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PETITIONER: KAVALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/05/1960

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) IMAM, SYED JAFFER SARKAR, A.K. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1960 AIR 1080  CITATOR INFO :  R          1962 SC 123  (12)  RF         1962 SC1006  (68)  RF         1962 SC1621  (91)  F          1963 SC 864  (29)  F          1963 SC1241  (67,85)  RF         1965 SC 632  (6,9,10,ETC.)  R          1965 SC1017  (9,10)  R          1966 SC 424  (7)  R          1967 SC1110  (12)  D          1967 SC1776  (4,6)  F          1967 SC1836  (27,61)  R          1968 SC 394  (7)  R          1968 SC1053  (10)  R          1970 SC 564  (43,55,153,154,158)  E          1970 SC1157  (15,17)  F          1971 SC2392  (5,9)  R          1971 SC2513  (6)  RF         1972 SC 425  (28)  RF         1972 SC2097  (6)  RF         1972 SC2240  (8)  RF         1972 SC2301  (48)  R          1973 SC 974  (9,10)  RF         1973 SC1461  (1525)  R          1973 SC2734  (16,27)  R          1974 SC1522  (3)  RF         1975 SC1193  (21)  R          1978 SC  68  (89)  R          1978 SC 597  (120,181,189)  F          1978 SC 771  (16,20,61)  MV         1982 SC1325  (80)  F          1983 SC 920  (5)  F          1988 SC1353  (18)  D          1990 SC 997  (9)  E&D        1990 SC1771  (13)

ACT: Marumakkathayam   Law-Enactment  for  removal  of   doubts-. Constitutional validity -Madras Marumakkathayam  (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 (32 of 1955) -Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1) (f), 31, 31A.

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HEADNOTE: These  petitions by the holder of Kavalappara  Sthanam,  his wife,  daughters  and  soil  challenged  the  constitutional validity  of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of  Doubts) Act,  1955 passed by the Madras Legislature soon  after  the Privy  Council had declared the properties in possession  of the Sthanee to be Sthanam properties in which the members of the  tarwad had not interest.  Section 2 Of the  Act,  which contained the substantive provision, was as follows:--    " 2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in respect of which:- (a)  there  is or had been at any time an  intermingling  of the  properties  of the sthanam and the  properties  of  the tarwad, or  (b)  the  members of the tarwad have been  receiving  main. tenance  from  the  properties  purporting  to  be   sthanam properties  as  of  right, or in pursuance of  a  custom  or otherwise, or (c)there  had  at any time been a vacancy  caused  by  there being,  no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed  to the Sthanam, 888 shall  be  deemed to be and shall be deemed always  to  have been   a   Marumakkathayam   tarwad   and   the   properties appertaining  to  such a sthanam shall be deemed to  be  and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging  to the   tarwad  to  which  -.he  provisions  of   the   Madras Marumakkathayam  Act,  1932  (Mad.   XXII  of  1933),  shall apply." The  question  for  decision was whether  the  impugned  Act infringed   the  fundamental  rights  of   the   petitioners guaranteed by Arts. 4, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. Held  (per Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.)  that  the three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the  well- settled  principles  of Marumakkathayam Law with  regard  to which there could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not  germane  but  extraneous to the  object  it  sought  to achieve.   They were a device to deprive the sthanam of  its properties and vest them in the tarwad and as such  directly hit by Art. 19(1)(f) and could not be saved by Art. 19(5). Assuming  that  the Sthanam properties were held  in  janmam right  and as such were estates within the meaning  of  Art. 31A,  the  impugned  Act was immune  from  challenge.   That Article,  properly construed, envisages agrarian reform  and provides for the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietary and various other kinds of subordinate rights in  a tenure called the estate solely for that  purpose  and must  be limited to it.  Although it may not be  permissible to  refer  to the statement of objects and  reasons  of  its amendment  for purposes of construction, it can be  referred to  for the limited purpose of ascertaining  the  conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the amendment. Aswini  Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [19531 S.C.R. 1,  con- sidered. There  is  no  substance  in the  argument  that  since  the impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls within by cl. (2)(b) of Art. 31A.  That clause has to be read with cl. (1)(a)  of the Article and since the impugned Act  does  not contemplate  any  agrarian reform or seek  to  regulate  the rights  inter se between landlords and tenants or modify  or extinguish  any  of the rights  appertaining  janmam  right, leaving  all  its characteristics intact, it does  not  come

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within the purview of Art. 31A of the Constitution. Sri  Ram  Ram  Narain v. State of Bombay,  [1959]  SUPP.   1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] SUPP.  1 S.C.R. 748, referred to. Fundamental  rights  have a transcendental position  in  the Constitution  and before an Article embodying a  fundamental right  can  be construed to exclude  another  every  attempt should  be made to harmonize them and not until it is  found impossible to do so, can one be made to yield to the  other. Barring  such exceptional cases, any law that infringes  any of the fundamental rights must be void. 889 The word ’law’ in Art. 31(1) must mean a valid law, and such a law must satisfy two tests, (1) that the legislature  must be  competent to enact it and (2) that it must not  infringe any  fundamental rights.  A law that deprives a  citizen  of his  property  must, therefore, be invalid if  it  infringes Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Deep Chand v. State Of U. P., [1959] SUPP. (2) S.C.R. 8, and Basheshway Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 528, referred to. Article  31 Of the Constitution, since its amendment by  the Constitution  (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, is no  longer  a selfcontained Article providing for a subject different from that  dealt  with by Art. 19, but deals with  two  different subjects,  CIS.  (2) and (2A) dealing with  acquisition  and requisition  and  cl. (1) with deprivation  of  property  by authority  of  law, and can no longer be  construed  on  the analogy  of Art. 2 1 so as to exclude the operation of  Art. 19. The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R. 587, A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to. State  of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Any., [1955]  1  S.C.R. 777, held inapplicable. Nor  does Art. 31(1) deal with police power.  Although  such power,  as  understood  in America, is  no  arbitrary  power divorced  from social control and public good, there can  be no  need  of  importing  such a  doctrine  into  the  Indian Constitution. The  word ’law’ used by Art. 31(1) indicates its  limitation and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31(1) can  be  sustained only if the restrictions it  imposes  are reasonable  and in the interest of the general public.   The Constitution  does not confer on the Indian  Parliament  the same  power  which the Parliament of England  possesses  and while  it does contemplate a welfare State, that has  to  be brought  about  within its frame-work  of  the  Constitution itself. The   correct  approach  should,  therefore,  be  first   to ascertain the fundamental right and then to see whether  the law infringes that right.  If ex facie it does so, it has to stand  the  test of Art. 19(5).  In  certain  circumstances, however,  deprivation of fundamental right to  property  may also amount to a reasonable restriction under the Article. Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India, [196O] 2 S.C.R. 375, referred to. Individual  proprietary rights being  ordinarily  inviolable unless a clear case is made out for restricting them,  there must  be  a  harmonious balancing  between  the  fundamental rights  declared by Art. 19(1) and social control  permitted by Art. 19(5).  It is implicit in the nature of restrictions that  no inflexible standard can be laid down and each  case must be decided on its own facts.  But the restrictions must not be arbitrary and must have a reasonable relation to  the

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object sought to be achieved and shall be in the interest of the general public. 890 State  of  Madras  v. V. G. Rao, [1952]  S.C.R.  597,  Henry Webster  v. Peter Cooper, 14 Law Ed. 510, and The  Citizens’ Savings and Loan Association and Cleaveland, Ohio v.  Topeka City, 22 Law Ed. 455, referred to. Although  the redress of a real and genuine grievance  of  a section  of the community may be in public interest,  it  is impossible to hold that the impugned legislation was  either justified or in such public interest. Iswari  Prosad v. N. R. Sen, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 273, held  in- applicable. Marumakkathayam  Law  is a body of customs and  usages  that have  received  judicial recognition, and  is  fundamentally different  from Hindu Law, being a matriarchal system.   The family,  called tarwad, consists of all the  descendants  of one  common ancestor.  It consists of a mother and her  male and  female  children  and  the  children  of  those  female children  and so on.  Only the senior-most male  member  can attain  the  sthanam, which is a position  of  dignity  with specific  properties  attached to it. When he  does  so  and becomes  the Sthanee he ceases to have any interest  in  the tarwad  properties.   Occasionally  a  female  member   also becomes  the Sthanee.  Like a Hindu widow or  an  impartible estate-holder  the Sthanee has an absolute interest  in  the income of the Sthanam properties or acquisitions  therefrom. A member of the tarwad has no right to maintenance from  out of the Sthanam properties nor can such property be converted into  tarwad  property by the grant of such  maintenance  by custom   or  otherwise  or  intermingling  of  the   Sthanam properties  with the tarwad properties by the Sthanee.   His position  approximates to that of a member separated from  a Hindu  family and there can be no scope for the  application of the doctrine of blending.  Like the Sthanee who ceases to have  any  present proprietary interest in the  tarwad,  the members  of the tarwad also can have no present  proprietary interest in the sthanam property.  They continue to be blood relations  with  a contingent right of  succession  to  each others’  property that is no more than a spies  successions. The  right of a subsequently born male member of the  tarwad to  succeed  to the Sthanam and its property  is  judicially recognised. Case-law reviewed. Per  Imam and Sarkar, JJ.-The impugned Act is  protected  by Art.  31A and is not open to question in the ground that  it violates  Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1) Of the  Constitution. There  is  no basis for the contention  that  Art.  31(1)(a) contemplates  a law relating to agrarian reform  only.   The Article makes no mention of any such reform and there can be no  doubt  that  under it a janmam right  may  be  acquired, extinguished or modified whether the land held in such right is agricultural or not. It  is not permissible to refer to the objects  and  reasons stated in the Bills, by which the Acts amending Art. 31A  of the  Constitution were introduced, for the  construction  of the  statute and, therefore, the word ’law’ in  Art.  31A(1) cannot  be  read in relation to sub-cl. (a) only  as  a  law intended to achieve agrarian 891 reform   on  the  basis  of  the  supposed  object  of   the Legislature in enacting Art. 31A. Aswini  Kumar  Ghose  v.  Arabinda  Bose,  [1953]  S.C.R.  1 referred to. It  is  not correct to say that the impugned  Act  does  not

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effect  any modification of janmam rights and  therefore  it does  not come within Art. 31A.  When the Article speaks  of modification  of  janmam rights, it does not speak  of  such rights in the abstract but contemplates the modification  of such  rights  held  by  a  person.   It  would  be  as  much modification  of janmam rights, if such rights held  by  one person  are  directed  to be held by  a  number  of  persons jointly, as when the incidents of such rights are altered. Sri  Ram  Ram Narain Medhi v. The State  of  Bombay,  [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab,  [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748, relied on. It is not correct to say that the Legislature in giving  the provisions of the impugned Act retrospective operation or in providing  that  they  should  prevail  notwithstanding  any decision of the court to the contrary, was acting judicially and  not in a legislative capacity and that the Act  was  on that  ground  invalid.  The rule obtaining in  America  that legislative action cannot retract on past controversies  and reverse  decisions  of  courts  and  the  relevant  American decisions can have no application in India. Piare Dusadh’s case, [1944] F.C.R. 61, referred to.

JUDGMENT:  ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 443 of 1955 and  40-41  of 1956.  Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for  enforcement of Fundamental Rights.  M.   C.  Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. N.  Andley,  J.  B.  Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra,  for  the  petitioners (In all the petitions).  R.   H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the State of Madras.  K.   V.  Suryanarayana Iyer, Advocate-General for the  State  of Kerala and T. M. Sen, for the State of Kerala.  A.  V.  Viswanatha  Sastri and M.  R.  Krishna  Pillai,  for  respondents Nos. 2 to 9.  Purshottam   Trikamdas  and  M.  B.  Krishna   Pillai,   for  respondent No. 12 (In Petn.  Nos. 40-41 of 56).  A.   V.  Viswanatha  Sastri  and  K.  R.  Krishnaswami,  for  respondents Nos. 13 and 15-17 (In Petn.  No. 443 of 55).  K.   B. Krishnaswami for respondents Nos. 11 and 14 (In  all  the petitions).  892  Purshottam Trikamdas and K. R. Krishnaswami, for  respondent  No. 12 (In Petn.  No. 443 of 55).  A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for   Intervener  No. 1.  Sardar Bahadur, for Intervener No. 2.  1960.   May 4. The judgment of Sinha, C. J., Subba  Rao  and  Shah,  JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao, J. The  judgment  of  Imam and Sarkar, JJ. was delivered by Sarkar, J.  SUBBA  RAO, J.-These three connected petitions  filed  under  Art.  32  of  the Constitution raise  the  question  of  the  constitutional   validity  of  the  Madras   Marumakkathayam  (Removal  of  Doubts)  Act, 1955, (Madras Act  32  of  1955)  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  impugned  Act).   These  petitions were heard by this Court on a preliminary question  raised  by  the  respondents and the  judgment  thereon  was  delivered  on  March  4,  1959.   This  Court  rejected  the  preliminary objection and directed the petitions to be heard  on merits, and pursuant to that order, these petitions  were  posted for disposal on merits.  The  facts  have  been fully stated by Das, C.  J.,  in  the  preliminary judgment and it would, therefore, be  sufficient

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if  the  relevant facts pertaining to the  questions  raised  were stated here.  The  petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955  is  Kavalappara  Kottarathil  Kochunni Moopil Nair.  He is the holder of  the  Kavalappara sthanam to which is attached Kavalappara  estate  situate  in  Walluvanad  Taluk  in  the  district  of  South  Malabar.  In pre-British times the Kavalappara Moopil  Nair,  who was the senior most male member of Kavalappara Swaroopam  (dynasty),  was the ruler of Kavalappara territory.  He  had  sovereign   rights   over  his   territory.    Besides   the  Rajasthanam,  the  Kavalappara Moopil Nair held  five  other  sthanams  granted  by  the Raja  of  Palghat  for  rendering  military  services  and two other sthanams  granted  to  his  ancestors  by  the  Raja of  Cochin  for  rendering  similar  services.    Properties  are  attached  to  each  of   these  sthanams.   The petitioner’s immediate predecessor  died  in  1925   and  the  petitioner  became  the  Moopil   Nair   of  Kavalappara estate and as such the sthanee of the properties  893  attached   to  the  various  sthanams  held  by  him.    The  petitioner  in  Petition No. 443 of 1955 will  hereafter  be  referred to as " the sthanee ". Respondents 2 to 17 are  the  junior members of the Kavalappara tarwad, and, according  to  the sthanee, they have no interest in the said properties.  In  1932, the Madras Marumakkathayam Act (Mad.  Act XXII  of  1932)  came into force where under the members of a  Malabar  tarwad  were  given a right to enforce partition  of  tarwad  properties or to have them registered as impartable.   After  some  infructuous  proceedings under the provisions  of  the  said  Act,  respondents 10 to 17, who then  constituted  the  entire Kavalappara tarwad, filed O.S. No. 46 of 1934 in  the  court   of  the  Subordinate  Judge  of  Ottapalam   for   a  declaration that all the properties under the management  of  the  sthanee  were tarwad properties belonging  equally  and  jointly  to the sthanee and the members of the tarwad.   The  Subordinate  Judge dismissed the suit.  On appeal, the  High  Court  of  Madras on April 9, 1943, allowed the  appeal  and  reversed  the decision of the Subordinate Judge and  decreed  the  suit,.   On farther appeal to the  Privy  Council,  the  Board  by  its judgment dated July 29,  1947,  restored  the  judgment of the Subordinate Judge.  The Privy Council  found  that  the  Kavalappara  estate in Walluvanad  Taluk  was  an  impartible estate and that nothing had happened to alter the  original  character of the property in its relation  to  the  members  of the family.  On that finding, the Privy  Council  held  that  respondents 10 to 17 were not  entitled  to  the  declaration  they sought in that case.  The result  of  that  litigation was that all the properties in the possession  of  the sthanee were declared to be sthanam properties and  that  the members of the tarwad had no interest therein.  After  the  title of the sthanee was thus  established,  the  Madras  Legislature passed the impugned Act in 1955.   Under  the  impugned Act, every sthanam possessing one or other  of  the  three  characteristics mentioned therein it  is  common  case  that  the  impugned Act applies  to  the  petitioner’s  sthanam  shall be deemed and shall be deemed always to  have  been properties belonging to the tarwad.  The sthanee  116  894  states  that  the  impugned Act is ultra  vires  the  Madras  Legislature,  void  and inoperative and that  the  said  Act  cannot affect the rights of the sthanee or his estate to any  extent.  The first petitioner in Petition No. 40 of 1956 is the  wife  of the sthanee, who has also been added as respondent 18  to

