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PETITIONER: KARAM SINGH SOBTI & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI PRATAP CHAND & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/08/1963

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. DAS, S.K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1965 AIR   83            1964 SCR  (4) 673  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1965 SC  87  (10)

ACT: Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958--Section 57, scope and  effect of-Meaning  of "shall have regard to the provisions of  this Act"  in  s. 57(2) first proviso--Delhi Ajmer  Rent  Control Act,  1952,  s. 35--Revisional Jurisdiction of  High  Court- Finding by lower appellate court that landlord acquiesced in subletting--Whether High Court could interfere on the ground of no evidence. 648

HEADNOTE: By s. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 which came into force on June 9, 1952, courts were prohibited from directing  eviction  of a tenant at the suit of  a  landlord excepting  in  the  cases mentioned in the  proviso  to  it. Clause  (c)  of the proviso permitted  ejectment  where  the "tenant without obtaining the consent of landlord has before the  commencement of this Act sub-let. . . .  the  premises" Relying on this clause the respondent landlord filed a  suit against  the  appellant  and  respondent  no.  2  for  their ejectment  from a shop room let to the latter alleging  that it  had been sub-let to the appellant without  his  consent. The  appellant  resisted  the suit on the  ground  that  the respondent land lord had acquiesced in the subletting.   The trial  judge  decreed the suit holding that  the  respondent landlord  had not done so.  The appellant alone appealed  to the  Additional Senior Sub-judge who set aside the order  of the trial judge taking the view that the respondent landlord had  acquiesced in the sub-letting.  He also held  that  the subletting had commenced not later than November 1950.   The landlord moved the High Court in revision under s. 35 of the Act. While  the matter was pending in the High Court,  the  Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, came into force.  Section 57 of  the Act of 1958, provided; "(1) The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act,  1952,  in  so far as it is  applicable  to  the  Union Territory of Delhi, is hereby repealed. (2)  Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the  said Act  pending,  at the commencement of this Act,  before  any

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court or other authority shall be continued and disposed  of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, as if the said  Act had continued in force and this Act had  not  been passed: Provided that in any such suit or proceeding for the fixation  of standard rent or for the eviction of  a  tenant from any premises to which s. 54does not apply, the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of  this Act:  Provided  further that the, provisions for  under  the said  Act shall continue in force in respect of  Suit,,  and proceedings disposed of thereunder." The Court held that by reason of the provisions of subs. (2) of S. 57 of the Act of 1958 the revision case had to be dis- posed  of  in accordance with the provisions of the  Act  of 1952.   It also held that there was no evidence  to  justify the  appellate  court’s  findings that  the  respondent  had acquiesced  in  the sub-letting by respondent no. 2  to  the appellant.   In  that  view of the  matter  the  High  Court allowed  the  petition  of  revision.   The  appellant  then appealed to this Court. Held:     It was competent for the High Court under s. 35 of the Act of 1952 to interfere with the findings of the  court below  on  the question of acquiescene on  the  ground  that there  was no evidence to support that finding.  If a  court had arrived at a finding without any evidence to support it, it can be legitimately said that it had not decided the case "according to law" within the meaning of that expression  in s. 35. 649 Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhai  Lall Chowdhury, 119621 Supp.  I S.C.R.  933, Pooran Chand v. Motilal, 119631 Supp. 2  S.C.R. 906 and Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal, (1899) L.R. 26 I.A. 58, referred to. The  right of’ the appellant to challenge the decree of  the trial  Judge by appeal could not be affected by the  failure of the respondent no. 2 to file an appeal. Per  Das,  Acting  C. J., and Hidaytullah,  J.  (Sarkar,  J. dissenting): The first proviso to s. 57(2) of the Delhi Rent Control  Act,  1958  does not demand that  a  suit  for  the eviction  of it tenant filed under the Delhl and Ajmer  Rent Control  Act,  1952,  must  be  governed  entirely  by   the provisions  of  the  new  Act.   The  provisions  applicable continue  to  be  the provisions of the old  Act  with  this addition  that  where the new Act has slightly  modified  or clarified  the previous provisions, those modifications  and clarifications should IV applied.  Where entirely new rights and  new liabilities have been created, the  new  provisions must  not be allowed to override the provisions of  the  old Act.  If the expression "shall have regard to the provisions of this Act" in the first proviso to s. 57(2) means that the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, shall  apply to  ill such suits or proceedings as are referred to  in  s. 57(2) except in the matter of the jurisdiction of the  civil court, then in reality the substantive provision of s. 57(2) will  be  denuded  of  its full  effect  for  all  practical purposes.   Moreover,  that would be giving  effect  to  the provisions  of the Rent Control Act of 1958  retrospectively though  s.  57(2) states in clear terms that all  suits  and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act  will be dealt with in accordance with provisions of the old  Act. The   correct  approach  is  to  read  the   first   proviso harmoniusly  with the substantive provision contained in  s. 57(2). Per  Sarkar,  J. The expression "shall have  regard  to  the provisions  of the new Act" in s. 57(2) of the Act  of  1958 gives   to  all  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1958   a

