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PETITIONER: KANWAR LAL GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AMAR NATH CHAWLA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/10/1974

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1975 AIR  308            1975 SCR  (2) 269  1975 SCC  (3) 646  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC 349  (32)  O          1975 SC2299  (113,119,120,249,490,493,495,4  RF         1981 SC1068  (9)  D          1985 SC1133  (2,3,6,8,14,17,21)  RF         1987 SC1577  (21)

ACT: Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) ss. 77(1)  and 123(6)-Expenses   incurred by party sponsoring candidate  in excess  of  the  prescribed  limit-If  and  when  a  corrupt Practice-Reform of election law suggested.

HEADNOTE: Section 77(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, provides  that every candidate at an election shall,  either by  himself  or by his election agent, keep a  separate  and correct  account of all expenditure, in connection with  the election,  incurred or authorised by him or by his  election agent   between   the  date  of  the  publication   of   the notification   calling   the  election  and  the   date   of declaration of result thereof, both dates inclusive; and  s. 77(3) gays that the total of the said expenditure shall  not exceed such amount as may be prescribed. The  objects of enacting a ceiling on the expenditure  which may legitimately be incurred in connection with an  election are : (a)It should be open to any individual or to any political party, however small, to be able to contest an election on a footing  of equality with any other individual or  political party,  however  rich and well financed it may  be,  and  no individual  or political party should be able to  secure  an advantage  over others by reason of its  superior  financial strength.   The democratic process can function  efficiently and  effectively,  for the benefit of the  common  good  and reach out the benefits of self-government to the common  man only  if it brings about a participatory democracy in  which every  man, howsoever lowly or humble he may be,  should  be able  to participate on a footing of equality  with  others. Now  money.  plays  an  important  part  in  the  successful prosecution of an election campaign by buying  advertisement and canvassing facilities, by providing the means for  quick and  speedy communications and movements  and  sophisticated

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campaign  techniques,  and also by the  employment  of  paid workers  where  volunteers  are found  to  be  insufficient. Therefore,  if one political party or individual has  larger resources  available  to it than another  the  former  would certainly, under the present system of conducting elections, have an advantage over the latter in the electoral  process. [265C-F] (b)The  other  objective  of limiting  expenditure  is  to eliminate, as far as possible, the influence of big money in electoral  process.  If there were no limit  on  expenditure political   parties   would  go  all  out   for   collecting contributions and obviously the largest contributions  would be  from  the  rich and the affluent who  constitute  but  a fraction of the electorate.  It is likely that some  elected representatives would tend to share the views of the wealthy supporters  of  their  political party,  either  because  of shared  background  and  association,  increased  access  or subtle influenceswhich condition their thinking.  In such an event, the result would be that thouostensibly       the political  parties  which  receive  such  contributions  may profess  an   ideology acceptable to the  common  man,  they would  in effect and substance be the representatives  of  a certain  economic  class, and their policies  and  decisions would  be  shaped by the interests of that  economic  class. Persons   of   a  particular  class   who   have   exclusive governmental  power, even if they tried to act  objectively, would  tend  to overlook the interests of other  classes  or view those interests differently.  To this natural  tendency may  be  added  the fact that  office  bearers  and  elected representatives  may  quite  possibly  be  inclined,  though unconsciously and imperceptibly, to espouse the policies and decisions  that  will attract  campaign  contributions  from affluent  individuals  and  groups.   Preelection  donations would be Rely to operate as post-election promises resulting ultimately  in  the casualty of the interest of  the  common man.   The  small  man’s chance is  the  essence  of  Indian democracy   and   that   would  be   stultified   if   large contributions  from rich and affluent individuals or  groups are not divorced from the electoral process. [266E-F, 267C-D, E-F, G-H] 2-M255SupCII75 260 Under s, 123(6) not only is the incurring of expenditure  in excess  of the prescribed limit a corrupt practice but  also the  authorising  of such expenditure.  Authorising  may  be implied or express, and whether a particular expenditure wag impliedly authorised by the candidate would depend upon  the facts  and circumstances of each case as appearing from  the evidence adduced before the court. [264H-265B] The reasonable interpretation of the provision, which  would carry  out  its  object  and  intendment  and  suppress  the mischief  and advance the remedy by purifying  the  election process  and  ridding  it  of  the  pernicious  and  baneful influence of big money, is, that the legislature could never have  intended that what the individual candidate cannot  do the  political  parties sponsoring him, or his  friends  and supporters,  should be free to do.  When a  political  party sponsoring  a candidate incurs expenditure  specifically  in connection  with his election, as distinguished from  expen- diture  on  general  party  propaganda,  and  the  candidate knowingly  takes  advantage  of it or  participates  in  the programme or activity or consents to it or acquiesces in it, it   would   be  reasonable  to  infer,  save   in   special circumstances,  that he impliedly authorised  the  political party  to incur such expenditure; and he cannot  escape  the

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rigors  of  the ceiling by saying that he has  not  incurred expenditure but big political party has done so.  The  party candidate does not stand apart from his political party  and if the political party does not want its candidate to  incur the  disqualification  it  must exercise  control  over  the expenditure which may be incurred by it directly to  promote the  poll prospects of the candidate.  The same  proposition must  hold good in case of expenditure incurred  by  friends and  supporters directly in connection with the election  of the  candidate.   If a candidate were to be subject  to  the limitation of the ceiling but the political party sponsoring him or his friends’ and supporters were to be free to  spend as  much as they like in connection with his  election,  the object of imposing a ceiling would be completely  frustrated and  the  beneficent provision enacted in  the  interest  of purity  and genuineness of the democratic process  would  be wholly emasculated. [268A-F] Ranajaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh & Ors. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 671, Ram  Dayal  v.  Brijraj Singh & Ors. [1970]  1  S.C.R.  530, Magraj Patodia v. R. K. Birla & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R. 118 and B.  Rajagopala  Rao v. N. G. Ranga, A.I.R.  1971  S.C.  266, referred to. In the present case, the first respondent’s election to  the Lok  Sabha  was  challenged by  the  petitioner  on  various grounds, one of which wag that the first respondent incurred or authorised expenditure in excess of the prescribed  limit of  Rs.  10,000  in contravention of  s.  77  and  committed corrupt practice under s. 123(6).  The High Court  dismissed the election petition. Allowing the appeal to this Court, Held  :  (1)  The  total expenditure  proved  to  have  been incurred or authorised by the first respondent exceeded  the prescribed  limit and therefore his election should  be  set aside on the ground of corrupt practice defined in s. 123(6) [316F] (a)A   chart  was  furnished  to  the  petitioner   giving information  as  to  the  dates and  places  of  the  public meetings  held in connection with the election of the  first respondent and the names of the speakers who spoke at  those public meetings.  This chart was prepared in compliance with the directions of the trial court from the official  records in  the possession of the I.G. of Police.  Therefore  it  is relevant and admissible in evidence under the first part  of s.  35  of the Evidence Act.  Though it is a  weak  type  of evidence,   and  standing  by  itself  cannot  be   regarded sufficient  to establish the holding of a public meeting  by the   first  respondent,  it  can  be  relied  upon   as   a corroborative  piece  of evidence which  may  be  considered along  with other evidence in the case.  The  oral  evidence thug  corroborated,  disclosed that in addition  to  the  23 public meetings admitted by the first respondent, 9  further public  meetings were held on big behalf at various  places. The first respondent not only suppressed the expenditure  on these   nine  additional  public  meetings,  but,  also   he suppressed  the real expenditure on the admitted  23  public meetings. [281G-282C, G-283A, 293A-C, 301A-B] (b)If  the  Court comes to the conclusion that’ an  item  of expenditure  has been suppressed in the return  of  election expenses, the mere fact that there is no sufficient evidence about the amount that must have been spent is no ground  for ignoring  the matter.  It is the duty of the Court to  asses all expenses as best as it 26 1 can  though  the court should not enter into the  region  of speculation or merely try to guess the amount that must have