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this  petition ; and petitioners 2 and 3 therein  are  their  daughters.  The first respondent to the said petition is the  State  of Madras and respondents 2 to 17 are the members  of  the tarwad.  On August 3, 1955, the sthanee executed a  gift  deed  in favour of the petitioners in the said  petition  in  respect of properties granted to his predecessor by the Raja  of  Palghat.   This petition raised the  same  questions  as  Petition No. 443 of 1955 and seeks for the same reliefs.  Petition  No.  41  of 1956 is filed  by  Ravunniarath  Rajan  Menon, who is the son of the sthanee.  The first  respondent  therein  is the State of Madras and respondents 2 to 17  are  the  members of the tarwad and respondent 18 is the  stanee.  This petitioner alleges that on August 3, 1955, the  sthanee  executed  a  gift  deed  in his favour  in  respect  of  the  properties granted to the sthanee’s predecessor by the  Raja  of  Cochin.  This petition contains similar  allegations  as  the other two petitions and asks for similar reliefs.  The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the  petitioners  in  all the three petitions, raised before us the  following  points:  (1)  The  impugned Act  is  constitutionally  void,  because it offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution.  (2)  It  is  also  void because it deprives the  sthanee  of  his  fundamental  right  to  hold and  dispose  of  property  and  thereby  offends against Art. 19(1) (f) of the  Constitution  and is not saved by cl. (5) of Art. 19. (3) The impugned Act  is  further bad because it has been made by the  Legislature  not in exercise of its legislative power but in exercise  of  judicial power.  Learned  counsel  for the respondents while  countering  the  arguments  advanced by the learned  Attorney-General  raised  two further points, viz., (1) the petitioner’s sthanam is an  "   estate  "  within  the  meaning  of  Art.  31A  of   the  Constitution and therefore the Act  895  extinguishing or modifying the rights pertaining to the said  sthanam cannot be questioned on the ground that it infringes  Arts.  14,  19  and  31 of the  Constitution;  and  (2)  the  impugned  Act  purports  to deprive the  petitioner  of  his  sthanam properties by authority of law within the meaning of  Art.  31(1)  of  the  Constitution and,  as  he  is  legally  deprived   of  his  properties,  Art.  19(1)  (f)   of   the  Constitution has no application, for, it is said, Art. 19(1)  (f) pre-supposes the existence of the petitioner’s title  to  the  sthanam and its properties, and, as he is  deprived  of  his title therein by the impugned Act, he can no longer rely  upon his fundamental right under Art. 19(1) (f).  Learned  counsel for the respondents further contended  that  the gifts of the sthanam properties by the sthanee in favour  of the petitioners in the other two petitions were void  and  that,  therefore, they have no fundamental right  to  enable  them   to  come  to  this  Court  under  Art.  32   of   the  Constitution.  Before  we  pass on to the merits of the case, it  would  be  convenient at the outset to clear the ground.  It cannot  be  disputed  that  the  impugned  Act  passed  by  the   Madras  Legislature   could  not  have  had  any   extra-territorial  operation  so  as to affect the properties  in  the  quondam  Cochin  State.   It is not disputed that, after  the  States  Reorganization, the provisions of the Act were not  extended  by any legal process to the properties situate in that  area  of  the Kerala State which originally formed part of  Cochin  State.   In the premises, we are not called upon  to  decide  the  fundamental  right  of the sthanee in  respect  of  the  sthanam properties in the said area.  We do not also propose  to  express any opinion on the validity or otherwise of  the

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gift deeds executed by the sthanee in favour of his wife and  daughters, and son; for, if the gifts were valid, the donees  would  have a right to maintain the petitions, and  if  they  were not valid, the donor would continue to be the owner  of  the  properties  gifted.  The title inter se is  not  really  germane to the present. enquiry, for the validity of the Act  in  respect  of sthanam properties other than those  in  the  Cochin  State,  falls to be decided in  the  first  petition  itself.  896  We,  therefore, leave open the question of the  validity  of  the gift deeds.  We shall take first the contention of the respondents  based  on Art. 31A of the Constitution, for, if that contention was  accepted,  no  other questions except one  would  arise  for  consideration.  Learned Attorney-General contends that the question was  not  specifically  raised in the pleadings, that it was  a  mixed  question  of fact and law, and that if it was allowed to  be  raised  at  this  stage, his clients  would  be  irreparably  prejudiced.  Further, he argues that there is no material on  the  record on the basis of which we can decide whether  the  properties  of the petitioners are held in janmam  right  or  not.  In the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 2 to 17,  no  plea  on the basis of Art. 31A is taken.   Only  in  the  counter  filed  by the State of Kerala, this  contention  is  raised.   Paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit contains  the  said plea and it is:  "  I  am advised that the impugned statute is  Dot  open  to  attack  on any of the grounds set forth in the petition  and  further  and  in any view of the case that it  is  saved  by  virtue of the provisions of Art. 31A of the Constitution  as  amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.  "  Except  this  bald statement, no statement is  made  to  the  effect  that  all  the properties of  the  sthanee,  or  any  portion   thereof,  are  held  in  janmam  right.    Learned  Advocate-General,  appearing for the State of Kerala,  while  conceding  that the plea could have been more  precise,  and  supported  by definite particulars, contends that  there  is  material  on  the  record containing the  admission  of  the  petitioner  in  the first petition that the  properties  are  janmam  properties,  and, even apart  from  such  admission,  whatever  properties the petitioner held as appertaining  to  the sthanam, they could not be other than janmam  properties  or  properties held as a subordinate tenure- holder under  a  janmi and that in either case they would form part of an  it  estate" within the meaning of Art. 31 A of the Constitution.  It is true that in the previous proceedings which went up to  the Privy Council, there is a statement  897  that in regard to the properties under the management of the  Court of Wards, " sthanam registration took place in Malabar  and  all  the  properties  belonging  to  the  sthanee  were  registered  in  the name of Kavalappara Moopil Nair  ".  But  that  in itself does not conclude the  matter.   Ordinarily,  when  a question raised depends upon elucidation of  further  facts  not  disclosed in the statements  already  filed,  we  would  be  very reluctant to allow a party to raise  such  a  plea  at the time of arguments.  But in this case we do  not  think we would be justified in not allowing the  respondents  to raise the contention, as the validity of the impugned Act  depends   upon   the  application  of’  Art.  31A   of   the  Constitution.  We would, therefore, for the purpose of  this  petition,  assume  against  the petitioner  that  he  is  in  possession of the properties in janmam right and proceed  to

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consider on that basis the contention raised.  Learned  counsel for the respondents contends that Art.  31A  of the Constitution excludes the operation of Art.13 in  the  matter  of the extinguishment or modification of any  rights  in   an  estate,  that  the  impugned   legislation   either  extinguishes  or  modifies the sthanam right in  the  janmam  property which is an " estate as defined in the said Article  and  that, therefore, the impugned Act cannot be  challenged  on the ground that it infringes Arts. 14, 19 and 31 in  Part  III  of the Constitution.  To appreciate this contention  it  will  be  convenient to read the material portions  of  Art.  31A.  Article  31A.  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  article 13, no law providing for-  (a)  the  acquisition by the State of any estate or  of  any  rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of  any  such rights,          ...................................................  shall  be  deemed  to  be void on  the  ground  that  it  is  inconsistent  with,  or takes away or abridges  any  of  the  rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31.   ...............................................   (2) In this article,-  898  (a)  The  expression  " estate " shall, in relation  to  any  local area, have the same meaning as that expression or  its  local  equivalent has in the existing law relating  to  land  tenures  in force in that area, and shall also  include  any  jagir,  inam  or muafi or other similar grants  and  in  the  States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right.  (b)  the  expression  " right ", in relation to  an  estate,  shall  include  any  rights vesting in  a  proprietor,  sub-  proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat,  under-  raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in  respect of land revenue."  This  Article  was  introduced in the  Constitution  by  the  Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.  As it  originally  stood, the said Article only provided that no law  affecting  rights  of  any  proprietor or intermediate  holder  in  any  estate  shall be void on the ground that it is  inconsistent  with  any of the fundamental rights Included in Part III  of  the  Constitution.   Article  31A has been  amended  by  the  Constitution  (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.  The  object  of  the amendment was explained in the Statement of the  Objects  and Reasons and the relevant part thereof reads:  "It will be recalled that the Zamindari abolition laws which  came  first in our programme of social  welfare  legislation  were   attacked  by  the  interests  affected  mainly   with  reference  to articles 14, 19 and 31, and that in  order  to  put an end to the dilatory and wasteful litigation and place  these  laws above challenge in the courts, articles 31A  and  31B and the Ninth Schedule were enacted by the  Constitution  (First   Amendment)  Act.   Subsequent  judicial   decisions  interpreting  articles  14, 19 and 31  have  raised  serious  difficulties in the way of the Union and the States  putting  through   other   and  equally  important   social   welfare  legislation on the desired lines, e.g., the following:-  (i)  While  the  abolition of zamindaries and  the  numerous  inter mediaries between the State and the tiller of the soil  has been achieved for the most part, our next objectives  in  land  reform  are  the fixing of limits  to  the  extent  of  agricultural  land  that  may be owned or  occupied  by  any  person, the disposal of  899  any  land held in excess of the prescribed maximum  and  the

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further  modification  of  the rights  of  land  owners  and  tenants in agricultural holdings.   ..........................................................  It is accordingly proposed in clause 3 of the Bill to extend  the scope of article 31A so as to cover these categories  of  essential welfare legislation."  The object of the amendment relevant to the present  enquiry  was only to enable the State to implement its next objective  in  the  land reform, namely, the fixing of  limits  to  the  extent  of agricultural lands that may be owned or  occupied  by  any person, the disposal of any land held in  excess  of  the  prescribed maximum and the further modification of  the  rights of land owners and tenants in agricultural  holdings.  The  object was, therefore, to bring about a change  in  the  agricultural  economy  but not to recognize  or  confer  any  title in the whole or a part of an estate on junior  members  of  a family.  This Court has held in Aswini Kumar Ghose  v.  Arabinda  Bose(1) that the statement of objects and  reasons  is  not  admissible  as  an aid to  the  construction  of  a  statute.   But we are referring to it only for  the  limited  purpose  of  ascertaining the conditions prevailing  at  the  time the bill was introduced, and the purpose for which  the  amendment was made.  Unhampered  by any judicial decision, let us now  scrutinize  the express terms of the Article to ascertain its scope  and  limitations.   Sub-el. (a) of Art. 31A(1) enables the  State  to  acquire  any  estate  or of any  rights  therein  or  to  extinguish or modify any such rights.  " Estate " is defined  in el. (2)(a) to have the same meaning as that expression or  its  local  equivalent has in the existing law  relating  to  land  tenures  in  force  in that  area,  and  by  inclusive  definition  it takes in any jagir, inam, or muafi  or  other  similar  grants and in the States of Madras and  Kerala  any  janmam right.  Clause (2)(b) defines the expression " rights  ",  in relation to an estate, to include any rights  vesting  in  a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor,  tenure-  holder,  raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and  any  rights or privileges in respect of land revenue.  If   (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1.  900  an  estate  so  defined is acquired by  the  State,  no  law  enabling  the  State  to  acquire any  such  estate  can  be  questioned  as  inconsistent with the  rights  conferred  by  Arts.  14,  19 or 31 of the Constitution.  So too,  any  law  extinguishing or modifying any such rights mentioned in  cl.  (1)(a) and defined in el. (2)(b) cannot be questioned on the  said  grounds.  The broad contention that a  law  regulating  inter  se the rights of a proprietor in his estate  and  the  junior  members  of his family is also covered by  the  wide  phraseology  used in cl. (2)(b), may appear to be  plausible  but that argument cannot be sustained if that clause is read  along with the other provisions of Art. 31 A. The definition  of  "  estate" refers to an existing law  relating  to  land  tenures  in  a particular area indicating thereby  that  the  Article is concerned only with the land tenure described  as  an   " estate ". The inclusive definition of  the  rights of  such  an  estate also enumerates the rights  vested  in  the  proprietor  and  his subordinate tenure-holders.   The  last  clause  in  that definition, viz., that  those  rights  also  include the rights or privileges in respect of land revenue,  emphasizes the fact that the Article is concerned with land-  tenure.   It is, therefore, manifest that the  said  Article  deals  with  a tenure called "estate" and provides  for  its  acquisition  or  the extinguishment or modification  of  the  rights of the land-holder or the various subordinate tenure-

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holders  in  respect  of their rights  in  relation  to  the  estate.  The contrary view would enable the State to  divest  a  proprietor of his estate and vest it in  another  without  reference to any agrarian reform.  It would also enable  the  State  to  compel  a proprietor to  divide  his  properties,  though  self-acquired, between himself and other members  of  his  family or create interest therein in favour of  persons  other  than tenants who had none before.  Such acts have  no  relation  to  land-tenures  and the.), are  purely  acts  of  expropriation of a citizen’s property without any  reference  to agrarian reform.  Article 31A deprives citizens of  their  fundamental rights and such an Article cannot be extended by  interpretation  to  overreach  the object  implicit  in  the  Article.  The unsondness of the wider interpretation will be  made clear if the Article is construed with reference to the  901  janmam  right.   Under the definition, any janmam  right  in  Kerala  is  an " estate ". A janmam right  is  the  freehold  interest  in a property situated in Kerala.  Moor in  his  "  Malabar  Law  and  Custom " describes  it  as  a  hereditary  proprietorship.   A  janmam  interest  may,  therefore,   be  described as " proprietary interest of a landlord in lands "  and  such  a janmam right is described as  "estate"  in  the  Constitution.   Substituting  janmam  right "  in  place  of  "estate  " in cl. 2 (b), the rights " in Art. 31 A  (1)  (a)  will  include  the rights of a  proprietor  and  subordinate  tenure-holders  in  respect of a janmam right.   It  follows  that the extinguishment or modification of a right refers to  the rights of a proprietor or a subordinate tenure-holder in  the  janmam  right.  A proprietor called the  janmi  or  his  subordinate  tenure-holder  has certain  defined  rights  in  janmam  right ". Land-tenures in Malabar are established  by  precedents or immemorial usage.  Janmam right is a  freehold  interest  in property and the landlord is called " janmi  ".  He can create many subordinate interests or tenures therein,  such as verum pattom (simple lease), kushikanom (mortgage of  waste land with a view to its being planted on),  kushikara-  pattam (mortgage of waste land for improvements, the  tenant  paying  rent), kanom kuzhikanom (mortgage of waste land  for  improvements,   the   landlord  receiving   some   pecuniary  consideration), kanom (mortgage with possession, a fee being  generally  paid), mel-kanom (higher mortgage), koyu  panayam  (mortgage  of the right of cultivation),  kanom  poramkadani  (loan advanced on the security of land already held on mort-  gage),  otti  usufructuary mortgage, the full value  of  the  land being advanced), kaivituka otti (usufructuary mortgage,  with    relinquishment   of   the   power   of    transfer),  ottikkumpuiram  (where  a sum is advanced  beyond  the  otti  amount),  neermuthal (where a further sum is advanced on  an  otti   mortgage   in  addition   to   the   ottikkunipuram),  peruvartham   (usufructuary   mortgage,   the   land   being  redeemable  at  its  value  in the market  at  the  time  of  redemption),  anubham or anubhavam (relinquishment  of  land  for  enjoyment  by the tenant in perpetuity),  karankari  or  jamma koyu (sale  117  902  or  transfer  in perpetuity of the  right  of  cultivation),  kariama  (right  of  perpetual  enjoyment),  cooderoopad  or  nelamuri (assignment of rent produce), kutti kanom (mortgage  of  forests, the mortgagee felling the timber for trade  and  paying a fee on each stump or tree to the landlord).   These  rights may be extinguished or modified.  A law may  regulate  the  rights  between  a janmi and  his  subordinate  tenure-  holders; but it may also affect his rights unconnected  with

