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PETITIONER: KIHOTO HOLLOHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ZACHILLHU AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/02/1992

BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) SHARMA, L.M. (J) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1992 SCR  (1) 686        1992 SCC  Supl.  (2) 651  JT 1992 (1)   600        1992 SCALE  (1)338

ACT:      Constitution of India,1950:      Articles  102(2),  191(2, Tenth  schedule  inserted  by constitution   (Fifty-Second  amendment)   Act,   1985-Anti- defection law-Object and Constitutionality of.      Tenth   Schedule-Para  2-Members  of   Parliament/State Legislatures-Disqualification   on  account  of   defection- whether   violative  of  rights  and  freedom  envisaged  by article 105.      Para  2(1)(b)-expression  "any  direction"-Construction of-Whether  whip/direction  should  clearly  indicate   that voting/abstention  from  voting contrary to it  would  incur disqualification.      Paragraph    6-Speakers/Chairmen-Power    to     decide disputed disqualification of a Member of a House-Nature of.      Speakers/Chairman-whether  act as tribunal and  satisfy requirements of independent adjudicator machinery.      ‘Finality’   to  orders  of  Speakers/  Chairmen;   and immunity  to  proceedings  under  para  6(1)  analogous   to Articles 122(1) and 212(1)-Whether excludes judicial review.      Doctrine of necessity-Applicability of.      Paragraph   7-Expression  ‘no  court  shall  have   any jurisdiction  in  respect  with the  matter  connected  with disqualification  of  a  Member  of  a  House’-Whether  bars jurisdiction of Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 136, 226 and 227: whether required ratification envisaged by proviso to Article 368(2): whether can be severed from other provisions of Schedule.      Doctrine of severability-Applicability of.                                                      687      Articles  122(1),212(1)-Proceedings  in   Parliament/State Legislature-Whether  justiciable on ground of illegality  or perversity.      Articles  136, 226, 227-Orders under Paragraph  6-Scope of Judicial review-Whether confined to jurisdictional errors only.      Article  368-Constitutional amendment-Amending  powers- Scope,object, nature and limitations explained.      Extinction  of  rights and restriction  of  remedy  for enforcement   of  right-Distinction  between-Extinction   of remedy  without curtailing right-Whether makes a  change  in

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the right.      Administrative Law :      Judicial  review-Statute-Finality and  ouster  clauses- Meaning, object and scope of.      Practice & Procedure :      Interlocutory orders-Purpose of.      Words and Phrases :      ‘Administration  of  Justice’,  ‘Court’,  ‘final’   and ‘Tribunal’meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      By the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act,  1985 (popularly  known  as  the  Anti-defection  law)  the  Tenth Schedule was inserted in the constitution of India providing for  disqualification  of  a  Member  of  either  House   of Parliament or of a State Legislature found to have  defected from continuing as a Member of the House.      Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule states that a  Member of  a House would incur disqualification if  he  voluntarily gives up his membership of the party by which he was set  up as  a candidate at the election, or if he without  obtaining prior permission of the political party to which he  belongs votes or abstains from voting in the House contrary to  "any direction" issued by such political party and such voting or abstention  has  not been condoned by such  political  party within  15 days from the date of such voting or  abstention; or if a Member elected otherwise than as a candidate set  up by any political party joins a political party after the                                                      688  election;  or,  if a nominated Member joins  any  political party  after expiry of six months from the date he took  his seat.    Paragraph   6(1)  states  that  the   question   of disqualification  shall  be  referred for  decision  of  the chairmen/Speaker  of  the House and his  decision  shall  be final.  It further provides that such question in respect of Chairman/Speaker  shall  be referred for  decision  of  such Member  of the House as the House may elect in this  behalf. according to Paragraph 6(2) all proceedings under para  6(1) shall be deemed to be proceedings in  Parliament/Legislature of a House within the meaning of Article 122/212.  Paragraph 7 states that no court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any  matter connected with the disqualification of a  Member of a House.      A  large number of petitions were filed before  various High   Courts  as  well  as  this  Court   challenging   the constitutionality of the Amendment.  This Court  transferred to  itself the petitions pending before the High Courts  and heard all the matters together.      The challenge was mainly on the grounds that  Paragraph 7  of  the Tenth Schedule, in terms and ineffect  sought  to make a change in chapter IV of Part V and Chapter V of  Part VI of the Constitution as it takes away the jurisdiction  of the  Supreme  court under Article 136 and that of  the  High Courts  under  Articles  226 and 227  of  the  constitution, and,therefore,the Bill before presentation to the  President for assent would require to be ratified by the  legislatures of  not  less than one-half of the States by  resolution  to that  effect as envisaged by the proviso to Article  368(2); that  in  the  absence  of such  a  ratification  the  whole Amendment  Bill was an abortive attempt to bring  about  the amendment  indicated  therein; that even assuming  that  the amendment  does not attract the proviso to  Article  368(2), Paragraph  7 of the Schedule is liable to be struck down  as

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it  takes away the power of judicial review; that  the  very concept  of disqualification for defection is  violative  of the   fundamental   values   and   principles    under-lying parliamentary    democracy   and   violates   an    elective representative’s  freedom  of speech, right to  dissent  and freedom of conscience and is destructive of a basic  feature of  the  Constitution;  that the  investiture  of  power  to adjudicate disputed defections in the Chairmen/Speakers, who being  nominees  of  political parties are  not  obliged  to resign their party affiliations, does not stand the test  of an independent and impartial adjudicatory machinery and  is, therefore, violative of the basic feature of                                                       689 the constitution.  It was also contended that the expression "any  direction" in Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Schedule  might be  unduly  restrictive of the freedom  of speech,  and  the right  of  dissent  which may itself  be  obnoxious  to  and violative of constitutional ideals and values.      The  respondents  contended  that  the  Tenth  Schedule created  a nonjusticiable constitutional area  dealing  with certain  complex  political  issues  which  have  no  strict adjudicatory  disposition and the exclusion of this area  is constitutionally  preserved by imparting a finality  to  the decision   of   the  Speakers/Chairmen  by   deeming   whole proceedings as those within Parliament/House of  legislature envisaged in Articles 122 and 212 and further excluding  the Court’s Jurisdiction under Paragraph 7; that no question  of ouster of judicial review would at all arise inasmuch as the Speaker/chairman  exercising power under Paragraph  6(1)  of the Tenth Schedule function not as a statutory tribunal  but as a part of state’s Legislative department; and that having regard to the political issues, the subject matter is itself not   amenable  to  judicial  power  but  pertains  to   the constitution of the House and the legislature is entitled to deal with it exclusively.      The Court on 12.11.1991 gave its operative conclusions, indicating  reasons  to  follow and by  its  judgment  dated 18.2.1992 gave the reasons.      On the questions whether: (1) the Tenth Schedule to the constitution  inserted  by  the  constitution  (Fifty-Second Amendment)  Act,  1985, seeking to penalise  and  disqualify elected  representatives  is violative  of  the  fundamental principles  of  Parliamentary democracy  and  is,  therefor, destructive  of the basic feature of the  Constitution;  (2) Paragraph  7  of the Tenth Schedule in terms and  in  effect brings  about a change in operation and effect  of  Articles 136,226 and 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the Bill introducing  the  amendment would  require  ratification  as envisaged  by  the proviso to Article 368(2); (3)  the  non- compliance  with the proviso to Article 368(2) would  render the  entire Bill vitiated and an abortive attempt  to  bring about  a  valid  amendment or would  Paragraph  7  alone  be invalidated   with  the  application  of  the  doctrine   of severability; (4) the Tenth Schedule created a new and  non- justiciable  constitutional  area  not  amenable  to  curial adjudicative   process;  and  whether  Paragraph   6(1)   in imparting  a  constitutional ‘finality’to the  decisions  of Chairmen/Speakers,  and  paragraph  6(2)  in  the  event  of attracting immunity under Articles 122                                                       690      and 212, bar judicial review; (5) the Chairmen/Speakers satisfy  the  requirements of  an  independent  adjudicatory machinery  or whether the investiture of  the  determinative and  adjudicative  jurisdiction  in  them  under  the  Tenth Schedule  would  vitiate  the provision  on  the  ground  of

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reasonable likelihood of bias.      Dismissing  Writ Petition No.17 of 1991  and  remitting Writ Petition Rule No.2421 of 1990 (subject matter of TP No. 40/91) to the High Court of Guwahati, this Court      HELD:  (By  the  Court) (i) Paragraph 7  of  the  Tenth Schedule to the Constitution in terms and in effect excludes the  jurisdiction of all Courts including the Supreme  Court and High courts, and brings about a change in the  operation and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the  constitution of  India,  and  therefore,  the  amendment  would   require ratification  in  accordance with the  proviso  to  Articles 368(2) of the constitution of India.                                            [pp. 711F-G;714G]      (ii)   The  finality clause in Para 6(1) of  the  Tenth Schedule   to  the  Constitution  is  not  decisive.    Such finality,being  for  the  statute alone,  does  not  exclude extraordinary  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court   under Article  136 and of the High Courts under Articles  226  and 227 of the Constitution.                          [713E-F; 788B-C]      (iii)  The  legal  fiction in para 6(2)  of  the  Tenth Schedule  brings  a proceeding under para  6(1)  within  the ambit of clause (1) of Article 122/212 of the  Constitution, and,  therefore,  makes  it justiciable  on  the  ground  of illegality  or perversity inspite of the immunity it  enjoys to a challenge on the ground of "irregularity of procedure." [713G; 788E-F]      Per Majority (M.N. Venkatachaliah. K. Jayachandra Reddy JUDGMENT:      (i)  Paragraph  7  of the  Tenth  Schedule  contains  a provision  which is independent of, and stands  apart  from, the main provisions of the Tenth Schedule which are intended to  provide  a  remedy  for the  evil  of  unprincipled  and unethical political defection and, therefore, is a severable part.   The remaining provisions of the Tenth  Schedule  can and  do stand independently of Paragraph 7 and are  complete in themselves workable and are not truncated by the excision of Paragraph 7. [p.712E-F]                                                        691      (ii) There is nothing in the proviso to Article  368(2) which  detracts  from  the severability of  a  provision  on account  of the inclusion of which the Bill  containing  the amendment  requires  ratification  from  the  rest  of   the provisions  of  such Bill which do not attract  and  require such ratification.  Having regard to the mandatory  language of  Article  368(2) that "thereupon the  Constitution  shall stand  amended" the operation of the proviso should  not  be extended  to constitutional amendments in a bill  which  can stand by themselves without such ratification. [711G-H; 712- A-B]      (iii)  The Constitution (Fifty-Second  Amendment)  Act, 1985  in so far as it seeks to introduce the Tenth  Schedule in the Constitution of India, to the extent of its provision which  are amenable to the legal-sovereign of  the  amending process of the Union Parliament cannot be over borne by  the proviso to Article 368(2) which cannot operate in that area. [712B-C]      (iv)   Paragraph  2  of  the  Tenth  schedule  to   the constitution  is valid.  Its provisions do not  suffer  from the vice of subverting democratic rights of elected  Members of  Parliament  and  the legislatures  of  the  States.   It does  not violate their freedom of speech, freedom  of  vote and  conscience; nor does it violate any rights  or  freedom under Article 105 and 194 of the Constitution. [712F-H]      The  provisions  are  salutory  and  are  intended   to

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strengthen  the fabric of Indian Parliamentary democracy  by curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections. [712H, 713A]      (v)  The Tenth Schedule does not, in providing  for  an additional ground for disqualification and for  adjudication of  disputed  disqualifications,  seek  to  create  a   non- justiciable constitutional area. [p. 769A-B]      (vi) The Speakers/Chairmen while functioning under  the Tenth  Schedule exercise judicial power and act as  Tribunal adjudicating   rights  and  obligations  under   the   Tenth schedule, and their decisions in that capacity are  amenable to judicial review. [713C]      (vii)  Paragraph  6(1) of the Tenth  Schedule,  to  the extent  it seeks to impart finality to the decision  of  the Speakers/Chairman  is valid.  But the concept  of  statutory finality embodied therein does not detract from or  abrogate judicial  review  under  Articles 136, 226 and  227  of  the Constitution in so far as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates,                                                       692      male  fides,  non-compliance  with  Rules  of   Natural Justice and perversity are concerned. [713E-F]      (viii)  The deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of  the Tenth  Schedule  attracts an immunity analogous to  that  in Article 122(1) and 212(1) of the constitution to protect the validity   of  proceedings  from  mere   irregularities   of procedure and confines the scope of the fiction accordingly.                                       [713G-H, 714A]      Spl.Ref.  No.1 of 1964 (Keshav Singh’s case)  [1965]  1 SCR 413,referred to.      (ix) Having regard to the constitutional scheme in  the Tenth  Schedule,judicial review should not cover  any  stage prior to the making of a decision by the  Speakers/Chairmen; and  no  quia  timet  actions  are  permissible,  the   only exception for any interlocutory interference being cases  of interlocutory  disqualifications  or suspensions  which  may have  grave,  immediate and irreversible  repercussions  and consequence.             [713D-E]      (x)  The Speakers/Chairmen hold a pivotal  position  in the  scheme of Parliamentary democracy and are guardians  of the  rights and privileges of the House.  They are  expected to  and do take far reaching decisions in the  Parliamentary democracy. Vestiture of power to adjudicate  questions under the  Tenth  Schedule  in  them  should  not  be   considered exceptionable.              [714B-C]      Per Lalit Mohan Sharma and J.S. Verma, JJ.-contra      (i) Without ratification, as required by the  mandatory special  provision  prescribed  in the  proviso  to  Article 368(2)  of  the  Constitution the stage  of  presenting  the Constitution (Fifty-Second) Amendment Bill for assent of the President did not reach and, therefore, the so-called assent of the President was non est.[715B-C]      (ii)  In the absence of ratification it is  not  merely paragraph  7  but  the  entire  Constitution   (Fifty-Second Amendment)  Act,  1985 which is  rendered  unconstitutional, since   the  constitutional  power  was  not  exercised   as prescribed in Article 368, and, therefore, the  Constitution did  not stand amended in accordance with the terms  of  the Bill providing for amendment. [715D-E]                                                        693      (iii)  Doctrine of severability cannot be applied to  a Bill  making  a  constitutional  amendment  where  any  part thereof  attracts the proviso to clause (2) of Article  368.

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[715F]      (iv)  Doctrine  of severability is  not  applicable  to permit  striking  down  para 7 alone  saving  the  remaining provisions  of the Bill making the Constitutional  Amendment on  the  ground that Para 7 alone attracts the  proviso  the Article 368(2). [715G]      (v) The Speaker’s decision disqualifying a Member of  a House  under  paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth  Schedule  is  not immune from judicial scrutiny.  It is a nullity liable to be so declared and ignored. [782G]      (vi)   An   independent  adjudicatory   machinery   for resolving disputes relating to the competence of Members  of the  House  is envisaged as an attribute of  the  democratic system  which is a basic feature of our  Constitution.   The tenure  of  the Speaker, who is the authority in  the  Tenth schedule  to  decide  this  dispute,  is  dependent  on  the continuous  support  of  the  majority  in  the  House  and, therefore,  he does not satisfy the requirement of  such  an independent  adjudicatory authority; and his choice  as  the sole  arbiter in the matter violates an essential  attribute of the basic feature.                     [716B-C]      (vii)  Consequently,  the entire  Constitution  (Fifty- Second  Amendment)  Act,  1985  which  inserted  the   Tenth Schedule  together with clause (2) in Articles 102 and  191, must be declared unconstitutional. [716C-D]      (viii)  Accordingly, all decisions rendered by  several Speakers  under  the Tenth Schedule must  also  be  declared nullity and liable to be ignored.                                [p.716D]      Per  Venkatachaliah : J.1.1.A  constitutional  document outlines  only broad and general principles meant to  endure and   be  capable  of  flexible  application   to   changing circumstances-a  distinction which differentiates a  statute from a Charter under which all statutes are made. [726G-H]      Cooley on "Constitutional Limitation"   8th Edn.  Vol.I p.129, referred to.      1.2.  In considering the validity of  a  constitutional amendment  the changing and the changed  circumstances  that compelled the amendment                                                     694 are important criteria. [727B]      U.S.Supreme Court in Maxwell v. Dow 44 Lawyer’s Edition 597 at p. 605, referred to.      1.3.  The Tenth Schedule is a part of the  Constitution and  attracts  the  same  canons  of  construction  as   are applicable  to the expounding of the fundamental  law.   One constitutional power is necessarily conditioned by the other as   the  Constitution  is  one  "coherent   document".   In expounding   the   process  of  the  fundamental   law   the Constitution must be treated as a logical-whole. [726D-E]      1.4.  The distinction between what is  constitutionally permissible and what is outside it is marked by a ‘hazy-gray line’and  it is the Court’s duty  to identify,  "darken  and deepen"  the demarcating line of constitutionality - a  task in  which  some element of Judges’ own  perceptions  of  the constitutional  ideals inevitably participate.  There is  no single litmus test of constitutionality.  Any suggested sure decisive  test,  might  after  all  furnish  a   "transitory delusion  of  certitude"  where  the  "complexities  of  the strands in the web of constitutionality which the Judge must alone  disentangle" do not lend themselves to easy and  sure formulations  one  way  or the other.  It is  here  that  it becomes  difficult  to  refute  the  inevitable  legislative element in all constitutional adjudications. [730D-F]

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    "Theory of Torts" American Law Review 7[1873];  Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes-Free Speech and the Living Constitution by H.L. Pohlman 1991 Edn. p.223, referred to.      Amalgamated  Society  of Railway Servants  v.  Osborne, 1910 A.C. 87, referred to.      1.5.  A  political party functions on the  strength  of shared  beliefs. Any freedom of its Members to vote as  they please  independently  of  the  political  party’s  declared policies  will  not  only embarrass  its  public  image  and popularity but also undermine public confidence in it which, in  the ultimate analysis, is its source of  sustenance-nay, indeed,  its very survival.  Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the  Tenth Schedule  gives  effect to this principle and  sentiment  by imposing  a  disqualification  on  a  Member  who  votes  or abstains from voting contrary to "any directions" issued  by the political                                                        695 party.  The provision, however, recognising two  exceptions: one  when the Member obtains from the political party  prior permission to vote or abstain from voting and the other when the Member has voted without obtaining such permission...his action  has  been  condoned by the  political  party.   This provision itself accommodates the possibility that there may be  occasions when a Member may vote or abstain from  voting contrary  to  the  direction  of  the  party  to  which   he belongs.[734D-E; 735B-C]      Griffith and Ryle on "Parliament, Functions, Practice & Procedure" 1989 Edn. page 119, referred to.      1.6.  In  a  sense anti-defection law  is  a  statutory variant of its moral principle and justification  underlying the  power  of recall.  What might justify a  provision  for recall  would justify a provision for  disqualification  for defection.  Unprincipled defection is a political and social evil.  It  is perceived as such  by  the  legislature.   The anti-defection law seeks to recognise the practical need  to place  the  proprieties of political and  personal  conduct- whose awkward erosion and grotesque manifestations have been the bane of the times-above certain theoretical  assumptions which  in reality have fallen into a morass of personal  and political   degradation.    This  legislative   wisdom   and perception   should   be  deferred  to.   The   choices   in constitutional adjudications quite clearly indicate the need for such deference.[739D-G]      ‘Constitutional   Reform,  -  Reshaping   the   British Political  System,  by Rodney  Brazier.  1991  Edn.pp.48-53, referred to.      1.7.The Tenth Schedule does not impinge upon the rights or immunities under Article 105(2) of the Constitution.  The freedom  of speech of a Member is not an ‘absolute  freedom. That  apart, the provisions of the Tenth Schedule  do    not purport  to make a Member of a House liable in  any  "Court" for   anything   said   or  any  vote  given   by   him   in Parliament.[732H; 733C]      Jyoti  Basu & Ors. v.Debi Ghosal & Ors., [1982]  3  SCR 318, referred to.      2.1.   A   provision  which  seeks   to   exclude   the jurisdiction of Courts is strictly construed.  [742E]      H.H.  Maharajadhiraja  Madhav Rao  Jiwaji  Rao  Scindia Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India, [1971] 1 SSC 85,  referred to.                                                     696      Mask  &  Co.v.Secretary of State, AIR  1940  P.C.  105, referred to.      2.2  The rules of construction are attracted where  two or  more reasonably possible constructions are open  on  the

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language of the statute. [742F]      2.3. As regards Paragraph 7 to the Tenth Schedule, both on  its  language  and  having  regard  to  the  legislative evolution of the provision, the legislative intent is  plain and   manifest.   The  words  "no  Courts  shall  have   any jurisdiction  in  respect of any matter connected  with  the disqualification  of a member" are of wide import and  leave no  constructional  options.  This  is  reinforced  by   the legislative   history  of  the  anti-defection   law.    The Constitution  (Fifty-Second  Amendment) Bill for  the  first time  envisaged  the  investitute of  the  power  to  decide disputes  on  the Speakers or the Chairmen whereas  the  two similar Constitution (32nd and 48th amendment) Bills, (which had   lapsed)  did  not  contain  any  clause  ousting   the jurisdiction of the Courts.  The purpose of the enactment of Paragraph  7, as the debates in the House indicate,  was  to bar  the jurisdiction of the Courts under Articles 136,  226 and 227 of the Constitution. {742F-G, H, 743B]      2.4. The changes in Chapter IV of Part V and Chapter  V of the Part VI of the constitution envisaged by the  proviso to  Article 368(2) need not be direct.  The change could  be either  "in terms of or in effect". It is not  necessary  to change  the  language  of  Articles  136  and  226  of   the Constitution  to  attract the proviso.  If in  effect  these Articles  are  rendered ineffective  and  made  inapplicable where  these articles could otherwise have been  invoked  or would,  but  for  Paragraph 7, have operated  there  is  ‘in effect’a change in those provisions attracting the proviso. [p. 745C-D]      2.5. Though the Amendment does not bring in any  change directly in the language of Articles 136,226 and 227 of  the constitution,,  however, in effect Paragraph 7 curtails  the operation of those Articles respecting matter falling  under the  Tenth  Schedule.  There is a change in  the  effect  in Articles  136, 226 and 227 within the meaning of clause  (b) of  the proviso to Article 368 (2). Paragraph 7,  therefore, attracts the proviso and ratification was necessary. [745F]      Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India &  State of Bihar, [1952] SCR 89 Sajjan Singh v. State of  Rajasthan, [1965] 1 SCR 933, referred to.                                                      697      3.1  The criterion for determining  the  constitutional validity  of  a  law is the competence  of  the  law  making authority   (which  would  depend  on  the  ambit   of   the Legislative  power  and the limitations imposed  thereon  as also on mode of exercise of the power).  While examining the constitutional validity of laws the doctrine of severability is  applied  which  envisages  that if  it  is  possible  to construe  a  statute so that its validity can  be  sustained against  a constitutional attack it should be  so  construed and  that when part of a statute is valid and part is  void, the  valid  part must be separated from  the  invalid  part. [746C; 747D]      Cooley’s  constitutional Limitations; 8th Edn. Vol.  1, p. 359-360, referred to.      R.M.D.  Chamarbaughwalla v. Union of India, [1957]  SCR 930;  Shri Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalavaru v.  State   of Kerala,  [1973]  Supp. 1 SCR; Minerva Mills Ltd. &  Ors.  v. Union  of India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 206 and Sambhamurthy  & Ors.  etc.v.  State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., [1987]  1  SCR 879, referred to.      3.2. Though the amending power in a constitution is  in the  nature  of a constituent power and differs  in  content from  the Legislative power, the limitations imposed on  the constituent power may be substantive as well as  procedural.

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Substantive  limitations are those which restrict the  field of  exercise  of the amending power and exclude  some  areas from  its  ambit.  Procedural limitations  are  those  which impose  restrictions with regard to the mode of exercise  of the amending power, e.g. the limitation requiring a  special majority  under  Article  368(2) of the  constitution  is  a procedural one.  Both these limitations, however, touch  and affect the constituent power itself, and impose a fetter  on the  competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution  and any  amendment made in disregard of these limitations  would go  beyond  the  amending power  and  would  invalidate  its exercise. [746C-E, 747C]      3.3.   Although   there  is  no   specific   enumerated substantive  limitation on the power in Article 368, but  as arising  from  very  limitation  in  the  word  ‘amend’,   a substantive limitation is inherent on the amending power  so that  the  amendment does not alter the basic  structure  or destroy the basic features of the Constitution. [747A-B]      3.4. The proviso to Article 368(2) was introduced  with a view to giving                                                       698 effect  to the federal principle.  Its scope is confined  to the limits prescribed therein and is not construed so as  to take  away  the power in the main part  of  Article  368(2). [750C-D]      Madras  & Southern Mahratta railway company v.  Bazwada Municipality, (1944) 71 I.A. 113 and Commissioner of  Income Tax, Mysore v. Indo- Mercantile Bank Ltd.(1959), Supp. 2 SCR 256, referred to.      3.5.   An  amendment  which  otherwise   fulfils    the requirements of Article 368(2) and is outside the  specified cases which require ratification cannot be denied legitimacy on the ground alone of the company it keeps. [750E]      3.6. The words "the amendment shall also require to  be ratified  by  the legislature" occurring in the  proviso  to Article 368(2) indicate that what is required to be ratified by  the legislatures of the States is the amendment  seeking to make the change in the provisions referred to in  clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso. The need for and the  requirement of the ratification is confined to that particular amendment alone and not in respect of amendments outside the ambit  of the proviso.  The proviso can have, therefore, no bearing on the validity of the amendments which do not fall within  its ambit. [750G-H]      3.7.  A composite amendment which makes alterations  in the  First  and  Fourth  schedules  as  well  as  in   other provisions  of the Constitution requiring  special  majority under  Article  368(2),  even though passed  by  the  simple majority  and  not  by special majority, may  be  upheld  in respect  of  the  amendments made in the  First  and  Fourth schedules. [755D]      Bribery    Commissioner    v.    Pedrick    Ranasinghe, 1965A.C.172, referred to.      3.8. There is really no difference in principle between the  condition  requiring passing of the Bill by  a  special majority before its presentation to the President for assent contained   in   Article  368(2)  and  the   condition   for ratification  of  the amendment by the legislatures  of  not less  than  one-half  of  the  States  before  the  Bill  is presented  to  the  President for assent  contained  in  the proviso. [753D-E]      3.9.  The  principle  of severability  can  be  equally applied  to a composite amendment which  contains  amendment in provisions which do not require ratification by States as well   as  amendment  in  provisions  which   require   such

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ratification   and  by  application  of  the   doctrine   of severability,                                                        699 the  amendment  can be upheld in respect of  the  amendments which  do not require ratification and which are within  the competence  of Parliament alone.  Only these  amendments  in provisions which require ratification under the proviso need to be struck down or declared invalid. [753E-F]      3.10.  The test of severability requires the  Court  to ascertain whether the legislature would at all have  enacted the law if the severed part was not the part of the law  and whether   after   severance   what   survives   can    stand independently and is workable. [753G]      3.11.  The main purpose underlying  the  Constitutional (Fifty-Second  Amendment) Act and introduction of the  Tenth Schedule is to curb the evil of defection which was  causing immense  mischief  in  our  body-politic.   The  ouster   of jurisdiction  of Courts under Paragraph 7 was incidental  to and  to lend strength to the main purpose which was to  curb the  evil  of  defection.   It  cannot  be  said  that   the constituent body would not have enacted the other provisions in  the Tenth Schedule if it had known that Paragraph 7  was not  valid,  Nor  can  it  be said  that  the  rest  of  the provisions  of the Tenth schedule cannot stand on their  own even  if Paragraph 7 is found to be  unconstitutional.   The provisions  of Paragraph 7 is therefore, severable from  the rest of the provisions. [pp.754A-C]      4.1. Democracy is a basic feature of the  Constitution. Whether  any  particular brand or system  of  Government  by itself,  has this attribute of a basic feature, as  long  as the  essential  characteristics  that entitle  a  system  of government  to be called democratic are otherwise  satisfied is  not  necessary to be gone into.  Election  conducted  at regular, prescribed intervals is essential to the democratic system  envisaged  in the Constitution.  So is the  need  to protect  and  sustain the purity of the  electoral  process. That  may take within it the quality, efficacy and  adequacy of  the  machinery  for resolution  of  electoral  disputes. [p.733F-G]      4.2.  In  the Indian  constitutional  dispensation  the power  to decide a disputed disqualification of  an  elected Member of the House is not treated as a matter of  privilege and  the power to resolve such electoral dispute is  clearly judicial and not legislative in nature.  The power to decide disputed  disqualification  under  Paragraph  6(1)  is   pre eminantly of a judicial complexion. [pp.759G.763C]      Indira  Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976] 2  SCR  347; Special Reference                                                        700 No. 1 of 1964, [1965] 1 SCR 413 & Express Newspaper Ltd.  v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578,, referred to.      Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow & Co., 1910 10 CLR 266, referred to.      4.3.  The  word  "Courts" is used  to  designate  those Tribunals  which  are set up in an organised State  for  the administration of justice.  By Administration of Justice  is meant  the  exercise  of  judicial power  of  the  State  to maintain and uphold rights and to punish "wrongs".  Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. Where there is a lis an affirmation by one party and  denial by  another-and the dispute necessarily involves a  decision on  the rights and obligations of the parties to it and  the authority is called upon to decide it, there is an  exercise of judicial power.  That authority is called a Tribunal,  if

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it  does not have all the trappings of a court.   Thus,  the Speaker or the Chairman, acting under Paragraph 6(1) of  the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal.[763G-H, 764E-F, 766B]      Associated  Cement  companies Ltd. v. P.N.  Sharma  and Anr.,  [1965]  2  SCR 366 and  Harinagar  Sugar  Mills  Ltd. v.Shyam  Sunder  Jhunjhunwala  & Ors.,  [1962]  2  SCR  339, referred to.      5.1.  A  finality clause is not  a  legislative  magical incantation  which  has the effect of telling  off  Judicial Review.  Statutory finality of a decision presupposes and is subject  to its consonance with the statute.  The  principle that is applied by the courts is that in spite of a finality clause it is open to the court to examine whether the action of  the authority under challenge is ultra vires the  powers conferred  on  the said authority.  An action can  be  ultra vires  for  the  reason that it is  in  contravention  of  a mandatory  provision of the law conferring on the  authority the  power  to take such an action.  It will also  be  ultra vires  the  powers  conferred  on the  authority  if  it  is vitiated  by mala fides or is colourable exercise  of  power based  on  extraneous  and  irrelevant  consideration.  [pp. 755D,765D-E]      ‘Administrative   Law’   6th   Edn.   at   p.   720   & Constitutional  Fundamentals,  the  Harmlyn  Lectures,  1989 Edn., p.88, referred to.      5.2.  The  finality  clause with the  word  "final"  in paragraph  6(1)  of the Tenth schedule does  not  completely exclude the jurisdiction of the                                                      701      Courts   under  Articles  136,  226  and  227  of   the Constitution.  But it does have the effect of limiting  the scope of the jurisdiction.  If the intendment is to  exclude the jurisdiction of the superior Courts, the language  would quite obviously have been different. [758H, 759A,765C,758A]      Brundaban Nayak v. Election Commission of India & Anr., [1965]  3  SCR 53; Union of India v. Jyoti  Prakash  Mitter, [1971]  3 SCR 483; Durga. Shankar Mehra v.  Reghuraj  Singh, AIR 1954 SC 520 and Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram  Patel & Ors., [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131, referred to.      5.3.  An  ouster  clause confines  judicial  review  in respect  of actions falling outside the jurisdiction of  the authority taking such action but precludes challenge to such action  on the ground of an error committed in the  exercise of  jurisdiction  vested in the authority  because  such  an action cannot be said to be an action without  jurisdiction. [765F]      Anisminic  Ltd. v.Foreign commission, [1969] 2 AC  147; S.E.  Asia Fire Bricks v. Non-Metallic Products,  1981  A.C. 363, referred to.      6.  The fiction in Paragraph 6(2) attracts an  immunity from  mere  irregularities of procedures. The  very  deeming provision  implies that the proceedings of  disqualification are,  in  fact,. not before the House; but only  before  the Speaker  a  specially  designated authority.   The  decision under  Paragraph 6(1) is not the decision of the House,  nor is  it subject to the approval by the House.   The  decision operates  independently of the House.  A  deeming  provision cannot  by its creation transcend its own power.  There  is, therefore,  no  immunity  under Articles 122  and  212  from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule. [763D-F]      7. The scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6 would be confined  to

