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PETITIONER: KAPTAN SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF M.P. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       24/04/1997

BENCH: M.K. MUKHERJEE, S.P. KURDUKAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.      Leave granted.      The six  appellants before us were arraigned before the Sessions  Judge,  Morena  for  rioting  and  the  murder  of Baijnath in  the night  between June  5 &6,  1983. The trial Judge acquitted  them of  both the  charges;  and  aggrieved thereby the  respondent No.2, who was the grandfather of the deceased, sent  a registered  letter to the High Court. That letter was  registered as a criminal revision and notice was issued to the appellants. After hearing the parties the High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the acquittal of the appellants and remanded the matter to the trial Court to pass  a fresh  judgment after  hearing the parties or, if need be,  to hold  a retrial. The above judgment of the High Court is under challenge in this appeal.      In assailing  the judgment of the High Court Mr. Lalit, the learned  counsel appearing  for the appellants submitted that the  High Court  exceeded its  revisional  jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr. P.C. in that it reappraised the entire evidence from  its own  point of view and reached inferences contrary to  those of the trial Court on almost every point, which  was   legally  impermissible.   In  support   of  hes contention he  relied upon  the judgments  of this  Court in Chinnaswamy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1962 S.C 1788), Mahendra Pratap  vs, Sarjn Singh (AIR 1968 S.C. 707), Khetra Basi vs. state of Orissa (AIR 1970 S.C. 272) and P.N.J. Raju vs. B.P.  Appadn (AIR   1975  S.C. 1854 ), Wherein the scope and extent  of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an  order of acquittal have been dealt with. In Chinnaswamy  (supra) this  Court held  that though it was open to  the High  Court to  set aside an order of acquittal even at  the instance  of the private parties the revisional jurisdiction should  be exercised  only in exceptional cases when   there was  some glaring  defect in  the procedure  or there  was   a  manifest   error  on  a  point  of  law  and consequently  there  had  been  a  flagrant  miscarriage  of justice. This  Court Pointed out that it was not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies but indicated some cases

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which would  justify the  High Court  to Interfere  with  an order of  acquittal in revision. The cases so indicated are: where the  trial Court  has no  jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused or where the trial Court has wrongly  shut out  evidence which the prosecution wished to produce  or where  the  appeal  Court  has  wrongly  held evidence which  was admitted  by  the  trial  Court  as  not admissible or  where material  evidence has  been overlooked either by  the trial  court or  by the appeal Court or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of an offence. Which is invalid  under law.  In the other Cases referred to above this  Court   reiterated  the   principles  laid   down   in Chinnaswamy  (supra)   and  observed   that  the  revisional jurisdiction when  invoked by  a private complainant against all order of acquittal ought not to be exercised lightly and that it  could be  exercised only  in exceptional case where the interests  of public  justice required  interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice.      Apart from  the cases relied upon by Mr. Lalit, we find that in  Ayodhya vs.  Ram Sumer  Singh (AIR  1981 SC 1415) a three judge  Bench  of  this  Court  dealt  with  the  power exercisable under Section 401 Cr. P.C. In that case the high Court, after referring to Chinnaswamy (supra), had said:      " In the instant case, we find that      this is  a case  of non-application      of mind  on the  part of  the Court      below. The  Probative value  of the      First Information Report (Ex.KA 19)      has  been   entirely  ignored.  The      individual  testimony  of  the  eye      witnesses has  not  been  discussed      and their  reliable  testimony  has      been     ignored,  from   which  it      follows that  material evidence has      not been considered and it has been      overlooked. The  entire Judgment is      full of  inconsistencies. The Court      below has misquoted the evidence at      some  places,  for  example,  while      dealing with  the copy of statement      (Ex.KA 18).  The Judgment  consists      of faulty  reasoning  and  lack  of      judicial approach.  Accepted canons      for appreciating evidence have been      thrown to the wind. The conclusions      on  the   question  of  motive  are      against the  weight of overwhelming      evidence  in   the  case.   In  our      opinion, the  view expressed by the      court below  has resulted  in grave      miscarriage of  justice so  far  as      the opposite  parties Uma  Shanker,      Girja   Shanker,   Gauri   Shanker,      Achhaibar,  Jhabbar,   Bansu,   Ram      Katul, Ayodhya Dube and Vindhyachal      are concerned.  The above,  in  our      opinion,      are       exceptional      circumstances   which compel  us to      order  retrial   of  the  aforesaid      opposite parties."      In upholding  the above  order of  the High  Court this Court observed as under:      "In our  view the  High  Court  has      given    adequate    reasons    for

