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PETITIONER: KARUNA RAM MEDHI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KAMAKHYA PRASAD BARUAH & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       25/04/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI, K.VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  THE 2ND DAY OFAPRIL, 1997 Present:        Hon’ble Mr.Justice K.Ramaswamy        Hon’ble Mr.Justice D.P.Wadhwa Pravir Choudhary, Adv. for the appellant S.A. Syed and S.K. Nandy, Advs.for theRespondents  O R D E R      The following order of thecourt was delivered:  O R D E R      Substitution allowed.      This appeal  by special  leave arises fromthe judgment of theFull Bench  of the  High Courtof  Assam,  made  on 24.8;.1982 in S.A. No. 58 of 1976.      The admitted  facts are that the respondent had entered into and agreement of lease of land with the predecessor-in- title of  the appellant on January  5,1953 for a period of seven years  onpayment of  premium  of  Rs.30/-  p.a. The respondent constructeda house therein within five  years from the  date of  the lease. The housewas gutted in afire on April 4, 1958 and thereafterthe respondent reconstructed the house.  Theappellant  had issued  a notice on December 12,1959asking the respondent to vacatethe land and deliver the possessionon  January  1, 1960.The  respondent has resisted the  contentions raised  in the  suit filed  by the appellant for  ejectment of  the respondent from the demised property. The  trial Court  decreed thesuit. On appeal, the Additional District  Judge confirmed the same. In the second appeal,the Full Bench of the High Court reversed the decree of thetrial Court anddismissed the suit. Thus this appeal by special leave.      Shri  Prabir   Chowdhury,learned  counsel  for the appellants, with  his painstaking preparation, has contended strenuously that  the High  Court is  wrong in coming to the conclusion that the respondent had constructed  the  house with permission of the predecessor of the appellant. The respondent hasnot pleaded anyacquiescence inthat behalf, Unless the lease deed does contain any term forconstruction of thehouse on  the non-residential  premisesof the land, the respondentis not entitledto the protection of Section 5 of  the Act. Consequently, heis liable to ejectment under

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Section11 of the AssamNon-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act,  1955,  (for  short,  the’Act’  ).  Thesuit  notice terminating  the  lease is  valid  inlaw.  The  question, therefore, is whether the view of the Full Bench of theHigh Court  is   vitiated  by   anyerrorof  law  warranting interference?  The   High   Court,   after   the   elaborate consideration of the matter, has held that:      "Here  the  suitwas   filed   on      21.1.60,  whereasthe  notice  was      received  by   the  defendant   on      12.12.59. Therefore,  the notice is      not in  accordancewith law and the      notice   of   termination without      giving onemonth’stime asprovided      under Section 11 of the Act is  not      valid.      next it  was heldthat "the  house      was constructed  within five years.      There is  clear finding recorded by      the  courts  below that  both  the      structuresone  constructed  within      five years of the lease and  also      the other one constructed after the      earlier structure after the earlier      structure was  gutted by fire, were      ofpermanent nature."      The notice to quit is badin law as one month’s notice was notissued to the respondent. On that premise, the Court proceeded to  decide on the facts whether the respondent is entitled to  the protection  ofSection 5 of the Act. After elaborate consideration, the Full Benchhas held:      "Atenantalthough not entitled to      build  under   the contract,   has      actually built  permanent structure      onthe  land  of  the  tenancy  for      residential  or  businesspurposes      with the knowledgeand acquiescence      of the   landlord,  shall not  be      ejected by the landlord  except on      the groundof non-payment of rent."      Atpage  22, it  was  further  held      that,      "The contention raised on behalf of      the  landlord   that   unless   the      construction is  made  within  five      years of the current leasewhich is      relied upon  by  a party, such  a      tenant   is    not  entitled    to      protectionunder  Section 5(1)  (a)      ofthe Actis not correct."      "In the  present case the permanent      structure which  was built earlier      within the periodfive  years  and      thereby  acquiring the  protection      under Section  5(1) (a) ofthe Act,      itcould  not be  said to have been      whittled down by the mere fact that      the said  permanent  structure  has      been gutted out byfire. The act of      fire in  getting out  the permanent      structurewas   not   within   the      control of the appellant, it  was      accidentalwithoutany violation on      the part of the appellant.This was      an event whichcouldnot   be

