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PETITIONER: KATIKARA CHINTAMANI DORA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GUNTREDDI ANNAMNAIDU & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1973

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH PALEKAR, D.G. KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1069            1974 SCR  (2) 655  1974 SCC  (1) 567  CITATOR INFO :  R          1976 SC 656  (10)

ACT: Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)  Act 1948-s.  9(1)-Jurisdiction  of the  Settlement  Officer  and Civil  Court-Whether finding of Settlement Officer could  be questioned  in  a  Civil Court-Effect  of  Amending  Act  on pending actions.

HEADNOTE: The  Settlement Officer under the Madras Estates  (Abolition and  Conversion  into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 suo motu  made  an inquiry  as to whether a particular village notified by  the State   Government   was  an  estate  or  not   within   the contemplation of s. 9(2) of the Act and held that it was not an  "inam  estate"  within the meaning of  s.  2(7)  of  the Abolition  Act  but  that the village became  an  estate  by virtue  of  Madras Estates Land (3rd Amendment)  Act,  1936. Ther  appellants  unsuccessfully  appealed  to  the   Estate Abolition  Tribunal.  The appellant then instituted  a  suit (O.S.  47  of  1953)  against the  State  Government  for  a declaration  that the village was not an "estate"  under  s. 3(2)(d)   of  them  Madras  Estates  Land  Act,   1908   and consequently Madras Estate (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 and the  Abolition  Act were not applicable to  it.   The  trial court  decreed  the suit.  The State  Preferred  an  appeal. During the pendency of the appeal the appellant filed a suit (O.S. No. 101 of 1954) against the respondents for  recovery of  certain  amount as rent or damages in respect  of  lands cultivated   by  them  in  the  village  in  dispute.    The respondents contended that the village was an estate  within the  meaning of the Act and that it had been so held by  the Settlement  Officer.   Ultimately both the parties  filed  a joint memo on 26th March, 1958 that they would abide by  the decision  of  the  High Court or the Supreme  Court  in  the appeal  or revision arising out of the suit (O.S. 47/53)  on the question whether the village was or was not an  "estate" under, s. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act.  The  High Court  (in A.S. No. 668 of 1954 which was an appeal  arising out  of O.S. 47 of 1953) confirmed the decree of  the  trial court that the village in dispute was not an ’estate’.   The

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State did not appeal, with the result that the High  Court’s decision became final and the decree dated 28th March,  1958 became, effective. Against  the  decree  of 28th  March,  1958  the  appellants preferred  an appeal (A.S. 239 of 1961) to the  High  Court. The  appeal  related only to the extent of the land  in  the possession  of  the respondents and the quantum of  rent  or damages.  The appellants’ claim was that the entire land was under cultivation of the respondents and so the lower  court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants’ claim for rent or damages  in  toto.  The respondents  raised   a  preliminary objection at the time of hearing of the appeal that the suit itself   was   incompetent  as  the  Civil  Court   had   no jurisdiction  to  decide  whether the suit  village  was  an estate  or  not and, therefore, any (decision given  by  the High Court would not bind the parties and the decree in O.S. 101 of 1954 would be without Jurisdiction rendering it  null and  void and that the Settlement Officer was the  competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his  deci- sion  had become final in view of the introduction of s.  9A by  Act 20 of 1960.  The High Court upheld  the  preliminary objection of the respondents and rejected the contentions of the appellants that since s. 9A was inserted by an amendment which  came  into  force on 23rd June, 1960,  it  could  not affect  the compromise decree of the court passed  on  March 28,  1958 or the decree of the High Court by which both  the parties agreed to abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of  O.S. 47  of 1953.  The High Court held that the Civil  Court  was not  the forum for the suit as framed by the appellants  and the questions raised in the suit L748SuP CI/74 656 including  the  claim for arrears of rent or  damages,  were outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Civil  Court,  and   so dismissed the appeal. Allowing the appeal, HELD:1  (a) There is no doubt that the question  was  within the  competence  of the Civil Court.  Under  the  Abolition Act,  as it stood at the material date, the inquiry  of  the Settlement  Officer  could legitimately be confined  to  the ascertainment  of only two disputes of fact, viz.,  (i)  Was the  village an "inam village"? (ii) If so, was it an  ’Inam Estate’  as defined in s. 2(7) of the Abolition Act  ?  Once issue (ii) was determined, the inquiry would be complete and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction circumscribed by s. 9(1) reached; if he went beyond those limits to  investigate and  determine  something  which is  unnecessary  or  merely incidental or remotely related to issue No. (ii), ’then such incidental or unnecessary determination could be  questioned in a Civil Court. [668FG] (b)  Any   finding  recorded  by  the   Settlement   Officer regarding  the property in question being an ’inam  village’ or not,’ is not final or conclusive it being a finding of  a jurisdictional  fact  only, the Preexistence of which  is  a sine  qua non to the exercise of his exclusive  jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer. [668H] (c)  The  legislature  must have visualised that  under  the cloak  of  an  erroneous  finding as  to  the  existence  or nonexistence  of this prerequisite, the  Settlement  Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him or refuse  to  exercise jurisdiction vesting in  him.   Perhaps that   is  why  the  statute  does  not  leave   the   final determination  of  this preliminary fact to  the  Settlement Officer/Tribunal  and his erroneous finding on that fact  is liable  to be questioned in a Civil Court.  Once it is  held

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that  determination  of  this fact is not a  matter  of  the exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  Settlement  Officer,   the appellants  cannot be debarred on the basis of any  doctrine of  res judicata from getting the matter fully  and  finally adjudicated  by a court of competent jurisdiction.  [669B-C; E] Addanki Tiruvenkata Tata Desika Charyulu v. State of  Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 807 followed. District  Board, Tanjore v. Noor Mohammed, (1952) 2 MJ.  586 (S.C.) referred to. (2)  It is well settled that ordinarily when the substantive law  is altered during the pendency of an action, rights  of the parties are decided according to law, as it existed when the  action was taken unless the new statute shows  a  clear intention  to  vary  such rights.  A plain  reading  of  the impugned Act would show that there was nothing of this  kind which  expressly or by necessary intendment affects  pending actions. [67OC-D] (b)  There is no non-obstante clause in the amending Acts 17 and  18  of 1957 with reference to pending or  closed  civil actions.   These  amending  Acts’  were  published  in   the government  gazette of December 23, 1957 and will  therefore be deemed to have come into force from that date only.  They could therefore be construed as having prospective operation only. [67OG-H] (c)  In  the Amending Act 20 of 1960 also no back  date  for its commencement has been mentioned.  It will, therefore, be deemed to have commenced on June 23, 1960 which is the  date on which it was published in the Government gazette. [674E] Section  9A  takes  in its retrospective  sweep  only  those decisions of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the  commencement  of  ’the Amending Act  20  of  1960  were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non- est by a decree of a competent court. [675-F] In  the instant case the decision of the Settlement  Officer dated  September  2, 1950 was not such a decision.   It  had ceased  to exist as a’ result of the inter-linked decree  in O.S.  47  of 1953 and O.-S. 101 of 1954  passed  before  the enactment  of the Amending Act.  The Amending Act  of  1960, therefore,  does not in any way affect the finality  or  the binding effect of those decrees. [675G] 657 (d)  Order  23  rule  3 C.P.C. not only  permits  a  partial compromise  and adjustment of a suit by a lawful  agreement, but  further gives a mandate to the court to record  it  and pass  a decree in terms of such compromise or adjustment  in so  far  as  it  relates to the  suit.   If  the  compromise agreement  was  lawful  the decree to the extent  it  was  a consent decree was not appealable because of the express bar in s. 96(3) of the Code. [672E] Raja  Sri  Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State  of  Orissa [1956]  S.C.R. 72, Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v.  Broach Borough  Municipality [1970] 1 S.C.R. 388 and Reid  v.  Reid [1886] 31 Ch.D. 403 at 408, followed. (e)  In any suit the parties, in order to avoid  unnecessary expenses   and  botheration,  could  legitimately  make   an agreement  to abide by a determination on the same point  in issue  in another pending action in an advanced stage  There was  nothing  unlawful and improper in such  an  arrangement particularly  when  the interests,of  the  respondents  were sufficiently  safeguarded  by the State.  By no  stretch  of reasoning it could be said that the agreement was  collusive or  was an attempt, to contract out of the statute.  In  the instant  case as soon as the parties made the  agreement  to abide  by  the determination in the appeal (A. S.  668)  and

