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PETITIONER: KASAMBHAI ARDUL REHMANBHAI SHAIKH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1980

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR  854            1980 SCR  (2)1037  1980 SCC  (3) 121

ACT:      Prevention of  Food Adulteration  Act 1954,  Sections 7 and 16-Plea-bargaining-Magistrate  if  competent  to  record conviction if accused pleads guilty.      Criminal  Trial-Judgment-Cyclostyled   form  in   which merely   blanks    filled   by   Magistrate-Such   Disposal- Reprehensible policy.      Sentencing-Offences of  food adulteration-Deterrent and punitive sentences-Necessity for.

HEADNOTE:      The appellants  were prosecuted for committing offences under  section  16(1)(a)(i)  read  with  section  7  of  the Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration  Act,  1954.  After  some evidence  was  led  on  behalf  of  the  prosecution,  plea- bargaining took  place between  the prosecution, the accused and the  Magistrate. The  accused pleaded  guilty which plea was accepted by the Magistrate. The accused were accordingly convicted and  sentenced to  undergo imprisonment  till  the rising of the Court and to pay a small fine.      The  High   Court  initiated  suo  motu  proceeding  in revision.  The   accused   appeared   and   challenged   the convictions recorded  against them,  but the  High Court did not go  into the  circumstances in  which the plea of guilty was entered, enhanced the sentences imposed on them to three months’ simple imprisonment and fine.      Allowing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1.  A conviction  based on  the  plea  of  guilty entered by the accused as a result of plea-bargaining cannot be sustained. [1041E]      2. The  High Court  was clearly in error in not setting aside the  conviction and  sending  the  case  back  to  the Magistrate for  trial in  accordance with  law, ignoring the plea of guilty entered by the appellants. [1041F]      3. The  Magistrate trying  an  accused  for  a  serious offence  like  adulteration  must  apply  his  mind  to  the evidence recorded  before him  and, on  the  facts  as  they emerge from  the evidence,  decide whether  the  accused  is guilty or not. [1040B]      In  the   instant  case   the  Magistrate   had  got  a cyclostyled form  of judgment  in which  merely blanks  were

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filled in by him. This clearly indicates that the Magistrate was in  the habit of encouraging plea-bargaining and letting off the  accused lightly  if there  was a  plea  of  guilty, enabling quick  disposal without  any  effort.  This  was  a highly reprehensible  practice. The High Court had expressed strong disapproval of it. [1039H-1040A]      4. (i) It is highly regrettable that the prosecution as well as the Magistrate should have been a party to any plea- bargaining in  a prosecution  for adulteration involving the health and well-being of the community. Adulteration has 1038 assumed alarming  proportions and it is essential to wipe it out ruthlessly  and completely by bringing to book offenders responsible for  adulteration resulting  in ruination of the health  of  the  people.  The  investigating  agencies  must intensify their  efforts and  catch hold  of those  who  for private economic  gain are prepared to jeopardize the health of the community. When such persons are arraigned before the Court and  found guilty  a deterrent  and punitive  sentence must be imposed upon them. [1039E-G]      (ii) If  it is  possible  to  get  away  with  a  light sentence in  respect of an offence of adulteration the anti- adulteration  law   will  cease  to  have  any  meaning  and validity. [1039H]      5. Administration  of justice  is  a  sacred  task  and partakes of  the divine  function. It  is with  the greatest sense  of  responsibility  and  anxiety  that  the  judicial officer must  discharge his  judicial function, particularly when it concerns the liberty of a persons. [1040C]      6. It  would be  contrary to  public policy  to allow a conviction to be recorded against an accused by inducing him to confess  to a  plea of guilty on an allurement being held out to  him that  if he  enters a plea of guilty, he will be let off  very lightly.  Such a  procedure would  be  clearly unreasonable, unfair  and unjust  and would  be violative of Art. 21  of the  Constitution. It  would have  the effect of polluting the  pure fount of justice because it might induce an innocent  accused to  plead guilty  to suffer a light and inconsequential punishment rather than go through a long and ardous criminal  trial. The judge also might be likely to be defected from  the path  of duty  to do justice and he might either convict  an innocent accused by accepting the plea of guilty or  let of  a guilty  accused with  a light sentence, thus, subverting  the process  of low  and  frustrating  the social  objective   and  purpose  of  the  anti-adulteration statute.  This   practice  would   also  tend  to  encourage corruption  and  collusion  and  as  a  direct  consequence, contribute to  the lowering  of  the  standard  of  justice. [1041B-E]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal Nos. 93-94 of 1980.      Appeals by  special leave  from the  Judgment and order dated 30-1-1979  of  the  Gujarat  High  Court  in  Criminal Revision Application No. 306/78 and 305/78.      T. U. Mehta and Vimal Dave for the Appellant.      H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.      The following Judgments were delivered:      BHAGWATI, J.  This appeal  by special leave is directed against a  judgment of  the Gujarat  High Court  in suo motu revision against an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,  Balasinor  convicting  the  appellant  of  the

