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PETITIONER: KARNATAKA STATE TOURISM DEVELOPMENT CORPN. LTD. ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KARNATAKA STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL & ORS. ETC.ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/10/1986

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 2039            1986 SCR  (3)1008  1986 SCC  (4) 421        JT 1986   606  1986 SCALE  (2)579

ACT:      Motor Vehicles  Act, 1939: ss. 2(29A), 2(16), 63(7)-Cl. (iv)  of  proviso-Rule  of  ’preference’-Interpretation  and application of-Clause  (iv)-Whether infringes  Article 14 of the Constitution-"Tourist  Vehicle" may include a motor car, a motor car excludes an omnibus.      Words and  Phrases:  "Tourist  Vehicle"-Meaning  of-ss. 2(29A) and 2(16), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.      Administrative Law:      Statutory Tribunal-Decision  of-Cannot be pre-empted by executive discretion.

HEADNOTE:      Sub-section (7)  of s.  63 of  the Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939 empowers the State Transport Authority, for the purpose of promoting  tourism, to  grant permits valid for the whole or any  part of  India, in respect of such number of tourist vehicles as  the Central  Government may  in respect of that State specify in this behalf. A proviso to that sub-section, introduced by  s. 24  of the  Amending Act of 1978 laid down that preference  shall be  given to applications for permits from (i)  the India Tourism Development Corporation; (iii) a State Tourism Development Corporation; (iii) a State Tourist Department, and  (iv) operators  of tourist  cars, or travel agents, approved in this behalf by the Central Government.      There were  as many  as  495  applications  before  the Karnataka State  Transport Authority for the grant of 14 All India Tourist  Vehicle permits.  By  its  proceedings  dated April 30,  1984, the  Authority granted  11 permits  to  the Karnataka State  Tourism Development Corporation, one to the Indian  Tourism  Development  Corporation  and  two  to  the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. 1009      On  appeals   being  preferred,   the  Karnataka  State Transport Appellate  Tribunal, by  its order  dated February 28, 1985 set aside the grant of two permits in favour of the Karnataka State  Road Transport  Corporation, three  out  of eleven permits  to the  Karnataka State  Tourism Development Corporation, and  instead granted  three permits  to private operators and increased the number of permits granted to the Indian Tourism Development Corporation from one to three, on

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the  premises  that  in  view  of  the  rule  of  preference enunciated by  the proviso to s. 63(7) the applications from the non-preferred  category had to be excluded as the number of applications  from the applicants who were required to be given preference  exceeded  the  number  of  permits  to  be granted. Though  some of  the appellants before the Tribunal had better  expertise, experience and resources they did not succeed.      The High  Court rejected  the  writ  petitions  on  the ground that  the rule of preference contained in the proviso to s.  63(7) contemplated  exclusion of  the ’non-preferred’ class, if sufficient number of applicants from the preferred classes were available.      In these appeals by special leave, it was contended for the appellants  that on  a  correct  interpretation  of  the proviso to  s. 63(7) the preference became operative only if other things  were equal.  It was also urged that the fourth sub-clause  of   the  proviso   offended  Art.   14  of  the Constitution, and had to be struck down.      Allowing the appeals, the Court, ^      HELD: 1.1 The rule contained in the proviso to s. 63(7) of the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is a rule of preference and not a rule of exclusion, for it does not say that the permit shall be  granted to  the categories  of operators specified therein.  The   claims  of   eligible  applicants   must  be considered  on  merits,  applying  the  rule  of  preference whenever the claims are approximately equal. The application of an  applicant is  not  to  be  altogether  excluded  from consideration on  the sole  ground that another applicant is entitled  to   preference.  Though   the  proviso  does  not expressly refer  to other  things being equal, the principle is very much implicit in it. [1015B-E]      1.2 What  has been  said by this Court in Sher Singh v. Union of  India, [1984]  1  SCR  464,  about  preference  in relation to  s. 47(1-H)  applies  mutatis  mutandis  to  the preference contemplated  by the  proviso to  s. 63(7) in the instant case. [1017C] 1010      2.1  Clause   (iv)  of  the  proviso  to  s.  63(7)  is arbitrary, unreasonable  and unconstitutional.  There is  no indication in  it as  to the manner in which the approval of the Central  Government is  to be sought and granted and the considerations which  are expected to weigh with the Central Government. It  compels a tribunal, created by a statute for the purpose of considering rival claims and granting permits on merits,  to  give  preference  to  persons  securing  the approval of  the Executive  Government. To  the  extent  the clause goes,  it pre-empts  the decision  of the  designated tribunal by executive discretion. [1017E-G]      2.2  The  clause  provides  for  a  preference  not  to operators of  tourist vehicles  but to  operators of tourist cars and travel agents, though the permits to be granted are for tourist  vehicles. It  is difficult  to  understand  why preference should  be given  to operators of tourist cars in the matter  of granting  permits for  tourist vehicles which may well  be omnibuses  required to  travel long  distances. [1018B-C]      2.3 The  experience of running a tourist taxi cannot be said to be a better qualification than running a tourist bus when  the  question  is  of  granting  permits  for  tourist vehicles. [1018C-D]      3.  Having   regard  to  the  definitions  of  ’tourist vehicle’ and  ’motor car’  contained in  s. 2(29-A)  and  s. 2(16) respectively of the Act, the expression ’tourist cars’