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induced  the  court  to  pass a  decree  in  terms  of  that agreement  the  principle of estoppel  underlying  s.  96(3) C.P.C. became operative and the decree to the extent it  was in terms of that agreement became final and binding  between the  parties.  It was as effective in creating  an  estoppel between  the  Parties as a judgment on  contest.  [672F-C  & 673C] In the instant case that part of the decree in suit No.  101 of 1954 and the appeal from that decree could not be said to be  a continuation of that part of the claim which had  been settled  by  agreement.   The combined  effect  of  the  two integrated decrees was to completely vacate and render  non- est  decision  dated  September 2, 1950  of  the  Settlement Officer. [673F] Raja  Sri  Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State  of  Orissa [1956] S.C.R. 72 applied. Per Krishna Iyer, J. concurring Courts   have  to  be  anchored  to  well-known  canons   of statu tory construction and if they are out of tune With the law  maker’s  meaning and purpose the  legitimate  means  of setting  things right is to enact a new Interpretation  Act. [678B] The  Indian  Constitution, adopting the  fighting  faith  of equal I protection of the laws to all citizens,  necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be, and  often-times  are,  extensively  interfered.  with   for achieving  the founding fathers’ social goals.   Legislative exercises  directed towards distributive justice as  in  the present  case, cannot be considered- in the light  of  dated value  system,  though  sanctified by  bygone  decisions  of Courts. [677H] In  the present case the Act in question is clear about  its intent and its application gives little difficulty.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1936 of 1967 From the Judgment and Decree dated the 14th October, 1966 of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 239 of 1961 and Memo of Cross Objections therein arising out of the judgment  and decree  dated  28th  March 1958 of  the  Subordinate  Judge, Srikakulam in Original Suit No. 101 of 1954. M.   Natesan,  K.  Jayaram and  R.  Chandrasekhar,  for  the appellant, P. Parmeshwara Rao and T. Satyanarayana, for the respondent. The  Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR, and R. S. SARKARIA  JJ.  was delivered  by  SARKARIA, J. V. R. KRISHNA IYER,  J.  gave  a separate Opinion. 658 SARKARIA   J.-This  appeal  by  certificate,   involves   an examination of the, limits, of the respective. jurisdictions of  the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the Civil  Court  in relation  to an inquiry under s. 9(1) of the Madras  Estates (Abolition  and  Conversion into Ryotwari)  Act,  1948  (for short,  Abolition  Act)  and  the  effect  of  the  Amending Acts  .17  and  18  of 1957 and Act  20  of  1960  on  cases regarding  such  an inquiry pending in or  decided  by  the, Civil Courts.  It arises out of the following facts : The  lands  in dispute are situated  in  village  Kadakalla, Taluk   Palakonda.   On  June  13,  1950,  the  then   State Government  issued and published a notification  under  the, Madras  Estates  (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947  (for  short, Rent   Reduction   Act)   in  respect   of   this   village. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer of Srikakulam suo  motu

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made  an enquiry as to whether this village was an  "estate" or  not  within the contemplation of s. 9(2) of  the  Madras Estates  (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,  1948 (for  short,  called Abolition Act) and by an  order,  dated September  2,  1950, held that it was not an  ’inam  estate’ within  the  meaning of s. 2(7) of the Abolition  Act.   The Settlement  Officer further recorded a finding that  village Kadakalla  became an estate by virtue of the Madras  Estates Land  (3rd Amendment) Act, 1936.  Against that order of  the Settlement Officer, the appellants herein carried an  appeal to   the  Estates  Abolition  Tribunal,  Vizianagaram.   The ’Tribunal  by its order, dated September 16, 1952  dismissed the appeal in limine, with the observation that the decision of  the  Settlement  Officer  being  in  their  favour   the appellants had no right of appeal, The appellants then instituted O.S. 47 of 1953 in the  Court of  the  Subordinate  Judge, Srikakulam  against  the  State Government for a declaration that Kadakalla village was  not an   ’estate’  under  s.  3  (2)  (d)  of  1908   Act,   and consequently,_the  Rent Reduction Act and the Abolition  Act were  not  applicable to it.  The trial  court  decreed  the suit.   Aggrieved  by  the decree, the  State  preferred  an appeal  (A.S.  668  of 1954) to the  High  court  of  Andhra Pradesh. During  the  pendency  of the said  appeal,  the  appellants instituted  Original Suit No. 101 of 1954 (out of which  the present appeal has arisen) in the Court of Subordinate Judge Srikakulam,  against the respondents herein and  others  for the  recovery  of Rs. 15,681/19 as rent or damages  for  the year 1953 in respect of the lands cultivated by them in  the area of village Kadakalla. The  suit was resisted by the respondents inter alia on  the ground  that the suit village was an ’estate’ as defined  in s. 3(2) (d) of the 1908 Act, and that it had been so held by the  Settlement Officer as per his Order dated September  2, 1950.  It was further averred that the defendants not  being parties  to O.S. 47 of 1953, were not bound by the  decision in that case. It was added that the question as to  whether this  village was an estate or not, was pending in the  High ’Court of Andhra Pradesh in appeal from the decision in O.S. 47  of 1953, and as such, was sub judice.  The  jurisdiction of the Subordinate 659 Judge  to  try  the  suit  (O.S.  101  of  1954)  was   also questioned.   The  claim  for  rent  or  damages  was   also resisted. On  January  22,  1958,  the  respondents  herein  made   an application  for  permission to file an  additional  written statement  for adding the plea that the suit village  is  an ’inam estate.  On March 17, 1958, the trial court  dismissed this  application  holding that the question  %ought  to  be raised, was already covered by Issue No. 1. The  trial  court framed as many as eleven  issues,  out  of which Issues 1, 6 and 8 were as follows :               (1)   Whether  the suit village is  an  estate               within the meaning of Section 3 (2) (d) of the               Madras Estates Land Act ?               (6)   Whether  the plaintiffs are  barred  and               estopped  to  claim  rents in  view  of  prior               pattas  and rent decrees that were  previously               obtained ?               (8)   Whether  this Court has no  jurisdiction               to try the suit? On  March  26, 1958, the Advocates for the parties  filed  a joint  memo to the effect that "both parties agree to  abide