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been spent.  Generally it would be possible to arrive at  an amount of expenditure on a conservative basis, and where  it is  possible to arrive at such an estimate,  such  estimated amount  should be held as not shown by the candidate in  his election account. [300E-G] Magraj  Patodia v. R. K. Birla & Ors. [1971] 2 S.C.R.  11  8 and P. C. P. Reddiar v.  S.  Perumal,  [1972] 2  S.C.R.  646 referred to. (c)The   first  respondent  owned  the  responsibility   for expenses  in respect of the 23 public meetings  admitted  by him.   He  also admitted in his evidence that he  "bore  the expenses  of all the election meetings in my  constituency". Therefore,  there  is  no scope for the  argument  that  the expenses  of any of these additional 9 public meetings  were met  by any Organisation or individual other than the  first respondent.   Even  if the expenses of some  of  these  nine public  meetings  were  incurred  by  the  District  Pradesh Congress Committee or any other branch of the Congress orga- nisation  which sponsored his candidature, or by  any  other friend or supporter, such expenses must be held to have been authorised  by  the first respondent because,  he  knowingly took  advantage of such public meetings by participating  in them  and consented to, or at any rate, acquiesced  in  such expenses. [292E-H] (2)It  is  not  uncommon to find  that  during  elections, posters and handbills are printed without complying with the requirement  of  section  127A,  and  sometimes   containing scandalous  material about rival candidates.   There  should therefore be some independent semi-judicial  instrumentality set  up  by law, which would immediately  investigate,  even while the election fever is on and propaganda and canvassing are  in progress and the evidence is raw and fresh, how  the offending  handbills and posters have come  into  existence. [314A-D] Rahim  Khan  v.  Khurshid Ahmed & Ors.  C.A.  816  of  1973, decided on August 8, 1974, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil.  Appeal No.  1549  of 1972. Appeal from the Judgment & Order dated the 19th May, 1972 of the Delhi High Court in E.P. No. 2 of 1971. S.   N.  Marwaha,  A.  K  Marwaha and K.  C.  Dua,  for  the appellant. M.   N.  Phadke,  V.  P. Nanda, N. S. Dass Bahl  and  D.  N. Mishra, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI,  J.-The controversy in this appeal relates to  the validity  of  election  to  the Lok  Sabha  from  the  Sadar Parliamentary Constituency in the Union Territory of  Delhi. Eleven candidates originally offered themselves for election from  this constituency but out of them six  withdrew  their candidature  with the result that only five remained in  the field as contesting candidates.  They were the petition  and respondents.   Nos.  1 to 4. The petitioner was put up as  a candidate  by  the Jan Sangh, while the candidature  of  the first  respondent ’Was sponsored by the Congress,  which  at that time, on account of the split in the Organisation,  was known   as  the  ruling  Congress  or  the   new   Congress. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were independent candidates.  Though there  were nominally five candidates, the real contest  was between  the  petitioner  and  the  first  respondent.   The polling took place on 5th March, 1971 and the result of  the

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poll  was  declared  on 11th March,  1971.   The  petitioner secured 55305 votes, while the first 262 respondent  polled 98108 votes.  The first  respondent  thus won  by  a  large majority and was  declared  elected.   The petitioner thereupon filed an election petition  challenging the  validity  of the election of the  first  respondent  on various grounds.  The election petition was contested by the first  respondent  and,  as the voluminous  mass  of  record shows, it was fought out to a bitter and with great industry and  thoroughness on both sides.  Mr. Justice Andley of  the Delhi High Court, who heard the election petition, found  in an elaborate judgment that none of the grounds on which  the election was sought to be invalidated was established and he accordingly dismissed the election petition with costs.  The present  appeal  preferred by the  petitioner  impugns  this judgment of Mr. Justice Andley. The  election petition was based on numerous  grounds  which were summarised in paragraphs and subsequently elaborated in paragraphs  12, 14, 18 to 21 and 24 to 26.  The  ground  set out in paragraph 12 was that the elector rolls, on the basis of  which  the election had been held,  were  imperfect  and defective,  and  that vitiated the election.   Paragraph  14 alleged  the invalidity of the amendment in rule 56  of  the Conduct  of  Election Rules 1961 and paragraphs  18  and  19 challenged  the validity of the election on the ground  that about a Jac or more ballot papers, which had been chemically treated,   were   fraudulently  introduced  and   that   had materially affected the result of the election.  The  charge in  paragraphs 20 and 21 was that the first  respondent  was guilty  of corrupt practice, in that the  first  respondent, his  election  agent  and other persons  with  his  consent, including the first respondent, had printed and published  a handbill  and a poster containing statements in relation  to the  personal character or conduct of the  petitioner  which ware false and which the first respondent did not believe to be  true, and which were reasonably calculated to  prejudice the  prospects of the petitioner’s election.   Paragraph  24 also  charged a similar corrupt practice on  the  allegation that  these  statements were repeated by the first  and  the fifth  respondents  in public meetings as  also  during  the course  of  canvassing.   And  lastly,  it  was  alleged  in paragraphs 25 and 26 that the first respondent had  incurred or authorised expenditure in excess of the prescribed  limit of  Rs.  10,000  in  contravention  of  section  77  of  the Representation of the People Act, 1951.  These were  broadly the  grounds on which the election of the  first  respondent was sought to be declared void by the petitioner. Though  the first, second and fifth respondents filed  their respective  written  statements,  the contest  was  only  on behalf  of  the  first and fifth  respondents.   The  second respondent  supported  the  petitioner  :  his  support  was however  not of much value since he did not take any  active part  in the petition.  Respondents 3 and 4  were  obviously not interested in the petition and they did not even care to appear  or file any written statement.  The first and  fifth respondents  raised  in  their  written  statements  certain preliminary   objections   and  also  denied   the   various allegations  made in the petition and contested the  grounds on which the petitioner claimed to set aside the election of the  first respondent.  We shall deal with the  contents  of these written statements a little later when we examine  the specific charges leveled against 26 3 the  first respondent.  Suffice it to state for the  present

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that  on the basis of the preliminary objections  raised  in the written statements, the learned Trial Judge framed  four preliminary  issues and they were decided by an order  dated 6th August, 1971.  So far as the first preliminary issue  is concerned,  the learned Trial Judge held that paragraphs  9, 12,  18  to  21 and 24 to 26 did not  suffer  from  lack  of concise  statement of material facts, but they did not  give full  particulars  of  the allegations  and  he  accordingly directed the petitioner to furnish further particulars  with respect  to paragraphs 18 to 21, 24 and 25 as  specified  in the  schedule  to  the order.  The  second  and  the  fourth preliminary  issues do not survive for consideration :  they were decided against the petitioner and the petitioner  does not challenge the decision in appeal.  The third preliminary issue was decided in favour of the petitioner but it is  now meaningless  to  discuss it because the  petitioner  is  not pressing  the  ground  set out in paragraphs 18  and  19  in support of the appeal. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 6th August, 1971,  the petitioner   furnished   particulars  of   the   allegations contained in paragraphs 18 to 21, 24 and 25 by an  affidavit dated  19th August, 1971.  A reply to these particulars  was given  by  the first respondent on 26th  August,  1971.   We shall  have occasion to refer to these particulars  and  the reply made to them when we examine the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties. The learned Trial Judge then framed issues on the merits  by an order dated 3rd September, 1971.  Issues 1 to 7 of  these issues relate to the ground set out in paragraphs 18 and 19. It is not necessary to refer to them since they were decided against  the petitioner by the learned Trial Judge  and  the correctness  of this decision is not assailed on  behalf  of the  petitioner in the present appeal.  Issue 8  raised  the question  whether the first respondent, his  election  agent and  other persons with the consent of the first  respondent or  his  election  agent  committed  the  corrupt  practices charged in paragraphs 20 and 21 and Issue 9 raised a similar question  in  regard  to the corrupt practices  set  out  in paragraph 24.  The question whether the first respondent in- curred or authorised expenditure in excess of the prescribed limit  of  Rs. 10,000/- in contravention of  section  77  as alleged  in  paragraph  25, was put in issue  in  Issue  10. Issues 11, 12 and 13 raised certain subsidiary questions but it appears from the judgment of the learned Trial Judge that they  were not pressed by the learned Advocate appearing  on behalf  of the petitioner before the Trial Court.   We  need not,  therefore, spend any time on these issues.   The  last issue  was  issue 14 which was directed  against  the  fifth respondent  who  was  alleged  to  have  committed   corrupt practices. There was enormous oral as well as documentary evidence  led on  behalf of both sides.  This evidence  discloses  certain curious  and  unusual features to which we shall  advert  in course of time, but there can be no doubt that it  evidences very careful and thorough preparation of the case on  either side.   Not an inch of ground appears to have been  conceded by  one  side to the other and every move in this  long  and bitter  contest, from one side or the other, seems  to  have been well thought 264 out and relentlessly pursued.  The learned Trial Judge, on a consideration of the evidence presented before him, came  to the conclusion that issues 8, 9 and 10 were not  established by  the petitioner and there was also no satisfactory  proof in  regard to issue 14 and accordingly, by a judgment  dated