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cannot be  said to  mean ’tourist vehicles’. While a tourist vehicle may include a motor car, a motor car, by definition, excludes an omnibus. [1018D-E]      In the  instant case,  the  State  Transport  Appellate Tribunal and  the High  Court have  failed to  consider  the merits of  the claims  of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and  the private  operators who  did not  get  a certificate of approval from the Central Government, because of the  rule of preference contained in proviso to s. 63(7). Their orders  are, therefore, set aside. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal  is directed  to re-hear  the appeals and dispose them of in accordance with law. [1017C-E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal  Nos.3677- 3680 of 1986 Etc.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  10.3.1986  of  the Karnataka High Court in W.P. Nos. 4053 to 4056 of 1985.      Shanti Bhushan,  Dr. Y.S.  Chitale,  H.B.  Datar,  K.R. Nagaraja, 1011 R.S. Hegde,  R.B. Datar,  S.S. Jawali,  B.P.  Singh,  N.D.B. Raju, R.P.,  Wadhwani, Aruneshwar Gupta, Swaraj Kaushal, KMM Khan, S.R.  Setia, A.T.M.  Sampath and C.S. Vaidyanathan for the appearing parties.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J. Special  leave granted  in all the cases. These  appeals raise  common questions of law and may therefore, be  disposed of by a common judgment. In exercise of its  powers under s. 63(7) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Central Government  specified 50 as the number of ’All India Tourist  Vehicle  Permits’  which  may  be  granted  by  the Karnataka State  Transport Authority.  By s.  24 of Amending Act 47 of 1978, a proviso to s. 63(7) was introduced. We are concerned in these appeals with the vires and interpretation of this proviso. By the time the proviso came into force, 36 permits had  been granted  by the  Karnataka State Transport Authority and  14 remained to be granted. There were as many as 495 applications for the grant of these 14 permits. By an order dated February 1, 1984, the Supreme Court directed the Karnataka State  Transport Authority  to  dispose  of  these applications.  The   State  Transport   Authority,  by   its proceedings dated  April 30,  1984, granted 11 out of the 14 permits  to   the  Karnataka   State   Tourism   Development Corporation, one  permit to  the Indian  Tourism Development Corporation and  two permits  to the  Karnataka  State  Road Transport Corporation. A number of appeals were preferred to the  Karnataka   State  Transport  Appellate  Tribunal.  The Tribunal by  its order dated February 28, 1985 set aside the grant of  the two  permits in  favour of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, set aside the grant of three out of eleven permits to the Karnataka State Tourism Development Corporation and  instead granted  three permits  to  private operators and increased the number of permits granted to the Indian Tourism  Development Corporation  from one  to three. The Tribunal took the view that having regard to the rule of preference enunciated  by  the  proviso  to  s.  63(7),  the applications from  the ’non-preferred’  category had  to  be excluded as  the number  of applications from the applicants who were required to be given preference exceeded the number of permits  to be  granted. It  was on  that ground that the grant of  two permits  to the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation was set aside, though the Appellate Tribunal had

