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PETITIONER: KIRAN BEDI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/01/1989

BENCH: OJHA, N.D. (J) BENCH: OJHA, N.D. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR  714            1989 SCR  (1)  20  1989 SCC  (1) 494        JT 1989 (1)    21  1989 SCALE  (1)10

ACT:     Commissions of Inquiry Act,  1952/Commissions of Inquiry (Central)    Rules,   1972:   Sections   4   and    8-B/Rule 5(5)(a)--Commission      of     Inquiry--Examination      of witnesses--Sequence  of--Issuance of formal notice under  s. 8-B--When arises--Holding persons not entitled to be covered by  s. 8-B, and compelling them to enter witness box at  the inception  while directing similarly placed persons to  whom notice   issued   to  be  examined   at   the   end--Whether justified--Whether   discriminatory-Persons  whose   conduct being inquired into called upon for being cross-examined  at the inception of the inquiry while persons similarly  placed directed  to  be enquired at the end--Refuse to  bind  them- selves by oath and affirmation believing to be covered by s. 8-B-Whether can avoid consequences--Refusal--When justified.     Indian  Penal  Code. 1860:  Section  178--Commission  of Inquiry---Directing filing of complaint for prosecution  for failure to enter witness box--Whether complaint liable to be quashed for infringement of fundamental right.     Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 21, 32, 136  & 142-Commission of Inquiry--Holding persons not covered by s. 8-B of Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and compelling  them to  enter  witness box. while directing issue of  notice  to similarly    placed    persons-Whether    discriminatory--On refusal--Directing   filing  of  complaints  under  s.   178 IPC--Whether infringement of fundamental rights--Writ  Peti- tion/Special  Leave  Petition filed  challenging  order  for filing   complaints--Summons   by   Magistrate   not   chal- lenged--Maintainability    of--Interference    by    Supreme Court--Whether called for.

HEADNOTE:     A  Committee consisting of two Judges of the High  Court was  constituted  by Delhi Administration  to  enquire  into certain incidents in January 1988, involving the lawyers and the police sequel to an alleged incident of a lawyer,  being apprehended by the students of a College, and banded over to the police on the accusation of committing an offence within the  campus of the said College and his  subsequently  being brought  in handcuffs by the police for production before  a

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Magistrate, 21 who ultimately discharged him with direction to the  Commis- sioner  of Police to take action against the  guilty  police officials.     In  its interim report, the Committee observed  that  it had 10 examine the conduct of various police officers,  and, in particular, among others, the petitioners and recommended the transfer of the petitioners from their posts.     In  pursuance of a notice issued by the Committee  under Rule 5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of cases on behalf  of the  High  Court  Bar Association and  the  Commissioner  of Police  together with the supporting affidavits  were  filed before  the Committee. The Police were required to be  ready for  examination from May 16, 1988 onwards but  the  counter affidavit and the list of witnesses had not been filed  till 17th  May,  1988, on which date the Commissioner  of  Police submitted  two  applications  praying  for  postponement  of hearing  and for calling upon the Bar Association  to  start their  evidence first and to call upon the  Commissioner  of Police  to adduce the evidence thereafter.  Rejecting  these applications,  the  Committee passed an  order  saying  that since the Police had failed to file their counter  affidavit or  list of witnesses, the petitioners should be present  in Court on May 19, 1988 for crossexamination.     On  the petitioners’ refusing to enter  the  witness-box for taking oath for cross-examination, the Committee decided to  file complaints against the petitioners for  an  offence under  s. 178 of the Indian Penal Code and in  pursuance  of which  complaints were filed against the petitioners in  the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court under sub-s. (4) of s. 5  of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 read with s.  346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.     The petitioners challenged these orders in this Court by way  of  writ petitions and Special  Leave  Petitions.  This Court passed an order on June 2, 1988 directing the  Commit- tee  to reconsider the whole question relating to the  order in which the witnesses had to be examined in the case.     In  pursuance  of  the aforesaid  order,  the  Committee passed an order on 29th June, 1988 holding that the  concept of burden of proof was not quite relevant in the proceedings before  a  Commission, under the Act, which had  been  given free hand to lay down its own procedure subject, of  course, to  the provisions of the Act and the rules made  thereunder and that it would be difficult for the committee to lay down 22 the  manner  in  which the witnesses were  to  be  examined, foregoing its right to examine any witness at any stage,  if his  statement appeared to be relevant, that merely  because there were allegations against a particular person he  would not  be  said to be covered under s. 8-B, which  required  a positive order from the Committee, and that when the Commit- tee mentioned that it was to examine the conduct of  various Police  Officers and others, it did not have in view s.  8-B of  the Act. The Committee specifically held that the  three other  persons to whom notices had been issued under s.  8-B would be examined at the end of the inquiry.     On August 18, 1988 this Court quashed the orders of  the Committee  directing  the filing of the complaints  and  the criminal  proceedings  against the  petitioners  before  the Metropolitan Magistrate and held (a) that the Delhi Adminis- tration  had to examine first all its witnesses as  required by  Rule  5(5)(a) of the Rules framed under  the  Act;  even those  witnesses who may have filed affidavits  already  may first be examined in-chief before they were  cross-examined,

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since it was stated that when the affidavits were filed  the deponents  did not know what the other parties who had  also filed  affidavits had stated in their affidavits; the  ques- tion  whether a party had the right of cross-examination  or not shall be decided by the Committee in accordance with  s. 8-C of the Act; the direction to the Delhi Administration to examine its witnesses first did not apply to those witnesses who fell under s. 8-B of the Act, who had to be examined  at the  end of the inquiry, as opined by the Committee  itself; (b) that the petitioners were persons, who fell under s. 8-B of  the  Act and had to be dealt with accordingly,  and  (c) that  if the three persons to whom notices under s. 8-B  had been  issued  were  to be examined, even  according  to  the Committee, at the end of the inquiry there was no  justifia- ble reason to deny the same treatment to the petitioners who were in the same position as those three persons; the action of the Committee in asking them to be cross-examined at  the beginning  of  the inquiry was,  therefore,  discriminatory; mere non-issue of notices to them under s. 8-B ought not  to make  any difference if they otherwise satisfied the  condi- tions  mentioned in s. 8-B; the issue of such a  notice  was not  contemplated under s. 8-B of the Act; it was enough  if at  any  stage  the Commission considered  it  necessary  to inquire into the conduct of any person and such person would thereafter  be  governed by s. 8-B of the Act.  Reasons  for this order were to be given later. Giving reasons for the above order the Court, HELD: 1. Recourse to procedure under s. 8-B of the Commis- 23 sions of Enquiry Act, 1972 is not confined to any particular stage  and if not earlier, at any rate, as soon as the  Com- mittee made the unequivocal declaration of its intention, in its  interim report to examine the conduct of the two  peti- tioners it should have issued notice under s. 8-B to the two petitioners, if it was of the view, for which view there  is no justification, that issue of a formal notice under s. 8-B was  the  sine-qua-non for attracting that Section.  At  all events,  the  Committee could not deny the  petitioners  the statutory  protection  of s. 8-B by merely  refraining  from issuing  a  formal notice even though on  its  own  declared intention, the section was clearly attracted. [42C-E]     State  of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi  Ghulam  Mohammad, [1966]  Suppl.  S.C.R. page 401 and State  of  Karnataka  v. Union of India & Another, [1978] 2 S.C.R. page 1, relied on.     2.1 The use of the word ’or’ between clauses (a) and (b) of  s.  8-B of the Act makes it clear that s. 8-B  would  be attracted if requirement of either clause (a) or clause  (b) is fulfilled. Clause (a) of s. 8-B applies when the  conduct of  any  person is to be enquired into  whereas  clause  (b) applies to a case where reputation of a person is likely  to be prejudicially affected. [42B]     2.2 The fact that no formal notice had been issued under s. 8-B would constitute no justification for not treating  a person to be covered by that section if otherwise the ingre- dients of the said section were made out. Having once stated in its interim report in unequivocal terms, that the conduct of these two petitioners among others was to be examined, it was  not open to the Committee to still take the stand  that s.  8-B was not attracted in so far as they were  concerned. [42B-C]     2.3  Keeping in view the nature of the allegations  made in  the  statements of case and  the  supporting  affidavits filed  on behalf of the various Bar  Associations  including the  Delhi High Court Bar Association, requirement  of  even clause  (b)  of s. 8-B was fulfilled inasmuch  as  if  those