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jurisdictional  errors  only,  viz.,  infirmities  based  on violation  of  constitutional  mandate,  mala  fides,   non- compliance  with  rules of natural justice  and  perversity. But Judicial review cannot be available at a stage prior  to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and a quia- timet   action   would  not  be  permissible.    Nor   would interference be permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings.  Exceptions will, however,, have to be made  in respect  of  cases where disqualification of  suspension  is imposed during the pendency of the                                                         702      proceedings and such disqualification or suspension  is likely    to   have   grave,immediate    and    irreversible repercussions and consequence.[768E-H]      Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1964] 4 SCR 797;State of  Rajasthan  v.Union of India, [1978] 1 SCR  1;  Union  of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, (supra) and Union of India  & Anr.  v.  Tulsiram  Patel & Ors., [1985] Supp.  2  SCR  131, referred to.      8.  The  office of the Speaker is held in  the  highest respect   and  esteem  in  Parliamentary   traditions.   The evolution of the institution of Parliamentary democracy  has as its pivot the institution of the Speaker.  He is said  to be  the very embodiment of propriety and  impartiality.   He performs wide ranging functions including the performance of important  functions  of a judicial  character.   It  would, indeed be unfair to the high traditions of that great office to say that the investiture in it of this jurisdiction would be  vitiated for violation of a basic feature . of  democracy. It  is inappropriate to express distrust in the high  office of  the  speaker, merely because some of  the  speakers  are alleged,  or even found, to have discharged their  functions not  in  keeping  with the great  traditions  of  that  high office.  The Robes of the Speaker do change and elevate  the man inside. [770G-H, 771A, 772A, 773A-B]      G.V.  Mavalankar  ; The Office of Speaker,  Journal  of Parliamentary  Information, April 1956, Vol. 2. No. 1  p.33; HOP,  Deb.  Vol.IX  (1954),  CC  3447-48  and  Erskine  May- Parliamentary  Practice -20th edition p. 234 and  M.N.  Kaul and S.L. Shakdher in ‘Practice and Procedure of Parliament’ 4th Edition, referred to.      9.1.  The words "any direction" occurring in  Paragraph 2(1)(b)  of  the  Tenth Schedule  require  to  be  construed harmoniously  with  the other provisions  and  appropriately confined to the objects and purposes of the Schedule.  Those objects  and purposes define and limit the contours  of  its meaning.  The assignment of a limited meaning is not to read it down to promote its constitutionality but because such  a construction  is a harmonious construction in  the  context. There  is  no  justification to give  the  words  the  wider meaning. [774H, 775A-B]      Parkash  Singh Badal & Ors. v. Union of India  &  Ors., AIR 1987 Punjab & Haryana 263, referred to.      9.2.  While construing Paragraph 2(1)(b) it  cannot  be ignored that                                                       703      under the Constitution members of Parliament as well as of  the  State Legislature enjoy freedom of  speech  in  the House  though this freedom is subject to the  provisions  of the   Constitution  and  the  rules  and   standing   orders regulating the Procedure of the House.  The disqualification imposed by Paragraph 2(1)(b) must be so construed as not  to unduly  impinge on the said freedom of speech of  a  member. This  would be possible if Paragraph 2(1)(b) is confined  in its  scope  by  keeping in view the  object  underlying  the

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amendments  contained in the Tenth Schedule namely, to  curb the  evil or mischief of political defections  motivated  by the  lure  of office or other  similar  considerations.  [p. 775C-D]      9.3.    In   view   of   the   consequences   of    the disqualification,  i.e., termination of the membership of  a House,  it would be appropriate that the direction  or  whip which  results  in  such  disqualification  under  Paragraph 2(1)(b)  of  the Tenth Schedule is so worded as  to  clearly indicate  that voting or abstaining from voting contrary  to the   said   direction  would  result   in   incurring   the disqualification under Paragraph 2(1)(b), so that the member concerned  has  fore-knowledge of the  consequences  flowing from  his  conduct  in  voting  or  abstaining  from  voting contrary to such a direction.  [775H, 776A-B]      10.1 The purpose of interlocutory orders is to preserve in  status-quo  the  rights of the  parties,  so  that,  the proceedings  do  not become infructuous  by  any  unilateral overt  acts  by one side or the other during  its  pendency. [776G]      10.2. The interlocutory orders in the instant case were necessarily  justified so that, no land-slide  changes  were allowed  to occur rendering the proceedings ineffective  and infructuous.[776H, 777A]      Per VERMA, J. : 1.Under the Constitution of India which delineates  the spheres of jurisdiction of  the  legislature and  the judiciary,the power to construe the meaning of  the provisions in the Constitution and the laws is entrusted  to the judiciary with finality attached to the decision of this Court  inter alia by Article 141 about the true  meaning  of any   enacted  provision,  and  Article  144   obliges   all authorities in the country to act in aid of this Court.   It is, therefore, not permissible in our constitutional  scheme for any other authority to claim that power in  exclusivity, or in supersession of this Court’s verdict.  Whatever be the controversy prior to this Court entertaining such a  matter, it  must  end  when the Court is seized of  the  matter  for pronouncing its verdict and it is the constitutional                                                        704 obligation  of  every  person and authority  to  accept  its binding effect when the decision is rendered by this  Court. [p. 784F-H]      Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257,  291 (1821)  and  State of madras v. V.G. row,  [1952]  SCR  597, referred to.      2.1.  The  finality clause in Para 6(1)  of  the  Tenth Schedule to the Constitution which says that the decision of the Chairman or as the case may be, the speaker of the House shall be final is not decisive.  Such a finality clause   in a  statute  by  itself  is not  sufficient  to  exclude  the jurisdiction  of the High courts under Articles 226 and  227 and the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, the  finality  being for the statute alone.  This  is  apart from the decision being vulnerable on the ground of nullity. Sub-paragraph   (1)alone  is,  therefore,  insufficient   to exclude  the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High  Courts and the plenary jurisdiction of this Court. [788B-C]      2.2.  The ambit of a legal fiction must be confined  to the  limitation implicit in the words used for creating  the fiction  and  it  cannot be given  an  extended  meaning  to include  therein something in addition.   In construing  the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the language of  the Section  by  which  it is created and its  meaning  must  be restricted  by  the  plain words used.  It  cannot  also  be extended by importing another fiction. [788E, 789A]

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    2.3.  The legal fiction in sub-paragraph (2) of para  6 of  the Tenth Schedule serves a limited purpose  and  brings the  proceedings under sub-paragraph (1) thereof within  the ambit of clause (1) of Article 122 or Clause (1) of  Article 212,  and,  therefore, there is no occasion to  enlarge  its scope  by  reading  into it words which are  not  there  and extending  it also to clause (2) of these  Articles.  [788C, 789B]      Commissioner  of  Income-tax  v.  Ajax  Products  Ltd., [1965] 1 SCR 700, referred to.      2.4. A matter falling within the ambit of clause (1) of either  of the two Article 122 or 212 is justiciable on  the ground of illegality or perversity in spite of the  immunity it  enjoys to a challenge on the ground of "irregularity  of procedure". [788E-F]      2.5.  The  decision relating to disqualification  of  a member  does  not  relate to  regulating  procedure  or  the conduct of business of the House                                                      705  provided  for  in clause (2) of Articles 122  and  212  and taking  that  view  would amount to  extending  the  fiction beyond  its language and importing another fiction for  this purpose which is not permissible.  That being so, the matter falls within the ambit of clause (1) only of Article 122 and 212  as  a  result of which it would be  vulnerable  on  the ground   of   illegality  and  perversity   and   therefore, justiciable to that extent. [789C-D]      Spl.  Ref. No. 1 of 1964 (Keshav Singh’s  case)  [1965] 1 SCR 413,      3.1.  The  words in Paragraph 7 of the  Tenth  Schedule with  its non-obstante clause ‘notwithstanding  anything  in this  Constitution’ followed by expression ‘no  court  shall have  any jurisdiction’, are very wide and  ordinarily  mean that  this provision supersedes any other provision  in  the Constitution,  and  leave  no  doubt  that  the  bar  of   - jurisdiction  of  Courts  is  complete  excluding  also  the jurisdiction of the supreme court and the High courts  under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution  respectively. Further, the expression ‘in respect of any matter  connected with the disqualification of a Member of a House under  this Schedule’  is wide   enough  to  include  not   merely   the intermediate   stage   of  the   proceedings   relating   to disqualification but also the final order on the question of disqualification made under paragraph 6. This conclusion  is reinforced  by the finality clause and deeming provision  in para 6 of the Tenth Schedule and by the legislative  history of  the  absence of such a provision excluding  the  Court’s jurisdiction in the earlier two Bills which had lapsed. [pp. 789F-G, 790C, H]      3.2.  Para  7  of  the  Tenth  Schedule is,  therefore, unconstitutional   and   to  that  extent   at   least   the Constitution  does not stand amended in accordance with  the Bill seeking to make the constitutional amendment.                                                  [799E]      4.1.   Distinction   has  to  be  drawn   between   the abridgment  or extinction of a right and restriction of  the remedy  for  enforcement  of  the right.   If  there  is  an abridgment  of extinction of the right which results in  the disappearance of the cause of action which enables  invoking the remedy and in the absence of which there is no  occasion to  make a grievance and invoke the subsisting remedy,  then the change brought about is in the right and not the remedy. On the other hand, if the right remains untouched so that  a grievance based thereon can arise and, therefore, the  cause of   action  subsists,  but  the  remedy  is  curtailed   or

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extinguished so that cause of                                                        706 action cannot be enforced for want of that remedy, then the change  made  is  in the remedy and not  in  the  subsisting rights. [793A-C]      Sri sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India &  State of  Bihar,  [1952]  SCR  89 and Sajjan  Singh  v.  State  of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 SCR 933, explained      4.2. The instant case in unequivocal terms, is that  of destroying  the  remedy  by enacting para  7  of  the  Tenth Schedule  making  a  total  exclusion  of  judicial   review including  that by the Supreme Court under Article  136  and the   High  Courts  under  Articles  226  and  227  of   the Constitution.   But for para 7 which deals with  the  remedy and  not  the right, the jurisdiction of the  Supreme  Court under Article 136 and that of the High Courts under  Article 226  and  227  would  remain  unimpaired  to  challenge  the decision under para 6, as in the case of decisions  relating to  other  disqualification  specified  in  clause  (1)   of Articles  102  and 191, which remedy continues  to  subsist. [793D-F]      4.3.  The  extinction  of  the  remedy  alone   without curtailing the right, since the question of disqualification of  a  member  on the ground of defection  under  the  Tenth Schedule  does require adjudication on  enacted  principles, results  in making a change in Article 136 in Chapter IV  in Part  V and Articles 226 and 227 in Chapter V in Part VI  of the Constitution.                  [793F]      4.4.  The Constitution (Fifty-Second  Amendment)  Bill, therefore, attracted the proviso to Article 368(2) requiring ratification  by the specified number of State  legislatures before  its  presentation to the President for  his  assent. [793G]      5.1  The proviso to Article 368(2) of the  Constitution contains a constitutional limitation on the amending  power; and  prescribes  as a part of the special  procedure,  prior assent of the State Legislatures before presentation of  the Bill  to  the President for his assent in the  case  of  the relevant  Bills.   This  is a condition  interposed  by  the proviso in between the passing of the Bill by the  requisite majority  in each House and presentation of the Bill to  the President  for  the  assent, which  assent  results  in  the Constitution  automatically standing amended  in  accordance with  the  terms  of the Bill.  The Bills  governed  by  the proviso, therefore, cannot be presented to the President for his  assent without the prior ratification by the  specified number of State legislatures. [795C-E]                                                        707      5.2.  The  consequence  of  the  Constitution  standing amended  in accordance with the terms of the Bill on  assent by  the President, which is the substantive part of  Article 368,  results only when the Bill has been presented  to  the President  for  his assent in conformity  with  the  special procedure  after  performance of the  conditions  precedent, namely,  passing of the Bill by each House by the  requisite majority in the case of all Bills; and in the case of  Bills governed by the proviso, after the Bill  has been passed  by the  requisite majority in each House and it has  also  been ratified by the legislature by not less than one-half of the States.  Non-compliance of the special procedure  prescribed in  Article  368(2)  cannot bring about the  result  of  the Constitution  standing amended in accordance with the  terms of the Bill. [795F-G, H,796A]      Kesavananda  Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973]  Supp.1

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SCR, relied on.      5.3. The ordinary role of a proviso is to carve out  an exception from the general rule in the main enacting part. A Bill  falling within the ambit of the proviso to  cl.(2)  of Article  368 is carved out of the main enactment  in  clause (2) as an exception on account of which it cannot result  in amendment  of  the constitution on  the  President’s  assent without prior ratification by the specified number of  State legislature. [797G-H, 798A-B]      5.4.  The entire Tenth Schedule is enacted in  exercise of the constituent power under Article 368, not merely  para 7  therein,  and this has been done  without  following  the mandatory  special procedure prescribed.  It is,  therefore, the  entire Constitution (Fifty Second) Amendment  Bill  and not merely para 7 of the Tenth Schedule which required prior ratification  by  the  State  of  legislatures  before   its presentation  to  the President for his assent, it  being  a joint exercise by the parliament and the State Legislatures. The  stage of presentation of the Bill to the President  for his  assent not having reached, the President’s  assent  was non  est  and  it  could not  result  in  amendment  of  the Constitution  in accordance with the terms of the Bill.   It is not a case of severing the invalid constituent part  from the remaining ordinary legislation. [799G-H, 800A; 802C]      6.1.  The  doctrine of severability applies in  a  case where  an otherwise validly enacted legislation  contains  a provision  suffering  from a defect of lack  of  legislative competence  and the invalid provision is  severable  leaving the  remaining  valid  provisions  a  viable  whole.    this doctrine  has  no application where the legislation  is  not validly enacted due to non-compliance                                                        708 of the mandatory legislative procedure such as the mandatory special procedure prescribed for exercise of the constituent power.   The  doctrine  does  not  apply  to  a  still  born legislation.   It is not possible to infuse life in a  still born  by any miracle and deft surgery even though it may  be possible  to  continue  life  by  removing  a   congenitally defective part by surgical skill.                                        [800D-E]      The Bribery Commissioner v. Pedrick Ranasinghe,  [1965] AC 172, referred to.      6.2.  Severance of para 7 of the Tenth  Schedule  could not  be  made  for  the  purpose  of  ratification  or   the President’s assent and, therefore, not such severance can be made even for the ensuing result.  If the President’s assent cannot validate para 7 in the absence of prior ratification, the  same  assent  cannot  be  accepted  to  bring  about  a different  result with regard to the remaining part  of  the Bill. [800A-B]      7. The test whether the enactment would have been  made without para 7 indicates that the legislative intent was  to make the enactment only with para 7 therein and not  without it,  otherwise the enactment did not require the  discipline of Article 368and exercise of the constituent power and mode of  ordinary  legislation  could have been  resorted  to  in accordance with sub-clause (e) of clause (1) of Article  102 and 191, which would render the decision on the question  of disqualification on the ground of defection also amenable to judicial  review  as in the case of  decision  on  questions relating to other disqualification. [802F-H, 803A]      R.M.D.  Chamarbaughwalla v. The Union of India,  [1957] SCR 930, relied on.      8.1. Democracy is a part of the basic structure of  our Constitution,  and rule of law; and free and fair  elections

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are  basic features of democracy, One of the  postulates  of free  and  fair  elections is provision  for  resolution  of election disputes as also adjudication of disputes  relating to subsequent disqualifications by an independent authority. It is only by a fair adjudication of such disputes  relating to validity of elections and subsequent disqualifications of members  that true reflection of the electoral  mandate  and governance  by  rule of law essential for democracy  can  be ensured.                                                     [803E-G]                                                       709      8.2.   In  the  democratic  pattern  adopted   by   our Constitution, not only the resolution of election dispute is entrusted  to a judicial tribunal, but even the decision  on questions  as to disqualification of members under  Articles 103  and  192 is contemplated by  an  independent  authority outside the house, namely, President/Governor in  accordance with  the opinion of the Election commission,, all  of  whom are  high  constitutional  functionaries  with  security  of tenure, independent of the will of the House.                                              [803G-H, 804A]      8.3.  Sub-clause (e) of clause (1) in Articles 102  and 191 which provide for enactment of any law by the Parliament to prescribe any disqualification other than those prescribed in the earlier sub-clauses of clause (1), clearly  indicates that  all  disqualifications of  Members  were  contemplated within   the   scope   of  Articles  102   and   191.    All disqualification including disqualification on the ground of defection,  in  our constitutional scheme,  are,  therefore, different    species    of   the   same    genus,    namely, disqualification,  and  the constitutional scheme  does  not contemplate  any  difference  in  their  basic  traits   and treatment;  and were meant to be decided by  an  independent authority outside the House such as the  President/Governor, in   accordance   with  the  opinion  of   another   similar independent   constitutional   functionary,   the   Election commission of India, who enjoys the security of tenure of  a Supreme  Court Judge with the same terms and  conditions  of office. [804B-E]      8.4.  The Speaker’s office is undoubtedly high and  has considerable aura with the attribute of impartiality.   This aura  of the office was even greater when  the  Constitution was  framed  and yet the framed and yet the farmers  of  the Constitution  did  not  choose  to  vest  the  authority  of adjudicating  disputes as to disqualification of Members  to the  Speaker; and provision was made in Article 103 and  192 for  decision  of  disputes  by  the  President/Governor  in accordance with the opinion of the Election commission.   In the  Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is made not only  the  sole but the final arbiter of such dispute with no provision  for any appeal or revision against the Speaker’s decision to any independent outside authority.  This departure in the  Tenth Schedule is a reverse trend and violates a basic feature  of the Constitution.[804-G, 805E]      8.5.  The Speaker being an authority within  the  House and  his  tenure  being dependent on the  will  of  majority therein, likelihood of suspicion of                                                        710 bias   could  not  be  ruled  out.   The  question   as   to disqualification  of a member has  adjudicatory  disposition and,  therefore,  requires the decision to  be  rendered  in consonance with the scheme for adjudication of disputes Rule of  law  has  in it firmly entrenched  natural  justice,  of which,  Rule  against Bias is a necessary  concomitant;  and basic  postulates of Rule against Bias are : Nemo  judex  in

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cause  sua - ‘A Judge is disqualified from  determining  any case  in which he may be,or may fairly be suspected  to  be, biased’;  and ‘it is of fundamental importance that  justice should   not  only  be  done  but  should   manifestly   and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.                                              [804H, 805A-B]      8.6.  It  is  the Vice-President of India  who  is  ex- officio  Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and his position  being akin  to that of the President of India, is  different  from that  of  the  Speaker.  The observations  relating  to  the office  of the speaker do not apply to the chairman  of  the Rajya Sabha, that is the Vice-President of India. [805F-G]      8.7.  Since  the  conferment of  authority  is  on  the Speaker and the provision being unworkable for the Lok sabha and  the  State  Legislatures,  cannot  be  sustained,  even without  para  7,  the entire  Tenth  Schedule  is  rendered invalid  in the absence of any valid authority for  decision of  the  dispute notwithstanding the fact that  this  defect would  not apply to the Rajya sabha alone whose Chairman  is the  Vice-President  of India.  The statutory  exception  of doctrine  of necessity has no application since  designation of  authority in the Tenth Schedule is made by choice  while enacting  the  legislation  instead of  adopting  the  other available options. [805H, 806A-B]

&      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Transfer Petition (Civil)  No.40 of 1991.      (Under Article 139 A(1) of the Constitution of India).                               WITH      Writ Petition (Civil) No. 17 of 1991.      Soli J. Sorabjee, Vijay Hansaria and Sunil Kr. Jain for the Petitioner      Ejaz Maqbool and Markand D. Adkar for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                                       711         (OPERATIVE CONCLUSIONS IN THE MAJORITY OPINION)   [Per VENKATACHALIAH, K, JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND AGRAWAL, JJ.].      1.  The  Writ  Petitions,  Transfer  Petitions,   Civil Appeals, Special Leave Petitions and other connected matters raising  common questions as to the constitutional  validity of the constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, in so far as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of  India,  were  heard together.   Some  of  these  matters involve   investigation   and   determination   of   factual controversies and of the extent of applicability to them  of the  conclusions  reached  on  the  various   constitutional issues.   That exercise shall have to be undertaken  in  the individual cases separately.      The  present  judgment is pronounced  in  the  Transfer Petition  No.  40 of 1991 seeking the transfer of  the  Writ Petition, Rule No. 2421/90 on the file of the High Court  of Guwahati to this Court.      2.  The Transfer Petition is allowed and the  aforesaid Writ Petition is withdrawn to this Court for the purpose  of deciding the constitutional issues and of declaring the  law on the matter.      3.  For  the  reasons to be set  out  in  the  detailed judgment   to  follow,  the  following  are  the   operative conclusions   in  the  majority  opinion  on   the   various constitutional issues:          (A)  That  having  regard to  the  background  and          evolution   of   the  principles   underlying   the

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        Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, in so  far          as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in  the          Constitution of India, the provisions of  Paragraph          7  of  the Tenth Schedule of  the  Constitution  in          terms   and in effect bring about a change  in  the          operation  and effect of Articles 136, 226 and  227          of  the Constitution of India  and, therefore,  the          amendment   would   require  to  be   ratified   in          accordance  with the proviso to sub-Article (2)  of          Article 368 of the Constitution of India.           (B)  That there is nothing in the said proviso  to          Article   368   (2)   which   detracts   from   the          severability  of  a  provision on  account  of  the          inclusion   of  which  the  Bill   containing   the          Amendment  requires ratification from the  rest  of          the provisions of such Bill                                                       712           Which   do   not   attract   and   require    such          ratification.   Having  regard  to  the   mandatory          language  of  Article 368 (2) that  "thereupon  the          constitution shall stand amended" the operation  of          the    proviso   should   not   be   extended    to          constitutional amendments in a Bill which can stand          by themselves without such ratification.          (C)   That  accordingly,  the  Constitution   (52nd          Amendment)  Act,  1985, in so far as  it  seeks  to          introduce the Tenth Schedule in the constitution of          India,  to the extent of its provisions  which  are          amenable  to  the legal-sovereign of  the  amending          process of the union Parliament cannot be overborne          by  the proviso which cannot operate in that  area.          There  is no justification for the view  that  even          the  rest  of the provisions  of  the  constitution          (52nd  Amendment) Act, 1985, excluding Paragraph  7          of  the  Tenth  Schedule  become   constitutionally          infirm by reason alone of the fact that one of  its          severable  provisions which attracted and  required          ratification  under the proviso to Article 368  (2)          was not so ratified.          (D) That Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule contains          a  provision  which is independent of,  and  stands          apart  from,  the  main  provisions  of  the  Tenth          Schedule which are intended to provide a remedy for          the  evil of unprincipled and  unethical  political          defections  and,  therefore, is a  severable  part.          The remaining provisions of the Tenth Schedule  can          and  do stand independently of Paragraph 7 and  are          complete   in  themselves  workable  and  are   not          truncated by the excision of Paragraph 7.           (E) That the Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule  to          the  Constitution is valid.  Its provisions do  not          suffer  from  the  vice  of  subverting  democratic          rights  of  elected Members of Parliament  and  the          Legislatures  of the States.  It  does not  violate          their  freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  vote  and          conscience as contended.          The  provisions  of Paragraph 2 do  not  violet any          rights or freedom  under Article 105 and 194 of the          Constitution.          The  provisions  are salutory and are  intended  to          strengthen the                                                       713           fabric   of  Indian  parliamentary  democracy   by          curbing  unprincipled   and   unethical   political          defections.

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        (F) The contention that the provisions of the Tenth          Schedule,  even with the exclusion of Paragraph  7,          violate the basic structure of the Constitution  in          that  they affect the democratic rights of  elected          members  and,  therefore,  of  the  principles   of          Parliamentary democracy is unsound and is rejected.          (G) The Speakers, Chairmen while exercising  powers          and discharging functions under the Tenth  Schedule          act  as Tribunal adjucating rights and  obligations          under  the  Tenth Schedule and their  decisions  in          that capacity are amenable to judicial review.          However, having regard to the Constitutional Scheme          in  the Tenth Schedule, judicial review should  not          cover  any stage prior to the making of a  decision          by  the  speakers/Chairmen.  Having regard  to  the          Constitutional  intendment  and the status  of  the          repository of the adjudicatory power, no quia timet          actions are permissible, the only exception for any          interlocutory    interference   being   cases    of          interlocutory   disqualifications  or   suspensions          which  may have grave, immediate  and  irreversible          repercussions and consequence.           (H) That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule,  to          the  extent  it  seeks to impart  finality  to  the          decision  of the Speakers/Chairmen is  valid.   But          the  concept  of  statutory  finality  embodied  in          Paragraph  6 (1) does not detract from or  abrogate          judicial  review under Articles 136,226 and 227  of          the Constitution in so far as infirmities based  on          violations of constitutional mandates, mala  fides,          non-compliance  with Rules of Natural  Justice  and          perversity, are concerned.          (I)  That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6  (2)          of   the  Tenth  Schedule  attracts   an   immunity          analogous  to that in Articles 122 (1) and 212  (1)          of the Constitution as understood and explained  in          Keshav singh’s Case (Spl. Ref., No. 1, [1965] 1 SCR          413)  to protect the validity of  proceedings  from          mere  irregularities  of  procedure.   The  deeming          provision, having regard to the words "be deemed to          be proceedings in Parliament" or "proceedings                                                       714           in the Legislature of a State" confines the  scope          of the fiction accordingly.           (J)  That  contention  that  the  investiture   of          adjudicatory  functions  in  the  Speakers/Chairmen          would by itself vitiate the provision on the ground          of  likelihood of political bias is unsound and  is          rejected.   The  Speakers/Chairmen hold  a  pivotal          position  in the scheme of Parliamentary  democracy          and  are guardians of the rights and privileges  of          the  House.  They are expected to and do  take  far          reaching   decisions   in   the   functioning    of          Parliamentary  democracy.   Vestiture of  power  to          adjudicate  questions under the Tenth  Schedule  in          such  a constitutional functionaries should not  be          considered exceptionable.           (K)  In  the  view  we take  of  the  validity  of          Paragraph  7 it is unnecessary to pronounce on  the          contention   that  judicial  review  is   a   basic          structure  of the Constitution and Paragraph  7  of          the Tenth Schedule violates such basic structure .      The  factual controversies raised in the Writ  Petition will, however, have to be decided by the High Court applying the principles declared and laid down by this judgment.  The

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Writ  Petition is, accordingly,, remitted to the High  Court for such disposal in accordance with law.      (Operative conclusions in the minority opinion)      [Per SHARMA AND VERMA, JJ.]      For  the reasons to be given  in our detailed  judgment to follow, our operative conclusions in the minority opinion on the various constitutional issues are as follows:      1.  Para 7 of the Tenth Schedule,in clear terms and  in effect  excludes the jurisdiction of all  courts,  including the  Supreme  Court under Article 136 and  the  High  Courts under Articles 226 and 227 to entertain any challenge to the decision  under para 6 on any ground even of  illegality  or perveristy, not only at an interim stage but also after  the final  decision on the question of disqualification  on  the ground of defection.      2.  Para 7 of the Tenth Schedule, therefore,  in  terms and in effect,                                                      715  makes a change in Article 136 in Chapter IV of Part V;  and Articles  226  and  227  in Chapter V  of  Part  VI  of  the Constitution,  attracting  the  proviso  to  clause  (2)  of Article 368.      3.  In  view  of para 7 in the Bill  resulting  in  the Constitution  (Fifty-Second  Amendment)  Act,  1985  it  was required to be ratified by the Legislature of not less  than one-half  of the States as a condition precedent before  the Bill  could  be presented to the President  for  assent,  in accordance  with the mandatory special procedure  prescribed in the Proviso to clause (2) of Article 368 for exercise  of the   constituent  power.   Without  ratification   by   the specified  number  of  State  Legislatures,  the  stage  for presenting  the  Bill for assent of the  President  did  not reach  and, therefore, the so-called assent of the President was non est and did not result in the Constitution  standing amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill.      4.  In  the  absence of ratification by  the  specified          number of State Legislatures before presentation of          the  Bill  to  the President for  his  assent,   as          required  by the Proviso to clause (2)  of  Article          368,  it  is  not merely para  7  but,  the  entire          Constitution  (Fifty-Second  Amendment)  Act,  1985          which  is  rendered  unconstitutional,  since   the          constituent  power was not exercised as  prescribed          in Article 368, and therefore, the Constitution did          not  stand amended in accordance with the terms  of          the Bill providing for the amendment.      5. Doctrine of Severability cannot be applied to a Bill making  a  constitutional amendment where any  part  thereof attracts the Proviso to clause (2) of Article 368.      6. Doctrine of Severability is not applicable to permit striking  down para 7 alone saving the remaining  provisions of  the  Bill  making the Constitutional  Amendment  on  the ground that para 7 alone attracts the proviso to clause  (2) of Article 368.      7.  Even otherwise, having regard to the provisions  of the  Tenth  Schedule  of the Constitution  inserted  by  the Constitution   (Fifty_Second  Amendment)  Act,   1985,   the Doctrine of Severability does not apply to it.      8.Democracy  is  a part of the basic structure  of  the Constitution and free and fair elections with provision  for resolution of disputes relating to                                                       716 the  same  as  also for adjudication of  those  relating  to subsequent  disqualification by an independent body  outside the  House are essential features of the democratic   system

