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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1005 of 2006

PETITIONER: Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit, Indore

RESPONDENT: President, Indore Development Authority

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/02/2006

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6390/2002)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Leave granted.

       Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a  Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a Letters  Patent Appeal upholding the view of the learned Single Judge  that appellant is not entitled to benefits flowing from  Resolution No.9 dated 31.1.1986 of the respondent.   

       The factual background in a nutshell is as follows:

       The Indore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to  as the ’Authority’) adopted certain guidelines allowing the  Housing Co-operative Societies to utilize the land owned by  them by making plots for construction of houses for the  benefit of their members. The relevant guidelines contained in  the Circular dated 31.1.1986 are as follows:

"(1)    Only those societies shall be taken into  consideration which have got themselves  registered as per the law by purchasing the  land prior to the publication of the Declaration  of Section 50(2) of the Authority in respect of  the scheme.

(2)     Those societies will also be taken into  consideration which have got themselves  registered after the publication of the  Declaration of Section 50(2) but the  application was moved by them before the  Competent Authority for obtaining rebate  under the Urban Land Ceiling Act prior to the  above law.  

(3)     This will be mandatory for availing the  benefit of these facilities that while entering  into an advance agreement with the Authority,  the Society should hand over the vacant and  peaceful possession of the concerned land  itself to the Authority. And it will be at liberty  to move for revision etc. for enhancing the  compensation. With regard to the handing over  of the possession if there arises any court case

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or any other dispute then this facility would  not be available. If any tenant or sub tenant or  any other person holds the possession of the  land then it will be the responsibility of the  Society that it should make available the  vacant possession to the Authority by  removing them from the land. In the event of  being not so, this scheme of allotment of land  shall not be implemented."   

       The appellant was denied the benefit of the Circular on  the ground that it did not fulfill the requisite conditions. Writ  Petition (W.P. No.755 of 1994) was filed by the appellant  praying for appropriate directions to the Authority to grant it  the benefit of the Circular dated 31.1.1986. A learned Single  Judge dismissed the Writ Application noticing that the  appellant did not fulfill the requisite conditions. It was noted  that the appellant claiming to be one of the interested societies  applied to the Authority on 9.11.1987 and 28.12.1987. The  Authority called upon the appellant to furnish certain details.  By  order of the Authority dated 1.10.1993 the benefit was  declined. It was also noted by the High Court that the Circular  in question dated 31.1.1986 was withdrawn by resolution  No.93 dated 14.5.1993. Though a stand was taken by the  appellant that certain other societies similarly situated were  granted the benefit, the High Court noted that they stood on a  different footing. Learned Single Judge noted that the  appellant was not the owner of the land and it only claimed to  be the potential purchaser having purportedly entered into  certain agreements. That being so, it was held that the  appellant had not acquired any legal right to get the benefit in  terms of the Circular dated 31.1.1986.  A Letters Patent  Appeal was filed before the High Court which by the impugned  order upheld the view of the learned Single Judge. It was  specifically noted by the Division Bench that as the appellant- Society was not the owner of the land, it was not entitled to  the benefit.  

       In support of the appeal, Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned  senior counsel submitted that the real import of the  Resolution is that the society should have got a tangible  interest in the property. Appellant had entered into  agreements for purchase of the land on 18.1.1982 and,  therefore clearly fulfilled the conditions. In fact possession was  taken on 5.5.1992. It was also pointed out that in the case of  some others who had similarly situated the benefit had been  extended. According to him, denial of appellant in such  circumstances would amount to violation of Article 14 of the  Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ’Constitution’).

       In response, learned counsel for the respondent- Authority submitted that both learned Single Judge and the  Division Bench have rightly noticed that the appellant did not  fulfill the requisite conditions and, therefore, was not entitled  to any relief.  

       First Clause, as quoted above, requires that only those  societies were to be considered which had got themselves  registered as per law by purchasing land prior to the  publication of the Declaration of Section 50(2) of the Madhya  Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (in short  the ’Adhiniyam’). Stand of the learned counsel for the  appellant that what was mandatory was the registration and  not the ownership of the land is clearly untenable. The  conditions are cumulative i.e. (a) the society has to be

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registered; and (b) it must purchase the land prior to the  publication of Declaration of Section 50(2) of the Authority in  respect of the scheme. The second condition was admittedly  not fulfilled. Clause 3 is also relevant. It provides that it will be  mandatory for the society for availing the benefit of the scheme  to hand over a vacant and peaceful possession of the  concerned land to the Authority while entering into an  advance agreement with the Authority.  In other words, the  advance agreement could be entered into but at that point of  time the vacant and peaceful possession of the concerned land  was to be handed over to the Authority. The appellants could  not have done so because it was neither the owner nor in  possession of the concerned land. It is to be noted that there is  scope for advance agreement. It has been in that context  specifically noted in Clause (3) that so far as handing over  possession is concerned if there are court cases or any other  dispute then the facility regarding handing over possession  would not be availed.  Therefore, the view expressed by the  High Court is clearly in order.  

       So far as the allotment to non-eligible societies is  concerned even if it is accepted, though specifically denied by  the Authority, to be true that does not confer any right on the  appellants. Two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot  claim that since something wrong has been done in another  case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It  would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating  another wrong. In such matters, there is no discrimination  involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article  14 of the Constitution cannot be pressed into service in such  cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is  existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance  repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par.  Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been  committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of  negative equality the appellant cannot strengthen its case. It  has to establish strength of its case on some other basis and  not by claiming negative equality. (See Union of India v.  International Trading Co. (2003(5) SCC 437).    

       Looked at from any angle, the appeal deserves to be  dismissed which we direct.  No costs.