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allegations  were proved they were likely  to  prejudicially affect the reputation of the two petitioners. In view of the specific  term  of reference which  contemplated  taking  of "stringent  action" against all those responsible, even  the career  of the petitioners as police officers was likely  to be affected in case an adverse finding was recorded  against them  and the principle that the report of a  Commission  of Enquiry has no force proprio vigore does not, on a pragmatic approach to the consequences, seem to constitute  sufficient safeguard so far as the petitioners are concerned. [43C-E] 24     The  reason for the importance attached with  regard  to the matter of safeguarding the reputation of a person  being prejudicially affected in cl. (b) ors. 8-B of the Act is not far to seek. [43E-F]     Blackstone’s  Commentary of the laws of  England  Vol-I, IVth Edition, Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 77 at page 268  and D.F.  Marion  v.  Davis, 55 American Law  Reports  page  171 referred to.     3.1  Section 8-B inter alia contemplates an  opportunity being  given to the person governed by the said  section  to produce  evidence in his defence whereas s. 8-C  inter  alia gives  him  the  right to cross examine  the  witnesses  who depose against him. [45D]     Not  only that calling upon a person governed by s.  8-B to produce evidence in his defence at the very inception  of the inquiry is a contradiction in terms inasmuch as in  this situation such a person would really be required to disprove statements prejudicial to him of such witnesses who are  yet to be examined, it would also reduce the right of crossexam- ination  by such person to a mere formality for the  obvious reason  that by the time the witnesses who are to be  crass- examined  are  produced, the defence of  such  person  which would normally constitute the basis for the line and  object of cross-examination would already be known to such witness- es and they are likely to refashion their statements accord- ingly. [45E-F]     3.2 Perhaps in a case where there is no other witness to give information about the alleged incident about which  the inquiry  is  being held and the only person or  persons  who could give such information is or are the person or  persons who  are likely to be adversely affected by the inquiry,  it may  be necessary to depart from the above view as a  matter of  necessity.  But  this is not one such  case.  There  are admittedly any number of other persons who can give evidence about what happened on the relevant dates. [45G]     Since the two petitioners clearly fell within the  cate- gory  of persons contemplated by s. 8-B of the Act and  were consequently  entitled  to the same treatment  as  has  been accorded by the Committee to the persons to whom notice  has been issued by it under the said section, the Committee  was not  justified in calling upon the two petitioners to  stand in the witness box for cross-examination at the very initial stage of the enquiry. [54B-D] 3.3  The apprehension that in case a person governed  by  s. 8-B 25 was to be examined at the end and at that stage such  person even  at  the risk of not producing his  defence,  for  some reason,  chooses not to appear as a witness,  the  Committee would  be deprived of knowing the facts in the knowledge  of such  person  and such a course would obviously  hamper  the enquiry is more imaginary than real inasmuch as the power of the  Commission to call upon any person to appear as a  wit- ness under s. 4 of the Act, which in terms is very wide  and

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is not circumscribed by fetters of stage, would be available to  the  Commission and it would be entitled  to  call  such person as a witness even at that stage. [46A-C]     4.1 In view of the provisions contained in ss. 4 to 6 of the Act, and the rules framed thereunder a person could not, on  the  belief  that he was covered by s.  8-B,  avoid  the consequence of ss. 178 and 179, by claiming absolute immuni- ty  from binding himself by an oath or affirmation  for  an- swering questions put to them. [51H; 52A]     Mc Grain v. Daugherty, 71 L. ed. 580; Uphaus v. Wyman, 3 L.ed.  2d  1090; Sinclair v. United States,  73  L.ed.  692; Kastigar  v.  United States, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 and  Brown  v. Walker40 L.ed. 819, referred to.     However, a valid justification put forth by the  witness was  sufficient ground to make him immune from  prosecution. [52F]     Watkins  v.  United States, 1 L.ed. 2d 1273;  Flaxer  v. United  States,  3  L.ed. 2d 183 and  Murphy  v.  Waterfront Commission of New York, 12 L.ed. 2d 678 referred to.     In  the instant case, the petitioners are not  asserting that  they could not be required at all to appear as a  wit- ness before the Committee and make statement on oath. It was submitted  on their behalf that they did not either wish  to delay  the proceedings or to show disrespect to the  Commit- tee, but only wanted to protect their own interest by making the submission which they made before the Committee, as  per legal  advice given to them, namely that they being  covered by  s. 8-B of the Act their defence would be put to  serious jeopardy  and  will be prejudicially affected if  they  were required  to appear in the witness box for  crossexamination at the very inception of the inquiry even before  statements of witnesses proving the accusations against the petitioners had been recorded which they were entitled to defend.  [52B- E]     4.2 On the view of the Committee that persons covered by 8-B were to be examined at the end of the enquiry, the  fact that  an  affidavit of the petitioner was  on  record  could hardly justify the petitioner being 26 called upon to enter the witness box at the very  inception. [55C]     Smt. Indira Gandhi and another v. Mr. J.C. Shah  Commis- sion of Inquiry, ILR 1980(1) Delhi 552 referred to.     4.3  Had  the  Committee not been  labouring  under  the misapprehension that the petitioners were not covered by  s. 8-B,  because no notices under that section had been  issued to them, notwithstanding the fact that their conduct was  to be  examined on its own declared, intention, it would  obvi- ously  not  have required the petitioners to take  oath  for being  cross-examined at the stage at which it did  so.  The subsequent  orders of the Committee directing complaints  to be  filed against the petitioners for an offence  punishable under s. 178 IPC and the act of filing such complaints  were the consequences of the said misapprehension. [55F-G]     Since the petitioners were covered by s. 8-B, the action of the Committee in compelling the petitioners to enter  the witness box for being cross-examined, when even according to it  persons similarly situated were to do so at the  end  of the inquiry, was in itself discriminatory. There was, there- fore, valid justification for the refusal by the petitioners to  take oath for cross-examination at the stage  when  they were required to do so. [55H; 56A-B]     Therefore, the Committee should not have, in the instant case,  directed the filing of a complaint against either  of the petitioners for an offence punishable under s. 178  IPC.

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[56C]     5. Since the action of the Committee in holding that the petitioners  were not covered by s. 8-B of the Act and  com- pelling them to enter the witness box on the dates in  ques- tion  was discriminatory and the orders directing  complaint being  filed against the petitioners were illegal, it  is  a case  involving  infringement of Articles 14 and 21  of  the Constitution.  In such a situation, the power of this  Court to pass an appropriate order in exercise of its jurisdiction under  Articles  32 and 142 of the  Constitution  cannot  be seriously doubted, particularly having regard to the special facts and circumstances of this case. [56D-El     The orders directing filing of complaints being invalid, the  consequential  complaints and the  proceedings  thereon including  the  orders  of the  Magistrate  issuing  summons cannot survive. [56E-F] 6. If the petitioners are compelled to face prosecution.  in spite of 27 the finding that the orders directing complaint to be  filed against them were illegal, it would cause prejudice to them. Therefore, this Court can interfere in the matter. [56G]     7.  Apart from the directions contained in this  Court’s order  dated 18th August, 1988, it is not expedient  to  lay down  any particular rigid procedure to be followed  by  the Committee with regard to sequence in which witnesses were to be examined by it. [41G-H]

JUDGMENT:     ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 626  of 1988 etc. etc. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)     G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, S. Murlidha- ran,  A.D.N.  Rao, A. Subba Rao and Krishnan Kumar  for  the Petitioners.     Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, K.K. Venugo- pal, Kapil Sibbal, Lal Chand, C.S. Vaidyanathan, H.S. Phool- ka,  N.S.  Das, Rajiv Khosla, P. Tripathi,  Kailash  Vasdev, Miss A. Subhashini, Harish Salve and Ravinder Sethi, for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     OJHA,  J.  In the writ petition and  the  special  leave petitions  filed by Smt. Kiran Bedi, the orders dated  17th, 20th  and 23rd May 1988 passed by the Committee  of  Inquiry consisting of Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami and Mr. Justice  D.P. Wadhwa  of the High Court of Delhi (hereinafter referred  to as  the Committee) are sought to be quashed whereas  in  the writ  petition  and the S.L.P. filed by  Jinder  Singh,  the order  dated 26th May, 1988 passed by the said Committee  is sought to be quashed.     In  order to appreciate the respective submissions  made by  learned counsel for the parties, it would be  useful  to give  in brief the circumstances leading to the  appointment of  the Committee and also to quote the terms of  reference. What  ultimately assumed the shape of confrontation  between lawyers  and police sparked off from an alleged  unfortunate incident on 15th January, 1988 of a lawyer being apprehended by the students of St. Stephens College, University of Delhi and  being  handed over to the police on the  accusation  of committing an offence within the campus of the said College. According to the statement of case filed before the  Commit- tee on behalf of the Delhi 28

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High  Court Bar Association, the said lawyer was brought  by the police in handcuffs for production before a Metropolitan Magistrate  on 16th January, 1988. The lawyers present  pro- tested against the handcuffing but their protest was ignored by  the police officials. The Metropolitan Magistrate  ulti- mately  discharged  the  lawyer on the same  date  and  also directed  the Commissioner of Police to take action  against the guilty police officials. In support of their demand  for action  against  the police officials, the lawyers  went  on strike from 18th January 1988. In the said statement of case it was further stated that on 20th January, 1988, Smt. Kiran Bedi, Deputy Commissioner of Police, North District,  Delhi, made a statement in a Press conference justifying the action of  police  and criticising the order of the  Magistrate  in discharging  a  "thief" and that in order to  express  their deep  concern  and anguish a group of lawyers went  to  meet Smt. Bedi on 21st January, 1988 in her office which at  that time  was situated in the Tis Hazari Court  Complex  itself. Smt. Bedi, however, refused to come out and meet the lawyers whereupon they preferred to wait upon her till such time  as she  agreed  to meet them. They assert that while  they  had waited  for 15-20 minutes the police took recourse to  lathi charge  on  the lawyers at the orders of Smt. Bedi.  In  the said  statement  of case it has further been  asserted  that while the indefinite strike and the agitation of the lawyers demanding  a  judicial inquiry into the  incident  of  lathi charge  and suspension of Smt. Kiran Bedi was continuing,  a mob  which eventually swelled to about 3000 persons came  to Tis  Hazari  Court  Complex on 17th  February  1988  raising slogans  in  support of Smt. Bedi and against  the  striking lawyers. The mob used brickbats and stones causing injury to some lawyers and damage to property. According to them  this mob attack was engineered by Smt. Kiran Bedi. A statement of case was also filed by Ved Prakash Marwah, the then  Commis- sioner of Police, attaching thereto affidavits of 25  police officers including an affidavit of Smt. Kiran Bedi. There is a  denial on their part of the assertions  and  insinuations made  against them by the Delhi Bar Association referred  to above. With regard to the incident on 21st January 1988  the case  of Smt. Kiran Bedi as is apparent from  her  affidavit filed along with the aforesaid statement of case is that she along with some other officers reached her Tis Hazari Office at  about 11.15 A.M. and while a meeting was in progress  in connection  with the arrangements for the Republic Day  some time  around  22.00 noon, slogans were heard  "being  raised outside  by  an apparently large crowd  approaching  in  our direction.  Before  we realised what was happening.  all  of sudden  a  group of lawyers stormed into my  office  pushing aside  the female constable on duty at my door. They  rushed towards me making violent gestures and uttering  obsceneties at me. They made physical gesture 29 and threats to the effect  .......  The Police Officers  who were sitting around my table jumped to their feet. They held back one of hysterical persons who had actually advanced  in my  direction and formed a ring around the lawyers and  man- aged  to move them out of my office while bolting me  inside along with my female constable and a female visitor who  had come to see me for her own work". We have thought it  proper not  to quote the actual words of threat stated in the  said affidavit. According to Smt. Kiran Bedi the situation there- after  outside her office was handled by the other  officers present while she remained inside the office.     We  are not concerned with the correctness or  otherwise of  either of the two versions stated above and  as  already