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    reasonably anticipated.A   loss      occasionedby the act of God or Vis      major or  by any  event beyond  the      control of a person,  it cannot be      said thatsuch loss  willfall  on      him."      onthat  premise, the  Full Benchconcluded in para 10 thus:      "We are  firmly of opinion that on      the destruction  of  the  permanent      structure by  accident  beyond  the      control ofthe tenant or by any act      ofGod, the protection available to      a tenant  under the  provisions  of      Section  5,   byconstructing   a      permanent structure,    do    not      evaporate. Oncethe   protection      ensure tothe tenant  by virtue of      his  having   built  the  permanent      structure,within five years of the      lease forthe purpose of residence      and business,  the destruction  of      the structures by some event beyond      the control of thetenant would not      deprive  the  tenant  of  the  said      protection   providedhe    is      continuingin  thetenancy for the      purpose   of   his  residence   or      business."      Onthat  finding, the  decree of  the  trial  Court  as confirmed by the appellate Court came to be reversed.      Itis  true, as contended by Mr, Prabir Chowdhury,that the tenant is required to establish three essential facts as postulated under  Section 5(1)(a)  of the Act. It postulates thus:      "5(1)(a) "Where under theterms of      a contract entered into  between a      landlord  and  his tenant whether      before or after the commencement of      this Act,a tenant  whether before      orafter  the commencement of  the      Act, a tenant is entitled to build,      and has  in pursuance of such terms      actually built  within  the  period      five years from the  dateof  such      contract, a  permanent structure on      the  land of  the   tenancy   for      residential or  business  purposes,      orwhere  a  tenant  not  being  so      entitled  to  build,  hasactually      built anysuch  structure on  the      land of the tenancy for residential      orbusiness  purposes, orwhere  a      tenant not beingso  entitled  to      build, has actually builtany such      structureon   the  land of  the      tenancy for  any  of  thepurposes      aforesaid with  the  knowledge  and      acquiescence of  the landlord.  the      tenant shall  not be ejected by the      landlord from the tenancy except on      the groundof non-payment of rent."      The  following   conditions  must be  satisfied for application of section 5(1)(a):-      "(1) The  terms of the contract of

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    tenancy, the  tenant is entitled to      build on  the  land  of  tenancy  a      permanent structure.      (2) That  pursuantto thatliberty,      he had  actuallyconstructed  the      building.      (3) It  must be  constructed within      five years from the  date of  the      contract of  tenancy,  a  permanent      structure on the land of tenancy.      (4) That the permanent structure is      for   residential  orbusiness      purpose.      (5) The  construction waswith the      knowledge and  acquiescence of  the      landlord.      Ifthe  aforesaid conditions  are satisfied, the tenant shall not  be ejected  by the  land lord  fromthe  tenancy except on  the ground  of non-payment of rent. This view was laid by this court  inRafiquennessa vs. Lal Bahadur Chetri (dead) by  Lrs.& Ors. [(1964) 6 SCR 876] and Biswambhar Roy (dead) by  Lrs.vs.  Girindra Kumar Paul (dead)by Lrs.[AIR 1966 SC1908].      This was  construed by this Court in Dhananjoy Singh V. Usha Ranjan Bhadra & Ors [1970 ILR Vot.22 at 82]. Thisview was  reiterated  buy  this   Court  in  Bishwambar   Roy’s case(supra).      Itis  seen that  the High Court after considering the question of  law, following  the earlier Full Bench judgment of that Court in  Bireswar Banerjee  v. Sudhir RanjanBose [A.L.R 1973,  A&N  15]held that the tenant constructed the permanent structure  onthe  land takenon lease withinfive years from  thedate  of the  lease. He is entitled  to the protection of  tenancy.The mere fact that the said building was destroyed  by firesubsequently does  notdestroy the tenancyrights acquiredby the tenant and thereby the tenant is notliable to ejectment from the demised premises. Thus, he is  entitledto  theprotection of Section 5(1)(a) of the Act.      