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19th  May, 1972 he rejected the charges of corrupt  practice against  the first and fifth respondents and  dismissed  the election   petition  with  costs.   The   petitioner   being aggrieved  by  the  judgment  of  the  learned  Trial  Judge preferred  the  present appeal under section 116  A  of  the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The  petitioner assailed the correctness of the judgment  of the learned Trial Judge only on issues 8, 9, 10 and 14.  The judgment, in so far as it related to issues 1 to 7 and 11 to 13 was accepted by the petitioner and it is, therefore,  not necessary  to refer to the facts in so far as they bear  on, those  issues.  We shall confine ourselves only to  such  of the  facts  as are relevant to issues 8, 9, 10  and  14  and instead  of  setting  them out in a  narrative  form  before commencing  discussion of the arguments, what we propose  to do  is to refer to the relevant facts while discussing  each particular  issue.  We shall.proceed in the order  in  which these issues were argued before us. We  first  take up issue 10.  The charge against  the  first respondent  under  this  issue  was  that  be  incurred   or authorised expenditure in excess of the prescribed limit  of Rs.  10,000  in  contravention of  section  77  and  thereby committed the corrupt practice defined in section 123(6)  of the  Act.   Section 123 sets out various  corrupt  practices which have the effect of invalidating an election and one of them  is  the incurring or authorising  the  expenditure  in contravention  of section 77 : vide sub-section  (6).   Sub- section (1) of section 77 provides that "every candidate  at an  election  shall, either by himself or  by  his  election agent,   keep  a  separate  and  correct  account   of   all expenditure  in  connection with the  election  incurred  or authorised  by  him or by his. election agent,  between  the date of publication of the notification calling the election and  the  date of declaration of the  result  thereof,  both dates inclusive", while sub-section (3) says that "the total of the said expenditure shall not exceed such amount as  may be  prescribed."  It was common ground between  the  parties that   the  expenditure  prescribed  for   a   parliamentary constituency in the Union Territory of Delhi was Rs. 10,000. The first respondent and his election agent were, therefore, prohibited  by  section  77 from  incurring  or  authorising expenditure  in connection with his election  exceeding  Rs. 10,000,  and if the first respondent or his  election  agent incurred  or  authorised such expenditure in excess  of  Rs. 10,000, it would be a corrupt practice voiding his  election under section 123(6).  The question which, therefore, arises for  consideration  is whether the first respondent  or  his election   agent  incurred  or  authorised  expenditure   in connection with his election exceeding Rs. 10,000. Now,  before we proceed to discuss the evidence  bearing  on this question, we must clear the ground by pointing out that not only is the incurring of excessive expenditure a corrupt practice, but also the authorising of such expenditure,  and authorising  may be implied as well as express.   Where  the authorising is express, there is no difficulty    265 in bringing home the charge of corrupt practice against  the candidate  But  a somewhat difficult question on  facts  may arise  where  the charge is sought to be proved against  the candidate  on  the  basis  that  the  impliedly   authorised excessive expenditure.  Whether a particular expenditure was impliedly  authorised  by the candidate must depend  on  the facts  and circumstances of each case as appearing from  the evidence  adduced  before the Court.   This  question  Would arise in a challenging form where expenditure in  connection

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with the election is incurred, not by the candidate, but  by the  political party which has sponsored him or his  friends and supporters.  Can the limit on the expenditure be  evaded by  the candidate by not spending any moneys of his own  but leaving  it  to  the  political party  or  his  friends  and supporters  to spend an amount far in excess of tHe limit  ? The object of the prevision limiting the expenditure is two- fold.   In the first place, it should be open to  individual or  any  political  party, howsoever small, to  be  able  to contest an election on a footing of equality with any  other individual  or  political  party, howsoever  rich  and  well financed  it  may be, and no individual or  political  party should be able to secure an advantage over others by  reason of  its  superior  financial strength.   It  can  hardly  be disputed  that  the way elections are held in  our  country, money  is bound to play an important part in the  successful prosecution of an election campaign.  Money supplies "assets for  advertising and other forms of  political  solicitation that increases the candidate’s exposure to the public."  Not only  can  money buy advertising and  canvassing  facilities such  as hoardings, posters, handbills, brochures  etc.  and all the other paraphernalia of an election campaign, but  it can   also   provide  the  means  for   quick   and   speedy communications  and  movements  and  sophisticated  campaign techniques  and  is also "a substitute for energy"  in  that paid  workers can be employed where volunteers are found  to be  insufficient.   The  availability of  large  funds  does ordinarily tend to increase the number of votes a  candidate will  receive.   If,  therefore,  one  political  party   or individual has larger resources available to it than another individual  or political party, the former would  certainly, under  the present system of conducting elections,  have  an advantage  over  the latter in the electoral  process.   The former  would have a significantly greater  opportunity  for the propagation of its programme while the latter may not be able  to make even an effective presentation of  its  views. The  availability of disproportionately larger resources  is also  likely to lend itself to misuse or abuse for  securing to  the  political  party or individual  possessed  of  such resources,  undue advantage over other political parties  or individuals.   Douglas points out in his book called  Ethics in  Government  at  page  72, "if  one  party  ever  attains overwhelming  superiority in money, newspaper  support,  and (government)  patronage,  it  will  be  almost   impossible, barring  an economic collapse, for it ever to be  defeated." This  produces anti-democratic effects in that  a  political party or individual backed by the affluent and wealthy would be able to secure a greater representation than a  political party or individual who is without any links with  affluence or  wealth.   This would result  in  serious  discrimination between  one political party or individual and  another  on the  basis  of money power and that in its turn  would  mean that "some voters are denied an ’equal’ 266 voice and some candidates are denied an "equal chance".   It is elementary that each and every citizen has an inalienable right  to full and effective participation in the  political process  of  the legislatures and this  requires  that  each citizen should have equally effective voice in the  election of  the  members  of the legislatures.  That  is  the  basic requirement  of  the  Constitution.   This  equal  effective voice--equal  opportunity of participation in the  electoral process-would be denied if affluence and wealth are to  tilt the scales in favour of one political party or individual as against  another.   The  democratic  process  can   function

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efficiently  and effectively for the benefit of  the  common good  and reach out the benefits of self-government  to  the common man only if it brings about a participatory democracy in  which  every man, howsoever lowly or humble he  may  be, should be able to participate on a footing of equality  with others.   Individuals  with grievances, men and  women  with ideas  and vision are the sources of any society’s power  to improve  itself.   Government  by consent  means  that  such individuals must eventually be able to find groups that will work  with them and must be able to make their voices  heard in  these  groups  and no group  should  be  insulated  from competition and criticism.  It is only by the maintenance of such  conditions that democracy can thrive and  prosper  and this  can be ensured only by limiting the expenditure  which may  be incurred in connection with elections, so  that,  as far as possible, no one single political party or individual can  have unfair advantage over the other by reason  of  its larger  resources  and  the resources  available  for  being utilised  in  the electoral process  are  within  reasonable bounds  and not unduly disparate and the  electoral  contest becomes evenly matched.  Then alone the small man will  come into   his   own  and  will  be  able   to   secure   proper representation in our legislative bodies. The other objective of limiting expenditure is to  eliminate as  far  as  possible, the influence of  big  money  in  the electoral  process.  If there were no limit on  expenditure, political   parties   would  go  all  out   for   collecting contributions and obviously the largest contributions  would be from the rich and affluent who constitute but a  fraction of  the electorate.  The pernicious influence of  big  money would   then  play  a  decisive  role  in  controlling   the democratic  process in the country.  This  would  inevitably lead  to the worst form of political corruption and that  in its  wake  is bound to produce other vices  at  all  levels. This  danger  has been pointed out in telling words  in  the following passage from the notes in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 66, p. 1260:               "A  less  debatable  objective  of  regulating               campaign funds is the elimination of dangerous               financial  pressures  on  elected   officials.               Even if contributions are not motivated by  an               expected  return  in  political  favours,  the               legislator cannot overlook the effects of  his               decisions on the sources of campaign funds." It is difficult to generalise about the degree of  influence which  the  large  contributors may  wield  in  shaping  the policies  and  decisions of the political party  which  they finance.   It is-widely acknowledged, however, that, at  the very  least, they would have easy access to the leaders  and representatives  of  the political party.  But it  would  be naive to suggest 267 that the influence ends with mere access.  It may safely  be assumed that hardly any politicians "would consciously  sell their  votes"  ; the result may be nearly the same,  if  one accepts  Herbert Alexander’s analysis of the subtle  factors that influence a political party’s actions :                     "Many   politicians-who  do  what   they               honestly think is               right,  never  realize  that  they  are   mere               spokesmen  for their financial supporters.   A               legislator can avoid a Conflict of interest by               investing  in government bonds, but he  cannot               chance  the  conditioning that  leads  him  to               believe  that  what  is good  for  his  former