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by  the final decision whether in the High Court or  in  the Supreme  Court,  as  the  case may  be,  in  the  appeal  or revision, arising out of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file  of this  Court  on  the  question  whether  the,  suit  village Kadakalla  is not an estate under s. 3(2)(d) of  the  Madras Estates  Land  Act, as amended upto date".  As a  result  of this compromise, it was held that the decision of Issues  1, 6 and 8 would follow the final decision in O.S. 47 of  1953. The  remaining Issues were tried and decided on merits.   On March  28, 1958, the trial court keeping in view  the  joint memo  filed  by the parties and its findings  on  the  other Issues, passed a decree in these terms :               "In case it is ultimately decided by the  High               Court  or the Supreme Court, as the  case  may               be,  in the appeal or revision arising out  of               O.S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this  Court               that  the  suit village Kadakalla  is  not  an               estate  within the meaning of s. 3 (2) (d)  of               the Estates Land Act, the defendants to pay to               the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 3,000/- with in-               terest at 5-1/2 per cent per annum from  26-3-               1958 with interest thereon and for costs,  and               that  otherwise  suit should  stand  dismissed               with  costs  and that the decree  should  take               effect from the date of the final decision  of               O.S. No. 47 of 1953 referred to above." The appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954) arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953 was  decided by the High Court on February 12, 1959  whereby the  decree  of  the, trial  court  declaring  that  village Kadakalla was not an estate, was confirmed.  The application of  the State for issuance of a certificate of  fitness  for appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by the High Court. The State did not prefer any Special Leave Peti- 660 tion  in this Court, with the result, that the High  Court’s decision  in  that case became final and the  decree,  dated March 28, 1958, of the Subordinate Judge in O.S. 101 of 1954 also  became  effective.  After the disposal of  its  appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954), the Government issued G.O.R.T. No.  619- Rev.   dated   June   30,  1966,   canceling   the   earlier notifications in respect of this village notwithstanding the fact that prior to such renotification, section 9-A had been inserted  in  the Abolition Act by the Amending  Act  20  of 1960. Appellants  preferred an appeal (A.S. 239 of  1961)  against the  said decree, dated March 28, 1958, of  the  Subordinate Judge,  to  the  High Court.  Though in  the  Memorandum  of Appeal,  it was said. as usual, in general terms,  that  the "decision  of  the  lower court is against  law,  weight  of evidence and probabilities of the case", and that its decree was  "worthless and did not conform to the  requirements  of section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, yet, in substance, the  appeal  related only to the extent of the land  in  the possession  of  the respondents and the quantum of  rent  or damages.   The  appellants’ claim was that the  entire  suit land, as alleged in the plaint, was under the cultivation-of the respondents, and consequently. the lower court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants’ claim for Rs. 15,681/19  as rent or damages, in toto. On  April  6. 1962. the respondents  filed  cross-objections contending that the question as to whether Kadakalla village is  or  is not an ’estate’ as defined in s. 3(2)(d)  of  the 1908 Act, should have been gone into by the trial court  and that  the rent should have been decreed only in the  sum  of Rs. 551/29.

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The  High Court posted the appeal and  the  cross-objections for hearing in July, 1965., At that stage, on July 19, 1965. an  application  was made by the  respondents  praying  that Exhts.   B-196 and B-197, being copies of the  order,  dated September  2, 1950, of the Settlement Officer and the  order dated September 16, 1952, of the Estate Abolition  Tribunal, respectively,  be  read  as  additional  evidence.   It  was contended  that the Amending Act 20 of 1960 had added s.  9A to the Abolition Act, as a result of which, the order of the Settlement  Officer had acquired ’statutory  validity’;  and since  the  appellants  did not file an  appeal  within  two months  from  the  commencement of the  Amendment  Act,  the decision of the Settlement Officer became final and  binding on  all the parties including the appellants.  In  spite  of opposition by the, appellants, the High Court by its  order, dated August 23, 1956, allowed this additional evidence  and the setting up of the new plea. The  appeal and the cross-objections were heard together  in August.   1966.   The  respondents  raised   a   preliminary objection that the suit itself was incompetent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit village is  an estate, or not and, therefore, any decision given  by the  High Court in appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954) would not  bind the parties and the decree in the present suit (O.S. 101  of 1954) on the, basis of the judgment and decree in A.S. 668 661 of 1954. would be without jurisdiction rendering it null and void,  .that  the  Settlement  Officer  was  the   competent authority  to  decide  the tenure of  the  village  and  his decision  had  become final in view of the  introduction  of Section 9A by Act 20 of 1960. The preliminary objection of the respondents was upheld, The contention of the appellants, that since s. 9A was  inserted by  an amendment which came into force on June 23, 1960,  it could  not affect the compromise decree of the Court  passed earlier  on March 28. 1958 or the decree of the  High  Court whereby both the parties agreed to abide, by the decision of the  High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal  or  revision arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953, was rejected in these terms               "We see no force in this contention as Section               9A  is designed to meet such of the  decisions where   it has been held that the  village  is               not an inam estate as it stood after the  1936               Act  and  certainly the respondents  can  take               advantage of change. in statute,, if it is  to               their  benefit and there could be no  estoppel               against a statute and the rights accrued under               a statute.  It cannot reasonably be  contended               that the suit filed by the appellants and  the               decree  obtained have reached any finality  as               an  appeal  is only the  continuation  of  the               proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs." In  the  result. it dismissed the appeal  holding  that  the Civil Court was not the forum for the suit as framed by  the appellants  and the questions raised in the  suit  including the claim’ for arrears of rent or damages. were outside the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Before  dealing with the contentions canvassed, it  will  be useful  to  have  a clear idea  of  the  relevant  statutory provisions, including the expressions "inam village",  "inam estate" and "estate" as defined therein. S.   3(2)(d)  of  the Madras Estates Land Act. 1908,  as  it originally stood, defined "estate" as "any village of  which the  land  revenue  alone (i.e.  melwaram  alone)  has  been granted in inam to a person not owing the kudiwaram  (rights

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in  soil)  thereof,  provided  the  grant  has  been   made, confirmed  or  recognised by the British  Government  or  as separated part of such village." In this definition, it  was not clear whether the inamdar had the melwaram alone or both melwaram  and  kudiwaram.   To remove  this  obscurity,  the Madras  Estates  Land (Third Amendment) Act, (18  of  1936), substituted for the original sub-clause (d) in s. 3(2), this new clause               "(d)  any inam village of which the grant  has               been  made,  confirmed or  recognised  by  the               Government ’notwithstanding that subsequent to               the  grant, the village has  been  partitioned               among the grantees or the  successors-in-title               of the grantee or grantees."’ Section 3(2)(d) was further amended by Madras Estates Land Amendment Act II of 1945 with retrospective effect from  the date 662 on which the Third Amendment Act 18 of 1936 came into force. It  inserted (among others) Explanation 1, to  this  clause, which reads               "Where  a grant as an inam is expressed to  be               of  a named village. the area which forms  the               subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to               be  an estate notwithstanding that it did  not               include  certain lands in the village of  that               name  would  have  already  been  granted   on               service  or other tenure or been reserved  for               communal purposes." Explanation  I makes it clear that (apart from  being  made, confirmed,  or recognised by the Government), an inam  grant in  order  to come within the purview of "estate"  under  s. 3(2) (d) has to be a grant expressly made of a named village or  whole Village, and not only of a part of the village  or of some defined area in a village.  However, it remains  and is ’deemed to be a grant of a whole village  notwithstanding the  exclusion of certain lands already granted  on  service ,or other tenure or reserved for communal purposes; nor does it  cease to be a grant of an entire village merely  because the  village has been subsequently’ partitioned amongst  the grantees or their successors. The  interpretation of "estate" has behind it the  authority of  a bedroll of decisions, including that of this Court  in District Board, Tanjore, v. Noor Mohammed(1) Next,   in  chronological  order,  is  the  Madras   Estates (Abolition  and  Conversion into Ryotwari).  Act,  (XXVI  of 1948).   Section 1(3) thereof provided that "it  applies  to all  estates  as defined in section 3, clause  (2)  of  the Madras  Estates Land Act. 1908 (except inam  villages  which became  estates by virtue of the Madras Estates Land  (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.  The material part of s. 2 of this Act says               (3)   "Estate" means a zamindari or an  under-               tenure or an under tenure of an inam estate.               (7)   "Inam Estate" means an estate within the               meaning  of section 3. clause (2) (d), of  the               Estates Land Act, but does not include an inam               village  which became an estate by  virtue  of               the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act,               1936". Thus, to begin with, this Act did not take in its fold post- 1936 inam estates.  Its operation remained confined to  pre- 1936  inam estates till the commencement of Act 18 of  1957, which we shall presently notice. Section  9  of the Abolition Act indicates  the  authorities