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in   our   Constitution.    Accordingly,   an    independent adjudicatory  machinery for resolving disputes  relating  to the  competence  of Member of the House is envisaged  as  an attribute of this basic feature.  The tenure of the  Speaker who  is the authority in the Tenth Schedule to  decide  this dispute  is  dependent  on the  continuous  support  of  the majority in the House and, therefore,, he (the Speaker) does not   satisfy  the  requirement  of  such   an   independent adjudicatory  authority; and his choice as the sole  arbiter in  the matter violates an essential attribute of the  basic feature.      9. Consequently, the entire constitution  (Fifty-Second Amendment)  Act,  1985  which inserted  the  Tenth  Schedule together  with clause (2) in Articles 102 and 191,  must  be declared unconstitutional or an abortive attempt to so amend the constitution.      10.  It  follows  that all decisions  rendered  by  the several  Speakers  under  the Tenth Schedule  must  also  be declared nullity and liable to be ignored.      11. On  the  above  conclusions,  it  does  not  appear necessary  or appropriate to decide the  remaining  question urged.                              ORDER      The Transfer Petition is allowed and the Writ Petition, Rule  No.  2421  of 1990 on the file of the  High  Court  of Guwahati  is  withdrawn  to this Court for  the  purpose  of deciding the constitutional issues and of declaring the  law on the matter.      In  accordance with the majority opinion,  the  factual controversies  raised  in the Writ Petition  will,  however, have to be decided by the High Court Applying the principles declared  and laid down by the majority.  The Writ  Petition is, accordingly remitted to the High Court for such disposal in accordance with law.      VENKATACHALIAH,    J.    In   these    petitions    the constitutional  validity  of  the  Tenth  Schedule  of   the Constitution  introduced by the  Constitution  (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act. 1985, is assailed.  These two cases were                                                       717 amongst a batch of Writ Petitions, Transfer Petitions, civil Appeals,  Special  Leave  Petitions and  other  similar  and connected  matters raising common questions which  were  all heard together.  On 12.11.1991 we made an order  pronouncing our  findings and conclusions upholding  the  constitutional validity of the amendment and of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, except for Paragraph 7 which was declared  invalid for want of ratification in terms of and as required by  the proviso  to  Article 368 (2) of the  Constitution.   In  the order  dated 12.11.1991 our conclusions were set out and  we indicated that the reasons for the conclusions would  follow later.  The reasons for the conclusions are now set out.      2.  This order is made in Transfer Petition No.  40  of 1991 and in Writ Petition No. 17 of 1991.  We have not  gone into  the factual controversies raised in the  Writ-Petition before  the Writ-Petition before the Guwahati High Court  in Rule No.2421 of 1990 from which Transfer Petition No. 40  of 1991  arises.  Indeed, in the order of 12th  November,  1991 itself the said Writ Petition was remitted to the High Court for its disposal in accordance with law.      3.  Shri F.S. Nariman, Shri Shanti Bhushan,  Shri  M.C. Bhandare, Shri Kapil Sibal, Shri Sharma and shri Bhim Singh, learned  counsel  addressed  arguments  in  support  of  the petitions.    Learned   Attorney-General,   Shri   Soli   J. Sorabjee,Shri  R.K.  Garg,Shri  Santhosh  Hegde  sought   to support the constitutional validity of the amendment.   Shri

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Ram  Jethmalani has attacked the validity of  the  amendment for the same reasons as put forward by Shri Sharma.      4.  Before  we proceed to record our  reasons  for  the conclusions reached in our order dated 12th November,  1991, on  the  contentions raised and argued, it is  necessary  to have  a brief look at the provisions of the Tenth  Schedule. The  Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to  the  Bill which   was  adopted  as  the   Constitution   (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985 says:           "The  evil  of  political defections  has  been  a          matter of national concern.  If it is not combated,          it  is likely to undermine the very  foundation  of          our democracy and the principles which sustain  it.          With  this  object, an assurance was given  in  the          Address  by  the President to Parliament  that  the          Government  intended  to introduce in  the  current          session of Parliament an anti-defection                                                       718  Bill.   This  Bill  is meant for  outlawing  defection  and fulfilling the above assurance."      On  December  8,  1967, the Lok  sabha  had  passed  an unanimous Resolution in terms following:          "a     high-level    Committee    consisting     of          representatives    of   political    parties    and          constitutional  experts  be set up  immediately  by          Government  to consider the problem of  legislators          changing their allegiance from one party to another          and their frequent crossing of the floor in all its          aspects and make recommendations in this regard."      The   said  Committee  known  as  the   "Committee   on Defections" in its report dated January 7, 1969, inter-alia, observed:           "Following  the  Fourth General Election,  in  the          short period between March 1967 and February, 1968,          the  Indian  political scene was  characterised  by          numerous instances of change of party allegiance by          legislators in several States.  Compared to roughly          542  cases in the entire period between  the  First          and   Fourth   General  Election,  at   least   438          defections  occurred  in  these  12  months  alone.          Among  Independents,  157 out of  a  total  of  376          elected  joined  various parties  in  this  period.          That  the lure of office played a dominant part  in          decisions of legislators to defect was obvious from          the  fact that out of 210 defecting legislators  of          the  States  of  Bihar,  Haryana,  Madhya  Pradesh,          Punjab,  Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh and  West  Bengal,          116 were included in the Council of Ministers which          they helped to bring into being by defections.  The          other disturbing features of this phenomenon  were:          multiple acts of defections by the same persons  or          set  of  persons (Haryana affording  a  conspicuous          example); few resignations of the membership of the          legislature    of   explanations   by    individual          defectors, indifference on the part of defectors to          political proprieties, constituency preference   or          public  opinion; and the belief held by the  people          and  expressed  in the press  that  corruption  and          bribery were behind some of these defections".                                         (emphasis supplied)                                                    719      The Committee on Defections recommended that a defector should  be  debarred for a period of one year or  till  such time as he resigned his seat and got himself re-elected from appointment  to  the office of a Minister  including  Deputy

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Minister or Speaker or Deputy Speaker, or any post  carrying salaries or allowances to be paid from the Consolidated Fund of  India  or of the State or from the funds  of  Government Undertakings in public sector in addition to those to  which the defector might be entitled as legislator.  The Committee on Defections could not however, reach an agreed  conclusion in the matter of disqualifying a defector from continuing to be a Member of Parliament/State Legislator.      Keeping in view the recommendations of the committee on Defections,   the  Constitution  (Thirty-Second   Amendment) Bill,, 1973 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on May 16, 1973. It provided for disqualifying a Member from continuing as  a Member   of  either  House  of  Parliament  or   the   State Legislature  on his voluntarily giving up his membership  of the political party by which he was set up as a candidate at such  election  or of which he became a  Member  after  such election, or on his voting or abstaining from voting in such House  contrary  to any direction issued by  such  political party or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf  without  obtaining prior permission of  such  party, person  or  authority.  The said Bill,  however,  lapsed  on account  of  dissolution  of  the  House.   Thereafter,  the Constitution   (Forty-eight   Amendment)  Bill,   1979   was introduced  in  the Lok Sabha which also  contained  similar provisions  for disqualification on the ground of defection. This Bill also lapsed and it was followed by the Bill  which was  enacted into the Constitution (Fifty Second  Amendment) Act, 1985.      5.  This brings to the fore the object  underlying  the provisions in the Tenth Schedule.  The object is to curb the evil of political defections motivated by lure of office  or other similar considerations which endanger the  foundations of our democracy.  The remedy proposed is to disqualify  the Member  of  either  House  of Parliament  or  of  the  State Legislature who is found to have defected from continuing as a Member of the House.  The grounds of disqualification  are specified in Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule.      Paragraph  2(1)  relates  to  a  Member  of  the  House belonging  to a political party by which he was set up as  a candidate at the election.  Under                                                        720 Paragraph    2(1)   (a)   such   a   Member   would    incur disqualification  if he voluntarily gives up his  membership of  such political party.  Under clause (b) he  would  incur the disqualification if he votes or abstains from voting  in the  House  contrary  to  "any  direction"  issued  by   the political  party  to which he belongs or by  any  person  or authority authorised by it in this behalf without obtaining, in  either case, prior permission of such  political  party, person  or authourity and such voting or abstention has  not been  condoned by such political party, person or  authority within  fifteen  days  from  the  date  of  such  voting  or abstention.   This sub para would also apply to a  nominated member  who is a Member of a political party on the date  of his nomination as such Member or who joins a political party within six months of his taking oath.      Paragraph  2(2)  deals  with  a  Member  who  has  been elected  otherwise  than  as  a  candidate  set  up  by  any political  party and would incur the disqualification if  he joins any political party after such election.  A  nominated Member  of the House would incur his disqualification  under sub  para  (3)  if he joins any political  party  after  the expiry  of  six months from the date on which he  takes  his seat.      6.  Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Tenth  Schedule,  however,

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exclude   the   applicability   of   the   provisions    for disqualification  under  para  2  in  cases  of  "split"  in the original political  party  or  merger  of  the  original political party with another political party.      These provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition to  the role of political parties in the political  process. A  political  party  goes  before  the  electorate  with   a particular  programme  and  it sets  up  candidates  at  the election on the basis of such programme.  A person who  gets elected  as  a candidate set up by a political party  is  so elected  on  the basis of the programme  of  that  political party.  The provisions of Paragraph 2(1) (a) proceed on  the premise that political propriety and morality demand that if such  a person, after the election, changes his  affiliation and  leaves  and political party which had set him up  as  a candidate  at  the  election,  then he should  give  up  his Membership  of  the  legislature  and  go  back  before  the electorate.  The same yard stick is applied to a person  who is elected as an Independent candidate and wishes to join  a political party after the election.      Paragraph  2  (1) (b) deals with a  slightly  different situation  i.e. a variant where dissent  becomes  defection. If a Member while remaining a                                                       721 Member  of  the political party which had set him  up  as  a candidate  at  the election, votes or abstains  from  voting contrary to "any direction" issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf he incurs the disqualification.  In  other words, it deals with a Member who expresses his dissent from the  stand  of the political party to which  he  belongs  by voting  or abstaining from voting in the House  contrary  to the direction issued by the political party.      Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule reads:          "6  (1)  If  any question arises as  to  whether  a          Member   of   a  House  has   become   subject   to          disqualification  under this Schedule the  question          shall be referred for the decision of the  Chairman          or,  as the case may be, the Speaker of such  House          and his decision shall be final:          Provided  that where the question which has  arisen          is  as to whether the Chairman or the Speaker of  a          House has become subject to such  disqualification,          the question shall be referred for the decision  of          such Member of the House as the House may elect  in          this behalf and his decision shall be final.          (2) All proceedings under sub-Paragraph (1) of this          Paragraph  in  relation  to  any  question  as   to          disqualification of a Member of a House under  this          Schedule  shall  be  deemed to  be  proceedings  in          Parliament  within  the  meaning of Article 122 or,          as the case may be, proceedings in the  Legislature          of a State within the meaning of Article 212."      Paragraph 7 says:          "7. Bar of jurisdiction of courts:  Notwithstanding          anything in this Constitution, no court shall  have          any jurisdiction in respect of any matter connected          with  the disqualification of a Member of  a  House          under this Schedule."      7. The challenge to the constitutional validity of  the Amendment  which introduces the Tenth Schedule is sought  to be  sustained  of  many  grounds.   It  is  urged  that  the constitutional  Amendment  introducing Paragraph  7  of  the Tenth  Schedule,  in terms and in effect, seeks  to  make  a change  in Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution in  that

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it denudes the jurisdiction of the                                                        722 Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and  in  Chapter  V of part VI in that  it  takes  away  the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and  that, therefore, the legislative Bill, before presentation to  the President  for assent, would require to be ratified  by  the Legislature  of  not  less than one half of  the  States  by resolution to that effect.  In view of the admitted position that  no such ratification was obtained for the Bill, it  is contended,  the whole Amending Bill-not merely Paragraph  7- fails  and the amendment merely remains an abortive  attempt to  bring about an amendment.  It is further contended  that the  very  concept  of  disqualification  for  defection  is violative   of   the  fundamental  values   and   principles underlying  Parliamentary democracy and violates an  elected representative’s  freedom  of speech, right to  dissent  and freedom of conscience and is, therefore, unconstitutional as destructive  of a basic feature of the Indian  Constitution. It is also urged that the investiture in the Speaker or  the Chairman  of  the power to  adjudicate  disputed  defections would violate an important incident of another basic feature of  the Constitution, viz., Parliamentary democracy.  It  is contended that an independent, fair and impartial  machinery for  resolution  of electoral disputes is an  essential  and important incident of democracy and that the vesting of  the power of adjudication in the Speaker or the Chairman-who, in the  India  Parliamentary system are nominees  of  political parties   and  are  not  obliged  to  resign   their   party affiliations    after   election-is   violative   of    this requirement. It is alternatively contended that if it is to be held  that the  amendment  does  not attract  the  proviso  to  Article 368(2),  then  Paragraph 7 in so far as it  takes  away  the power  of judicial review, which, in itself, is one  of  the basic  features of the Constitution is liable to  be  struck down.      8.  There  are certain other contentions which, upon  a closer  examination, raise issues more of construction  than constitutionality.    For  instance,  some  arguments   were expanded on the exact connotations of a "split" as  distinct from a "defection" within the meaning of Paragraph 3.   Then again, it was urged that under Paragraph 2(b) the expression "any direction" is so wide that even a direction,, which  if given  effect to and implemented might bring about a  result which   may  itself  be  obnoxious  to  and   violative   of constitutional  ideals  and  values would  be  a  source  of disqualification   .    These  are,,  indeed,   matters   of construction  as  to  how,,  in the  context  in  which  the occasion  for the introduction of the Tenth  Schedule  arose and the high purpose it is intended to serve, the expression "any direction" occurring in Paragraph                                                        723 2(b)  is to be understood.  Indeed, in one of the  decisions cited  before  us (Prakash Singh Badal & Ors.  v.  Union  of India  & Ors., AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 263) this  aspect has  been  considered by the High Court.  The  decision  was relied upon before us.  We shall examine it presently.      9.  Supporting the constitutionality of the  Amendment, respondents  urge  that the Tenth Schedule  creates  a  non- justiciable constitutional area dealing with certain complex political   issues  which  have  no   strict    adjudicatory disposition.  New rights and obligations are created for the first   time   uno-flatu  by  the   Constitution   and   the Constitution itself has envisaged a distinct  constitutional

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machinery  for  the  resolution of  those  disputes.   These rights, obligations and remedies, it is urged, which are  in their  very nature and innate complexities are in  political thickets and are not amenable to judicial processes and  the Tenth Schedule has merely recognised this complex  character of  the  issues  and  that the exclusion  of  this  area  is constitutionally  preserved by imparting a finality  to  the decisions of the Speaker or the Chairman and by deeming  the whole proceedings as proceedings within Parliament or within the House of Legislature of the States envisaged in Articles 122   and  212,  respectively,  and  further  by   expressly excluding the Courts’ jurisdiction under Paragraph 7.      Indeed,  in  constitutional  and legal  theory,  it  is urged,, there is really no ouster of jurisdiction of  Courts or  of Judicial Review as the subject-matter itself  by  its inherent  character and complexities is not amenable to  but outside  judicial power and that the ouster of  jurisdiction under  Paragraph 7 is merely a consequential  constitutional recognition of the non-amenability of the subject-matter  to the  judicial power of the State, the corollary of which  is that  the  Speaker  or the Chairman,, as the  case  may  be, exercising powers under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule function  not as a statutory Tribunal but as a part  of  the State’s Legislative Department.      It is, therefore, urged that no question of the  ouster of jurisdiction of Courts would at all arise inasmuch as  in the  first place, having regard to the political  nature  of the  issues,  the subject-matter is itself not  amenable  to judicial  power.  It is urged that the question in the  last analyses  pertains to the constitution of the House and  the Legislature is entitled to deal with it exclusively.      10.  It is further urged that Judicial Review  -  apart from Judicial Review of the legislation as inherent under  a written constitution -is                                                        724 merely a branch of administrative law remedies and is by  no means  a  basic  feature  of  the  Constitution  and   that, therefore,  Paragraph  7, being a  constitutional  provision cannot be invalidated on some general doctrine not found  in the Constitution itself.      11. On the contentions raised and urged at the  hearing the questions that fall for consideration are the following:          (A) The Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment)  Act,          1985, in so far as  it seeks to introduce the Tenth          Schedule  is destructive of the basic structure  of          the   constitution  as  it  is  violative  of   the          fundamental principles of Parliamentary  democracy,          a basic feature of the Indian constitutionalism and          is  destructive of the freedom of speech, right  to          dissent and freedom of conscience as the provisions          of   the  Tenth  Schedule  seek  to  penalise   and          disqualify elected representatives for the exercise          of these rights and freedoms which are essential to          the  sustenance  of  the  system  of  Parliamentary          democracy.           (B) Having regard to  the legislative history  and          evolution  of the principles underlying  the  Tenth          Schedule,  Paragraph  7  thereof in  terms  and  in          effect, brings about a change in the operation  and          effect  of  Article  136,,  226  and  227  of   the          Constitution  of  India and,  therefore,  the  Bill          introducing  the amendment attracts the proviso  to          Article  368(2)  of  the  constitution  and   would          require  to be ratified by the legislative  of  the          States   before   the   Bill   is   presented   for

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        Presidential assent.           (C)  In view of the admitted  non-compliance  with          proviso  to Article 368(2) not only Paragraph 7  of          the  Tenth  Schedule,  but  also  the  entire  Bill          resulting   in   the   Constitution   (Fifty-Second          Amendment)  Act,  1985,  stands  vitiated  and  the          purported amendment is abortive and does not in law          bring about a valid amendment.           Or  whether,  the effect  of  such  non-compliance          invalidates   Paragraph  7  alone  and  the   other          provisions which, by themselves, do not attract the          proviso do not become invalid.           (D)  That even if the effect of  non-ratification          by the legislature                                                        725           of the States is to invalidate Paragraph 7  alone,          the  whole  of the Tenth Schedule  fails  for  non-          severability.  Doctrine of severability, as applied          to    ordinary    statutes   to    promote    their          constitutionality,      is     inapplicable      to          constitutional Amendments.           Even  otherwise,  having  regard  to   legislative          intent and scheme of the Tenth Schedule, the  other          provisions   of  the  Tenth  Schedule,  after   the          severance  and  excision  of  Paragraph  7,  become          truncated,  and  unworkable and  cannot  stand  and          operate  independently.  The Legislature would  not          have enacted the Tenth Schedule without Paragraph 7          which forms its heart and core.           (E)  That the deeming provision in Paragraph  6(2)          of  the Tenth Schedule attracts the immunity  under          Articles 122 and 212.  The Speaker and the Chairman          in relation to the exercise of the powers under the          Tenth  Schedule  shall  not  be  subjected  to  the          jurisdiction of any Court.           The Tenth Schedule seeks to and does create a  new          and non-justiciable area of rights, obligations and          remedies  to  be resolved in the  exclusive  manner          envisaged  by the Constitution and is not  amenable          to  ,  but  constitutionally  immune  from   curial          adjudicative processes.           (F) That even if Paragraph 7 erecting a bar on the          jurisdiction  of  Courts is held  inoperative,  the          Courts’  jurisdiction is, in any event,  barred  as          Paragraph  6(1)  which  imparts  a   constitutional          ‘finality’to  the  decision of the Speaker  or  the          Chairman, as the case may be, and that such concept          of ‘finality’ bars examination of the matter by the          Courts.           (G)  The concept of free and fair elections  as  a          necessary  concomitant and attribute  of  democracy          which  is a basic feature includes  an  independent          impartial  machinery  for the adjudication  of  the          electoral  disputes.  The Speaker and the  Chairman          do  not satisfy these incidents of  an  independent          adjudicatory machinery.           The   investiture   of   the   determinative   and          adjudicative jurisdiction                                                        726          in the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be,          would,  by  itself, vitiate the  provision  on  the          ground of reasonable likelihood of bias and lack of          impartiality and therefore denies the imperative of          an independent adjudicatory machinery.  The Speaker          and  Chairman  are elected and hold office  on  the

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        support of the majority party and are not  required          to  resign their Membership of the political  party          after  their election to the office of the  Speaker          or Chairman.           (H) That even if Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule          is  held  not  to bring about a  change  or  affect          Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution,  the          amendment  is  unconstitutional as  it  erodes  and          destroys judicial review which is one of the  basic          features of the constitution.      12. Re: Contention(A):      (The  Tenth  Schedule is part of the  constitution  and attracts the same cannons of construction as are  applicable to   the   expounding   of   the   fundamental   law.    One constitutional  power  is  necessarily  conditioned  by  the others  as  the  Constitution is  one  "coherent  document". Learned  counsel  for the petitioners accordingly  say  that Tenth   Schedule  should  be  read  subject  to  the   basic features of the Constitution. The Tenth Schedule and certain essential  incidents of democracy, it is urged,  cannot  co- exist.      In expounding the processes of the fundamental law, the Constitution  must  be treated as a  logical-whole.   Westel Woodbury Willoughby in the "Constitutional Law of the United States" states:           "The   Constitution  is  a  logical  whole,   each          provision of which is an integral part thereof, and          it  is,  therefore,, logically proper,  and  indeed          imperative,  to construe one part in the  light  of          the provisions of the other parts."                                    [2nd  Edn. Vol.1 page 65]      A  constitutional  document  outlines  only  broad  and general  principles  meant  to  endure  and  be  capable  of flexible   application   to  changing  circumstances   -   a distinction  which differentiates a  statue from  a  Charter under   which   all   statutes   are   made.    Cooley    on "Constitutional Limitations" says:                                                       727          "Upon   the   adoption  of  an   amendment   to   a          constitution,   the  amendment  becomes   a   part          thereof;  as much so as if it had  been  originally          incorporated  in the Constitution; and it is to  be          construed accordingly."                                  [8th Edn. Vol. 1 page 129]     13. In considering  the  validity  of  a  constitutional amendment  the changing and the changed  circumstances  that compelled   the  amendment  are  important  criteria.    The observations of the U.S. Supreme Court in Maxwell v. Dow (44 lawyer’s Edition 597 at page 605) are worthy of note:          "....to  read its language in connection  with  the          known  condition  of  affairs  out  of   which  the          occasion for its adoption may have arisen and  then          to  construe it,, if there be therein any  doubtful          expressions,  in  a  way  so far as  is  reasonably          possible,  to forward the known purpose  or  object          for which the amendment was adopted....."      The report of the Committee on Defections took note  of the   unprincipled  and  unethical  defections  induced   by considerations of personal gains said:          "....What  was most heartening was the  feeling  of          deep  concern over these unhealthy developments  in          national  life  on  the  part  of  the  leaders  of          political parties themselves.  Parliament  mirrored          this widespread concern......"                                                  [page 1]

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    14. It was strenuously contended by Shri Ram Jethmalani and  Shri Sharma that the provisions of the  Tenth  Schedule constitute   a  flagrant  violation  of  those   fundamental principles  and values which are basic to the sustenance  of the  very  system  of Parliamentary  democracy.   The  Tenth Schedule,  it  is  urged, negates  those  very  foundational assumptions  of  Parliamentary  democracy;  of  freedom   of speech;  of  the  right to dissent and  of  the  freedom  of conscience.   It   is  urged  that  unprincipled   political defections  may be an evil, but it will be the beginning  of much greater evils if the remedies, graver than the  disease itself, are adopted.  The Tenth Schedule, they say, seeks to throw  away the baby with the bath-water.   Learned  counsel argue  that  "crossing  the floor",  as it has  come  to  be called, mirrors the meanderings of a troubled conscience  on issues of political                                                      728 morality  and to punish an elected representative  for  what really  amounts to an expression of conscience  negates  the very  democratic  principles which the   Tenth  Schedule  is supposed to preserve and sustain.  Learned counsel  referred to the famous speech to the Electors of Bristol, 1774, where Edmund Burke reportedly said:          "It  ought  to  be the happiness  and  glory  of  a          representative to live in the strictest union,  the          closest  correspondence,  and the  most  unreserved          communication with his constituents.  Their  wishes          ought to have great weight with him; their opinion,          high respect; their business, unremitted attention.          It  is  his  duty  to  sacrifice  his  repose,  his          pleasures,  his satisfactions to theirs -and  above          all,  ever,  and  in all  cases,  to  prefer  their          interest to his own.  But his unbiased opinion, his          mature  judgment,  his enlightened  conscience,  he          ought  not to sacrifice to you, to any man,  or  to          any set of men living.... Your representative  owes          you,  not his industry only, but his judgment;  and          he   betrays,  instead  of  serving  you,   if   he          sacrifices it to your opinion."          [see:  Parliament Functions, Practice &  Procedures          by JAG Griffith and Michael Ryle 1989 Edn. page 70]      15.  Shri Jethmalani and Shri sharma also  relied  upon certain observations of Lord Shaw in Amalgamated Society  or Railway Servants v. Osborne, [1910 A.C. 87] to contend  that a   provision   which  seeks  to  attach  a   liability   of disqualification of an elected Member for freely  expressing his  views  on matters of conscience,  faith  and  political belief  are  indeed restraints on the freedom  of  speech  - restraints  opposed  to  public  policy.   In  that  case  a registered  trade  union framed a rule enabling it  to  levy contributions  on  the  Members to support  its  efforts  to obtain Parliamentary representation by setting up candidates at  elections.   It also framed a rule  requiring  all  such candidates  to sign and accept the conditions of the  Labour Party  and be subject to its whip.  The observations in  the case  relied upon by learned counsel are those of Lord  Shaw of Dunfermline who observed:          "Take  the testing instance: should his view as  to          right  and wrong on a public issue as to  the  true          line  of  service  to the realm,  as  to  the  real          interests  of  the constituency which  has  elected          him, or even of the society which pays him,  differ          from  the decision of the parliamentary  party  and          the maintenance by it of its                                                       729

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        policy,  he has come under a contract to place  his          vote  and  action into subjection not  to  his  own          convictions, but to their decisions.   My Lords,  I          do  not think that such a subjection is  compatible          either   with  the  spirit  of  our   parliamentary          constitution or with that independence and  freedom          which have hither-to been held to lie at the  basis          of   representative   government  in   the   United          Kingdom."                                                  [page 111]          "For  the people having reserved to themselves  the          choice  of their representatives, as the  fence  to          their properties, could do it for no other end  but          that  they  might always be freely chosen,  and  so          chosen  freely act and advise, as the necessity  of          the  commonwealth and the public good  should  upon          examination   and  mature  debate  be   judged   to          require....."                                                   [page 113]          "Still  further,  in  regard  to  the  Members   of          Parliament himself, he too is to be free; he is not          to   be   the  paid  mandatory  of  any   man,   or          organization  of  men, nor is he entitled  to  bind          himself  to  subordinate  his  opinions  on  public          questions to others, for wages, or at the peril  of          pecuniary loss; and any contract of this  character          would  not be recognized by a Court of law,  either          for its enforcement or in respect of its breach..."                                                   [page 115]      It  is relevant to observe here that the rule  impugned in that case was struck down by the Court of Appeal -  whose decision  was upheld by the House of Lords - on  grounds  of the Society’s competence to make the rule.  It was held that the rule was beyond its powers.  Lord Shaw, however, was  of the  view  that  the  impugned rule  was  opposed  to  those principles  of public policy essential to the working  of  a representative government.  The view expressed by Lord  Shaw was not the decision of the House of Lords in the case.      But,  the  real question is whether  under  the  Indian constitutional   scheme   is   there   any   immunity   from constitutional correctives against a                                                   730 legislatively  perceived  political  evil  of   unprincipled defections  induced  by  the lure  of  office  and  monetary inducements?      16.  The  points raised in the petitions  are,  indeed, far-reaching  and  of  no small importance  -  invoking  the ‘sense of relevance of constitutionally stated principles to unfamiliar settings’.  On the one hand there is the real and imminent threat to the very fabric of Indian democracy posed by certain levels of political behavior conspicuous by their utter  and  total  disregard of  well  recognised  political proprieties and morality.  These trends tend to degrade  the tone of political life and, in their wider propensities, are dangerous  to  and  undermine  the  very  survival  of   the cherished  values  of democracy.  there is  the  legislative determination through experimental constitutional  processes to combat that evil.      On  the other hand, there are, as in all political  and economic  experimentations, certain side-effects  and  fall- out  which might affect and hurt even  honest dissenters and conscientious objectors.  These are the usual plus and minus of  all areas of experimental legislation.  In  these  areas the distinction between what is constitutionally permissible and  what is outside it is marked by a ‘hazy gray-line’  and

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it is the Court’s duty to identify, " darken and deepen" the demarcating  line of constitutionality --- a task  in  which some   element   of   Judges’   own   perceptions   of   the constitutional  ideals inevitably participate.  There is  no single litmus test of constitutionality.  Any suggested sure decisive  test,  might  after  all  furnish  a   "transitory delusion  of  certitude"  where  the  "complexities  of  the strands in the web of constitutionality which the Judge must alone  disentangle" do not lend themselves to easy and  sure formulations  one  way  or the other.  It is  here  that  it becomes  difficult  to  refute  the  inevitable  legislative element in all constitutional adjudications.      17. All distinctions of law - even Constitutional law - are, in the ultimate analyses, "matters of degree".  At what line  the  ‘white’ fades into the ‘black’ is  essentially  a legislatively perceived demarcation.      In  his work "Oliver Wendell Holmes - Free  Speech  and the Living Constitution" (1991 Edition: New York  University Publication) Pohlman says:          "All distinctions of law, as Holmes never tired  of          saying, were                                                      731          therefore "matters of degree." Even in the case  of          constitutional adjudication, in which the issue was          whether  a particular exercise of power was  within          or without the legislature’s authority, the judge’s          decision  "will depend on a judgment  or  intuition          more subtle than any articulate major premise."  As          the   particular  exertion  of  legislative   power          approached the hazy gray line separating individual          rights   from  legislative  powers,   the   judge’s          assessment  of  constitutionality became  a  subtle          value judgment.  The judge’s decision was therefore          not deductive, formal, or conceptual in any sense.                                                 [page 217]                                        [emphasis supplied]      Justice Holmes himself had said:          "Two  widely  different  cases  suggest  a  general          distinction,  which  is  a clear  one  when  stated          broadly.   But  as  new  cases cluster around   the          opposite  poles, and begin to approach each  other,          the  distinction becomes more difficult  to  trace;          the determinations are made one way or the other on          a very slight preponderance of feeling, rather than          articulate reason; and at last a mathematical  line          is arrived at by the contact of contrary decisions,          which  is  so far arbitrary that it  might  equally          well  have been drawn a little further to  the  one          side or to the other."                                           [Emphasis supplied]          [See: "Theory of Torts" American Law Review 7 (1873)      The  argument that the constitutional remedies  against the  immorality and unprincipled chameleon-like  changes  of political  hues  in pursuit of power and  pelf  suffer  from something   violative   of  some  basic   feature   of   the Constitution,  perhaps,  ignores the essential  organic  and evolutionary character of a Constitution and its flexibility as   a  living  entity  to  provide  for  the  demands   and compulsions of the changing times and needs.  The people  of this  country  were  not beguiled into  believing  that  the menace   of unethical and unprincipled changes of  political affiliations is something which the law is helpless  against and  is to be endured as a necessary concomitant of  freedom of conscience.  The onslaughts on their sensibilities                                                      732