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retrospective   operation   and  not  to,  some   of   those provisions. Those words do not mean that the intention was that some  of the  provisions of the new Act only were to be  applied  and they  cannot  be given that meaning  because  otherwise  the effect of the proviso would be to wipe out largely the first part of the sub-section. The  words  "suits and other proceedings" in sub-s.  (2)  of s.57 of the Act of 1958 include appeals and revision cases. Hari  Shankar v. Rao Giridhari Lal Choudhary [1962] Supp.  1 S.C.R.  933, Pooran Chand v. Motilal, [1963] Supp. 2  S.C.R. 906  Lala Beni’ Ram v. Kundan Lal, (1899) L.R. 26  I.A.  58, Mukesh Chand v. Jamboo Parshad, (1963) LXV P.L.R. 285,  Shri Kishore Aggarwal v. Satya Dev, (1959) LXI P.L.R. 574, Jhabar Mal  Chokhani  v. Jinendra Parshad (1963) LXV’  P.L.R.  469, Ryots of Garbandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (1943) L.R. 70 I.A.  129, Mysore States Electricity Board v. The  Bangalore Woollen Cotton & Silk Mills Ltd. [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R.  127, Bulaqui Das v. Ram 42-2 S. C. India/64. 650 Saran,  (1960)  LXIII P.L.R. 231, Jiva  Bhai  Purshottam  v. Chhagan  Karson, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 568, Bimal Parshad Jain  v. Niadarmal, (1960) LXll P.L.R. 664 and Man Mohan Lal v. B. D. Gupta, (1962) LXIV P.L.R. 51, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 392 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated December  13, 1962, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit  Bench at Delhi) in Civil Revision No. 427-D of 1957. Bishan   Narain,   O.  C.  Mathur,   Ravinder   Narain   and J.B.Dadachanji for the appellants. A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. K. Jain, for respondent  1. S. N. Andley, for respondent No. 2. August  29, 1963.  The judgment of S. K. Das,   Acting  C.J. and  M.  Hidayatullah, J. was delivered by S.K.  Das  Acting C.J. Sarkar J. delivered  a dessenting opinion. S.   K.  DAS,  Acting Chief Justice.--With much  regret,  we have come to a conclusion different from that of our learned brother Sarkar, J. as respects the true scope and effect  of S.  57  of  the Delhi Rent Control  Act,  1958,  hereinafter referred to as the Control Act of 1958.  The Control Act  of 1958  repeals  the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control  Act,  1952, hereinafter  called  the Control Act of 1952, in so  far  as that Act was applicable to the Union territory of Delhi, but contains   certain   savings  in  respect  of   "suits   and proceedings" pending at the commencement of the Control  Act of 1958.  To these savings we shall advert later. The  facts giving rise to the appeal have been stated  fully in  the  judgment of Sarkar, J. and we need not restate  the facts.   The  respondent, Pratap Chand, relied on  cl.  (c), sub-cl.  (i), of the proviso to S. 13(l) of the Control  Act of  1952  in  support  of his  claim  for  eviction  of  the appellant from a room, being room no. 6 in Pratap  Buildings situate in Connaught Circus, New Delhi.  Sub-s. (1) of S. 13 of  the  Control  Act of 1952  states  that  notwithstanding anything  to the contrary contained in any other law or  any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of  possession of  any premises shall be passed by any Court in  favour  of the  landlord against any tenant (including a  tenant  whole tenancy is terminated); the proviso creates certain excep- 651

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tions  and states that nothing in sub-s. (1) shall apply  to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if  the  case comes within the exceptions mentioned  in  the proviso.   One  of the exceptions is mentioned in  cf.  (c), sub-cl.  (i), of the proviso.  That exception relates  to  a case  where the tenant without obtaining the consent of  the landlord  has before the commencement of the Control Act  of 1952 sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the  posses- sion of the whole or any part of the premises.  The  princi- pal question for decision in the appeal is whether the  res- pondent-landlord  is entitled to rely on the exception  pro- vided by cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to sub-s.  (1) of s. 13 of the Control Act of 1952. The learned trial judge by his Judgment dated June 11,  1956 gave a decree in favour of the respondent-landlord.  One  of the  questions  raised before the learned  trial  judge  was whether  the respondent-landlord had acquiesced in the  sub- letting in favour of the appellant.  The learned trial Judge decided   against   the  appellant’  on  the   question   of acquiescence.   There was then an appeal which was heard  by the  learned Additional Senior Subordinate Judge  of  Delhi. The  learned Subordinate Judge found.... (1) that  the  sub- letting had commenced not later than November, 1950, and (2) that thereafter the respondent-landlord continued to receive rent  with  full  knowledge of  the  subletting.   On  these findings  he  held  that  the  respondentlandlord  was   not entitled  to  avail himself of the exception stated  in  cl. (c),  sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 13  of the Control Act of 1952.  The learned Subordinate judge gave his  judgment  on June 11, 1957.  It has to  be  noted  that these judgments were given prior to the coming into force of the  Control  Act  of 1958.  That Act  came  into  force  on February  9,  1959.   On August  26,  1957  the  respondent- landlord moved the High Court of Punjab in revision under s. 35  of  the  Control Act of 1952.   When  the  revision  was pending in the High Court, the Control Act of 1958 came into force.   The High Court held that there was no  evidence  to justify  the finding of the learned Subordinate  Judge  that the respondent-landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting of the room in favour of the appellant, and the case being  one where there is no evidence to justify a finding, it was open to the High Court 652 to  interfere in revision.  The question of the  true  scope and effect of s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 was  agitated before the High Court and the High Court held that by reason of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 57 of the Control  Act of  1958,  the revision before it had to be disposed  of  in accordance  with the provisions of the Control Act of  1952. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the petition in revision and  restored  the decree for possession made by  the  trial court.   The  appellant then moved this  court  for  special leave  and  having  obtained such leave  has  preferred  the present appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court dated December 13, 1962. We are in complete agreement with the conclusions reached by our learned brother, Sarkar, J. in respect of the  following questions:               (1)   whether the High Court was competent  on               an  application in revision to set  aside  the               finding  of the lower appellate court  on  the               question of acquiescence ;               (2)   whether the High Court was right in  its               view that there was no evidence in the case to               support the finding of the learned Subordinate

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             Judge on the question of acquiescence ; and               (3)   whether  the appeal before  the  learned               Subordinate  fudge  was  maintainable  in  the               absence   of  an  appeal  by  the   Automobile               Association of Upper India. On the conclusions reached on the aforesaid three questions, the respondent-landlord will be entitled to succeed,  unless s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 stands in his way.  If  the provisions of the Control Act of 1958 apply, then sub-s. (1) of s. 14 of the Control Act of 1958 will stand in the way of the  respondent-landlord,  because the  sub-letting  in  the present case did not take place on or after June 9, 1952 and will not therefore come within the exception provided in cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 14 of the Control Act of 1958.  Therefore, the narrow question before us is....... is the present case governed by cl. (c). sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Control Act of 1952 or is it governed by the provisions of the Control Act of 1958? The answer to this question depends 653 on the true scope and effect of s. 57 of the Control Act  of 1958. We  now  proceed to read s. 57 of the Control Act  of  1958. That section is in these terms:               "57. (1) The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act,               1952,  in  so far as it is applicable  to  the               Union territory of Delhi, is hereby repealed.               (2)Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits  and               other proceedings under the said Act  pending,               at  the commencement of this Act,  before  any               court  or other authority shall  be  continued               and   disposed  of  in  accordance  with   the               provisions of the said Act, as if the said Act               had  continued in force and this Act  had  not               been passed :               Provided  that in any such suit or  proceeding               for  the fixation of standard rent or for  the               eviction  of  a tenant from  any  premises  to               which section 54 does not apply, the court  or               other  authority  shall  have  regard  to  the               provisions of this Act:               Provided  further  that  the  provisions   for               appeal  under the said Act shall  continue  in               force  in  respect of  suits  and  proceedings               disposed of thereunder." Two  questions  arise  out of s. 57.   It  is  clear  beyond dispute  that had sub-s. (2) of s. 57 stood by itself,  then the present case would be governed by the provisions of  the Control  Act  of  1952,  assuming  that  an  application  in revision  is a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of  the  sub- section.  There are however two provisos to sub-s. (2) of s. 57.   It is the interpretation of these two  provisos  which has  caused much difficulty in the present case.  The  first question is, what is the true scope and effect of the  first proviso, with particular reference to the expression  "shall have  regard  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act"  occurring therein?  The second question is.... does an application  in revision come within the expression "suits and  proceedings" occurring  in  sub-s. (2) by reason of  the  second  proviso which  makes a special provision for appeals?  If,  however, we  decide against the appellant on the first  question  and hold  that the application in revision, assuming it to be  a proceeding  within  the  meaning  of  sub-s.  (2),  must  be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, then