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    interfering with  the acquittal and      ordering   a    retrial   of    the      appellants. We  may  add  that  the      High Court  also expressed the view      that  the  instances  mentioned  by      this Court in Chinnaswamy vs. State      of  Andhra  Pradesh  as  justifying      interference   with    orders    of      acquittal  in   the   exercise   of      revisional       powers        were      illustrative and not exhaustive. We      agree with  the view  expressed  by      the High  Court and we only wish to      say  that   the  Criminal   Justice      System does  not admit  of  ’Pigeon      holing’ .  If and  the law  do  not      fall  neatly  into  slots,  When  a      Court  starts   laying  down  rules      enumerated    (1),(2),(3),(4)    or      (a),(b),(c),(d),  it  is  arranging      for  itself   traps  and  pitfalls.      Categories,   classifications   and      compartments,  which  statute  does      not mention,  all tend  to make law      less flexible,  less  sensible  and      less just."      From a  conspectus of  the above  decisions it  follows that the revisional power of the High Court while sitting in judgment over and order of acquittal should not be exercised unless there exists a manifest illegality in the judgment or order of acquittal or there is grave miscarriage of justice. Read in  the context  of  the above principle of law we have no hesitation in concluding that the judgment of the trial Court in  the instant  case is  patently wrong  and  it  has caused grave  miscarriage of  justice. The  High  Court  was therefore fully  justified in  setting aside  the  order  of acquittal. From the judgment of the trial Court we find that one  of  the  grounds  that  largely  weighed  with  it  for acquitting the  appellants was  that an Inspector of CID who had taken  up the investigation of the case and was examined by  the   defence  (D.W.3)   testified   that   during   his investigation he  hound that  the story  as made  out by the prosecution was not true and on the Contrary the plea of the accused (appellants)  that in  the night  of the  incident a dacoity with  murder took  place in the house of Baijnath by unknown criminals and the appellants were implicated falsely was true  . It  is trite  that result  of investigation  can never be legal evidence; and this Court in Vijender etc. Vs. State of  Delhi (JT  1977 (3)  SC 131),  made the  following comments while comments while dealing with this issue:      "The reliance of the trial Judge on      the result of investigation to base      is  findings   is  again   patently      wrong. If  the observation  of  the      trial judge in this regard is taken      to its  logical conclusion it would      mean that a finding of guilt can be      recorded against an accused without      a trial,  relying solely  upon  the      police   report   submitted   under      Section 173  Cr.P.C., which  is the      outcome of  an  investigation.  The      result   of   investigation   under      chapter   XII   of   the   Criminal      procedure code is a conclusion that

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    an investigating  officer draws  on      the basis  of  materials  collected      during investigating  officer draws      on the basis of materials collected      during   investigation   and   such      conclusion can  only form the basis      of  a  competent    Court  to  take      cognizance thereupon  under Section      190(1) (b) cr. p. c. and to proceed      with the  case for trial, where the      materials     collected      during      investigation are  to be translated      into  legal   evidence,  The  trial      conclusion solely  on the  evidence      adduced during  the trial;  and  it      cannot rely on the investigation or      the result  thereof. Since  this is      law,   elementary    principle   of      criminal law, we need not dilate on      this point ."      The High  Court  was,  therefore,  fully  justified  in commenting upon  the trial  court’s impermissible  and undue reliance on  the evidence of DW 3 and , for that matter, the result  of  his  investigation  .  Incidentally  it  may  be mentioned  that   ignoring  the   report  of   investigation submitted by the Inspector the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences  alleged against  the appellants  and committed the case  to the  court of  Session. There  are other patent infirmities in  the judgment of the trial Court to which the High Court  has adverted  but in case any reason given by us for this  comment of  ours creates an unconscious impression upon the trial Court, we refrain from doing so.      We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and dismiss it. Before  parting with   this  judgment we  would like  to observe that  in complying  with the  directions of the High Court, the  trial Court  should not be in any way influenced by any  observation made  by the  High  Court  touching  the merits of the case.