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pointed  out we have referred to them only to  indicate  the background  in which the Committee was  constituted.  Having referred  in  brief to the circumstances which  led  to  the appointment  of  the  Committee we now quote  the  order  of reference:                    "F.No. 10/9/88-NP-II                DELHI ADMINISTRATION: DELHI                   (HOME POLICE-II DELHI)                                 Dated the 23rd Feb. 1988. ORDER           Whereas the Administrator of the Union  Territory. of Delhi is of the opinion that a judicial inquiry is neces- sary into matters of public importance mentioned below;  Now therefore,  the  Administrator is pleased  to  constitute  a Committee,  in consultation with the Chief Justice of  Delhi High  Court consisting of Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami  and  Mr. Justice  D.P.  Wadhwa Hon’ble Judges of the  High  Court  to inquire into and record their findings on the following:                      (i)  The incident of the 15th  January,               1988  in St. Stephen’s College, University  of               Delhi  regarding apprehension of a  lawyer  by               the police.                      (ii)  The incident and reported  lathi-               charge  on the 21st January, 1988 outside  the               office of the DCP/North, Delhi.               30                    (iii)  Circumstances leading to  presence               of a mob in Tis Hazari premises on 17th Febru-               ary, 1988 and the resultant violence.                    (iv)  Any  other  incidental  development               connected with the above.               The  Committee is requested to  ascertain  the               facts leading to the aforesaid incidents  with               a  view to identifying those  responsible  for               the  incidents so that stringent action  could               be taken against all those responsible.                        The Committee may, if it deems appro-               priate, submit an interim report within  seven               days of its first sitting suggesting action if               any,  against  police officials or  any  other               involved  persons  pending submission  of  the               final report within a period of 3 months."     Subsequently in pursuance of a direction issued by  this Court the aforesaid notification was modified by the  Admin- istrator vide Notification dated 15th March, 1988 by direct- ing  that the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6,  8,  8-A, 8-B. 8-C, 9, 10 and 10-A of the Commissions of Inquiry  Act, 1952 and the rules made under Section 12 thereof shall apply to the said Committee.     The Committee submitted an interim report on 9th  April, 1988 and during the course of proceedings before it thereaf- ter passed the aforesaid orders which are the subject matter of these writ petitions and special leave petitions.     After  having heard learned counsel for the  parties  at length  we  passed an order on 18th August,  1988  which  we consider  it  appropriate to reproduce here with a  view  to avoiding the repetition of the reasons already given therein in support of the said order: "It is unfortunate that this case has arisen between lawyers and police who are both guardians of law and who  constitute two  important segments of society on whom the stability  of the country depends. It is hoped that cordiality between the two sections will be restored soon.        In  order to avoid any further delay in the  proceed- ings before the Committee consisting of Goswamy and  Wadhwa,

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JJ, 31 constituted  by Order dated 23rd February, 1988  to  enquire into certain incidents which took place on the 15th January, 1988.  2 1st January, 1988 and 17th February, 1988, we  pass the  following order now but we shall give detailed  reasons in support of this order in due course. The order is as under:   1.  This  order  is passed on the basis  of  the  material available on record, the various steps already taken  before the Committee and other peculiar features to the case.   2.  The Delhi Administration has to examine first all  its witnesses as required by Rule 5(5)(a) of the Commissions  of Inquiry  (Central) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred  to  as the Rules) framed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter  referred to as the Act). Even those  witnesses who   may  have  filed  affidavits  already  may  first   be examined-in-chief  before they are cross-examined, since  it is stated that when the affidavits were filed the  deponents did  not  know what the other parties who  have  also  filed affidavits  had  stated in their  affidavits.  The  question whether  a  party has the right of crossexamination  or  not shall be decided by the Committee in accordance with Section 8-C  of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the  case to  which  reference will be made hereafter  this  direction issued to the Delhi Administration to examine its  witnesses first  as provided by rule 5(5)(a) of the Rules referred  to above  does not apply to those witnesses falling under  sec- tion  8-B of the Act, who have to be examined at the end  of the inquiry as opined by the Committee itself.   3.  We have gone through the several affidavits and  other material  placed before the Committee and also  the  Interim Report dated April 9, 1988 passed by the Committee. In  para 13 of the Interim Report the Committee has observed thus:     During the course of the inquiry, we have to examine the conduct  of various police officers and others and  particu- larly,  as the record shows, of the DCP (North),  Addl.  DCP (North),  SHO,  PS Samepur (Badli) and  SI  Incharge  Police Post, Tis Hazari and SI. Samepur (Badli). In para 14 of the Interim Report it is observed. 32     Lawyers have seriously urged that this Committee  should send a report recommending suspension of the DCP (North)  Ms Kiran Bedi.     Ultimately the Committee recommended the transfer of the petitioners  in  these  cases, namely, Ms  Kiran  Bedi,  DCP (North)  and  Jinder  Singh SI, Incharge  Police  Post,  Tis Hazari. Section 8-B of the Act reads: "8-B. If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission,                     (a)  considers it necessary  to  inquire               into the conduct of any person; or                     (b) is of opinion that the reputation of               any  person  is  likely  to  be  prejudicially               affected by the inquiry,               the  Commission  shall give to that  person  a               reasonable  opportunity of being heard in  the               inquiry  and  to produce evidence in  his  de-               fence:                        Provided that nothing in this section               shall  apply where the credit of a witness  is               being impeached."     In  its Interim Report the Committee  has  unequivocally observed  that  it  had to examine the  conduct  of  various police  officers,  and in particular among others  Ms  Kiran

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Bedi,  DCP  (North) and Jinder Singh,  SI,  Incharge  Police Post, Tis Hazari.     Having  given our anxious consideration to all  the  as- pects of the case we hold that the petitioners Ms Kiran Bedi and  Jinder Singh are persons who fall under Section 8-B  of the Act and have to be dealt with accordingly.     4.  According to the Committee’s own opinion  formed  in the  light of the facts and circumstances of the  case,  all these  persons to whom notices under Section 8-B of the  Act are  issued have to be examined at the end of  the  inquiry. This  is obvious from the order of the Committee  passed  on June 29, 1988 after it was asked by this Court by its  order dated June 2, 1988 to reconsider the whole question relating to  the order in which the witnesses had to be  examined  in the case. In its order dated June 29, 1988 the Committee has observed thus: 33               "Without  going into the controversy  if  Rule               5(5) is an independent rule or is governed  by               Sections  8-B  and 8-C of the  Act,  we  would               direct  that in the circumstances of the  case               three  persons namely, the Additional  Commis-               sioner of Police (Special Branch), DCP  (Traf-               fic)  and  Mr.  Gopal Das Kalra,  SI  to  whom               notices under Section 8-B of the Act have been               issued be examined at the end of the inquiry."     If three persons referred to above to whom notices under Section 8-B have been issued are to be examined even accord- ing  to the Committee at the end of the inquiry there is  no justifiable  reason to deny the same treatment to the  peti- tioners  Ms Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh who are in the  same position as those three persons. The action of the Committee in asking them to be cross-examined at the beginning of  the inquiry  appears to us to be discriminatory. Mere  non-issue of  notices to them under Section 8-B ought not to make  any difference  if  they otherwise satisfy the  conditions  men- tioned  in  Section 8-B. The issue of such a notice  is  not contemplated  under Section 8-B of the Act. It is enough  if at  any stage the Commission considers it necessary  to  in- quire  into  the conduct of any person.  Such  person  would thereafter  be governed by Section 8-B of the Act. The  Com- mittee  should have considered whether the petitioners  were entitled to be treated as persons governed by Section 8-B of the  Act before asking them to get into the witness box  for being  cross-examined. If the Committee had found  that  the petitioners  were  covered under Section 8-B,  then  perhaps they  would not have been asked to get into the witness  box for  being cross-examined till the end of the  inquiry.  The Committee would have then asked them to give evidence  along with  others  who were similarly placed at the  end  of  the inquiry.     On  behalf of both the petitioners it is submitted  that they did not either wish to delay the proceedings or to show disrespect to the Committee but only wanted to protect their own interest by making the submission which they made before the Committee as per legal advice given to them.     This is not a case where the circumstances in which  the several  incidents  that had taken place were not  known  to anybody  else. The affidavits and other material before  the Committee show that there were a large number of persons who were  eye-witnesses  to  the incidents and  who  could  give evidence before the Committee. Taking  into  consideration all the aspects of the  case  we feel that 34