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654 the second question need not be decided by us in the present case. Therefore,  we proceed to deal with the first  question  the answer to which will be decisive of the appeal. S.   57  of the Control Act of 1958 has been the subject  of several decisions in the Punjab High Court.  We shall  refer to  these  decisions at a later stage.  We prefer  first  to consider the question on general principles of  construction having regard to the words used in the section. But  before we do so, a brief reference may be made  to  the general  scheme of the two Control Acts.  Chapter 11 of  the Control  Act  of  1952 dealt with  standard  rent  and  also contained  provisions  relating  to  other  charges  by  the landlord.   The  dominant object was to prevent  payment  of rent in excess of standard rent and unlawful charges made by the landlord.  Chapter III dealt with control of eviction of tenants and in this chapter occurred s. 13 to which we  have already made a reference.  Chapter IV dealt with hotels  and lodging  houses and as we are not concerned with hotels  and lodging houses, no reference need be made to the  provisions in  this  chapter.   Chapter V dealt  with  jurisdiction  of Courts,  Appeals, Review and Revision and Chapter  VI  dealt with miscellaneous provisions.  The point to be noticed with regard  to the provisions in chapter V is that  the  Control Act  of  1952 conferred power and Jurisdiction  on  ordinary civil  courts with the usual right of appeal from the  first court as in other civil proceedings and a right to move  the High  Court  in  revision from the  appellate  judgment,  in respect of suits for recovery of possession of all  premises as defined in the Act, which definition excluded rooms in  a hotel  or lodging house.  With regard to hotels and  lodging houses,  jurisdiction  was conferred on a Controller  to  be appointed by the Central Government. The Control Act of 1958 made a radical change in respect  of many matters.  So far as eviction of tenants is concerned, a matter  with which we are concerned in the  present  appeal, jurisdiction was conferred on the Controller to be appointed under s. 35 to order recovery of possession of the  premises on one or more of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to s. 14 of the Control Act of 1958.  S. 16 of the Control Act  of 1958 put certain restrictions on sub- 655 letting  and one of these restrictions was that no  premises which  had  been sub-let either in whole or in  part  on  or after June 9, 1952 without obtaining the consent in  writing of the landlord should be deemed to have been lawfully  sub- let ; but where at any time before June 9, 1952 a tenant had sub-let  the whole or any part of the premises and the  sub- tenant  was at the commencement of the Act in occupation  of such premises, then notwithstanding that the consent of  the landlord was not obtained for such sub-letting, the premises would  be  deemed  to  have been  lawfully  sublet.   S.  17 required  the sub-tenant to give notice to the landlord  and s. 18 provided that in certain circumstances the  sub-tenant was to be treated as the tenant.  With the details of  these provisions  we are not concerned in the present case  except to  point  out  that the Control Act of  1958  made  radical changes  in the matter of eviction of tenants on the  ground of  sub-letting.  In the matter of sub-letting the  relevant date was taken as June 9, 1952 the date on which the Control Act  of  1952 came into force, and a  distinction  was  made between  sub-letting before that date and sub-letting  after that date.  A subletting before June 9, 1952 was treated  as lawful  sub-letting if the sub-tenant was in  occupation  of

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the premises at the commencement of the Control Act of 1958; but  a sub-letting after June 9, 1952 without  the  previous consent  in writing of the landlord was treated as  unlawful for the purposes of the Control Act of 1958. Let us now consider s. 57 of the Control Act of 1958 against the  background  of the scheme of the two Control  Acts,  as stated  above.  The first sub-section of s. 57  repeals  the Control  Act  of 1952 in so far as it is applicable  to  the Union territory of Delhi.  If the repeal stood by itself the provisions of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) would have applied  with  regard to the effect of the  repeal  and  the repeal  would  not  affect the  previous  operation  of  any enactment  repealed  or  anything  duly  done  or   suffered thereunder  or  affect any right, privilege,  obligation  or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any  enactment so repealed.  The provisions of the General Clauses Act will not, however, apply where a different intention appears from the  repealing enactment.  Such an intention is  clear  from sub-s. (2) of s. 57 which contains the saving clause. 656 It  states in express terms that notwithstanding the  repeal of the Control Act of 1952, all suits and proceedings  under the  Control Act of 1952 pending before any court  or  other authority  at the commencement of the Control Act  of  1958, shall  be continued and disposed of in accordance  with  the provisions of the Control Act of 1952, as if the Control Act of  1952 had continued in force and the Control Act of  1958 had  not been passed.  Nothing can be more emphatic  in  the matter  of a saving clause than what is contained in  sub-s. (2) of s. 57.  We had said earlier that had sub-s. (2) of s. 57   stood  by  itself  without  the  provisos,   then   the incontestable position would have been that the present case would  be governed by the provisions of the Control  Act  of 1952.  The question before us is, does the first proviso  to sub-s. (2) make a change in the position and if so, to  what extent?   The  first proviso states inter alia that  in  the matter of eviction of a tenant from any premises to which s. 54  does not apply, the court or other authority shall  have regard to the provisions of the Control Act of 1958.  S.  54 need  not  be  considered  by us  as  it  merely  saves  the operation  of  certain  enactments which  do  not  apply  to premises  under our consideration.  What is the  meaning  of the expression "shall have regard to the provisions of  this Act"  (meaning the Control Act of 1958) ? Does it mean  that the  proviso takes away what is given by sub-s. (2),  except in  the  matter of jurisdiction of the civil court  to  deal with an eviction matter which was pending before the Control Act  of 1958 came into force?  We are unable to  agree  that such is the meaning of the first provisio. We think that the first proviso must be read harmoniously with the  substantive provision contained in sub-s. (2) and the    only   way   of harmonising the two is to accept the    view    which    the Punjab  High  Court  has accepted, namely,  that  the  words "shall  have  regard to the provisions of this  Act"  merely mean  that  "where  the new Act  has  slightly  modified  or clarified  the previous provisions, these modifications  and clarifications  should be applied".  We see no other way  of harmonising sub-s. (2) with the first proviso thereto. A  similar expression occurring in s. 49 of the  Electricity (Supply) Act (LIV of 1948) was considered by this 657 court in the Mysore State Electricity Board v. The Bangalore Woolen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. and others etc.(1).  This Court referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Ryots of  Garbandro  v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi(2)  and  expressed