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the  tenure.  To illustrate: A janmi holds 10 acres of  land  in  janmam right, out of which he may sell 2 acres  each  to  five  persons;  the  land is divided into 5  plots  held  by  different  holders,  but  each one continues  to  have  full  rights of a janmi ; the janmam right is not extinguished  or  modified,  though  the land is divided  between  5  persons.  That  is what the impugned Act purports to do.  It does  not  modify  any of the rights appertaining to " janmam right  ",  but only confers shares in the property on other members  of  the tarwad.  It is said that the inclusive definition of the  expression " rights " in cl. (2) (b) takes in such a case as  it  extinguishes or modifies the proprietor’s right  in  the  land.   This  is a superficial reading of the  Article.   We  have  already  explained how such a modification  is  not  a  modification  of a right pertaining to a " janmam  right  ",  but only a deprivation of a particular janmi of his right in  his property or a curtailment of his right therein,  leaving  all  the  characteristics of a janmam right intact.   It  is  said that a contrary construction has been accepted by  this  Court  in two decisions.  The first is that in Sri  Ram  Ram  Narain   v.  State  of  Bombay  (1).   In  that  case,   the  constitutional   validity   of  the   Bombay   Tenancy   and  Agricultural  Lands  (Amendment) Act, 1956  (Bom.   XIII  of  1956), was canvassed.  Under that Act the title to the  land  which vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant  on  the  tiller’s  day  or  within  the  alternative  period  prescribed in that behalf.  This title is defeasible only in  the  event  of  the tenant failing to  appear  or  making  a  statement  that  he is not willing to purchase the  land  or  committing  default  in  payment of  the  price  thereof  as  determined   (1) [1959] SUPP.  1 S.C.R. 489.  903  by the Tribunal constituted for that purpose.  This Act was,  therefore, enacted to implement the agrarian reform in  that  part of the country and it expressly confers certain  rights  on tenants in respect of their tenements which they did  not  have  before.  The Act creates absolute rights in  a  tenant  which was either by the extinguishment or by modification of  a  landlord’s  rights  and conferment of  the  same  on  the  tenant.  This law is, therefore, one pertaining to the land-  tenure of the State.  The  second decision is that in Atma Ram v. State of  Punjab  (1).  There, this Court was concerned with the provisions of  the  Punjab  Security of Land Tenure Act-(IO  of  1953)  (as  amended by Act 11 of 1955).  Under that Act, the substantive  rights  of  a  landowner were modified  in  three  respects,  namely, (1) it modified his rights of settling his lands  on  any terms and to any one he chooses; (2) it modified, if  it  did  not altogether extinguish, his right to  cultivate  the  surplus  area  as  understood  under the  Act;  and  (3)  it  modified  his right of transfer in so far as it obliged  him  to  sell  lands not at his own price but at  a  price  fixed  under  the  statute,  and not to any one  but  to  specified  persons,  in accordance with the provisions of the Act.   It  is  clear  from  the said Act that  the  provisions  thereof  purport to regulate the rights in respect of lands which are  estates  within  the meaning of the law  relating  to  land-  tenures  in  Punjab.  It was contended therein that  in  the  purview  of Art. 31A, only the entire estates were  included  but not portions thereof, but that contention was negatived.  Sinha,  J. (as he then was), who delivered the  judgment  of  the Court, observed at p. 526 thus:  "Keeping  in view the fact that Art. 31A was enacted by  two  successive amendments-one in 1951 (First Amendment), and the

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second in 1955 (Fourth Amendment)-with retrospective effect,  in order to save legislation effecting agrarian reforms,  we  have  every reason to hold that those expressions have  been  used in their widest amplitude, consistent with the  purpose  behind those amend. ments ".   (1) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 748.  904  This  Court has, therefore, recognised that  the  amendments  inserting  Art.  31A in the  Constitution  and  subsequently  amending it were to facilitate agrarian reforms and in  that  case  it was held that the impugned Act affected the  rights  of the landlords and tenants.  Neither  of  the  two  decisions,  therefore,  supports  the  contention  that  Art. 31A comprehends modification  of  the  rights  of an owner of land without reference to the law  of  land-tenures.  The  impugned Act does not purport to modify  or  extinguish  any right in an estate.  The avowed object of it is only  to  declare  particular sthanams to be  Marumakkathayam  tarwads  and the property pertaining to such sthanams as the property  of  the  said tarwads.  It declares particular  sthanams  to  have  always been tarwads and their property to have  always  been tarwad property.  The result is that the sole title  of  the sthanee is not recognised and the members of the  tarwad  are  given  rights  therein.   The  impugned  Act  does  not  effectuate any agrarian reform and regulate the rights inter  se between landlords and tenants.  We, therefore, hold  that  the  respondents  cannot rely upon Art. 31A to  deprive  the  petitioner of his fundamental rights.  Now  coming  to  the  arguments  advanced  by  the   learned  Attorney-General,  as  we propose to hold in his  favour  on  point  (2), we are relieved of the necessity to express  our  opinion  on points (1) and (3) raised by him.  On the  basis  of  this elimination, the question that falls to be  decided  is  whether the impugned Act deprives the petitioner of  his  fundamental right to hold and dispose of property and is not  protected  by cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.   This  question  is  inextricably  connected  with  the  contention  raised  by  the  respondents that Art.  31(1)  excludes  the  operation  of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.  We  shall,  therefore, proceed to consider both these questions.  The  argument of the learned counsel for the respondents  is  that  Art.  19(1)(f) must give place to Art.  31(1)  of  the  Constitution.  In other words, a  905  person’s  fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose  of  property is conditioned by the existence of property and  if  he  is deprived of that property by authority of  law  under  Art.  31(1),  his  fundamental  right  under  Art.  19(1)(f)  disappears with it.  Fundamental  rights  have a transcendental position  in  the  Constitution.  Our Constitution describes certain rights  as  fundamental  rights and places them in a separate Part.   It  provides a machinery for enforcing those rights.  Article 32  prescribes a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of  those  rights  and  makes the remedial right itself  a  fundamental  right.   Article 13(1) declares that " All laws in force  in  the  territory of India immediately before the  commencement  of  this  Constitution, in so far as they  are  inconsistent  with  the provisions of this Part, shall, to the  extent  of  such inconsistency, be void "; and Art. 13(2) prohibits  the  State  from making any law which takes away or abridges  the  rights  conferred  by  Part  III  of  the  Constitution  and  declares  that any law made in contravention of that  clause  shall,  to the extent of the contravention, be void.  It  is

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true that any other Article of the Constitution may  exclude  the  operation  of the fundamental rights in  respect  of  a  specific  matter-for  instance, Arts. 31A and 31B.   It  may  also  be that an Article embodying a fundamental  right  may  exclude another by necessary implication, but before such  a  construction excluding the operation of one or other of  the  fundamental rights is accepted, every attempt should be made  to  harmonise the two Articles so as to make them  co-exist,  and only if it is not possible to do so, one can be made  to  yield to the other.  Barring such exceptional circumstances,  any  law made would be void if it infringes any one  of  the  fundamental rights.  The relevant Articles read:  Article 19. (1) AU citizens shall have the right--   ....................................................   (f)acquire,        hold        and        dispose        of  property... ....................... .......  (5)    Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of  the  said  clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in  so  far as it imposes, or prevent the State  906  from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the  exercise  of  any of the rights conferred by the  said  sub-  clauses either in the interests of the general public or for  the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.  "    Article 31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his  property  save by authority of law.  (2)   No   property  shall  be  compulsorily   acquired   or  requisitioned  save  for  a  public  purpose  and  save   by  authority  of a law which provides for compensation for  the  property  so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes  the  amount  of the compensation or specifies the  principles  on  which,  and the manner in which, the compensation is  to  be  determined  and  given; and no such law shall be  called  in  question  in any court on the ground that  the  compensation  provided by that law is not adequate.  (2A)  Where a law does not provide for the transfer  of  the  ownership  or  right to possession of any  property  to  the  State or to a Corporation owned or controlled by the  State,  it  shall  not  be  deemed to  provide  for  the  compulsory  acquisition  or requisitioning of property,  notwithstanding  that it deprives any person of his property."  Clause (2) of Art. 31 has been amended and cl. (2A) has been  inserted  in Art. 31 by the Constitution (Fourth  Amendment)  Act,  1955.   The said cl. (2) in its original  form,  i.e.,  before  the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955,  read  as follows :  "  (2)  No property, moveable or immoveable,  including  any  interest  in,  or in any company owning, any  commercial  or  industrial  undertaking,  shall be taken  possession  of  or  acquired  for public purposes under any law authorizing  the  taking  of such possession or such acquisition,  unless  the  law  provides  for  compensation  for  the  property   taken  possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the  compensation,  or specifies the principles on which and  the  manner  in which, the compensation is to be  determined  and  given."  To  have a correct appreciation of the scope of the  amended  clauses of Art. 31, it is necessary to consider,  907  in the words of Lord Coke, the following circumstances :  (i)  What was the law before the Act was passed;  (ii) What  was the mischief or defect for which the law  had  not provided;  (iii)     What remedy Parliament has appointed; and  (iv) the reason of the remedy.

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The  unamended  clauses of the Article were the  subject  of  judicial scrutiny by this Court in the State of West  Bengal  v.  Subodh Gopal Bose (1).  There, the respondent  purchased  certain property at a revenue sale and as such purchaser  he  acquired under s. 37 of the Bengal Revenue Sales Act,  1859,  the  right  "  to  avoid and  annul  all  under-tenures  and  forthwith   to  eject  all  under-tenants  "  with   certain  exceptions.  In exercise of that right he brought a suit for  eviction  of  certain under-tenants and  obtained  a  decree  therein.   When  the  appeal against  the  said  decree  was  pending, the Act was amended.  The amending Act  substituted  by s. 4 the new s. 37 in place of the original s. 37 and  it  provided  by s. 7 that all pending suits, appeals and  other  proceedings  which had not already resulted in  delivery  of  possession, should abate.  It was contended on behalf of one  of  the respondents therein that s. 7 was void as  abridging  his fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(f) and Art. 31.  The  Court  by  a  majority  held that the Act  was  void  as  it  infringed Art. 31 of the Constitution.  The majority of  the  Judges,  who constituted the bench, took the view that  cls.  (1)  and  (2)  of Art. 31 related to  the  same  subject  of  eminent domain and that the State had no power to  seriously  impair  the rights of a citizen in property  without  paying  compensation.   Patanjali Sastri, C. J., expressed his  view  thus at p. 618:  "  Under the Constitution of India, however, such  questions  must be determined with reference to the expression "  taken  possession  of or acquired " as interpreted  above,  namely,  that  it  must be read along with the word " deprived  "  in  clause  (1)  and  understood as  having  reference  to  such  substantial abridgement of the rights of ownership as would  (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 587.  908  amount  to deprivation of the owner of his property. No  cut  and  dried test can be formulated as to whether in  a  given  case  the  owner is " deprived of his  property  within  the  meaning of article 31 each case must be decided as it arises  on  its own facts.  Broadly speaking it may be said that  an  abridgement  would  be  so substantial as  to  amount  to  a  deprivation within the meaning of article 31, if, in effect,  it  withheld the property from the possession and  enjoyment  of the owner, or seriously impaired its use and enjoyment by  him, or materially reduced its value."  Das,  J.  (as he then was), observed that Art.  31(2)  dealt  with  only  acquisition and requisition  of  property  where  under  title  passed  to  the  State  and  that  Art.  31(1)  conferred  police  power on the State.   Ghulam  Hasan,  J.,  concurred   with   the   view   of   the   Chief    Justice.  Jagannadhadas,  J., did not agree with the view of Das,  J.,  that Art. 31(1) conferred police power on the State, but  he  was  not  also  able to agree with the  view  of  the  Chief  Justice  that Art. 31(1) has reference only to the power  of  eminent domain.  He also expressed his disagreement with the  view  of Das, J., that acquisition and taking possession  in  Art.  31(2)  have  to  be  taken  as  necessarily  involving  transfer of title or possession.  The result of the decision  is that this Court by majority held that Art. 31(1) and  (2)  provided  for the doctrine of eminent domain and that  under  cl. (2) a person must be deemed to have been deprived of his  property, if he is " substantially dispossessed " or if  his  right  to  use and enjoy his property  has  been  "seriously  impairedor  the  value  of the property  is  "  materially  reducedby  the  impugned law. This view was  followed  in  Dwarakadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The, Sholapur Spinning and  Weaving  Co.  Ltd. (1) and in Saghir Ahmad v. The  State  of

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U.P. (2).  Presumably, Parliament accepted the minority view  of Das, J., on the interpretation of el. (2) of Art. 31  and  amended the Constitution by the Constitution (Fourth  Amend-  ment)  Act, 1955.  The amendment made it clear that cl.  (2)  of  Art.  31 applies only to  acquisition  and  requisition.  Clause (2A) of the said Article which was inserted  (1) [1954] S.C.R. 674.  (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707.  909  by  the said amendment. explains that unless a law  provides  for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession  of  any  property  to  the State or to a  corporation  owned  or  controlled  by the State, it shall not be deemed to  provide  for   the  compulsory  acquisition  or   requisitioning   of  property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his  property.  The result is that it did not accept the majority  view of this Court that deprivation of property need not  be  by  acquisition alone but also by any serious impairment  of  an  dividual’s right to property, whether his  ownership  or  right to possession of the property has been transferred  to  the  State  or its nominee or not.  This amendment  also  in  effect  accepted  the view of Das, J., that  deprivation  of  property  in  el.  (1) of Art. 31 covers  cases  other  than  acquisition  or requisition of property by the  State.   But  the amendment in other respects does not give any indication  as   regards  the  interpretation  of  Art.  31(1)  of   the  Constitution,  for  no  change in the  phraseology  of  that  clause is made.  Therefore,  we  must  look at the terms of  that  clause  to  ascertain  its  true  meaning.   The  words  are  clear  and  unambiguous  and they do not give rise to any difficulty  of  construction.  The said clause says in a negative form  that  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  his  property  save  by  authority  of law.  The law must obviously be a  valid  law.  Article  13(2) says that " the State shall not make any  law  which  takes away or abridges the rights conferred  by  this  Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall,  to  the  extent  of the contravention, be void  ".  The  law  depriving  a person of his property  cannot,therefore,  take  away  or  abridge  the right conferred by Part  III  of  the  Constitution.   In a recent decision in Deep Chand v.  State  of U.P. (1) this Court considered the limitations placed  by  the  Constitution on the Parliament and the Legislatures  of  the States in making laws.  After reading Arts. 245, 246, 13  and  31 of the Constitution, this Court proceeded to  state,  at p. 655, thus :  "  The combined effect of the said provisions may be  stated  thus:  Parliament and the Legislatures of States have  power  to make laws in. respect of any  (1) [1959] SUPP. (2) S.C.R. 8.  118  910  of  the  matters  enumerated in the relevant  lists  in  the  Seventh  Schedule and that power to make laws is subject  to  the  provisions of the Constitution including Art. 13  i.e.,  the power is made subject to the limitations imposed by Part  III of the Constitution............ When cl. (2) of Art.  13  says in clear and unambiguous terms that no State shall make  any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by  Part III, it will not avail the State to contend either that  the  clause  does not embody a curtailment of the  power  to  legislate  or  that  it  imposes only  a  check  but  not  a  prohibition.   A constitutional prohibition against a  State  making certain laws cannot be whittled down by analogy or by  drawing  inspiration  from decisions on  the  provisions  of

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other constitutions; nor can we appreciate the argument that  the words " any law " in the second line of Art. 13(2) posit  the  survival  of  the  law  made  in  the  teeth  of   such  prohibition."  The same view was expressed by this Court in Basheshar  Nath  v.  Commissioner  of Income-tax, Delhi Therein Das,  C.  J.,  says at p. 158 thus:  "  As  regards  the  legislative organ  of  the  State,  the  fundamental right is further consolidated by the  provisions  of  Art. 13.  Clause (1) of that Article, provides that  all  laws in force in the territories of India immediately before  the commencement of the Constitution, in so far as they  are  inconsistent  with the provisions of Part III shall, to  the  extent of the inconsistency, be void.  Likewise cl. (2)  of’  this  Article prohibits the State from making any law  which  takes away or abridges the rights conferred by the same Part  and   follows  it  up  by  saying  that  any  law  made   in  contravention  of  this clause shall, to the extent  of  the  contravention, be void.  It will be observed that so far  as  this  Article  is concerned, there is no relaxation  of  the  restriction  imposed by it such as there are in some of  the  other Articles   .................."  Bhagwati,  J.,  observed much to the same effect at  p.  161  thus:  "  It is absolutely clear on a perusal of Art. 13(2) of  the  Constitution that it is a constitutional mandate   (1) [1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 528.  911  to  the  State and no citizen can by any act  or  con.  duct  relieve the State of the solemn obligation imposed on it  by  Art. 13(2)................."  One  of us had also stated to the same effect, after  citing  Art. 13, at p. 181 :  "  This  Article, in clear and unambiguous terms,  not  only  declares  that all laws in force before the commencement  of  the   Constitution  and  made  thereafter  taking  away   or  abridging the said rights would be void to the extent of the  contravention  but also prohibits the State from making  any  law taking away or abridging the said rights."  It  is,  therefore, manifest that the law must  satisfy  two  tests  before  it can be a valid law, namely, (1)  that  the  appropriate legislature has competency to make the law;  and  (2)  that  it  does  not take away or  abridge  any  of  the  fundamental   rights   enumerated  in  Part   III   of   the  Constitution.  It follows that the law depriving a person of  his  property will be an invalid law if it infringes  either  Art. 19(1)(f) or any other Article of Part III.  Learned  counsel,  appearing  for  the  respondents,   while  conceding  that the validity of a law must pass the test  of  the  foregoing two conditions, contends that in the  context  of  Art. 31, we should apply the construction  analogous  to  that  put upon by this Court on the word " law " in Art.  21  of  the  Constitution in the case of A. K.  Gopalan  v.  The  State  of  Madras(1).  In the said case,  the  question  was  whether the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950  (IV of 1950), were ultra vires the Constitution.  This Court  by a majority held that the said Act, with the exception  of  s. 14 thereof, did not contravene any of the Articles of the  Constitution and, therefore, the detention of the petitioner  therein  was not illegal.  In that context, a  question  was  raised  whether  the  said  Act  must  be  struck  down   as  infringing  Art. 19(1)(d) of the Constitution.   This  Court  held  that  the  concept  of the  right  "  to  move  freely  throughout  the  territory of India " referred  to  in  Art.