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by the incessant unethical political defections did not dull their perception of this phenomenon as a canker eating into the vitals of those values that make democracy a living  and worth-while faith.  This is prominently an area where Judges should  defer to legislative perception of and  reaction  to the pervasive dangers of unprincipled defections  to protect the  community.   "Legislation  may  begin  where  an   evil begins".   Referring to the judicial philosophy  of  Justice Holmes in such areas, Pohlman again says:           "A  number of Holmes’s famous aphorisms  point  in          the  direction  that judges should defer  when  the          legislature reflected the pervasive and predominant          values and interests of the community.  He had, for          example,  no "practical" criterion to go on  except          "what  the  crowd  wanted."   He  suggested,  in  a          humorous  vein that his  epitaph.................No          judge  ought  to  interpret  a  provision  of   the          Constitution  in  a  way  that  would  prevent  the          American people from doing what it really wanted to          do.   If the general consensus was that  a  certain          condition was an "evil" that ought to be  corrected          by   certain   means,  then  the   government   had          the  power to do it:  "Legislation may begin  where          an  evil  begins"; "Constitutional law  like  other          mortal  contrivances  has to  take  some  chances."          "Some  play  must be allowed to the joints  if  the          machine  is  to  work."  All  of  these  rhetorical          flourishes  suggest  that Holmes  deferred  to  the          legislature  if and when he thought  it  accurately          mirrored the abiding beliefs, interests, and values          of the american public."                                          (emphasis supplied)          [See:  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes  -Free  Speech          and  the Living Constitution by H.L.  Pohlman  1991          Edn. page 233]      18. Shri Sharma contends that the rights and immunities under Article 105(2) of the Constitution which according  to him  are placed by judicial decisions even higher  than  the fundamental-right  in  Article 19(1)(a), have  violated  the Tenth  Schedule.  There are at least two objections  to  the acceptability  of  this contention.  The first is  that  the Tenth   Schedule  does  not  impinge  upon  the  rights   or immunities  under  Article 105(2).  Article  105(2)  of  the Constitution provides:          "105.  Powers, privileges, etc., of the  Houses  of          Parliament and                                                        733          of the Members and committees thereof.- (1)........          (2) No Member of Parliament shall be liable  to any          proceedings  in  any court in respect  of  anything          said or any vote given by him in Parliament or  any          committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable          in  respect  of  the publication by  or  under  the          authority  of  either House of  Parliament  of  any          report, paper, votes or proceedings.      The  freedom of speech of a Member is not  an  absolute freedom.   That apart, the provisions of the Tenth  Schedule do  not  purport to make a Member of a House liable  in  any ‘Court’  for  anything  said or any vote  given  by  him  in Parliament.  It is difficult to conceive how Article  105(2) is   a   source  of  immunity  from  the   consequences   of unprincipled floor-crossing.      Secondly,  on  the nature and  character  of  electoral rights  this Court in Jyoti Basu & Ors. v. Debi Ghosal  &  3 S.C.R. 318 observed:

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        "A  right to elect, fundamental though it is  to  a          democracy,   is,  anomalously  enough,  neither   a          fundamental  right nor a Common Law Right.   It  is          pure  and  simple, a statutory right.   So  is  the          right to be elected.  So is the right to dispute an          election.  Outside of statute, there is no right to          elect,  no  right  to be elected and  no  right  to          dispute an election.  Statutory creations they are,          and therefore, subject to statutory limitation.’                                                   [Page 326]          Democracy  is a basic feature of the  constitution. Whether  any  particular brand or system  of  Government  by itself,  has this attribute of a basic feature, as  lone  as the  essential  characteristics  that entitle  a  system  of government  to be called democratic are otherwise  satisfied is  not  necessary to be gone into.  Election  conducted  at regular, prescribed intervals is essential to the democratic system  envisaged  in the constitution.  So is the  need  to protect  and  sustain the purity of the  electoral  process. That  may take within it the quality, efficacy and  adequacy of the machinery for resolution of electoral disputes.  From that  it  does not necessarily follow that  the  rights  and immunities  under  sub-article  (2) of Article  105  of  the Constitution, are elevated into fundamental rights and  that the  Tenth  Schedule would have to be struck  down  for  its inconsistency with Article                                                        734               105 (2) as urged by Shri Sharma.      19.Parliamentary   democracy  envisages  that   matters involving  implementation  of  policies  of  the  Government should  be discussed by the elected representatives  of  the people.   Debate, discussion and persuasion  are,  therefor, the means and essence of the democratic process. During  the debates  the Members put forward different points  of  view. Members belonging to the same political party may also have, and  may  give expression to, differences of  opinion  on  a matter.  Not unoften the view expressed by the Members in the House  have resulted in substantial modification,  and  even the  withdrawal,  of  the  proposals  under   consideration. Debate  and  expression of different points of  view,  thus, serve an essential and healthy purpose in the functioning of Parliamentary  democracy.   At times such an  expression  of views  during the debate in the House may lead to voting  or abstenance from voting in the House otherwise than on  party lines.      But  a  political party functions on  the  strength  of shared  beliefs.   Its own political  stability  and  social utility depends on such shared beliefs and concerted  action of  its  Members  in  furtherance  of  those  commonly  held principles.   Any  freedom of its members to  vote  as  they please  independently  of  the  political  party’s  declared policies  will  not  only embarrass  its  public  image  and popularity but also undermine public confidence in it which, in the ultimate analysis, is its source of sustenance - nay, indeed,  its  very  survival.  Intra-party  debates  are  of course  a different thing.  But a public image of  disparate stands by Members of the same political party is not  looked upon,in political tradition, as a desirable state of things. Griffith  and  Ryle on "Parliament,  Functions,  Practice  & Procedure" (1989 Edn. page 119) say:          "Loyalty  to  party  is the norm,  being  based  on          shared beliefs.  A divided party is looked on  with          suspicion  by  the electorate.  It is  natural  for          Members to accept the opinion of their Leaders  and          Spokesmen  on the wide variety of matters on  which

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        those   Members  have  no   specialist   knowledge.          Generally Members will accept majority decisions in          the   party  even  when  they  disagree.    It   is          understandable therefore that a Member who  rejects          the  party  whip  even on a  single  occasion  will          attract attention and more criticism than sympathy.          To  abstain from voting when required by  party  to          vote  is to suggest a degree of unreliability.   To          vote  against  party is disloyalty.  To  join  with          others in abstention                                                      735          or   voting   with  the  other   side   smacks   of          conspiracy."                                       (emphasis supplied)      Clause (b) of sub-para (1) of Paragraph 2 of the  Tenth Schedule  gives  effect to this principle and  sentiment  by imposing  a  disqualification  on  a  Member  who  votes  or abstains from voting contrary to "any directions" Issued  by the political party.  The provision, however, recognises two exceptions:  one when the Member obtains from the  political party  prior permission to vote or abstain from  voting  and the  other when the Member has voted without obtaining  such permission but his action has been condoned by the political party.   This provision itself accommodates the  possibility that  there  may  be occasions when a  Member  may  vote  or abstain  from voting contrary to the direction of the  party to  which he belongs.  This, in itself again, may provide a clue  to  the proper understanding and construction  of  the expression  "Any Direction" in clause (b) of Paragraph  2(1) whether really all directions or whips from the party entail the  statutory consequences or whether having regard to  the extra-ordinary  nature and sweep of the power and  the  very serious consequences that flow including the extreme penalty of disqualification the expression should be given a meaning confining  its  operation to the contexts indicated  by  the objects  and purposes of the Tenth Schedule.  We shall  deal with this aspect separately.      20.  The working of the modern Parliamentary  democracy is  complex.  The area of the inter-se relationship  between the    electoral    constituencies   and    their    elected representatives  has  many complex features  and  overtones. The  citizen as the electorate is said to be  the  political sovereign.  As long as regular general elections occur,  the electorate  remains the arbiter of the ultimate  composition of   the  representative  legislative  body  to  which   the Government  of  the  day  is  responsible.   There  are,  of course,,  larger  issues of  theoretical  and  philosophical objections to the legitimacy of a representative  Government which might achieve a majority of the seats but obtains only minority  of the electoral votes.  It is said that  even  in England  this  has  been the  phenomenon  in  every  general elections in this century except the four in the years 1900, 1918, 1931  and 1935.      But  in the area of the inter-relationship between  the constituency  and  its  elected representative,  it  is  the avowed  endeavour of the latter to requite the  expectations of  his voters.  Occasionally, this might conflict with  his political obligations to the political party sponsoring  him which expects--                                                     736 and exacts in its own way - loyalty to it.  This duality  of capacity  and functions are referred to by a learned  author thus:          "The functions of Members are of two kinds and flow          from  the  working  of  representative  government.

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        When a voter at a general election, in that  hiatus          between  parliaments,  puts his cross  against  the          name   of   the  candidate  he  is   [most   often]          consciously  performing two functions:  seeking  to          return a particular person to the house of  commons          as  Member  for that constituency; and  seeking  to          return to power as the government of the country  a          group  of  individuals of the same  party  as  that          particular   person.    The  voter  votes   for   a          representative  and for a government.  He may  know          that  the candidate he votes has little  chance  of          being elected..........."          "When  a  candidate is elected as a Member  of  the          House  of Commons, he reflects those two  functions          of the voter.  Whatever other part he may play,  he          will be a constituency M.P.  As such, his job  will          be to help his constituents as individuals in their          dealings  with the departments of State.   He  must          listen  to  their  grievances  and  often  seek  to          persuade  those in authority to  provide  remedies.          He must have no regard to the political leanings of          his constituents for the represents those who voted          against  him or who did not vote at all as much  as          those  who  voted  for him.  Even  if  he  strongly          disagrees with their complaint he may still seek to          represent it, though the degree of enthusiasm  with          which he does so is likely to be less great."          [See:   Parliament   -   Function.   Practice   and          Procedures  by  JAG Griffith and Ryle -  1989  Edn.          page 69]      So  far  as  his  own  personal  views  on  freedom  of conscience   are  concerned,,  there  may   be   exceptional occasions  when  the elected  representative  finds  himself compelled  to  consider  more closely  how  he  should  act. Referring to these dilemmas the authors say:          "....The first is that he may feel that the  policy          of  his  party  whether  it  is  in  office  or  in          opposition,  on a particular matter is not  one  of          which  he approves.  He may think this  because  of          his  personal  opinions or because of  its  special          consequences                                                     737          for  his  constituents  or  outside  interests   or          because  it reflects a general position within  the          party   with  which  he  cannot  agree.   On   many          occasions,  he  may support the party  despite  his          disapproval.  But occasionally the strength of  his          feeling will be such that he is obliged to  express          his opposition either by speaking or by  abstaining          on  a vote or even by voting with the  other  side.          Such opposition will not pass unnoticed and, unless          the  matter is clearly one of conscience,  he  will          not be popular with the party whips.          The  second  complication is caused  by  a  special          aspect   of   parliamentary   conduct   which   not          frequently transcends party lines. Members, who are          neither  Ministers  nor   front-bench    Opposition          spokesmen,  do  regard  as  an  important  part  of          their function the general scrutiny of Governmental          activity.    This  is  particularly  the  role   of          select  committees  which have, as  we  shall  see,          gained  new prominence since 1979. No doubt, it  is          superficially  paradoxical  to see Members  on  the          Government  side of the House joining  in  detailed          criticism  of the administration and yet voting  to

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        maintain  that  Government in office.  But  as  one          prominent  critic of government has said, there  is          nothing   inherently  contradictory  in  a   Member          sustaining the Executive in its power or helping it          to  overcome  opposition  at  the  same  time    as          scrutinising  the  work of the executive  in  order          both  to improve it and to see that power is  being          exercised in a proper and legitimate fashion."                                             [page 69 and 70]      Speaking  of the claims of the political party  on  its elected Member Rodney Brazier says:          "Once returned to the House of Commons the Member’s          party  expects  him  to be  loyal.   This   is  not          entirely unfair or improper, for it is the price of          the party’s label which secured his election.   But          the  question is whether the balance of a  Member’s          obligations  has  tilted too far in favour  of  the          requirements of party.  The nonsense that a  Whip--          even  a three-line whip--is no more than a  summons          to  attend  the House, and that,  once  there,  the          Member  is completely free to speak and vote as  he          thinks fit, was                                                        738          still being put about, by the Parliamentary Private          Secretary  to  the Prime Minister, as  recently  as          1986. No one can honestly believe that.  Failure to          vote  with his party on a three-line  whip  without          permission  invites  a party reaction.   This  will          range  (depending on the circumstances and  whether          the  offence is repeated) from a quiet word from  a          Whip  and appeals to future loyalty, to a  ticking-          off  or a formal reprimand (perhaps from the  Chief          Whip himself), to any one of a number  of  threats.          The  armoury of intimidation includes  the  menaces          that the Member will never get ministerial  office,          or go on overseas trips sponsored by the party,  or          be  nominated  by his party for  Commons  Committee          Memberships,  or that he might be deprived  of  his          party’s  whip  in the House, or that  he  might  be          reported  to his constituency which might  wish  to          consider his behaviour when reselection comes round          again.....Does    the   Member   not   enjoy    the          Parliamentary  privilege of freedom of speech?  How          can  his speech be free in the face of  such  party          threats?   The answer to the inquiring  citizen  is          that the whip system is part of the  conventionally          established machinery of political organisation  in          the  house,  and has been ruled not to  infringe  a          Member’s  parliamentary privilege in any way.   The          political parties are only too aware of utility  of          such  a system,, and would fight in the last  ditch          to keep it."          [See; Constitutional Reform - Reshaping the British          Political System by Rodney Brazier, 1991 Edn. pages          48 and 49]      The  learned  author, referring to cases  in  which  an elected Member is seriously unrepresentative  of the general constituency  opinion,  or whose  personal  behaviour  falls below standards acceptable to his constituents commends that what  is needed is some additional device to ensure  that  a Member  pays heed to constituents’ views. Brazier speaks  of the efficacy of device where the constituency can recall its representative.  Brazier says:          "What  sort of conduct might attract the  operation          of  the recall power?  First, a Member  might  have

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        misused his Membership of the House, for example to          further  his  personal  financial  interests  in  a          manner  offensive to his constituents.  They  might          consider  that the action taken against him by  the          house (or, indeed, lack                                                      739          of action) was inadequate.......Thirdly, the use of          a  recall  power might be particularly apt  when  a          member changed his party but declined to resign his          seats  and fight an immediate by-election.   It  is          not  unreasonable  to expect a Member  who  crosses          the  floor of the House, or who joins a new  party,          to resubmit himself quickly to the electors who had          returned  him in different colours.  Of course,  in          all those three areas of controversial conduct  the          ordinary process of reselection  might well  result          in   the  Member  being  dropped  as  his   party’s          candidate (and obviously would definitely have that          result  in  the third case).  But that  could  only          occur  when the time for reselection came;  and  in          any  event  the constituency would still  have  the          Member  representing  them until the  next  general          election.  A cleaner and more timely parting of the          ways  would be preferable.  Sometimes  a  suspended          sentence does not meet the case."                                             [page 52 and 53]      Indeed, in a sense an anti-defection law is a statutory variant of its moral principle and justification  underlying the  power  of recall.  What might justify a  provision  for recall  would justify a provision for  disqualification  for defection.  Unprincipled defection is a political and social evil.  It is perceived as such by the legislature.   People, apparently, have grown distrustful of the emotive  political exultations  that such floor-crossings belong to the  sacred area of freedom of conscience, or of the right to dissent or of  intellectual freedom.  The anti-defection law  seeks  to recognise  the  practical need to place the  proprieties  of political  and personal conduct-- whose awkward erosion  and grotesque  manifestations have been the base of the times  - above certain theoretical assumptions which in reality  have fallen into a morass of personal and political  degradation. We  should, we think, defer to this legislative  wisdom  and perception.   The  choices in  constitutional  adjudications quite  clearly indicate the need for such  deference.   "Let the  end  be legitimate, let it be within the scope  of  the Constitution and all means which are appropriate, which  are adopted  to that end..." are constitutional. [See  Kazurbach v. Morgan: 384 US 641].      21.  It  was  then urged  by  Shri  Jethmalani that the distinction  between  the  conception  of  "defection"   and "split" in the Tenth Schedule is so thin and artificial that the differences on which the distinction rests are indeed                                                     740 an outrageous defiance of logic. Shri Jethmalani urged  that if  floor-crossing  by  one  Member  is  an  evil,  then   a collective  perpetration  of  it by  1/3rd  of  the  elected Members of a party is no better and should be regarded as an aggravated  evil  both logically and from the  part  of  its aggravated consequences.  But the Tenth Schedule, says  Shri Jethmalani,  employs  its  own  inverse  ratiocination   and perverse   logic  to  declare  that  where  such   evil   is perpetrated collectively by an artificially classified group of not less than 1/3rd Members of that political party  that would  not  be a "defection" but a  permissible  "split"  or "merger".

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    This exercise to so hold-up the provision as such crass imperfection is performed by Shri Jethmalani with his wonted forensic skill.  But we are afraid what was so  attractively articulated,  on  closer  examination,  is,  perhaps,   more attractive than sound.  The underlying premise in  declaring an individual act of defection as forbidden is that lure  of office  or  money  could  be  presumed  to  have  prevailed. Legislature has made this presumption on its own  perception and   assessment  of  the  extant  standards  of   political proprieties  and  morality.  At the  same  time  legislature evisaged  the need to provide for such  "floor-crossing"  on the  basis of honest dissent.  That a particular  course  of conduct   commended   itself   to  a   number   of   elected representatives   might,  in  itself,  lend   credence   and reassurance  to a presumption of bonafide.  The  presumptive impropriety  of motives progressively weakens  according  as the  numbers  sharing  the  action  and  there  is   nothing capricious  and arbitrary in this legislative perception  of the distinction between ‘defection’ and ‘split’.      Where is the line to be drawn? What number can be  said to  generate  a presumption of bonafides ?  Here  again  the Courts  have  nothing else to go by except  the  legislative wisdom and, again, as Justice Holmes said, the Court has  no practical criterion to go by except "what the crowd wanted". We   find  no  substance  in the  attack  on  the  statutory distinction between "defection" and "split".      Accordingly we hold:          "that the Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule to  the          Constitution  is  valid.   Its  provisions  do  not          suffer  from  the  vice  of  subverting  democratic          rights  of  elected Members of Parliament  and  the          Legislatures  of the States.  It does  not  violate          their freedom of                                                      741          speech,   freedom   of  vote  and   conscience   as          contended.          The  Provisions of Paragraph 2 do not violate  any          rights or freedom under Articles 105 and 194 of the          Constitution.          The  provisions  are salutory and are  intended  to          strengthen  the  fabric  of  Indian   Parliamentary          democracy  by curbing unprincipled   and  unethical          political defections.          The  contention  that the provisions of  the  Tenth          Schedule,  even with the exclusion of Paragraph  7,          violate the basic structure of the Constitution  in          they  affect  the  democratic  rights  of   elected          Members  and,  therefore,  of  the  principles   of          Parliamentary   democracy   is   unsound   and   is          rejected."      22. Re: Contention (B):      The  thrust  of the point is that  Paragraph  7  brings about a change in the provisions of chapter IV of Part V and chapter  V  of  Part  VI  of  the  Constitution  and   that, therefore, the amending Bill falls within proviso to Article 368  (2).   We  might, at the outset,  notice  Shri  Sibal’s submission  on a point of construction of Paragraph 7.  Shri Sibal  urged that Paragraph 7, properly construed, does  not seek to oust the jurisdiction of courts under Articles, 136, 226   and   227  but  merely   prevents   an   interlocutory intervention  or  a quia-timet action.  He  urged  that  the words  "in  respect  of  any  matters  connected  with   the disqualification of a Member" seek to bar jurisdiction  only till  the  matter  is  finally decided  by  the  speaker  or Chairman,  as  the case may be, and does not  extend  beyond

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that  stage  and  that in dealing  with  the  dimensions  of exclusion  of  the  exercise of  judicial  power  the  broad considerations  are  that provisions which seek  to  exclude Courts’  jurisdiction  shall  be  strictly  construed.   Any construction which results in denying the Courts’ it, it  is urged, not favoured.  Shri Sibhal relied upon the  following observations  of this Court in H.H.  Maharajadhiraja  Madhav Rao  Jiwaji  Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors: v. Union  of  India, [1971] 1 SCC 85:          "...The  proper  forum under our  Constitution  for          determining  a legal dispute is the Court which  is          by  training and experience, assisted  by  properly          qualified  advocates, fitted to perform that  task.          A   provision   which  purports  to   exclude   the          jurisdiction  of the Courts in certain matters  and          to deprive the aggrieved party                                                   742          of  the normal remedy will be  strictly  construed,          for it is a principle not to be whittled down  that          an   aggrieved   party   will   not,   unless   the          jurisdiction of the Courts is by clear enactment or          necessary  implication barred, be denied his  right          to seek recourse to the Courts for determination of          his rights..........".          "The Court will  avoid imputing to the  Legislature          an  intention  to enact a  provision  which  flouts          notions of justice and norms of fairplay, unless  a          contrary intention is manifest from words plain and          unambiguous.  A provision in a statute will not  be          construed  to  defeat  its  manifest  purpose   and          general values which animate its structure.  In  an          avowedly  democratic polity,  statutory  provisions          ensuring  the security of fundamental human  rights          including  the right to property will,  unless  the          contrary  mandate  be precise and  unqualified,  be          construed  liberally  so as to  uphold  the  right.          These   rules  apply  to  the   interpretation   of          constitutional and statutory provisions alike."                                                 [page 94-95]      It  is true that the provision which seeks  to  exclude the jurisdiction of Courts is strictly construed.  See also, Mask & Co., v. Secretary of State, AIR 1940 P.C. 105.      But  the rules of construction are attracted where  two or  more reasonably possible constructions are  open on  the language of the statute.  But, here both on the language  of paragraph  7 and having regard to the legislative  evolution of  the  provision,  the legislative  intent  is  plain  and manifest.   The words "no Court shall have any  jurisdiction in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member"  are of wide import and leave no constructional options.   This is reinforced by the legislative history  of the   anti-defection  law.   The  deliberate  and   purposed presence  of  Paragraph 7 is clear from the history  of  the previous proposed legislations on the subject.  A comparison of   the  provisions  of  the  Constitution   (Thirty-second Amendment)  Bill,  1973 and  the  Constitution  (Forty-eight Amendment) Bill, 1978, (both of which had lapsed) on the one hand and the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Bill, 1985, would bring-out the avowed and deliberate intent of Paragraph 7 in the  Tenth  Schedule.  The previous constitution  (32th  and 48th Amendment) Bills contained similar provisions for                                                     743 disqualification  on grounds of defections, but these  Bills did  not contain any clause ousting the jurisdiction of  the court.  Determination of disputed disqualifications was left

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to  the   Election  Commission  as  in  the  case  of  other disqualifications  under Article 102 and 103 in the case  of members  of Parliament and Articles 191 and 192 in the  case of  Members of Legislature of the States.  The  Constitution (Fifty-second  Amendment) Bill for the first time  envisaged the  investiture  of  the power to decide  disputes  on  the speaker  or the Chairman.  The purpose of the  enactment  of Paragraph  7, as the debates in the House indicate,  was  to bar  the jurisdiction of the Courts under Articles 136,  226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, Shri Sibal’s suggested contention   would  go  against  all   these   over-whelming interpretative  criteria apart from its  unacceptability  on the express language of paragraph 7.      23.  But  it was urged that no question  of  change  in Articles  136,  226 and 227 of the Constitution  within  the meaning  of  clause  (b) of the proviso  to  Article  368(2) arises  at  all in view of the fact that the area  of  these rights and obligations being constitutionally rendered  non- justiciable,  there  is no judicial  review  under  Articles 136,226 and 227 at all in the first instance so as to  admit of  any idea of its exclusion.  Reliance was placed  on  the decisions  of this Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo  v. Union of India and State of Bihar, [1952] SCR 89 and  Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 SCR 933.      24. In Sankari Prasad’s case, the question was  whether the  Amendment  introducing  Articles 31A  and  31B  in  the Constitution  required ratification under the said  proviso. Repelling this contention it was observed:          "It will be seen that these articles do not  either          in  terms or in effect seek to make any  change  in          article  226 or in articles 132 and  136.   Article          31A   aims  at  saving  laws  providing   for   the          compulsory acquisition by the State of certain kind          of property from the operation of articles 13  read          with  other  relevant articles in Part  III,  while          article 31B purports to validate certain  specified          Acts and Regulations already passed, which, but for          such  a provision, would be liable to  be  impugned          under  Article 13.  It is not correct to  say  that          the  powers of the High Court under Article 226  to          issue  writs  "for the enforcement of  any  of  the          rights  conferred  by Part III" or  of  this  Court          under  Articles  132 and 136 to  entertain  appeals          from  orders issuing or refusing such writs are  in          any way affected.  They remain just the same                                                        744          as  they were before: only a certain class of  case          has been excluded from the purview of Part III  and          the  courts could no longer interfere,  no  because          their powers were curtailed in any manner or to any          extent,  but  because there would  be  no  occasion          hereafter  for the exercise of their power in  such          cases." [1982 SCR 89 at 108]      In Sajjan Singh’s case, a similar contention was raised against  the validity of the Constitution  (17th  Amendment) Act,  1964  by which Article 31 A was again amended  and  44 statutes  was  whether the amendment  required  ratification under  the proviso the Article 368.  This Court noticed  the question thus :          "The question which calls for our decision is: what          would be the requirement about making an  amendment          in  a  constitutional provision contained  in  Part          III,  if  as a result of the  said  amendment,  the          powers  conferred on the High Courts under  Article          226 are likely to be affected?"

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                                              [P. 940]      Negativing the challenge to the amendment on the ground of nonratification, it was held:          "....  Thus,  if  the pith and  substance  test  is          applied to the amendment made by the impugned  Act,          it  would  be clear that Parliament is  seeking  to          amend fundamental rights solely with the object  of          removing  any possible obstacle in the  fulfillment          of the socio-economic policy in which the party  in          power  believes.  If that be so, the effect of  the          amendment   on  the  area  over  which   the   High          Courts’powers prescribed by Article 226 operate, is          incidental and in the present case can be described          as  of  an insignificant order.  The  impugned  Act          does  not  purport  to  change  the  provisions  of          Article 226 and it cannot be said even to have that          effect  directly  or in  any  appreciable  measure.          That  is  why we think that the argument  that  the          impugned  Act  falls under the proviso,  cannot  be          sustained...."                                                   [P.944]                                                  745      The propositions that fell for consideration is Sankari Prasad   Singh’s  and  Sajjan  Singh’s  cases   are   indeed different.   There the jurisdiction and power of the  Courts under Articles 136 and 226 were not sought to be taken  away nor  was there any change brought about in those  provisions either "in terms or in effect", since the very rights  which could  be adjudicated under and enforced by the Courts  were themselves  taken away by the Constitution.  The result  was that there was no area for the jurisdiction of the Courts to operate upon.  Matters are entirely different in the context of  paragraph 7.  Indeed the aforesaid cases,  by  necessary implication  support  the point urged for  the  petitioners. The changes in Chapter IV of Part V and Chapter V of Part VI envisaged  by  the proviso need not be direct.   The  change could  be  either  "in terms of or in effect".   It  is  not necessary to change the language of Articles 136 and 226  of the Constitution to attract the proviso.  If in effect these Articles  are  rendered ineffective  and  made  inapplicable where  these articles could otherwise have been  invoked  or would,  but  for  Paragraph 7, have operated  there  is  ‘in effect’ a change in those provisions attracting the proviso. Indeed  this position was recognised in Sajjan Singh’s  case where it was observed:          "If  the  effect  of  the  amendment  made  in  the          fundamental rights on Article 226 is direct and not          incidental  and  is of a  very  significant  order,          different considerations may perhaps arise."                                                     [P.944]      In  the  present cases, though the amendment  does  not bring in any change directly in the language of Article 136, 226  and  227   of  the  Constitution,  however,  in  effect paragraph  7  curtails  the  operation  of  those   Articles respecting matters falling under the Tenth Schedule.   There is a change in the effect in Article 136, 226 and 227 within the meaning of clause (b) of the proviso to Article  368(2). Paragraph   7,   therefore,   attracts   the   proviso   and ratification was necessary.      Accordingly, on Point B, we hold:          "That having regard to the background and evolution          of the principles underlying the Constitution (52nd          Amendment)  Act,  1985, in so far as  it  seeks  to          introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of          India,  the provisions of Paragraph 7 of the  Tenth

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        Schedule of the constitution in terms and in effect          bring                                                      746          about  a  change  in the operation  and  effect  to          Articles  136, 226 and 227 of the  Constitution  of          India  and, therefore, the amendment would  require          to  be ratified in accordance with the  proviso  to          sub-Article (2) of Article 368 of the  Constitution          of India."      25. Re: Contentions ‘C’ and ‘D’ :      The criterion for determining the validity of a law  is the  competence of law-making authority.  The competence  of the  law-making authority would depend on the ambit  of  the legislative  power, and the limitations imposed  thereon  as also  the  limitations  on mode of exercise  of  the  power. Though the amending power in a constitution is in the nature of  a  constituent  power and differs in  content  from  the Legislative   power,   the  limitations   imposed   on   the constituent  power my be substantive as well as  procedural. Substantive  limitations are those which restrict the  field of exercise of the amending power and exclude some areas fro its  ambit.   Procedural limitations are those  which  impose restrictions with regard to the mode of the exercise of  the amending power.  Both these limitations, however, touch  and affect  the  constituent power itself,  disregard  of  which invalidates its exercise.      26. The Constitution provides for amendment in Articles 4, 169, 368, paragraph 7 of Fifth Schedule and paragraph  21 of Sixth Schedule.  Article 4 makes provisions for amendment of the First and the Fourth Schedules, Article 169  provides for amendment in the provision of the Constitution which may be   necessary  for  abolition or  creation  of  Legislative Councils  in  States,  paragraph 7  of  the  Fifth  Schedule provides  for amendment of the Fifth Schedule and  paragraph 21  of  Sixth Schedule provides for amendment of  the  Sixth Schedule.   All  these provisions prescribe  that  the  said amendments can be made by a law made by Parliament which can be  passed  like any other law by a simple majority  in  the House of Parliament.  Article 368 confers the power to amend the  rest  of the provisions of the Constitution.   In  sub- Article (2) of Article 368, a special majority -  two-thirds of  the  members  of each House of  Parliament  present  and voting  and majority of total membership of such House -  is required to effectuate the amendments.  The proviso to  sub- article  (2)  of Article 368 imposes a  further  requirement that if any change in the provisions set out in clauses  (a) to  (e)  of  the  proviso, is  intended  it  would  then  be necessary that the amendment                                                  747 be ratified by the legislature of not less than one-half  of the States.      Although  there is no specific  enumerated  substantive limitation on the power in Article 368, but as arising  from very   limitation  in  the  word  ‘amend’,   a   substantive limitation  is  inherent on the amending power so  that  the amendment does not alter the basic structure or destroy  the basic  features  of the Constitution.   The  amending  power under  Article 368 is subject to the substantive  limitation in  that the basic structure cannot be altered or the  basic features  of  the Constitution  destroyed.   The  limitation requiring  a  special majority is a  procedural  one.   Both these  limitations  impose  a fetter on  the  competence  of Parliament to amend the Constitution and any amendment  made in  disregard  of  these limitations  would  go  beyond  the amending power.