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agreement  with  the  view of the  Privy  Council  that  the expression  "have  regard to" or "having regard to"  has  no more  definite or technical meaning that of ordinary  usage, and  only requires that the provisions to which regard  must be  had  should  be  taken  into  ,consideration.   If   the expression  "have regard to" in the first proviso to  sub-s. (2)  means  that the provisions of the Control Act  of  1958 shall apply to all such suits or proceedings as are referred to in sub-s. (2) except in the matter of Jurisdiction of the civil  court, then in reality the substantive  provision  of sub-s.  (2)  will  be denuded of its  full  effect  for  all practical purposes.  We do not think that it would be  right to read the first proviso of sub-s. (2) in that way.  It was argued before us that the first proviso related only to  two matters, (a) fixation of standard rent and (b) eviction of a tenant, and the intention was that in these two matters only the  provisions of the Control Act of 1958 would  apply  and not  in  others.  If that was the intention,  nothing  would have    been    easier    than    to    say    in     sub-s. (2).  ."Notwithstanding  such repeal, all  suits  and  other proceedings under the said Act except those for fixation  of standard  rent  and eviction of a tenant etc."  Subs-s.  (2) does not, however say so, and if the first proviso is to  be interpreted  in the manner suggested by the  appellant,  the provisions  as to jurisdiction in the new Act  would  affect the power of the civil court to pass a decree for eviction. We  now turn to the decisions of the Punjab High Court.   In Shri  Krishna Aggarwal v. Satya Dev(3) it was held that  the first  proviso  to  sub-s. (2) of s.  57  was  directory  in character  and  not  mandatory; therefore,  the  courts  and authorities concerned had a discretion conferred on them  to take  into consideration the provisions of the new Act  when it  was  considered necessary in a proper case  and  in  the interest  of justice.  We do not wish, however, to base  our decision on these grounds.  We think that the proper way  of reading sub-s. (2) and the first proviso thereto is (1)  [1963]  Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127. (3) (1959) LXI P.I.R.  574. (2) [1943] L.R. 70 I.A. 129. 658 to  harmonise both in the best way possible.  In Bulaqi  Das Madan  Moha & others v. Ram Sarup(1) the view expressed  was that  the proviso must have some meaning and force  and  the proviso  intended  that where the old  provisions  had  been repeated   with  modifications,  the  old  Act   should   be interpreted  in  the light of the modifications so  long  as they   did   not  involve  creating  any  new   rights   and liabilities.  A similar view was expressed by the same judge in  Shri  Bimal  Parshad Jain  v.  Shri  Niadarmal(2).   The question  was considered by a Division Bench in Shri  Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Shri Jinendra Pershad(3).  At pages 474  and 475 of the report Dulat, J. who spoke for the Bench said:               "It would thus appear that apart from  Gosain,               the  other learned judges of this  court  have               generally  agreed that the proviso to  s.  57,               sub-section  (2), does not demand that a  suit               for  the eviction of a tenant filed under  the               previous Act of 1952 must be governed entirely               by the provisions of the new Act but that,  on               the  other  hand,  the  provisions  applicable               continue  to be the provisions of the old  Act               with this addition that, where the new Act has               slightly  modified or clarified  the  previous               provisions,     those    modifications     and               clarifications  should be applied, but,  where               entirely  new rights and new liabilities  have

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             been  created, the new provisions must not  be               allowed  to  override the  provisions  of  the               previous  Act, and nearly all the  cases  have               been decided on that basis." We agree with the view expressed by Dulat, J. We also  agree with the  High Court that if the first proviso to subs.  (2) of  s.  57 is interpreted in the way contended  for  by  the appellant  here,  it would really be giving  effect  to  the provisions  of  the  Control Act  of  1958  retrospectively, though  sub-s. (2) of s. 57 states in clear terms  that  all suits and proceedings pending at the commencement of the new Act  will be dealt in accordance with the provisions of  the old Act.  This is really putting the same argument that  the proviso  must  be  read harmoniously  with  the  substantive provision, in another way. (1)(1960) LXII P.I.R. 231.  (2) (1960) LXII P.I.R. 664. (3) (1963) LXV P.L.R. 469. 659 For  the reasons given above we have come to the  conclusion that in the present case the respondent-landlord is entitled to the benefit of cl. (c), sub-cl. (i), of the proviso to s. 13(1)  of the Control Act of 1952 and the first  proviso  to sub-s.  (2)  of s. 57 of the Control Act of  1958  does  not stand in his way.  He is, therefore, entitled to succeed, as the appellant has failed to make out any acquiescence by the landlord  to  the sub-letting in question.   Therefore,  the High  Court  rightly allowed the petition  in  revision  and restored the decree for possession made by the trial  court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. SARKAR J.-The respondent Pratap Chand, hereafter referred to as the respondent, who was the owner of Pratap Buildings  in Connaught Circus, New Delhi had let a room in it, being room No.  6,  to the respondent, the  Automobile  Association  of Upper India, formerly known as the Automobile Association of Northern India and hereafter referred to as the Association. The  appellant  was  a  sub-tenant of  the  room  under  the Association.  These facts are not in dispute.  On October 5, 1959,  the respondent gave the Association a notice to  quit and  on  December  25,  1954  brought  a  suit  against  the Association  and the appellant for their enviction from  the room.  It is out of this suit that the present appeal arises and the question is--Is the appellant liable to be evicted? Section  13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Act, 1952 which  had come  into  force  on June 9, 1952 and  governed  the  case, prohibited Courts from directing eviction of a tenant at the suit  of a landlord excepting in the cases mentioned in  the proviso  to  it.   Clause (c) of this proviso  said  that  a decree  for recovery of possession might be made  where  the Court  was satisfied that the "tenant without obtaining  the consent of the landlord has before the commencement of  this Act,-sublet,   assigned   or  otherwise  parted   with   the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises".   The respondent relied on this provision in the Act and contended that  the  Association had without his consent  sub-let  the shop-room  to the appellant and that he had come to konw  of this sub-letting about the end of May 1954.  The Association does not appear to have seriously contested the suit but the appellant  did.   Both  the Association  and  the  appellant admitted that the landlord had not 660 consented  to the subletting before it started but  the  ap- pellant contended that the respondent had full knowledge  of his occupation of the shop-room as a sub-tenant and had with such  knowledge  accepted  rent  from  the  Association  and