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the  Committee should not have in the circumstances  of  the case  directed the filing of a complaint against  either  of the petitioners for an offence punishable under Section  178 IPC.     In view of the foregoing we feel that the orders of  the Committee  directing  the filing of the complaints  and  the criminal  proceedings  initiated  against  the   petitioners before  the  Metropolitan Magistrate pursuant  to  the  com- plaints  filed on behalf of the Committee should be  quashed and  we accordingly quash the said orders of  the  Committee and also the criminal proceedings. A  judgment containing the reasons for this order will  fol- low.     Before  concluding  this order we record  the  statement made  by  Shri Kuldip Singh,  learned  Additional  Solicitor General  appearing  for the Delhi  Administration  that  the Delhi  Administration  and its police  officers  will  fully cooperate  with  the  Committee so that  the  Committee  may complete  its work as early as possible. We also record  the statement  made  by Shri G.  Ramaswamy,  learned  Additional Solicitor  General that he and his clients, the  petitioners in  this case hold the Committee in great respect  and  that they  never intended to show any kind of discourtesy to  the Committee.  He also expresses apology for using one  or  two strong  words  against the Committee in the  course  of  the arguments in this Court.     We  now proceed to give our detailed reasons in  support of the aforesaid order:     We find it necessary to refer to some of the regulations framed  by the Committee to regulate its procedure. We  also find it necessary to indicate the nature of the orders which have  been  challenged in these writ petitions  and  special leave  petitions.  It also seems appropriate  at  this  very place  to refer to the order of this Court passed  in  these proceedings on 2nd June 1988 and the order of the  Committee passed on 29th June, 1988 in pursuance of the order of  this Court dated 2nd June 1988. As is apparent from a copy of the regulations filed in these proceedings, the Committee framed "Regulations of procedure under Section 8 of the Commissions of  Enquiry  Act, 1952 to be followed by  the  Committee  of Inquiry".  Regulations  8, 11, 14, 18, and 21 which  in  our opinion  appear to be relevant for purposes of  these  cases are reproduced as hereunder: "8. To avoid its proceedings being unduly prolonged and 35               protracted, the Committee may divide and group               together the various persons, Associations and               departments  before  it in such manner  as  it               thinks  just  and proper for the  purposes  of               producing oral evidence, cross-examination  of               witnesses examined before it, and for address-               ing arguments.                        Provided, however, any person who  is               likely to be prejudicially affected as provid-               ed in Sec. 8-B of the Act shall be entitled to               appear  personally  or through  an  authorised               agent,  and to produce evidence in his or  her               defence.               11. The witness whose evidence is recorded  by               the  Committee orally on oath will be  allowed               to be cross-examined by the concerned  parties               in accordance with the provisions of the Act.               14.  The affidavit or statement of case  filed               by any deponent can be treated as his examina-               tion-in-chief.

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             18.  Technical rules of the Evidence  Act,  as               such,  shall  not  govern  the  recording  and               admissibility  of evidence before the  Commit-               tee.  However, the principles of natural  jus-               tice and fair play shall be followed.               21. The Committee reserves the right to alter,               modify, delete or add to any of these  regula-               tions  of  procedure at any  time  during  the               inquiry, as and when it considers necessary."     In  pursuance of a notice issued by the Committee  under Rule 5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of case inter alia  on behalf  of Delhi High Court Bar Association and the  Commis- sioner  of  Police which were accompanied by  affidavits  in support of the facts set out in the respective statements of case  were filed before the Committee. On 8th  April,  1988, the  parties and their counsel stated that they  would  need two  weeks’ time to file counter affidavit and list of  wit- nesses  to  be  examined by them. The time  prayed  for  was granted. The proceedings on that date were adjourned to 22nd April, 1988. On that date an application was made on  behalf of the Commissioner of Police and other police officers  for extension  of time to file counter affidavit which  was  ex- tended till 13th May, 1988. The following order, how- 36 ever,  was  simultaneously passed on that date.  "Mr.  Vijay Shankar  Das has been told to keep. his witnesses ready  for being  examined from 16th May, 1988. The Committee  proposes to  hold the sitting from day-today w.e.f. 16th  May,  1988. For further proceedings and recording of evidence to come up on  16th  May, 1988." Here it may be pointed  out  that  Mr. Vijay  Shankar Das was the counsel appearing for  the  Delhi Police  and the effect of the order aforesaid was  that  the Delhi  Police was required to keep its witnesses  ready  for being  examined from 16th May, 1988. On 16th May  time  till 5.00 P.M. to all concerned to file their counter  affidavits along  with  the list of witnesses was granted  and  further proceedings  were adjourned for the next day. On  17th  May, 1988,  two applications were made on behalf of  the  Commis- sioner  of Police; one for postponement of heating  and  the other  for calling upon the Bar Association to  start  their evidence  and  to call upon the Commissioner  of  Police  to adduce  his evidence thereafter. The counter  affidavit  and the  list  of  witnesses on behalf of  the  Commissioner  of Police  had  not been filed even till 17th  May,  1988.  The Committee dismissed both the applications referred to  above and  passed an order saying that since the  Commissioner  of Police has failed to file the counter affidavit or the  list of  witnesses, Mr. Jinder Singh, S.I., and Mrs. Kiran  Bedi, the  then D.C.P. (North) be present in Court on  19.5.88  at 10.30  A.M.  for being cross-examined. On  19th  May,  1988, counsel for Delhi Police was directed to produce Mr.  Jinder Singh, S.I., in the witness box for being cross-examined. On being  informed by counsel for Delhi Police that Mr.  Jinder Singh was not available, bailable warrant was ordered by the Committee to be issued for production of Mr. Jinder Singh at 10.30 A.M. on 23rd May, 1988. Thereafter Smt. Kiran Bedi who was present in Court was directed to come in the witness box for  cross-examination.  The relevant portion of  the  order passed thereafter on 19th May, 1988 reads as hereunder:               "Mrs.  Bedi has been asked to take  oath,  but               she  has refused to do so. At this  stage,  we               called upon Mr. G. Ramaswamy, Counsel  appear-               ing for Delhi Police as also Mr. Vijay Shanker               Dass, Counsel appearing for Mrs. Kiran Bedi to               justify  the  action  of the  witness  in  not

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             taking the .oath. We call upon the counsel  to               address  because according to us  prima  facie               offence is made out under Section 178 I.P.C.                        Mr. Ramaswamy relies on the  judgment               of  this Court in Smt. Indira Gandhi and  Anr.               v.  Mr. J.C. Shah, Commission of Inquiry,  ILR               1980(1) Delhi 5522. We have been               37               taken through certain passages of judgment and               we  find that the facts of case  are  entirely               different  inasmuch as no affidavit  had  been               filed  by Smt. Indira Gandhi in that case  and               she had been summoned merely under Section 8-B               of the Commission of Enquiry Act.                        In the present case, an affidavit  of               Mrs.  Kiran Bedi is on record. She had  to  be               given further opportunity to make any  further               statement and her affidavit already filed  has               to be justified by cross-examination.                        Let  notice issue to Mrs. Kiran  Bedi               to show cause why she should not be prosecuted               under section 178 I.P.C. Since she is present,               she  is accepting this notice. The  notice  is               returnable  for tomorrow, the 20th May,  1988.               Ordinarily directions have to be issued to her               to  be present in court, but Mr. Shankar  Dass               undertakes  that she will be present in  Court               tomorrow and as such no further directions are               necessary."     On 20th May, 1988 as the order sheet of that date  indi- cates  counter  affidavit along with list of  witnesses  was filed on behalf of the Commissioner of Police and both  were taken  on record. With regard to the notice issued  to  Smt. Kiran  Bedi  on  19th May, 1988,  the  following  order  was passed:               "By  our order dated 19.5.88, we had issued  a               notice  to Mrs. Bedi to show cause as  to  why               she should not be prosecuted under Section 178               of the I.P.C. for refusing to take oath in the               witness  box. Notice was made  returnable  for               today.                        Mr. Shankar Dass who appears for Mrs.               Kiran  Bedi has refused to show any  cause  on               the ground that notice was too short.                         We  have heard the arguments of  Mr.               K.K.  Venugopal on behalf of the Bar  Associa-               tion.                         For  orders to come up on 23rd  May,               1988. Mrs. Kiran Bedi who is present today  is               directed to be present in the Court on 23.5.88               at 10.30 A.M."               38     On  23rd May, 1988, the Committee held that  refusal  of Smt. Kiran Bedi in not testifying on oath before the Commit- tee was wholly unjustified and proceeded to file a complaint for  an offence under section 178 of the Indian Penal  Code. As  regards Mr. Jinder Singh, it seems that he could not  be required to appear in the witness box on 23rd, 24th or  25th May, 1988. On 26th May, 1988 the following order was passed: "Mr. Jinder Singh was directed to come into the witness box. When  asked by us to bind himself on oath or affirmation  to state  the truth, the witness refused to do so.  Earlier  we had authorised the court master to administer him the  oath. But,  as we have already said, the witness refused  to  take the  oath. The witness states that he is willing to  make  a