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    27. While examining the constitutional validity of laws the  principle that is applied is that if it is possible  to construe  a  statute so that its validity can  be  sustained against  a constitutional attack it should be  so  construed and  that when part of a statute is valid and part is  void, the  valid  part must be separated from  the  invalid  part. This is done by applying the doctrine of severability.   The rationale  of this doctrine has been explained by Cooley  in the following words;          "It  will  sometimes be found that an  act  of  the          legislature is opposed in some of its provisions to          the   constitution,   while  others,  standing   by          themselves, would be unobjectionable.  So the forms          observed  in passing it may be sufficient for  some          of  the purposes sought to be accomplished  by  it,          but insufficient for others.  In any such case  the          portion  which conflicts with the constitution,  or          inregard to which the necessary conditions have not          been  observed,  must  be  treated  as  a  nullity.          Whether the other parts of the statute must also be          adjudged  void  because  of  the  association  must          depend  upon a consideration of the object  of  the          law,  and  in what manner and to  what  extent  the          unconstitutional portion affects the remainder.   A          statute, it has been said, is judicially held to be          unconstitutional,  because  it is  not  within  the          scope  of  legislative  authority;  it  may  either          propose  to accomplish something prohibited by  the          constitution,  or  to accomplish some  lawful,  and          even  laudable  object, by means repugnant  to  the          Constitution of the United States                                                      748          or  of the State.  A statute may contain some  such          provisions,  and yet the same act, having  received          the  sanction of all branches of  the  legislature,          and  being  in the form of law, may  contain  other          useful  and salutary provisions, not  obnoxious  to          any  just  constitutional exception.  It  would  be          inconsistent   with   all   just   principles    of          constitutional law to adjudge these enactments void          because  they are associated in the same  act,  but          not connected with or dependent on others which are          unconstitutional."          [Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations; 8th Edn. Vol.          1, p. 359-360]      In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, [1957] SCR 930, this Court has observed:          "The  question whether a statute, which is void  in          part  is to be treated as void in toto, or  whether          it is capable of enforcement as to that part  which          is valid is one which can arise only with reference          to  laws  enacted by bodies which  do  not  possess          unlimited  powers of legislation as,  for  example,          the   legislatures   in  a  Federal   Union.    The          limitation on their powers may be of two kinds:  It          may  be  with reference to  the  subject-matter  on          which  they could legislate, as, for  example,  the          topics  enumerated  in  the Lists  in  the  Seventh          Schedule in the Indian Constitution, ss. 91 and  92          of  the  Canadian Constitution, and s.  51  of  the          Australian   Constitution;  or  it  may   be   with          reference to the character of the legislation which          they could enact in respect of subjects assigned to          them as for example, in relation to the fundamental          rights  guaranteed in Part III of the  Constitution

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        and  similar constitutionally protected  rights  in          the  American  and  other  Constitutions.   When  a          legislature   whose   authority   is   subject   to          limitations aforesaid enacts a law which is  wholly          in  excess of its powers, it is entirely  void  and          must   be  completely  ignored.   But   where   the          legislation falls in part within the area  allotted          to  it  and in part outside it, it  is  undoubtedly          void as to the latter; but does it on that  account          become necessarily void in its entirety? The answer          to  this  question must depend on whether  what  is          valid could be separated from what                                                   749          is invalid, and that is a question which has to  be          decided  by  the court on a  consideration  of  the          provisions of the Act." [P.940]      The  doctrine of severability has been applied by  this Court in cases of challenge to the validity of an  amendment on the ground of disregard of the substantive limitations on the   amending  power,  namely,  alteration  of  the   basic structure.   But  only the offending part of  the  amendment which  had  the effect of altering the basic  structure  was struck down while the rest of the amendment was unheld,  See :  Shri  Kesavananda  Bharti  Sripadagalavaru  v.  State  of Kerala,  [1973]  Supp. SCR 1; Minerva Mills  Ltd.&  Ors.  v. Union  of India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 206; P. Sambhamurthy  & Ors,  etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., [1987]  1  SCR 879.      28.Is  there  anything in  the  procedural  limitations imposed  by sub- Article (2) of Article 368  which  excludes the  doctrine  of  severability in respect of  a  law  which violates  the said limitations? Such a violation  may  arise when  there  is  a composite Bill or what  is  in  statutory context  or  jargon  called  a  ‘Rag-Bag’  measure   seeking amendments  to several statutes under one  amending  measure which seeks to amend various provisions of the  Constitution some of which may attract clauses (a) to (e) of the  proviso to  Article  368(2)  and  the Bill,  though  passed  by  the requisite  majority  in both the Houses  of  Parliament  has received  the assent of the President without it being  sent to  States for ratification or having been so sent fails  to receive such ratification from not less than half the States before the Bill is presented for assent.  Such an  Amendment Act  is  within the competence of Parliament insofar  as  it relates to provisions other than those mentioned in  clauses (a)  to (e) of proviso to Article 368(2) but in  respect  of the  amendments  introduced  in provisions  referred  to  in clauses (a) to (e) of proviso to Article 368(2),  Parliament alone is not competent to make such amendments on account of some  constitutionally  recognised federal  principle  being invoked.  If the doctrine of severability can be applied  it can  be upheld as valid in respect of the amendments  within the  competence of Parliament and only the amendments  which Parliament alone was not competent to make could be declared invalid.      29.  Is  there anything compelling in  the  proviso  to Article 368(2) requiring it to be construed as excluding the doctrine of severability to such an amendment? It is settled rule of statutory construction that "the proper function  of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which could                                                         750 otherwise  fall  within  the general language  of  the  main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case" and that where   "the  language of the main enactment  is  clear  and unambiguous,  a  proviso  can have no  repercussion  on  the

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interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude  from it  by  implication what clearly falls  within  its  express terms". [See : Madras & Southern Mahratta railway company v. Bezwada  Municipality,  (1944)  71  I.A.  133  at  P.   122; Commissioner  of Income Tax, Mysore v. Indo-Mercantile  Bank Ltd., [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 256 at p. 266.      The  proviso  to Article 368(2) appears  to  have  been introduced  with  a  view to giving effect  to  the  federal principle.   In  the  matter  of  amendment  of   provisions specified in clauses (a) to (e) relating to legislative  and executive  powers  of the States vis-a-vis  the  Union,  the Judiciary,  the election of the President and  the  amending power  itself,  which  have a bearing  on  the  States,  the proviso imposes an additional requirement of ratification of the  amendment  which  seeks to effect  a  change  in  those provisions  before the Bill is presented for the  assent  of the President.  It is salutary that the scope of the proviso is  confined  to the limits prescribed therein  and  is  not construed  so as to take away the power in the main part  of Article 368 (2).  An amendment which otherwise fulfills  the requirements of Article 368(2) and is outside the  specified cases which require ratification cannot be denied legitimacy on the ground alone of the company it keeps.  The main  part of  Article 368(2) directs that when a Bill which  has  been passed by the requisite special majority by both the  Houses has  received the assent of the President "the  Constitution shall  stand  amended in accordance with the  terms  of  the Bill".   The proviso cannot have the effect of  interdicting this constitutional declaration and mandate to mean that  in a  case  where the proviso has not  been  complied-even  the amendments which do not fall within the ambit of the proviso also  become abortive.  The words "the amendment shall  also require  to be ratified by the legislature"   indicate  that what  is required to be ratified by the legislatures of  the States  is the amendment seeking to make the change  in  the provisions referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso. The  need  for and the requirement of  the  ratification  is confined  to  that  particular amendment alone  and  not  in respect of amendments outside the ambit of the proviso.  The proviso  can have, therefore, no bearing on the validity  of the  amendments which do not fall within its  ambit.  Indeed the  following  observations of this Court in  Sajjan  Singh case (supra) are apposite:                                                       751          "In our opinion, the two parts of Art.368 must on a          reasonable  construction  be harmonised  with  each          other  in  the sense that the  scope  and effect  of          either  of them should not be allowed to be  unduly          reduced or enlarged."                                                      [P.940]      30.  During  the arguments reliance was placed  on  the words  "before the Bill making provision for such  amendment is  presented  to the President for assent" to  sustain  the argument that these words imply that the ratification of the Bill by not less than one-half of the States is a  condition -precedent  for the presentation of the Bill for the  assent of  the President.  It is further argued that a  Bill  which seeks  to  make a change in the provisions  referred  to  in clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso cannot be presented before the  President for his assent without such ratification  and if  assent is given by the President in the absence of  such ratification, the amending Act would be void and ineffective in its entirety.      A  similar  situation can arise in the context  of  the main  part of Article 368(2) which provides: "when the  bill

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is  passed  in  each  House  by  a  majority  of  the  total membership of that House and by a majority of not less  than two-thirds of the Members of that House present and  voting, it  shall  be  presented to the  president".   Here  also  a condition is imposed that the Bill shall be presented to the President  for his assent only after it has been  passed  in each House by the prescribed special majority.  An amendment in the First and Fourth Schedule referable to Article 4  can be  introduced  by Parliament by an ordinary law  passed  by simple  majority.   There may be a Bill  which  may  contain amendments made in the First and Fourth Schedules as well as amendments in other provisions of the constitution excluding those  referred to in the proviso which can be amended  only by  a  special majority under Article 368(2)  and  the  Bill after  having  been  passed only  by  an  ordinary  majority instead of a special majority has received the assent of the President.   The amendments which are made in the First  and Fourth Schedules by the said amendment Act were validly made in view of Article 4 but the amendments in other  provisions were  in  disregard  to Article  368(2)   which  requires  a special  majority.   Is  not the  doctrine  of  severability applicable  to such an amendment so that amendments made  in the First and Fourth Schedules may be upheld while declaring the  amendments in the other provisions as  ineffective?   A contrary                                                  752 view excluding the doctrine of severability would result  in elevating a procedural limitation on the amending power to a level higher than the substantive limitations.      31.  In  Bribery Commissioner  v.  Pedrick  Ranasinghe, (1965 A.C. 172), the Judicial Committee has had to deal with a  somewhat similar situation.  This was a case from  Ceylon under  the Ceylon (Constitution) Order of 1946.  Clause  (4) of  section  29 of the said Order in council  contained  the amending power in the following terms;          "(4)In  the  exercise  of  its  powers  under  this          section, Parliament may amend or repeal any of  the          provisions of this Order, or of any other Order  of          Her  Majesty in council in its application  to  the          Island:          Provided  that no Bill for the amendment or  repeal          of  any  of the provisions of this Order  shall  be          presented  for  the  Royal  Assent  unless  it  has          endorsed on it a certificate under the hand of  the          speaker  that  the number of votes cast  in  favour          thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to          not  less  than two-thirds of the whole  number  of          members of the House (including those not present).          Every  certificate of the Speaker under  this  sub-          section  shall be conclusive for all  purposes  and          shall not be questioned in any court of law."      In  that  case,  it was found that section  41  of  the Bribery   Amendment   Act,  1958  made   a   provision   for appointment of a panel by the Governor-General on the advice of  the  Minister of Justice for selecting  members  of  the Bribery Tribunal while section 55 of the constitution vested the   appointment,  transfer,  dismissal  and   disciplinary control  of  judicial  officers  in  the  Judicial   Service Commission.  It was held that the legislature had  purported to  pass a law which, being in conflict with section  55  of the Order in Council, must be treated, if it is to be valid, as  an implied alteration of the  Constitutional  provisions about the appointment of judicial officers and could only be made  by  laws  which comply with  the  special  legislative procedure  laid  down  in section 29(4).   Since  there  was

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nothing  to  show that the Bribery Amendment Act,  1951  was passed  by  the necessary two-thirds majority, it  was  held that "any Bill which does not comply                                                   753 with the condition precedent of the proviso, is and remains, even though it receives the Royal Assent, invalid and  ultra vires".  Applying the doctrine of severability the  Judicial Committee,  however,  struck down the  offending  provision, i.e. section 41 alone.   In other words passing of the  Bill by   special  majority  was  the  condition  precedent   for presentation of the Bill for the assent.  Disregard of  such a  condition precedent for presenting a Bill for assent  did not  result in the entire enactment being vitiated  and  the law  being declared invalid in its entirety but it only  had the  effect of invalidation of a particular provision  which offended  against the limitation on the amending  power.   A comparison of the language used in clause (4) of section  29 with  that  of  Article  368(2) would  show  that  both  the provisions bear a general similarity of purpose and both the provisions  require  the  passing of the  Bill   by  special majority  before  it  was presented for  assent.   The  same principle  would,  therefore, apply  while  considering  the validity  of  a composite amendment which makes  alterations in  the  First  and Fourth Schedules as  well  as  in  other provisions  of the Constitution requiring  special  majority under  Article 368(2) and such a law, even though passed  by the  simple  majority and not by special  majority,  may  be upheld  in respect of the amendments made in the  First  and Fourth   Schedules.   There  is  really  no  difference   in principle  between  the condition requiring passing  of  the Bill  by a special majority before its presentation  to  the President  for  assent contained in Article 368(2)  and  the condition   for  ratification  of  the  amendment   by   the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States  before the Bill is presented to the President for assent  contained in  the  proviso.   The principle  of  severability  can  be equally  applied  to a composite  amendment  which  contains amendments  in provisions which do not require  ratification by  States as well as amendment in provisions which  require such  ratification  and by application of  the  doctrine  of severability, the amendment can be upheld in respect of  the amendments  which do not require ratification and which  are within  the  competence  of Parliament  alone.   Only  these amendments  in provisions which require  ratification  under the proviso need to be struck down or declared invalid.      32.   The  test of severability requires the  Court  to ascertain whether the legislature would at all have  enacted the law if the severed part was not the part of the law  and whether   after   severance   what   survives   can    stand independently  and  is workable.  If the provisions  of  the Tenth  Schedule  are  considered in the  background  of  the legislative history, namely, the report of the ‘Committee on Defections’ as well as the earlier Bills which were                                                        754 moved to curb the evil of defection it would be evident that the main purpose underlying the constitutional amendment and introduction  of the Tenth Schedule is to curb the  evil  of defection  which was causing immense mischief in  our  body- politic.   The  ouster  of  jurisdiction  of  Courts   under Paragraph 7 was incidental  to and to  lend strength to  the main  purpose which was to curb the evil of  defection.   It cannot  be  said that the constituent body  would  not  have enacted the other provisions in the Tenth Schedule if it has known  that Paragraph 7 was not valid.  Nor can it  be  said that the rest of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule cannot

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stand  on  their  own even if Paragraph 7  is  found  to  be unconstitutional.   The  provisions  of  Paragraph  7   can, therefore,  be  held to be severable from the  rest  of  the provisions.          We accordingly hold on contentions ‘C’ and ‘D’:          "That  there  is  nothing in the  said  proviso  to          Article   368   (2)   which   detracts   from   the          severability  of  a  provision on  account  of  the          inclusion   of  which  the  Bill   containing   the          Amendment  requires ratification from the  rest  of          the  provisions of such Bill which do  not  attract          and  require such ratification.  Having  regard  to          the  mandatory  language of Article 368(2)  that  "          thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended" the          operation of the proviso should not be extended  to          constitutional  amendments in Bill which can  stand          by themselves without such ratification.          That,    accordingly,   the   Constitution    (52nd          Amendment)  Act,  1985, in so far as  it  seeks  to          introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of          India,  to the extent of its provisions  which  are          amenable  to  the legal-sovereign of  the  amending          process of the Union Parliament cannot be overborne          by  the proviso which cannot operate in that  area.          There  is no justification for the view  that  even          the  rest  of the provisions  of  the  constitution          (52nd  Amendment) Act, 1985, excluding Paragraph  7          of  the  Tenth  Schedule  become   constitutionally          infirm by reason alone of the fact that one of  its          severable  provisions which attracted and  required          ratification  under the proviso to  Article  368(2)          was not so ratified.          That  Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule contains  a          provision                                                        755          which is independent of, and stands apart from  the          main  provisions  of the Tenth Schedule  which  are          intended  to  provide  a remedy  for  the  evil  of          unprincipled  and  unethical  political  defections          and, therefore, is a severable part.  The remaining          provisions  of the Tenth Schedule can and do  stand          independently  of Paragraph 7 and are  complete  in          themselves  workable and are not truncated  by  the          excision of Paragraph 7."      33. Re: Contentions ‘E’ and ‘F’:      These  two contentions have certain over-lapping  areas between  them  and  admit  of  being  dealt  with  together. Paragraph  6(1)  of  the Tenth Schedule seeks  to  impart  a statutory  finality  to the decision of the Speaker  or  the Chairman.  The argument  is that, this concept of ‘finality’ by  itself,  excludes Courts’ jurisdiction.  Does  the  word "final"  render  the  decision of the  Speaker  immune  from Judicial  Review?  It is now well-accepted that  a  finality clause  is not a legislative magical incantation  which  has that  effect  of  telling  of  Judicial  Review.   Statutory finality  of  a decision presupposes and is subject  to  its consonance  with the statute.  On the meaning and effect  of such  finality clause, Prof.  Wade in  ‘Administrative  Law’ 6th Edn, at page 720 says:          "Many statues provide that  some decision shall  be          final.  That provision is a bar to any appeal.  But          the  courts  refuse  to  allow  it  to  hamper  the          operation  of judicial review.  As will be seen  in          this  and  the following section, there is  a  firm          judicial policy against allowing the rule of law to

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        be undermined by weakening the powers of the court.          Statutory  restrictions  on judicial  remedies  are          given   the   narrowest   possible    construction,          sometimes  even  against the plain meaning  of  the          words.   This  is a sound policy,  since  otherwise          administrative  authorities and tribunals would  be          given  uncontrollable power and could  violate  the          law at will. ‘Finality’ is a good thing but justice          is a better."          "If  a  statute says that the  decision  ‘shall  be          final’  or  ‘shall be final and conclusive  to  all          intents  and purposes’ this is held to mean  merely          that  there  is  no  appeal:  judicial  control  of          legality is unimpaired.  "Parliament only gives the          impress of finality to                                                        756          the  decisions  of the tribunal on  condition  that          they are reached in accordance with the law.   This          has been the consistent doctrine for three  hundred          years."      Learned Professor further says:          "The   normal  effect  of  a  finality  clause   is          therefore to prevent any appeal.  There is no right          of  appeal  in  any  case unless  it  is  given  by          statute.  But where there is general provision  for          appeals,  for example, from quarter session to  the          High Court by case stated, a subsequent Act  making          the  decision  of  quarter session  final  on  some          specific matter will prevent an appeal.  But in one          case  the Court of Appeal has deprived  a  finality          clause of part even of this modest content, holding          that a question which can be resolved by certiorari          or declaration can equally well be the subject of a          case  stated,  since  this  is  only  a  matter  of          machinery.  This does not open the door to  appeals          generally,  but only to appeals by case  stated  on          matters  which could equally well be dealt with  by          certiorari or declaration, i.e., matter subject  to          judicial review.          "A provision for finality may be important in other          contexts, for example when the question is  whether          the finding of one tribunal may be reopened  before          another, or whether an interlocutory order is  open          to appeal......".                                                   [Page 721]      Lord  Devlin had said "Judicial interference  with  the executive   cannot  for long greatly exceed  what  Whitehall will  accept"  and  said that a decision  may  be  made  un- reviewable  "And that puts the lid on".  Commenting on  this Prof.   Wade says: "But the Anisminic case showed  just  the opposite,  when the House of Lord removed the lid and  threw it  away."  [See: Constitutional  Fundamentals,  the  Hamlyn Lectures, 1989 Edn. p.88]      In  Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1954  SC 520  the order of the Election Tribunal was made  final  and conclusive  by  s. 105 of the Representation of  the  People Act,  1951.   The  contention  was  that  the  finality  and conclusiveness  clauses  barred  the  jurisdiction  of   the Supreme  Court  under  Article  136.   This  contention  was repelled.  It was observed:          ".....but  once  it is held that it is  a  judicial          tribunal  empowered                                                        757          and  obliged  to  deal  judicially  with   disputes          arising out of or in connection with election,  the

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        overriding  power  of this Court to  grant  special          leave,   in  proper  cases,  would   certainly   be          attracted and this power cannot be excluded by  any          parliamentary legislation.          ......   But  once  that  Tribunal  has  made   any          determination  or adjudication on the  matter,  the          powers of this Court to interfere by way of special          leave can always be exercised.          ......  The  powers  given by Article  136  of  the          Constitution, however, are in the nature of special          or residuary powers which are  exercisable  outside          the  purview  of ordinary law, in cases  where  the          needs of justice demand interference by the Supreme          Court of the land ......          Section 105 of the Representation of the People Act          certainly  give  finality to the  decision  of  the          Election  Tribunal so far as that Act is  concerned          and  does  not provide for any further  appeal  but          that  cannot  in  any way cut down  or  effect  the          overriding powers which this court can exercise  in          the matter of granting special leave under Art. 136          of the Constitution."                                                    [p.522]      34.  Again, in Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash  Mitter, [1971]  3  SCR  483 a similar finality  clause  in  Articles 217(3) of the Constitution camp up for consideration.   This Court said:          "....The  President  acting  under  Article  217(3)          performs  a judicial function of  grave  importance          under  the scheme of our Constitution.   He  cannot          act    on    the   advice   of    his    Ministers.          Notwithstanding the declared finality of the  order          of  the  president the Court  has  jurisdiction  in          appropriate  cases  to set aside the order,  if  it          appears   that   it  was   passed   on   collateral          considerations or the rules of natural justice were          not observed, or that the President’s judgment  was          coloured  by the advice or representation  made  by          the executive or it was founded on no evidence...."          (p-505).                                                         758                Referring to the expression  "final"occurring          in Article 311(3) of the Constitution this Court in          Union  of  India & Anr. v. Tulsiram  Patel  &  Ors.          [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 at page 274 held:          "......The finality given by clause (3) of  Article          311  to the disciplinary authority’s decision  that          it  was  not  reasonably practicable  to  hold  the          inquiry  is not binding upon the court.  The  court          will also examine the charge of mala fides, if any,          made  in  the  writ  petition.   In  examining  the          relevance  of the reasons, the court will  consider          the  situation which according to the  disciplinary          authority  made it come to the conclusion  that  it          was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.          If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant,          then  the  recording  of its  satisfaction  by  the          disciplinary  authority would be an abuse of  power          conferred upon it by clause (b)....."      35. If the intendment is to exclude the jurisdiction of the superior Courts, the language would quite obviously have been different.  Even so, where such exclusion is sought  to be  effected  by an amendment the further  question  whether such an amendment would be destructive of a basic feature of the  Constitution  would  arise.   But  comparison  of   the

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language  in Article 363(1) would bring out in contrast  the kind  of language that may be necessary to achieve any  such purpose.      In  Brundaban Nayak v. Election Commission of  India  & Anr.,  [1965]  3 SCR 53, in spite of  finality  attached  by Article  192 to the decision of the Governor in  respect  of disqualification incurred by a member of a State Legislature subsequent to the election, the matter was examined by  this Court on an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution   against  the  decision  of  the  High   Court dismissing the writ petition filed under Article 226 of  the Constitution.  Similarly in Union of India v. Jyoti  Prakash Mitter,  [1971]3 SCR 483, in spite of finality  attached  to the order of the President with regard to the  determination of age of a Judge of the High Court under Article 217 (3) of the  Constitution, this Court examined the legality  of  the order  passed  by the President during the  pendency  of  an appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution.      There  is  authority against the acceptability  of  the argument  that the word "final" occurring in Paragraph  6(1) has the effect of excluding the                                                        759 jurisdiction of the Courts in Articles 136, 226 and 227.      36. The  cognate questions are whether a dispute of the kind envisaged by Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule is in  a non-justiciable area and that, at all events, the fiction in Paragraph 6(2) that all proceedings under Paragraph 6(1)  of the   Tenth  Schedule  be  deemed  to  be  "proceedings   in Parliament"  of "Proceedings in the Legislature of a  State" attracts  immunity  from  the scrutiny  by  Courts as  under Article 122 or 212, as the case may be.      Implicit  in  the  first of  these  postulates  is  the premise that questions of disqualification of members of the House are essentially matters pertaining to the Constitution of the House and, therefore, the Legislature is entitled  to exert  its exclusive power to the exclusion of the  judicial power.    This  assumption  is  based  on  certain   British legislature  practices  of the past in an area which  is  an impalpable congeries of legal rules and conventions peculiar to  and characteristic of British Parliamentary  traditions. Indeed,   the  idea  appears  to  have  started   with   the proposition that the Constitution of the House was itself  a matter  of privilege of the House.  Halsbury  contains  this statement:          "1493,  Privilege  of  the  House  of  Commons   in          relation  to  its  constitution:   In  addition  to          possessing  a complete control over the  regulation          of  its  own  proceedings and the  conduct  of  its          members, the House of Commons claims the  exclusive          right of providing, as it may deem fit, for its own          proper constitution."                                          (emphasis supplied)          (See: Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol.  34          Pages 603 & 604)      But in the Indian constitutional dispensation the power to decide a disputed disqualification of an elected   member of the House is not treated as a matter of privilege and the power to resolve such electoral disputes is clearly judicial and  not  legislative  in nature.  The  fact  that  election disputes were at some stage decided by the House of  Commons itself  was  not  conclusive  that  even  their  power   was legislative.   The controversy, if any, in this area is  put at rest by the authoritative earlier pronouncements  of this Court.                                                          760

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    37.In  Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976] 2  SCR 347 Beg J., referring to the historical background  relating to  the  resolution of electoral disputes by  the  House  of Common said:          "I do not think that it is possible to contend,  by          resorting  to some concept of a succession  to  the          powers  of the medieval "High Court of  Parliament"          in  England,  that a judicial power  also  devolved          upon   our  Parliament  through   the   constituent          Assembly,  mentioned  in  Sec.  8  of  the   Indian          Independence Act of 1947.  As already indicated  by          me, the Constituent assembly was invested with  law          making and not judicial powers.  Whatever  judicial          power  may  have  been possessed  once  by  English          kings    sitting  in Parliament,  constituting  the          highest  Court  of the realm in  medieval  England,          have  devolved solely on the House of Lords as  the          final  court  of  appeal  in  England.   "King   in          Parliament" had ceased to exercise judicial  powers          in any other way long before 1950.  And, the House          of  Commons had certainly not exercised a  judicial          power  as a successor to the one time  jurisdiction          of  the  "King  in Parliament"  with  the  possible          exception   of   the  power  to  punish   for   its          contempts...."                                                [p.627 & 628]      In   the   same  case,  Justice   Mathew   made   these observations  as  to the imperative judicial nature  of  the power to resolve disputes.          "The  concept  of democracy as  visualised  by  the          Constitution presupposes the representation of  the          people in Parliament and State Legislatures by  the          method  of  election.   And,  before  an   election          machinery can be brought into operation, there  are          three requisites which require to be attended to  ,          namely, (1) there should be a set of laws and rules          making  provisions  with  respect  to  all  matters          relating to, or in connection with, elections,  and          it should be decided as to how these laws and rules          are  to be made; (2) there should be  an  executive          charged  with the duty of securing the due  conduct          of  elections; and (3) there should be  a  judicial          tribunal to deal with disputes arising out of or in          connection with elections......"                                                      [p.504]          "In  whichever body or authority, the  jurisdiction          is vested, the                                                      761          exercise  of the jurisdiction must be  judicial  in          character.    This   court   has   held   that   in          adjudicating  an election dispute an  authority  is          performing  a judicial function and a petition  for          leave   to   appeal  under  Article  136   of   the          Constitution  would lie to this Court  against  the          decision nothwithstanding the provisions of Article          329(b)."                                          (emphasis supplied)                                                      [p.506]      It is also useful to recall the following  observations of Gajendragadkar J., on the scope of Article 194(3) of  the Constitution,  which  is  analogous  to  Article  105(3)  in Special Reference No.1 of 1964 [1965] 1 SCR 413:          "This  clause requires that the powers,  privileges          and immunities which are claimed by the House  must          be  shown to have subsisted at the commencement  of

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        the Constitution, i.e., on January 26, 1950.  it is          well-known that out of a large number of privileges          and  powers  which  the House  of  commons  claimed          during   the  days  of  its  bitter  struggle   for          recognition, some were given up in course of  time,          and some virtually faded out by desuetude; and  so,          in  every  case  where a power is  claimed,  it  is          necessary  to  enquire whether it was  an  existing          power  at the relevant time.  It must  also  appear          that  the  said power was not only claimed  by  the          House of Commons, but was recognised by the English          Courts.  It would obviously be idle to contend that          if  a  particular power which is  claimed  by  the          House  was claimed by the House of Commons but  was          not  recognised by the English Courts,   it  would          still be upheld under the latter part of clause (3)          only  on the ground that it was in fact claimed  by          the House of Commons.  In other words, the  inquiry          which  is  prescribed by this clause  is:   is  the          power in question shown or proved to have subsisted          in the House of Commons at the relevant time?"                                             (See page 442)      This  question is answered by Beg, J. in  Indira  Nehru Gandhi’s case:          "I think, at the time our Constitution was  framed,          the decision                                                      762          of an election dispute had ceased to be a privilege          of  the House of Commons in England and  therefore,          under  Article 105(3), it could not be a  privilege          of Parliament in this country."                                                     [p.505]      38.Indeed,  in dealing with the  disqualifications  and the  resolution of disputes relating to them under  Articles 191 and 192 or Article 102 and 103, as the case may be,  the Constitution  has  evinced  a  clear  intention  to  resolve electoral-disputes  by resort to the judicial power  of  the State.  Indeed, Justice Khanna in Indira Nehru Gandhi’s case said:          "Not  much argument is needed to show  that  unless          there  be  a machinery for  resolving  an  election          dispute  and  for going into the  allegations  that          elections were not free and fair being vitiated  by          malpractices, the provision that a candidate should          not resort to malpractices would be in the  nature          of  a mere pious wish without any  legal  sanction.          It  is  further plain that if the validity  of  the          election declared to be valid only if we provide  a          forum for going into those grounds and prescribe  a          law for adjudicating upon those grounds....."  (See          page 468)      It  is,  therefore,  inappropriate to  claim  that  the determinative jurisdiction of the Speaker or the Chairman in the Tenth Schedule is not a judicial power and is within the non-justiciable legislative area.  The classic exposition of Justice  Issacs  J.,  in  Australian  Boot  Trade  Employees Federation  v. Whybrow & Co., [1910] 10 CLR 226 at page 317, as   to   what  distinguishes  a  judicial  power   from   a legislative power was referred to with the approval of  this Court in Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR  1958 SC 578 at 611. Issacs J., stated:          "If  the  dispute is as to the relative  rights  of          parties   as   they  rest  on   past   or   present          circumstances,  the  award is in the  nature  of  a          judgment,  which might have been the decree  of  an