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19(1)(d) of the Constitution was entirely different from the  concept  of the right to "personal liberty" referred  to  in  Art. 21 and that Art. 21  (1)[1950] S.C.R. 88.  912  should  not,  therefore,  be  read  as  controlled  by   the  provisions  of Art. 19.  Though the learned Judges  excluded  the  operation  of Art. 19 in considering  the  question  of  fundamental  right under Art. 21, the judgment of the  court  discloses three shades of opinion.  As much of the  argument  is  centred  on  the analogy drawn from  this  decision  the  relevant Articles may be summarized:  Under  Art. 21, no person shall be deprived of his  life  or  personal  liberty  except in accordance with  the  procedure  established  by law.   Clauses(1) and (2) of Art. 22  afford  protection in the matter of arrest and detention in  certain  cases.    Clauses  4,  (5)  and  (6)  thereof  provide   for  preventive detention and constitutional safeguards  relating  thereto.   It  may not be inappropriate  to  describe  these  provisions   as   forming  an  exhaustive  code,   as   they  elaborately deal with a particular subject, namely, life and  personal liberty.  In construing the said provisions, Kania,  C. J., said at p.   100-101 thus:  "  So  read,  it clearly means that the  legislation  to  be  examined  must be directly in respect of one of  the  rights  mentioned  in  the sub-clauses.  If there is  a  legislation  directly attempting to control a citizen’s freedom of speech  or  expression,  or  his right  to  assemble  peaceably  and  without arms, etc., the question whether that legislation is  saved  by  the  relevant saving clause of  article  19  will  arise.   If,  however, the legislation is  not  directly  in  respect  of  any of these subjects, but as a result  of  the  operation  of other legislation, for instance, for  punitive  or  preventive detention, his right under any of these  sub-  clauses  is  abridged, the question of  the  application  of  article  19  does not arise.  The true approach is  only  to  consider the directness of the legislation and not what will  be the result of the detention otherwise valid , on the mode  of  the detenue’s life."    Mahajan,  J.  (as he then was), gave the  reason  for  his  conclusion at p. 226:  "  I  am satisfied on a review of the whole  scheme  of  the  Constitution that the intention was to make article 22 self-  contained  in respect of laws on the subject  of  preventive  detention."  913  The  learned Judge further elaborated the point thus  at  p.  228:  "  If the intention of the Constitution was that a law  made  on  the subject of preventive detention had to be tested  on  the  touchstone  of reasonableness, then it would  not  have  troubled itself by expressly making provision in article  22  about  the precise scope of the limitation subject to  which  such  a  law could be made and by mentioning  the  procedure  that the law dealing with that subject had to provide.  Some  of  the  provisions  of  article 22  would  then  have  been  redundant...................."  Mukherjea, J. (as he then was), said much to the same effect  at p. 225:  "  In my opinion, the group of articles 20 to 22 embody  the  entire protection guaranteed by the Constitution in relation  to deprivation of life and personal liberty both with regard  to substantive as well as to procedural law."  Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was), stated at p. 191  " Read as a whole and viewed in its setting among the  group

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of  provisions  (articles 19 to 22) relating to "  Right  to  Freedom  ", article 19 seems to my mind to pre-suppose  that  the  citizen  to whom the possession  of  these  fundamental  rights is secured retains the substratum of personal freedom  on  which  alone the enjoyment of these  rights  necessarily  rests."  The learned Judge further dilated on the point at p. 191.  "  Deprivation  of personal liberty in such a  situation  is  not, in my opinion, within the purview of article 19 at  all  but is dealt with by the succeeding articles 20 and 21.   In  other  words,  article  19 guarantees to  the  citizens  the  enjoyment  of certain civil liberties while they  are  free,  while articles 20-22 secure to all persons-citizens and non-  citizenscertain  constitutional  guarantees  in  regard   to  punishment and prevention of crime."  Das, J. (as he then was), stated at p. 302 thus:  " The purpose of article 19(1)(d) is to guarantee that there  shall  be  no State barrier.  It  gives  protection  against  provincialism.  It has nothing to do with the freedom of the  person as such."  914  The learned Judge continued to state at p. 304:  " Therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the  rights  protected  by  article 19(1), in so far as  they  relate  to  rights attached to the person, i.e., the rights referred  to  in  sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g), are rights which only  a  free citizen, who has the freedom of his person  unimpaired,  can exercise."  The  views of the learned Judges may be  broadly  summarized  under  three  heads, viz., (1) to invoke Art. 19(1),  a  law  shall  be made directly infringing that right; (2) Arts.  21  and  22  constitute  a  self-contained  code;  and  (3)  the  freedoms  in Art. 19 postulate a free man.  On the basis  of  the   said  theories,  this  Court,  with  Fazl   Ali,   J.,  dissenting, rejected the plea that a law made under Art.  21  shall  not infringe Art. 19(1).  Had the question  been  res  integra,  some of us would have been inclined to agree  with  the  dissenting view expressed by Fazl Ali, J.; but  we  are  bound  by  this  judgment.  Even so,  there  is  no  analogy  between  Art.  21, as interpreted by this  Court,  and  Art.  31(1).   Article 21 deals with personal  liberty.   Personal  liberty, Kania, C.J., observed, includes " the right to  eat  or  sleep  when one likes or to work or not to work  as  and  when one pleases and several such rights " and " deprivation  of  such  liberty  ",  in the words  of  the  learned  Chief  Justice,  "  is quite different from restriction  (which  is  only  a partial control) of the right to move freely  (which  is  relatively  a minor right of a  citizen)".   "  Personal  Liberty  "  is a more comprehensive concept and has  a  much  wider  connotation  than  the  right  conferred  under  Art.  19(1)(d).   Arts.  19(1)(d)  and  22  deal  with   different  subjects,  whereas both Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(1)  deal  with  the  same  subject,  namely,  property;  while  under   Art.  19(1)(f),  a  citizen  has the right to  acquire,  hold  and  dispose of property, Art. 31(1) enables the State to make  a  law  to deprive him of that property.  Such a  law  directly  infringes  the fundamental right given under Art.  19(1)(f).  Further, Arts. 21 and 22 are linked up together; while  Art.  21  enables  the State to deprive a person of  his  life  or  personal  liberty according to the procedure established  by  law, Art. 22 prescribes certain procedure in respect of both  punitive and preventive detention.  They constitute, an  915  integrated  code in the matter of personal liberty.  On  the  other  hand, Art. 31(1), by reason of the amendment,  ceases

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to  be  a  part  of the  guarantee  against  acquisition  or  requisition  of  property without the authority of  law  and  must therefore be construed on its own terms.  The said Articles are not in pari materia and they differ in  their  scope and content.  There is material difference  not  only in the phraseology but also in their setting.   Article  31(1),  therefore, cannot be construed on the basis  of  the  construction placed upon Art. 21.  The decision in The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (1),  on  which  reliance  is  placed  by  learned  counsel  for   the  respondents  in support of their contention that Art.  31(1)  excludes  the operation of Art. 19(1), is one based  on  the  pre-existing law before the Constitution (Fourth  Amendment)  Act, 1955.  In that case it was contended that ss. 5(1)  and  6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act,, 1948 (Bom.  Act  XXXIII  of  1948), as amended by Bombay Act 11 of  1950  and  Bombay  Act XXXIX of 1950, were ultra vires  Arts.  19(1)(f)  and  31(2)  of the Constitution.  The premises  in  question  there belonging to the respondents were requisitioned by the  Governor  of  Bombay  under  the said  Act.   The  Act  also  provided  for compensation, and this Court found that  there  was  a clear public purpose for the requisition, and  upheld  the  law under Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.   This  Court  also  considered the alternative argument advanced,  namely,  that  the Act was hit by Art. 19(1)(f) of  the  Constitution  inasmuch  as unreasonable restrictions were imposed  on  the  rights  of the respondents to acquire, bold and  dispose  of  property.   In rejecting that argument, Bose,  J.,  speaking  for the Court, observed at p. 780 thus :  "  We need not examine those differences here because it  is  enough  to  say that article 19(1)(f) read with  clause  (5)  postulates  the existence of property which can  be  enjoyed  and over which rights can be exercised because otherwise the  reasonable restrictions contemplated by clause (5) could not  be brought into play.  If there is no property which can  be  acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction  (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.  916  can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire,  hold  and  dispose  of  it, and as  clause  (5)  contemplates  the  placing of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of  those  rights  it  must  follow that  the  article  postulates  the  existence  of  property  over  which  these  rights  can  be  exercised.  "  For these observations the learned Judge has drawn upon  the  principle  laid  down in A. K. Gopalan’s  Case  (1).   These  observations   prima   facie  appear  to  be   against   the  contentions  of  the  petitioner  herein.   But  a   further  scrutiny   reveals  that  they  have  no  bearing   on   the  construction of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution after cl. (2)  of  Art. 31 has been amended and el. (2A) has been  inserted  in that Article by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)  Act,  1955.  Before the amendment, this Court, as we have  already  noticed,  held by a majority in The State of West Bengal  v.  Subodh Gopal Bose (2) that cls. (1) and (2) of Art. 31  were  not  mutually exclusive in scope and content, but should  be  read  together  and  understood as  dealing  with  the  same  subject,  namely,  the acquisition or taking  possession  of  property  referred to in cl. (2) of Art. 31.  In that  view,  Art.  31, before the amendment, was a selfcontained  Article  providing  for a subject different from that dealt  with  in  Art.  19.   On that basis it was possible to hold,  as  this  Court held in The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (3) on the  analogy  drawn from Art. 21, that when the property  therein  was requisitioned within the meaning of Art. 31, the  opera-

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tion  of  Art. 19 was excluded.  But there is no  scope  for  drawing  such  an  analogy after  the  Constitution  (Fourth  Amendment)  Act,  1955, as thereafter they  dealt  with  two  different subjects: Art. 31(2) and (2A) with acquisition and  requisition  and Art. 31(1) with deprivation of property  by  authority  of  law.  The decision of this  Court  in  Bhanji  Munji’s  Case  (3)  no  longer holds  the  field  after  the  Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.  Strong  reliance is placed upon the observations of Das,  J.  (as he then was), in Subodh Gopal Bose’s Case ( 2 ). Therein  the learned Judge dissented from the view of the majority on  the   interpretation   of  Art.  31(1)  and   (2)   of   the  Constitution.  In the course  (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88       (2) [1954] S.C.R 587.                    (3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777,  917  of  his dissenting judgment, the learned Judge made  certain  observations on the effect of his interpretation of Art.  31  on Art. 19.  The learned Judge said at p. 632 thus:  " Such being the correct correlation between article  19(1),  sub-clauses  (a) to (e) and (g) on the one hand and  article  21  on the other, the question necessarily arises as to  the  correlation  between  article  19(1)  (f)  and  article  31.  Article  19(1)(f)  guarantees to a citizen, as  one  of  his  freedoms, the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property  but  reasonable restrictions may be imposed on the  exercise  of  that  right  to  the extent  indicated  in  clause  (5).  Article 31, as its heading shows, guarantees to all persons,  citizens  and  non-citizens, the ’ right to property’  as  a  fundamental right to the extent therein mentioned.  What,  I  ask myself, is the correlation between article 19(1)(f) read  with  article 19(5) and article 31 ? If, as held by my  Lord  in A.     K. Gopalan’s Case(1) at p. 191, subclauses (a) to  (e)and (g) of article 19(1) read with the relevant clauses  (2)  to  (6)  ’  presuppose that the  citizen  to  whom  the  possession  of these fundamental rights is  secured  retains  the  substratum  of  personal freedom  on  which  alone  the  enjoyment of these rights necessarily rests’, it must follow  logically that article 19(1)(f) read with article 19(5) must  likewise presuppose that the person to whom that fundamental  right  is  guaranteed  retains his  property  over  or  with  respect to which alone that right may be exercised.  I found  myself unable to escape from this logical conclusion."  The  learned  Judge earlier expressed the  same  opinion  in  Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India (2).  When  it  was  pointed out to the learned Judge that, if his view  was  correct, the legislature while it cannot restrict a person’s  right  to property unless the restriction is reasonable  and  for  a  public purpose, it can deprive him of  his  property  without  any such limitations, the learned  Judge  negatived  the objection in the following words at p. 654:  (1) [1950] S.C.R, 88,  (2) [1950] S.C.R. 869.  119  918  "  What  is  abnormal if our Constitution  has  trusted  the  legislature,  as  the people of Great Britain  have  trusted  their  Parliament ? Right to life and personal  liberty  and  the  right to private property still exist in Great  Britain  in  spite  of the supremacy of Parliament.   Why  should  we  assume   or   apprehend  that  our   Parliament   or   State  legislatures  should act like mad men and deprive us of  our  property without any rhyme or reason?"  Further, the learned Judge was of the view that unless  Art.  3  l(l) was construed in the manner he did, it would not  be

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possible for the State to bring about a welfare State  which  our Constitution directs it to do.  Elaborating this  point,  the learned Judge observed, at p.655, thus:  We must reconcile ourselves to the plain truth that emphasis  has  now  unmistakably shifted from the  individual  to  the  community.   We cannot overlook that the avowed  purpose  of  our   Constitution  is  to  set  up  a  welfare   State   by  subordinating  the social interest in individual liberty  or  property to the larger social interest in the rights of  the  community.   As  already observed, the police power  of  the  State  is    the  most essential of  powers,  at  times  most  insistent,  and always one of the least limitable powers  of  the  government’.........  In the matter of  deprivation  of  property otherwise than by the taking of posession or by the  acquisition  of it within the meanings of article 31(2)  our  Constitution has trusted our legislature and has not thought  fit  to impose any limitation on the legislature’s  exercise  of the State’s police power over private property ".  Relying upon the said observations, learned counsel for  the  respondents  pressed on us the following three  points:  (1)  After the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, cl. (1)  of  Art.  31 must be read independently of el.  (2)  thereof  and,  if so read, cl. (1) must be held to deal  with  police  power.  (2) Without such power the State cannot usher  in  a  welfare  State which the Constitution enjoins it to do.  (3)  The  fact  that there is no limitation on the power  of  the  legislature to make law depriving a citizen of his  property  need not deter us from recognising such power, as we  919  can  trust our legislatures and Parliament as the people  of  Great Britain have trusted their Parliament.  We cannot agree with the con tention of the learned  counsel  that  Art.  31(1) deals with " police power ". In  the  view  expressed  by Das, J. (as he then was), the legislature  can  make any law depriving a person of his property and the only  limitation  on such power is its good sense.  But  "  police  power  ", as it is understood in American Law, can never  be  an arbitrary power.  Willis on Constitutional  Law " says at p. 727:  "  The United States Supreme Court has said that the  police  power  embraces regulations designed to promote  the  public  convenience   or   the  general  prosperity,  as   well   as  regulations  designed  to  promote the  public  health,  the  public morals or the public safety ’. "  In  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America,  prepared  by the Legislative Reference Service,  Library  of  Congress  (Senate Document No. 170, 82D Congress), "  police  power " is generally defined thus at p. 982:  "  The  police power of a State today  embraces  regulations  designed  to promote the public convenience or  the  general  prosperity  as  well  as those  to  promote  public  safety,  health,  morals, and is not confined to the  suppression  of  what is offensive, disorderly, or unsanitary, but extends to  what is for the greatest welfare of the State ".  Prof.   Willoughby states in his Constitutional Law  of  the  United  States  (Vol.  III, p.  1774):.........  the  police  power knows no definite limit.  It extends to every possible  phase  of what the Courts deem to be the public  welfare  ".  Holmes,  J.,  in Noble State Bank  v.  Haskell(1)  concisely  defines  ’police power" thus: " It may be said in a  general  way  that the police power extends to all the  great  public  needs ". It is, therefore, clear that police power cannot be  divorced  from social control and public good.   We  cannot,  therefore,  import  the  doctrine of  police  power  in  our  Constitution  divorced  from the necessary  restrictions  on