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thereby acquiesced in the subletting and was, therefore, not entitled to eviction on the ground of subletting without the landlord’s consent. The learned trial judge by his judgment dated June 11,  1956 held that the respondent landlord had not acquiesced in  the subletting and in that view of the matter directed ejectment of  the Association and the appellant.  The  appellant  then went  up in appeal under s. 34 of the Act to the  Additional Senior Sub-judge of Delhi who held that the sub-letting  had commenced  not  later  than  November  1950  and  that   the respondent continued to receive rent with full knowledge  of the sub-letting.  He, therefore, decided that the respondent was  not entitled to the decree for possession  and  allowed the  appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial  Court  and dismissed the suit by his judgment dated June 11, 1957.   On August  26,  1957, the respondent moved the  High  Court  of Punjab in revision under s. 35 of the Act. While  the revision petition was pending in the  High  Court the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act 1958  came  into  force.   It repealed the Act of 1952 but made some of the provisions  of the repealed Act applicable to certain pending matters.  One of  the  questions  in this appeal will  be,  which  of  the provisions of the new Act are to apply to the pending cases. In the revision petition, apart from challenging the finding of  acquiescence  by  the  learned  Senior  Sub-Judge,   the respondent contended that the appellate judgment was in  any event wrong because the tenant, the Association, not  having appealed from the decree in ejectment made against it by the learned trial judge, that decree stood and as a result of it the tenancy was at an end and, therefore, the appellant sub- tenant  who  only derived title through the tenant,  had  no right  to  remain in possession of the  demised  room.   The appellant on his part in opposing the petition supported the judgment  of the Additional Senior SubJudge on  the  merits, disputed  that his rights were concluded by the  failure  of the Association to appeal from the 661 judgment  of the trial judge and further contended  that  in view  of  the provisions of s. 57(2) of the Act of  1958  to which  I  will  later refer, the right of  the  landlord  to possession  had to be decided by the provisions of that  Act and  under s. 16 of this Act the respondent was not  on  the facts found entitled to an order for ejectment on the ground of sub-letting without his consent. The  various  points raised in the case were not  all  heard together  in  the High Court but the result of  the  several hearings was a,, follows: that the fact that the tenant  had not  appealed  did not take away the sub-tenant’s  right  to relief, that there was no evidence to justify the  appellate Court’s  finding that the respondent had acquiesced  in  the sub-letting  by the Association to the appellant,  that  the High  Court could in revision set aside the judgment of  the lower  appellate Court on this (,round and lastly,  that  s. 57(2) of the Act of 1958 (lid not require the High Court  in exercising  its revisional powers to decide  the  landlord’s right  to possession by reference to the provisions  of  the Act  of  1958.  In that view of the matter  the  High  Court allowed  the petition for revision and restored  the  decree for possession passed by the trial Court.  This judgment  of the High Court is challenged in this appeal. The  first question is whether the High Court was  competent in the exercise of its revisional Jurisdiction to set  aside the  finding of the lower appellate Court that the  landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting.  Section 35 of the Act of 1952  under which the revision petition had been filed  gave

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jurisdiction  to the High Court to satisfy itself  that  the decision of the Court below had been "according to law".  It has been held by this Court in Harz Shan kar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhury(1) that a revision petition under s. 35 of the Act of 1952 did not lie to interfere with a plain finding of fact.   Relying  on  this  case  learned  counsel  for   the appellant contended that the High Court had no  jurisdiction to  interfere with the finding of acquiescence by the  lower appellate  Court.  In that case however there  was  evidence which  could  have supported the finding arrived at  by  the Court  below the High Court and the High Court had only  re- assessed the value of that evidence.  This, it was held, the High Court could not do.  Such a case is (1) [1962] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 933. 662 very  different  from a case where, as in the  present,  the High  Court interferes with the finding on the  ground  that there is no evidence to support it.  If a Court had  arrived at  a  finding  without any evidence to support  it  can  be legitimately   said  that  it  had  not  decided  the   case "according to law" : see Pooran Chand v. Motilal(1).  I  may also refer to Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan cited on behalf of the respondent where it was observed that, acquiescence is not a question  of  fact  but of legal inference  from  the  facts found. The question then arises whether the High Court was right in its  view that there was no evidence in the case to  support the finding of acquiescence.  The evidence only showed  that the respondent knew that the appellant was in occupation  of the  demised premises.  I think that the High Court  pointed out,  rightly  that the fact that a landlord  had  knowledge that a person other than a tenant was in possession did  not by itself always lead to an inference that the landlord  had knowledge  that the person in possession was  a  sub-tenant. The  facts of the present case made such an  inference  more difficult.  They were as follows: The appellant had been  in possession  of the room from sometime in 1949 till  November 1950  along  with  the Association.  All this  time  he  was publishing  a magazine called the All India  Motorist  which was  the  official organ of the Association.   This  he  was doing under an agreement with the Association which provided that  "office  accommodation  for  the  staff  of  the  A.I. Motorist  to  be provided by the Association  in  6,  Pratap Buildings".  He was at one time the General Secretary of the Association  and constantly on the premises doing  also  his own  business there,, In November 1950 the Association  took another premises as the demised room was found too small for its expanding activities.  From November 1950, the appellant remained in sole possession of the premises carrying on  his businesses  there as previously, including the  business  of publishing the aforesaid official organ of. the Association. In  may 1954, the agreement between the Association and  the appellant  for the printing and publication of the  magazine was  brought to an end and the Association started  its  own magazine.  Since (1)  [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 906. (2)   [1899] L.R. 26 I.A. 58. 663 then the appellant alone has been using the room for his own purposes. I  do  not think that these facts establish  that  the  res- pondent  had  any reason to think that from  November  1950, when  the sub-tenancy commenced, the appellant had  been  in possession  as a sub-tenant for he had been using  the  room for the work of tile Association.  Only since May 1954,  the

