did not listen to the said advice.  They started abusing the members of the  prosecution party.  They were requested not to use abusive language.  At that  juncture, it is alleged that Accused Nos. 3, 4 and 5 asked Accused Nos. 1  and 2 to kill them or to assault them.  Accused No. 1 went to the roof top of  a house.  He was holding a double barrel gun.  He fired shots at least aiming  at two persons standing at two different places.  He must have fired some  other shots also.  Deceased No. 1 Ram Asrey was standing at the Galiyara  whereas deceased No. 2 was standing near the wall towards the West of the  said Kothi.  It has been proved that Accused No. 2 also fired shots.  17  persons received injuries.  

       Dr. H.C. Nigam (PW-4) who conducted the post mortem examination  on the body of the deceased Ram Harak found the following injuries:

\023(1)         Lacerated wound 3/1/2 cm x = cm.  Bone  deep on the forehead 6 cm over the nose bridge.   There was swelling on all four sides of this injury.   Multiple firearm entry wounds in an area of 36 cm  x 30 cm spread over chest and right side of  abdomen and on chest and left side of abdomen. (2)     Multiple firearm entry wounds on entero- medival aspect of right hand in an area of 7 cm x  cm (sic), 7/1/2 cm above right side. (3)     Multiple firearm entry wounds in an area of  11 cm x 8 cm towards the front side of right  forearm 7 cm below the elbow. (4)     Multiple firearm entry wounds in an area of  9 cm x 6/1/2 cm on the backside of the palm of  right hand,7 cm below from the wrist joint.\024

       Dr. Gopal Swaroop (PW-5) who conducted the post mortem  examination on the body of the deceased Ram Asrey found the following  injuries:

\0231.  Multiple punctured wound (caused by  firearm) found over right side of face in an area of  8 cm x 6 cm muscle deep on which 4-5 marks of  pellets were found, they were marks of black  colour of shots whose margins were inverted.   These wounds of entry were of varying size of < x  < cm to 3 cm x > cm.

2.      Multiple punctured wounds (firearm  wounds) over the right side of neck in an area of  15 cm x 6 cm x muscle deep marks of 2-3 pellets  in number which were towards the inner side.   These were inverted wound of entry of varying  size of < x < cm to 3 cm x > cm.

3.      Multiple punctured wound in an area of 21  cm x 6 cm x muscle deep over the right shoulder in  the upper limbs just below the shoulder joint of  black colour.  The wounds of entry were of  varying size of < cm x < cm to > cm x > cm.

4.      Multiple punctured wound (firearms) 42 cm  x 26 cm x muscle deep towards the front side of  right chest on which approximately mark of 50 to  60 pellets were present which were wounds of  entry whose size differed from < cm x < cm to >  cm x > cm.\024

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       The injuries on the deceased, therefore, must have been caused as a  result of more than one shots fired at each of them.

       Dr. P.N. Pandey (PW-6) examined Mishri Lal, Pyare and Shiv Pal.   The following injuries were found on the body of the Mishri Lal: \023(1)         Firearm wound 0.5 cm x 0.4 cm on left side  neck 12 cm above left sterno clavicle joint. (2)     Lacerated wound 1 cm x 0.5 cm on left palm  in between middle and lateral fingers. (3)     Abrasion 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm on joint of right  side knee.\024

       On the body of Pyare, the following injuries were found:

\023(1) Abrasion 0.2 cm x 0.2 cm on left side back  of chest 10 cm away from vertebral column. (2)     Abrasion 0.2 cm x 0.2 cm on inner side on  left foot 6 cm beneath the knee joint.\024

       The following injuries were found on the body of Shiv Pal:

\023(1) Abrasion 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm on left side of  chest 8 cm above the left nipple. (2)     Abrasion 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm on left side thigh  upper part 35 cm above left knee joint.\024

       As regards injuries on the body of Mishri Lal, Dr. Pandey opined:

\023\005Injury No. 1 of Mishri Lal can be caused by a  pellet fired from rifle. Injury No. 2 can be caused  by some blunt weapon, for instance, lathi.  The  remaining injuries can be caused by pellets from  the rifles of the three accused.\024

       As regards injuries on the persons of Pyare and Shiv Pal, Dr. Pandey  opined that the injuries were caused by friction.