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        ordinary   judicial  tribunal  acting   under   the          ordinary  judicial power. There the law  applicable          to  the  case must be observed.  If,  however,  the          dispute  is as to what shall in the future  be  the          mutual rights and responsibilities of the  parties-          in  other words, if no present rights are  asserted          or  denied, but a future rule of conduct is  to  be          prescribed,   thus   creating   new   rights    and          obligations, with                                                        763          sanctions for non-conformity then the determination          that   so   prescribes,  call  it  an   award,   or          arbitration, determination, or decision or what you          will,  is essentially of a  legislative  character,          and  limited only by the law which  authorises  it.          If,   again,  there  are  neither  present   rights          asserted, nor a future rule of conduct  prescribed,          but  merely  a fact ascertained necessary  for  the          practical  effectuation  of  admitted  rights,  the          proceeding, though called an arbitration, is rather          in  the  nature of an appraisement  or  ministerial          act."      In  the  present  case, the power  to  decide  disputed disqualification  under Paragraph 6(1) is preeminently of  a judicial complexion.      39. The fiction in Paragraph 6(2), indeed, places it in the first clause of Article 122 or 212, as the case may  be. The words "proceedings in Parliament" or "proceedings in the legislature  of  a  State"  in  Paragraph  6(2)  have  their corresponding  expression  in  Articles  122(1)  and  212(1) respectively.   This   attracts  an   immunity   from   mere irregularities of procedures.      That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule was introduced, the Constitution did not evince any intention to invoke  Article 122 or 212 in the conduct of  resolution  of disputes  as  to  the  disqualification  of  members   under Articles  191(1)  and  102(1). The  very  deeming  provision implies  that  the proceedings of disqualification  are,  in fact, not before the House; but only before the Speaker as a specially designated authority. The decision under paragraph 6(1) is not the decision of the House, nor is it subject  to the   approval   by  the  House.   The   decision   operates independently  of the House. A deeming provision  cannot  by its  creation  transcend its own judicial  scrutiny  of  the decision  of the Speaker or Chairman exercising power  under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule.      40.  But  then is the Speaker or  the  Chairman  acting under  Paragraph 6(1) is a Tribunal? "All tribunals are  not courts, though all Courts are Tribunals". The word  "Courts" is used to designate those Tribunals which are set up in  an organised  State  for  the  Administration  of  Justice.  By Administration of justice is meant the exercise of  judicial power  of  the State to maintain and uphold  rights  and  to punish  "wrongs".  Whenever there is an  infringement  of  a right  or  an injury, the Courts are there  to  restore  the vinculum  juris,  which is disturbed. See:  Harinagar  Sugar Mills                                                        764 Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala & Ors., [1962] 2 SCR  339. In that case Hidayatullah, J. said:           "....By   "courts"  is  meant  courts   of   civil          judicature and by "tribunals", those bodies of  men          who  are appointed to decide controversies  arising          under certain special laws. Among the powers of the          State   is  included  the  power  to  decide   such

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        controversies.  This  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the          attributes  of  the State and is aptly  called  the          judicial  power  of the State. In the  exercise  of          this  power, a clear division is  thus  noticeable.          Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before          tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary          courts  of civil judicature. Their  procedures  may          differ,  but  the  functions  are  not  essentially          different.  What distinguishes them has never  been          successfully established. Lord Stamp said that  the          real distinction is that the courts have "an air of          detachment".  But this is more a matter of age  and          tradition   and  is  not  of  the   essence.   Many          tribunals,   in   recent  years,   have   acquitted          themselves  so well and with such detachment as  to          make this test insufficient."                                                      [p.362]      Where  there is a lis-an affirmation by one  party  and denial  by  another-and the dispute necessarily  involves  a decision on the rights and obligations of the parties to  it and  the authority is called upon to decide it, there  is  a exercise  of  judicial power.  That authority  is  called  a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a  Court. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma and Anr., [1965]2 SCR 366, this Court said:          ".....  The  main and the basic test,  however,  is          whether  the adjudicating power which a  particular          authority  is  empowered  to  exercise,  has   been          conferred  on it by a statute and can be  described          as  a part of the State’s inherent power  exercised          in  discharging  its judicial  function.   Applying          this  test,  there can be no doubt that  the  power          which the State Government exercises under  R.6(5)          and  R.6(6)  is  a part  of  the  State’s  judicial          power.....There is, in that sense, a lis; there  is          affirmation by one party and denial by another, and          the  dispute  necessarily involves the  rights  and          obligations of the parties to it.  The order  which          the State Government ultimately passes is                                                         765          described as its decision and it is made final  and          binding....."                                               [p.386 and 387]      By   these  well-known  and  accepted  tests  of   what constitute  a Tribunal, the Speaker or the Chairman,  acting under paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal.      41. In the operative conclusions we pronounced on  12th November, 1991 we indicated in clauses G and H therein  that Judicial  review  in  the  area is  limited  in  the  manner indicated.  If the adjudicatory authority is a tribunal,  as indeed we have held it to be, why, then, should its scope be so  limited?   The finality clause in paragraph 6  does  not completely  exclude  the jurisdiction of  the  courts  under Articles  136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution. But it  does have  the effect of limiting the scope of the  jurisdiction. The principle that is applied by the courts is that in spite of  a  finality clause it is open to the  court  to  examine whether the action of the authority under challenge is ultra vires  the powers conferred on the said authority.  Such  an action  can  be  ultra vires for the reason that  it  is  in contravention of a mandatory provision of the law conferring on the authority the power to take such an action.  It  will also be ultra vires the powers conferred on the authority if it  is vitiated by mala fides or is colourable  exercise  of power  based  on extraneous and  irrelevant  considerations.

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While  exercising their certiorari jurisdiction, the  courts have  applied  the test whether the  impugned  action  falls within  the jurisdiction of the authority taking the  action or  it  falls outside such jurisdiction.  An  ouster  clause confines  judicial  review  in respect  of  actions  falling outside the jurisdiction of the authority taking such action but  precludes challenge to such action on the ground of  an error  committed in the exercise of jurisdiction  vested  in the authority because such an action cannot be said to be an action  without  jurisdiction.  An ouster  clause  attaching finality to a determination, therefore, does oust certiorari to  some  extent and it will be effective  in  ousting   the power  of  the court to review the decision of  an  inferior tribunal  by  certiorari if the inferior  tribunal  has  not acted  without jurisdiction and has merely made an error  of law  which  does  not affect its  jurisdiction  and  if  its decision is not a nullity for some reason such as breach  of rule of natural justice.  See : Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade,  6th  Edn.,  pp. 724-726; Anisminic  Ltd.  v.  Foreign Compensation  commission,  [1969] 2 AC 147; S.E.  Asia  Fire Bricks v. Non-Metallic Products, [1981] A.C. 363.                                                766      In  Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1964] 4 SCR  797, while  considering the scope of judicial review  during  the operation of an order passed by the President under  Article 359(1)  suspending  the fundamental right  guaranteed  under Article  21 of the Constitution, it has been held  that  the said  order did not preclude the High Court  entertaining  a petition  under  Article  226 of the  Constitution  where  a detenu  had  been  detained in violation  of  the  mandatory provisions  of the detention law or where the detention  has been ordered mala fide. It was emphasised that the  exercise of a power mala fide was wholly outside the scope of the Act conferring   the  power  and  can  always  be   successfully challenged. (p. 825)      Similarly  in  State of Rajasthan v.  Union  of  India, [1978]  1 SCR 1, decided by a seven judge Bench, high  Court was   considering  the  challenge  to  the  validity  of   a proclamation issued by the President of India under  Article 356  of the constitution. At the relevant time under  clause (5)  of  Article  356, the  satisfaction  of  the  President mentioned  in  clause (1) was final and  conclusive  and  it could not be questioned in any court on any ground. All  the learned judges have expressed the view that the proclamation could be open to challenge if it is vitiated by mala  fides. While taking this view, some of the learned judges have made express reference to the provisions of clause(5).      In  this  context, Bhagwati, J (as  the  learned  Chief Justice  then was) speaking for himself and A.C.  Gupta,  J. has stated:          "Of  course by reason of cl. (5) of Art.  356,  the          satisfaction   of  the  President  is   final   and          conclusive and cannot be assailed on any ground but          this  immunity from attack cannot apply  where  the          challenge is not that the satisfaction is  improper          or  unjustified, but that there is no  satisfaction          at  all. In such a case it is not the  satisfaction          arrived  at by the President which  is  challenged,          but the existence of the satisfaction itself. Take,          for  example, a case where the President gives  the          reason  for taking action under Art. 356,  cl.  (1)          and  says  that he is doing so, because  the  Chief          Minister of the State is below five feet in  height          and,  therefore,  in his opinion  a  situation  has          arisen where the Government of the State cannot  be

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        carried on in accordance with the provisions of the          Constitution. Can the so called satisfaction of the          President  in such a case not be challenged                                                        767          on the ground that it is absurd or perverse or mala          fide or based on a wholly extraneous and irrelevant          ground  and  is,  therefore,  no  satisfaction   at          all."(pp. 82-83)          Untwalia, J. has held as follows:          "I,  however,  must  hasten to add  that  I  cannot          persuade myself to subscribe to the view that under          no  circumstances an order of proclamation made  by          the  President under Article 356 can be  challenged          in   a   Court  of  Law.  And,  I  am   saying   so          notwithstanding  the provision contained in  clause          (5)   of  the  said  Article  introduced   by   the          Constitution(38th Amendment) Act, 1975."(p. 94)          "But then, what did I mean by saying that situation          may arise in a given case where the jurisdiction of          the  Court is not completely ousted? I  mean  this.          If,  without  entering into  the  prohibited  area,          remaining  on the fence, almost on the face of  the          impugned  order  or the threatened  action  of  the          President it is reasonably possible to say that  in          the eye of law it is no order or action as it is in          flagrant   violation  of  the  very  words   of   a          particular Article, justifying the conclusion  that          the order is ultra vires, wholly illegal or  passed          mala   fide,  in  such  a  situation  it  will   be          tantamount in law to be no order at all. Then  this          Court  is not powerless to interfere with  such  an          order and may, rather, must strike it down."(p. 95)          Similarly, Fazal Ali, J. has held :          "Even  if  an  issue is  not  justiciable,  if  the          circumstances   relied   upon  by   the   executive          authority are absolutely extraneous and irrelevant,          the  Courts have the undoubted power to  scrutinise          such an e exercise of the executive power.  Such  a          judicial scrutiny is one which comes into operation          when  the  exercise  of  the  executive  power   is          colourable or mala fide and based on extraneous  or          irrelevant considerations." (p. 116)          "It  is  true  that while an order  passed  by  the          President under Article 356 is put beyond  judicial          scrutiny  by cl. (5) of Art.356, but this does  not          mean that the Court possesses no jurisdiction                                                    768          in  the matter at all.  Even in respect of cl.  (5)          of  Art. 356, the Courts have a limited  sphere  of          operation  in  that  on the reasons  given  by  the          President in his order if the Courts find that they          are absolutely extraneous and irrelevant and  based          on  personal and illegal consideration  the  Courts          are  not powerless to strike down the order on  the          ground of mala fide if proved." (p.120)      In  Union  of India v. Jyoti  Prakash  Mitter  (supra), dealing with the decision of the President under Article 217 (3)  on  the question as to the age of a judge of  the  High Court,  requiring a judicial approach it was held  that  the field of judicial review was enlarged to cover violation  of rules  of  natural justice as well as an order based  on  no evidence because such errors are errors of jurisdiction. c     In  Union  of  India & Anr. v. Tulsiram  Patel  &  Ors. (supra)  this Court was dealing with Article 311 (3) of  the constitution  which  attaches finality to the order  of  the

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disciplinary  authority  on  the  question  whether  it  was reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry.  It was  observed that  though the ‘finality’ clause did not bar  jurisdiction it did indicate that the jurisdiction is limited to  certain grades.      In the light of the decisions referred to above and the nature of function that is exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under  paragraph  6,  the scope  of  judicial  review  under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect  of an  order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under  paragraph  6 would  be  confined  to  jurisdictional  errors  only  viz., infirmities  based on violation of  constitutional  mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity.      In view of the limited scope of judicial review that is available  on account of the finality clause in paragraph  6 and also having regard to the constitutional intendment  and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power  i.e. Speaker/Chairman,  judicial review cannot be available at  a stage   prior   to  the  making  of  a   decision   by   the Speaker/Chairman  and  a  quia timet  action  would  not  be permissible.   Nor would interference be permissible  at  an interlocutory  stage  of the proceedings.   Exception  will, however,  have  to  be  made  in  respect  of  cases   where disqualification   or  suspension  is  imposed  during   the pendency  of  the proceedings and such  disqualification  or suspension   is   likely  to  have  grave,   immediate   and irreversible repercussions and consequence.                                                769      42. In the result, we hold on contentions E and F :          That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing  for          an  additional grant for disqualification  and  for          adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to          create  a nonjusticiable constitutional area.   The          power  to  resolve  such  disputes  vested  in  the          Speaker or chairman is a judicial power.          That  Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to  the          extent it seeks to impart finality to the  decision          of the Speakers/Chairmen is valid.  But the concept          of  statutory finality embodied in  Paragraph  6(1)          does  not detract from or abrogate judicial  review          under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution          in  so  far as infirmities based on  violations  of          constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance          with  Rules of Natural Justice and perversity,  are          concerned.           That  the deeming provision in Paragraph  6(2)  of          the  Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity  analogous          to  that  in  Articles 122(1)  and  212(1)  of  the          Constitution as understood and explained in  Keshav          Singh’s  Case Spl.Ref. No. 1, [1965] 1 SCR 413,  to          protect  the  validity  of  proceedings  from  mere          irregularities    of   procedure.    The    deeming          provision, having regard to the words "be deemed to          be  proceedings in Parliament" or  "proceedings  in          the  Legislature of a State" confines the scope  of          the fiction accordingly.          The  Speaker/Chairmen while exercising  powers  and          discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule  act          as  Tribunal  adjudicating rights  and  obligations          under  the  Tenth Schedule and their  decisions  in          that capacity are amenable to judicial review.          However,   having  regard  to  the   Constitutional          Schedule  in  the Tenth Schedule,  judicial  review          should not cover any stage prior to the making of a

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        decision  by the Speakers/Chairman.  Having  regard          to the constitutional intendment and the status  of          the  repository of the adjudicatory power, no  quia          timet  actions are permissible, the only  exception          for  any interlocutory interference being cases  of          interlocutory   disqualifications  or   suspensions          which may have grave, immediate and irreversible                                                   770           repurcussions and consequence.      43.   Re : Contention(G):      The  argument  is  that  an  independant   adjudicatory machinery   for  resolution  of  electrol  disputes  is   an essential incident of democracy, which is a basic feature of Indian  consitutionalism.  It is urged that  investiture  of the  power of resolving such disputes in the Speaker or  the Chairman  does  not  answer this  test  of  an  independent, impartial  quality  of the adjudicatory machinery.   It  is, therefore,  urged that Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth  Schedule is violative of a basic feature.      It  is  also  urged that a Speaker,  under  the  Indian Parliamentary  tradition  is  not  required  to  resign  his membership of the political party on whose strength he  gets elected  and that inevitably the decision of the Speaker  is not  free tugs and pulls of political polarisations.  It  is urged  that the Speaker who has not resigned his  membership of  the  political  party cannot be impartial  and,  at  all events,  his  functioning will not be free  from  reasonable likelihood of bias.      44.   The   Tenth  Schedule  breaks   away   from   the constitutional  pattern for resolution of  disqualifications envisaged in Articles 103 and 192 of the Constitution  which vest  jurisdiction  in this behalf in the President  or  the Governor  acting  according  to  the  opinion  of   Election Commission.  The disqualifications for defection could  very well  have  been included in Article 102(1) or 191(1)  as  a ground,  additional  to the already existing  grounds  under clauses  (a)  to  (e)  in  which  event,  the  same  dispute resolution    machinery   would   have   dealt   with    the disqualifications  for  defections  also.   But  the   Tenth Schedule,  apparently. attempted a different  experiment  in respect of this particular ground of disqualification.      45.The  question  is, whether the  investiture  of  the determinative  jurisdiction in the Speaker would  by  itself stand  vitiated  as  denying  the  idea  of  an  independent adjudicatory  authority.  We are afraid the  criticism  that the provision incurs the vice of unconstitutionality ignores the high status and importance of the office of the  Speaker in a Parliamentary democracy.  The office of the speaker  is held  in  the highest respect and  esteem  in  Parliamentary traditions.    The   evolution   of   the   institution   of Parliamentary democracy has as its pivot the institution  of the  Speaker.   ‘The Speaker holds a  high,   important  and ceremonial  office.  All questions of the well being of  the House                                                     771 are  matters of Speaker’s concern’.  The Speaker is said  to be  the very embodiment of propriety and  impartiality.   He performs wide ranging functions including the performance of important functions of a judicial character.      Mavalankar, who was himself a distinguished occupant of that high office, says :          "In  parliamentary  democracy, the  office  of  the          Speaker  is held in very high esteem  and  respect.          There are many reasons for this.  Some of them  are          purely  historical  and some are  inherent  in  the

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        concept  of parliamentary democracy and the  powers          and  duties  of  the Speaker.   Once  a  person  is          elected  Speaker,  he  is  expected  to  be   above          parties,  above  politics.   In  other  words,   he          belongs  to all the members or belongs to none.  He          holds the scales of justice evenly irrespective  of          party or person, though no one expects that he will          do  absolute justice in all matters; because, as  a          human   being  he  has  his  human  drawbacks   and          shortcomings.   However,  everybody knows  that  he          will   intentionally  do  no  injustice   or   show          partiality.   "Such a person is naturally  held  in          respect by all."          [See  : G. V. Mavalankar : The Office  of  Speaker,          Journal  of Parliamentary Information, April  1956,          Vol. 2, No. 1, p.33]      Pundit  Nehru  referring to the office of  the  Speaker said :          "....The   speaker   represents  the   House.    He          represents the dignity of the House, the freedom of          the  House  and because the  House  represents  the          nation,  in a particular way, the  Speaker  becomes          the  symbol  of the nation’s freedom  and  liberty.          Therefore,  it  is  right that that  should  be  an          honoured  position, a free position and  should  be          occupied  always by men of outstanding ability  and          impartiality.          [See : HOP. Deb. Vol.IX (1954), CC 3447-48]      Referring to the Speaker, Erskine may says :          "The Chief characteristics attaching to the  office          of  Speaker in the House of Commons  are  authority          and impartiality.  As a symbol of his authority  he          is accompanied by the Royal Mace                                                  772          which is borne before him when entering and leaving          the  chamber  and  upon  state  occasions  by   the          Sergeant  at Arms attending the House  of  commons,          and  is  placed upon the table when he  is  in  the          chair.  In debate all speeches are addressed to him          and he calls upon Members to speak - a choice which          is not open to dispute.  When he rises to  preserve          order  or to give a ruling on a doubtful  point  he          must  always be heard in silence and no Member  may          stand when the Speaker is on his feet.  Reflections          upon the character or actions of the Speaker may be          punished  as  breaches of  privilege.   His  action          cannot  be criticized incidentally  in   debate  or          upon  any form of proceeding except  a  substantive          motion.  His authority in the chair is fortified by          many  special powers which are referred  to  below.          Confidence  in the impartiality of the Speaker  is          an   indispensable  condition  of  the   successful          working  of procedure, and many  conventions  exist          which  have as their object not only to ensure  the          impartiality of the Speaker but also to ensure that          his impartiality is generally recognised....."          [See : Erskine May - Parliamentary Practice -  20th          edition p. 234 and 235]      M.N. Kaul and S.L. Shakdher in ‘Practice and  procedure of Parliament’ 4th Edition, say :          "The all important conventional and ceremonial head          of  Lok Sabha is the Speaker.  Within the walls  of          the House his authority is supreme.  This authority          is  based on the Speaker’s absolute  and  unvarying          impartiality - the main feature of the office,  the

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        law  of its life.  The obligation  of  impartiality          appears  in  the  constitutional  provision   which          ordains  that the Speaker is entitled to vote  only          in  the case of equality of votes.   Moreover,  his          impartiality  within  the House is secured  by  the          fact  that he remains above all  considerations  of          party  or political career, and to that  effect  he          may  also  resign  from  the  party  to  which   he          belonged."                                                     [p. 104]      46. It would, indeed, be unfair to the high  traditions of that great                                                        773 office   to  say  that  the  investiture,  in  it  of   this Jurisdiction  would  be vitiated for violation  of  a  basic feature  of  democracy.   It  is  inappropriate  to  express distrust  in the High office of the Speaker, merely  because some  of  the Speakers are alleged, or even found,  to  have discharged  their  functions not in keeping with  the  great traditions of that high office.  The Robes of the Speaker to change and elevate the man inside.      47.  Accordingly,  the contention that the  vesting  of adjudicatory  functions  in the Speakers/Chairmen  would  by itself vitiate the provision on the ground of likelihood  of political   bias   is   unsound  and   is   rejected.    The Speakers/Chairmen  hold a pivotal position in the scheme  of Parliamentary democracy and are guardians of the rights  and privileges  of the House.  They are expected to and to  take far  reaching decisions in the functioning of  Parliamentary democracy.  Vestiture of power of adjudicate questions under the  Tenth Schedule in such a  constitutional  functionaries should not be considered exceptionable.      48.Re : Contention H :      In  the view we take of the validity of paragraph 7  it is  unnecessary  to  pronounce  on  the  contention  whether judicial  review is a basic feature of the Constitution  and paragraph  7  of  the Tenth  Schedule  violates  such  basic structure.      49.  We may now notice one other contention as  to  the construction of the expression ‘any direction’ occurring  in paragraph  2(1)(b).   It is argued that  if  the  expression really attracts within its sweep every direction or whip  of any  kind whatsoever it might be unduly restrictive  of  the freedom  of  speech  and  the right  of  dissent  and  that, therefore, should be given a meaning limited to the  objects and purposes of the Tenth Schedule.  Learned counsel  relied upon  and commended to us the view taken by the minority  in the Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court  in Parkash  Singh Badal & Ors. v. Union of India &  Ors.,  [AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 263]  where such a restricted  sense was approved.  Tewatia J. said :          "If  the  expression  : "any direction"  is  to  be          literally construed then it would make the people’s          representative    a   wholly   political    party’s          representative,  which  decidedly he  is  not.  The          Member would virtually lose his identity and  would          become a rubber                                                     774          stamp  in the hands of his political  party.   Such          interpretation of this provision would cost it, its          constitutionality,  for  in  that  sense  it  would          become   destructive   of   democracy/parliamentary          democracy,  which  is  the  basic  feature  of  the          Constitution.   Where giving of narrow meaning  and          reading down of the provision can save it from  the

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        vice  of unconstitutionality the Court should  read          it  down particularly when it brings the  provision          in line with the avowed legislative intent......."          "..........the  purpose  of  enacting  paragraph  2          could  be no other than to insure stability of  the          democratic   system,  which  in  the   context   of          Cabinet/Parliamentary form of Government on the one          hand means that a political party or a coalition of          political parties which has been voted to power, is          entitled  to govern till the next election, and  on          the  other, that opposition has a right to  censure          the   functioning  of  the  Government   and   even          overthrow  it by voting it out of power if  it  had          lost  the confidence of the people, then voting  or          abstaining from voting by a Member contrary to  any          direction  issued by his party would  by  necessary          implication  envisage  voting  or  abstaining  from          voting in regard to a motion or proposal, which  if          failed, as a result of lack or requisite support  in          the  House, would result in voting  the  Government          out of power, which consequence necessarily follows          due  to well established constitutional  convention          only  when  either  a motion of  no  confidence  is          passed by the House or it approves a cut-motion  in          budgetary   grants.    Former   because   of    the          implications  of Article 75(3) of the  Constitution          and  latter  because  no  Government  can  function          without  money  and  when  Parliament  declines  to          sanction money, then it amounts to an expression of          lack  of  confidence in the  Government.   When  so          interpreted the clause (b) of sub-paragraph (1)  of          paragraph  2 would leave the Members free  to  vote          according to their views in the House in regard  to          any other matter that comes up before it."                                                [p.313 & 314]      The reasoning of the learned judge that a wider meaning of   the   words  "any  direction"  would   ‘cost   it   its constitutionality’ does not commend to us.                                                        775 But we approve the conclusion that these words require to be construed   harmoniously  with  the  other  provisions   and appropriately  confined to the objects and purposes  of  the Tenth Schedule.  Those objects and purposes define and limit the  contours of its meaning.  The assignment of  a  limited meaning   is   not   to  read  it  down   to   promote   its constitutionality  but  because  such a  construction  is  a harmonious  construction  in  the  context.   There  is   no justification to give the words the wider meaning.      While construing Paragraph 2(1)(b) it cannot be ignored that under the Constitution members of Parliament as well as of  the  State legislature enjoy freedom of  speech  in  the House  though this freedom is subject to the  provisions  of the   constitution  and  the  rules  and   standing   orders regulating  the  Procedure  of the House  [Art,  105(1)  and art.194(1)].  The disqualification imposed by Paragraph 2(1) (b)  must  be so construed as not to unduly impinge  on  the said freedom of speech of a member.  This would be  possible if Paragraph 2(1)(b) is confined in its scope by keeping  in view  the object underlying the amendments contained in  the Tenth  Schedule,  namely, to curb the evil  or  mischief  of political  defections  motivated by the lure  of  office  or other  similar  considerations.  The said  object  would  be achieved  if the disqualification incurred on the ground  of voting or abstaining from voting by a member is confined  to cases  where a change of Government is likely to be  brought

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about  or is prevented, as the case may be, as a  result  of such voting or abstinence or when such voting or  abstinence is  on  a matter which was a major policy and  programme  on which the  political party to which the member belongs  went to  the polls. For this purpose the direction given  by  the political  party to a member belonging to it, the  violation of   which  may  entail  disqualification  under   paragraph 2(1)(b),  would  have to be limited to a vote on  motion  of confidence  or no confidence in the Government or where  the motion under consideration relates to a matter which was  an integral policy and programme of the political party on  the basis  of which it approached the elaborate.  The voting  or abstinence from voting by a member against the direction  by the  political  party  on  such a  motion  would  amount  to disapproval  of the programme of the basis of which he  went before  the  electorate  and got himself  elected  and  such voting  or abstinence would amount to a breach of the  trust reposed in him by the electorate.      Keeping    in    view   the   consequences    of    the disqualification  i.e., termination of the membership  of  a House; it would be appropriate that the                                                     776 direction  or  whip which results in  such  disqualification under Paragraph 2(1)(b) is so worded as to clearly  indicate that  voting or abstaining from voting contrary to the  said direction  would  result in incurring  the  disqualification under  Paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule so  that  the member  concerned  has fore-knowledge  of  the  consequences flowing from his conduct in voting or abstaining from voting contrary to such a direction.      50.  There are some submissions as to the exact  import of   a  "split  -  whether  it  is  to  be   understood   an instantaneous,  one time event or whether a "split"  can  be said to occur over a period of time.  The hypothetical poser was that if one-third of the members of a political party in the legislature broke-away from it on a particular day and a few  more members joined the spliter group a couple of  days later, would the latter also be a part of the "split" group. This  question of construction cannot be in vaccuo.  In  the present cases, we have dealt principally with constitutional issues.  The meaning to be given to "split" must necessarily be  examined  in a case in which the question arises  in  the context   of   its  particular   facts.    No   hypothetical predications  can or need be made.  We, accordingly,,  leave this question open to be decided in an appropriate case.      51.  Before parting with the case, we should advert  to one other circumstance.  During the interlocutory stage, the constitution   bench   was   persuaded   to   make   certain interlocutory  orders which, addressed as they were  to  the Speaker of the House, (though, in a different capacity as an adjudicatory  forum  under the  Tenth  Schedule)  engendered complaints  of  disobedience culminating in  the  filing  of petitions for initiation of proceedings of contempt  against the Speaker.  It was submitted that when the very  question of jurisdiction of  the Court to deal with  the  matter  was raised and even before the constitutionality of Paragraph  7 had  been pronounced upon, self restraint required  that  no interlocutory orders in a sensitive area of the relationship between the legislature and the Courts should been made.      The  purpose of interlocutory orders is to preserve  in status-quo   the  rights  of  the  parties,  so  that,   the proceedings  do  not become infructuous  by  any  unilateral overt  acts  by one side or the other during  its  pendency. One of the contentions urged was as to the invalidity of the amendment  for  non-compliance with the proviso  to  Article

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368(2)  of the Constitution.  It has now   been  unanimously held  that  Paragraph  7 attracted the  proviso  to  article 368(2).    The  interlocutory  orders  in  this  case   were necessarily                                                    777 justified  so  that, no land-slide changes were  allowed  to occur rendering proceedings ineffective and infructuous.      52.  With  the  finding and  observations as  aforesaid W.P.No. 17 of 1991 is dismissed.  Writ petition in Rule  No. 2421  of 1990 in the High Court of Gauhati is remitted  back to  the High Court for disposal in accordance with  law  and not   inconsistent  with  the  findings   and   observations contained in this order.      VERMA, J. : This matter relating to disqualification on the  ground  of defection of some members  of  the  Negaland legislative  Assembly under the Tenth Schedule  inserted  by the  Constitution  (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act,  1985,  was heard  along  with some other similar  matters  relating  to several  Legislative Assemblies including those of  Manipur, Meghalaya,  Madhya  Pradesh, Gujarat and Goa, since  all  of them   involved  the  decision  of  certain   constitutional questions relating to the constitutional validity of para  7 of  the Tenth Schedule and consequently the validity of  the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985 itself.   At the hearing, several learned counsel addressed us on account of which the hearing obviously took some time.  Even  during the  course  of the hearing, the actions  of  some  Speakers tended  to alter the status quo, in some cases resulting  in irreversible  consequences which could not be  corrected  in the event of para 7 of the Tenth Schedule being held invalid or   the  impugned  orders  of  the  Speakers  being   found justiciable  and,  on  merits illegal  and,  therefore,  the urgency  increased of deciding the questions debated  before us  at the earliest.  For this reason, we  indicated  during the  course  of  the hearing that  we  would  pronounce  our operative  conclusions soon after conclusion of the  hearing with reasons therefor to follow.  Accordingly, on conclusion of  the hearing on November 1, 1991, we indicated  that  the operative conclusions would be pronounced by us at the  next sitting of the Bench  when it assembled on November 12, 1991 after the Diwali Vacation.  The operative conclusions of the majority (Venkatachaliah, Reddy and Agrawal, JJ.) as well as of  the miority (Lalit Mohan Sharma  and  J.S.Verma,JJ.)were thus pronounced on November 12, 1991.  We are now indicating herein  our  reasons for the operative conclusions  of   the minority view.      The unanimous opinion according to the majority as well as the minority is that para 7 of the tenth Schedule  enacts a  provision  for  complete  exclusion  of  judicial  review including the jurisdiction of the                                                     778 Supreme Court under Article 136 and of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and, therefore,  it makes  in terms and in effect a change in Articles 136,  226 and  227 of the Constitution which attracts the  proviso  to clause   (2)  of  Article  368  of  the  Constitution;   and therefore,  ratification  by the specified number  of  State Legislatures before the Bill was presented to the  President for his assent was necessary, in accordance therewith.   The majority view is that in the absence of such ratification by the  State  legislatures, it is para 7 alone  of  the  Tenth Schedule  which is unconstitutional; and it being  severable from the remaining part of the Tenth Schedule, para 7  alone is liable to be struck down rendering the  speakers’decision under  para  6  that of a  judicial  tribunal   amenable  to

