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PETITIONER: KESAR SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SADHU

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       29/01/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (2)   334        1996 SCALE  (2)177

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                        O R D E R      Leave granted.      Substitution allowed.      Though the  respondent has  been served, he is not appearing either  in person or through counsel. We have heard the  counsel for  the appellants.  The respondent filed a  suit in 1978 for recovery of possession of the land from  the appellants on the basis of a declaratory decree obtained  by one  Nathu in  the year  1924 as  a collateral on the basis of the custom. It is their case that the  appellant had  purchased  the  property  from Rulia who is an alienator to Nathu and under the custom he was  the nearest  collateral and this alienation was not supported by consideration. On appeal, dismissal of the suit by trial Court met reveral. The Second Appeal was dismissed  in  RSA  No.2416/79.  In  execution  the appellant took  the plea that since the customary right had been  taken away  by an  amendment made  later, the decree passed  by the  trial Court  is a  nullity. That application was  negatived and  in the  impugned  order dated January  30, 1992  the High  Court dismissed  the revision. Thus this appeal by special leave.      The controversy  is no  longer res  inteqra.  This Court in Darshan Singh vs. t Sin Pal [AIR 1991 SC 1654] considered the  effect of the Amendment Act 1973 on the customary right of the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 and held that :      "Considering the  above principles,      the  provisions  of  the  Principal      Act, the  statement of  object  and      reasons and  the provisions  of the      Amendment Act  and the decisions of      the Punjab  High Court  and of this      Court, we  are of the view that 5.7      of the  Principal Act as amended by      the Amendment  Act is retrospective

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    and  is   applicable   to   pending      proceedings. The  decisions of this      Court dated  28-11-1986 in  Ujaggar      Singh v. Dharam Singh (Civil Appeal      No.1263 of 1973) and in Udham Singh      v.  Tarsem   Singh  (Civil   Appeal      No.1135 of 1974) dated 15-7-1987 do      not need reconsideration.      In  course   of  the  arguments  it      transpired   that   some   of   the      appellants might  have had right to      contest the  alienations under  the      Hindu   Law.   Doubts   have   been      expressed as to whether after these      appeals  are   dismissed  any  such      claim  would   be  tenable  in  law      inasmuch as,  it is  submitted, the      right under the Principal Act was a      statutory right  which has now been      taken  away.   The  answer  to  the      question  would   depend  on   what      resulted when  the Punjab  Laws Act      and the  Principal Act were passed.      There appears  to be  no doubt that      by  the  former  the  customs  were      preserved and  by  the  latter  the      customary    right    to    contest      alienation  was   regulated.   This      would be  clear from  the following      analysis.      However,  the   intention  of   the      legislature and  the provisions  of      the statute  have to  be  carefully      examined to  ascertain the  result.      "An   Act   of   Parliament   which      recognises   the    existence   and      validity  of   a  custom   may  not      operate  to  create  new  statutory      rights in  favour of the persons or      classes  of   persons   who   might      formerly  have   benefited  by  the      custom. Such  a statute  may merely      have the  effect of sanctioning the      validity of the custom as a custom.      without merging  the custom  in the      higher title by statute.      In the  instant case  we are of the      view that  the custom was confirmed      and regulated  by the  Punjab  Laws      Act and  the Principal  Act and  it      WAS done away with by the Amendment      Act. No  statute was  passed on the      basis of the custom itself so as to      transform the  custom itself into a      higher statutory  right. Therefore,      either before  or after  the custom      has been  done  away  with  by  the      Amendment Act,  the rights  of  the      parties  under   Hindu  Law  remain      unaffected anci  will  provide  the      rule of  decision where alienations      are contested  under Hindu  Law. It      was observed  by Robertson,  J.  in      Daya Ram  v. Sohel  Singh,  110  PR      (1906) 390 that "in all cases under

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    5.5 of the Punjab Laws Act, it lies      upon the  person asserting  that he      is ruled  in regard to a particular      matter by  custom, to prove that he      is so governed, and not by personal      law, and  further to prove what the      particular custom  is. There  is no      presumption created  by the  clause      in  favour   of  custom;   on   the      contrary it is only when the custom      is established that it is to be the      rule    of     decision."     These      observations were  approved by  the      privy Council in Abdul Hussein Khan      v. Bibi  Sona Dero (1917) 45 Ind Ap      10(13):(AIR 1917  PC 181 at p.183).      This was  reiterated by  this Court      in Salig Ram v. Munshi Ram (1962) 1      SCR 470: (AIR 1961 SC 1374) holding      that "where the parties are Hindus,      the Hindu  Law would  apply in  the      first   instance    and   whosoever      asserts a  custom at  variance with      the Hindu  Law, shall have to prove      it...... "      In view  of the above position, the view of the learned judge that  the appellant  is  not  entitled  to  raise  the executability of  the decree  in execution  is  not  correct since the  Amendment Act  was  applicable  at  the  time  of passing the  decree by  the appellate  Court and  the  above decree, therefore,  is nullity.  When the matter goes to the root of  the jurisdiction,  it is settled law that it can be raised even  in execution  also. Under  those circumstances, the High  Court was  not right  in rejecting the revision of the appellants  stating that  they are not entitled to raise the plea of nullity. In this view of settled legal position, it does  not serve  any purpose  to remand the matter to the executing court for fresh orders.      Accordingly, the  appeal is  allowed. The orders of the courts below  are set  aside.  Consequently,  the  execution petition also stands dismissed. No costs.