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appellant  occupied  the room solely for his  own  purposes. The respondent might well, therefore, have thought that  the occupation of the appellant prior to 1954 was really for the Association.   Since  1954 however the  respondent  had  not accepted  any  rent.   I  am unable in  this  state  of  the evidence to hold that the view that the High Court took  was erroneous.  I do not think that the case of Mukesh Chand  v. lamboo Parshad(1) to which learned counsel for the appellant referred assists him on this point.  There it was held  that knowledge  of  possession  was  on the  facts  of  the  case evidence of knowledge of possession under a licence.  It  is not  necessary  to  pronounce on  the  correctness  of  that decision  for  we are concerned with a  different  question, namely  whether  knowledge  of  possession  is  evidence  of knowledge of possession under a contract of sub-tenancy.   A point  was raised at the bar that even if  acquiescence  had been  proved  that would not have  affected  the  landlord’s statutory  right  to recover possession on proof of  a  sub- letting without his consent.  I do not think it necessary to deal   with  that  question  in  the  present  case  as   no acquiescence was proved. The  next question is as to the rights of the  appellant  in the  absence  of  an  appeal by  the  Association  from  the decision of the trial Court.  This question does not present any  real difficulty.  The suit bad been filed both  against the tenant and the sub-tenant, being respectively the  Asso- ciation  and the appellant.  One decree had been  passed  by the  trial  judge against both.  The appellant had  his  own right  to appeal from that decree.  That right could not  be affected  by  the  Association’s decision  not  to  file  an appeal.  There was one decree and, therefore, the  appellant was  entitled to have it set aside even though  thereby  the Association  would also be freed from the decree.  He  could say that decree was wrong and should be set (1) (1963) LXV P.L.R.  285. 664 aside  as  it was passed on the erroneous finding  that  the respondent  had  not acquiesced in the  sub-letting  by  the Association  to him.  He could challenge that decree on  any ground available.  The lower appellate Court was, therefore, quite  competent  in the appeal by the  appellant  from  the joint  decree in ejectment against him and the  Association, to  give him whatever relief he was found entitled to,  even though the Association had filed no appeal. I come now to the last and the more difficult of the  points argued in this case.  That point turns on the interpretation of  s.  57  of the Act of 1958 the terms  of  which  are  as follows:               S.    57. (1) The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control               Act,  1952, in so far as it is  applicable  to               the  Union  territory  of  Delhi,  is   hereby               repealed.               (2)   Notwithstanding  such repeal, all  suits               and  other  proceedings  under  the  said  Act               pending,  at  the commencement  of  this  Act,               before  any court or other authority shall  be               continued  and disposed of in accordance  with               the provisions of the said Act, as if the said               Act  had continued in force and this  Act  had               not been passed:               Provided  that in any such suit or  proceeding               for  the fixation of standard rent or for  the               eviction  of  a tenant from  any  premises  to               which section 54 does not apply, the court  or               other  authority  shall  have  regard  to  the

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             provisions of this Act:               Provided  further  that  the  provisions   for               appeal  under the said Act shall  continue  in               force  in  respect of  suits  and  proceedings               disposed of thereunder. It is said by the appellant that the first proviso to  subs. (2)  of s. 57 of the Act of 1958 required the High Court  to decide the claim for ejectment in the revision case  pending before it in accordance with the provisions of that Act  and as  under s. 16 of the Act no decree in ejectment  could  be passed against the Association or the appellant on the facts of  the  present case, the High Court was wrong  in  passing such a decree. The respondent’s answer to this contention is two fold.   It is first said that the proviso only required a Court to have regard  to  the provisions of this Act and that  meant  that only those provisions of the new Act were to be 665 applied  which were clarifications and modifications of  the old  but  none other.  If this is so, no doubt the  new  Act could be of no assistance to the appellant.  This contention is  based  on  judgment of the Punjab High Court  but  I  am unable to accept it as correct. The  earliest  case before the High Court was  Shri  Krishna Aggurwal v. Satya Dev(1).  There it was held that the  first proviso  only  gave a discretion to the Court to  apply  the provisions  of  the new Act when the  interests  of  justice required it.  This view has not however been accepted in the later cases and has been expressly given up in the last case which was Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Jinendra Parshad(2).  As it has  not  been  pressed before us, it is  not  necessary  to discuss it further.  Plainly, an interpretation which  makes the  substantive rights of parties depend on the  discretion of court is impossible of acceptance. The reasons which have been given to support the  contention that  the first proviso only made the provisions of the  new Act  which  were  modifications and  clarifications  of  the provisions  of  the  old Act are various but  none  of  them appears  to me to be well founded.  First, it is  said  that the words "have regard to" support that view and reliance is placed on Ryats of Garbandho v. Zemindar of  Parliakimedi(3) for  this purpose : see Jhabar Mal’s case(2).  In that  case the  Judicial Committee held that the words meant  that  the provisions referred to must be taken into consideration  but it was not obligatory to follow them. Apart from the fact that the view expressed by the  Judicial Committee turned on the statute before it as it was  careful to  observe by saying "any general interpretation of such  a phrase is dangerous and unnecessary", I am unable to see how the  decision  supports the view for which it was  cited  in Jhabar Mal’s case(2).  In that case the words were given the meaning  that compliance with the provisions  indicated  was not  obligatory, a meaning which is not sought to be put  on them  in the present case by any one, for the view that  the first  proviso  gives  a discretion to the  Court  has  been discarded.   Surely the Parlakimedi case(3) is no  authority for  the  view  that the words "shall  have  regard  to  the provisions of this Act" mean that it (1)  [1959]  LXI.  P.L.R.    574.    (2) [1963]  LXV  P.L.R. 469. (3)[1943] L.R. 70 I.A. 129. 43-- 2 SC India/64 666 shall be obligatory to apply only such of the provisions  of the new Act which are modifications or clarifications of the