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empowered to determine Inam estate.  It says               "(1)  As soon as may be after the  passing  of               this Act, the Settlement Officer may suo  motu               and   shall,   on  application   enquire   and               determine  whether  an  inam  village  in  his               jurisdiction is an inam estate or not.               (1)   (1952) 2 M. J 586 (S. C.)                                    663               (2)   Before   holding   the   inquiry,    the               Settlement Officer shall cause to be published               in  the  village in the prescribed  manner,  a               notice  requiring all persons claiming an  in-               terest  in  any land in the  village  to  file               before, him statements bearing on the question               whether the village is an inam estate or not.               (3)   The  Settlement Officer shall then  hear               the  parties and afford to them  a  reasonable               opportunity  of  adducing  all  such  evidence               either oral or documentary as they may  desire               to examine all such documents as he has reason               to  believe  are  in  the  possession  of  the               Government and have a bearing on the  question               before him and give him decision in writing.               (4)   (a) Any person deeming himself aggrieved               by a decision of the Settlement Officer  under               sub-section (3) may within two months from the               date  of the decision or such further time  as               the  Tribunal  may in  its  discretion  allow,               appeal to the Tribunal.               (b)   Where any such appeal is preferred,  the               Tribunal  shall cause to. be Publisher in  the               village  in  the prescribed  manner  a  notice               requiring all persons who have applied to  the               Settlement  Officer under sub-section  (1)  or               filed  before him before it, and after  giving               them a reasonable opportunity of being               heard, give its decision.               (c)   The decision of the Tribunal under  this               sub-section  shall be final and not be  liable               to be questioned in any court of law.                (5)  No  decision of the  Settlement  Officer               under sub-section (3) or of the Tribunal under               sub-section (4) shall be invalid by reason  of               any defect in the form of the notice  referred               to  in sub-section (2) or sub-section  (4)  as               the  case  may  be,  or  the  manner  of   its               publication.               (6)   Every  decision  of  the  Tribunal   and               subject  to such decision, every  decision  of               the  Settlement  Officer  under  this  section               shall  be binding on all persons  claiming  an               interest   in   any  law   in   the   village.               notwithstanding  that any such person has  not               preferred   any  application  or   filed   any               statement or adduced any evidence or  appeared               or participated in the proceedings before  the               Settlement Officer or the Tribunal as the case               may be.               (7)   In  the  absence  of  evidence  to   the               contrary   the  Settlement  Officer  and   the               Tribunal  may Presume that an inam village  is               an inam estate".               Madras Amendment Act 17 of 1951, introduced s.               64-A, which runs thus:               "64-A.(1)  The  decision  of  a  Tribunal   or

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             Special Tribunal in any proceeding under  this               Act, or- of a Judge of the               664               High  Court  hearing a case under  Section  51               (2),  on any matter falling within its or  his               Jurisdiction  shall be binding on the  parties               thereto,’ and persons claiming under them,  in               any suit of. proceeding in a Civil Court in so               far  as  such matter is in issue  between  the               parties  or persons aforesaid in such suit  or               proceeding.               (2)   The decision of a Civil Court (not being               ;he  Court  of  Small Causes)  on  any  matter               within  its jurisdiction shall be  binding  on               the parties thereto and persons claiming under               them in any proceeding under this Act before a               Tribunal  or Special Tribunal, or a  Judge  of               the High Court under section 5 1 (2) in so far               as such matter is in issue between the parties               or persons aforesaid in such proceeding." In 1957, two Amending Acts both of which came into force  on December 23, 1957, were passed.  One was Andhra Pradesh  Act 17  of  1957,  which substituted the  following  clause  for clause  (a) in subsection (4) of s. 9 of the Abolition  Act, 1948 :                (a)  (i) Against a decision of the Settlement               Officer  under subsection (3), the  Government               may,  within  one year from the  date  of  the               decision or if such decision was given  before               the   commencement  of  the   Madras   Estates               (Abolition   and  Conversion  into   Ryotwari)               (Andhra  Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1957,  within               one  year  from  such  commencement  and   any               persons aggrieved by such decision may  within               two  months from the date of the  decision  or               such  further time as the Tribunal may in  its               discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal.               (ii)  If,,  before  the  commencement  of  the               Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion  into               Ryotwari)  (Andhra  Pradesh  Amendment)   Act,               1957,  any  order  has  been  passed  by   the               Government   against   a   decision   of   the               Settlement  Officer  on the  ground  that  the               Government  were  not  competent  to  file  an               appeal  under this clause or that such  appeal               was  time-barred,  the Tribunal  shall  on  an               application filed by the Government within one               year  from the commencement of  the  Amendment               Act aforesaid, vacate the order already passed               by it and pass a fresh order on merits." In  clause  (b) of s.9(4) of the Abolition  Act,  after  the words  where  such appeal is preferred", the  words  "by  an aggrieved  person,  the Tribunal shall give  notice  to  the Government  and  in the case of all appeals whether  by  the ;Government or by an aggrieved person" were inserted. The  second Amending Act was Andhra Pradesh Act 18 of  1957, section  2  of which substituted the following  section  for sub-section (3) of s. 1 of the Abolition Act 665               "It  applies  to  all estates  as  defined  in               section  3, clause (2), of the Madras  Estates               Land Act, 1908, (Madras Act 1 of 1908)."               This     Act    further    substituted     the               following clause for clause (7) of s.2 of  the               principal Act:

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             "In  an  estate" means an  estate  within  the               meaning  of section 3, clause (2) (d)  of  the               Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (Madras Act 1 of               1908)". In s.9 of the principal Act, after the words "Inam  village" or  "the  village",  wherever they occurred  the  words  "or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam" were inserted. It will be seen that Act 18 of 1957, made the Abolition  Act applicable  even to villages that became estates  under  the 1936  Amendment  of the 1908 Act.  For the  purpose  of  the Abolition  Act that distinction between pre-1936  and  post- 1936 inam grants disappeared, and this Act became applicable to  all estates falling under the definition ill  section  3 (2) of the 1908 Act. Andhra Pradesh Act No. 20 of 1960, which came into force  on the 23rd of June, 1960 inserted in the Abolition Act, s.9-A, which, provides :               "  Inquiry  under section 9 not  necessary  in               certain  cases If before the  commencement  of               the  Madras Estates (Abolition and  Conversion               into   Ryotwari)   (Andhra   Pradesh    Second               Amendment) Act, 1957 (Andhra Pradesh Act XVIII               of 1957) (any decision was given under section               9 in respect of any village that it was not an               inam  estate as it stood defined  before  such               commencement,  and that decision was based  on               the  finding that the inam village  became  an               estate  by virtue of the Madras  Estates  Land               (’third Amendment) Act, 1936 (Madras Act XVIII               of 1936) then:               (a)   if  the  decision based on  the  finding               aforesaid was given by the Tribunal under sub-               section(4)  of  section 9,  no  fresh  inquiry               under  that  section shall  be  necessary  for               taking any, proceedings tinder this Act on the               basis of that finding; and               (b)   if  the  decision based on  the  finding               aforesaid was given by the Settlement Officer,               and  no appeal was filed to the Tribunal,  the               Government or any person aggrieved, may appeal               to  the  Tribunal  against  the  decision  and               finding  within  two  months  from  the   com-               mencement of the Madras Estates (Abolition and               ment).   Act,  1960 and if no such  appeal  is               filed,  the finding of the Settlement  Officer               shall  be final and no fresh inquiry shall  be               necessary  for  taking any  proceedings  under               this Act on the basis of that finding."               666               The  same  Act  20  of  1960  introduced  this               section in the present Act :               "12(1)  No  notification  issued  under   sub-               section (4) of section 1 of the principal  Act               during  the period between the 23rd  December,               1957, and the commencement of this Act, on the               basis  of  finding recorded  in  any  decision               given  before the said date by the  Settlement               Officer,  or the Tribunal under section  9  of               the  principal Act (such finding being to  the               effect that the inam village become an  estate               by  virtue of the Madras Estates  Land  (Third               Amendment)  Act,  1936 (Madras  Act  XVIII  of               1936),  shall  be  deemed  to  be  invalid  or               ever  .to  have  been invalid  merely  on  the               ground

