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PETITIONER: KAUSHALYA DEVI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI K.L. BANSAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/12/1968

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BACHAWAT, R.S. HEGDE, K.S.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  838            1969 SCR  (2)1048  1969 SCC  (1)  59  CITATOR INFO :  E          1973 SC1311  (20,33,34)  D          1974 SC 471  (7,22,25)  R          1974 SC 994  (34,35)  RF         1975 SC2130  (2)  RF         1981 SC1401  (3)  F          1982 SC1518  (9)  RF         1987 SC1823  (8)  RF         1987 SC1986  (32)

ACT: Delhi  and  Ajmer Rent Control Act, 2952,  s.  13-Compromise decree  passed  without  regard to provisions  of  s.  13-If valid.

HEADNOTE: The appellant-plaintiffs filed a suit in February 1956,  for the eviction the respondent on the ground that the  premises were required for their own use, that the defendant  already owned  a suitable house of his own, and that the  respondent had  defaulted in payment of rent, after the  defendant  had flied  a  written statement and issues  had been   framed  a joint  application  was made by them that a  compromise  had been  effected.  The  trial court decreed the  suit  in  the plaintiff’s favour in terms of the compromise which provided inter alia, for the ejectment of the  defendant  after  31st December  1958, and fixed the standard rent as agreed.   The defendant, however, did not vacate the premises in  December 1958, and presented an application in February 1959 under s. 47  C.P.C., challenging the validity of the decree  alleging that it had been passed in contravention of the provision of Delhi  and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and contending  that the decree was, therefore, a nullity.  He ’failed before the Sub-Judge  and also in appeal before the  Senior  Sub-Judge. However, the High Court in revision held in his favour. appeal to this Court,     HELD:  The High Court has rightly held that  the  decree was  a  nullity  as the order passed on  the  basis  of  the compromise  did  not  indicate that  any  of  the  statutory grounds mentioned in s. 13 of the Act existed. [1050 B] Bahadur  Singh  v. Muni Subrat Dass, [1969]  2  S.C.R.  432,

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followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1966.     Appeal from the judgment and order  dated  September  7, 1962  of  the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at  Delhi  in Civil Revision Application No. 140-D of 1961.            ’  P. Sinha, G. Bhimsena Rao and M. 1. Khowaja,     for the appellants.   I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Sikri,  J.   This appeal by certificate granted  by  the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi is  governed by  the  decision  of this Court in Bahadur  Singh  v.  Munl Subrat Dass(1). (1) [1969] 2 S,C.R. 1041        The facts out of which the present appeal arises  are these.      One Raghunath Sharma, predecessor-m-interest  of the   appellants        hereinafter  referred  to   as   the plaintiff--instituted  on February 7,     1956, suit No.  53 of  1956 in the Court of Subject 1st Class,      Delhi,  for the  eviction  of  his  tenant,  K.L.  Bansal,   hereinafter referred  to  as the defendant.  He gave three  grounds  for ejectment  in  the  plaint:  (1 )  that  the  premises  were required  bona fide      by the plaintiff for occupation  as residence for himself and other      members of the  family, and that he had no other, suitable accommodation to meet his bona  fide  residential  requirements;  (2)  that        the defendant already owned a house in Delhi which was  suitable for him; and (3) that the defendant had defaulted in payment of     rent.        The defendant flied a written statement denying these allegaltions.   Appropriate issues were framed on  April  4, 1956.  On     June 5, 1956, an application was filed by  the plaintiff  and the     defendant that a compromise had  been effected on the following     terms:                       "(a) Decree for ejectment be passed in               favour of the plaintiff against the defendant,               the  decree will be executable after the  31st               December, 1958, if the defendant does not give               possession till then.                       (b) The standard rent of the  premises               be  fixed at Rs. 40/- per mensem,  instead  of               Rs. 50/- paid at present payable from the  1st               July,  1956,  till the defendant  vacates  the               premises.                         (c) The amount, in deposit with this               Court be paid               to  the  plaintiff   which  will  be  adjusted               between the               On  July 6, 1956, the counsel for the  parties               and  the plaintiff made a statement on  solemn               affirmation  to  the same effect, and  on  the               same  day  the Court  recorded  the  following               order:                       "In  view  of  the  statement  of  the               parties’ counsel and the written compromise, a               decree   is  passed  in  favour  of        the               plaintiff against the defendant." The decree was drawn up accordingly.    The  defendant,  however, did  not vacate the   premises’ on  December 31, 1958.  On the other hand, he  presented  an

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application  on  February  16, 1959, under  s.  47,  C.P.C., challenging  the  validity of the decree alleging  that  the same  had been passed in contravention of the provisions  of s. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (XXXVIII of 1952), (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and hence the decree was a nullity. He failed 1050 before the Sub-Judge, ’and also’on appeal before the  Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi.     The High Court, on revision, held that the decree was  a nullity  as the order passed on the basis of the  compromise did not indicate that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in  s.  13 of the Act existed.  In Bahadur  Singh’s  case(1) this  Court held that the decree passed on the basis  of  an award was in contravention of s. 13(1) of the Act became the Court  had passed the decree in terms of the  award  without satisfying  itself  that  the ground  of  eviction  existed. Bachawat, J,. speaking for the Court, observed that "on  the plain  wording of s. 13(1) the Court was forbidden  to  pass the decree.  The decree is a nullity and cannot be  enforced in execution."  This Court, accordingly, declared inter alia that  "the  decree  in  so far as  it  directs  delivery  of possession of the premises to the landlord is a nullity  and cannot be executed."     The  present case is also governed by the provisions  of s. 13(1) of the Act and, as we have said before, this appeal must fail, in view of the judgment of this Court in  Bahadur Singh’s  case(x). In the result the appeal is dismissed  but there will be no order as to costs. R.K.P.S.                                 Appeal dismissed. (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432. 1051