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             company  or  present backers is good  for  the               country." It is likely that some elected representatives would tend to share the views of the wealthy supporters of their political party, either because of shared background and associations, increased access or subtle influences which condition  their thinking.   In  such event the result would be  that  though ostensibly   the  political  Parties  which   receive   such contributions may profess an ideology acceptable to the com- mon   man,   they   would  in  effect   and   substance   be representative  of  a  certain  economic  class  and   their policies  and decisions would be shaped by the interests  of that  economic class.  It was over a hundred years ago  that John Stuart Mill observed that persons of a particular class who  have exclusive governmental power, even if they try  to act  objectively,  will tend to overlook  the  interests  of other classes, or view those interests differently.  And  to this  natural  tendency may be added the  fact  that  office bearers  and elected representatives may quite  possibly  be inclined, though unconsciously and imperceptibly, to espouse policies   and   decisions-that   will   attract    campaign contributions from affluent individuals and groups.  It  was said  if  the  electoral process in  the  United  States  of America  : "Members of the Rockefeller and Du Pont  families invest  in  the election of a Republican  President  because they  sense that if that party takes over the  White  House, their interests will gain more sympathetic attention-"  "The central objective of contributions is access to the power of the elected official-" "For a gift of a few hundred  dollars an  individual  may gain, in return, the intercession  of  a Congressman  that  will get him a government contract  or  a tariff  provision that will ultimately net him or his  busi- ness tens of thousands of dollars." It is obvious that  pre- election  donations  would  be likely to  operate  as  post- election  promises resulting ultimately in the  casualty  of the  interest of the common man, not so much  ostensibly  in the legislative process as in the implementation of laws and administrative or policy decisions.  The small man’s  chance is  the  essence  of  Indian democracy  and  that  would  be stultified  if  large contributions from rich  and  affluent individuals  or groups are not divorced from  the  electoral process.   It  is for this reason that our  Legislators,  in their wisdom, enacted a coiling on the expenditure which may legitimately  be  incurred in connection with  an  election. This background must inform the court in the  interpretation of this vital and significant provision in the election  law of our country. 268 Now, if a candidate were to be subject to the limitation  of the  ceiling, but the political party sponsoring him or  his friends  and supporters were to be free to spend as much  as they  like  in connection with his election, the  object  of imposing the coiling would be completely frustrated and  the beneficent  provision enacted in the interest of purity  and genuineness  of  the  democratic  process  would  be  wholly emasculated.   The  mischief sought to be remedied  and  the evil sought to be suppressed would enter the political arena with  redoubled force and vitiate the political life of  the country.  The great democratic ideal of social, economic and political  justice  and equality of status  and  opportunity enshrined  in the Preamble of our constitution would  remain merely  a distant dream eluding our grasp.  The  legislators could never have intended that what the individual candidate cannot do, the political party sponsoring him or his friends and  supporters  should  be free to do.   That  is  why  the

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legislature  wisely interdicted not only the  incurring  but also  the authorising of excessive expenditure by  a  candi- date.   When  the  political party  sponsoring  a  candidate incurs  expenditure  in  connection with  his  election,  as distinguished from expenditure on general party  propaganda, and  the  candidate  knowingly  takes  advantage  of  it  or participates  in the programme or activity or fails to  dis- avow the expenditure or consents to it or acquiesces in. it, would   be   reasonable   to   infer,   save,   in   special circumstances,  that he impliedly authorised  the  political party  to  incur such expenditure and he cannot  escape  the rigour of the ceiling by saying that he has not incurred the expenditure,  but his political party has done so.  A  party candidate does not stand apart from his political party  and if the political party does not want the candidate to  incur the  disqualification,  it must exercise  control  over  the expenditure which may be incurred by it directly to  promote the  poll prospects of the candidate.  The same  proposition must  also  hold  good in case of  expenditure  incurred  by friends  and  supporters  directly in  connection  with  the election  of  the candidate.  This is  the  only  reasonable interpretation  of the provision which would carry  out  its object and intendment and suppress the mischief and  advance the remedy by purifying our election process and ridding  it of the pernicious and baneful influence of big money.   This is  in  fact what the law in England has  achieved.   There, every  person, on pain of criminal penalty, is, required  to obtain  authority  from the candidate before  incurring  any political expenditure on his behalf.  The candidate is given complete  discretion  in authorising  expenditure  upto  his limit.  If expenditure made with the knowledge and  approval of the candidate exceeds the limit or if the candidate makes a false report of the expenditure after the election, he  is subject  not only to criminal penalties, but also to  having his  election voided.  It may be contended that  this  would considerably  inhibit  the electoral campaign  of  political parties.   But  we do not think so. in the  first  place,  a political party is free to incur any expenditure it likes on its general party propaganda though, of course, in this area also some limitative ceiling is eminently desirable  coupled with  filing  of  return  of  expenses  and  an  independent machinery to investigate and take action.  It is only  where expenditure  is  incurred which can be identified  with  the election of a given candidate that it would be liable to  be added  to  the  expenditure  of  that  candidate  as   being impliedly authorised by him.  Secondly, 269 if  there is continuous community involvement  in  political administration  punctuated  by  activated  phases  of  well- discussed  choice of candidates by popular participation  in the  process of nomination, much of unnecessary  expenditure which  is  incurred today could  be  avoided.   Considerable distance  may  not  have to be traveled  by  candidates  and supports   nor  hidden  skeletons  in  political   cupboards tactically  uncovered, propagandist marijuana  ’  skillfully administered,  temptations of office strategically held  out nor  violent demonstrations disruptiveness  attempted.   The dawn-to-dawn  multiple  speeches and  monster  rallies,  the flood  of  posters  and  leaflets  and  the  organising   of transport  and  other arrangements for large  numbers  would become  otiose.  Large campaign funds would not be  able  to influence the decision of the electors if the selection  and election   of  candidates  becomes  people’s   decision   by discussion  and not a Hobson’s choice offered  by  Political parties.   Limiting  election expenses must be part  of  the

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political process. This view, which we are taking, does not run counter to  any earlier  decisions  of this Court.  The  first  decision  to which we must refer in this connection is Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh & Ors.(1). There the corrupt practice charged against  the elected candidate was that certain persons  who were  in  employment  of  his  father  worked  for  him   in connection  with the election and their number exceeded  the maximum   number  of  persons  who  could  be  employed   in connection  with the election as specified in Sch.  VI  read with  section 77.  This charge was negatived by a  Bench  of five judges of this Court.  The Bench held that in order  to attract  the  inhibition  of the relevant  sections  it  was necessary  that the employment of persons other than  or  in addition  to  those  specified in Sch.  VI should  be  by  a candidate  or his agent and since in that case, the  persons who  worked  in connection with the  election  were  neither employed nor paid by the elected candidate or his agent, the prohibitory  requirement  of section 77  read  with  section 123(7) was not breached.  It will be seen that this decision was  concerned primarily with the question whether  servants of  the father of the elected candidate, who worked for  the elected  candidate  in connection with  the  election,  were liable  to be taken into account in determining whether  the maximum number of persons who may be employed for payment in connection with the election were exceeded.  It is no  doubt true  that  this  Court observed  that  no  expenditure  was incurred  by the elected candidate over and above  what  was shown in his return of expenses and he could not, therefore, be  said  to have concealed such expenditure, but  that  was obviously  because  those persons who worked  in  connection with  the election wore not paid by him.  This Court had  no occasion to consider whether the elected candidate should be said to have authorised any expenditure by knowingly  taking advantage of the services of these persons, because no  such argument  was advanced before this Court.  In fact  such  an argument  could  not  plausibly  be  advanced  because   the salaries  paid by the father to these persons were  not  for the purpose of working in connection with the election.  The (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 671. 270 salaries were paid because they were servants in the regular employment of the father and it was merely at the request of the  father that "they assisted the son in  connection  with the  election which strictly speaking they were not  obliged to do".  This decision does not, therefore, run contrary  to what we have said. We  may  then refer to the decision of this  Court  ill  Ram Dayal  v. Brijraj Singh & Ors.(1) The question  which  arose for   consideration  in  that  case  was   whether   certain expenditure  incurred  by the Maharaja of  Gwalior  and  the Rajmata  in connection with the election of  Brijraj  ’Singh was  liable to be included in his election expenses.   Shah, J., <as he then was) speaking on behalf of a )Division Bench of  two  judges,  pointed out that in  the  absence  of  any connection  between the canvassing activities carried on  by the Maharaja and the Rajmata with the candidature of Brijraj Singh,  it  is impossible to hold that any  expenditure  was incurred for Briraj Singh which was liable to be included in his election expenses.  The learned Judge then proceeded  to add               "  We agree with the High Court that under  s.               77(1)   only  the  expenditure   incurred   or               authorised by the candidate himself or by  his               election  agent is required to be included  in