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             (a)   that before issuing the notification  no               fresh  inquiry  was  made  by  the  Settlement               Officer  under  the said section 9  after  the               said date; or               (b)   that  the  landholder  or  other  person               aggrieved  had no. occasion to appeal  to  the               Tribunal  against the decision and finding  of               the   Settlement   Officer;   and   all   such               notifications  issued  and  actions  taken  in               pursuance thereof during the period  aforesaid               shall  be deemed always to have  been  validly               issued and taken in accordance with law.               (2)   No suit or other proceeding  challenging               the  validity  of  any  such  notification  or               action  or for any relief on the  ground  that               such  notification or action was  not  validly               issued or taken shall be maintained or  conti-               nued in any court, and no court shall  enforce               any   decree   or  other  holding   any   such               notification or action to be invalid or  grant               any relief to any person." The  first  question that falls for decision is  :  To  what extent  and  in what  circumstances  the  Civil  Court  is competent  in  a  suit to go into the  question  whether  a particular village is an "estate"? By virtue of s. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the  Civil Courts  ’have  jurisdiction to decide all suits of  a  civil nature excepting those of which their cognizance,, is either expressly  or impliedly barred.  The exclusion of the  civil court’s  jurisdiction,  therefore,  is  not  to  be  readily assumed   unless  the  relevant  statute  expressly  or   by inevitable  implication does so.  The question thus  further resolves  itself  into the :issue : How far  s.9(1)  of  the Abolition   Act  confers  exclusive  jurisdiction   on   the Settlement Officer to determine inam estates? This  matter  is not res Integra.   In  Addenki  Tiruvenkata Thata  Desika Charyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1)  this Court held that there is an express bar to the  jurisdiction of the civil court to adjudicate upon the question,  whether "any inam village" is an "inam 1.   A.I.R. 1964 S. C. 807 667 estate"  or  not, and that ,to the extent of the  question stated  in  s.  9(1), the  jurisdiction  of  the  Settlement Officer  and  of  the  Tribunal  are  exclusive  ".  It  was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court would be subject to two limitations.  First, the  civil  courts have jurisdiction to examine  into  cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied  with or  the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity  with the  fundamental  principles  of  judicial  procedure.   The second is as regards the exact extent to which, the,  powers of  statutory tribunals are exclusive.  The question  as  to whether  any  particular case falls under the first  or  the second  of the above categories would depend on the  purpose of the statute. and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal  set up and other relevant factors. Applying  the  above  principles, the  Court  clarified  the limits  of  the respective jurisdictions of  the  Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the civil. court, thus :                the  object  of the Act is  to  abolish  only               "inam  estates". This  determination  involves               two   distinct   matters  in   view   of   the               circumstances that every "inam village" is not

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             necessarily "an inam estate" viz., (1) whether               a  particular property is or is not  an  "inam               village" and (2) whether such a village is "an               inam  estate"  within the  definition  of   s.               2(7). The first of these questions whether the               grant  is of an "inam village" is referred  to               in s. 9(1) itself as some extrinsic fact which               must  preexist before the  Settlement  Officer               can embark on the enquiry contemplated by that               provision and the Abolition Act as it stood at               the  date  relevant to this-appeal,  makes  no               provision  for  this  being  the  subject   of               enquiry by the Settlement Officer ...               Where    therefore   persons   appearing    in               opposition to the proceedings initiated before               the Settlement Officer under s. 9 question the               character  of  the  property  as  not  falling               within  the description of an "inam  village",               he  has of necessity to decide the Issue,  for               until   he  holds  that  this   condition   is               satisfied  he  cannot  enter  on  the  further               enquiry  which is the one which by s. 9(1)  of               the  Act  he is directed to  conduct.  On  the               terms  of s. 9 (1), the property  in  question               being  an "inam village" is assumed as a  fact               on  the existence of which the  competency  of               the Settlement Officer to determine the matter               within his jurisdiction rests and as there are               no  words  in the statute  empowering  him  to               decide  finally  the former be  cannot  confer               jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on               this    preliminary    condition    to     his               jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this               question, therefore, is (subject to the result               of  an appeal to the Tribunal) binding on  the               parties   only   for  the  purposes   of   the               proceedings under the Act, but no further. The               correctness of that finding may be  questioned               in  any  subsequent legal  proceeding  in  the               ordinary courts of the land where the question               might arise for decision."               668 Now let us approach the problem in hand in the light of  the principles enunciated in Desika Charyulu’s case (supra). Mr.  Natesan, learned Counsel for the  appellants,  contends that  in the instant case, the decision, dated September  2, 1950,  of  the  Settlement Officer fell  within  the  second category  of  cases pointed out in  Desika  Charyulu’s  case (supra)  which  could  be challenged  in  the  civil  court, because,  firstly,  Kadakalla  village  was  not  an   "inam village"  as the, ,grant was not of the whole  village,  and the  Settlement Officer had grievously erred in assuming  it to  be  so;  secondly, as soon  as  the  Settlement  Officer reached  the  finding  that the village  was  not  an  "inam estate" within the then extant definition in s. 2(7) of  the Abolition Act, he became functus officio and had no  further jurisdiction  under s. 9(1) to proceed with the enquiry  and hold that it was an estate" under s. 3(2)(d) of the  Estates Land Act, 1908. In  reply,  Mr. P. Rameshwara Rao, learned Counsel  for  the respondents,  maintains that under s. 9(1),  the  Settlement Officer  had  the jurisdiction to determine  all  the  three facts, namely : (1) whether Kadakalla was an ’inam village’; (2)  if so, whether it was a pre-1936 ’inam estate’  falling under the definition in s. 2(7) of the Abolition Act, or (3)

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a post-1936 ’inam estate’ under s. 3(2)(d), of the 1908 Act. The  decision  of the Settlement Officer, according  to  the learned  Counsel,  as  to fact No. (1)  was  conclusive  and operated  as  res judicata under s. 64-A, of  the  Abolition Act,  between  the parties, be,cause before  the  Settlement Officer,  it  was no-body’s case that Kadakalla was  not  an "inam village".  In these circumstances, the decision of the Settlement Officer not being in excess of his  jurisdiction, could  not  be questioned in a civil court.   The  argument, though   seemingly  attractive,  does  not  stand  a   close examination  and we are unable to accept it.  On  the  other hand,  we  find force in what has been  contended  from  the appellants’ side. Under  the Abolition Act, as it stood at the material  date, the enquiry by the Settlement Officer could legitimately  be confined  to the ascertainment of only two issues of  fact, viz.(1) Was Kadakalla an "inam village" ? (2) if so, was it an  ’inam  estate’ as defined in s. 2 (7) of  the  Abolition Act?   Once issue (2) was determined, the enquiry  would  be complete  and  the  limits  of  his  exclusive  jurisdiction ,circumscribed  by s. 9(1) reached; and, if he  went  beyond those limits to investigate and determine further  something which  was  unnecessary  or merely  incidental  or  remotely related  to issue (2), then such incidental  or  unnecessary determination, could be questioned in the civil court. Again,  any  finding  recorded  by  the  Settlement  Officer regarding  the property in question being an ’inam  village’ or  not, is not final or conclusive it being a finding of  a jurisdictional  fact, only, the preexistence of which  is  a sine  qua non to the exercise of his exclusive  jurisdiction by   the  Settlement  Officer.   Investigation  as  to   the existence  or otherwise of this preliminary fact is done  by the  Settlement Officer to ascertain whether or not  he  has jurisdiction to determine that the particular property is an ’inam estate’.  If upon such investigation, he 669 finds   that  the  property  is  ’an  ’inam  village’,   the foundation for the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction is laid,  and  he  can then, and then  only,  embark  upon  the enquiry  envisaged  by the statute.  If  such  investigation reveals that the property is not an ’inam village’, the con- dition  precedent  to the exercise of such  jurisdiction  by him, would be lacking. The Legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of an erroneous finding as to the existence or nonexistence  of this  prerequisite,  the Settlement  Officer  may  illegally clutch  at jurisdiction not conferred on him, or, refuse  to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him.  Perhaps, that is  why the  statute does not leave the final determination of  this preliminary fact to the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and  his erroneous  finding on that fact is liable to be question  in civil court. The contention of Mr. Rao that before the Settlement Officer the  fact of Kadakalla village being an "inam  village"  was not disputed, does not appear to be home out by the  record. A   perusal  of  the.   Settlement  Officer’s  order   dated September  2, 1950, would show that it was contended  before him on behalf of the Inamdars "that there was no village  at all at the time of grant" and "that there were more than one grant as Inam in the village". Assuming  for the sake of argument that the  appellants  had failed  to  contest or adduce proof  before  the  Settlement Officer that Kadakalla was not an ’inam village’, then also, we fail to appreciate how, on Principle that would make  the case  any  different so as to preclude the  appellants  from