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that  power as evolved by judicial decisions of the  Supreme  Court  of  the United States.  Indeed, uninfluenced  by  any  such doctrine, the plain meaning of the clear words  (1)219 U.S. 104.  920  used in Art. 31(1) of the Constitution enables the State  to  discharge its functions in the interest of social and public  welfare  which  the State in America can do in  exercise  of  police  power.  The limitation on the power of the State  to  make  a law depriving a person of his property, as  we  have  already stated, is found in the word " law " and that  takes  us back to Art. 19 and the law made can be sustained only if  it  imposes reasonable restrictions in the interest  of  the  general public.  We  find  it also very difficult to accept  the  second  and  third aspects of the approach to the question.  The duty  of  this  Court  is  only to interpret  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  in a liberal spirit, but not to  eradicate  or  modify   the   fundamental   rights.    That   apart,    our  constitution-makers  thought  otherwise.   The  Constitution  declares  the fundamental rights of a citizen and lays  down  that  all  laws made abridging or taking  away  such  rights  shall  be void.  That is a clear indication that the  makers  of the Constitution did not think fit to give our Parliament  the same powers which the Parliament of England has.   While  the  Constitution  contemplates  a welfare  State,  it  also  provides that it should be brought about by the  legislature  subject  to  the limitations imposed on its power.   If  the  makers  of  the Constitution intended  to  confer  unbridled  power  on the Parliament to make any law it liked  to  bring  about  the welfare State, they would not have  provided  for  the fundamental rights.  The Constitution gives every  scope  for  ordered  progress of society towards a  welfare  State.  The State is expected to bring about a welfare State  within  the  framework of the Constitution, for it is authorized  to  impose  reasonable  restrictions, in the  interests  of  the  general public, on the fundamental rights recognized in Art.  19.  If the interpretation sought to be placed on Art. 31(1)  was accepted, it would compel the importation of the  entire  doctrine  of police power and grafting it in Art.  31(1)  or  the  recognition of arbitrary power in the legislature  with  the  hope or consolation suggested that our  Parliament  and  legislatures  may  be trusted not to act  arbitrarily.   The  first  suggestion is not legally permissible and the  second  does not stand to reason,  921  for  the Constitution thought fit to impose  limitations  on  the  power  of the legislatures even in the case  of  lesser  infringements of the rights of a citizen.  Another   argument  raised  by  learned  counsel   for   the  respondents  may also be noticed.  If the view expressed  by  us  be correct, the argument proceeds, the law  depriving  a  person  of his property-however urgent the need may  be  and  whatever  grave danger or serious vice it seeks to avert  or  suppress- can never be a reasonable restriction on the right  to  enjoy  property and therefore every such  law  would  be  void.   The  learned  Attorney-General argues  that  in  the  present case the petitioner is not deprived of his property,  but his right is only restricted.  It depends upon the  per-  spective from which we look at the facts.  In one sense, the  petitioner  has been deprived of his shares in the  property  given  by the statute to the respondents, but, even on  that  assumption,  we  do  not  think that  the  argument  of  the  respondents has any substance.  The correct approach to  the  question  is,  first to ascertain what  is  the  fundamental

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right  of  the  petitioners; then to see,  whether  the  law  infringes  that right.  If the law ex facie  infringes  that  right,  the State can support that law only by  establishing  that   the  law  imposes  reasonable  restrictions  on   the  petitioner’s  fundamental  right  in the  interests  of  the  general  public.   If  so approached, the  impugned  Act  by  seeking to deprive the petitioner of his property  certainly  infringes  his  fundamental  right.   There  is   absolutely  nothing  on  the record to sustain the validity of  the  law  under the said clause (5) of Art. 19.  The apprehension that  deprivation  can never be a restriction and therefore  every  law  depriving a person of his property must necessarily  be  void, even if justifiable, cannot help the respondents,  for  if  it is not saved by cl. (5), that result must  flow  from  the  promises.  But that apprehension has no  justification.  This Court has held in a recent decision that under  certain  circumstances  a law depriving a citizen of his  fundamental  right  to property may amount to a  reasonable  restriction.  In Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India (1), Das Gupta,  J.,  observed:  (1)  [1960] 2 S.C.R. 375.  922  "  It  is  reasonable  to  think  that  the  makers  of  the  Constitution   considered  the  word  ’restriction’  to   be  sufficiently  wide  to save laws ’ inconsistent’  with  Art.  19(1),  or  ’  taking  away the  rights’  conferred  by  the  Article,  provided  this inconsistency or  taking  away  was  reasonable  in  the  interests  of  the  different   matters  mentioned  in the clause.  There can be no  doubt  therefore  that they intended the word ’restriction ’ to include  cases  of   ’  prohibition’  also.   The  contention  that  a   law  prohibiting  the  exercise of a fundamental right is  in  no  case saved, cannot therefore be accepted.  It is undoubtedly  correct,  however,  that when, as in the present  case,  the  restriction  reaches the stage of prohibition  special  care  has  to  be  taken  by the Court to see  that  the  test  of  reasonableness  is satisfied.  The greater the  restriction,  the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court.  "  If  so,  the  State  can establish that  a  law,  though  it  purports to deprive the petitioner of his fundamental right,  under   certain  circumstances  amounts  to   a   reasonable  restriction within the meaning of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of  the  Constitution.  We,  therefore, hold that a law made depriving a citizen  of  his property shall be void, unless the law so made  complies  with   the  provisions  of  el.  (5)  of  Art.  19  of   the  Constitution.  This leads us to the question whether the provisions of  the  Act  infringe  Art.  19(1)(f)  of  the  Constitution.    The  impugned  Act  is  The Madras  Marumakkathayam  (Removal  of  Doubts)  Act, 1955 (Madras Act No. XXXII of 1955).   As  the  argument turns upon the provisions of the Act and as the Act  itself is a short one, it will be convenient to set out  all  the provisions thereof.  The  Madras  Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts)  Act,  1955  (Act No. XXXII of 1955).  (An   Act   to   remove  certain  doubts   in   the   Madras  Marumakkathayam  Act,  1932 (Madras Act XXII  of  1933),  in  regard to sthanams and sthanam properties).  Whereas doubts have arisen about the true legal character of  certain properties which are erroneously  923  claimed  to be or regarded as sthanam properties, but  which  are properties of the tarwad, the male members of which  are  entitled  to succeed to the sthanam and it is  necessary  to

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remove those doubts in respect of this question :  Be it enacted in the Sixth Year of the Republic of India  as  follows  1.  This  Act  may  be  called  the  MADRAS  MARUMAKKATHAYAM  (REMOVAL OF DOUBTS) ACT,, 1955.  (2)It  shall apply to all persons governed by  the  Madras  Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act, XXII of 1933).  2.Notwithstanding  any  decision of Court,  any  sthanam  in  respect of which:-  (a)there is or had been at any time an intermingling of  the  properties of the sthanam and the properties of the  tarwad,  or  (b)the   members  of  the  tarwad  have   been   receiving  maintenance  from  the properties purporting to  be  sthanam  properties  as  of  right, or in pursuance of  a  custom  or  otherwise, or  (c)there  had at any time been a vacancy caused  by  there  being  no male member of the tarwad eligible to  succeed  to  the sthanam,  shall  be  deemed to be and shall be deemed always  to  have  been   a   Marumakkathayam   tarwad   and   the   properties  appertaining  to  such a sthanam shall be deemed to  be  and  shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging  to  the   tarwad   to  which  the  provisions  of   the   Madras  Marumakkathayam  Act, 1932 (Madras Act XXII of 1933),  shall  apply.  Explanation:-All  words  and expressions used  in  this  Act  shall bear the same meaning as in the Madras Marumakkathayam  Act, 1932 (Madras Act XXII of 1933).  The  Act  presupposes  the existence of a  sthanam  and  its  properties.   It  says that the sthanam and  its  properties  possessing  one  or more of  the  characteristics  mentioned  therein  shall be deemed and shall be always deemed to  have  been   a   Marumakkathayam   tarwad   and   its   properties  respectively.  The  924  impugned  Act  applies  also  to  sthanams  whose  title  to  properties has been declared by courts of law.  Further  the  Act is given retrospective operation.  It is suggested  that  the provisions of the Act have not been happily worded  and,  if  properly  understood with the help of the  preamble,  it  would  be  clear that the sthanams were not  converted  into  tarwads  but only tarwads which were wrongly claimed  to  be  sthanams were declared to be not sthanams.  The preamble  of  a statute is " a key to the understanding of it " and it  is  well established that " it may legitimately be consulted  to  solve  any ambiguity, or to fix the meaning of  words  which  may  have  more than one, or to keep the effect of  the  Act  within its real scope, whenever the enacting part is in  any  of  these  respects  open to doubt ". We  do  not  find  any  ambiguity  in the enacting part of the Act.   Assuming  that  there  is some doubt, the preamble confirms our view of  the  construction of the Act.  According to the preamble  certain  properties  of the tarwad are erroneously claimed to  be  or  regarded  as sthanam properties and it has become  necessary  to remove those doubts by making the Act.  The preamble also  recognizes the existence of sthanams and the doubts  related  only to the title to the property of sthanams.  The enacting  part  purports to resolve these doubts by laying down  three  tests,  and  if  any one of these tests  is  satisfied,  the  sthanam  shall be deemed to be a tarwad and  the  properties  tarwad  properties.   In  short,  the  Act,  read  with  the  preamble,  takes  the sthanam, lays down certain  tests  and  proceeds  to  say  that  if one or other  of  the  tests  is  satisfied  in respect of any property claimed to be that  of

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the sthanam, the sthanam by statutory fiction is treated  as  the  tarwad  and its properties as tarwad  properties.   The  tests,  as  we will presently show, are  arbitrary  and  not  germane  to the question whether the properties belong to  a  sthanam or a tarwad.  Whatever may be the phraseology  used,  in  effect and substance, the Act in the guise  of  applying  certain  tests  seeks  to  convert  certain  sthanams   into  tarwards  and their properties into tarwad  properties.   It  applies  equally to sthanams governed by decrees  of  courts  and sthanams whose character and title to the properties can  be established by      clear  925  evidence  and to sthanams whose title is admitted.   In  the  said cases no question of doubt can conceivably arise.   The  Act  in the guise of dispelling doubts abolishes a class  of  sthanams  and  deprives  them  of  their  properties.    The  question is whether the said legislation can stand the  test  of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution.  The learned Advocate-General of Kerala seeks to support  the  legislation  on  the ground that under  the  Marumakkathayam  law, the three characteristics of properties mentioned in s.  2  pertain  to tarwad and, therefore, when  wrong  decisions  were  given by courts introducing confusion in  titles,  the  legislature  rightly stepped in to set right the  wrong  and  declare such sthanams possessing definite characteristics of  the  tarwad  to  be  and always  to  have  been  the  tarwad  properties.  He further argues that, as the law was made  to  protect the rights of the members of the tarwad in a  parti-  cular  class  of sthanams, the restrictions imposed  on  the  sthanees’ rights in their properties would be reasonable and  would   be   in  the  interests  of  the   general   public,  notwithstanding  the  fact that the  legislation  indirectly  affects the rights of a few decree-holder sthanees, who have  established their rights in a court of law.  Mr.  Purshottam  Tricumdas supported the  learned  Advocate-  General in this contention.  Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, who followed him, preferred  to  found  his contention on a broader basis, namely,  that  the  members of a tarwad and a sthanee have some interest in each  other’s  property and the legislation did nothing more  than  regulate  their  interest  inter se  to  restore  peace  and  harmony among them and to change the mutual relationship  to  bring  it  in accord with the concept of  a  modern  welfare  State.   If  that  be the object of the  Act,  the  argument  proceeds, the mere fact that the law incidently disturbs the  rights  of parties who have obtained decrees of  court  does  not make it unreasonable.  Before we consider the validity of these arguments, it would  be  convenient  at this stage to notice the  scope  of  Art.  19(1)(f)  and  Art.  19(5) of the  Constitution.   The  said  Articles read  120  926  Article    19.   (1)   All   citizens   shall    have    the  right .................................................  (f)  to acquire, hold and dispose of property.   .........................................................  (5)Nothing  in  sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of  the  said  clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in  so  far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any  law  imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any  of  the  rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in  the  interests of the general public or for the protection of the  interests of any Scheduled Tribe.  Under cl. (5), the State can make a law imposing  reasonable

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restrictions  on  the fundamental rights  embodied  in  Art.  19(1)(f) in the interests of the general public.  What  is  "  reasonable restriction "  has  been  succinctly  stated by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State Of -Madras v. V.  G. Row(1) thus at p. 607:  "It  is important in this context to bear in mind  that  the  test  of  reasonableness,  wherever  prescribed,  should  be  applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract  standard,  or general pattern of reasonableness can be  laid  down  as applicable to all cases.  The nature of  the  right  alleged  to have been infringed, the underlying  purpose  of  the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil  sought  to  be remedied thereby, the  disproportion  of  the  imposition,  the prevailing conditions at the  time,  should  all enter into the judicial verdict."  If we may say so, with respect, this passage summarizes  the  law  on the subject fully and precisely.  The learned  Chief  Justice in his description of the test of reasonableness, in  our view, has not stated anything more than the obvious, for  the  standard of reasonableness is inextricably  conditioned  by the state of society and the urgency for eradicating  the  evil sought to be remedied.  Some of the American  decisions  and passages from text-books cited at the Bar may be  useful  in ascertaining whether in the instant case the restrictions  imposed by the statute are reasonable.  (1) [1952] S.C.R. 597.  927  In Willoughby’s Constitutional Law it is stated at p.  795  thus:  As  between  individuals, no necessity,  however  great,  no  exigency,   however   imminent,  no   improvement,   however  valuable,  no refusal, however unneighbourly, no  obstinacy,  however  unreasonable,  no offers of  compensation,  however  extravagant,  can compel or require any man to part with  an  inch of his estate."  The  Supreme Court of th- United States of America in  Henry  Webster v. Peter Cooper(1) observed:  "  The result of the decision is, that the  constitution  of  the  State  has  secured  to  every  citizen  the  right  of  acquiring,  possessing, and enjoying property and  that,  by  the  true  intent  and meaning  of  this  section,  property  cannot, by a mere act of the Legislature, be taken from  one  man  and  vested  in another directly; nor can  it,  by  the  retrospective  operation of law, be  indirectly  transferred  from  one to another, or be subjected to the  government  of  principles  in  a court of justice, which  must  necessarily  produce that effect."  In The Citizens’ Savings and Loan Association of  Cleveland,  Ohio  v.  Topeka City (2), the Supreme Court of  the  United  States   of  America  again  declares  the   importance   of  individual property right thus:  "  The  theory of our governments, state  and  national,  is  opposed  to  the deposit of unlimited power  anywhere.   The  executive,  the  legislative and the  judicial  branches  of  these governments are all of limited and defined powers.  There  are limitations on such power which grow out  of  the  essential   nature   of  all  free   governments.    Implied  reservations of individual rights, without which the  social  compact  could  not exist, and which are  respected  by  all  governments  entitled to the same.  No court, for  instance,  would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted  that  A and B who were husband and wife to each other should be so  no longer, but that A should thereafter be the husband of C,  and  B  the  wife  of D. Or  which  should  enact  that  the  homestead now owned by A should