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             the account or return of election expenses and               thus  expenses incurred by any other agent  or               person  without  any thing more  need  not  be               included  in  the account or return;  as  such               incurring  of  expenditure  would  be   purely               voluntary." (Emphasis supplied) These  observations  would  show  that  mere  incurring   or expenditure  by  any  other person in  connection  with  the election  of a candidate, without something more, would  not make it an expenditure authorised by the candidate.  But  if there is something more which can reasonably lend itself  to the inference of implied authorisation, particularly  having regard  to  the  object  and  intendment  of  the  provision limiting  expenditure, the Court would readily draw such  an inference because the paramount object of this provision  is to bring about, as far as possible, equality in availability of  resources and eliminate the corrupting influence of  big money.   If-  is significant to note that in this  case  the Court  proceeded  to  examine  whether  the  evidence was sufficient to establish that Brijraj Singh traveled with the Maharaja in his helicopter and visited several villages  for his  election campaign ,and held that the evidence  in  this connection  was not reliable.  This inquiry would have  been wholly unnecessary unless the Court was of the view that  if Brijraj  Singh  could be shown to have travelled  ’With  the Maharaja  in his helicopter and visited several villages  in connection  with  his  election  campaign,  that  would   be sufficient  to  invest  the  expenditure  incurred  by   the Maharaja   with  the  character  of  expenditure   impliedly authorised  by Brijraj Singh.  This decision, therefore  far from contradicting the view taken by us, actually supports. We find the same view taken by this Court in the  subsequent decision  in Magraj Patodia v. R. K.  Birla & Ors.(2)  There also Hegde, J., (1)  [1970] 1 S.C.R. 530. (2) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 11 8. 271 speaking  on  behalf  of a Division  Bench  of  two  judges; observed;,  after  referring to the decisions  in  Rananjaya Singh  v.  Baijnath Singh, & Ors. (supra) and Ram  Dayal  v. Brijraj Singh & Ors. (supra)               "This  Court as well as the High  Courts  have               taken the view that the expenses incurred by a               political  party to advance the  prospects  of               the  candidates put up by it, without more  do               not fall within s. 77." (emphasis supplied). The  same view was reiterated again by a Division  Bench  of two  judges  of  this Court in B. Rayagopala Rao  v.  N.  C. Ranga.(1)  The question, therefore, in cases of  this  kind always   is  whether  there  is  someting  more  which   may legitimately   give   rise  to  an  inference   of   implied authorisation by a candidate.  What could be that  something more is indicated by us in the proposition formulated above, though  we  must confess that by its very nature it  is  not possible  to  Jay  down the exhaustive  enumeration  of  the circumstances in which that something more may be inferred. With these observations in regard to the scope and ambit  of the  provision limiting expenditure, we may now  proceed  to examine  the  facts  and see whether  the  first  respondent incurred or authorised expenditure exceeding Rs. 10,000/- in connection with his election. The first item of expenditure which we must consider in this connection  relates to expenses incurred in  holding  public meetings  in  connection  with the  election  of  the  first respondent.  The first respondent in the return of  expenses

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filed by him with the District Election Officer showed three amounts  as having been spent by him in connection with  his public  meetings.   One was an amount of Rs. 188/-  paid  to Tandon  Tent & Furniture House for furnishings supplied  for twelve public meetings held between 20th February, 1971  and 2nd  March,,  1971.  This expenditure was supported  by  the bill  of  Tandon Tent & Furniture House, R-25  which  showed that  for each of the twelve public meetings, Tandon Tent  & Furniture House had supplied twenty durris, six takhats  and two chaddars at an aggregate charge of Rs. 15/- per meeting. The other was an amount of Rs. 180/-, which according to the first  respondent,  was  paid to Saini  Electric  Works  for microphone,  loudspeakers and lighting arrangements made  at the same twelve public meetings.  The payment of this amount was sought to be supported by the receipt of Saini  Electric Works,.   R-27  which showed a consolidated  charge  of  Rs. 180/-  "on account of loudspeaker and lighting  arrangements for the period from 20th February, 1971 to 2nd March, 1971". The  third was an amount of Rs. 440/- paid to Aggarwal  Tent House  for  furnishings and electric equipment  supplied  at eleven public meetings and the bill of Aggarwal, Tent  House R-26  for  this amount showed that Aggarwal Tent  House  had supplied  for each public meeting one takhat, four  durries, two  chandanis,  one microphone and four floodlights  for  a total (1)  A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 266. 272 amount  of Rs. 440/- inclusive of Rs. 100/- for cartage  and Rs.  40/for  labour  charges.   The  first  respondent  thus admitted a total number of twenty-three public meetings  and according  to him, the total ,expenditure at each  of  these public  meetings was about Rs. 30/- for furnishings as  well as electric equipment, the aggregate expenditure being  only Rs.800/-. The petitioner challenged this figure of  expendi- ture  given  by the first respondent and contended  that  in addition  to  twenty-three public meetings admitted  by  the first  respondent,  many more public meetings were  held  in connection  with  the election of the first  respondent  and much larger expenditure was incurred in each of these public meetings than what was shown by the first respondent in  the bills  of  Tandon Tent & Furniture House and  Aggarwal  Tent House and the receipt of Saini Electric Works.  The argument of the petitioner was that in fact the first respondent  had held  more than fifty public meetings and at each  of  these public meetings he had incurred expenditure of not less than Rs.  200/-  and  the expenditure incurred  in  these  public meetings  itself  exceeded  the  prescribed  limit  of   Rs. 10,000/-.  The petitioner also urged that a huge meeting was organised  by  the first respondent in connection  with  the election  of  the first respondent at Idgah Road  which  was addressed by the Prime Minister and this meeting alone  cost about Rs. 50,000/- and the ceiling of Rs. 10,000/was clearly exceeded.   These  contentions require a close look  at  the evidence led on behalf of the parties. We  will  first  turn to consider  the  number  of  meetings organised  in  connection  with the election  of  the  first respondent.  The first respondent, no doubt, admitted twenty three public meetings, as indeed he was bound to do in  view of the return of expenses filed by him, but he did not state at  any  time, until he came in the witness  box  after  the closure of the evidence of the petitioner, as to which  were these  twenty three public meetings and when and where  they were  held.   The  petitioner set  out  in  the  particulars regarding paragraphs 20(2) and 24 of the petition, furnished by  him  pursuant to the order of the  learned  Trial  Judge

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dated  6th August, 1971, the dates and places of the  public meetings  where  the  allegations contained  in  the  poster annexure  ’A’  were orally repeated by the first  and  fifth respondents  and  these particulars  included  reference  to several  public  meetings  which did not form  part  of  the twenty  three  public meetings ultimately  admitted  by  the first  respondent, and yet the first respondent did  not  in his  reply to the particulars deny that any of these  public meetings  were hold by the respondent, but merely  contented himself   by  stating  vaguely  and  evasively   that   "the correctness   of  the  statements  made  against   paragraph 20(2)(ii)" was denied.  It is apparent that though more than twenty  three  public  meetings  were  held  by  the   first respondent the first respondent had not yet made up his mind as  to  which twenty three out of these public  meetings  he should admit.  If in fact only twenty three public  meetings were  held and the particulars furnished by  the  petitioner included  other public meetings, the first respondent  would have promptly come out with an assertion that such and  such public  meetings  alleged by the petitioner were  not  held. But  he could not and did not particularise any such  public meetings and deny them. 273 It is also significant to note that when the petitioner in a rather  curious menoeuvre summoned the first  respondent  to produce certain documents, the first respondent stated  that he  did  not  have  any list  of  public  meetings  held  in connection with his election and he did not have any  record showing  "the places where they were held  including  dates, names of the speakers who addressed or were to address" such public meetings.  The first respondent also stated in cross- examination that he had no record with him in support of his statement that there were twenty three public meetings.   It is  rather strange and difficult to believe that  the  first respondent should not have any record of the public meetings held  by him in connection with his election.  If the  first respondent did not have any such record, how could he in his evidence  give with any definiteness or certitude the  dates and  places of the twenty three public meetings admitted  by him.   It is apparent that the first respondent  refused  to produce the record of the public meetings under the  pretext that he did not have any such record, because he did not  at that stage, before the evidence of the petitioner was  fully disclosed  to  him, wish to commit himself to  any  specific public meetings and the record, if produced, would have gone against  him  and showed that many more  than  twenty  three public meetings were held by him.  The non-production of the record  must  result  in an adverse  inference  being  drawn against the first respondent. There  is  also another circumstance which  deserves  to  be noted  at this stage.  The first respondent was summoned  by the  petitioner  to  produce  inter  alia  applications  for permission  to  hold public meetings made by him or  on  his behalf or for his benefit by any of his workers or  election agents  or  other agents and in answer to  this  summons  he stated that he did not make any such application nor was any such  application made on his behalf or for his  benefit  by any of workers, election agents or other agents.  The  first respondent added that Dr. Roshan Lal made "applications  for permission  to  the authorities as President  of  the  Delhi Sadar District Congress Committee". it is obvious from these statements that until this time the first respondent had not thought  out  and formulated his defence in  regard  to  the public meetings.  The first respondent wanted to leave  open an  exit in case the petitioner was able to show  that  more