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reagitating that matter in the civil court.  Once it is held that  determination  of  this fact is not a  matter  of  the exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  Settlement  Officer,   the appellants cannot be debarred on the basis of any  doctrine, of  res-judicata from getting the matter fully  and  finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that under  the law in force at the material time, a suit for a  declaration that the decision of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal holding certain  properties to be an ’estate’ under s. 3 (2) (a)  of the, 1908 Act was void, was maintainable on the ground  that the suit property was not an ’inam village’. There can be no dispute that Suit No. 47 of 1953 is of  that category  and falls well nigh within the ratio of  Gosukonda Venkata. Narasayya v. State of Madras,(1) which was approved by  this Court in Desika Charyulu’s case (supra).  The  main contention  of  the  appellants in this suit  was  that  the village Kadakalla was not in ’inam village’ as the grant did not  comprise the whole village and consequently, it is  not an ’estate’ within the definition in s.3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act.   The trial court accepted this contention and  decreed the  suit.  The High Court confirmed that decision,  holding that  when the grant was made (in 1774), it was  neither  of the whole village nor of a named village within the  meaning of  Explanation  1  to  s.3 (2) (d) of  the  1908  Act.   In Original  Suit  101  of 1954, also, the relief  of  rent  or damages (1) A. I. R. 670 is  conditional  and  dependent upon and linked  up  (by  an agreement between the parties) with the determination of the main question involved in the former suit. We   have,  therefore,  no  hesitation  in  coming  to   the conclusion  that  the common question in  both  these  suits regarding  Kadakalla being an estate or not, on  the  ground that  it was not an inam village, was within the  competence of the civil court. Further point to be considered is : whether the jurisdiction of  the  civil  courts to proceed  with  and  determine  the aforesaid suits ’was, in any way, affected by the  enactment of  Amending  Acts  17 and 18 of  1957.   For  reasons  that follow, the answer to this question, in our opinion, must be in the negative. It is well settled that ordinarily, when the substantive law is  altered during the pendency of an action, rights of  the parties are decided according to law, as it existed when the action  was  begun  unless the new  statute  shows  a  clear intention  to vary such rights (Maxwell  on  Interpretation, 12th Edn. 220).  That is to say, in the absence of  anything in  the  Act,  to  say that  it  is  to  have  retrospective operation,  it cannot be so construed as to have the  effect of  altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation  at the time when the Act is passed. Let  us,  therefore, see whether there is  anything  in  the Amending  Acts  17 and 18 of 1957 which  in  clear  language gives them a retrospective effect.  A plain reading of these Amending Acts would show that there is nothing of this  kind in  them,  which,  expressly  or  by  necessary  intendment, affects  pending actions.  The only major change  introduced by Act 17 of 1957 was that it gave to the Government a right to  file  an appeal to the Tribunal, if  it  felt  aggrieved against the decision of Settlement Officer under sub-s.  (3) of  s.9 of the Abolition Act, within one year from the  date of  the decision, or, if such decision was  rendered  before December  23, 1957 i.e. the commencement of Act 17 of  1957,

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within  one  year from such date.  It further  entitled  the Government  to  get  its  appeal,  if  any,  dismissed,   as incompetent, by the Tribunal restored within one year of the commencement of the Amending Act.  Likewise, the only effect of  the  Amending Act 18 of 1957 was that  it  enlarged  the definition of ’inam estate’ for the purpose of Abolition Act by taking in post-1936 Inams. There  is no non-obstante clause in. these Amending Acts  of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions.  Nor is  there anything in the scheme, setting or  provisions  of these   Amending   Acts  which  fundamentally   alters   the conditions on which such actions were founded.. No back date or  dates of their commencement have been specified  in  the body  of these statutes as was done in Madras  Estates  Land Amendment  Act 11 of 1945 which was expressly enforced  with effect from the date of the commencement of Act 18 of  1936. These  Amending  Acts  were published  in  the  Government Gazette  on December 23, 1957, and will therefore be  deemed to have come into force 671 from  that  date only.  The provisions,  of  these  Amending Statutes  are not merely Procedural but  affect  substantive rights,,  and impose. new obligation’ and disabilities.   In them, the Legislature has not spoken in clear language  that they would unsettle, settled claims or take away or  abridge rights  already  accrued,  or  cause  abatement  of  pending actions.  These Amending Acts, ’therefore, can be  construed as  having  a prospective operation only. They  cannot  be interpreted  as taking away the rights of the  litigants  in Suits  O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of 1954 (which  were  at the   commencement  of  these  Amendments  pending  at   the appellate or original stage) to have their respective claims determined in, accordance with the law in force at the  time of the institution of the actions. Before  we  come  to  the Amending Act 20  of  1960,  it  is necessary to examine whether the decrees in O.S. 47 of  1953 and  O.S.  101 of 1954 had attained finality.  And,  if  so, when and to what extent ? So far as the decree of the High Court (in A.S. 668 of  1954 arising  out of O.S. 47 of 1953) is concerned, there  is  no dispute that it had become final and conclusive between  the parti es  to that action, namely, the State  Government  and the  present  appellants  on  February  12,  1954.   Learned Counsel  are, however, not agreed as to whether the  decree, dated March 28, 1958, passed by the civil court in Suit  No. 101 of 1954 had also assumed such a character. Mr. Natesan. vehemently contended that this decree in so far as  it,  pursuant  to the  agreement  between  the  parties, incorporated  in  it, the final determination  of  the  High Court in A.S. 668 of 1954-that Kadakalla was not an  estate- was  a  consent  decree, and as such,  was  final  and  non- appealable  in  view of s. 96(3) of the Code of  Civil  Pro- cedure. On the respondents’ side Mr. Rao argued that no part of this decree  was final and conclusive between the parties on  the ground of estoppel or otherwise, because-(a) the  appellants had  in grounds 1 and 2 of the Memo of Appeal  presented  in the  High Court, challenged the decree in its entirety;  (b) the  joint  memo  filed by the  Advocates,  concerned  legal issues,  including  that of jurisdiction. and  as  such  the agreement  was not lawful that would bind the  parties;  (c) the respondents were not a party to the proceedings in A. S. 668  of  1954  and (d) the arrangement  arrived  at  by  the Advocates,  being  dependent on the happening  of  a  future event,  did not amount to a lawful adjustment of the  claim,