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(1) 14 Law Ed. 510, 517.  (2) 22 Law Ed 455, 461.  928  no  longer be his, but should henceforth be the property  of  B."  We  have cited the relevant passages from the  textbook  and  the  decisions  not  with a view to define the  scope  of  "  reasonable restrictions " in Art. 19(5) of our Constitution,  but  only  to  point  out that,  as  between  citizens,  the  individual  proprietary  rights  are  ordinarily   respected  unless  a clear case is made out for  imposing  restrictions  thereon.   There  must, therefore, be  harmonious  balancing  between  the fundamental rights declared by Art.  19(1)  and  the social control permitted by Art. 19(5).  It is  implicit  in  the nature of restrictions that no  inflexible  standard  can  be laid down: each case must be decided on  its  facts.  But  the  restrictions  sought to be imposed  shall  not  be  arbitrary  but must have reasonable relation to  the  object  sought  to be achieved and shall be in the interests of  the  general public.  Before  we  proceed  to consider  whether  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  impugned Act  are  reasonable  within  the  meaning  of  el. (5) of Art. 19, it would  be  necessary  to  ascertain precisely the law on the following three  matters:  (1)  What is a sthanam in Marumakkathayam law?; (2) what  is  tarwad  under  the  said  law  ?  ;  and  (3)  what  is  the  relationship between members of a tarwad and a sthanee?  Marumakkathayam  law  governs  a  large  section  of  people  inhabiting  the West Coast of South India.   Marumakkathayam  literally means descent through sisters’ children.  It is  a  body  of  custom  and usage  which  have  received  judicial  recognition.  Though Sundara Aiyar, J., in Krishnan Nair  v.  Damodaran  Nair(1)  suggested that " Malabar law  is  really  only  a school of Hindu law ", it has not been  accepted  by  others.  There is a fundamental difference between Hindu Law  and Marumakkathayam system in that the former is founded  on  agnatic  family  and the latter is  based  on  matriarchate.  Marumakkathayam  family consists of all the  descendants  of  the  family  line  of one common ancestor and  is  called  a  tarwad.  The incidents of a tarwad are so well-settled  that  it is not necessary to consider the case-law, but it would  (1)  (1912) 1 I.L.R. 38 Mad. 48.  929  be  enough if the relevant passages from the  book  "Malabar  and  Aliyasanthana  Law" by Sundara Aiyar  are  cited.   The  learned author says at p. 7 thus :  "  The  joint  family  in  a  Marumakkathayam  Nayar  tarwad  consists  of a mother and her male and female children,  and  the children of those female children, and so on.  The issue  of  the male children do not belong to their tarwad  but  to  the tarwad of their consorts.  The property belonging to the  tarwad  is  the property of all the males and  females  that  compose  it.  Its affairs are administered by one  of  those  persons, usually the eldest male, called the karnavan.   The  individual  members are not entitled to  enforce  partition,  but  a  partition may be effected by  common  consent.   The  rights of the union members are stated to be (1) if,  males,  to succeed to management in their turn, (2) to be maintained  at the family house, (3) to object to an improper alienation  or  administration of the family property, (4) to  see  that  the property is duly conserved, (5) to bar an adoption,  and  (6)  to  get a share at any partition that may  take  place.  These  are what may be called effective  rights.   Otherwise  everyone is a proprietor and has equal rights."  For the purpose of this case it is not necessary to go  into

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further  ramifications  of the incidents of  a  tarwad,  for  nothing turns upon them.  We  are concerned in this case with a sthanam.  In the  book  of  Sundara  Aiyar  the origin, scope  and  incidents  of  a  sthanam are discussed at p. 249:  " As a technical word, ’ stanom’ means a position of dignity  of  this  kind,  that  is, one  to  which  certain  specific  property is attached, and which passes with it, and is  held  by  the person as the "  stani.........................  The  origin of stanom is by no means clear and is more or less  a  matter for speculation."  The  learned author proceeds to give the three modes of  the  origin of sthanams, namely, (1) in a ruling family " it  was  considered  necessary  in  the circumstances  that  for  the  maintenance  of  the  dignity of the  ruler  he  should  own  properties in which the  930  members  of the tarwad as such had no right or interest  and  which would pass with the Crown to his successor":  sthanams  in  the families of Zamorin, Palghat, Wulluvanad  and  other  Rajas are given as instances of this class of sthanams;  (2)  "  in  the  case of some  chieftains  and  public  officers,  sthanams  were  created  by the ruling king,  who,  when  he  appointed the head of a particular family to an office  with  hereditary  succession attached also certain lands  for  the  maintenance of the officer-holder ": Para Nambi is given  as  a prominent instance of this class; and (3) " when a  family  became very opulent and influential, it was sometimes deemed  necessary in order to keep its social position and influence  that the head should be able to maintain a certain amount of  state, and for that purpose the members of the family agreed  to  set apart certain property for him, and  such  property,  would  descend to the head of the family for the time  being  ".  To some of the questions posed by the decisions or  that  are  likely  to  arise, the learned  author  suggested  some  answers.   The  learned author describes the position  of  a  sthanee vis-a-vis the members of the tarwad thus:  "  It is rather that of a member of a tarwad  who  separates  himself  from it by division.  His accession to  the  stanom  operates  as a severance from the family.  In  consideration  of  his solely becoming entitled to the stanom  property  it  was  probably  considered fair that he should  give  up  his  existing  right in the property of the tarwad.  But  he  and  his  tarwad  will have the same right of succession  to  the  properties of each other as if his severance from the family  had been the result not of his accession to the stanom,  but  a  voluntary  division  between  him and  the  rest  of  the  family."  Another  difficulty visualized and attempted to be  answered  by  the learned author is the case of a family which has  no  male  member  to  succeed to the sthanam.   He  gives  three  possible  answers, namely, (i) escheat to the Crown  ;  (ii)  descent  according to the rules of devolution applicable  to  the  property  of  a  divided member  ;  and  (iii)  on  the  assumption that  931  the  property  is dedicated for the purpose of  the  tarwad,  reverting to the tarwad.  On the question, what would happen  to  the sthanam, if at the time of the death of the  sthanee  there  was no male member in the tarwad, though he  cited  a  decision  of the Madras High Court where a  subsequent  born  male infant was given a decree to recover the properties, he  was  of  the view that the question was not an easy  one  to  decide.  The decided cases considered the nature of this  institution

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and also its incidents.  A division bench of the Madras High  Court  in Vira Rayen v. The Valia Rani of  Pudia  Kovilagom,  Calicut  (1) held that according to the custom obtaining  in  the  family  of  the  Zamorin  Rajas  of  Calicut,  property  acquired  by a sthanam-holder and not merged by him  in  the  properties  of his sthanam, or otherwise disposed of by  him  in  his lifetime, became, on his death, the property of  the  kovilagom  in  which  he  was born, and,  if  found  in  the  possession of a member of the kovilagom, belonged presumably  to  the kovilagom as common property.  In the course of  the  judgment, the learned judges pointed out that in the  family  of the Zamorin of Calicut there were five sthanams or places  of dignity with separate properties attached to them,  which  were enjoyed in succession by the senior male members of the  kovilagom.   It  appears from the judgment that  the  senior  lady  of  the  whole  family also  enjoyed  a  sthanam  with  separate    property.     The    Judicial    Committee    in  Venkateswaralyany  Shekhari  Varma (2) was  considering  the  validity  of a perpetual lease of sthanam lands effected  by  one  of  the Valia Rajas of Palghat.  In that  context,  Sir  Arthur  Hobhouse,  delivering the judgment of  the  Judicial  Committee, described a sthanam thus at p. 386:  " It appears that in the families of the Malabar Rajas it is  customary  to  have a number of palaces, to  each  of  which  there   is   attached  an  establishment  with   lands   for  maintaining  it,  called  by the name  of  a  sthanam.   The  Palghat  family  have  no less  than  nine  sthanams.   Each  sthanam  has  a  raja  as  its  head  or  Sthanamdar.    The  Sthanamdar represents  (1) (1881) I.L.R. 3 Mad. 141.  (2) (1881) I.L.R. 3 Mad. 384.  932  the  corpus of his sthanam much in the same way as  a  Hindu  widow  represents the estates which have devolved upon  her,  and  he may alienate the property for the benefit or  proper  expenses of the sthanam.   " This passage equates a sthanamdar to a Hindu widow vis-a-  vis his rights both in the matter of representation as  well  as  his  right to alienate the property  pertaining  to  the  sthanam.  The decision in Mahomed v. Krishnan (1) dealt with  a  suit  filed  by the junior members  of  a  tarwad,  which  consisted  of the three sthanams, against the  karnavan  and  others,  including certain persons to whom he had  alienated  some tarwad property, inter alia, for a declaration that the  alienations  were  invalid  as against the  tarwad  and  for  possession of the property alienated.  One of the  questions  raised was whether the plaintiffs were competent to maintain  the suit.  The suit was resisted on several grounds and  one  of them was that the tarwad was not a Malabar family in  the  ordinary  sense of the term, but that it consisted of  three  sthanams and three illakur houses or subsidiary tarwads.  In  considering the objections the learned Judges considered the  nature  of  a  sthanam  property  and  made  the   following  observations at p. 112:  "  According to the custom of Malabar, the nature of  stanom  property  is such that the present holder has in it  a  life  interest and the successor derives no benefit from it during  the  life  of his predecessor, whereas  in  ordinary  tarwad  property each member of the tarwad has a concurrent interest  and a joint beneficial enjoyment.  Although the position  of  a  stani is analogous to that of a childless widow, in  that  both have a life interest, both represent the estate ate  or  the  inheritance  for  the  time  being,  and  both  have  a  disposing  power  only to the estate taken  by  reversioner.  Each male reversioner becomes under Hindu Law the full owner

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when  the  reversion  falls  in,  whereas  the  person  that  succeeds  to a stanom takes the same qualified  estate  that  his  predecessor bad.  The legal relation therefore  between  the  Vayoth Nair and the other stanomdars and the  karnavans  of the three subsidiary tarwads is that  (1)  (1888) I.L.R. 11 Mad. 106.  933  which subsists among a group of person-, entitled to succeed  to the stanom property in a certain order, each having  only  a  life interest therein and qualified power of  disposition  over  it.   The relation between the stani  and  the  junior  members  of  each  subsidiary tarwad is  that  which  exists  between the representative of the stanom for the time beinog  and  the class of persons who may become karnavans of  their  tarwads  and  therefore representatives of  the  junior  and  senior stanoms in the order of seniority."  This decision not only brings out the differences between  a  Hindu widow’s estate and the sthanee’s interest in a sthanam  property  but also points out that the interest of a  member  of  a  tarwad  is only a right to  succeed  to  the  sthanam  property in a certain order.  It is nothing more than a spes  successionis.   Seshagiri Ayyar, J., in Krishnan  Kidavu  v.  Raman(1) throws some light on the relationship to the tarwad  of  a  person who had succeeded to a sthanam.   The  learned  Judge says at p. 920 thus:  "  It is clear that if in his new sphere the stani  acquires  property  and  does not dispose of it, his  tarwad  will  be  entitled to it.  The converse position is at least arguable.  If  the tarwad becomes extinct, the quondam member  who  had  become  a stani may lay claim to the property.   It  cannot,  therefore,  be said that the attainment to a sthanam  severs  the relationship altogether.  The person thus ceasing to  be  a member is not in the position of a stranger."  The Judicial Committee in considering some of the aspects of  the institution of a sthanam in K. Kochunni v. K. Kuttanunni  (2 ), a case that was fought out between the petitioner  and  some  of the respondents in the present  petition,  accepted  the  meaning given to the word " sthanam " by Sandara  Aiyar  in  his book on " Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law  ",  namely,  that  it is a dignity to which property is attached for  its  maintenance and for the fulfilment of the duties attached to  the position, but rejected the contention that the following  two  circumstances indicated that the sthanam was a  tarwad:  (1) maintenance was  (1) (1916) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 918.  (2) I.L.R. [1948] Mad. 672.  121  934  decreed  against  Moopil Nair to the junior members  of  the  family  and  that maintenance was being paid to  the  junior  members;  and  (2) the Court of Wards  treated  the  sthanam  property  as  tarwad property.  The  first  circumstance was  explained away with the following remarks at p. 691:  "  The maintenance claimed was a customary one,  originating  in  ancient  times  when admittedly the Muppil  Nair  was  a  sthani  in  possession  of  sthanam  rights.   There  is  no  evidence as to how the maintenance allowance arose,  whether  it  was given in recognition of a legal claim or was only  a  generous  provision  made for the benefit of the  women  and  younger  members, which the Raja was perfectly competent  to  do out of property which he regarded exclusively as his own.  "  In   respect  of  the  second  circumstance,  the   Judicial  Committee remarked at p. 693 thus:  "  It  appears  from the evidence that the  Court  of  Wards  throughout  the entire period of their management from  1872

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till 1910 treated the estate as if it was a tarwad, but this  was  apparently  without  any investigation  into  the  true  nature of the property. ............... Besides there was no  adult  male  at that time to question the treatment  by  the  Court of Wards of the property as tarwad property."  A  third circumstance was relied upon, namely, that in  1872  the  only surviving member of the family was then a girl  of  six  years of age and that, therefore, there being  no  male  heir to succeed to the sthanam, the sthanam became  extinct.  The Judicial Committee did not allow this plea to be  raised  for  the first time before them.  That apart,  quoting  from  Sundara  Aiyar’s  book, they pointed out that  the  question  whether  a sthanam becomes extinct on the extinction of  the  male  members or is only in abeyance during the  absence  of  the male members so as to be capable of being revived,  does  not admit of an easy solution......  "  This  decision  lays down that if once it  has  been  ...  established that a property is a sthanam property, the  mere  fact  that  the  sthanamdar was giving  maintenance  to  the  members of the family or that the Court of Wards treated the  entire property as tarwad  935  property  would  not  in itself  convert  what,  is  sthanam  property into a tarwad property.  To  summarize:  The  origin  of  the  sthanam  is  lost   in  antiquity.   It  primarily means a dignity and  denotes  the  status of the senior Raja in a Malabar Kovilagom or  palace.  It is surmised that sthaiiams were also created by the Rajas  by  giving  certain properties to  military  chieftains  and  public  officers  and  also by  tarwads  creating  them  and  allocating  certain properties for their maintenance.   Most  of the the incidents of a sthanam are well settled.  Usually  the seniormost male member of the family and occasionally  a  female member attains a sthanam.  Properties are attached to  the  sthanam for the maintenance of its dignity.  The  legal  position of a sthanee is equated to that of a Hindu widow in  that he represents the estate for the time being and he  can  alienate the properties for necessity or for the benefit  of  the  estate.   Unlike  a Hindu widow,  the  successor  to  a  sthanee is always a life-estate-holder.  In that respect his  position  is more analogous to an impartable  estate-holder.  He  ceases  to  have  any present  interest  in  the  tarwad  properties.   Like  a Hindu widow or an  impartible  estate-  holder,  he  has an absolute interest in the income  of  the  sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom.  His  position  is  approximated to a member separated from the  family  and  that  the members of the tarwad succeed to his  acquisitions  unless acereted to the estate and he succeeds to the  tarwad  properties,  if the tarwad becomes extinct.  Questions  like  what  would happen if there is no male heir to a sthanam  at  any  point of time-whether the properties pertaining to  the  sthanam  would  escheat  to the State or  devolve  upon  the  members  of  the tarwad or whether a subsequent birth  of  a  male  heir  would revive the athanamare  raised  by  Sundara  Aiyar  in  his book, but there is a decision of  the  Madras  High  Court  where  in  the  case  of  Punnathoor  family  a  subsequent  born  male  heir  was given  a  decree  for  the  possession of the properties of a sthanam.  On the  question  whether  a  sthanam property, not being the  property  of  a  member  of  a tarwad, be blended with the  property  of  the  tarwad  so  as  to make it a tarwad property,  there  is  no  direct  936  decision.   On  principle if the sthanee, on  attaining  the  sthanam is in the position of a separated member of a  Hindu