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statement  without oath and would be prepared to answer  all the  questions  in cross-examination. When asked  if  he  is aware of the fact that his action in not taking the oath  is punishable  under Section 178 of the Indian Penal  Code,  he says  he has nothing further to state. On consideration  the Committee  is  of the opinion that since  this  witness  has already filed an affidavit which is a statement on oath,  it is not possible to record any further statement or  crossex- amine  without oath. Mr. Jinder Singh, however, states  that he  is  not prepared to take the oath because he is  in  the nature  of  an accused and he cannot be asked to  start  the evidence  and would be prepared to come in the  witness  box after the evidence of other party is recorded.                        Mr.  Jinder Singh at present S.I.  at               Police  Post,  Railway Station,  Subzi  Mandi,               Delhi,  who  was  S.I. in  charge  Tis  Hazari               Courts,  Delhi  during January  and  February,               1988, was summoned as a witness and was  asked               to  step into the witness box.  His  statement               was to be recorded on oath for the purpose  of               cross-examination.  He,  however,  refused  to               bind  himself  by an oath  or  affirmation  to               state  the  truth  when required  so  to  bind               himself  by the Committee. The Committee  con-               siders  that Mr. Jinder Singh who was  at  the               relevant  time  S.I. in charge at  Tis  Hazari               Courts, Delhi, where the incidents took  place               is  a  very material witness and his  case  is               identical  to the case of Ms. Kiran Bedi.  For               the  reasons recorded in our order dated  23rd               May, 1988 regarding Ms. Kiran Bedi, we proceed               to  file  a  complaint for  an  offence  under               section 178 of the Indian Penal Code."               39     In pursuance of the orders dated 23rd May and 26th  May, 1988 complaints were filed by the Committee in the Court  of the  Chief  Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, for  an  offence under section 178 of the Indian Penal Code and as is  appar- ent from a copy of one of the complaints produced before  us these  complaints  have been filed under  sub-section  4  of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 read  with section  346  of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973.  As already  indicated, it is the aforesaid orders  dated  17th, 20th, 23rd and 26th May, 1988 which have been challenged  in these writ petitions and special leave petitions. These writ petitions  and  special leave petitions first  came  up  for consideration’ before K.N. Singh, J. who was functioning  as the  Vacation Judge. After hearing the parties he passed  an order  on 2nd June, 1988. The relevant portion of the  order which  was passed by this Court on 2nd June, 1988  in  these proceedings, reads as hereunder:               "Learned  counsel for the parties  agree  that               the respondent Committee should be directed to               re-examine  the  order and sequence  in  which               parties  witnesses  as well as  the  witnesses               summoned  by the Committee should be  examined               with  reference to the incidents mentioned  in               the  Notification dated 23rd  February,  1988.               The  Committee  is  accordingly  directed   to               consider afresh the order in which the parties               witnesses as well as witnesses summoned by the               Committee  on its own are to be examined  with               reference  to the incidents mentioned  in  the               Notification  appointing the  Committee  after               hearing counsel for the parties. The Committee

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             is  further directed to consider the  question               as to the stage when main witnesses on  behalf               of the respective parties should be  examined.               The Committee will pass a reasoned order after               hearing the parties. Parties agree that  these               questions should be considered by the  Commit-               tee on 20th June, 1988 or any subsequent  date               subject to its convenience."     In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the Committee after hearing  learned counsel for the parties passed an order  on 29th  June, 1988. It inter alia took the view that the  con- cept of burden of proof did not appear to be quite  relevant in  the proceedings before a Commission under the Act  which had  been  given  free hand to lay down  its  own  procedure subject,  of  course, to the provisions of the Act  and  the rules made thereunder. It also held that it would be  diffi- cult  for the committee to lay down the manner in which  the witnesses are to be 40 examined  foregoing its right to examine any witness at  any stage if his statement appeared to be relevant.     One  of the submissions made by learned counsel for  the Commissioner  of Police was that since  serious  accusations have  been made by the lawyers against Smt. Kiran  Bedi  and the  police with regard to the incidents dated 21st  January and 17th February, 1988, the lawyers should be first  called upon to lead evidence to substantiate their allegations  and the  police personnel may be required to lead evidence  only in  rebuttal. This submission, however, did not find  favour with  the Committee. It took the view that the whole  stress of  learned counsel seemed to be on burden of proof and  was based on certain misconceptions. Likewise, the argument that Smt.  Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh also fell within the  pur- view of Section 8-B of the Act did not find favour with  the Committee.  In  this  connection, it was  pointed  out  that except for the three officers namely, the Addl. Commissioner of Police (Special Branch), New Delhi, D.C.P. (Traffic)  and Mr. Gopal Das Kalra, S.I., Police Station, Samepur  (Badli), to no other officer notice under section 8-B of the Act  had been  issued and that merely because there were  allegations against  a  particular  person he could not be  said  to  be covered  under Section 8-B which required a  positive  order from  the Committee. It was also pointed out that  a  person has  to be put on guard by the Committee if it considers  it necessary to inquire into his conduct or the Committee is of the opinion that the reputation of that person is likely  to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. When its attention was  invited to the interim report where the  Committee  had mentioned  that conduct of various police officers  particu- larly  of the D.C.P. (North), Addl. D.C.P.  (North)  S.H.O., P.S.  Samepur  (Badli) and S.I. Incharge  Police  Post,  Tis Hazari and S.I., Samaypur (Badli), was to be examined and it was  submitted  that consequently they  were  covered  under section 8-B, the Committee took the view that the submission was misplaced inasmuch as when the Committee mentioned  that it was to examine the conduct of various police officers and others,  it  did not have in view section 8-B  of  the  Act. According  to  the Committee the plea that Section  8-B  was attracted appeared to be an afterthought.     With regard to the three persons mentioned above to whom notices  under section 8-B of the Act had been  issued,  the Committee  specifically  held that those  persons  would  be examined at the end of the inquiry. The Committee emphasised on the circumstance that in the inquiry before it there  was no  "Lis" as is commonly understood while trying a  criminal

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or  civil case and that principle of burden of proof had  no relevance. 41     These  cases  were  then posted before  this  Bench  for hearing.  On  the  respective submissions  made  by  learned counsel for the parties, the following points, in our  opin- ion, arise for consideration:                   (i)  whether the procedure adopted by  the               Committee with regard to the sequence in which               witnesses were to be examined was legal?                   (ii)  Whether Smt. Kiran Bedi  and  Jinder               Singh,  the two petitioners, fell  within  the               category  of persons contemplated  by  Section               8-B of the Act and were consequently  entitled               to  the same treatment as was accorded by  the               Committee  to the persons to whom  notice  had               been issued by it under the said Section?                   (iii) whether the Committee was  justified               in  calling upon the two petitioners to  stand               in the witness box for crossexamination almost               at the very initial stage of the inquiry?                   (iv)  whether the orders of the  Committee               directing  prosecution of the two  petitioners               under Section 178 IPC are legal?                   (v)  whether  an  appeal  is  maintainable               against filing of complaint, the same being an               administrative Act?                   (vi) whether a challenge to the filing  of               the  complaint is infructuous inasmuch as  the               order  issuing  summons  to  the   petitioners               passed  by the Magistrate upon the  complaints               filed against them had not been challenged?                   (vii) whether it is a fit case for  inter-               ference  by this Court at this stage with  the               filing  of  complaint, it being  open  to  the               petitioners to prove themselves to be innocent               before the magistrate?      With  regard  to point No. (i), we are of  the  opinion that  apart from the directions contained in paragraph 4  of our  order  dated 18th August, 1988 regarding the  stage  at which persons failing under Section 8B of the Act were to be examined  and also what has been observed in paragraph 2  of the said order, we do not find it expedient to lay down  any particular  rigid procedure to be followed by the  Committee with regard to sequence in which witnesses were to be  exam- ined by it. 42     Consequently, we find it unnecessary to consider in  any further  detail,  the submissions made by  counsel  for  the parties  on this point. In so far as point No. (ii) is  con- cerned,  it  would  be seen that the use of  the  word  ’or’ between  clauses (a) and (b) of Section 8B of the Act  makes it  clear that Section 8B would be attracted if  requirement of either clause (a) or clause (b) is fulfilled. Clause  (a) of  Section 8B applies when the conduct of any person is  to be enquired into whereas Clause (b) applies to a case  where reputation of a person is likely to be prejudicially affect- ed.  As regards the enquiry about the conduct of Smt.  Kiran Bedi  and  Jinder Singh, even the Committee in  its  interim report  specifically  stated that the conduct of  these  two petitioners among others was to be examined. Having once  so stated in unequivocal terms, it was not open to the  Commit- tee to still take the stand that Section 8B was not attract- ed  in so far as they were concerned. Recourse to  procedure under  Section 8-B is not confined to any  particular  stage

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and  if not earlier, at any rate, as soon as  the  Committee made the aforesaid unequivocal declaration of its  intention in  its interim report, it should have issued  notice  under section 8-B to the two petitioners, if it was of the view as it seems to be, for which view there is apparently no justi- fication,  that issue of a formal notice under  section  8-B was  the  sine-qua-non for attracting that Section.  At  all events,  the  Committee could not deny the  petitioners  the statutory  protection  of Section 8-B by  merely  refraining from issuing a formal notice even though on its own declared intention the section was clearly attracted.     In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, [1966] Suppl. S.C.R. page 401, while dealing with Section 10 of  the Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Enquiry  Act,  1962, which  seems to be an amalgam of Section 8-B and 8-C of  the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 and repelling the  argument that  section 10 applied only when the conduct of  a  person came  to  be  enquired into incidentally and  not  when  the Commission  had  been set up to enquire  directly  into  the conduct of a person, it was held:               "If a Commission is set up to inquire directly               into  the conduct of a person, the  Commission               must  find it necessary to inquire  into  that               conduct and such a person would, therefore, be               one  covered  by s. 10. It  would  be  strange               indeed  if  the Act provided for fights  of  a               person  whose conduct incidentally came to  be               enquired into but did not do so in the case of               persons  whose conduct has directly to be  in               quired  into  under the order setting  up  the               Commission. It would               43               be equally strange if the Act contemplated the               conduct of a person being inquired into  inci-               dentally  and not directly. What can  be  done               indirectly should obviously have been  consid-               ered capable of being done directly."     In  State  of  Karnataka v. Union of  India  &  Another, [1978],  2 S.C.R., page 1, with reference to Section 8-B  of the  Act, it was held at page 108 of the report that it  was undeniable that the person whose conduct was being  enquired into was exposed to the fierce light of publicity.     Keeping  in view the nature of the allegations  made  in the  statements of case and the supporting affidavits  filed on  behalf  of the various Bar  Associations  including  the Delhi High Court Bar Association requirement of even  Clause (b) of Section 8-B was filfilled inasmuch as if those  alle- gations were proved they were likely to prejudicially affect the  reputation of the two petitioners. Indeed, in  view  of the  term of reference which contemplated taking of  "strin- gent action" against all those responsible, even the  career of  the  petitioners  as Police officers was  likely  to  be affected  in  case an adverse finding was  recorded  against them.  In view of the aforesaid specific term of  reference, the principle that the report of a Commission of Enquiry has no force proprio vigore does not on a pragmatic approach  to the consequences seem to constitute sufficient safeguard  so far as the petitioners are concerned.     The  reason for the importance attached with  regard  to the matter of safeguarding the reputation of a person  being prejudicially  affected in Clause (b) of Section 8-B of  the Act is not far to seek.     The  following words of caution uttered by the  Lord  to Arjun  in Bhagwad Gita with regard to dishonour or  loss  of reputation may usefully be quoted:

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             "Akirtinchapi      Bhutani       Kathaishyanti               te-a-vyayam,  Sambhavitasya  Chakirtir   mara-               nadatirichyate."  (234) (Men will recount  thy               perpetual  dishonour,  and to one  highly  es-               teemed, dishonour exceedeth death. )     In Blackstone’s commentary of the laws of England,  Vol- I,  IVth  Edition, it has been stated at page 101  that  the right of personal security consists in a person’s legal  and uninterrupted  enjoyment of his life, his limbs,  his  body, his health and his reputation. 44     In  Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77 at page 268 is to  be found the statement of law in the following terms:               "It  is  stated in the definition  Person,  70               C.J.S.p.  688  note 66 that legally  the  term               "person"  includes not only the physical  body               and  members, but also every bodily sense  and               personal attribute, among which is the reputa-               tion  a  man has acquired. Blackstone  in  his               Commentaries   classifies  and   distinguishes               those fights which are annexed to the  person,               jura personarum, and acquired fights in exter-               nal objects, jura rerum; and in the former  he               includes personal security, which consists  in               a  person’s legal and uninterrupted  enjoyment               of his life, his limbs, his body, his  health,               and  his reputation. And he makes  the  corre-               sponding classification of remedies. The  idea               expressed is that a man’s reputation is a part               of  himself,  as his body and limbs  are,  and               reputation  is  a sort of fight to  enjoy  the               goods opinion of others, and it is capable  of               growth  and real existence, as an arm or  leg.               Reputation  is, therefore, a  personal  fight,               and the right to reputation is put among those               absolute personal fights equal in dignity  and               importance to security from violence.  Accord-               ing  to  Chancellor Kent, "as a  part  of  the               rights of personal security, the  preservation               of every person’s good name from the vile arts               of detraction is justly included. The laws  of               the  ancients,  no less than those  of  modern               nations,  made private reputation one  of  the               objects of their protection.                        The fight to the enjoyment of a  good               reputation is a valuable privilege, of ancient               origin,  and  necessary to human  society,  as               stated  in  Libel and Slander S. 4,  and  this               fight is within the constitutional guaranty of               personal security as stated in  Constitutional               La S. 205, and a person may not be deprived of               this  fight  through  falsehood  and  violence               without liability for the injury as stated  in               Libel and Slander S. 4.                        Detraction from a man’s reputation is               an  injury  to his personality,  and  thus  an               injury  to  reputation is a  personal  injury,               that  is,  an injury to an  absolute  personal               right."     In  D.F. Marion v. Davis, 55 American Law Reports,  page 171, it was held: 45               "The  right  to  the enjoyment  of  a  private               reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is               of  ancient origin, and is necessary to  human

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             society.  A good reputation is an  element  of               personal  security,  and is protected  by  the               Constitution  equally  with the right  to  the               enjoyment of life, liberty, and property."     In  view  of the foregoing discussion  and  the  reasons already  stated in our order dated 18th August 1988, we  are of the view that the two petitioners namely, Smt. Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh clearly fell within the category of persons contemplated by section 8-B of the Act and were consequently entitled  to the same treatment as has been accorded by  the Committee  to the persons to whom notice has been issued  by it under the said section. As a consequence, we are  further of the opinion that our answer to point No. (iii) has to  be that the Committee was not justified in calling upon the two petitioners  to stand in the witness box for  cross-examina- tion  at  the  very initial stage of the  enquiry.  In  this connection,  it  has to be borne in mind  that  Section  8-B inter  alia contemplates an opportunity being given  to  the person  governed by the said section to produce evidence  in his  defence  whereas Section 8-C inter alia gives  him  the right to cross-examine the witnesses who depose against him. Not only that calling upon a person governed by Section  8-B to produce evidence in his defence at the very inception  of the inquiry is a contradiction in terms inasmuch as in  this situation such a person would really be required to disprove statements prejudicial to him of such witnesses who are  yet to  be  examined, it would also reduce the right  of  cross- examination  by  such  person to a mere  formality  for  the obvious reason that by the time the witnesses who are to  be cross-examined  are  produced, the defence  of  such  person which  would normally constitute the basis for the line  and object  of crossexamination would already be known  to  such witnesses and they are likely to refashion their  statements accordingly.     Perhaps  in  a case where there is no other  witness  to give information about the alleged incident about which  the inquiry  is  being held and the only person or  persons  who would give such information is or are the person or  persons who  are likely to be adversely affected by the inquiry,  it may  be necessary to depart from the above view as a  matter of  necessity.  But  this is not one such  case.  There  are admittedly any number of other persons who can give evidence about what happened on the relevant dates. Learned counsel for the various Bar Associations who shall 46 hereinafter  be referred to as learned counsel for  the  re- spondent  expressed  an apprehension that in case  a  person governed by Section 8-B was to be examined at the end and at that stage such person even at the risk of not producing his defence,  for some reason, chooses not to appear as  a  wit- ness,  the Committee would be deprived of knowing the  facts in  the  knowledge of such person and such  a  course  would obviously hamper the enquiry. To us this apprehension  seems to be more imaginary than real inasmuch as the power of  the Commission  to call upon any person to appear as  a  witness under  Section 4 of the Act which in terms is very wide  and is not circumscribed by fetters of stage, will be  available to  the Commission and the Commission would be  entitled  to call such person as a witness even at that stage.     Before  parting with these points we may point out  that learned counsel for the respondent cited several authorities in support of the principle that the report of a  Commission of  Inquiry which was only a fact finding body did not  have force proprio vigore and was only recommendatory in  nature. Since  the principle is well-settled we have not  considered

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it  necessary to deal with those authorities. Likewise  some cases  were  cited with regard to claim of  privilege  by  a witness.  Since the petitioners are not claiming any  privi- lege but are only claiming to be treated in a reasonable way as  persons  governed by Section 8-B of the Act  and  to  be meted out the same treatment which has been given to persons falling in that category, those cases also are not necessary to be dealt with.     Now  we  come  to the fourth point  namely  whether  the orders  of the Committee directing prosecution of the  peti- tioners  under  Section  178 I.P.C are legal.  In  order  to appreciate the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties on this point it will be useful to reproduce here Sections 178 and 179 I.P.C They read:               "178.  Refusing oath or affirmation when  duly               required by public servant to make it.--Whoev-               er  refuses  to  bind himself by  an  oath  or               affirmation to state the truth, when  required               so to bind himself by a public servant legally               competent  to  require that he shall  so  bind               himself, shall be punished with simple impris-               onment  for  a term which may  extend  to  six               months,  or with fine which may extend to  one               thousand rupees, or with both.                        179. Refusing to answer public  serv-               ant  authorised  to question.  Whoever,  being               legally bound to state the truth               47               on any subject to any public servant,  refuses               to answer any question demanded of him  touch-               ing that subject by such public servant in the               exercise  of the legal powers of  such  public               servant, shall be punished with simple impris-               onment  for  a term which may  extend  to  six               months,  or with fine which may extend to  one               thousand rupees, or with both."     The  Committee had in the instant case directed  a  com- plaint  to be filed against each of the petitioners  for  an offence punishable under Section 178 I.P.C. and subsequently filed  complaints accordingly. The charge against the  peti- tioners, therefore, was of refusal to bind themselves by  an oath or affirmation to state the truth on being called  upon to do so. Section 179 I.P.C. in the context becomes relevant in  so far as it deals with the consequences of  refusal  by the  person  concerned to answer questions demanded  of  him touching  that subject with regard to which such person  had bound  himself  to state the truth under  Section  178.  The context  in which the two petitioners were required to  bind themselves by an oath or affirmation to state the truth  was to  face cross-examination. The petitioners  were  obviously placed  on the horns of a dilemma. If they refused  to  bind themselves by an oath or affirmation to state the truth they became liable to be punished with simple imprisonment for  a term  which may extend to six months or with fine which  may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. If on the  other hand they had to bound themselves and thereafter refused  to answer  any  question as contemplated by  Section  179  they would have again become vulnerable to identical punishment.     The  problem  in the aforesaid background  presents  two propositions:  (1)  whether  on the belief  that  they  were persons  covered by Section 8-B of the Act  the  petitioners could  avoid the consequences of Sections 178 and 179  I.P.C by claiming absolute immunity from binding themselves by  an oath or affirmation for answering questions put to them  and (2) whether they could avoid those consequences if they  had