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no  doubt  regarding  the  resources  and  ability  of  that corporation to  operate the tourist services. It was on that ground again, it was so stated by the Tribunal, that some of the appellants 1012 before the  Tribunal had  to be  denied the grant of permits though otherwise  they would have been entitled to the grant of permits  having regard to their expertise, experience and resources. The  Tribunal rejected their appeals regretfully. A large  number of  applicants filed  writ petitions  in the High Court.  The writ  petitions were  rejected by  the High Court on  the ground that the preference contemplated by the proviso to  s. 63(7)  contemplated exclusion  of  the  ’non- preferred’ class if sufficient number of applicants from the preferred classes were available. The decision of this Court in Sher  Singh v.  Union of  India, [1984]  1  SCR  464  was distinguished on  the ground  that in  that case  the  court interpreted the word ’preference’ occurring in s. 47(1-H) in the back-ground of the provisions of Chapters IV and IV-A of the Act,  under the  former of  which  the  State  Transport Undertaking would  have preference  whereas under the latter the State  Transport Undertaking  would have a monopoly. The Karnataka State  Road Transport  Corporation, the  Karnataka State Tourism Development Corporation and some other private operators have  filed these appeals by special leave of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.      Shri Shanti  Bhushan, learned counsel for the Karnataka State  Road  Transport  Corporation,  Dr.  Chitley,  learned counsel for  some of  the  private  operators,  Shri  Datar, learned counsel  for the Karnataka State Tourism Development Corporation, Shri  Sampat and  Shri Javali,  learned counsel for  other   private  operators  submitted  that  the  State Transport Appellate  Tribunal and  the High Court were wrong in distinguishing the decision of this court in Sher Singh’s case and  that the  true position  was  that  on  a  correct interpretation of  the proviso to sec. 63(7), the preference became operative  only if  other things  were equal.  It was also  urged  that  the  fourth  sub-clause  of  the  proviso offended Art.  14 and  had to  be  struck  down.  Shri  C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned  counsel for  some  of  the  preferred private operators  urged that  the view  taken by  the  High Court and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was correct and that  the fourth  sub-clause of  the proviso to s. 63(7) did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution.      We may now glance at some of the relevant provisions of the Motor  Vehicles  Act.  S.  2(33)  defines  a  "transport vehicle" as  meaning a  "public service  vehicle or  a goods vehicle". A  "public service vehicle" is defined in s. 2(25) as "any  motor vehicle  used or  adapted to  be used for the carriage of  passengers for  hire or  reward, and includes a motor cab,  contract carriage, and stage carriage". A "motor car" is defined in s. 2(16) as "any motor vehicle other than a transport vehicle, 1013 omni-bus,  road-roller,  tractor,  motor  cycle  or  invalid carriage". A  "contract carriage"  is defined as, broadly, a motor vehicle  which carries  a passenger  or passengers for hire or  reward  under  a  contract.  "Tourist  vehicle"  is defined by s. 2(29-A) as "a contract carriage constructed or adapted and  equipped and maintained in accordance with such specifications as  the State Government may, by notification in the  Official Gazette,  specify in  this behalf".  "Stage carriage" is  defined  by  s.  2(29)  as  "a  motor  vehicle carrying or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver  which carries  passengers for  hire or reward at