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earlier  Act, and this is the meaning which is canvassed  by the  respondent.   The Judicial Committee  were  indeed  not concerned  with the provisions of two statutes one of  which had  been  repealed, as we are.  The two  cases  are  wholly different.   The  decision  of this Court  in  Mysore  State Electricity  Board v. The Bangalore Woollen Cotton and  Silk Mills Ltd.(1) in which the same words fell to be considered, is of even less assistance. Another  reason  given  is that the rule  is  that  no  more retrospective operation is to be given to a statute than its language renders necessary : see Shri Krishna’s case (2) . A somewhat  similar view was expressed in Bulaqui Das  v.  Ram Sarup(3)  where it was said that the proviso should be  read making only those provisions of the new Act applicable which are  modifications  of  the old as that  would  cause  least disturbance  of  the vested rights.  Again I  am  unable  to agree.   The words "shall have regard to the  provisions  of this Act" do give these provisions a retrospective operation and  there  is nothing in them to limit the  scope  of  such operation  to  some of those provisions.  The  rule  that  a statute  is not presumed to have retrospective operation  is no  justification  for astuteness in limiting the  scope  of that operation where the words do not indicate any limit.  I am wholly unable to agree that the words "shall have  regard to  the  provisions of this Act" at all provide  any  limit. They  would  not  indicate  any  limit  if  no  question  of retrospective operation arose (see Parlakimedi case) (4) and the  natural meaning of the words is not changed  when  they are used in a clause for giving retrospective operation to a statute.   I  may add that this reasoning is based  only  on those words. The  last  reasoning  on which the  respondent  founded  his contention  was  that  the  proviso  had  to  be   construed harmoniously with the first part of sub-s. (2) and not so as to  destroy  it altogether: see Shri Krishna’s  case(2)  and Jhabar  Mal’s  case(5).   There  is  no  doubt  about   this principle  (1) [1963]Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127. (2) [1959] LXI P.L.R. 574. (3) [1960]   LXII P.L.R.      231. (4) [1943]   L.R. 70 I.A. 129. (5) [1963]   LXV P.L.R. 469. 667 but  it is applicable when there is a conflict  between  two parts  of  a statute, a conflict which could not  have  been intended.  But where, as in the present case-and as to  this I  feel no doubt at all-the proviso is an exception  to  the part to which it is attached there is no conflict for it was intended  to reduce the field of operation of that  part  by the  proviso.  There is no occasion in such a case  to  feel perturbed  if  the  plain language of the  proviso  has  the effect  of  cutting down the scope of operation of  a  large part of the provision to which it is attached, for such  was the  intention  of the legislature.  There is of  course  no sounder principle of interpretation of statutes than to give plain language its plain meaning. Suppose  the  words  in the proviso were  "shall  apply  the provisions  of this Act".  Then those provisions would  have to  be applied even though the result was the wiping out  of the larger portion of the first part of the sub-section, The words  however are "shall have regard to the  provisions  of this  Act".  Whatever they mean, they do not mean  that  the intention  was  that some of the provisions of the  new  Act only  were  to  be applied and they  cannot  be  given  that meaning because otherwise the effect of the proviso would be to largely wipe out the first part of the subsection.  There

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is no Justification for twisting the language of the proviso in  a  zealous quest for harmony.  The  expressed  intention must  be  given effect to and no question  of  creating  any harmony   arises.   Since  those  words  do  not  confer   a discretionary   power,  they  must  be  read   as   imposing obligatory duties. I  do not also think that if the provisions of the  new  Act are  applied  to  pending  proceedings,  there  would  be  a tremendous  disharmony,  a disharmony which could  not  have been intended.  Under the first part of the sub-section  all pending  suits and proceedings are to be disposed  of  under the old Act.  Under the proviso in some of them the court or authority before whom they are pending are to have regard to the  provisions  of  the  new  Act.   Now,  the  courts  and authorities  under  the two Acts are different.   The  first part of the sub-section requires the courts and  authorities under  the old Act to dispose of the matters pending  before them  and  the proviso does not touch this portion  of  that part, for it requires the courts and autho- 668 rities  under the old Act to dispose of some of the  pending matters  by applying some of the provisions of the new  Act. Again the proviso leaves the scope of the first part of  the sub-section  wholly unaffected as regards pending suits  and proceedings  other  than those for eviction of a  tenant  or fixation of standard rent.  These would include  proceedings by  tenants  for being put back into  possession  and  those between hotels and lodging house keepers and their boarders. It may be that these would be fewer than the proceedings for ejectment  of tenants or standardisation of rents, but  that would be irrelevant.  What I wish now to observe is that  if the proviso is interpreted as making it obligatory to  apply all  the provisions of the new Act to  pending  proceedings. other  than those I have indicated above, the  result  would not  be  to  wipe. out the first  part  of  the  sub-section altogether, a good part would still remain operative.  I  do not  conceive  it to be the duty of a court  interpreting  a statute  to give words a meaning which they do  not  plainly bear  because  otherwise  some or even a  large  portion  of another part of the statute would become inoperative.   This would  be more so where one part was intended admittedly  to cut down the effect of another.  One must not further forget that in interpreting a beneficent Statute the effort  should always be in cases of doubt to put that interpretation which confers the larger benefit on those intended to be benefited :  Jiva  Bhai  Purshottam v. Chhagan Karson(1).   I  do  not however  wish it to be understood that I feel a  doubt  that the words "shall have regard to the provisions of this  Act" may  mean  those provisions only of the new  Act  which  are modifications or clarifications of the provisions in the old Act. I have now discussed all the reasons advanced in support  of the  respondcnt’s contention and am unable to accept it  for the reasons earlier mentioned.  I think the proviso  plainly makes  it obligatory to apply the provisions of the new  Act in  the  decision of the pending suits and  proceedings  for ejectment  of  tenants by the courts before whom  they  were pending under the old Act. The respondent then said that the first proviso to s.  57(2) of the Act of 1958 did not in any event make any part of the Act of 1958 applicable to pending revision cases (1)[1962] 1 S.C.R. 568, 573. 669 for that proviso only referred to suits or proceedings and a revision case was neither.  This view receives support  from