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valid justification for refusing to take oath or affirmation without  claiming  an absolute immunity from  binding  them- selves  by an oath or affirmation. The answer to  the  first proposition,  in  our  opinion, has to be  in  the  negative whereas  of the second in the affirmative. Our  reasons  for this conclusion are these:      In McGrain v. Daugherty, 71 L.ed. 580 one of the  ques- tions   which  arose  for  consideration  was  whether   the Senate--or  the House of Representatives, both being on  the same plane in this regard--has 48 power, through its own process, to compel a private individ- ual  to appear before it or one of its committees  and  give testimony  needed  to enable it efficiently  to  exercise  a legislative function belonging to it under the Constitution. It  was  held  that the power of  inquiry--with  process  to enforce it--is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function and that the provisions in this  behalf are not of doubtful meaning, but "are intended to be  effec- tively  exercised,  and therefore to carry  with  them  such auxiliary  powers as are necessary and appropriate  to  that end.  While  the power to exact information in  aid  of  the legislative  function was not involved in those  cases,  the rule  of interpretation applied there is applicable here.  A legislative  body cannot legislate wisely or effectively  in the  absence of information respecting the conditions  which the  legislation is intended to affect or change; and  where the  legislative body does not itself possess the  requisite information--which  not infrequently is true--recourse  must be  had to others who do possess it. Experience  has  taught that  mere requests for such information often are  unavail- ing,  and also that information which is volunteered is  not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before and  when the Constitution was framed and adopted.  In  that period  the  power of inquiry--with  enforcing  process--was regarded  and  employed as a necessary and  appropriate  at- tribute  of the power to legislate--indeed, was  treated  as inhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as we  do, that the constitutional provisions which commit  the legislative  function  to  the two houses  are  intended  to include  this attribute to the end that the function may  be effectively exercised."     On these findings, with regard to refusal by the witness to  appear  and testify before the Committee and  being  at- tached as a consequence thereof, it was held:               "We  conclude that the investigation  was  or-               dered  for a legitimate object; that the  wit-               ness wrongfully refused to appear and  testify               before  the  Committee and  was  lawfully  at-               tached;  that the Senate is entitled  to  have               him  give testimony pertinent to the  inquiry,               either at its bar or before the committee; and               that  the district court erred in  discharging               him from custody under the attachment."     In  Uphaus  v. Wyman (3 L.ed 2d 1090) a  witness  at  an investigation  by the Attorney General of the State  of  New Hampshire,  conducted pursuant to a resolution of the  State legislature authorizing the 49 Attorney General to determine whether there were subversives within the state, refused to obey a subpoena calling for the production  of a list of persons who were guests at  a  camp operated within New Hampshire by a voluntary corporation  of which the witness was executive director. On petition of the

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Attorney  General,  the Merrimack Country Court  called  the witness  before it and the witness again refused to  produce the  information, asserting, first, that, by the  Smith  Act (18  USC s. 2385), Congress had so completely  occupied  the field of subversive activities that the states were  without power to investigate in that area, and, second, that the due process  clause precluded enforcement of the  subpoena.  The court rejected the witness’ argument, and, upon his  contin- ued  refusal to produce the list, adjudged him  in  contempt and  committed him to jail until he should comply.  The  Su- preme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, and even after remand by the United States Supreme Court it reaffirmed its  former decision.  On  appeal, while affirming the decision  of  the Supreme  Court  of New Hampshire the United  States  Supreme Court  held that since the Attorney General sought to  learn if  subversive  persons  were in the State  because  of  the legislative  determination  that such  persons,  statutorily defined  with  a view toward the Communist  Party,  posed  a serious threat to the security of the State, the  investiga- tion was undertaken in the interest of self-preservation and this  governmental interest outweighed individual rights  in an  associational  privacy  which, however,  real  in  other circumstances were here tenuous at best. It was further held that  "the  governmental interest  in  self-preservation  is sufficiently  compelling  to  subordinate  the  interest  in associational privacy of persons who, at least to the extent of the guest registration statute, made public at the incep- tion  the association they now wish to keep private. In  the light of such a record we conclude that the State’s interest has not been "pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has come into fatal collision with the overriding" constitu- tionally  protected  rights of appellant and  those  he  may represent." In Sinclair v. United States, (73 L.ed. 692 it was held:               "Neither  Senate Joint Resolution 54  nor  the               action  taken under it operated to divest  the               Senate  or the committee of power  further  to               investigate  the actual administration of  the               land laws. It may be conceded that Congress is               without  authority to compel  disclosures  for               the  purpose  of  aiding  the  prosecution  of               pending suits; but the authority of that body,               directly or through its committees, to require               pertinent  disclosures in aid of its own  con-               stitutional power, is               50               not abridged because the information sought to               be elicited may also be of use in such suits."     In  Kastigar  v.  United States, (32 LEd 2d  2  12)  the United  States  District Court for the Central  District  of California’ ordered the petitioners to appear before a grand jury and to answer its questions under a grant of  immunity. The  immunity  was based upon a provision of  the  Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 stating that neither the compelled testimony nor any information directly or indirectly derived from  such  testimony  could be used  against  the  witness. Notwithstanding  the  grant  of  immunity,  the  petitioners refused to answer the grand jury’s questions and were  found in  contempt.  The United States Court of  Appeals  for  the Ninth  Circuit affirmed (440 F2d 954), rejecting  the  peti- tioners’  contention that it violated  their  constitutional privilege  against  self-incrimination  to  compel  them  to testify  without granting them transactional  immunity  from prosecution for any offence to which the compelled testimony might relate.

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   On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. It  held that the power of government to compel  persons  to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmen- tal  agencies was firmly established but was  not  absolute, being subject to a number of exemptions, the most  important of  which  was the Fifth Amendment privilege  against  self- incrimination. With reference to Federal Statute (18 USCS s. 6002) it was held:               "That a federal statute permitting the govern-               ment  to compel a witness to  give  testimony,               but granting the witness immunity from the use               in any criminal case of the compelled testimo-               ny or any evidence derived therefrom, does not               violate the Fifth Amendment privilege  against               self-incrimination."     In Brown v. Walker, (40 L.ed. 819) the question involved was  with regard to an alleged incompatibility between  that clause  of  the  5th Amendment to  the  Constitution,  which declares that no person "shall be compelled in any  criminal case  to be a witness against himself" and the act  of  Con- gress  of  February  11, 1983 (27 Stat. at  L.  443),  which enacts  that" no person shall be excused from attending  and testifying  or from producing books, papers,  tariffs,  con- tracts,  agreements  and  documents  before  the  Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of  the Commission,   ......  on the ground or for the  reason  that the testimony or evidence, documentary 51 or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him  or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person  shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture  for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing  concern- ing  which he may testify, or produce evidence,  documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or either of them, or in any such case or proceed- ing." It was held:               "it is entirely true that the statute does not               purport,  nor is it possible for any  statute,               to  shield the witness from the personal  dis-               grace or opprobrium attaching to the  exposure               of  his  crime; but, as we  have  already  ob-               served, the authorities are numerous and  very               nearly  uniform  to the effect  that,  if  the               proposed testimony is material to the issue on               trial, the fact that the testimony may tend to               degrade the witness in public estimation  does               not exempt him from the duty of disclosure.  A               person who commits a criminal act is found  to               contemplate  the consequences of  exposure  to               his good name and reputation, and ought not to               call upon the courts to protect that which  he               has  himself  esteemed to be  of  such  little               value.  The  safety and welfare of  an  entire               community  should  not be put into  the  scale               against  the  reputation of  a  self-confessed               criminal, who ought not, either in justice  or               in  good  morals, to refuse to  disclose  that               which may be of great public utility, in order               that his neighbors may think well of him.  The               design of the constitutional privilege is  not               to aid the witness in vindicating his  charac-               ter,  but  to protect him against  being  com-               pelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a               criminal  charge. If he secure legal  immunity               from  prosecution, the possible impairment  of

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             his good name is a penalty which it is reason-               able  he  should be compelled to pay  for  the               common  good. If it be once conceded that  the               fact that his testimony may tend to bring  the               witness into disrepute, though not to incrimi-               nate. him, does not entitle him to the  privi-               lege  of silence, it necessarily follows  that               if  it also tends to incriminate, but  at  the               same  time  operates as a pardon for  the  of-               fence,  the fact that the disgrace remains  no               more  entitles  him to immunity in  this  case               than in the other."     It  is  in this view of the matter and in  view  of  the provisions  contained in Sections 4 to 6 of the Act and  the rules framed thereunder that we are of the opinion that  the petitioners on the belief that they 52 were  persons  covered  by Section 8B could  not  avoid  the consequences  of Sections 178 and 179 by  claiming  absolute immunity  from binding themselves by an oath or  affirmation for answering questions put to them.     Indeed  in  the  instant case the  petitioners  are  not asserting  that they could not be required at all to  appear as  a  witness before the Committee and  make  statement  on oath. As is apparent from our order dated 18th August,  1988 on behalf of both the petitioners it was submitted that they did  not  either wish to delay the proceedings  or  to  show disrespect to the Committee but only wanted to protect their own interest by making the submission which they made before the  Committee as per legal advice given to them.  According to  learned  counsel for the petitioners  the  legal  advice given  to the petitioners was that since they  were  persons covered  by  Section  8B of the Act they  were  entitled  to produce evidence in defence and could as such be called upon to enter the witness box at the end of the inquiry and could not be required to enter the witness box for  cross-examina- tion almost as the first two witnesses before the Committee. According to him the stand taken by the petitioners was that they  being covered by Section 8B of the Act  their  defence would  be put to serious jeopardy and will be  prejudicially affected if they were required to appear in the witness  box for  cross-examination at the very inception of the  inquiry even before statements of witnesses proving the  accusations against  the petitioners had been recorded which  they  were entitled  to  defend. That this was really the case  of  the petitioners  will be apparent from our discussion  a  little later. In this background we pass on to the second  proposi- tion referred to above namely whether the petitioners  could avoid the consequences contemplated by Sections 178 and  179 I.P.C  by putting forth valid justification for refusing  to bind themselves by oath or affirmation even without claiming an  absolute immunity from binding themselves by an oath  or affirmation.     In  Watkins  v. United States, 1 L.ed. 2d 1273  a  union officer, appearing as a witness before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, refused to answer questions  as to past Communist Party membership of  certain persons, objecting to the questions on the ground of lack of pertinency to the subject under inquiry by the subcommittee. In a prosecution in the United States District Court for the District  of  Columbia, he was convicted  of  violating  the statute  providing  for  criminal  punishment  of  witnesses before  congressional  committees who refuse to  answer  any question  pertinent to the question under inquiry,  and  the conviction was affirmed by the