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than  twenty  three  public  meetings  were  held  and   he, therefore,  deftly and subtly threw out a veiled  suggestion implying  that  the public meetings were held by  the  Delhi Sadar  District  Congress Committee.  This attitude  of  the first  respondent betrays an anxiety to hold back  the  true facts in regard to the public meetings. It  may also be noted that even in the cross-examination  of the  petitioner and his witnesses, the first respondent  did not  put  forward  his case as to which  were  the  specific public meetings held by him in connection with his  election and  which  were  not.  It was only after  the  evidence  on behalf of the petitioner was closed and the first respondent knew  what exactly was the case of the petitioner,  that  he for  the  first time in his evidence  particularised  twenty three  specific  public  meetings  admitted  by  him.   This strategy was adopted obviously with the object that 274 the  twenty  three  public  meetings  named  by  the   first respondent should fit in with the unimpeachable  documentary evidence  which might be produced by the petitioner and  his witnesses and should not be falsified by such evidence. With  these  broad  general  observations  we  now  turn  to consider the oral and documentary evidence in regard to  the public   meetings  of  the  first  respondent.   The   first respondent  in  his evidence admitted the  following  twenty three public meetings and accepted financial  responsibility for them : 1.23-2-71 Malka Ganj      12. 25-2-71Narayan Mark 2.19-2-71 Roshanara Road 13.  15-2-71Chowk Tatu Shah 3.16-2-71 Ghanta Ghar         Bagichi Tatu ShahSubzi Mandi                           14.18-2-71Kasab Pura 4.2-3-71Clock Tower      15.20-2-71  Chowk   Bara    Tooti Subzi Mandi                 16.21-2-71Deputy Ganj 5.   24-2-71   Chhe Tooti in   Paharganj.               17.21-2-71Telewara 6.1-3-71Chowk Chhe Tooti   18. 24-2-71  Teliwara 7.   22-2-71   Chuna Mandi    19.13-2-71Chowk Kishan Ganj 8.   19-2-71   Tel Mandl      20.1-3-71P. Block,     Andha 9.2-3-71  Chowk Lachman Puri                 Mughal 10.  25-2-71   Katra Karim    21.16-2-71K. Block, Andba      Ram Nagar                               Mughal 11.2-3-71Chowk Nimwala       22.23-2-71 Nagia Park    Nabi Karim                          23.24-2-71    In   front   of Birla                            Mills. These  were  the  twenty three public  meetings  for  which, accordign to the first respondent, furnishings and  electric equipment  ware supplied by Tandon Tent &  Furniture  House, Saini Electric Works and Aggarwal Tent House.  The  question is whether any further meetings were held in connection with the  election  of the first respondent.  To  establish  that many  more  public meetings than twenty three were  held  to promote the election prospects of the ’first respondent, the petitioner  led  considerable oral as  well  as  documentary evidence. We  shall presently examine this evidence, but before we  do so. it would be convenient to dispose of two objections of a preliminary nature raised on behalf of the first respondent. The first respondent urged that though the petitioner at one time  contended  that about forty to fifty  public  meetings were  held  in  connection with the election  of  the  first respondent, he did not adhere to this claim in the course of the  arguments before the learned Trial Judge  and  confined his  claim only to nine public meetings in addition  to  the twenty   three  public  meetings  admitted  by   the   first respondent, and therefore, it was not now open to him in the

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present  appeal to contend that any further public  meetings were  held by the first respondent over and above  the  nine claimed before the learned Trial Judge.  This objection  is, however, untenable 275 because  it  is  clear from the  judgment  itself  that  the petitioner  could  not have confined his claim to  the  nine public  meetings referred to by the learned Trial Judge  and the   learned   Trial  Judge  was   obviously   under   some misapprehension  when he made observation to that effect  in the judgment.  Out of these nine public meetings, there were six which were included in the twenty three public  meetings admitted  by the first respondent and if that be so,  it  is difficult  to imagine how the petitioner could have  claimed them  as  being  in addition to these  twenty  three  public meetings.   The petitioner could not possibly have  confined his  claim to these nine public meetings, when out of  them, six were those which were admitted by the first  respondent, and  could not, therefore, be "in addition to  the  admitted public  meetings".  In fact,as the subsequent discussion  in the  judgment  shows,  the  learned  Trial  Judge   actually proceeded  to consider the evidence of the  police  officers and  the  officers  belonging to the CID which  was  led  on behalf of the petitioner for the purpose of proving  various other public meetings in addition to the nine referred to by the learned Trial Judge and held, on a consideration of this evidence, that none of ’these public meetings claimed by the petitioner  was established.  This exercise would have  been wholly unnecessary if the petitioner had given up his  claim in regard to these public meetings and confined his argument only to the nine public meetings referred to by the  learned Trial Judge. It  was  then contended by the first respondent  in  a  last desperate  attempt to thwart an inquiry by this  Court  into the number of public meetings, that the petitioner had given particulars   of  only  thirty  three  public  meetings   in compliance  with the order made by the learned  Trial  Judge dated  6th August, 1971 and it was, therefore, not  open  to him  to claim that any further public meetings were held  by the  first  respondent and his argument should  be  confined only  to the thirty three public meetings specified  in  the particulars.  This argument of the first respondent is  also futile.   It is clear from the particulars furnished by  the petitioner pursuant to the order dated 6th August, 1971 that the  particulars of thirty three public meetings were  given by the petitioner under paragraphs 20(2) (ii) and 24 and not under  paragraph  25  of the petition,  The  petitioner  had alleged  in  paragraphs 20(2) and 24  that  the  allegations contained in the poster annexure ’A’ were orally repeated by the  first and fifth respondents at various public  meetings and   the  petitioner  was,  therefore,  required  to   give particulars of such public meetings.  These particulars were given  by  the  petitioner  specifically  in  reference   to paragraphs 20(2) and 24 and they had nothing to do with  the allegations  in  paragraph 25.  So far as  paragraph  25  is concerned,  the  only particulars which the  petitioner  was required  to furnish were "details of the items or heads  of expenses  incurred by respondent No. 1", and the  petitioner accordingly  gave  items  or heads  of  expenses  under  the heading  "Paragraph 25(1) of the petition".  The  petitioner was not required and did not give particulars of the  public meetings held by the first respondent at which expenses were incurred  or authorised by the first respondent.   There  is nothing,  therefore,  in the particulars  which  debars  the petitioner from agitating as to what was the actual’  number

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of public meetings held by the first respondent. -M255 Sup.  CI/75 276 The  area of Sadar Parliamentary constituency was  comprised within  the jurisdiction of four different police  stations, namely,  Roshanara  Road, Pahargunj,  Subzimandi  and  Sadar Bazar.   The  Station House Officers pasted  at  these  four police  stations  were summoned by the  petitioner  to  give evidence  as regards the public meetings held  within  their respective  jurisdictions.   Khemraj Dutt (P.W. 1)  was  the first  witness called on behalf of the petitioner.   He  was the  Station House Officer at Roshanara Road police  station and he deposed from the records in his possession and  filed a list PW 1/1 showing that two public meetings were held  by the  first respondent within the jurisdiction of his  police station,  one at Nagia Park on 23rd February, 1971  and  the other  near  Birla Mills compounds on 24th  February,  1971. Both these public meetings are included in the twenty  three public meetings admitted by the first respondent and we need not, therefore, dwell on the evidence of this witness. The  next  witness  who  gave  evidence  on  behalf  of  the petitioner  was  Ramesh Chand, Station  House  Officer  from Sadar  Bazar Police Station (P.W. 6).  He prepared from  the records in his possession a list showing the public meetings held  with  in the jurisdiction of his police station  and filed it in court as Ex.  PW 615.  The entries in this  list have  been  the subject matter of  controversy  between  the parties and we ,shall, therefore, refer to these entries  in some detail.  The list was broadly in three parts.  One part expressly  referred  to  public meetings  held  by  the  New Congress,  the  second  part  to  public  meetings  held  by Jansangh  and the third part which was headed  "Others",  to certain  other  public  meetings.  There  wore  nine  public meetings set out in the first part as having been  organised by  the New Congress.  The first eight were those  included in  the twenty three public meetings admitted by  the  first respondent.   The ninth was a public meeting at  Idgah  Road which  was addressed by the Prime Minister.  We  shall  deal with  the  Idgah Road meeting separately as it stands  in  a different category by itself.  We are not concerned with the public  meetings  held  by  the  Jan  Sangh  and  need  not, therefore,  refer  to the second part.  The third  part  was headed "Others" and in this part eight public Meetings  were set  out  as  having  been held  on  different  dates.   The question  which was keenly debated before us was as to  what was the meaning of the heading "Others".  The contention  of the  first respondent was, and that was a  contention  which found favour with the learned Trial Judge and on which large part of his judgment on this point rested, that the  heading "Others" signified that the public meetings enumerated under that  heading were held by individuals or political  parties other than the Congress and the Jan Sangh.  The  Petitioner, on  the  other  hand, urged that the  heading  "Others"  was intended to indicate only that the public meetings  referred to  therein were other public meetings over and above  those set out in the first and second parts and since the  records did  not  show which were the political parties  which  held them,  they  were shown in a separate  category  under  this particular  heading.  The word "Others" was not intended  to convey  that these public ’meetings were of others, that  is of individuals or political parties other than the  Congress and the Jan Sangh.  We think that the meaning sought 277 to  be  given by the petitioner is correct and  it  must  be preferred   to  that  canvassed  on  behalf  of  the   first