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family,  there may not be any scope for the  application  of  the  doctrine  of blending.  No member of a tarwad  has  any  right to maintenance from out of the sthanam properties  and  the  mere  fact that a sthanee for the time  being,  out  of  generosity  or otherwise, gives maintenance to one or  other  members  of  the tarwad cannot legally have  the  effect  of  converting the sthanam property into a tarwad property;  nor  the  fact that the sthanam properties are treated as  tarwad  properties can have such a legal effect.  Now,  what  is the relationship between the tarwad  and  the  sthanee ? It is true that whatever may be the origin of  the  sthanam,  ordinarily,  the  seniormost member  of  a  tarwad  succeeds to that position, but once he succeeds, lie  ceases  to have any proprietary interest in the tawad.  So too,  the  members  of  the  tarwad  have  absolutely  no   proprietary  interest in the sthanam property.  Thereafter, they continue  to  be  only  " blood relations" with  perhaps  a  right  of  succession to the property of each other on the happening of  some  contingency.   The said right is nothing more  than  a  spes successions the tarwad may supply future sthanees.  With this background let us look at the terms of the Act  to  see  what  it  purports to do.  What is the  effect  of  the  impugned  Act  ?  It is not the form that  matters  but  the  substance  of  it in its operation on the vested  rights  of  citizens.   The  Act  destroys the finality  of  decrees  of  courts  establishing  the title of janmies  to  the  sthanam  properties.  It affects the undisputed title of sthanees  in  sthanam  properties,  though  they  may  not  have  obtained  decrees  in respect thereof.  It statutorily  confers  title  retrospectively  on the members of the tarwad who  had  none  before.   It arbitrarily dislocates the title of  particular  sthanees  in  respect  of certain  sthanam  with  particular  characteristics, which have no relation to the title of  the  sthanees.    The  first  characteristic  mentioned  in   the  impugned  Act  is that there is or had been at any  time  an  intermingling  of  the  properties of the  sthanam  and  the  properties of  937  the  tarwad.  If the word "intermingling" conveys  only  the  idea  of  mere factual mixing up of the  sthanam  properties  with  the tarwad properties, it cannot, by any  known  legal  notion  of Marumakkathayam Law or on any analogy drawn  from  Hindu  Law,  convert the sthanam property  into  the  tarwad  property.   Even  if  it  is  understood  in  the  sense  of  blending,  the  sthanee, who ceases to be a  member  of  the  tarwad  and is in a position of a separated  member,  cannot  legally blend his property with that of the tarwad, for  the  legal concept of blending implies that the person who blends  his property with that of the family is an undivided  member  of the family.  The  second characteristic mentioned in the impugned Act  is  that  the  members  have  been  receiving  maintenance  from  properties  purporting to be sthanam properties as of  right  or in pursuance of custom or otherwise.  This characteristic  is foreign to the concept of sthanam.  No member of a tarwad  is  entitled  as  of right to any maintenance  from  out  of  properties   of   the  sthanam.   Under  this   clause,   if  maintenance  is so received, the sthanam is deemed to  be  a  tarwad on the basis that the receipt of maintenance from the  sthanee  out of the sthanam property brings about  the  said  result.  If a sthanee creates any such right in favour of  a  tarwad, it may bind him, but it cannot certainly be  binding  on the sthanam properties or its successor.  If a custom  be  established  on evidence, it may become an incident  of  the  sthanam,  but  it  cannot obliterate  or  extinguish  it  or

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convert  it  into  a tarwad.  The word  "otherwise"  in  the  context, it is contended, must be construed by applying  the  rule  of  ejusdem generis.  The rule is  that  when  general  words  follow  particular  and specific words  of  the  same  nature, the general words must be confined to the things  of  the  same kind as those specified.  But it is  clearly  laid  down  by decided cases that the specific words must  form  a  distinct genus or category.  It is not an inviolable rule of  law, but is only permissible inference in the absence of  an  indication  to the contrary.  On the basis of this rule,  it  is contended, that the right or the custom mentioned in  the  clause  is a distinct genus and the words " or  otherwise  "  must be  938  confined to things analogous to right or custom such as lost  grant, immemorial user, etc.  It appears to us that the word  "  otherwise " in the context only means " whatever  may  be  the  origin  of  the receipt of maintenance ".  One  of  the  objects  of  the legislation is to by-pass  the  decrees  of  courts  and the Privy Council observed that the  receipt  of  maintenance might even be out of bounty.  It is most  likely  that  a word of the widest amplitude was used to cover  even  acts  of  charity  and bounty.  If that  be  so,  under  the  impugned  Act even a payment of maintenance out  of  charity  would destroy the character of an admitted sthanam which  ex  facie is expropriatory and unreasonable.  Nor  does the third characteristic embody  an  unimpeachable  test of the extinction of a sthanam or the conversion of the  same  into a tarwad.  Under the impugned Act, if  there  had  been  at  any time a vacancy caused by there being  no  male  member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the sthanam  the  sthanam  would be deemed to be a tarwad.  Not only there  is  no  justification for enacting that non-existence of such  a  male  heir  at any point of time should put an  end  to  the  character  of the sthanam, but the only decided case of  the  Madras  High  Court on the point recognized the right  of  a  subsequently born male member in a tarwad to succeed to  the  sthanam and its properties.  Therefore, the three tests laid down by the impugned Act  to  enable the drawing of the statutory fiction are not only not  germane but extraneous to the object sought to be achieved.  What  is more, the impugned Act is made retrospective so  as  to  make  the sthanee liable to arrears of  maintenance  and  past  profits.   The  contention that the  impugned  Act  is  nothing more than a readjustment of rights inter se  between  the  members  of  the  tarwad and  the  sthanee  is  without  substance,  for, before the Act, except ties of blood and  a  right to succeed in a particular contingency the members  of  the  tarwad  had  no interest in  presenti  in  the  sthanam  property  nor  vice  versa.   The impugned  Act  is  only  a  legislative  device to take the property of one and vest  it  in another without compensation, and, therefore, on its face  stamped with unreasonableness.  In short, the  939  impugned  Act is expropriatory in character and is  directly  hit by Art. 19(1) (f) and is not saved by cl. (5)of Art. 19.  Another condition for the application of cl. (5) of Art.  19  is  that the restrictions should be in the interests of  the  general public.  We assume for the purpose of this case that  there are sthanams with characteristics similar to those  of  the  petitioner’s sthanam and that the Act confers title  on  the junior members of tarwad in properties of such  sthanams  and that they form a defined section of the public.  If  so,  a  question  arises  whether  a section  of  the  public  is  "general  public " within the meaning of Art.  19(5).   This

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fell  to be considered by a full bench of the Calcutta  High  Court  in Iswari Prosad v. N. R. Sen (1).  It was  contended  before the full bench of the said High Court that the  words  "  in  the interests of the general public " mean "  in  the  interests  of  the public of the whole of  the  Republic  of  India ". Negativing this contention, Harries, C.J., observed  at p. 278 thus:  " The phrase ’ in the interests of the general public’ means  I  think nothing more than ’in the public interest’, and  it  may  well be that legislation affecting a limited  class  of  persons  or a limited area might well be legislation in  the  public interests, though the public of other parts of  India  might not be directly affected by such legislation.  If they  are  indirectly affected such would be quite  sufficient  to  make  such legislation in the public interest.   Legislation  affecting a particular class or a particular area would only  directly affect the members of that class or the inhabitants  of  that particular area.  But the removal of  some  serious  abuse  or  grievance or discontent is  a  matter  indirectly  affecting the public generally.  It is not in the  interests  of the general public or in the public interest to allow any  class  of persons to labour under some grievance and  to  be  genuinely  discontented.   It  is in the  interests  of  the  general public or in the public interest that all classes of  the citizens of India are content and that their  grievances  should  be removed.  A festering sore on the human body  may  eventually affect the whole   (1) A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 273.  940  body though at first its effect is localised.  Grievances or  discontent  in some particular area or in some State  or  in  some  class  of  persons may  eventually  affect  the  whole  Republic  of India, though originally the effects  might  be  limited.  The removal of any grievance, abuse or  discontent  is  a matter not only where the discontent or  grievance  is  genuine  it  may well be in the public  interest  to  remove  such,  though the public in other parts of India may not  be  directly  affected.   It  is in  the  public  interest  that  persons  should be governed justly and well and  removal  of  hardship  and  grievances of a particular class is  I  think  clearly  a matter of public interest.   We agree with these observations.  Relying  upon  these  observations,  it  is  said  that  the  decision  of  the  Privy Council created a  stir  among  the  members of that class of the public who are governed by  the  Marumakkathayam Law, either because the pre-existing  rights  were  disturbed  or because there is no justification  in  a  welfare State for one member of the tarwad succeeding to the  entire  sthanam  property  to the  exclusion  of  the  other  members  of the tarwad, and so, the argument proceeds,  that  the  State  has stepped in to rectify the mistake or  to  do  justice consistent with modern trends.  It is further argued  that the redress of this grievance of a section of the  com-  munity  is in the interest of the public.  This argument  is  purely  based  on surmises.  We have pointed  out  that  the  junior  members of the tarwad had never any interest in  the  sthanam  properties.  We cannot say on the materials  placed  before  us  that  any  public interest  will  be  served  by  depriving  a sthanee of his properties and conferring  title  in  his properties so deprived on others.  Nor is there  any  evidence that there was a real and genuine grievance in this  particular  section  of  the  public  belonging  to  tarwads  justifying the interference by the State.  We cannot on  the  materials  placed before us hold that this reform is in  the  public interest.

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The learned Attorney-General raised a further point that  no  law  can impose restrictions retrospectively on  fundamental  rights aid, in support of his contention, he relied upon the  wording of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the  941  Constitution  and also on the decision of the Privy  Council  in  Punjab  Province v. Daulat Singh (1).  But, as  we  have  held that the restrictions imposed are not reasonable within  the meaning of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution,  this  question need not be decided in this case.  We  declare  that Madras Act 32 of 1955 is  void  and  ultra  vires  the  Constitution  and  issue  a  writ  of   mandamus  restraining   the  State  of  Kerala  from   enforcing   the  provisions  of the said Act against the petitioner  and  his  sthanams.   In  the  result, Petition No.  443  of  1955  is  allowed with costs; Petition No. 40 of 1956 is allowed,  but  in the circumstances, without costs ; and Petition No. 41 of  1956 is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.  SARKAR, J.-In our view these petitions fail.  The petitions challenge the validity of an Act passed by the  Madras   Legislature  called  the   Madras   Marumakkathayam  (Removal  of Doubts) Act, 1955.  The substantive  provisions  of the Act are contained in s. 2 which is in these terms:  "S. 2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in  respect of which-  (a)there is or had been at any time an intermingling of  the  properties of the sthanam and the properties of the  tarwad,  or  (b)the   members  of  the  tarwad  have   been   receiving  maintenance  from  the properties purporting to  be  sthanam  properties  as  of  right, or in pursuance of  a  custom  or  otherwise, or  (c)there  had at any time been a vacancy caused  by  there  being  no male member of the tarwad eligible to  succeed  to  the  sthanam,     shall  be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to  have  been   a   Marumakkathayam   tarwad   and   the   properties  appertaining  to  such a sthanam shall be deemed to  be  and  shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging  to  the   tarwad   to  which  the  provisions  of   the   Madras  Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act, XXII of 1933),  shall  apply."   (1) [1946] F.C.R. 1.  122  942  Sthanams  and  tarwads  are  peculiar  institutions  of  the  Malabar  area and a few words about them are  necessary.   A  tarwad   is   an   undivided   family   governed   by    the  Marumakkathayam  Law,  the customary law  of  Malabar.   The  outstanding feature of that law is that for the purposes  of  inheritance, descent is traced through the female line.  The  property of the tarwad or family is owned by all its members  but  is managed ordinarily by the eldest male  member,  such  manager being called the karnavan.  Before the Madras  Maru-  makkathayam  Act, 1932, was passed, a member of  the  tarwad  could  not insist on a partition and a partition took  place  only  when all the adult members agreed.  The  members  had,  however, the right to be maintained by the karnavan and  had  certain other rights to which it is not necessary for us  to  refer.   The  Madras Marumakkathayam Act,  1932,  made  some  changes  in the customary law.  The more  important  changes  were that the junior members were given power to inspect the  accounts  of the karnavan and a right to ask  for  partition  subject to certain limitations.  We  turn now to sthanams.  A sthanam is a station,  rank  or

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dignity.   A sthani is the holder of a sthanam.   A  sthanam  usually  has  lands  attached  or granted  to  keep  up  the  station,  rank  or dignity of the sthani and it  appears  to  have  come  into existence in one or other  of  the  manners  hereinafter stated.  The ancient rulers of the Malabar coast  possessed sthanams and it may be taken that the lands  which  they held as rulers were regarded as being sthanam lands  in  character.  The sthanam held by a ruler went by the name  of  Rajasthanam.   The Rajasthanams have continued though  there  are no rulers now.  Apart from Rajasthanams, there are other  kinds  of sthanams.  The rulers often granted sthanams  with  lands  attached  to them to their subsidiary  chieftains  or  other persons of consequence in their States.  Sthanams with  lands  were  also sometimes granted for  rendering  military  service.  Again when a family became opulent and influential  the members of the tarwad sometimes agreed to set aside  for  the  karnavan certain lands in order that he might  keep  up  his social position and influence and so again a sthanam was  created.  A sthanam with the  943  lands  attached thereto devolved on the death of the  holder  for the time being to the next senior member of his  tarwad.  When a member of the tarwad becomes the sthani he loses  his  interest  in the tarwad properties though he does not  cease  to be a member of the tarwad.  The members of the tarwad  in  their  turn  have  no interest in the  sthanam  lands.   The  sthani  is  entitled to utilize the income  of  the  sthanam  properties for his own purposes.  For a more detailed state-  ment of the character of a sthanam reference may be made  to  P. R. Sundara Ayyar’s book on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law.  We have taken the greater part of what we have said in  this  paragraph  from Kuttan Unni v. Kochunni (1).  The  important  point  to note for the purposes of these petitions  is  that  the sthani for the time being is alone entitled to the lands  of  his sthanam and the members of his tarwad are not  enti-  tled to them while all members of a tarwad except the sthani  are entitled jointly to all the properties of a tarwad.  There  are  altogether  three petitions  before  us  bearing  numbers  443 of 1955 and 40 & 41 of 1956 and they have  been  heard together.  The petitioner in Petition No. 443 of  1955  is the Moopil Nayar or the senior member of the  Kavalappara  tarwad or family to which the parties to this petition other  than  the States of Kerala and Madras, belong.  As the  head  of.  the family he claimed to be entitled to eight  sthanams  with the lands attached to them respectively.  It appears that the Kavalappara family was a ruling  dynasty  in   pre-British  times  and  ruled  over  the   Kavalappara  territory.  The Moopil Nayar or senior member of this family  for  the time being was the ruler of the Kavalappara  State.  The Kavalappara territory was the Ruler’s Rajasthanam.  When  Malabar was ceded by Tippu Sultan to the East India  Company  in  1792, the Kavalappara family lost its sovereign  rights.  The   Kavalappara   territory,  however,  continued   as   a  Rajasthanam held by the Moopil Nayar or the senior member of  the  family for the time being.  The petitioner in  Petition  No. 443 of 1955 has been the Moopil Nayar of the Kavalappara  family since his elder  (1)  I.L.R. [1944] Mad. 515.  914  brother’s  death  in  1925  and  claims  the  lands  of  the  Rajasthanam  as  such.   This  is the  first  of  the  eight  sthanams  mentioned  earlier.  The head of  the  Kavalappara  family was entitled to five other sthanams granted from time  to  time  by the rulers of Palghat to whom  the  Kavalappara  State  was  subordinate.  Each of these  sthanams  also  had

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lands attached to it.  The lands attached to the Rajasthanam  and  sthanams granted by the rulers of Palghat were  situate  in  the South Malabar district which originally  appertained  to  the  State  of Madras and is now part of  the  State  of  Kerala.   The  head  of  the  Kavalappara  family  was  also  entitled to two further sthanams with the lands attached  to  them  which  had been granted by the ruler of  Cochin.   The  lands  belonging to these two sthanams were situate  in  the  former  State of Cochin now merged in the State  of  Kerala.  The petitioner made a gift of the lands attached to the five  sthanams  which had been granted by the Raja of Palghat,  to  his wife and daughters.  The donees under this gift are  the  petitioners in Petition No. 40 of 1956.  He likewise made  a  gift  of  the lands attached to the two sthanams  which  had  been  granted  by the Raja of Cochin to his son who  is  the  petitioner in Petition No. 41 of 1956.  These gifts had been  made before the impugned Act bad been passed.  It  is necessary now to refer to a previous litigation.   On  April  10, 1934, the then junior members of the  Kavalappara  family filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of  Ottapalam for a declaration that all the properties  managed  by the Moopil Nayar were tarwad properties belonging equally  and  jointly to all the members of the tarwad including  the  Moopil  Nayar  and  that the latter  was  managing  them  as  Karnavan and not as sthani.  The defendant to this suit  was  the petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955, the Moopil Nayar  or  the  senior  member of the  family.   The  Moopil  Nayar  resisted  the  suit claiming to be solely  entitled  to  the  disputed lands on the basis that they were sthanam lands and  he  was the sthani.  The suit was dismissed by  the  learned  Subordinate  Judge  but  on  appeal  the  decision  of   the  Subordinate  Judge was reversed by the High Court of  Madras  and a decree  945  was  passed as claimed in the suit.  It is this judgment  of  the High Court which is reported in I.L.R. [1944] Mad.  515,  to  which  reference has been made earlier.   On  a  further  appeal  to  the  Privy  Council by  the  Moopil  Nayar,  the  decision  of  the High Court was set aside and that  of  the  Subordinate  Judge restored.  The decision of  the  Judicial  Committee  was given on July 29, 1947.  The result was  that  the petitioner, Moopil Nayar, was declared to be entitled as  sthani to the disputed properties and it was held that those  properties   were   sthanam  properties   and   not   tarwad  properties.  The  impugned Act came into force on October 19,  1955.   At  that  time the South Malabar District was part of the  State  of  Madras.   Later,  with the formation  of  the  State  of  Kerala, this area became part of that State and continued to  be governed by the Act.  That Act was never extended to  any  other  part of Kerala and never applied to  the  territories  covered by the former Cochin State which had been merged  in  the  State of Kerala.  The petitions were filed  challenging  the validity of the Act soon after it came into force.  We  will  take up Petition No. 443 of 1955 first.   In  this  petition   we  are  concerned  only  with  the   Kavalappara  Rajasthanam.  The petitioner, the Moopil Nayar, was entitled  at  the date of the petition only to the lands  attached  to  that  sthanam  for  he  had earlier  given  away  the  lands  belonging  to the other sthanams to his wife, daughters  and  son as already stated.  He complains that as a result of the  impugned Act he has been deprived of the exclusive ownership  of the lands attached to the Kavalappara Rajasthanam and has  to share it with the other members of his tarwad or  family.  It  is  not in dispute that the Act applies  to  Kavalappara