The decision  cited  by  Mr.  Prabir  Chowdhury,  Viz., Venkatlal G.  Pittie &Anr. v. Bright Bros.(pvt.)Ltd. [(1987)3  SCR 593  AT 601]   on the nature of the permanent structure as  defined in Section 3(d) of Act aslaid down in some ofthe decisions of the Calcutta High Court referred to by this court in  the above judgment is of no relevance for the purpose  ofthis  case. Itis truethat Section 3(d) of the  Act  defined  "  permanent structure".  The  permanent structure mustbe construed  as defined  in  Section  3(d), Since the permanent structure is built as per the permission expressly contained in the contract of lease orby necessary acquiescence of the landlord  the tenant  constructed it to the knowledge  of the  landlord, What  will bea  permanent structure for  the purpose of the protection ofsection5 of the Actis a question of fact. The question of nature of the structure, i.e.,  whether  it  is  a  permanent within the meaningof  Section 3(d)  of the  Act, was  notput in issue before the  High Court. Therefore, wecannot go  intothat question for  the first time in  deciding the nature of the construction made  by the  respondent before  the  fire had broken out.  Under these  circumstances, the  above judgment renderslittleassistance to the appellant.      Hethen  contendedthat  it is for the tenant to prove that the  landlord hadpermitted the  construction. In the light of  the recitals in the lease deed, no such permission was given  in writing; so it isnot valid in law. Therefore,

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the High  Courtwas  not rightin concluding  that  he has constructed the permanent  structure.Therefore,  landlord cannot be deprived of his statutory right to eviction on the ground of acquiescence without any pleading or proof inthis behalf. We   find  noforce  in  thecontention.  He had constructed the house within  five years  obviously to the Knowledge of  the landlord and he acquiesced toit as it was not objected to.      Itis  rather   unfortunate that  the question  was not raised by the appellantin the High Court and we do notfind the same  issuein  thepleadings. ThisCourt in Karam Singh Sobti & Anr. vs. Shri Pratap Chand & Anr. [(1964) 4 SCR 647 AT  649]   merely  consideredthe  questionwhether the construction made  by the  tenant should  be regarded  as  a permanent structure in relationto the legalityof the plot? It wasfound that  he has  no evidenceto showwhen exactly the said  housewas  constructed. In  other words, the ratio thereinis  with reference  to the  period during  which the construction was  made and  this Courtdid notfind that it was not a permanent  structure. The  decision therein if of little assistance to the appellant.      InCanaraBank v. Canara SalesCorporation  &Ors. [(1987)2  SCC 666],  the question was whether the customer- accountholderto whom the monthly  pass-sheets of account are communicated is deprived ofhis right to file a suit for account. It wascontended that since  in the regular course, pass-sheets ofthe account  were being communicated and he had acquiescedto thesame, the suit was not maintainable. In this context,  this Courthad  that  thequestion  of acquiescence does not arise so long as he is entitled to the settlement  ofaccount.  The  ratio  also  isnot  of any assistance to the appellant. InShiromani & Ors. v. em Kumar & Ors.[(1968)3  SCR 639 at 644], thequestion therein was under the Mitakshara Law of theBenaresSchool of HinduLaw, viz., whether  a wife  is entitled  to an equalshare in the property alongwith the  sons.There  was a prior partition betweenthe  sons evidenced by Ex. D-4 to whichtheir mother was a  signatory. It  was contended in the suitfiled by the mother that  she had  acquiesced  to  the  division  of the property and thereby when she claimed her sharewas declared disentitled. In this context,it was held that the plea of acquiescence must  be specifically  pleaded and proved.  In that case,  it was  not done.The  ratio  thereof  has  no application tothe present  case for  the reason  that the appellant has not disputed the construction of the house and that it was not  his case thathis predecessor-in-title had acquiesced to the construction of the permanentstructure in the land leasedout to the respondent.      Hehas  also placed  rellance on an unreported judgment of this Court in  Pramila Rani Nag v. rohd. Mir Hussain & Ors. [C.A.  Mp/1209/74]decidedon 17.1.1995 which is on the nature of  the construction.  That also has norelevance to this case.      Thus we  hold that the view takenby the High Court is not vitiated  by any  error oflaw warranting interference. The appellant  is entitled  to withdraw the  amounts  under deposit.      The appealis accordingly dismissed. No costs.