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judicial  review  by the Supreme court and the  High  courts under  Article  136, 226 and 227.  The minority  opinion  is that  the  effect  of  invalidity of para  7  of  the  Tenth Schedule  is to invalidate the entire  Constitution  (Fifty- Second  Amendment)  Act,  1985  which  inserted  the   Tenth Schedule  since the President’s assent to the  bill  without prior  ratification  by the State Legislatures is  non  est. The minority view also is that para 7 is not severable  from the remaining part of the Tenth Schedule and the Speaker not being an independent adjudicatory authority for this purpose as  contemplated  by  a  basic  feature  of  democracy,  the remaining  part  of the Tenth Schedule is in excess  of  the amending  powers being violative of a basic feature  of  the Constitution.   In the minority opinion, we have  held  that the  entire constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act,  1985 is  unconstitutional  and an abortive attempt  to  make  the constitutional Amendment indicated therein.      Before   proceeding  to give our detailed  reasons,  we reproduce  the  operative conclusions pronounced  by  us  on November  12,  1991  in the minority  opinion  (Lalit  Mohan Sharma and J.S. Verma, JJ.) as under :          "For  the  reasons  to be  given  in  our  detailed          judgment  to follow, our operative  conclusions  in          the minority opinion on the various  constitutional          issues are as follows :          1.Pare 7 of the Tenth Schedule, in clear terms  and          in effect, excludes the jurisdiction of all courts,          including the Supreme Court under Article  136  and          the  High  Courts under Articles  226  and  227  to          entertain any challenge to the decision under  para          6  on any ground even of illegality or  perversity,          not only                                                        779          at  an  interim  stage but  also  after  the  final          decision on the question of disqualification on the          ground of defection.          2.  Para  7 of the Tenth  Schedule,  therefore,  in          terms and in effect, makes a change in Article  136          in  Chapter IV of Part V; and Articles 226 and  227          in  Chapter  V  of  Part  VI  of  the  Constitution          attracting the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368.          3.  In view of para 7 in the Bill resulting in  the          constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, it          was  required to be ratified by the Legislature  of          not less than one-half of the States as a condition          precedent before the Bill could be presented to the          President  for  assent,  in  accordance  with   the          mandatory  special  procedure  prescribed  in   the          proviso  to clause (2) of Article 368 for  exercise          of the constituent power.  Without ratification  by          the  specified  number of State  Legislatures,  the          stage  for  presenting the Bill for assent  of  the          President  did  not reach and, therefore,  the  so-          called assent of the President was non est and  did          not result in the constitution standing amended  in          accordance with the terms of the Bill.          4. In the absence of ratification by the  specified          number of State Legislatures before presentation of          the  Bill  to  the President  for  his  assent,  as          required  by the proviso to clause (2)  of  Article          368,  it  is  not merely para  7  but,  the  entire          Constitution  (Fifty-Second  Amendment)  Act,  1985          which  is  rendered  unconstitutional,  since   the          constituent  power was not exercised as  prescribed          in Article 368, and therefore, the Constitution did

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        not  stand amended in accordance with the terms  of          the Bill providing for the amendment.          5.Doctrine  of Severability cannot be applied to  a          Bill  making a constitutional amendment  where  any          part thereof attracts the proviso to clause (2)  of          Article 368.          6.  Doctrine of Severability is not  applicable  to          permit  striking  down  para 7   alone  saving  the          remaining   provisions  of  the  Bill  making   the          Constitutional Amendment on the ground that para  7          alone attracts the proviso to clause (2) of Article          368.                                                      780          7. Even otherwise, having regard to the  provisions          of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution  inserted          by  the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment)  Act,          1985,  the Doctrine of Severability does not  apply          to it.          8.  Democracy is a part of the basic  structure  of          the  Constitution and free and fair elections  with          provision  for resolution of disputes  relating  to          the same as also for adjudication of those relating          to  subsequent disqualification by  an  independent          body  outside the House are essential  features  of          the   democratic   system  in   our   Constitution.          Accordingly, an independent adjudicatory  machinery          for  resolving disputes relating to the  competence          of Members of the House is envisaged as a attribute          of  this basic feature.  The tenure of the  Speaker          who  is  the  authority in the  Tenth  Schedule  to          decide this dispute is dependent on the  continuous          support   of  the  majority  in  the   House   and,          therefore,  he  (the  Speaker)  does  not   satisfy          the requirement of such an independent adjudicatory          authority;  and his choice as the sole  arbiter  in          the matter  violates an essential attribute of  the          basic feature.          9.Consequently,  the  entire  Constitution  (Fifty-          Second  Amendment)  Act, 1985  which  inserted  the          Tenth Schedule together with clause (2) in Articles          102  and 191, must be declared unconstitutional  or          an abortive attempt to so amend the Constitution.          10.It  follows that all decisions rendered  by  the          several Speakers under the Tenth Schedule must also          be declared nullity and liable to be ignored.          11.  On the above conclusions, it does  not  appear          necessary  or appropriate to decide  the  remaining          questions urged."      it is unnecessary in this judgment to detail the  facts giving  rise  to  the debate on  the  constitutional  issues relating  to  the  validity  of  the  Tenth  Schedule,  more particularly para 7 therein, introduced by the  Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985.  Suffice it to say  that these  matters arise out of certain actions of the  Speakers of several Legislative Assemblies under the Tenth  Schedule. Arguments on these questions were                                                      781 addressed  to  us by several learned  counsel,  namely,  the learned  Attorney General, S/Shri A.K. Sen, Shanti  Bhushan, M.C.  Bhandare, F.S. Nariman, Soli J. Sorabjee,  R.K.  Garg, Kapil  Sibal, M.R. Sharma, Ram Jethmalani, N.S. Hegde,  O.P. Sharma, Bhim  Singh and R.F. Nariman.  It may  be  mentioned that  some learned counsel modified their initial stand  to some   extent  as  the  hearing  progressed   by   advancing alternative  arguments  as well.  Accordingly,  the  several

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facets  of each constitutional issue debated before us  were fully focused during the hearing.  The main debate, however, was  on  the  construction of paras 6 and  7  of  the  Tenth Schedule  and the validity of the Constitutional  Amendment. Arguments were also addressed on the question of  violation, if  any,of  any  basic feature of the  Constitution  by  the provisions of the Tenth Schedule.      The   points   involved   in  the   decision   of   the constitutional issues for the purpose of our opinion may  be summarised broadly as under :-      (A)  Construction of para 6 of the Tenth Schedule.  Its           effect  and  the extent of exclusion  of  judicial           review thereby.      (B)  Construction of para 7 of the Tenth Schedule.  Its           effect  and the extent of  exclusion  of  judicial           review thereby.      (C)  In  case of total exclusion  of  judicial  review           including the jurisdiction of Supreme Court  under           Article 136 and the High Courts under Articles 226           and 227 of the Constitution by the Tenth Schedule,           does  para  7  make a  change  in  these  Articles           attracting  the proviso to clause (2)  of  Article           368 of the Constitution ?      (D)  The effect of absence of prior ratification by the           State   Legislatures   before  the   Bill   making           provisions for such amendment was presented to the           President   for  assent,  on  the   constitutional           validity of the Tenth Schedule.      (E)  Severability of para 7 from the remaining part  of           the Tenth Schedule and its effect on the  question           of constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule.      (F)  Violation of basic feature of the Constitution, if           any, by the Tenth Schedule as a whole or any  part           thereof  and its effect on  the  constitutionality           for this reason.                                                       782      (G)   Validity of the Tenth Schedule with reference  to            the  right of dissent of members with  particular            reference to Article 105.      As  indicated  by  us  in  our  operative   conclusions pronounced  earlier,  we  need  not  express  our  concluded opinion  on  the  points argued  before  us  which  are  not necessary  for supporting the conclusion reached by us  that the entire Tenth Schedule and consequently the  Constitution (Fifty-Second  Amendment) Act, 1985 is  unconstitutional  on the  view  we  have  taken on the  other  points.   We  are, therefore,  giving our reasons only in respect of the points decided by us leading to the conclusion we have reached.      At  this stage, it would be appropriate to mention  the specific  stand of the Speakers taken at the  hearing.   The learned  counsel  who  appeared  for  the  several  Speakers clearly stated that they were instructed to apprise us  that the  Speakers did not accept the jurisdiction of this  Court to  entertain these matters in view of the complete  bar  on jurisdiction of the courts enacted in para 7 read with  para 6  of the Tenth Schedule.  Accordingly, they abstained  from addressing us on the merits of the impugned orders which led to these matters being brought in this Court in spite of our repeated  invitation  to them to also address us  on  merits in each case,  which all the other learned counsel  did.  No doubt,    this   Court’s   jurisdiction   to   decide    the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule was  conceded, but no more.      It is in these extra-ordinary circumstances that we had to  hear  these matters.  We need not refer  herein  to  the

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details of any particular case since the merits of each case are dealt separately in the order of that case.  Suffice  it to  say  that the unanimous view of the Bench  is  that  the Speakers’  decision disqualifying a member under  the  Tenth Schedule is not immune from judicial scrutiny.  According to the  majority  it  is subject to judicial  scrutiny  on  the ground  of  illegality or perversity which in  the  minority view, it is a nullity liable to be so declared and ignored.      We  consider it apposite in this context to recall  the duty of the Court in such delicate situations.  This is best done  by  quoting  Chief  Justice  Marshall  in  Cohens   v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, 404, 5 L.Ed.257, 291 [1821],  wherein he said :                                                    783          "It  is  most true, that this Court will  not  take          Jurisdiction  if it should not : but it is  equally          true  that it must take jurisdiction if it  should.          The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid          a measure because it approaches the confines of the          constitution.   We cannot pass it by because it  is          doubtful.   With  whatever  doubts,  with  whatever          difficulties,  a  case  may be  attended,  we  must          decide  it if it be brought before us.  We have  no          more right to decline the exercise of  jurisdiction          which  is  given, than to usurp that which  is  not          given.   The one or the other would be  treason  to          the  constitution.   Questions may occur  which  we          would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them.   All          we  can do, is to exercise our best  judgment,  and          conscientiously  to  perform our  duty.   In  doing          this,  on  the  present  occasion,  we  find   this          tribunal  invested with appellate  jurisdiction  in          all cases arising under the constitution  and  laws          of the United States.  We find no exception to this          grant, and we cannot insert one.          XXX                     XXX                  XXX           ....If the question cannot be brought in a  court,          then  there  is no case in law or  equity,  and  no          jurisdiction is given by the words of the  article.          But  if, in any controversy depending in  a  court,          the  cause should depend on the validity of such  a          law,  that  would  be  a  case  arising  under  the          constitution,  to which the judicial power  of  the          United States would extend....."                                          (emphasis supplied)      More  recently, Patanjali Sastri, CJ., while  comparing the  role  of this Court in the constitutional  scheme  with that of the U.S. Supreme Court, pointed out in the State  of Madras  v.  V.G. Row [1952] SCR 597 that the  duty  of  this Court  flows  from express provisions  in  our  Constitution while such power in the U.S. Supreme Court has been  assumed by  the interpretative process giving a wide meaning to  the "due process" clause.  Sastri, CJ., at p.605, spoke thus:          "Before  proceeding to consider this  question,  we          think  it  right to point out,  what  is  sometimes          overlooked, that our constitution contains express          provisions for judicial review of legislation as to          its conformity with the Constitution, unlike as  in          America   where  the  Supreme  Court  has   assumed          extensive powers of                                                        784          reviewing  legislative  acts  under  cover  of  the          widely  interpreted  ‘due process’  clause  in  the          Fifth  and  Fourteenth Amendments.   If,then,  the,          courts  in this country face up to  such  important

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        and none too easy task, it is not out of any desire          to  tilt at legislative authority in  a  crusader’s          spirit,  but  in discharge of a duty  plainly  laid          upon them by the Constitution.  This is  especially          true  as  regards the ‘fundamental rights’,  as  to          which  this court has been assigned the role  of  a          sentinel   on  the  qui  vive.   While  the   Court          naturally attaches great weight to the  legislative          judgment,   it  cannot  desert  its  own  duty   to          determine  finally  the  constitutionality  of   an          impugned  statute.   We  have  ventured  on   these          obvious  remarks  because it appears to  have  been          suggested in some quarters that the courts  in  the          new   set   up  are  out  to  seek   clashes   with          legislatures in the country."                                           (emphasis supplied)      We are in respectful agreement with the above statement of  Sastri,  CJ, and wish to add that even  though  such  an obvious  statement  may have been necessary soon  after  the Constitution  came  into force and may not  be  a  necessary reminder four decades later at this juncture, yet it appears apposite   in  the present context to  clear  the  lingering doubts  in  some  minds. We have  no  hesitation  in  adding further   that  while  we  have  no  desire  to  clutch   at jurisdiction,  at the same time we would not be deterred  in the  performance  of this constitutional duty  whenever  the need arises.      We would also like to observe the unlike England, where there is no written Constitution and Parliament is  supreme, in  our country there is a written Constitution  delineating the  spheres  of  jurisdiction of the  legislature  and  the judiciary  whereunder the power to construe the  meaning  of the provisions in the Constitution and the laws is entrusted to  the judiciary with finality attached to the decision  of this Court inter alia by Article 141 about the true  meaning of  any  enacted  provision  and  Article  144  obliges  all authorities  in the country to act in aid of this Court.  It is, therefore, not permissible in our constitutional  scheme for  any other authority to claim that power in exclusivity, or in supersession of this Court’s verdict.  Whatever be the controversy prior to this Court entertaining such a  matter, it  must  end  when the court is seized of  the  matter  for pronouncing  its  verdict  and  it  is  the   constitutional obligation  of  every  person  and  authority to accept  its binding effect when the decision is rendered by this  Court. It  is  also  to be remembered that  in  our  constitutional scheme based on                                                   785 democratic  principles which include governance by  rule  of law,  every  one  has to act  and  perform  his  obligations according   to   the  law  of  the  land  and  it   is   the constitutional obligation of this Court to finally say  what the  law  is.  We have no doubt that the  Speakers  and  all others sharing their views are alive to this  constitutional scheme, which is as much the source of their jurisdiction as it is of this Court  and also conscious that the power given to  each wing is for the performance  of a public duty as  a constitutional  obligation and not for  self-aggrandisement. Once  this perception is clear to all, there can be no  room for any conflict.      The Tenth Schedule was inserted in the Constitution  of India by the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985 which  came  into  force with effect from  1.3.1985  and  is popularly known as the Anti-Defection Law.  The Statement of Objects  and  Reasons  says  that  this  amendment  in   the

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Constitution  was  made  to combat  the  evil  of  political defections which has become a matter of national concern and unless combated, is likely to undermine the very foundations of our democratic system and the principles which  sustained it.   This amendment is, therefore, for outlawing  defection to  sustain our democratic principles.  The  Tenth  Schedule contains  eight paras.  Para 1 is the interpretation  clause defining  ‘House’ to mean either House of Parliament or  the legislative Assembly or, as the case may be, either House of the  Legislature of a State.  The  expressions  ‘legislature party’ and ‘original political party’ which are used in  the remaining  paras  are  also defined.  Para  2  provides  for disqualification  on  ground of defection. Para  3  provides that disqualification on ground of defection is not to apply in  case of split indicating therein the meaning of  ‘split. Para 4 provides that disqualification on ground of defection is  not  to  apply  in case  of  merger.   Para  5  provides exemption for the Speaker or the Deputy speaker of the House of  the People or of the Legislative Assembly of the  State, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of States or the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council of a State from  the  applicability  of the  provisions  of  the  Tenth Schedule.  Para  8  contains the rule making  power  of  the Chairman or the Speaker.      For  the purpose of deciding the jurisdiction  of  this Court and the justiciability of the cause, it is paras 6 and 7 which are material and they read as under:      "6.  Decision  on questions as to  disqualification  of ground of defection. -                                                786          1. If any question arises as to whether a member of          a  House  has become  subject  to  disqualification          under this Schedule, the question shall be referred          for  the decision of the Chairman or, as  the  case          may be, the Speaker of such House and his  decision          shall be final :          Provided  that where the question which has  arisen          is  as to whether the Chairman or the Speaker of  a          House has become subject to such  disqualification,          the question shall be referred for the decision  of          such member of the House as the House may elect  in          this behalf and his decision shall be final.          2. All proceedings under sub-paragraph (1)  of this          paragraph  in  relation  to  any  question  as   to          disqualification of a member of a House under  this          Schedule  shall  be  deemed to  be  proceedings  in          Parliament within the meaning of Article 122 or, as          the case may be, proceedings in the Legislature, of          a State within the meaning of Article 212.          7. Bar of Jurisdiction on courts.-          Notwithstanding  anything in this Constitution,  no          court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any          matter  connected  with the disqualification  of  a          member of a House under this Schedule."          We   shall  now  deal  with  the  points   involved          enumerated earlier.      Points ‘A’ & ‘B’ - Paras 6 & 7 of Tenth Schedule      In support of the objection raised to the  jurisdiction of this  Court  and  the  justiciability  of  the  Speaker’s decision  relating to disqualification of a member,  it  has been  urged  that sub-paragraph (1) of para 6  clearly  lays down  that the decision of the Chairman or, as the case  may be,  the  Speaker  of such House shall  be  final  and  sub- paragraph  (2)  proceeds to say that all  proceedings  under sub-paragraph  (1)  ’shall be  deemed  to the proceedings in

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Parliament  ...... or, ..... proceedings in the  Legislature of  a  State’ within the meaning of Article 122  or  Article 212,  as  the  case may be.  It was  urged  that  the  clear provision in para 6 that the decision of the                                                   787 Chairman/Speaker  on the subject of  disqualification  under this Schedule shall be final and the further provision  that all  such proceedings ‘shall be deemed to be proceedings  in Parliament  .... or, .... proceedings in the Legislature  of as State’, within the meaning of Article 122 or Article 212, as the case may be, clearly manifests the intention that the jurisdiction  of all courts including the Supreme  Court  is ousted in such matters and the decision on this question  is not  justiciable.  Further argument is that para 7 in  clear words  thereafter  reiterates that position by  saying  that ‘notwithstanding  anything  in this Constitution,  no  court shall  have  any  jurisdiction  in  respect  of  any  matter connected  with the disqualification of a member of a  House under  this Schedule.  In other words, the argument is  that para 6 by itself provides for ouster of the jurisdiction  of all  courts  including  the Supreme Court and para  7  is  a remanifestation  of that clear intent in case of  any  doubt arising from para 6 alone.  On this basis it was urged  that the  issue  raised  before us is  not  justiciable  and  the Speaker  or  the  Chairman, as the case may  be,  not  being ‘Tribunal’  within  the meaning of that expression  used  in Article 136 of the Constitution, their decision is not  open to judicial review.      In  reply,  it was urged that finality Clause  in  sub- paragraph (1) of para 6 does not exclude the jurisdiction of the high Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and of this Court under Article 136. Deeming provision in sub-paragraph (2) of Para  6,  it was urged, has the only effect of making  it  a ‘proceedings   in   Parliament’  or  ‘proceedings   in   the Legislature  of  a State’ to bring it within  the  ambit  of clause (1) of Articles 122 or  212 but not within clause (2) of   these   Articles.   The  expression   ‘proceedings   in Parliament’ and ‘proceedings in the Legislature of a  State’ are used only in clause (1) of Articles 122 and 212 but  not in  clause  (2) of either of these Articles, on  account  of which the scope of the fiction cannot be extended beyond the limitation implicit in the specific words used in the  legal fiction.   This  being  so,  it  was  argued  that  immunity extended  only  to ‘irregularity of procedure’  but  not  to illegality  as held in Keshav Singh -[1965] 1 SCR  413.   In respect  of  para 7, the reply is that  the  expression  ‘no court’ therein must be similarly construed to refer only  to the  courts  of  ordinary jurisdiction but  not  the  extra- ordinary jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 & 227  and  the Plenary jurisdiction of  Supreme  Court  under Article  136.  It was also argued that the  Speaker/Chairman while  deciding the question of disqualification  of  member under  para  6 exercises a judicial function  of  the  State which otherwise would be vested  in the courts and,                                                        788 therefore, in this capacity he acts as ‘Tribunal amenable to the  jurisdiction  under  Articles 136, 226 and 227  of  the Constitution.   Shri  Sibal also contended that the  bar  in para  7  operates  only at the  interim  stage,  like  other election  disputes, and not after the final  decision  under para 6.      The  finality  clause in sub-paragraph (1)  of  para  6 which says that the decision of the Chairman or, as the case may  be,  the Speaker of such House shall be  final  is  not decisive.   It is settled that such a finality clause  in  a

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statute   by  itself  is  not  sufficient  to  exclude   the jurisdiction  of the High Courts under Articles 226 and  227 and the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, the  finality  being for the statute alone.  This  is  apart from the decision being vulnerable on the ground of nullity. Accordingly,  sub-paragraph  (1) alone  is  insufficient  to exclude  the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High  Courts and  the  plenary  jurisdiction of this  Court.   The  legal fiction  in sub-paragraph (2) of para 6 can only  bring  the proceedings under sub-paragraph (1) thereof within the ambit of clause (1) of Article 122 or clause (1) 212, as the  case may  be since the expressions used in sub-paragraph  (2)  of para  6  of the tenth Schedule are ‘shall be  deemed  to  be proceedings   in   Parliament’  or   ‘proceedings   in   the Legislature of a State’ and such expressions find place both in  Articles 122 and 212 only in clause (1) and  not  clause (2)  thereof.   The  ambit of the  legal  function  must  be confined  to the limitation implicit in the words  used  for creating  the  fiction and it cannot be  given  an  extended meaning   to include therein something  in addition.  It  is also  settled  that  a matter falling within  the  ambit  of clause (1)  of either of these two Article is justiciable on the  ground  of  illegality or perversity in  spite  of  the immunity  it  enjoys  to  a  challenge  on  the  ground   of ‘irregularity of procedures’.      To overcome this result, it was argued that such matter would  fall within the ambit of Clause (2) of both  Articles 122  and  212  because  the  consequence  of  the  order  of disqualification by the Speaker/Chairman would relate to the conduct of business  of the House.  In the first place,  the two  separate clauses in Articles 122 and 212 clearly  imply that  the meaning and scope of the two cannot  be  identical even  assuming there be some overlapping area between  them. What  is to be seen is the direct impact of the  action  and its  true  nature and not the further  consequences  flowing therefrom.   it  cannot  be doubted in  view  of  the  clear language  of sub-paragraph (2) of para 6 that it relates  to clause  (1)  of  both Articles 122 and  212  and  the  legal fiction cannot, therefore, be extended beyond the limits                                                     789 of the express words used in the fiction. In construing  the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the language of  the Section  by  which  it is created and its  meaning  must  be restricted  by  the  plain words used.  It  cannot  also  be extended by importing another fiction.  The fiction in  para 6(2) is a limited one which serves its purpose by  confining it  to  clause  (1)  alone of  Articles  122  and  212  and, therefore,,  there  is no occasion to enlarge its  scope  by reading  into it words which are not there and extending  it also  to clause (2) of these Articles.  See Commissioner  of Income-tax v. Ajax Products Ltd., [1965] 1 SCR 700.      Moreover,  it  does  appear to  us  that  the  decision relating to disqualification of a member does not relate  to regulating procedure or the conduct of business of the House provided  for  in  clause (2) of Articles 122  and  212  and taking  that  view  would amount to  extending  the  fiction beyond  its language and importing another fiction for  this purpose which is not permissible.  That being so, the matter falls  within the ambit of Clause (1) only of  Articles  122 and  212 as a result of which it would be vulnerable on  the ground   of  illegality  and  perversity   and,   therefore, justiciable to that extent.      It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the  objection of jurisdiction on the finality clause or the legal  fiction created in para 6 of the Tenth Schedule when  justiciability

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of  the  clause  is  based on  a  ground  of  illegality  or perversity  (see Keshav Singh - [1965] 1 SCR 413).  This  in our  view is the true construction and effect of para  6  of Tenth Schedule.      We shall now deal with para 7 of the Tenth Schedule.      The  words  in  para  7  of  the  Tenth  Schedule   are undoubtedly   very  wide  and  ordinarily  mean  that   this provision   supersedes   any   other   provision   in    the Constitution.   This  is  clear  from the  use  of  the  non obstinate   clause   ‘notwithstanding   anything   in   this Constitution’  as  the  opening words of para  7.   The  non obstinate clause followed by the expression ‘no court  shall have  any  jurisdiction’leave  no  doubt  that  the  bar  of jurisdiction  of  courts  contained in para  7  is  complete excluding  also the jurisdiction of the Supreme court  under Article  136 and that of the High Courts under Articles  226 and  227 of the Constitution relating to matters covered  by para 7.  The question, therefore, is of the scope of para 7. The scope of para 7 for this purpose is to be determined  by the  expression  ‘in respect of any  matter  connected  with disqualification   of  a  member  of  a  House  under   this Schedule’.                                                   790      One  of the constructions suggested at the hearing  was that  this expression covers only the intermediate stage  of the  proceedings relating to disqualification under  para  6 and  not  the end stage when the final order is  made  under para  6  on  the  question  of  disqualification.   It   was suggested  that this construction would be in line with  the construction  made  by this Court in its  several  decisions relating  to exclusion of Courts’ jurisdiction  in  election disputes at the intermediate state under Article 329 of  the Constitution.   This construction suggested of para  7  does not  commend  to us since it is contrary to  the  clear  and unambiguous language of the provision.   The expression  ‘in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a  member of a House under this Schedule’ is wide enough  to include not merely the intermediate stage of the proceedings relating to disqualification but also the final order on the question  of  disqualification made under para  6  which  is undoubtedly such a matter.  There is thus express  exclusion of  all  courts’ jurisdiction even in respect of  the  final order.      As  earlier indicated by virtue of the finality  clause and the deeming provision  in para 6, there is exclusion  of all  courts’ jurisdiction to a considerable  extent  leaving out  only  the  area  of justiciability  on  the  ground  of illegality  or perversity which obviously is relatable  only to the final order under  para 6.  This being so,  enactment of  para 7 was necessarily made to bar the  jurisdiction  of courts  also  in  respect of  matters  falling  outside  the purview  of the exclusion made by para 6. para 7  by  itself and  more  so  when  read along with para  6  of  the  Tenth Schedule,  leaves  no doubt that exclusion  of  all  courts’ jurisdiction  by para 7 is total leaving no area within  the purview, even of the Supreme Court or the High Courts  under Articles  136 ,  226 and 227.  The language of para 7  being explicit, no other aid to construction is needed.  Moreover, the  speech of the Law Minister who piloted the Bill in  the Lok    Sabha  and that of the Prime Minister  in  the  Rajya Sabha  as  well as the debate on this subject  clearly  show that these provisions were enacted to keep the entire matter relating  to disqualification including the Speakers’  final decision  under para 6 on the question of  disqualification, wholly  outside the purview of of all  courts including  the

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Supreme Court and the High Courts.  The legislative  history of  the  absence of such a provision excluding  the  courts’ jurisdiction in the two earlier Bills which lapsed also  re- inforces the conclusion that enactment of para 7 was clearly to provide for total ouster of all courts’ jurisdiction.                                                      791      In the face of this clear language, there is no rule of construction  which  permits the reading of para  7  in  any different manner since there is no ambiguity in the language which  is  capable of only one construction,  namely,  total exclusion  of the Jurisdiction of all courts including  that of the Supreme Court and the High Courts under Articles 136, 226  and 227 of the Constitution in respect of every  matter connected  with the disqualification of a member of a  House under  the  Tenth  Schedule  including  the  final  decision rendered by the Speaker/Chairman, as the case may be.   Para 7  must, therefore, be read in this manner alone.      The  question now is of the effect of enacting  such  a provision in the Tenth Schedule and the applicability of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368 of the Constitution.      Point ‘C’ - Applicability of Article 368(2) Proviso      The above construction of para 7 of the Tenth  Schedule gives rise to the question whether it thereby makes a change in Article 136 which is in Chapter IV of part V and Articles 226  and  227  which  are in Chapter V of  Part  VI  of  the Constitution.   If  the effect of para 7 is to make  such  a change in these provisions so that the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368 is attracted, then the further question which arises is of the effect on the Tenth Schedule of the absence of   ratification   by  the  specified   number   of   State Legislatures, it being admitted that no such ratification of the Bill was made by any of the State Legislatures.      Prima  facie it would appear that para 7 does  seek  to make  a  change  in  Articles  136 ,  226  and  227  of  the Constitution  inasmuch  as  without  para  7  in  the  Tenth Schedule  a  decision  of the  Speaker/  Chairman  would  be amenable  to  the jurisdiction of the Supreme  Court  under Article   136 and of the high Courts under Articles 226  and 227   as   in   the   case  of   decisions   as   to   other disqualifications provided in clauses (1) of Article 102  or 191  by the President/Governor under Article 103 or  192  in accordance with the opinion of the Election Commission which was  the  Scheme under the two earlier Bills  which  lapsed. However, some learned counsel contended placing reliance  on Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State  of Bihar, [1952] SCR 89 and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 SCR 933 that the effect of such total exclusion  of the  jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the  High  Courts does not make a change in Articles 136, 226 and 227. A close reading of these decisions indicates that instead                                                     792 of supporting this contention, they do infact negative it.      In  Sankari Prasad, the challenge was to  Articles  31A and  31B  inserted in the Constitution by  the  Constitution (First  Amendment)  Act, 1951.  One of  the  objections  was based  on absence of ratification under Article 368.   While rejecting  this  argument, the Constitution  Bench  held  as under:-          "It will be seen that these Articles do not  either          in  terms or in effect seek to make any  change  in          article  226 or in articles 132 and  136.   Article          31A   aims  at  saving  laws  providing   for   the          compulsory  acquisition by the State of  a  certain          kind  of property from the operation of article  13          read  with  other relevant articles  in  Part  III,

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        while  article  31B purports  to  validate  certain          specified  Acts  and  Regulations  already  passed,          which, but for such a provision, would be liable to          be impugned under article 13.  It is not correct to          say that the powers of the High Court under article          226  to issue writs "for the enforcement of any  of          the rights conferred by Part III" or of this  Court          under  articles  132 and 136 to  entertain  appeals          from  orders issuing or refusing such writs are  in          any  way  affected.  They remain just the  same  as          they  were  before : only a certain class  of  case          has been excluded from the purview of Part III  and          the  courts could no longer interfere, not  because          their powers were curtailed in any manner or to any          extend,  but  because there would  be  no  occasion          hereafter for the exercise of their powers in  such          cases."                                          [emphasis supplied]      The  test applied was whether the  impugned  provisions inserted  by  the Constitutional Amendment  did  ‘either  in terms or in effect seek to make any change in Article 226 or in Articles 132 and 136’.  Thus the change may be either  in terms  i.e.  explicit  or in effect  in  these  Articles  to require  ratification.   The  ground for  rejection  of  the argument therein was that the remedy in the courts  remained unimpaired  and unaffected by the change and the change  was really  by extinction of the right to seek the  remedy.   In other words, the change was in the right and not the  remedy of  approaching  the court since there was  no  occasion  to invoke  the remedy, the right itself being taken  away.   To the  same  effect is the decision in Sajjan  Singh,  wherein Sankari Prasad was followed stating clearly that there was                                                    793 no justification for reconsidering Sankari Prasad.      Distinction  has to be drawn between the abridgement or extinction  of  a right and restriction of  the  remedy  for enforcement  of  the  right.  If there is  an abridgement or extinction  of the right which results in the  disappearance of the cause of action which enables invoking the remedy and in  the  absence  of which there is no occasion  to  make  a grievance and invoke the subsisting remedy, then the  change brought  about is in the right and not the remedy.  To  this situation,  Sankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh apply.   On  the other  hand,  if  the  right remains  untouched  so  that  a grievance based thereon can arise and, therefore, the  cause of   action  subsists,  but  the  remedy  is  curtailed   or extinguished so that the cause of action cannot be  enforced for  want  of that remedy, then the change made  is  in  the remedy  and  not in the subsisting right.   To  this  latter category,   Sankari   Prasad  and  Sajjan  Singh   have   no application.  This is clear from the above-quoted passage in Sankari  Prasad  which clearly brings out  this  distinction between a change in the right and a change in the remedy.      The  present  case, in unequivocal terms,  is  that  of destroying  the  remedy  by enacting para  7  in  the  Tenth Schedule  making  a  total  exclusion  of  judicial   review including  that by the Supreme Court under Article  136  and the   High  Courts  under  Articles  226  and  227  of   the Constitution.   But for para 7 which deals with  the  remedy and  not  the right, the jurisdiction of the  Supreme  Court under Article 136 and that of the High Courts under Articles 226  and  227  would  remain  unimpaired  to  challenge  the decision under para 6, as in the case of decisions  relating to  other  disqualifications  specified  in  clause  (1)  of Articles  102  and 191, which remedy continues  to  subsist.