       Participation by all the accused in causing death of two persons and  injuries sustained by others is, therefore, apparent. 15.     This Court in Mizaji and Another v. The State of U.P. [(1959) Supp  (1) SCR 940] opined that there are two parts of Section 149 of the Indian  penal Code.  To attract the first part, it was not necessary that there should  be a pre-concert.  In regard to the second part, it was stated:

\023\005Even if the offence committed is not in direct  prosecution of the common object of the assembly,  it may yet fall under Section 149 if it can be held  that the offence was such as the members knew  was likely to be committed. The expression \021know\022  does not mean a mere possibility, such as might or  might not happen. For instance, it is a matter of  common knowledge that when in a village a body  of heavily armed men set out to take a woman by  force, someone is likely to be killed and all the  members of the unlawful assembly must be aware  of that likelihood and would be guilty under the  second part of Section 149. Similarly, if a body of  persons go armed to take forcible possession of the  land, it would be equally right to say that they have  the knowledge that murder is likely to be  committed if the circumstances as to the weapons  carried and other conduct of the members of the

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unlawful assembly clearly point to such knowledge  on the part of them all\005\024

16.     In Bishna Alias Bhiswadeb Mahato & Ors. v. State of West Bengal  [(2005) 12 SCC 657 : 2005 (9) SCALE 204], this Court held :

       \023For the purpose of attracting Section 149  and/or 34 IPC, a specific overt act on the part of  the accused is not necessary.  He may wait and  watch.  Inaction on the part of an accused may  some time go a long way to hold that he shared a  common object with others.\024      17.     In Triloki Nath and Others v. State of U.P. [(2005) 13 SCC 323], the  law has been stated in the following terms:

       \023For the purpose of attracting Section 149 of  the IPC, it is not necessary that there should be a  pre-concert by way of a meeting of the persons of  the unlawful assembly as to the common object.  If  a common object is adopted by all the persons and  shared by them, it would serve the purpose.\024

18.     Ms. Goswami relied upon a decision of this Court in Munna Chanda  v. State of Assam [(2006) 3 SCC 752] wherein the accused persons were  held to have not formed any common object keeping in view the genesis of  the said occurrence which took place at three different stages.  Appellants  therein were involved only at the third stage.  It was in the peculiar fact  situation obtaining therein this Court opined:

       \023The appellants herein were not armed with  weapons.  They except Bhuttu were not parties to  all the  three stages of the dispute.  At the third  stage of the quarrel, they wanted to teach the  deceased  and others a lesson. For  picking up  quarrel with Bhuttu, they might have become  agitated and asked for apologies from Moti.   Admittedly, it was so done  at the instance of  Nirmal, Moti was assaulted by Bhuttu at the  instance of Rattan.  However, it cannot be said that  they had common object of intentional killing  of  the deceased.  Moti,  however, while being  assaulted could free himself from the grip of the  appellants and fled from the scene.  The deceased,  was being chased not only by the appellants herein  but by many others.  He was found dead next  morning.  There is, however, nothing to show as to  what role the appellants either conjointly or  separately played.  It is also not known as to  whether if one or all of the appellants were present,  when the last blow was given. Who  are those, who  had assaulted the deceased is also not known. At  whose hands he received injuries is again a  mystery.  Neither Section 34 nor Section 149 of  the Indian Penal Code is, therefore, attracted. [See  Dharam Pal and Others v. State of Haryana \026  (1978) 4 SCC 440 and Shambhu Kuer v. State of  Bihar \026 AIR 1982 SC 1228].\024

19.     Right of self-defence is a plea which is available to the accused but  the burden to prove the same would be on them.

