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PETITIONER: KHACHAR BHIKHUBHAI UNADBHAIAND TWO OTHERS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       10/05/1996

BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN (J) BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 2104            1996 SCC  (4) 738  JT 1996 (6)   264        1996 SCALE  (4)492

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Faizan Uddin, J.      This appeal  has been directed against the judgment and order dated  June 30,  1995 passed by a learned single Judge of the  High Court  of Gujarat  at Ahmedabad,  in a  Special Civil Application  No. 4891 of 1995. filed by the appellants against the  judgment dated March 31, 1995 passed by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal  in Revision Application No. TEN.B.A.184 of 1994, in  a case  arising out  of Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act. 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act’).      Unadbhai Apabhai  Khachar was  recorded holder  of land measuring 72  acres 4  gunthas situated  in village Ratanoar and Motachheda  in Bocad Taluka. On coming into force w.e.f. 1.4.1976, of  the  amended  Celling  Act  II  of  1974,  the Mamlatdar gave a notice to land-holder Unadbhail Apabhai for taking action  for failure  to submit information in respect of his  holdings in  prescribed  form.  Since  Unadbhai  had already died  on April  27. 1970. his heirs - two sons and a daughter - the present appellants - submitted information in the prescribed form. The mamlatdar made an inquiry under the provisions of  the Act  and vide order dated January 5, 1982 declared an  area of  26 acres 16 gunthas as surplus land as the appellants  were jointly  found entitled  to retain only one unit  of 45 acres of land out of the holdings comprising of an area of 72 acres 4 gunthas.      The appellants  challenged the  said order of Mamlatdar in appeal  before the  Deputy Collector which was dismissed. But the Revenue Tribunal by its order dated November 5, 1988 passed in  the Revision preferred by the appellants remanded the case  back to the Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector by his  fresh order  set  aside  order  of  Mamlatdar  dated January 5.  1982 and  allowed the  appeal party and remanded the case  back to  Mamlatdar to  decide afresh after hearing the parties.  The Mamlatdar  made an  inquiry as directed in the Remand Order and by his fresh order dated March 31, 1989

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declared an ares of 26 acres 16 gunthas as surplus land. The Mamlatdar took  the view  that since  on 1.4.76  the date on which the  amended  Act  came  into  force,  all  the  three appellants being  the heirs  of the  deceased Unadbhai  were minors and,  therefore, they  were not  entitled benefit  of sub-sections (3B)  or (3C)  of  Section  6  of  the  Act  as introduced by  amending Act of 1974 with some other relevant provisions by  Amending Act  No. II of 1974. The main Act of 1961 was  brought into  force with  effect from  15th  June, 1961. The  appellants again  preferred an appeal against the said order  before the  Deputy Collector which was dismissed by an  order dated March 26, 1990. The appellants went up in revision before  the Revenue  Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal set aside  the orders passed by the Mamlatdar as well as the Deputy Collector  in appeal  and remanded  the case  back to Mamlatdar for  deciding the case afresh according to law, as per observations made therein.      In the  third round,  the Mamlatdar  by his order dated March 30,  1993 held that there was no surplus land with the appellants as  both the sons of the deceased-holder Unadbhai were entitled to one unit each. Aggrieved by the said order, the State  Government went up in appeal before the Assistant Collector, Palitana,  who allowed  the appeal, setting aside the order of the mamlatdar dated March 30. 1993 and restored the original  order of  the mamlatdar  dated January 5, 1982 passed in  Ceiling Case No. 132. This order of the Assistant Collector was  challenged in  Revision  before  the  Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the Revision relying on the decision in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Kala Sana, 1994 (1)  Gujarat Law Reporter 448. wherein it has been held that in  a family  comprising  of  only  brothers,  a  major brother cannot  be treated as a major son for the purpose of sub-section (3C)  of Section 6 of the Act, as the word "son" has to  be understood  in the  context of living parents and such s  living parent  could either  be such a son mother or father. According to the said decision of the High Court, if either parent  is living.  a major  son will  get a separate ceiling  unit   of  land   otherwise  not.   The  appellants challenged the  decision of the Revenue Tribunal in the High Court of  Gujarat in  Special Civil  Application No. 4891 of 1995. The  High Court, relying on its decision in Patel Kala Sana’s case  (supra), dismissed  the  application  by  order dated June  30, 1995  as well  as the  review by order dated September 5,  1995 against  which this  appeal by  a special Leave has been directed.      The Learned  counsel for  the appellants submitted that the father  of the  appellants had  died on  April 27, 1970, much before  coming into force of the amended Ceiling Act on April 1, 1976 and, therefore, the appellants being the heirs of Unadbhai  will be  deemed to  have become  owners of  the respective shares  in the land in question prior to the date of coming  into force  of the  said Act  and that  being so, there will  be no  land  exceeding  the  ceiling  limit.  He further submitted  that even  otherwise having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (3C) of Section 6 of the Act, the  two major  sons of  the deceased Unadbhai would be entitled to  get one  unit each  of 54 acres and, therefore, there will  be no land with them exceeding the ceiling limit out of  a area  of 72  acres 4 gunthas. He submitted that it would be  wrong to  interprate sub-section (3C) of Section 6 of the  Act in  a way  so as  to exclude  the sons  from the entitlement of  a separate  unit simply  because neither  of their parents  was alive on the date of coming into force of the amended  Ceiling Act.  Thus, the  main  contention  that centres round  is with  regard to the interpretation of sub-