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separate fares  paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey." Chapter IV, sections  42 to  68, deals  with "Control  of  Transport vehicles". Section  42 prescribes  permits for  the use of a transport vehicle  in any  public place. Sections 46, 47 and 48 deal  with the  grant of  stage carriage permits. Section 47(1) prescribes  the matters to be taken into consideration in  granting   stage  carriage   permits   and   the   first consideration, naturally,  is "the  interest of  the  public generally." The  proviso to  s. 47(1) prescribes that, other things being  equal, a  registered cooperative society and a person possessing  a licence  for driving transport vehicles shall be given preference over individual owners in granting stage carriage  permits. Section  47(1-A) enables  the State Government to reserve a certain percentage of stage carriage permits for  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes. Section 47(1-C)  enables the  State Government  to reserve a certain percentage  of stage  carriage  permits  to  persons belonging to  economically weaker sections of the community. Section 47(1-H)  prescribes  that  notwithstanding  anything contained in  the section, an application for stage carriage permit from  a State  Transport undertaking for operating in any inter-State  route shall  be  given  preference  overall other applications,  provided, of  course, the  authority is satisfied that the State Transport Undertaking would be able to operate in the inter-State route without detriment to its responsibility for  providing efficient  and  adequate  road transport services  in any  notified area or notified route. Sections 49, 50, 51 deal with the grant of contract carriage permits. Section  52 and  53  deal  with  private  carrier’s permit and sections 54, 55 and 56 deal with public carrier’s permit. Section 57 deals, generally with the procedure to be followed in applying for and granting permits. Section 63(1) stipulates, broadly,  that a  permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority  of any one region shall not be valid in any other  region, unless  the permit has been countersigned by the  Regional Transport  Authority of  that other region, and a  permit granted in any one State shall not be valid in any other  State unless countersigned by the State Transport Authority of 1014 that other  State or  by the  Regional  Transport  Authority concerned.  Section   63(7)  is  the  provision  with  whose interpretation and  vires we are primarily concerned in this case. It is as follows:           "(7) Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  sub-           section(1) but  subject to  any rules  that may be           made under this Act, any State Transport Authority           may, for  the purpose  of promoting tourism, grant           permits valid  for the whole or any part of India,           in respect  of such  number of tourist vehicles as           the Central  Government may,  in respect  of  that           State, specify  in this behalf, and the provisions           of Sections  49, 50,  51, 57, 58, 59, 59-A, 60, 61           and 64  shall, as far as may be, apply in relation           to such permits:                Provided that  preference shall  be given  to           applications for permits from-                (i)    the    India    Tourism    Development                Corporation;                (ii) a State Tourism Development Corporation;                (iii) a State Tourist Department;                (iv) such  operators of tourist cars, or such                travel agents,  as may  be approved  in  this                behalf  by   the  Ministry   of  the  Central

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              Government dealing in tourism." Section 68  enables the  State Government  to make rules for the purpose  of  carrying  into  effect  the  provisions  of Chapter IV.  Chapter IV-A  relates  to  "special  provisions relating to  State Transport  Under-takings." Sections 68-C, 68-D and 68-E provide for the preparation and publication of schemes of  road transport  service to  be provided by State Transport Undertakings,  the procedure  to be followed, etc. Section 68-F(1)  prescribes that  where, in  pursuance of an approved scheme, a State Transport Undertaking applies for a stage carriage  permit, a  contract  carriage  permit  or  a public carrier’s  permit in  respect of  a notified  area or notified route,  such permit  shall be  granted to the State Transport Undertaking  by the State Transport Authority in a case where  the said  area or  route lies  in more  than one region and  the Regional  Transport Authority  in any  other case. This  is to  be so  notwithstanding  anything  to  the contrary contained in Chapter-IV. 1015      The general scheme of the Act in the matter of grant of permits for  stage carriages  and contract carriages appears to be  that except  in the  case  of  a  notified  route  or notified area,  where under  s. 68-F(1) the permit has to be necessarily granted  to the  State Transport Undertaking, in all other  cases, the claims of all eligible applicants must be considered  on merits,  applying the  rules of preference wherever the  claims are  approximately equal. Except in the case of  a notified  route or notified area, the application of  no   applicant   may   be   altogether   excluded   from consideration on  the sole  ground that another applicant is entitled to  preference under one or the other provisions of the statute.  The proviso  to s. 47(1) for example, provides that other  conditions being  equal, an  application  for  a stage carriage permit from a cooperative society or a person holding a valid licence for driving transport vehicles shall as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owners.  There  is  no  problem  here  since  the proviso itself  says that the rules of preference will apply only if  other conditions  are equal.  Section 47(1-H)  also enunciates  a   rules  of   preference  and   says  that  an application for  stage carriage  permit from State Transport Undertaking for  operating in any inter-State route shall be given preference  overall other  applications. While  it  is true that  s. 47(1-H)  does not  expressly refer  to  "other things being  equal", it  appears  to  be  implicit  in  the provision that other things are equal. The rule is a rule of preference and not a rule of exclusion. Section 47(1-H) does not say,  for example, like s. 68-F(1) that the permit shall be granted  to the  State Transport Undertaking. That is how s. 47(1-H)  was interpreted in Sher Singh’s case. Desai, J., speaking for the court observed:           "However, when an application for a permit is made           under Chapter  IV, the  Undertaking has to compete           with private  operators who  may as  well make  an           application  for   permit.  When  the  Undertaking           applies for  permit  under  Chapter  IV,  it  must           satisfy the  Regional Transport  Authority that it           is better  suited than  the  private  operator  to           render  transport   facility  to   the  travelling           public. Sec. 47(1-H) however, provides that in the           case of  inter-State route,  the Undertaking  will           have preference  in the  matter of  stage carriage           permit.  Does   preference  of  this  nature  deny           equality guaranteed  by Art.  14?  The  expression           ’preference’ amongst  others  means  prior  right,