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Rajasthanam.   The  respondents  to this  petition  are  the  junior  members of the Kavalappara family and the States  of  Kerala  and  Madras.  The State of Madras has  not  appeared  perhaps  because the Act applies to lands which  have  since  the filing of the petition, been transferred from Madras  to  Kerala,  upon  which transfer the State of Kerala  had  been  made  a party to the petition.  There are three  interveners  in  946  this  petition two of whom support the respondents  and  one  supports the petitioner.  The  petitioner,  Moopil  Nayar, first  says  that  the  Act  violates Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it  applies  to  the stbanam held by him only and to no  other  sthanams.  This raises a question of fact.  He, however, also says that  the Act is bad as infringing Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the  Constitution  as  it  deprives  him of  his  right  to  hold  property  and  that it is not saved by cl. (5) of  Art.  19.  If, however, the Act enacts a law within the meaning of Art.  31 A of the Constitution, the -petitioner cannot be heard to  complain  of violation of Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1).   So  the question arises, Is it saved by Art. 31A?  That  article  so far as is material in this case is set out below:-  "   Art.  31A.  (1) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  article 13, no law providing for--    (a)  the acquisition by the State of any estate or of  any  rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of  any  such rights,    ........................................................  shall  be  deemed  to  be void on  the  around  that  it  is  inconsistent  with,  or takes away or abridges  any  of  the  rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31 :  Provided  that  where  such  law  is  a  law  made  by   the  Legislature of a State, previsions of this article shall not  apply  thereto unless such law having been reserved for  the  consideration of the President, has received his assent.  (2)  In this article,-  (a)  the  expression  ’ estate’ shall, in  relation  to  any  local area, have the same meaning as that expression or  its  local  equivalent has in the existing law relating  to  land  tenures  in force in that area, and shall also  include  any  jagir,  inam  or  muafi or other similar grant  and  in  the  States of Madras and Kerala, any janmam right;  (b)the  expression  ’rights’, in relation  to  an  estate,  shall  include  any  rights vesting in  a  proprietor,  sub-  proprietor,  under-proprietor, tenureholder, raiyat,  under-  raiyat or other intermediary  947  and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue ".  It   appears  that  the  Act  had  been  reserved  for   the  consideration of the President and had received his assent.  If,  then, the Act provides for a modification of rights  in  an " estate ", it would not be void on the ground that it is  inconsistent with Arts. 14, 19 and 3l the violation of which  the  petitioner  complains.  Under Art. 31A (2)  (a),  an  "  estate " includes, in the State of Kerala, any janmam right.  This of course means lands held in janmam rights for  janmam  rights exist only in lands.  Again, under sub-cl. (b) of el.  (2)  of Art. 31A the expression " rights " used in  relation  to an " estate " in that article includes the rights of  the  proprietor  of the estate or others holding under  him.   In  regard to this sub-clause it has been held by this Court  in  Alma Ram v. State of Punjab (1) that the expression " rights  "  in  relation  to  an  estate has  been  used  in  a  very  comprehensive  sense and includes not only the  interest  of

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the proprietor or sub-proprietor but also of lower grades of  tenants,  that is, all those who have acquired rights  under  him by what are called processes of sub-infeudation.  The respondents contend that the rights affected by the  Act  are   janmam   rights  and,  therefore,  the  Act   is   one  contemplated  by  Art. 31A.  The petitioner,  Moopil  Nayar,  states  that  the  respondents have  not  alleged  that  the  sthanam  properties  are held in janmam right.   It  appears  that  in the affidavit of the State of Kerala it  is  stated  that  the Act is saved by virtue of the provisions  of  Art.  31A.  As we are concerned with lands in the State of Kerala,  the Act could be saved by Art. 31A if the lands were held in  janmam  rights  or in rights held under the  holder  of  the  janmam rights.  The allegation that the Act is saved by Art.  31 A, therefore, clearly implies that the lands attached  to  the   sthanams  were  held  in  janmam  rights   or   rights  subordinate to janmam rights.  There is no statement by  the  petitioner  anywhere on the records that the lands were  not  held  on  such rights.  On the other hand, it  would  appear  from what we state later that  (1)  [1959] SUPP.  I S.C.R. 748.  948  the  rights  in  the  lands were  janmam  rights  or  rights  subordinate to janmam rights.  Janmam right is really a freehold interest in land.  In s. 3  (k)  of  the  Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, a  janmi  has  been  defined as a person entitled to the absolute  proprietorship  of  land.  What we have earlier stated leaves no doubt  that  the  lands,  belonging to the sthanams were  lands  held  in  absolute proprietorship, that is, in freehold interest.   It  has  not  been  alleged that the freehold  interest  in  the  sthanam lands has undergone any change.  Neither has it been  shown to us that in the Malabar area land can be held in any  right other than janmam right or subordinate rights  created  by  the  holder  of a janmam right.  Again  in  his  written  statement  in the suit of 1934, earlier mentioned, which  is  on  the record of this case, the petitioner,  Moopil  Nayar,  stated  that  the lands of the sthanams situated  in  Madras  remained  in the management of the Court of  Wards,  Madras,  from  1872  to 1916 and were registered as  held  in  janmam  rights.   Therefore,  it  seems  to  us  that  it  has  been  established  that  the lands belonging to  the  sthanams  in  South  Malabar  district are held in  janmam  rights.   That  being so, rights in such lands would be rights in an  estate  within the meaning of Art. 31 A (1) (a).  It  is said on behalf of the petitioner, Moopil Nayar,  that  the  Act  compels  him to share the  lands  with  the  other  members of his family.  If so it seems to us that the effect  of  the  Act  is to modify the interest of  a  holder  of  a  sthanam  in the lands attached thereto.  His rights as  sole  owner  of the lands are modified by making him one  of  the,  joint  owners  of them along with the other members  of  his  family.   As the lands were held in janmam rights or  rights  subordinate  thereto,  the Act would be saved  by  Art.  31A  though it may infringe Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) or 31(1).  The  petitioner,  however, contends that even if  the  lands  were  held in janmam rights, Art. 31A would not protect  the  Act.   He  first  says that the Act  contemplated  by  Art,.  31A(l)(a)  is  an Act passed with the  object  of  effecting  agrarian  reforms  which the Act before us is not.   But  we  find nothing in the article to justify this contention.  The  article does not mention  940  any  agrarian  reform.   Under it any janmam  right  may  be  acquired, extinguished or modified; this would be so whether

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the land held on janmam right was agricultural land or  land  which can never be used for agricultural purposes.  Article  31  A was introduced into the Constitution  by  the  Constitution   (First   Amendment)  Act,   1951.    It   was  subsequently amended by the Constitution (Fourth  Amendment)  Act,  1955.   Both  these  Acts  made  the  amendments  with  retrospective   effect   from  the   commencement   of   the  Constitution.    The   petitioner  seeks  to   support   the  contention  that the Act contemplated by Art. 31A (1)(a)  is  an  Act  dealing with agrarian reforms by referring  to  the  objects  and reasons stated in the Bills by which  the  Acts  amending the Constitution were introduced in the Parliament.  It  does not seem to us that it is permissible to  refer  to  such objects and reasons for the construction of a  statute:  see  Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose (1).   We  conceive  therefore, that we are not entitled to read the word " law "  in  Art. 31A (1) in relation to sub-cl. (a), only as  a  law  intended  to  achieve agrarian reforms on the basis  of  the  supposed object of the legislature in enacting Art. 31A.  We  also  observe that apart from the objects and reasons  found  in the Bills, there is nothing on which the contention  that  the  law contemplated by Art. 31 A (1)(a) is a law  intended  to achieve agrarian reform, can be based.  It is next said that the Act did not effect any modification  of janmam rights and hence again Art. 31A is of no avail  to  protect   it.   It  is  contended  that   the   modification  contemplated  by  the  Article  is  a  modification  of  the  incidents  of the janmam rights.  It is said that  what  the  Act  did  was  to distribute  janmam  rights  among  various  persons  and  several  owners held the  same  janmam  rights  which,  before the Act, had been held by one.  That, it  may  be stated, is so but that does not affect the real  question  for  decision.   When the Article talks of  modification  of  janmam  rights  it  does  not talk of  such  rights  in  the  abstract.  It contemplates the modification of the  (1)[1953] S.C.R. 1.  950  rights  held by a person.  It would be as much  modification  of  janmam  rights  if such rights held by  one  person  are  directed to be held by a number of persons jointly, as  when  the incidents of such rights are altered.  Further our  view  receives  support from two decisions of this Court,  namely,  Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay(1) and  Atma  Ram v. The State of Punjab (2 ). These cases dealt with Acts  one of the provisions of which compelled a landlord to  sell  to his tenant the whole or a portion of the land held by the  latter  at a price to be fixed in the manner indicated.   It  was  held that though this provision violated Art.  19(1)(f)  yet it was saved by Art. 31A.  It will be seen that here the  incidents of the tenure on which the landlord held the  land  were  not altered.  After he had been compelled to  transfer  the lands to his tenants, he held the remainder on the  same  terms  as before, yet it was held that the  Acts  compelling  the  landlord  to sell a part of the land held by  him  were  saved  by  Art. 31A.  In our view, therefore,  the  Act  now  before  us  is saved by Art. 31A and it cannot  be  declared  invalid  even  if  it  violates  the  provisions  of   Arts.  19(1)(f),  14 and 31 (1) of the Constitution.  In this  view  of the matter it is not necessary for us to consider whether  the Act in fact violates Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1) or any  of them or is saved by el. (5) of Art. 19.  Next  it  is  said that the Act is bad as it  is  really  an  exercise by the legislature of judicial power which it  does  not  possess and not an exercise of a legislative  power  at  all.  We are unable to hold that this is so.  There are  two

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things  in the Act on which this contention has been  based.  The  first  is that the Act has been given  a  retrospective  operation.  It is quite clear to us that by itself does  not  make the Act a thing done in the exercise of judicial power.  The  legislature has the power to give retrospective  opera-  tion  to  an  Act.  That of course  interferes  with  vested  rights but the legislature can interfere with such rights in  the  exercise  of  its  legislative  power.   That  is   not  adjudicating  between  parties affected by the Act.   It  is  laying down the law to be followed by  (1)  [1959] SUPP.  I S.C.R. 489.  (2) [1959] SUPP. 1  S.C.R.  748.  951                                           951  courts  in future.  It is so none the less that the  law  is  altered as from a past date.  Then  it  is said that the Act provides that it is  to  have  effect notwithstanding any decision of the Court contrary to  its provisions.  That the Act no doubt does.  Can it be said  that  it thereby adjudicates and not legislates ?  In  Piare  Dusadh v. King Emperor (1) it was pointed out that in  India  the  legislature very often in the enactments that it  makes  sets  aside decisions of Courts.  In America a rule  appears  to  obtain  that  " Legislative action  cannot  be  made  to  retroact  on  past controversies and  to  reverse  decisions  which  the courts in the exercise of their undoubted  autho-  rity  have made ": Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations,  8th  Ed.,  p. 190.  It was held in Piare Dusadh’s case (1) at  p.  104,  that  this  rule had no  application  in  India.   The  observation there made may be set out:-   It  is  clear  from  the  American  authorities  that  this  limitation  has been derived from the interpretation  placed  by  the American courts on what are known as the  Fifth  and  Fourteenth Amendments which provide against any person being  " deprived of life, liberty or property without due  process  of  law  ". The expression " due process of  law"  has  been  interpreted as referring only to ’ judicial process’ and  as  not including legislation ......... As this requirement  had  been made part of the written constitution, it followed that  no  enactment  passed  by  a  legislature  limited  by  that  constitution  could  authorise anything in violation  of  it  Hence  the  rule  (stated  by Cooley) that  ’  it  would  be  incompetent   for   the   legislature,   by    retrospective  legislation,  to make valid any proceedings which  had  been  had  in  the  courts  but  which  were  void  for  want   of  jurisdiction over the parties.’ The constitutional  position  in India is different.  "  It  seems to us that this observation of the  Federal  Court  which no doubt was made with reference to the Government  of  India Act,., 1935, applies with equal force to the  position  obtaining under our Constitution.  It has been held by  this  Court that there is no scope  (1)  [1944] F.C.R. 61.  952  under  our Constitution for the application of the  American  concept of " due process of law".  The American cases  cited  in  support  of  the contention that  a  legislation  cannot  override  judicial decisions therefore afford no  assistance  in  our country.  Article 31B itself provides that it  would  apply  notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of  any  court  to  the contrary and it had been enacted  by  an  Act  passed by the Parliament.  There have been many Acts  passed  since  the  Constitution  came into  force  which  contained  similar  provisions.  In no case has it ever been  contended  that  such  an Act amounted to an exercise of  the  judicial  function by the legislature.  The Act before us lays down  a

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law to be applied by courts in future in the adjudication of  disputes  between  parties.  It also says  that  the  courts  shall apply the law notwithstanding that there is an earlier  decision  on  the  rights of the  parties  which  are  being  litigated upon in a subsequent proceeding.  The Act does not  itself annul any decision of any court.  All that it says is  that  the  law  laid  down  is  to  be  applied  by   courts  irrespective  of any previous decision.  It does not in  any  sense  adjudicate between parties.  It, therefore, seems  to  us  that the contention that the impugned Act is  really  an  exercise of judicial power is ill-founded.  In our view, the challenge brought against the impugned  Act  fails.   Petition  No.  443 of 1955  should,  therefore,  be  dismissed with costs.  Coming  now to the Petition No. 40 of 1956  the  petitioners  here are the wife and the two daughters of the petitioner in  Petition  No. 443 of 1955.  The respondents are  the  junior  members  of  the  tarwad  as also  the  Moopil  Nayar.   The  petitioners  claim  as donees from the Moopil  Nayar  to  be  entitled  to the sthanam lands in the Palghat area.   It  is  not  necessary  for us to decide whether the  petitioner  in  Petition  No. 443 of 1955 had the right to make the gift  in  favour  of  his wife and daughters.  That question  has  not  been  gone into by consent of the parties.  If the  gift  is  valid  then  what we have said earlier  in  connection  with  Petition  No. 443 of 1955, will apply to this petition  also  and it must for the same reason  953  fail.  If the gift is invalid, the petition must fail on the  ground that the Act has not affected the petitioners’ rights  in  any  lands held by them.  We would,  therefore,  dismiss  that  petition  with costs except the costs of  the  hearing  before us for all the three petitions were heard together.  Lastly,  we come to Petition No. 41 of 1956.  This  petition  must  clearly be dismissed.  It was filed by the son of  the  petitioner  in  Petition  No. 443 of  1955  claiming  to  be  entitled  to the sthanam lands situate in an area which  was  formerly  part  of the Cochin State.  It is not  in  dispute  that  the  impugned  Act was never extended  to  that  area.  Therefore,  whether the gift to him was valid or not, as  to  which we say nothing, the petitioner in this petition is not  affected  by  that  Act at all.   His  petition  is  clearly  misconceived.  His petition is, therefore, dismissed and  he  will pay the costs excepting the costs of the hearing.                        ORDER OF COURT.  In view of the judgment of the majority, Petition No. 443 of  1955,  is  allowed with costs, Petition No. 40 of  1956,  is  allowed  without  costs,  and Petition No. 41  of  1956,  is  dismissed without costs.