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respondent.   The  list was admittedly  prepared  by  Ramesh Chand  and he explained in his evidence in so many terms  as to what he meant by the heading "Others".  He stated in  his evidence, obviously referring to the public meetings set out in  the  third  part, that "the name of  the  party  is  not mentioned  against  Some  of the  meetings".   These  public meetings  may  have been held by the Conggress  or  the  Jan Sangh  or  any  other individual or  political  party.   The records from which the list was prepared did not show  which were the political parties which held these public  meetings and  they  were,  therefore, classified  under  the  heading "Others".   Ramesh  Chand  did not  say  that  these  public meetings were held by some individuals or political  parties other  than the Congress and the’ Jan Sangh and that is  why they  were included under the heading "Others" nor  was  any such  suggestion  made  to him  in  cross-examination.   The explanation  given  by Ramesh Chand that the  names  of  the political parties which held these public meetings were  not known and hence not mentioned in the list was not challenged on  behalf of the first respondent in cross-examination  and if this explanation is to be accepted, as it must be, it  is apparent that these public meetings were subsumed under  the heading "Others" because the records did not show which were the  political parties which held them.  The word  "Others", meant merely "other meetings" and not meetings "of  others", that  is of individuals or political parties other than  the Congress and the Jan Sangh.  We cannot, therefore, say  that merely because a particular public meeting finds a place  in the third part under the heading "Others", it could not be a public  meeting of the Congress.  The third part would  show that the public meetings there referred to were held on  the dates  mentioned  against  them, but  whether  these  public meetings  were held by the Congress or the Jan Sangh or  any other  individual  or political party could  be  ascertained only  from  other  evidence, because the  records  with  the police did not show the names of the political parties which held these public meetings. The  third witness from the police force summoned on  behalf of  the  petitioner  was Chaman Lal (P.W.  7)  who  was  the Station  House Officer posted at Pahargunj  Police  Station. This   witness  also  prepared  from  the  records  in   his possession  a  list  showing  the  public  meetings  of  the Congress held within the jurisdiction of his police  station and  filed  it in court as Ex.  PW 7/1.  There  were  twelve public  meetings shown in this list as having been  held  by the  Congress,  but  out of  them,  three  public  meetings, namely, one at Chunamandi on 17th February, 1971, the  other at  Arakashan Road, Bagichi Alauddin on 27th February,  1971 and  the  third  at  Chowk Lachmanpur  on  1st  March,  1971 appeared  to have been cancelled.  Thus, according  to  this list, nine public meetings were held by the Congress  within the  jurisdiction of the Pahargunj Police Station.   Out  of these  nine  public  meetings, seven were  included  in  the twenty  three  public meetings admitted, by the  first  res- pondent  and  we need not, therefore, refer to  them.   That leaves   for  consideration  two  public   meetings   which, according to the list, were held at Multani Dhandha on  18th February,  1971  and  22nd February, 1971.  So  far  as  the public meetings at Multani Dhandha on 18th 278 February,  1971  is concerned, the contention of  the  first respondent  was, and that was the contention which  appealed to  the  learned Trial Judge, that it was a  meeting  of  T. Sohan  Lal who was a Congress candidate from  the  adjoining Karol  Bagh Parliamentary constituency and not a meeting  of

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the first respondent.  We do not think it is possible for us to hold affirmatively that this public meeting was a meeting of  T.  Sohan Lal.  The first respondent could  have  easily summoned  T.  Sohan Lal who belonged to the  same  political party  as he and established through his evidence that  this was public meeting of T. Sohan Lal, but the first respondent failed  to  do  so.   That,  however,  does  not  help   the petitioner, because the burden is on the petitioner to  show that  this  public  meeting  was  a  meeting  of  the  first respondent and the petitioner must discharge that burden  on the evidence on record.  How one fact which stands out  from the evidence of Om Prakash Makkan (RI/WI) is that a part  of Multani Dhandha (within the jurisdiction of Pahargunj police Station)   fell   within  the  area  of   the   Karol   Bagh Parliamentary  constituency  and  this  fact  could  not  be controverted  on  behalf of the petitioner.  If  a  part  of Multani  Dhandha  fell  within the area of  the  Karol  Bagh Parliamentary constituency, the possibility cannot be  ruled out  that  the public meeting of 18th February,  1971  might have  been  held  by T. Sohan Lal in  his  part  of  Multani Dhandha  in connection with his election.  That in fact  was the  suggestion  made by Om Parkash Makkan  (RI/WI)  in  his evidence  and  it  was  repeated  on  behalf  of  the  first respondent in the course of the arguments.  This  suggestion gains  strength from the fact that amongst the  speakers  at this public meeting, shown in the list Ex.  PW 7/ 1, was  T. Sohan Lal.  There was no positive evidence led on behalf  of the petitioner showing that this public meeting was held  in that  part  of Multani Dhandha which fell within  the  cons- tituency  of  the first respondent.  The  only  evidence  on which  the petitioner sought to rely in this connection  was that of Madan Lal Kherana (PW 10), but that evidence  merely referred  to  a meeting of the first respondent  in  Multani Dhandha   and,  as  we  shall  presently  show,  the   first respondent  did hold a public meeting at Multani Dhandha  on 22nd  February,  1971,  and  this  evidence  was   obviously referable  to that public meeting.  The evidence  on  record does not, therefore, exclude the possibility that the public meeting  of  18th February 1971 might have been held  by  T. Sohan  Lal  in his part of Multani Dhandha which  also  fell within the jurisdiction of Pahar Gun’ Police Station--and we cannot hold it proved that this public meeting was a meeting of the first respondent.  The petitioner, however, stands on a firmer footing in regard to the public meeting at  Multani Dhandha  on  22nd February, 1971.  This  public  meeting  is clearly  shown in the list as having been held as a  meeting of  the  Congress and Ex.  PW 7/3, which is a  copy  of  the report  intimating permissions granted to the  Congress  for holding  various public meetings, shows that permission  was granted for holding this public meeting.  The only ground on which  the learned Trial Judge rejected this public  meeting was that it was shown as cancelled in the list Ex.  PW  7/1. But this was an obvious error committed by the learned Trial Judge,  because  if we look at the list Ex.  PW 7/1,  it  is clear that, unlike the three public meetings at  Chunamandi, Arakasban Road Bagichi Alauddin and Chowk Lachmanpuri, there is  no  endorsement  of  cancellation  against  this  public meeting and the 279 list clearly shows that this meeting was held, but the total number of persons attending it and the names of the speakers were  not known and hence not mentioned in the records.   It was  suggested  on  behalf of the first  respondent  in  the course  of arguments that this public meeting might also  be of T. Sohan Lal but this suggestion is wholly untenable.  In

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the  first  place, out of seven public  meetings  for  which permissions  were  granted  under  Ex.   PW  7/3,  six  were admittedly  public meetings in connection with the  election of  the  first  respondent,  and  therefore,  if  would   be reasonable  to  infer  that the seventh  public  meeting  at Multani Dhandha on 22nd February, 1971 must also be a public meeting of the first respondent.  Secondly, it is  difficult to believe that within four days of the first public meeting at  Multani  Dhandha on 18th February, 1971,  T.  Sohan  Lal should  have held another public meeting at the same  place. It  is  more probable that this public meeting  should  have been  held  by the first respondent for whom  this  was  the first and the only meeting in this area.  Lastly, Madan  Lal Khorana  (PW  10) deposed to a public meeting of  the  first respondent  at  Multani Dhandha and this  evidence  was  not challenged  at all in cross-examination and it was not  even suggested  to this witness that no meeting was held  by  the first  respondent in Multani Dhandha.  We, therefore,  hold, on the strength of the list PW 7/1 and the permission PW 7/3 supported by the evidence of Madan Lal Khorana (PW 10), that a  public  meeting  was  held at  Multani  Dhandha  on  22nd February; 1971 in connection with the election of the  first respondent. Then we come to the evidence of Ram Murti Sharma (PW 8), who was the Station House Officer at Subzimandi Police  Station. This  witness  filed a list Ex.  PW 8/3 showing  the  public meetings held by the Congress within the jurisdiction of his police  station  and  giving  particulars  of  such   public meetings.  There were only six public meetings shown in this list  and they were all included in the twenty three  public meetings admitted by the first respondent.  Since no further public  meetings appeared to have been held by the  Congress according to this list, we need not say any thing more about it.  The petitioner, however, relied on a letter dated  12th February,  1971 Ex.  PW 8/2 addressed by the  Sub-Divisional Magistrate  to Dr. Roshan Lal according permission  to  hold public meetings at certain places on the dates shown against them.   The  contention  of the petitioner  was  that  since permission  was  granted  to Dr. Roshan Lal  to  hold  these public meetings, they must be presumed to have been held and must  be added to the twenty three public meetings  admitted by the first respondent.  Now, out of seven public  meetings for  which permission was granted by this letters four  were admittedly held as shown in the list Ex. 8/3.  The  question is  whether the other three public meetings, namely, one  at ’K’ Block, Andha Mughal on 18th February, 1971, the other at Malka  Gunj on 22nd February, 1971 and the third  at  Ghanta Ghar  on 3rd March, 1971 for which permission  was  granted, were held.  We may straight away dismiss the public  meeting alleged to have been held at Ghanta Ghar on 3rd March, 1971, for  there  is no evidence at all to show that  this  public meeting  was  held and Ram Murti Sharma  (P.W.  8)  actually stated in this evidence that the permission for this  public meeting was cancelled by 280 the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate  by  his  order  dated  13th February,  1971.   Indeed, it is difficult to see  how  this public  meeting could possibly have been held on 3rd  March, 1971 within 48 hours before the date of polling.  So far  as the  other  two  public meetings, one at  ’K’  Block,  Andha Mughal  on  18th February, 1971 and other at Malka  Gunj  on 22nd  February, 1971 are concerned, they also stand  on  the same footing and cannot be regarded as proved, because there is no evidence at all to show that these two public meetings were actually held pursuant to the permission granted by the