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section (3C)  of Section  6 of the Act, which was introduced by Amending  Act II  of 1974, which came into force on April 1, 1976. Here it  would be  relevant to  see  some  of  the  relevant definitions of various expression. The expression "appointed day" has  been defined  in Section  2(4) to  mean the day on which this  Act comes  into force,  i.e. 15.6.1961. The term "joint family"  has been  defined in  Section 2(16)  to mean Undivided Hindu  family and  in the  case of other persons a group or  unit the  members of  which by custom or usage are joint in  estate or  residence. The  expression "person"  in Section 2(21)  includes  a  joint  family.  Further  Section 2(27A) defines  the expression  "specified date" to mean the date of  coming  into  force  of  the  Amending  Act,  which admittedly came into force w.e.f. April 1, 1976.      The  Gujarat   Agricultural  Lands  Ceiling  Act,  1960 (Gujarat Act  No. XXVII  of 1961)  was brought into force in the Stare of Gujarat on June 15, 1961 with a view to fix the ceiling on  holding agricultural land and to provide for the acquisition and  surplus agricultural land. As said earlier, the  main   question  involved   in  this   appeal  is   the interpretation of  sub-section (3C) of Section 6 of the Act. Sub-section (3C) of Section 6 of the Act reads as follows :-      "6(3C): Where  a family  or a joint      family irrespective  of the  number      of members  includes a  major  son,      then each major son shall be deemed      to be  a separate  person  for  the      purposes of sub-section (1)."      In the  case of  Patel Kala  Sana (supra), the question before the  High Court  was whether  or not  the legislature contemplated any Kind of family or a Joint family other than the family  or the  joint family of the father and his major sons for  the purposes  of sub-section  (3C) of Section 6 of the Act.  After analyzing the various relevant provisions of the Act,  the high  Courts came  to the  conclusion that the word "son" occurring in sub-section (3C) of Section 6 of the Act is  quite plain  and unamabiguous  in its  meaning in as much as  a son in a family or for that matter a joint family would connote  a son  in the context of a living parent. The High Court  also took  the view  that a  family or  a  joint family consisting  of mother and her major son or sons would also get the benefit of sub-section (3C) of Section 6 of the Act, as  the word  "son" has to be understood in the context of a  living parent and such a living parent could either be son’s mother  or father. If either parent is living, a major son in  the family  will be  regarded as  a son  and nothing else. it  has been  further held  by the high Court that the family unit.  though the  mother may  not be the head of the family for  all purposes,  will be  headed by the mother and none else.  In  that  context,  the  son  will  have  to  be recognized as  a son  of that  mother who  is found  living. According to  the High  Court, the  existence  of  the  male benefit of  Section 6(3C)  of the  Act to a major son in the family would  also be  entitled to the benefits flowing from Section 6(3C)  of the  Act. This  view of  the High Court of Gujarat taken in the case of Patel Kala Sana (supra) came up for consideration  of this  Court in  a bunch  of  petitions which were disposed of by this Court by order dated November 30, 1995  passed in  Civil Appeal  No. 7227 of 1995, wherein the interpretation  of sub-section  (3C) of Section 6 of the Act as  expressed by  the High  Court has  been accepted and upheld by this court.      In the  present case  before us, neither of the parents (father and  mother) of  the present appellants was alive on

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the specified  date i.e. 1.4.1976. This fact has been stated by the Revenue Tribunal in its judgment dated March 31, 1995 and the said fact was not disputed before us. That being so, the  appellants  being  tow  sons  and  a  daughter  of  the deceased-holder of  the land  would not  be  entitled  to  a separate unit and having regard to the provisions of Section 6 (3C) of the Act, we find no error in the impugned judgment of the High Court.      Consequently, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. We make no order as to costs.