       The High Court, in our opinion, committed an error in rejecting the

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plea of self-defence raised on behalf of the accused stating that the incident  took place at an open space.  There is no law that right of self-defence  cannot be exercised in relation to a dispute over an open space.  But the  factual matrix obtaining in the instant case being absolutely different, we are  of the opinion that right of self-defence on the part of the accused was not  available.  Accused persons were the aggressors.  They had gone to the  scene of occurrence with weapons.  Phool Chand and other accused, in all  probability, thought that having regard to the order passed by the  Superintendent of Police asking his subordinate officers to afford them  protection, they could take law in his own hands.  Thus, they could raise  construction by show of force.

       Evidences adduced on behalf of the prosecution in no unmistakable  terms point out that all the overt acts started from the side of the accused  persons.  They rejected the advice not to raise any construction till the  dispute is determined.  They started using abusive language and even when  asked not to do so they continued to do so.  Only when a protest was made  by the villagers, Accused No. 1 Phool Chand went to the roof top of a house  and started indiscriminating firing.  He was in army.  He was presumably a  good marks man.  Shots fired by him hit the deceased on vital parts of their  bodies.  

20.     It is not the case of the appellants that the villagers intended to  dispossess them.  We have noticed hereinbefore that they were not armed at  all.  They had assembled at the place only with a view to resist the attempt  on the part of the accused persons to raise constructions in respect whereof  Accused No. 1 himself had given an undertaking that he would not do so.   The Superintendent of Police might have issued certain directions to the  Sub-Inspector but indisputably the lis was pending adjudication before a  competent authority.  Accused could not have taken law in their own hands  only because the Superintendent of Police has asked his police officer to  give protection to him.

21.     It has been found by the learned Trial Judge as also the High Court  that the prosecution witnesses did not enter into their house.  The plea that  the modesty of Smt. Shakuntala Devi was outraged has been rejected by  both the courts.  The accused did not lodge any First Information Report in  that behalf.  They, for reasons best known to them, did not go to a  government doctor to get their purported injuries examined on their persons.   Although the offence took place in the morning of 3.02.1978, they went to  DW-1 only on the next day to get their purported injuries examined.  For  valid and cogent reasons, the testimonies of the DWs had not been accepted.   The question as to whether in a situation of this nature the right of private  defence could be exercised by the accused persons must be considered  having regard to the following facts:

(i)     the prosecution witnesses were not armed; (ii)    there is nothing to show that they attempted to dispossess Accused  No. 1. (iii)   They did not dismantle the structures. (iv)    Accused persons themselves started abusing them. (v)     They intended to establish their right of raising constructions for  which they were fully prepared. (vi)    Had the matter been otherwise, the villagers would have also gone  to the site with arms. (vii)   Why all the five accused persons were armed has not been  explained.

22.     The fact that number of injuries sustained by the prosecution  witnesses and the nature thereof, viz., they suffered gun shot injuries as also  injuries caused by lathis, goes a long way to show that the accused persons  had shared common object.

       From the post mortem as also the injury report, it is evident that more  than one gun was used for commission of the offence.  The prosecution

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witnesses also suffered injuries which could only be caused by lathis.  It is,  therefore, a case where all the appellants together with Phool Chand had  taken part in the commission of the offence.

23.     In Shambhu Nath Singh and others v. State of Bihar [AIR 1960 SC  725], this Court opined:

\0236. Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is  declaratory of the vicarious liability of the  members of an unlawful assembly for acts done in  prosecution of the common object of that assembly  or for such offences as the members of the  unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be  committed in prosecution of that object. If an  unlawful assembly is formed with the common  object of committing an offence, and if that  offence is committed in prosecution of the object  by any member of the unlawful assembly, all the  members of the assembly will be vicariously liable  for that offence even if one or more, but not all  committed the offence. Again, if an offence is  committed by a member of an unlawful assembly  and that offence is one which the members of the  unlawful assembly knew to be likely to be  committed in prosecution of the common object,  every member who had that knowledge will be  guilty of the offence so committed. But "members  of an unlawful assembly may have a community of  object upto a certain point, beyond which they may  differ in their objects, and the knowledge  possessed by each member of what is likely to be  committed in prosecution of their common object  may vary not only according to the information at  his command, but also according to the extent to  which he shares the community of object and as a  consequence of this the effect of Section 149 of the  Indian Penal Code may be different on different  members of the same unlawful assembly."  Jahiruddin v. Queen Empress, ILR 22 Cal 306.\024