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         advantage, precedence  etc. But  how would  it  be           possible to give precedence to one over the other.           It signifies that other things being equal, 1016           one will  have preference over the others. When an           application for  a stage  carriage permit is being           processed as  required by sec. 47, the application           of the  Undertaking for an inter-State route shall           be examined  as application  of any  other private           operator.  Their   merits  and  demerits  must  be           ascertained keeping  in view  the requirements  of           (a) to  (f) of  s. 47(1)  and after  comparing the           merits and  demerits of  both, not  with the yard-           stick of  mathematical accuracy,  but other things           being equal,  the application  of the  Undertaking           will have  preference over others. Qualitative and           quantitative  comparison   on  broad  features  of           passenger  transport   facility  such   as  fleet,           facilities to travelling public and other relevant           consideration  may   be   undertaken   and   after           balancing these  factors other things being equal,           the application  of the Undertaking shall be given           preference over  other  applicants.  There  is  no           question of  eliminating private  operators merely           because  the   Undertaking  applies  for  a  stage           carriage permit  under Chapter  IV. That situation           is  catered   to  under   Chapter  IV-A.   In   an           application under  Chapter IV,  Corporation has to           enter the arena like any other applicant, face the           competition and  come-up to  the  level  of  other           private  operators   intending  to   obtain  stage           carriage permits  and then in respect of the route           in question claim preference. Would this statutory           provision violate  equality guaranteed by Art. 14?           The answer is obviously in the negative."           ..................................................           ..................................................                "................ let  it be  made clear that           while  considering   the  application   for  stage           carriage permit  under s. 47, the private operator           has an equal chance to get a permit even on inter-           State route  if it  shows that  the Undertaking is           either unable  to provide efficient and economical           service or  that the  private operator  is  better           equipped to  render the  same. Preference  in this           context would  mean that  other  things  generally           appearing to  be qualitatively  and quantitatively           equal  though   not  with  mathematical  accuracy,           statutory  provision  will  tilt  the  balance  in           favour of the Undertaking." What has  been said  by the  Court  with  reference  to  the preference 1017 provided for  in s.  47(1-H) applies with equal force to the preference provided  for by  the proviso to s. 63(7). In the judgment  under   appeal,  the   High  Court   attempted  to distinguish the  decision of this Court in Sher Singh’s case on the ground that any other interpretation would have wiped out the  difference between  Chapter IV and Chapter IV-A. We do not  think the High Court was right in distinguishing the case in  that fashion.  The reference  to Chapter IV-A there was  for   the  purpose   of   contrasting   the   exclusion contemplated by  s. 68.F(1)  with the preference to be given under s.  47 (1-H) and so to interpret the word ’preference’ occurring in  s. 47(1-H).  We have  no hesitation  in saying