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53 United States Court of Appeals for the District of  Columbia Circuit.  On  certiorari, the United  States  Supreme  Court reversed the conviction. Warren, Chief Justice, speaking for the  five  members  of the Court, ruled that  to  support  a conviction  under  a statute a  congressional  investigating committee  must, upon objection of a witness on the  grounds of  pertinency, state for the record the subject  under  in- quiry  at that time and the manner in which  the  propounded questions  are  pertinent thereto. Consequently  refusal  to answer  a question on the ground that it was not  pertinent, was found to be a valid justification.     In  Flaxer v. United States, 3 L.ed. 2d 183  relying  on the decision in Watkins (Supra) that the courts must  accord to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defend- ants  in  all other criminal cases it was held that  one  of these guarantees is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the refusal of the witness was deliberate and intentional.  This decision  is.  therefore˜ an authority for  the  proposition that  if the refusal of the witness was not  deliberate  and intentional but was for a valid cause such refusal could not be made the basis for prosecuting the witness.     In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York, 12 L.ed. 2d 678 notwithstanding the grant of immunity under the  laws of New Jersey and New York, petitioners, as witnesses before the  Waterfront  Commission of New York Harbor,  refused  to answer  questions on the ground that the answers might  tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of immunity did not purport to extend. Petitioners were  there- upon  held in civil and criminal contempt of court. The  New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the civil contempt  judgments, holding  that a state may constitutionally compel a  witness to give testimony which might be used in a federal  prosecu- tion  against him. On certiorari, the United States  Supreme Court  vacated  the judgment of contempt  and  remanded  the cause to the New Jersey Supreme Court. It was held:               "...  We  hold the constitutional rule  to  be               that  a state witness may not be compelled  to               give  testimony  which  may  be  incriminating               under federal law unless the compelled  testi-               mony  and  its fruits cannot be  used  in  any               manner by federal officials in connection with               a  criminal prosecution against him.  We  con-               clude,  moreover, that in order  to  implement               this  constitutional rule and accommodate  the               interests of the State and Federal Governments               in               54               investigating   and  prosecuting  crime,   the               Federal  Government  must be  prohibited  from               making any such use of compelled testimony and               its  fruits.  This  exclusionary  rule,  while               permitting  the States to  secure  information               necessary   for  effective  law   enforcement,               leaves the witness and the Federal  Government               in  substantially the same position as if  the               witness  had claimed his privilege in the  ab               sence of a state grant of immunity. It follows               that petitioners here may now be compelled  to               answer  the questions propounded to  them.  At               the  time  they refused  to  answer,  however,               petitioners  had a reasonable fear,  based  on               this  Court’s  decision in Feldman  v.  United               States,  supra, that the  federal  authorities               might use the answers against them in  connec-

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             tion  with a federal prosecution. We have  now               overruled  Feldman and held that  the  Federal               Government  may  make no such use of  the  an-               swers.  Fairness  dictates  that   petitioners               should  now  be afforded  an  opportunity,  in               light  of  this  development,  to  answer  the               questions.  Accordingly, the judgment  of  the               New  Jersey  courts  ordering  petitioners  to               answer  the questions may remain  undisturbed.               But  the judgment of contempt is  vacated  and               the  cause remanded to the New Jersey  Supreme               Court  for proceedings not  inconsistent  with               this opinion."     In  this case also it is, therefore, clear that a  valid justification  put  forth by the witness was  considered  to constitute sufficient ground to make him immune from  prose- cution.     We  have  already pointed out in our  order  dated  18th August, 1988 that if the Committee had found that the  peti- tioners were covered by Section 8B of the Act it would  most probably  itself  not  have required them to  get  into  the witness  box  for being cross-examined till the end  of  the inquiry.  We have reached this conclusion from  the  circum- stances that it is the Committee’s own view as expressed  in its  order  dated 29th June, 1988 that  persons  covered  by Section  8B have to be examined at the end of  the  inquiry. That  the  case of the petitioners in not  taking  oath  for being cross-examined at the very initial stage was based  on Section  8B  seems  to be apparent. The plea  taken  in  the application made on behalf of the Commissioner of Police  on 17th May, 1988 for first calling upon the Bar Association to start  their evidence and to call upon the  Commissioner  of Police  to  adduce  his evidence thereafter  was  the  first indication  in  this behalf. This plea was, at  all  events, relevant qua those police officers whose conduct was 55 to be examined. Secondly, when on 19th May, 1988 the learned counsel  for  Smt. Kiran Bedi was required  to  justify  her stand of not taking oath, Section 8B was specifically plead- ed  and reliance was placed on the decision in the  case  of Smt.  Indira Gandhi and another v. Mr. J.C. Shah  Commission of  Inquiry,  ILR 1980 1 Delhi 552 as is borne  out  by  the order  of the Committee of that date. The  justification  so pleaded was repelled by the Committee on two grounds, namely that  Smt. Indira Gandhi in that inquiry had not  filed  any affidavit  and that she had been summoned under Section  8B. On  the view of the Committee expressed in its  order  dated 29th June, 1988, which will, in the absence of any  material to the contrary, be deemed to be its view even on 19th  May, 1988, that persons covered by Section 8B were to be examined at  the  end of the inquiry, the fact that an  affidavit  of Smt. Kiran Bedi was on record could hardly justify her being called upon to enter the witness box at the very  inception. As  regards the second ground we have already held that  the fact that no formal notice had been issued under Section  8B would constitute no justification for not treating a  person to be covered by that section, if otherwise the  ingredients of the said section were made out.     As regards Jinder Singh the order of the Committee dated 26th  May, 1988 quoted earlier indicates that  Jinder  Singh had clearly stated that he is not prepared to take the  oath because  he is in the nature of an accused and he cannot  be asked to start the evidence and would be prepared to come in the witness box after the evidence of other party is record- ed. Jinder Singh did not state that he was an accused before

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the  Committee. In saying that he was "in the nature of"  an accused be obviously meant that since his conduct was to  be examined  as contemplated by Section 8B he was  entitled  to appear  as a witness in his defence after the  witnesses  on behalf  of  the Bar Association which was accusing  him  had been  examined. Had the Committee not been  labouring  under the misapprehension that the petitioners were not covered by Section  8B, because no notices under that section had  been issued to them, notwithstanding the fact that their  conduct was  to be examined on its own declared intention, it  would obviously not have required the petitioners to take oath for being  cross-examined at the stage at which it did  so.  The subsequent  orders of the Committee directing complaints  to be  filed against the petitioners for an offence  punishable under  Section  178 I.P.C. and the act of filing  such  com- plaints  apparently were the consequences of  the  aforesaid misapprehension.  We have already held that the  petitioners were  covered  by Section 8B of the Act. The action  of  the Committee in compelling the petitioners to enter the witness box on the dates in question for being 56 cross-examined,  when  even according to it as  is  apparent from  its  order dated 29th June,  1988,  persons  similarly situated  were  to do so at the end of the inquiry,  was  in itself discriminatory. There was, therefore, valid  justifi- cation  for the refusal by the petitioners to take oath  for cross-examination at the stage when they were required to do so.  The  Committee could have on its own  reconsidered  the question whether the prosecutions should be pressed  further when  the case was referred back to it by the learned  Vaca- tion Judge of this Court by his order dated 2nd June,  1988. For these reasons and the reasons already given in our order dated  18th  August,  1988 we are of the  opinion  that  the Committee  should not have in the instant case directed  the filing of a complaint against either of the petitioners  for an  offence  punishable under Section 178 I.P.C.  We  decide point (iv) accordingly.     As  regards  points (v), (vi) and (vii)  suffice  it  to point  out that the petitioners have apart from filing  spe- cial  leave petitions also filed writ petitions  challenging the very same orders and since we have held that the  action of  the Committee in holding that the petitioners  were  not covered  by  Section 8B of the Act and  compelling  them  to enter the witness box on the dates in question was discrimi- natory  and  the  orders  directing  complaint  being  filed against  the  petitioners were illegal, it is  apparently  a case  involving  infringement of Articles 14 and 21  of  the Constitution. In such a situation the power of this Court to pass  an appropriate order in exercise of  its  jurisdiction under  Articles  32 and 142 of the  Constitution  cannot  be seriously doubted particularly having regard to the  special facts and circumstances of this case. On the orders  direct- ing filing of complaints being held to be invalid the conse- quential  complaints and the proceedings  thereon  including the orders of the Magistrate issuing summons cannot  survive and it is in this view of the matter that by our order dated 18th  August,  1988  we have quashed them.  As  regards  the submission  that  it  was not a fit  case  for  interference either  under Article 32 or Article 136 of the  Constitution inasmuch  as it was still open to the petitioners  to  prove their  innocence  before the Magistrate, suffice it  to  say that in the instant case if the petitioners are compelled to face  prosecution  in spite of the finding that  the  orders directing complaint to be filed against them were illegal it would  obviously cause prejudice to them.. Points (v),  (vi)

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and (vii) are decided accordingly.     These,  apart from those stated in our order dated  18th August, 1988 are our reasons for the said order. N.P.V. 57