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offence  under   s.  16(1)(a)(i)  read  with  s.  7  of  the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentencing him to suffer  simple imprisonment  till the rising of the Court and to  pay a  fine of  Rs. 125/-  or in  default to undergo simple imprisonment for- 1039 a further period of 30 days. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court  of the  learned  Magistrate  for  an  offence  of adulteration  of   turmeric  powder   punishable  under   s. 16(1)(a)(1) read  with  s.  7  of  the  Prevention  of  Food Adulteration Act, 1954.      It appears from the record that after some evidence was led on behalf of the prosecution, plea bargaining took place between  the   prosecution,  the  defence  and  the  learned Magistrate and  on the  basis of an understanding arrived at between these  three parties,  the appellant  pleaded guilty and the  learned Magistrate  accepting this  plea of guilty, recorded a  finding of  conviction against the appellant and let  off   the  appellant   with  a   nominal  sentence   of imprisonment till  the rising of the Court and a small fine. It is,  of course true that there is no specific evidence to show that  the plea  for guilty was entered by the appellant as a result of plea bargaining, but two circumstances, viz., (1) that  the appellant  pleaded  guilty,  even  though  the sample was  treated as  cancelled by  the public  Analyst on account of  its being  broken and  leaking and  there was no evidence of  the report  of the  public Analyst  showing the sample as  adulterated and  (2) that  the  judgment  of  the learned Magistrate  was given in a cyclostyled form, clearly lead to the inference that the plea of guilty was entered by the appellant in consequence of an assurance held out by the prosecution and acquiesced in by the learned Magistrate that he would be let off with a very light sentence. It is highly regrettable that  the prosecution  as well  as  the  learned Magistrate should  have  been  a  party  to  any  such  plea bargaining in  a prosecution  for adulteration involving the health and  well-being of  the community.  Unfortunately, in our country  adulteration has  assumed alarming  proportions and it is absolutely essential to wipe it out ruthlessly and completely by  bringing to  book offenders  responsible  for adulteration resulting  in ruination  of the  health of  the people. The  investigating  agencies  must  intensify  their efforts and  catch  hold  of  those  who  for  some  private economic gain  are prepared  to jeopardize the health of the community and  indulge in  mass murder and when such persons are arraigned  before the  Court and  found guilty  a really deterrent and  punitive sentence  must be imposed upon them. If it  comes to  be known that even in respect of an offence of adulteration,  it is  possible to  get away  with a light sentence, the  anti-adulteration law  will cease to have any meaning and  validity. It will be mocked at by the people as a futile  legislative exercise.  Moreover, we find that here the  learned  Magistrate  had  got  a  cyclostyled  form  of judgment in  which merely  blanks were  filled in by him and this is  the clearest  possible evidence  that he was in the habit of  encouraging plea  bargaining and  letting off  the accused lightly  if there  was a  plea of guilty, so that he may get quick disposal 1040 without any effort. This was a highly reprehensible practice and we  are glad  to note  that the High Court has expressed strong disapproval  of it.  The Magistrate trying an accused for a  serious offence like adulteration must apply his mind to the  evidence recorded  before him  and, on  the facts as they emerge from the evidence, decide whether the accused is