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Thus,   this   extinction  of  the  remedy   alone   without curtailing the right, since the question of disqualification of  a  member  on the ground of defection  under  the  Tenth Schedule  does required adjudication on enacted  principles, results in making a change in Article 136  in Chapter IV  in Part  V and Articles 226 and 227 in Chapter V in Part VI  of the Constitution.      On  this conclusion, it is undisputed that the  proviso to  clause  (2)  of  Article  368  is  attracted   requiring ratification  by the specified number of State  Legislatures before  presentation  of  the  Bill   seeking  to  make  the constitutional amendment to the President for his assent.      Point ‘D’ - Effect of absence of ratification                                                        794      The material part of Article 368 is as under :          "368. Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution          and  Procedure  therefore.  -  (1)  Notwithstanding          anything  in this Constitution, Parliament  may  in          exercise  of its constituent Power amend by way  of          addition, variation or repeal any provision of this          Constitution in accordance with the procedure  laid          down in this article.          (2)  An  amendment  of  this  Constitution  may  be          initiated  only by the introduction of a Bill,  for          the purpose in either House of parliament, and when          the  Bill is passed in each House by a majority  of          the  total  membership  of  that  House  and  by  a          majority of not less than two-thirds of the members          of  that  House  present and voting,  it  shall  be          presented  to   the President who  shall  give  his          assent  to the Bill and thereupon the  Constitution          shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of          the Bill :      Provided  that  if  such amendment seeks  to  make  any      change in -      (a)  Article 54, Article 55, Article 73, Article 162 or           Article 241, or      (b)  Chapter  IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part  VI,  or           Chapter I of Part XI, or      (c)  any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or      (d)  the representation of States in Parliament, or      (e)   the  provisions of this  article,  the  amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislature of  not less  than  one-half of the States by  resolutions  to  that effect  passed by those legislatures before the Bill  making provision  for such amendment is presented to the  President for assent."                                           (emphasis supplied)      it  is clause (2) with its proviso which  is  material. The main part of clause (2) prescribes that a constitutional amendment  can  be initiated only by the introduction  of  a Bill for the purpose and when the Bill is passed                                                   795 by each House by a majority of the total membership of  that House  and by a majority of not less than tow-thirds of  the members  of  that  House present and  voting,  it  shall  be presented to the President who shall give his assent to  the Bill  and thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended  in accordance  with the terms of the Bill.  In short, the  Bill not  being passed by the required majority is  presented  to the  President for his assent to the Bill and on  giving  of the  assent,  the Constitution stands  amended  accordingly. Then  comes,  the   proviso  which says  that  ‘if  such  an amendment  seeks  to  make  any  change’  in  the  specified provisions  of  the Constitution, the amendment  shall  also

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require  to be ratified by the Legislature of not less  than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect  passed by  those Legislatures before the Bill making provision  for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.  In other   words,   the  proviso  contains   a   constitutional limitation  on the amending power; and prescribes as a  part of  the  special  procedure,  prior  assent  of  the   State legislatures   before  Presentation  of  the  Bill  to   the President for his assent in the case of such Bills.  This is a condition interposed by the proviso in between the passing of  the  Bill by the requisite majority in  each  House  and presentation  of the Bill to the President for  his  assent, which  assent  results  in  the  Constitution  automatically standing  amended  in  accordance with terms  of  the  Bill. Thus, the Bills governed by the proviso cannot be  presented to   the  President  for  his  assent  without   the   prior ratification  by the specified number of State  Legislatures or  in  other  words, such ratification is  a  part  of  the special  procedure or a condition precedent to  presentation of the Bill governed by the proviso to the President for his assent.   It logically follows that the consequence  of  the Constitution  standing amended in accordance with the  terms of  the  Bill  on  assent by the  President,  which  is  the substantive part of Article 368, results only when the  Bill has  been  presented  to the President  for  his  assent  in conformity  with the special procedure after performance  of the  conditions  precedent, namely, passing of the  Bill  by each  House  by the requisite  majority in the case  of  all Bills;  and  in the case of Bills governed by  the  proviso, after the Bill has been passed by the requisite majority  in each House and it has also been ratified by the  legislature of not less than one-half of the States.      The  constituent  power for amending  the  Constitution conferred  by  Article  368 also  prescribes  the  mandatory procedure  in  clause  (2) including its  proviso,  for  its exercise.   The  constituent  power  cannot,  therefore,  be exercised  in  any other manner and  non-compliance  of  the special procedure                                                 796 so  prescribed  in Article 368 (2) cannot  bring  about  the result  of the Constitution standing amended  in  accordance with the terms of the Bill since that result ensues only  at the  end  of  the prescribed  mandatory  procedure  and  not otherwise.   The  substantive  part of  Article  368   which provides  for the resultant amendment is the consequence  of strict   compliance  of  the  mandatory  special   procedure prescribed  for exercise of the constituent power  and  that result does not ensue except in the manner prescribed.      The  true nature and import of the amending  power  and procedure  under  Article  368  as  distinguished  from  the ordinary legislative procedure was indicated in  Kesavananda Bhartim[1973] Supp.  SCR 1 at pp. 561, 563 & 565 :          "....Under  Article  368 However, a  different  and          special  procedure  is provided  for  amending  the          constitution.   A  Bill  has to  be  introduced  in          either  House of Parliament and must be  passed  by          each  House separately by a special  majority.   It          should be passed not only by 2/3rds majority of the          members  present and voting but also by a  majority          of  the  total  strength of the  House.   No  joint          sitting of the two Houses is permissible.   In  the          case  of  certain provisions  of  the  Constitution          which  directly  or  indirectly  affect  interstate          relations, the proposed amendment is required to be          ratified  by  the  Legislatures  which  is  not   a

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        legislative  process of not less than one  half  of          the States before the Bill proposing the  amendment          is presented to the President for his assent.   The          procedure  is  special  in the  sense  that  it  is          different and more exacting or restrictive than the          one by which ordinary laws are made by  Parliament.          Secondly in certain matters the State  Legislatures          are   involved  in  the  process  of   making   the          amendment.  Such partnership between the Parliament          and the State Legislatures in making their own laws          by the ordinary procedure is not recognised by  the          Constitution.    It   follows  from   the   special          provision made in Article 368 for the amendment  of          the Constitution that our Constitution is a ‘rigid’          or ‘controlled’constitution because the Constituent          Assembly  has "left a special direction as  to  how          the  constitution  is to be changed.   In  view  of          Article   368,  when  the  special   procedure   is          successfully   followed,  the  proposed   amendment          automatically becomes a part of the                                                   797           constitution or, in other words, it writes  itself          into the constitution."           XXX                    XXX                     XXX          "....  But  when it comes to the amendment  of  the          Constitution,   a   special  procedure   has   been          prescribed  in  Article 368, Since  the  result  of          following  the special procedure under the  Article          is  the amendment of the constitution  the  process          which  brings  about  the result is  known  as  the          exercise   of  constituent  power  by  the   bodies          associated   in  the  task  of  the  amending   the          constitution.  It is, therefore, obvious, that when          the Parliament and the State Legislatures  function          in accordance with Article 368 with a view to amend          the  constitution, they exercise constituent  power          as  distinct from their ordinary legislative  power          under  Articles  245 to 248.  Article  368  is  not          entirely  procedural.   Undoubtedly part of  it  is          procedural.   But there is a clear mandate that  on          the   procedure   being  followed   the   ‘proposed          amendment  shall become part of  the  constitution,          which  is  the  substantive part  of  Article  368.          Therefore,  the peculiar or special power to  amend          the  constitution  is to be sought in  Article  368          only and not elsewhere."          XXX                     XXX                     XXX          "....The  true position is that the alchemy of  the          special   procedure  prescribed  in   Article   368          produces the constituent power which transport  the          proposed amendment into the constitution and  gives          it  equal  status  with  the  other  parts  of  the          constitution."                                           (emphasis supplied)      Apart  from  the  unequivocal language  of  clause  (2) including the proviso therein indicating the above result of prior ratification being a part of the special procedure  or condition  precedent for valid assent of the President,  the same result is reached even by another route.  The  ordinary role  of  a proviso is to carve out an  exception  from  the general  rule in the main enacting part.  The main  enacting part  of  clause  (2)  lays  down  that  on  a  Bill  for  a constitutional  amendment  being passed in each House  by  a requisite  majority, it shall be presented to the  President for   his  assent  and  on  the  assent  being  given ,  the

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Constitution shall stand amended in accordance                                                      798 with the terms of the Bill.  The proviso then carves out the exception in case of Bills seeking to make any change in the specified  Articles of the Constitution prescribing that  in the   case  of  those  Bills,  prior  ratification  by   the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States is also required  before the Bill is presented to the President  for assent.  This means that a Bill falling within the ambit  of the  proviso is carved out of the main enactment  in  clause (2) as an exception on account of which it cannot result  in amendment  of  the Constitution on  the  President’s  assent without prior ratification by the specified number of  State Legislatures.  The proviso in clause (2) is enacted for  and performs  the function of a true proviso by  qualifying  the generality of the main enactment in clause (2) in  providing an exception and taking out of the main enactment in  clause (2)  such Bills which but for the proviso would fall  within the main part.  Not only the language of the main  enactment in  clause (2) and the proviso thereunder is unequivocal  to give  this clear indication but the true role of a  proviso, the  form in which the requirement of prior ratification  if such a Bill by the State Legislatures is enacted in  Article 368   lend   further  assurance  that  this  is   the   only construction  of  clause (2) with its proviso which  can  be legitimately made.  If this be the correct constructions  of Article  368  (2) with the proviso as we think it  is,  then there  is no escape from the logical conclusion that a  Bill to which the proviso applies does not result in amending the Constitution  in accordance with its terms on assent of  the President  if  it  was presented to the  President  for  his assent and the President gave his assent to the Bill without prior  ratification  by the specified number  of  the  State Legislatures.  This is the situation in the present case.      Thus the requirement of prior ratification by the State Legislatures is not only a condition precedent forming  part of  the  special  mandatory procedure for  exercise  of  the constituent  power and a constitutional  limitation  thereon but  also  a  requirement carving out an  exception  to  the general  rule of automatic amendment of the Constitution  on the President’s assent to the Bill.      In  other  words, clause (2) with the  proviso  therein itself lays down that President’s assent does not result  in automatic  amendment of the Constitution in case of  such  a Bill  it  was not duly ratified before presentation  to  the President  for his assent.  Nothing more is needed  to  show that  not only para 7 of the Tenth Schedule but  the  entire Constitution (Fifty-                                                       799 Second  Amendment)  Act, 1985 is still born or  an  abortive attempt  to  amend  the  Constitution  for  want  of   prior ratification  by the State Legislatures of the  Bill  before its presentation to the President for his assent.      The   result  achieved  in  each  case  is   the   same irrespective of the route taken.  If the route chosen is for construing  the  language  of clause (2)  with  the  proviso merely  a part of it, the requirement or prior  ratification is  a  condition  precedent  forming  part  of  the  special mandatory procedure providing that the constituent power  in case  of such a Bill can be exercised in this manner  alone, the  mode  prescribed for other Bills being  forbidden.   If the route taken is of treating the proviso as carving out an exception from the general rule which is the normal role  of a  proviso, then the result is that the consequence  of  the Constitution standing amended in terms of the provisions  of

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the Bill on the President’s assent as laid down in the  main part of clause (2) does not ensue without prior ratification in case of a Bill to which the proviso applies.        There can  thus  be no doubt that para 7 of  the  Tenth   Schedule which seeks to make a change in Article 136 which is a  part of Chapter IV of Part V and Articles 226 and 227 which  form part  of Chapter V of Part VI of the Constitution,  has  not been enacted by incorporation in a Bill seeking to make  the constitutional Amendment in the manner prescribed by  clause (2) read with the proviso therein of Article 368. Para 7  of the  Tenth Schedule is, therefore, unconstitutional  and  to that extent at least the Constitution does not stand amended in   accordance   with  the  Bill  seeking   to   make   the Constitutional Amendment.  The further question now is:  its effect  on the validity of the remaining part of  the  Tenth Schedule  and  consequently the  Constitution  (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985 itself.      Point ‘E’ - Severability of para 7 of Tenth Schedule      The  effect of absence of ratification indicated  above suggests  inapplicability of the Doctrine  of  Severability. In our opinion, it is not para 7 alone but the entire  Tenth Schedule may the Constitution (Fifty-Second  Amendment) Act, 1985  itself  which is rendered  unconstitutional  being  an abortive  attempt to so amend the Constitution.  It  is  the entire Bill and not merely rely para 7 of the Tenth Schedule therein  which  required  prior ratification  by  the  State Legislatures  before its presentation to the  President  for his assent, it being a joint exercise by the Parliament  and State  Legislatures.  The stage for presentation of Bill  to the President for his assent not having                                                    800 reached, the President’s assent was non est and it could not be  result  in amendment of the Constitution  in  accordance with  the terms of the Bill for the reasons  given  earlier. Severance of para 7 of the Tenth Schedule could not be  made for  the purpose of ratification or the  President’s  assent and,  therefore, no  such severance can be made even for the ensuing  result.  If the President’s assent cannot  validate para 7 in the absence of prior ratification, the same assent cannot  be accepted to bring about a difference result  with regard to the remaining part of the Bill.      On this view, the question of applying the Doctrine  of Severability  to  strike  down para 7  alone  retaining  the remaining  part  of Tenth Schedule does not arise  since  it presupposes  that the Constitution stood so amended  on  the President’s  assent.  The Doctrine does not apply to a still born legislation.      The Doctrine of Severability applies in a case where an otherwise  validly enacted legislation contains a  provision suffering  from a defect of lack of  legislative  competence and the invalid provision is severable leaving the remaining valid  provisions a valid provisions a viable  whole.   This doctrine  has  no application where the legislation  is  not validly  enacted  due  to non-compliance  of  the  mandatory legislative   procedure  such  as  the   mandatory   special procedure prescribed for exercise of the constituent  power. It  is  not possible to infuse life in a still born  by  any miracle  of deft surgery even though it may be possible  to continue  life by removing a Congenitally defective part  by surgical  skill.  Even the highest degree of surgical  skill can help only to continue life but it cannot infuse life  in the case of still birth.      With  respect,  the  contrary view does  not  give  due weight  to the effect of a condition precedent forming  part of  the  special  procedure and the role of  a  proviso  and

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results  in rewriting the proviso to mean that  ratification is  not  a  condition precedent  but  merely  an  additional requirement  of  such a Bill to make  that  part  effective. This  also  fouls with the  expression  ‘Constitution  shall stand  amended.....’  on the assent of  President  which  is after  the  stage  when  the amendment  has  been  made  and ratified  by  the  State  Legislatures  as  provided.    The historical background of drafting the proviso also indicates the  significance  attached  to  prior  ratification  as   a condition  precedent for valid exercise of  the  constituent power.      We are unable to read the Privy Council decision in The Bribery Commissioner V.  Pedrick Ranasinghe [1965] AC 172 as an authority to                                                  801 support applicability of the Doctrine of Severability in the Present case.  In Kesavananda Bharati, the substance of that decision  was indicated by Mathew, J., at p. 778 of  S.C.R., thus:          "....  that  though Ceylon Parliament  has  plenary          power  of ordinary legislation, in the exercise  of          its  constitution  power  it  was  subject  to  the          special procedure laid down in s, 29 (4)....."      While section 29(4) of Ceylon (Constitution) Order  was entirely  procedural  with  no  substantive  part   therein, Article   368  of  the  Indian  Constitution  has   also   a substantive  part  as pointed out  in  Kesavananda  Bharati. This distinction also has to be borne in mind.      The challenge in Ranasinghe was only to the legality of a conviction made under the Bribery Act, 1954 as amended  by the  Bribery  Amendment  Act, 1958 on the  ground  that  the Tribunal which had made the conviction was constituted under section  41 of the Amending Act which was invalid  being  in conflict with section 55  of the Constitution and not  being enacted by exercise of constituent power in accordance  with section  29(4) of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order.   Supreme Court of Ceylon quashed the conviction holding section 41 of the  Amending Act to be invalid for this reason.  The  Privy Council  affirmed  that view and in this context  held  that section 41 could be severed from rest of the Amending  Act. Ranasinghe  was not a case  of a Bill passed in exercise  of the   constituent  power  without  following   the   special procedure of section 29(4) but of a Bill passed in  exercise of   the   ordinary  legislative  power   containing   other provisions which could be so enacted, and including  therein section  41 which could be made only in accordance with  the special procedure of section 29(4) of the Constitution.  The Privy  Council made a clear distinction between  legislative and constituent powers and reiterated the principles thus:          "....The  effect of section 5 of the Colonial  Laws          Validity Act, which is framed in a manner  somewhat          similar to section 29(4) of the Ceylon Constitution          was that where a legislative power is given subject          to  certain  manner and form, that power  does  not          exist  unless  and  until the manner  and  form  is          complied with Lord Sankey L.C. said :          "A  Bill,  within the scope of sub-section  (6)  of          section 7A, which received the Royal Assent without          having been approved by                                                      802          the electors in accordance with that section, would          not be a valid act of the legislature.  It would be          ultra vires section 5 of the Act of 1865."      The  Bribery  Amendment Act, 1958, in  Ranasinghe,  was enacted  in exercise of the ordinary legislative  power  and

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therein was inserted section 41 which could be made only  in exercise  of the constituent power according to the  special procedure   prescribed  in  section  29(4)  of  the   Ceylon (Constitutions)  Order.  In this situation, only section  41 of  the  Amending  Act was held to be  invalid  and  severed because the special procedure for the constituent power  was required  only for that provision and not the rest.  In  the instant  case  the  entire  Tenth  Schedule  is  enacted  in exercise  of  the Constituent power under Article  368,  not merely  para  7  therein, and this  has  been  done  without following  the mandatory special procedure  prescribed.   It is,   therefore,  not  a  case  of  severing   the   invalid constituent  part from the remaining  ordinary  legislation. Ranasinghe   could  have  application  if  in  an   ordinary legislation  outside the ambit of Article  368, a  provision which  could  be made only in exercise  of  the  constituent power  according to Article  368 had been  inserted  without following  the  special  procedure,  and  severance  of  the invalid constituent part alone was the question.  Ranasinghe is, therefore, distinguishable.      Apart   from   inapplicability  of  the   Doctrine   of Severability to a Bill to which the proviso to clause (2) of Article  368  applies, for the reasons given,  it  does  not apply  in  the  present case to strike  down  para  7  alone retaining the remaining part of the Tenth Schedule.  In  the first place, the discipline for exercise of the  constituent power  was consciously and deliberately adopted  instead  of resorting to the mode of ordinary legislation in  accordance with  sub-clause (e) of clause (1) of Articles 102 and  191, which   would  render  the  decision  on  the  question   of disqualification on the ground of defection also amenable to judicial  review  as in the case of  decision  on  questions relating  to  other disqualifications.  Moreover,  even  the test applicable for applying the Doctrine of Severability to ordinary    legislation    as    summarised    in     R.M.D. Chamarbaughwalla v.  The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R.  930, indicates  that  para  7 alone is not  severable  to  permit retention  of  the remaining part of the Tenth  Schedule  as valid  legislation.  The settled test whether the  enactment would  have  been  made without para 7  indicates  that  the legislative intent was to make the enactment only with  para 7  therein and not without it.  This intention  is  manifest throughout and                                                    803 evident from the fact that but for para 7 the enactment  did not require  the discipline of Article 368  and exercise  of the  constituent power.  Para 7 follows para 6 the  contents of  which  indicate  the importance given to  para  7  while enacting  the  Tenth  Schedule.   The  entire  exercise,  as reiterated  time and again in the debates, particularly  the Speech  of the Law Minister while piloting the Bill  in  the Lok Sabha and that of the Prime Minister in the Rajya Sabha, was to emphasise that total exclusion of judicial review  of the  Speaker’s decision by all courts including the  Supreme Court, was the prime object of enacting the Tenth Schedule. The  entire  legislative history shows this.   How  can  the Doctrine  of Severability be applied in such a situation  to retain the Tenth Schedule striking down para 7 alone ?  This is further reason for inapplicability of this doctrine.      Point ‘F’- Violation of basic features      The  provisions  in the Tenth Schedule  minus  para  7, assuming  para  7 to be severable as held  in  the  majority opinion,  can be sustained only if they do not  violate  the basic  structure  of the Constitution or damage any  of  its basic  features.   This  is settled  by  Kesavananda  Bharti

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[1973]  Supp. S.C.R. 1. The question, therefore, is  whether there  is  violation  of any of the basic  features  of  the Constitution  by the remaining part of the  Tenth  Schedule, even assuming the absence of ratification in accordance with the  proviso  to  clause  (2)  of  Article  368  results  in invalidation of para 7 alone.      Democracy  is  a  part of the basic  structure  of  our Constitution;  and rule of law, and free and fair  elections are  basic features of democracy.  One of the Postulates  of free  and  fair  elections is provision  for  resolution  of election disputes as also adjudication of disputes  relating to subsequent disqualifications by an independent authority. It  is only by a fair adjudication of such disputes relating to validity of electrons and subsequent disqualifications of members  that true reflection of the electoral  mandate  and governance  by  rule of law essential for democracy  can  be ensured.    In  the  democratic  pattern  adopted   in   our Constitution, not only the resolution of election dispute is entrusted  to a judicial tribunal, but even the decision  on questions  as to disqualification of members under  Articles 103 and 192 is by the President/Governor in accordance  with the opinion of the Election Commission.  The  constitutional scheme,   therefore,  for  decision  on  questions   as   to disqualification  of  members  after  being  duly   elected, contemplates adjudication of such disputes by an independent authority out                                                      804 side  the  House, namely, President/Governor  in  accordance with the opinion of the Election Commission, all of whom are high  constitutional functionaries with security  of  tenure independent  of  the will of the House.  Sub-clause  (e)  of clause  (1)  in  Articles 102 and  191  which  provides  for enactment  of  any law by the Parliament  to  prescribe  any disqualification other than those prescribed in the  earlier sub-clauses  of  clause  (1),  clearly  indicates  that  all disqualifications  of members were contemplated  within  the scope   of   Articles  102  and   191.    Accordingly,   all disqualifications  including disqualification on the  ground of  defection, in our constitutional scheme,  are  different species of the same genus, namely, disqualification, and the constitutional scheme does not contemplate any difference in their basic traits and treatment.  It is undisputed that the disqualification  on the ground of defection could  as  well have  been  prescribed  by  an  ordinary  law  made  by  the Parliament  under  Articles  102 (1) (e)  and  191  (1)  (e) instead  of by resort to the constituent power  of  enacting the   Tenth  Schedule.   This  itself  indicates  that   all disqualifications of members according to the constitutional scheme were meant to be decided by an independent  authority outside  the  House  such  as  the  President/Governor,   in accordance  with the opinion of another similar  independent constitutional   functionary,,  the Election  Commission  of India,  who  enjoys the security of tenure of  tenure  of  a Supreme  Court judge with the same terms and  conditions  of office.  Thus, for the purpose of entrusting the decision of the   question   of  disqualification  of  a   member,   the constitutional  scheme  envisages an  independent  authority outside the House and not within it, which may be  dependent on the pleasure of the Majority in the House for its tenure.      The  Speaker’s  office  is  undoubtedly  high  and  has considerable aura with the attribute of impartiality.   This aura  of the office was even greater when  the  Constitution was  framed and yet the farmers of the Constitution did  not choose to vest the authority of adjudicating disputes as  to disqualification  of members to the Speaker;  and  provision

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was  made  in  Articles 103 and 192  for  decision  of  such disputes  by the President/Governor in accordance  with  the opinion of the Election Commission.  To reason is not far to seek.      The Speaker being an authority within the House and his tenure being dependent on the will of the majority  therein, likelihood of suspicion of bias could not be ruled out.  The question as to disqualification of a member has adjudicatory disposition and, therefore, requires the decision                                                       805 to   be   rendered  in  consonance  with  the   scheme   for adjudication  of  disputes.  Rule of law has  in  it  firmly entrenched, natural justice, of which, rule against Bias  is a  necessary  concomitant;  and  basic  postulates  of  Rule against  Bias  are; Nemo judex in causa sua -  ‘A  Judge  is disqualified  from determining any case in which he may  be, or  may  fairly be suspected to be, biased’; and ‘it  is  of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but  should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be  done.’ This  appears to be the underlying principle adopted by  the framers  of the Constitution in not designating the  Speaker as  the authority to decide election disputes and  questions as  to disqualification of members under Articles  103,  192 and 329 and opting for an independent authority outside  the House.   The framers of the Constitution had in this  manner kept  the office of the Speaker away from this  controversy. There  is nothing unusual in this scheme if we bear in  mind that  the  final  authority for removal of a  Judge  of  the Supreme  Court and High Court its outside the  judiciary  in the Parliament under Article 124(4).  On the same  principle the authority to decide the question of disqualification  of a member of legislature is outside the House as envisaged by Articles 103 and 192.      In the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker is made not only the sole but the final arbiter of such dispute with no provision for any appeal or revision against the Speaker’s decision to any  independent outside authority.  This departure  in  the Tenth  Schedule  is  a reverse trend and  violates  a  basic feature  of  the Constitution since the  speaker  cannot  be treated  as  an authority contemplated for  being  entrusted with   this  function  by  the  basic  postulates   of   the Constitution, notwithstanding the great dignity attaching to that office with the attribute of impartiality.      It  is  the Vice-President of India who  is  ex-officio chairman of the Rajya Sabha and his position, being akin  to that  of the President of India, is different from  that  of the Speaker. Nothing said herein relating to the  office  of the Speaker applies to the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, that is,   the  Vice-President  of  India.   However,  the   only authority  named  for  the Lok  Sabha  and  the  Legislative Assemblies  is the Speaker of the House and  entrustment  of this  adjudicatory  function fouls with  the  constitutional scheme  and,  therefore,  violates a basic  feature  of  the Constitution.  Remaining part of the Tenth Schedule also  is rendered  invalid notwithstanding the fact that this  defect would  not apply to the Rajya Sabha alone whose Chairman  is the  Vice-President  of  India,  since  the  Tenth  Schedule becomes                                                 806 unworkable  for  the Lok Sabha and the  State  Legislatures. The  Statutory  exception of Doctrine of  Necessity  has  no application  since  designation of authority  in  the  Tenth Schedule  is made by choice while enacting  the  legislation instead of adopting the other available options.      Since the conferment of authority is on the Speaker and

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that  provision  cannot be sustained for the  reason  given, even  without para 7, the entire Tenth Schedule is  rendered invalid  in the absence of any valid authority for  decision of the dispute.      Thus, even if the entire Tenth Schedule cannot be  held unconstitutional   merely  on  the  ground  of  absence   of ratification  of  the Bill, assuming it  is  permissible  to strike  down para 7 alone, the remaining part of  the  Tenth Schedule  is  rendered unconstitutional also on  account  of violation  of the aforesaid basic feature.  Irrespective  of the   view  on  the  question  of  effect  of   absence   of ratification, the entire Tenth Schedule must be struck  down as unconstitutionally.      Point ‘G’ - Other contentions      We have reached the conclusion that para 7 of the Tenth Schedule is unconstitutional; that the entire Tenth Schedule is  constitutionally  invalid   in  the  absence  of   prior ratification in accordance with the proviso to clause (2) of Article  368;  that the Doctrine of  Severability  does  not apply  in  the present case of  a  constitutional  amendment which suffers from the defect of absence of ratification  as required  by the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368;  that the  remaining  part of the Tenth Schedule minus para  7  is also  unconstitutional for violation of a basic  feature  of the  Constitution;  and that the entire Tenth  Schedule  is, therefore,    constitutionally   invalid    rendering    the Constitution  (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985 still  born and an abortive attempt to amend the constitution.  In  view of  this conclusion, it is not necessary for us  to  express our  concluded opinion on the other grounds of challenge  to the  constitutional  validity of the entire  Tenth  Schedule urged  at the hearing on the basis of alleged  violation  of certain  other basic features of the Constitution  including the   right  of  members  based  on  Article  105   of   the Constitution.      These  are  our  detailed  reasons  for  the  operative conclusions pronounced by us earlier on November 12, 1991.                                                        807