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and the decree based on it, was inchoate. None of the points urged by Mr. Rao appears to hold water. The  allegations  in grounds 1 and 2 of the Memo  of  Appeal (which  have  been referred to in a foregoing part  of  this judgment)  are  too  vague  and  general  to  amount  to  an averment.   They  appear to have been introduced just  as  a matter of form and habit by the draftsman.  From the Memo of Appeal, read as a whole, it is clear that, in substance  and truth,, the challenge was directed only against that part of 3-L748SCI/74 672 the decree- which fixed the quantum of rent and damages.  In fact, before the, High Court it was vigorously contended  on behalf of the ,appellants that , part of the decree,  which, in effect, declared that the village is not an estate’ under s.  3 (2) (d), having been imported with the consent of  the parties,  was not appealable under s. 96(3), Code  of  Civil Proce dure, and, in reality, had not been appealed  against. In  support of this contention, reliance was placed on  the, Division  Bench ,decision in Srinivasa  v.  Tathachariar(1). The High Court did not discuss or distinguish this decision. Nor did it say in so many words that the whole of the decree including the part based on compromise, was under  challenge in  the appeal.  It rejeited the contention with the  remark that  it  had  already "observed that the appeal  is  but  a continuation  of  the, suit and there could be  no  estoppel against  a  statute".  Perhaps, it was assumed that  in  the Memo of Appeal, every bit of the decree was being challenged by the appellants.  We think, with all respect, that such an assumption  was contrary to the well  established  principle that  in construing a pleading or a like petition,  in  this ,country,  the court should not look merely to its form,  or pick  out from it isolated words or sentences; it must  read the  petition as a whole, gather the real intention  of  the party  and  reach  at the substance  of  the  matter.   Thus construed,  the  Memo of Appeal in this, case could  not  be said to contain a challenge to that part of the decree which was  in  terms  of  the  compromise  agreement  between  the parties. Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, not only  permits a  partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by  a  lawful agreement,  but  further  gives a mandate to  the  court  to record it and pass a decree, in terms of such compromise  or adjustment  in  so far as it relates to the suit.   If  the compromise  agreement was lawful-and, as we shall  presently discuss, it was so-the decree to the extent it was a consent decree, was not appealable,because of the express bar in  s. 96,(3) of the Code. Next  point is, whether this agreement was lawful ? We  have already  discussed  that the Amending Acts of 1957  did  not affect pending actions in which a declaration is sought that a  particular property is not an estate, on the ground  that it  is  not  an  ’inam  village’.   This  issue  which   was intertwined  with that of jurisdiction, was very  largely  a question  of  fact.  It follows therefrom that in  any  such suit, the parties in order to avoid unnecessary expense  and botheration,  could legitimately make an agreement to  abide by  a  determination on the same point in issue  in  another pending  action in an advanced -stage.  There  was  nothing unlawful  and improper in such an  arrangement  particularly when  the  interests at the  respondents  were  sufficiently safeguarded  by the State which was hotly controverting  the decree  of  the  trial court regarding  Kadakalla  being  an estate.   By no stretch of reasoning it could be  said  that this  agreement was collusive or was an attempt to  contract

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out of the statute. There can be no doubt that as soon as the Court accepted the compromise agreement between the parties, and, acting on it, passed a (1)  A. I. R. 1918 Mad. 546. 673 decree  in terms thereof, the compromise, to the  extent  of the  matter  covered by it, was complete.   Nothing  further remained  to  be done by the parties in  pursuance  of  that agreement.   The decree had become absolute and  immediately executable on February 12, 1959 when the High Court in  A.S. 668  of  1954  finally decided that  Kadakalla  was  not  an estate. Be  that as it may,, the bar to an appeal against a  consent decree,  in sub-s. (3) of s. 96 of the Code is based on  the broad  principle  of  estoppel.   It  presupposes  that  the parties to an action can, expressly or by implication, waive or forego their right of appeal by any lawful ,agreement  or compromise,  or even by conduct.  Therefore, as soon as  the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination  in the  ,appeal  (A.S.  668) and induced the court  to  pass  a decree in terms of that agreement, the principle of estoppel underlying  196(3)  became operative and the decree  to  the extent  it was in terms of that agreement, became final  and binding  between  the parties.  And it was as  effective  in creating  an estoppel between the parties as a  judgment  on ,contest.    Thus,  the  determination  in   A.S.   668-that Kadakalla was not an ’estate’-became as much binding on  the respondents, as on the parties in that appeal. In the view we take, we can derive support from the ratio of this  Court’s decision in Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan  Bhanja Deo  v.  State  of Orissa(1).  In that  case,  there  was  a compromise  decree between the predecessors-in-title of  the appellant  therein  on the one hand, and  the  Secretary  of State  on  the  other, that Kanika Raj was  an  ’estate’  as defined by Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951.  This Court held  that  the  appellant was estopped  by  the  compromise decree from denying that the Raj was not such an ’estate’. In  the  light of the above discussion, we would  hold  that part  of  the decree in Suit No. 101 of 1954  which  was  in terms of the compromise agreement had become, final  between the  parties, and, the appeal from that decree could not  be said  to be a continuation of that part of the  claim  which had  been settled by agreement.  The combined effect of  the two  integrated decrees in Suit No. 47 and Suit No. 101,  in so far as they, declared that Kadakalla, not being an. ’inam village, was not an estate under s. 3(2)(d) of the 1908 Act, was  to  completely vacate and render non-est  the  decision dated September 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer. Against  the above background, we have to  consider  whether the  Amending  Act 20 of 1960  operates  retrospectively  to nullify  final decrees of civil courts which had before  its commencement, declared such decisions of Settlement  Officer totally  void and nonexistent ?  Does the ’Act expressly  or by necessary intendment bring into life again all such  dead decisions of the Settlement Officer ? In  approaching these questions, two fundamental  principles of  interpretation have to be kept in view.  The  first  is, that if the Legislature, (1)  [1956] S.C.R. 72. 674 acting   within   its  legislative  competence,   wants   to neutralise  or  reopen  a  court’s  decision,  "it  is   not sufficient"-to  use  the words of Hidaytullah C.J.  in  Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality(1)-

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"to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall  not bind,  for that is tantamount to reversing the  decision  in exercise  of judicial power which the Legislature  does  not possess  or exercise.  A court’s decision must  always  bind unless   the  conditions  on  which  it  is  based  are   so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have  been given in the altered circumstances." Thus, the first test to be  applied is, whether the Amending Act 20 of 1960  has  so radically  altered the conditions on which the said  decrees proceed, that they would not have been passed in the altered circumstances  ?  The point is that the law  which  was  the basis  of  the  decision  must  be  altered  and  then,  the foundation failing, the binding value of the decision  fails when  the  non obstante clause is superadded.  As  shall  be presently  seen, by this test, the answer to  this  question must be in the negative. The  second principle-to recall the words of Bowen L.J.  in Reid  v.  Reid(2)-is,  that in construing a  statute  or  "a section   in  a  statute  which  is  to  a  certain   extent retrospective,  we  ought nevertheless to bear in  mind  the maxim  (that is, except in special cases, the new law  ought to  be  construed so as to interfere as little  as  possible with vested-eights as applicable whenever we reach the  line at  which the words of the section cease to be plain.   That is  a  necessary  and  logical  corollary  of  the,  general proposition   that   you  ought  not  to   give   a   larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some  extent  intended  to be retrospective,  than  you  can plainly see the Legislature meant." With  the  above principle in mind, let us now  examine  the provisions  of  the Amending Act 20 of 1960.  In  this  Act, also  no back date for its commencement has been  mentioned. It will, therefore, be deemed to have commenced on June  23, 1960,  which  is the date on which it was published  in  the Govt.   Gazette.   It  does  not say  (excepting  in  s.  12 inserted  by it which obviously does not apply to the  facts of this case) that the amendment would have effect and would be  deemed always to have had effect from the  inception  of the  parent Act, nor does it use any equivalent  expressions or  similar words which are usually found in  Amending  Acts intended to have retrospective operation without any limit.’ Section 9-A inserted by this Amending Act in the parent Act, does not begin with any non-obstante cause, whatever  having reference  to decrees or orders of civil courts.  In  terms, it  concern,s  itself  only  with  a  certain  category   of decisions given before the commencement of Act 18 of 1957 by the Settlement Officer/Tribunal, under s. 9 of the Abolition Act.   Such  decisions  are those which were  based  on  the finding  that a particular Inam village had become  estateby virtue  of the.  Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment)  Act, 1936. The  Order,  dated  September 2,  1950,  of  the  Settlement Officer  in  the  instant  case,  was  a  decision  of  this category,  inasmuch  as he held that.Kadakalla  was  not  an ’inam estate’ because it was a post-1936 (1) L19701 1 S.C.R. 388. (2) (1886) 31, Ch.  D. 402 at 408. 675 inam, and as such, was not- covered by the definition in  s. 2 (7) of the Abolition Act.  But, before the commencement of the  Amending  Act, 1960, this decision as a result  of  the High  Court’s decree, stood finally vacated.  It is  not  at all  clear from the language of this Amending Act, that  the intention  was  to  revive even  such  legally  non-existent decisions  of  the  Settlement Officer.   On  The  contrary,