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guilty or  not.  It  must  always  be  remembered  by  every judicial officer  that administration of justice is a sacred task  and  according  to  our  hoary  Indian  tradition,  it partakes of  the divine function and it is with the greatest sence  of  responsibility  and  anxiety  that  the  judicial officer must  discharge his  judicial function, particularly when it  concerns  the  liberty  of  a  person.  The  course followed by  the learned  Magistrate  in  the  present  case clearly showed  that there was no application of mind by him to the  case laid  on behalf of the prosecution and he was a consenting party  to the  appellant being persuaded to enter the plea  of guilty  and, acting mechanically on the plea of guilty as  extracted from  the appellant,  he  appeased  his insensitive conscience  by recording  a  finding  conviction against the  appellant and  let him off with a mere sentence of imprisonment  till the  rising of the Court and a nominal fine.      The High  Court on  its attention  being drawn  to  the Order passed  by the  learned Magistrate  initiated suo motu proceeding in revision by issuing notice to the appellant to show cause  why the  sentence imposed  on him  should not be enhanced. The appellant appeared in answer to the notice and challenged the conviction recorded against him, but the High Court did not go into the circumstances in which the plea of guilty was  entered by the appellant and relying on the plea of guilty  proceeded on  the basis  that the  appellant  was rightly  convicted   and  since   the  offence  said  to  be established against  the appellant,  was with  respect to an article of  ’primary food’  punishable under s. 16(1)(a) (i) of the  Prevention of  Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the High Court held  that the appellant was liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for  a minimum  term of  3 months and a fine of not less  than Rs.  500. The High Court accordingly enhanced the sentenced  imposed on  the appellant to 3 months’ simple imprisonment and  a fine  of Rs.  500 or in default, further simple imprisonment for 30 days. This order made by the High Court is  challenged in  the present appeal preferred by the appellant after obtaining special leave of this Court.      Now, it  does not  appear from  the record  whether the entire prosecution evidence was completed before the learned Magistrate before  the plea  of guilty was entered on behalf of the  appellant, but  one thing  is clear that the finding conviction recorded by the learned Magistrate 1041 against the  appellant was  not based on the evidence led on behalf of  the prosecution.  The conviction of the appellant based solely  on the  plea of guilty entered by him and this confession of  guilt was  the result  of plea  of bargaining between  the   prosecution,  the  defence  and  the  learned Magistrate. It  is obvious that such conviction based on the plea of  guilty entered by the appellant as a result of plea bargaining cannot  be sustained.  It is to our mind contrary to public  policy to  allow  a  conviction  to  be  recorded against an  accused by  inducing him to confess to a plea of guilty on  an allurement  being held  out to  him that if he enters a  plea of  guilty, he  will be let off very lightly. Such a  procedure would  be clearly unreasonable, unfair and unjust and  would be violative of the new activist dimension of Art.  21 of  the Constitution unfolded in Maneka Gandhi’s case. It  would have  the effect of polluting the pure fount of justice,  because it  might induce an innocent accused to plead  guilty   to  suffer   a  light   and  inconsequential punishment rather than go through a long and ardous criminal trial which, having regard to our combers and unsatisfactory system of  administration of justice, is not only long drawn

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out and  ruinous in  terms  of  time  and  money,  but  also uncertain and unpredictable in its result and the judge also might be  likely to  be defected from the path of duty to do justice and  he might  either convict an innocent accused by accepting the  plea of  guilty or  let off  a guilty accused with a  light sentence,  thus, subverting the process of law and frustrating  the social  objective and  purpose  of  the anti-adulteration statute.  This practice would also tend to encourage  corruption   and  collusion   and  as   a  direct consequence, contribute  to the  lowering of the standard of justice. There  is no  doubt in our mind that the conviction of an  accused based on a plea of guilty entered by him as a result of  plea-bargaining  with  the  prosecution  and  the Magistrate must  be held to be unconstitutional and illegal. The  High   Court  should  have  therefore,  set  aside  the conviction of  the appellants  and sent the case back to the learned  Magistrate   for  trial  in  accordance  with  law, ignoring the  plea of  guilty entered  by the appellant. The High Court was clearly in error in not doing so.      We  accordingly   allow  the   appeal,  set  aside  the judgments of  the High Court as also the Order of conviction and sentence  recorded against  the appellant by the learned Magistrate and  remand the case to the learned Magistrate so that he  may proceed  with the  case from the stage at which the appellant  confessed to  a plea  of guilty.  The learned trial Magistrate  will ignore  the plea of guilty entered by the appellant and proceed further with the case after giving an opportunity  to the  prosecution to  lead such additional evidence as it thinks fit and 1042 then allowing  the appellant  to enter  upon his defence and lead such  evidence in  defence as he thinks proper and then dispose of  the case  in accordance  with law. The appellant will continue on the same bail on which he has been released by this Court by its Order dated 30th March, 1979.      BHAGWATI, J.  The facts  giving arise to this appeal by special leave  are almost  identical with  those of Criminal Appeal No.  93 of 1980 save and except that the appellant is different and for the same reasons as are given by us in our Judgment disposing  of Criminal  Appeal No.  93 of  1980, we allow the present appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court as  also the Order of Conviction and sentence recorded against the  appellant by  the learned Magistrate and remand the case  to the  learned Magistrate  so that he may proceed with  the  case  from  the  stage  at  which  the  appellant confessed to  a plea of guilty. The learned trial Magistrate will ignore  the plea of guilty entered by the appellant and proceed further with the case after giving an opportunity to the prosecution  to lead  such  additional  evidence  as  it thinks fit and then allowing the appellant to enter upon his defence and  lead such  evidence in  defence  as  he  thinks proper and  then dispose of the case in accordance with law. The appellant will continue on the same bail on which he has been released  by this  Court by its Order dated 30th March, 1979. N.V.K.                                      Appeals allowed. 1043