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Shri  Krishna’s case(1) and Man Mohan Lal v. B. D.  Gupta(2) but  a  contrary  view was taken in Bimal  Parshad  lain  v. Niadarmal(3).   In fact the two earlier mentioned  judgments in  the High Court held that the words "suit or  proceeding" in  the first proviso did not include either an appeal or  a revision case. This  view  is based on the terms of the second  proviso  to sub-s.  (2) of s. 57 which I have earlier set out.   It  was said that by dealing specifically with appeals in that  pro- viso  the legislature has indicated clearly that it did  not intend an appeal to be considered as a suit or proceeding in that  sub-section.   It  was also said that  if  a  suit  or proceeding included an appeal then the second proviso  would become  wholly  redundant for what is provided  there  would then come within the rest of sub-s. (2). This  reasoning seems to me to be based on a  misreading  of the  second  proviso which states that "the  provisions  for appeal under the said Act shall continue in force in respect of suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder".  Now  what are  "provisions  for  appeal"?  They  of  course  mean  the provisions  which set out how or when and in what  court  an appeal  may be filed and so on, that is, provisions  dealing with  the  institution of appeals, their  competence,  their procedure and the courts where they may be filed and so  on. The  words  do  not refer to any provision of  the  old  Act dealing with the merits of an appeal.  The old Act does  not contain,  as indeed no Act does, any specific provision  for the  decision  of the merits of an appeal  as  distinguished from the decision of the same case at the trial stage.   The provisions  for deciding the merits are always the  same  in both  cases.   The words "provisions  for  appeal  therefore cannot possibly refer to provisions dealing with the  merits of  a case.  The word "appeal" had to be used in the  second proviso  as  it  was concerned with appeals  from  suits  or proceedings  mentioned in it, namely, those which  had  been disposed  of under the old Act.  That word was not  used  to indicate that suits or proceedings mentioned in the rest  of the sub-section were not to in- (1) [1959] LXI P.L.R. 574. (2)  [1962] LXIV P.L.R. 51. (3)  [1960] LMI P.L.R. 664. 670 clude  an appeal.  Furthermore the second proviso would  not be  redundant if the words "suit or proceeding" in the  rest of  the sub-section were understood as including an  appeal, for it states under which law the competence of appeals  and revision petitions from cases disposed of under the old  Act are to be decided while the rest of the subsection does  not deal  with  such  matters but deals with  the  courts  where pending  matters are to be heard and the law by  which  they are  to  be decided and disposed of.  I may also  point  out that  under  the  two  Acts  Jurisdiction  is  conferred  on different authorities.  There is, therefore, nothing In  the second proviso which would indicate that the words "suit  or proceeding" in the first part of sub-s. (2) or in the  first proviso were not intended to include an appeal or a revision case. Another reason given was that a revision could not be a suit because  it  was not a rehearing.  Even if this  is  so,  it would  not  be  an answer to the contention  that  the  word "proceeding"  would  include an appeal or a  revision  case. Furthermore,  it is conceded that an appeal is  a  rehearing and  would  be included within the word suit if  the  second proviso was not there.  I have already shown why the  second proviso  does not prevent an appeal from being  included  in

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the  words  "suit  or proceeding" in the rest  of  the  sub- section.   Now if an appeal is to be held a suit and  as  no distinction  can  be made between an appeal and  a  revision case,  it  would follow that the word "suit" might  on  this reasoning  include a revision case.  It is  indeed  admitted that  the  word "appeal" in the second  proviso  includes  a revision case.  Obviously any other view would be  untenable for no intelligible reason can be found why a revision  case should  be treated differently from an appeal.   For  myself however I would say that as a matter of plain English  there is  no difficulty in including within the word  "proceeding" an  appeal  or  a revision case.  I see no  reason  why  the legislature  should  have thought of applying  one  law  for cases which were pending at the original stage when the  new Act  came  into  force and another law for  the  appeals  or revision cases from original trial which were pending then. A  third reason given why suits or proceeding in  the  first part of sub s. (2) and the first proviso should not 671 include  an  appeal  or  a  revision  case  is  that   might necessitate  a remand for further evidence.  This is  admit- tedly  an  argument of convenience and hence  not  of  great strength.   But  I am unable to see why a  remand  would  be necessary.  Ex-hypothesi the case had been started under the old  Act  and  all evidence that should have  been  led  had already been led.  A remand for taking fresh evidence  could only  be  necessary  if an amendment of  the  pleadings  was allowed in view of the fresh rights created by the new  Act. So far as a new right is given to the landlord he can always file a fresh suit.  The taking of the new evidence which  it is  said would be an inconvenience cannot therefore  in  any event be avoided. If the words "suit or proceeding" in the first part of  sub- s.  (2) or the first proviso do not include an appeal  or  a revision case the result would be somewhat anomalous.  It is clear  that  s. 6 of the General Clauses Act  keeping  alive certain  rights under repealed Act cannot be availed  of  to keep alive rights under the 1952 Act for sub-s. (2) of s. 57 of the 1958 Act specifically states which of the  provisions of  the  1952 Act are to remain available in  spite  of  the repeal of that Act.  On the respondent’s contention  nothing in  the first part of sub-s. (2) or the first proviso to  it would make the old Act applicable to pending appeals or  one that came to be filed after the coming into force of the new Act.   One is then left wondering by which law  the  appeals and revision cases which are pending when the new Act  comes into  force or are subsequently filed under the second  pro- viso  are  to be governed.  It clearly could not  have  been intended that the pending appeals or revision cases were not to  be proceeded with any more.  Therefore, it seems  to  me that  it  would be an unnatural construction  of  the  words "suit or proceeding" in the first part of sub-s. (2) or  the first proviso to it to say that they do not include  appeals or  revision cases.  In my view the High Court was under  s. 57(2)  of the 1958 Act bound to apply the provision of  that Act  in  deciding the merits of the  revision  case  pending before it when the new Act came into force. The  next  question is, How were the merits of  the  pending revision  case  affected  by the  new  Act?   The  appellant contends  that  s.  16  of this Act  prevents  a  decree  in ejectment being passed against him by the High Court in 672 the  revision case.  This is fallacious.  Section  16(1)  no doubt  says that certain sub-lettings would be deemed to  be lawful  sub-lettings.  It is also true that the  sub-letting

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to the appellant was of the kind mentioned in s. 16(1).  The effect however of making sub-lettings lawful under s.  16(l) is  to prevent an cjectment being ordered against  the  sub- tenant when the tenancy of the intermediate tenant comes  to an  end  but  this only in cases where  the  sub-tenant  has given.  the prescribed notice: see ss. 17 and 18.   The  ap- pellant  cannot get the benefit of these provisions  for  he had not given that notice.  Section 16(l) does not otherwise prevent the ejectment of a tenant or sub-tenant. None the less however as the provisions of the new Act apply to  the  pending revision case, the respondent has  to  show that  he is entitled to an order for ejectment  under  those provisions.   Now  the only ground on which  the  respondent claims  ejectment  is for sub-letting without  his  consent. The circumstances under which ejectment can be decreed under the new Act are set out in the proviso to s. 14.  Under that proviso  a subletting on or after June 9, 1952  without  the consent of the landlord in writing may justify a decree  for possession  but not any other kind of sub-letting.   In  the present  case  on the facts found, the  sub-letting  to  the appellant was not of this kind for it took place in November 1950.   A sub-letting which took place on that date even  if it  was without the landlord’s consent would not justify  an order  for possession against the tenant at the instance  of the  landlord.  No other provision in the new Act  has  been pointed out under which for such subletting the landlord was entitled  to an order for possession.  It follows  that  the High Court was not entitled to pass a decree for  possession but  should have dismissed the revision case.   Whether  the landlord  respondent is entitled to an order for  possession for  any  other reason under the new Act is not  a  question that arises in this appeal and I express no opinion on it. I would, therefore, allow the appeal.                        ORDER BY COURT In  view  of  the  majority  judgment,  the  appeal   stands dismissed with costs. 673