24.     In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa and Others v. State of Karnataka  [1994 Supp (3) SCC 235], this Court opined:

\0239. From the above discussion it is established by  the prosecution that A-1 to A-5 formed into an  unlawful assembly variously armed and  participated in the occurrence during which two  deceased persons died and P.Ws. 2 to 4 received  injuries. The next question is whether the common  object of the unlawful assembly was to commit the  murders. Whether there was such a common object  or not, depends upon various factOrs. A-1 and A- 2, though armed with axes, did not use the sharp  side but only gave one or two blows on the heads  with the butt ends. A-4 and A-5 who were armed  with sticks dealt blows only on the legs and or on  the hands which were not serious. A-3 did not  participate in the attack on any of the two deceased  persons. These circumstances show that the  common object of the unlawful assembly cannot  be said to be to cause murders and at any rate it  cannot be said that all the accused shared the same  and that they had knowledge that the two deceased  persons would be killed and with that knowledge

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continued to be the members of the unlawful  assembly. However, taking all the circumstances  of the case into consideration, the common object  can be held to be only to cause grievous hurt. A-1  and A-2, however, dealt blows with the butt ends  of the axes on the two deceased persons and the  injuries on the heads caused by them proved to be  fatal. Having given our earnest consideration to  this aspect of the case, we are of the view that A-1  and A-2 must be held liable for their individual  acts and they would be liable to be punished under  Section 302 I.P.C. and A-3 to A-5 under Sections  326/149 I.P.C. so far as the attack on the two  deceased persons is concerned.\024

25.     In Bunnilal Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [(2006) 10 SCC 639], this  Court held:

\02313\005We may say here that it is now the settled  law that under Section 149 IPC, the liability of  other members for the offence committed during  the continuance of the occurrence rests upon the  fact whether the other persons knew before hand  that the offence actually committed was likely to  be committed in prosecution of the common  object.  Such knowledge may reasonably be  collected from the nature of the assembly, arms or  behaviour on or before the scene of occurrence\005\024

26.     In Sunil Balkrishna Bhoir v. The State of Maharashtra [2007 (7)  SCALE 184], this Court held:

\02317. Section 149 per se constitutes a substantive  offence. The object of this section is to make clear  that an accused person whose case falls within its  terms cannot put forward the defence that he did  not, with his own hand, commit the offence  committed in prosecution of the common object of  the unlawful assembly or such as the members of  the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in  prosecution of that object. Unlawful assembly was  formed originally to assault and something might  have happened all of a sudden.\024

27.     In a case of this nature, the injuries on the part of the defence  witnesses need not detain us as sufferance of such injuries at the hands of the  prosecution witnesses had not been believed by both the courts below.  We  do not see any reason to differ with the said findings.

28.     If Phool Chand was armed by the purported order passed by the  Superintendent of Police that he should have assistance from the police  officers.  We fail to see any reason as to why he could not go to the police  station and lodge a First Information Report.  Why the injured persons did  not go to a Government Hospital for getting themselves examined on that  date itself.  It betrays common sense as to why they had to go to a private  doctor and that too on the next date.  The accused persons even did not mind  setting up a false plea to the effect that modesty of Smt. Shakuntala Devi had  been outraged.  The testimony of Smt. Shakuntala Devi has been discarded  by the courts below.  No attempt even had been made before us to assail the  correctness of that part of the judgment.

29.     For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this  appeal which is dismissed accordingly.