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definite indications ire available that the section was  not intended  to  have unlimited retrospective  operation.   The first  of  such indications is available from  the  marginal heading  of  s.  9-A,  itself " which is  to  the  effect  : "Inquiry  under section 9. not necessary in certain  cases", The  heading discloses the purpose as well as the extent  of the new provision. it envisages only such cases in which the decision  of  the Settlement Officer  was  not  successfully challenged in the civil court on the ground that the  parti- cular  property  was not an inam village; for, it  would  be pointless,  only  in such cases, to hold a  further  inquiry into-the matter. The second hint of legislative intent is available in s. 64- A  (2)  which  has not been touched  by  the  Amending  Act. Section  64-A(2)  provides that the decision  of  the  civil court on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding on  the parties thereto and persons claiming under  them  in any  proceeding under the Abolition Act before the  Tribunal or  the Special Tribunal.  If the intention was  to  exclude the  Jurisdiction of the civil court  altogether,  s.64-A(2) would either have been deleted or drastically amended so  as to  alter  the basic conditions with effect  from  the  very inception of the parent Act, that in the altered  Conditions those  decisions could not have been rendered by  the  civil courts.  For instance, it could say that the decision of the Settlement  Officer  on the question  whether  a  particular property  is an ’inam village’ or not, would  be  conclusive and final and would always be deemed to have been so." In view, of what has been said above, we are of the  opinion that  s.9-A  takes  in its retrospective  sweep  only  those decisions of the settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the  commencement  of  the  Amending Act  20  of  1960  were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non- est  by a decree of a competent court.  The  decision  dated September  2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the  instant case, was not such a decision.  It had ceased to exist as ’a result  of  the inter-linked decree in O.S. 47 of  1953  and O.S.  101  of  1954, passed before  the  enactment  of  this Amending Act.  The Amending Act of 1960, therefore, does not in  any way, affect the finality or the binding  effect.  of those decrees. Quite,  a  number of authorities were cited by  the  learned Counsel on both sides, but it is not necessary to notice all of  them because in lost of them the facts  were  materially different.    Only   one  of  those  cases  in   which   the interpretation of ss. 9-A and 64-A was involved reserves  to be  noticed.   It is reported in Yeliseth  Satyanarayana  v. Aditha agannadharab and ors.(1) (1)  [1966] I.L.R. A.P. 729. 676 The  writ petitioners in that case had challenged the  order of  the Estates Abolition Tribunal which had held  (1)  that the previous order of the Civil Court holding the suit lands to be an estate, by virtue of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936 to  the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, was not res  judicata under  s. 64-A of the Abolition Act and (2) that  the  land- holder  had a right of appeal under s. 9-A of the said  Act, and  that the inam was not of the whole village and,  conse- quently, was not an ’estate’. The first question for consideration by the High Court  was, whether  the  appeal  filed by the  land-holder  before  the Estates Abolition Tribunal was maintainable, notwithstanding the fact that such an appeal was not entertained earlier  by the Tribunal on the ground of its being incompetent.  On the construction of s. 9-A(b), this question was answered in the

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affirmative. The  second question before the High Court was, whether  the previous  judgments  of the Civil Court  were  res  judicata under  s.  64-A.   The  Bench  analysed  and  explained  the circumstances  in which the first or the second sub-s of  s. 64-A   operates.   It  will  be  useful  to  extract   those observations here               "The  bar under s. 64-A is applicable  in  two               sets of circumstances; one, where the decision               was of a Tribunal or Special Tribunal or of  a               Judge  of the High Court hearing a case  under               section  51;  (2)  the other, where  it  is  a               decision  of  a  Civil  Court  on  any  matter               falling   within   its   jurisdiction.     The               decisions mentioned in the first category  are               binding on the Civil Courts and the  decisions               mentioned  in the second category are  binding               on the Tribunal or Special Tribunal or a Judge               of  the High Court when he hears a case  under               s.  51  (2).  In so far as the facts  of  this               case  are concerned, it is sub-section (2)  of               section 64-A that is applicable." On  the  second question, the learned Judges held  that  the previous  decisions of the Civil Court could not operate  as res  judicata  because  the issue as  to  whether  the  suit property  was an estate under the Amending Act of 1957,  was not  under  contest.   Both  the  parties  as  a  matter  of concession,  had conceded that fact and the Government.  was not  a party to the proceeding.  In these  peculiar  circum- stances, it was held that the ’concession or assumption made in the previous proceedings, was not a ’decision’ within the meaning  of s. 64-A(2).  In the case before us,  as  already observed,  the  State  had contested  this  issue  regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, right upto the High Court. It  would,  therefore, operate as res judicata  between  the State  and  the  land-owners.  The same  binding  effect  is produced  by  estoppel raised by the consent decree  in  the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen.  Thus, this ruling does not, advance the case of the respondents. For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, reverse the judgment of the High Court and send the case back to  it for decision 677 on the remaining issues in accordance with law.  We make  no orders as to the costs of this Court. KRISHNA   IYER,  J.-The  judgment  just  delivered  has   my concurrence.   But  a  certain  juristic  thought  expressed therein  and consecrated in an authoritative  passage  which has fallen from Bowen, L.J., in Reid v. Reid(1) persuades me to  break  my  silence  not  so  much  in  dissent  but   in explanatory divagation.  The proposition there expressed and here  followed  relates to the  presumption  against  vested rights being affected by subsequent legislation.   Certainly this legal creed of Anglo-Indian vintage has the support  of learned  pronouncements,  English and Indian.  But  when  we apply it in all its sternness and sweep, we err.  Precedents should not be petrified nor judicial dicta divorced from the socioeconomic mores of the age.  Judges are not prophets and only interpret laws in the light of the contemporary  ethos. To regard them otherwise is unscientific.  My thesis is that while  applying  the  policy of  statutory  construction  we should  not forget the conditions and concepts  which  moved the  judges  whose  rulings are cited, nor  be  obsessed  by respect at the expense of reason.  Justice Gardozo(2) has in felicitous words made the same point :

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             "There should be greater readiness to  abandon               an untenable position .... when in its  origin               it   was  the  product  of   institutions   or               conditions  which have gained a  new  signifi-               cance or development with the progress of  the               years.   In such circumstances, the  words  of               Wheeler,  J.,  in Dwy v. Connecticut  Co.,  89               Conn. 74, 99,. express the tone and temper  in               which  problems  should be met :  "That  court               best serves the law which recognizes that  the               rules  of  law  which  grew  up  in  a  remote               generation may, in the fullness of experience,               be  found to serve another  generation  badly,               and which discards the old rule when it  finds               that  another  rule  of  law  represents  what               should  be  according to the  established  and               settled   judgment   of   society,   Ind    no               considerable  property  rights  have   be-come               vested  in reliance upon the old rule.  It  is               thus  great writers upon the common  law  have               discovered  the  source  and  method  of   its               growth, and in its growth found its health and               life.   It  is  not  and  it  should  not   be               stationary,  Change of this  character  should               not  be left to the,, legislature." If  judges               have  woefully  misinterpreted  the  mores  of               their day, or if the mores of their day are no               longer those of ours, they ought not to tie  ,               in  helpless  submission, the hands  of  their               successors." The  Indian  Constitution, adopting the  fighting  faith  of equal_protection  of the laws to all  citizens,  necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be, and   often-times  are,  extensively  interfered  with   for achieving the founding fathers’ social goals. (1)  [1886] 31 Ch.D.402;408. (2)  Cardozo The Nature of Judicial Process; PP. 151-52. 678 Legislative exercises directed towards-distributive justice, as in the present case, cannot be considered in the light of a dated value system, though sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts. However,  in the present case, let me hasten to repeat,  the Act   in  question  is  clear  about  its  intent  and   its application  gives  little difficulty.  I  have  said  these words  only to enter a mild caveat, on the lines  indicated, so  as to obviate future misapprehensions about  the,rule,of interpretation-not  to  add a new element of  judicial  sub- jectvism.  Speaking generally, courts have to be anchored to well known canons of statutory construction and if they  are out  of  time with the law-makers’ meaning and  purpose  the legitimate  means of setting things right is to enact a  new Interpretation Act. P.B.R.                 Appeal allowed. 679