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that all  that has  been said  about  ’preference’  in  Sher Singh’s case  in relation  to  s.  47(1-H)  applies  mutatis mutandis to the preference contemplated by the proviso to s. 63(7). Since  the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the High Court  have failed to consider the merits of the claims of the  Karnataka State  Road Transport  Corporation and the private operators  who did not get a certificate of approval from  the   Central  Government,  because  of  the  rule  of preference contained  in proviso  to s.  63(7),  the  proper course for  us is  to set  aside the  orders  of  the  State Transport Appellate  Tribunal and  the  High  Court  and  to direct the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to re-hear the appeals and  dispose them  of in  accordance with law, after considering the  claims of  the eligible  applicants in  the manner indicated in Sher Singh’s case and now.      A question  was raised before us about the vires of the fourth clause  of the  proviso to  s. 63(7).  Clauses (i) to (iii) of the proviso providing for preference to be given to applications for permits from the Indian Tourism Development Corporation, the  State Tourism  Development Corporation and the State  Tourist Department  were not  questioned, but the preference provided  for by  clause (iv)  and to be given to "such operators  of tourist  cars, or such travel agents, as may be  approved in  this behalf  by the Ministry dealing in tourism" was questioned as an infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution. We  find it  difficult to  sustain this clause and uphold  its validity.  The very  idea  that  a  Tribunal created by  a statute  for the  purpose of considering rival claims and granting permits on merits should be compelled to give peference  to persons  securing  the  approval  of  the executive Government,  appears to  us to  be  arbitrary  and unreasonable. To  the extent  that it  goes, the clause pre- empts the  decision of  the designated tribunal by executive discretion. It was said that the clause contained sufficient guidelines  for  the  exercise  of  discretion  in  granting approval by  the Central  Government. It  was said  that the object of the proviso to s. 1018 63(7) was  very obviously  the promotion  of tourism and the approval of  the Central  Government would be given to those operators of  tourist cars  and travel  agents  who  may  be expected to serve that purpose.      It is difficult to agree with these submissions. In the first  place,  clause  (d),  it  is  seen,  provides  for  a preference, not  to operators  of tourist  vehicles  but  to operators of  tourist cars  and travel  agents.  Though  the permits  to   be  granted  are  for  tourist  vehicles,  the preference is  confined to  operators of  tourist  cars  and travel agents.  One may  understand a  preference granted to operators  of  tourist  vehicles  but  it  is  difficult  to understand why  preference should  be given  to operators of tourist cars  in the  matter of granting permits for tourist vehicles which may well be omnibuses required to travel long distances. Surely  it cannot  be  said  that  experience  of running a  tourist  taxi  is  a  better  qualification  than running a  tourist bus when the question of granting permits for tourist  vehicles arises.  The High  Court of  Karnataka tided over  the difficulty  by interpreting  the  expression "tourist  cars"   as  meaning   "tourist  vehicles".  It  is difficult to  agree with the interpretation of the Karnataka High Court  having regard  to the  definitions of "Transport Vehicle" and  "motor car"  contained in  s. 2(29-A)  and  s. 2(16) respectively.  While a  tourist vehicle  may include a motor car,  a motor car, by definition, excludes an omnibus. In the  second place, we have no indication as to the manner

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in which  the approval  of the  Central Government  is to be sought and granted and the considerations which are expected to  weigh   with   the   Central   Government.   Shri   C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned  counsel for the ’Preferred’ Operators has placed  before us  ’a Scheme  for granting  approval  to tourist transport  operators in  India.’ The scheme makes no reference to the proviso to sec. 63(7) of the Motor Vehicles Act. On  the other  hand, it  mentions that approval carries with it  certain privileges,  such as,  allotment of  ex-STC vehicles and  that it  is,  therefore,  necessary  that  the department  is   able  to   exercise  some  control  on  the functioning of  these operators. The terms and conditions to be fulfilled  are that ’the party must have been in the car- hire business  for a period of 2 years with the help of cars of indigenous  make or  cars  obtained  from  elsewhere  and should  have   sufficient  contacts   with  travel  agencies hoteliers/airlines, etc.  and should be financially sound or that they  should be  owning and  operating five vehicles as tourist taxies  of either  indigenous make  or acquired from elsewhere regardless  of the period in the car-hire business or that  they should  be ex-Defence  Service personnel,  who satisfy certain  prescribed conditions.  It is seen that the scheme excludes omnibus operators and requires applicants to have 1019 either two  years’ experience  in the car hire business with contacts in  the tourist  business or  to own  five  tourist taxies. There  are no guidelines as to how the discretion to grant  approval   is  to   be  exercised  once  the  minimum conditions are  fulfilled. The  matter appears to be left to the total discretion of the Central Government, virtually as we said, pre-empting the decision of the statutory tribunal. We think  that clause  (iv) of  the proviso  to s.  63(7) is unconstitutional and we so declare it.      In the  result we  set aside  the orders  of the  State Transport Appellate  Tribunal and  the High Court and direct the State  Transport Appellate  Tribunal to hear the appeals in the light of what we have said. P.S.S.                                      Appeals allowed. 1020