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PETITIONER: KESHABO & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF M.P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       08/01/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (1)   571        1996 SCALE  (1)447

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      This appeal  by special  leave arises  from  the  order dated May 7, 1992 of the Division Bench of the High Court of M.P. in  M.P.No. 1499/92.  The  admitted  position  is  that Section 165  of the M.P. Revenue Code, 1959 [for short, "the Code"] was  enforced in  Gariaband area from October 2, 1959 by way  of an  amendment and publication in the Gazette. The sale of  the land  of the Bhumiswami rights in favour of the appellants by  the Adivasi  (Scheduled Tribe)  Somu Gond was made on  December 23, 1960. Ultimately, the Board of Revenue in its  order dated  January 16,  1992 in  Revision Case No. 150/90 confirming the order of Additional Commissioner dated 23.9.1990 held  that even  prior to  1976,  even  under  the unamended Section 165(6) of the Code it is mandated that the purchaser should  obtain prior permission from the competent authority for  alienation of  the Bhumiswami  right  of  the adivasis. Since  the permission  was not taken, the sale was held void.  The High  Court by  its order  dated May 7, 1992 affirmed the view of the Board of Revenue.      It  is   contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the appellants that  the notification  under sub-section  (6) of Section 165  was published  in 1977 and the sale having been made in  1960, the  finding of the Tribunal that the sale is void, is  not correct  in law.  We  find  no  force  in  the contention. Section 165 (6) reads thus:      "Notwithstanding anything in sub-section      (1) the right of Bhumiswami belonging to      a tribe  which has  been declared  to be      aboriginal tribe by the State Government      by a notification in that behalf for the      whole or  part of the area to which this      code applies shall not be transferred to      a person  not belonging  to  such  tribe      without  the  permission  of  a  Revenue      Officer not below the rank of Collector,

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    given for  reasons  to  be  recorded  in      writing."      A  reading  of  this  sub-section  would  also  clearly indicate that  the Bhumiswami  right belonging  to a  tribe, which has been declared to be ab original tribe by the State Government by  a notification  in that behalf, for the whole or part  of the area to which the Code applies, shall not be transferred to  a non-tribal  person, not  belonging to such tribe, without  prior permission  of the Revenue Officer not below the  rank  of  Collector,  given  for  reasons  to  be recorded in  writing. The  Board of  Revenue has pointed out that prior  to the  amendment in  1976, obtaining permission for alienation  of the  land was  a condition  precedent. If that condition  precedent, viz.,  obtaining prior permission from the  competent authority  for reasons  to  be  recorded therein was not taken, the sale in contravention of the Act, therefore, becomes void. It is a welfare legislation made to protect the  ownership rights  in the  land of  a  Scheduled Tribe  to   effectuate  the   constitutional  obligation  of Articles 39(b)  and 46  of the  Constitution read  with  the Preamble.  Economic  empowerment  of  a  tribal  ot  provide economic democracy  is the  goal. Prevention of exploitation of them due to ignorance or indegency is constitutional duty under Article 46. Agricultural land gives economic status to the  tiller.   Therefore,  any   alienation   of   land   in contravention  of  the  above  objectives  is  void.  It  is contended that  the application under Section 170 [1] should have been  filed within  two years  from the  date of  sale. Since the application was not so filed, the authorities were not right  in directing entertainment of the application. It is not  in dispute  that the  authority has jurisdiction suo motu to  go into  the violation of the statutory provisions. Even otherwise,  since it  is a  beneficial legislation, the authorities are  bound  to  give  effect  to  constitutional policy; they  are not  devoid of jurisdiction, even if it is filed beyond limitaiton to entertain the applications. It is a matter  of public  policy and  of discretion.  Under these circumstances, we  do not  think there  is  any  substantial question of law warranting interference.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.