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Sub-Divisional Magistrate. We  may  then  refer to the evidence  of  the  CID  officers summoned  by the petitioner to prove the holding of  various public meetings by the first respondent.  The first  witness belonging  to this group was Mahender Pal Singh (PW 20)  who was  an  Inspector, CID Special Branch at Tees  Hazari.   He stated  in his evidence that during the election period  his staff  used  to  cover election  meetings  held  by  various political parties and they included public meetings held  by the  first respondent.  He further stated that the  officers who  were sent to cover the public meetings used  to  attend them  and then submit, either on the basis of the  shorthand notes  taken  down by them or from memory,  reports  of  the speeches  made at these public meetings.  He was then  asked to  state  from  his  records as to  what  were  the  public meetings held in the Sadar Parliamentary constituency  which were  covered by his staff.  He, however, claimed  privilege in  respect  of the records brought by him and  produced  an affidavit  of the Inspector General of Police in support  of his   claim  of  privilege.   The  affidavit   was   plainly inadequate as it merely repeated the language of section 123 of  the Evidence Act under which the privilege was  claimed, without informing the Court as to how the records in respect of which the privilege was claimed fell within the terms  of the  section.  The learned Trial Judge,  therefore  rejected the  claim for privilege based on this affidavit but gave  a further,  opportunity to the Inspector General of Police  to file  a proper affidavit claiming privilege on 4th  January, 1972.   It appears that the Inspector General of Police  was not  ready  with his affidavit on 4th January, 1972  and  he asked for further time upto 10th January, 1972.  The learned Trial  Judge  granted him time but made an  order  that  the counsel  for the Inspector General of Police should give  to the  counsel of the petitioner by 5th January, 1972 "a  list of  the  persons  who were deputed to  attend  the  Congress election   meetings  in  Sadar  Parliamentary   constituency together with their present official addresses, the dates of the  meetings  attended, the times of the meetings  and  the list of the speakers at such meetings".  In compliance  with this direction, a chart containing the requisite particulars prepared from the records was handed over to the counsel for the petitioner on 5th January, 1972.  This chart referred to twenty  two  public meetings held in support  of  the  first respondent  in  Sadar Parliamentary  constituency  and  gave dates and places of these public meetings, the names of  the speakers who spoke at these public meetings and the officers who   covered  them.   The  Inspector  General   of   Police thereafter  filed another affidavit dated 6th January,  1972 claiming privilege on the ground that the records  contained "the mental notes and reports of officials which are made by public  officers  in the course of the  discharge  of  their official duties", for the benefit  281 of  the CID Special Branch and the practice of keeping  such documents  was necessary for the proper information  of  the CID  Special Branch, and the disclosure of  these  documents "would  lead to injury to public interest and prejudice  the working  of  the CID Special Branch.   And  moreover,  these documents were unpublished official records relating to  the affairs of the State." The learned Trial Judge, by an  order dated 12th January, 1972 upheld the claim of privilege  made on the strength of this affidavit.  The result was that  the reports made by the officers comprised inter alia the mental notes made by them,were shut   out from the petitioner  and a   very  valuable  piece  of  evidence  which  would   have

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established beyond doubtwhat were the public meetings  held by the first respondent was denied to the petitioner.  There can  be  no  doubt that these reports were  made  by  public servants  in discharge of their official duty and they  were relevant under the first part of section 35 of the  Evidence Act  since they contained statements showing what  were  the public meetings held by the first respondent.  Vide P. C. P. Reddiar  v. S. Perumal. (1) But by reason of the order  made by the learned Trial Judge upholding the claim of privilege, these reports were removed from the ken of the petitioner as well  as the learned Trial Judge.  The petitioner  contended before  us  that  the learned Trial Judge was  in  error  in upholding   the  claim  of privilege and  that  the  reports should have been made available to the petitioner.  There is great force in this contention of the petitioner because  it is  difficult  to  see-how,  barring  any  observations   or nothings made by the officers by way of comment or  opinion, the  rest  of  the reports  containing  factual  data  could possibly be regarded as privileged.  The learned Trial Judge himself could have looked at the reports for the purpose  of satisfying  himself  as  to  what  was  the  nature  of  the statements  contained in the reports and whether  they  were privileged, and if so, to what extent, but the learned Trial Judge  apparently did not choose to do.  However, it is  not necessary for us to decide this question of privilege and we need  not express any final opinion upon it, since  we  find that the officers who covered these public meetings and made reports  have  themselves given evidence on  behalf  of  the petitioner and though they did suffer from the handicap that they  could  not  refresh their memory  by  looking  at  the reports, they have given fairly reliable evidence in  regard to the public meetings covered by them and the exclusion  of the  reports from the evidence is, therefore, really of  not much  consequence.   Moreover, the chart  furnished  by  the counsel   for  the  Inspector  General  of  Police  to   the petitioner gives sufficient information as to the dates  and places  of the public meetings held in connection  with  the election  of  the  first respondent and  the  names  of  the speakers who spoke at these public meetings.  The petitioner made an application to the learned Trial Judge being IA  No. 645 of 1972 for taking this chart in evidence and marking it as an exhibit in the case but the learned Trial Judge, by an order dated 20th April, 1972, rejected this application.  We do not think the learned Trial Judge was right in  rejecting this chart out of hand as document without (1) [1972] 2 S.C.R. 646 282 any  evidentiary  value  whatever.  It  is  clear  that  the entries  in  the reports made by the  officers  stating  the dates and places of the public meetings covered by them  and the names of the speakers at those public meetings could not possibly be privileged and in fact, as appears clearly  from the  affidavit claiming privilege, the Inspector General  of police   did  not  claim  privilege  in  respect  of   these particulars  entered in the reports.The claim for  privilege made  by him was in respect of reports of speeches  made  at the  public meetings since they were based on  mental  notes and  were  not  "verbatim  copies of  the  speeches  of  the speakers".   It was for this reason that the  learned  Trial Judge directed that a chart showing the dates and places  of the public meetings and the names of the speakers should  be compiled by the Inspector General of Police and handed  over to the counsel for the petitioner.  This chart was obviously to  be prepared from the official records in the  possession of  the Inspector General of Police which would be  relevant

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under  the  first part of section 35 of  the  Evidence  Act. When  this direction was given by the learned  Trial  Judge, the first respondent did not raise any objection, though the furnishing  of  the  chart would be  clearly  tantamount  to production  of  the relevant parts of the  official  records containing particulars in regard to the dates and places  of the  public  meetings and the names of  the  speakers.   The chart  furnished  by  the Inspector  General  of  Police  in compliance  with this direction of the learned  Trial  Judge was,   therefore,  clearly  admissible  in  evidence.    The Inspector General of Police, in fact, affirmed this chart in his affidavit claiming the privilege and said in paragraph 3 of  that affidavit that the chart had been supplied  to  the counsel  of  the petitioner "through the  witness  Inspector Mohinder Pal Singh." It was suggested on behalf of the first respondent  that there was nothing to show that  this  chart produced by the petitioner along with his application IA No. 645  of  1972 was the same as that given  by  the  Inspector General of police.  But this suggestion is wholly untenable. It  is  nothing but an afterthought.  No such plea  was  put forward  by the first respondent in reply to IA No.  645  of 1972.   The  first  respondent  did  not  dispute,  in   the affidavit filed by him in reply to this application that the chart  produced by the petitioner was not the same  as  that handed over to him by the Inspector General of Police.   The first  respondent  then contended that if  this  chart  were treated as evidence, he would be deprived of an  opportunity of cross-examining the CID officers who made the reports  or maintained  the  official records from which the  chart  was prepared.   But  that is no argument, because  even  if  the reports  made  by  CID officers or the  official  ,  records maintained  by  them  had been  produced  by  the  Inspector General  of  Police,  they would  have  been  admissible  in evidence under the first part of section 35 of the  Evidence Act,  without any oral evidence as to their  contents  being required  to  be  given by the CID  officers  who  made  the reports  or maintained the official records, The  petitioner is,  therefore,  not unjustified in asking us to  treat  the chart as a Piece of evidence with probative value, though it must  be said that it is weak type of evidence and  standing by  itself  without  anything more, it  cannot  be  regarded sufficient  to establish the holding of a public meeting  by the first respondent.  It can, however, certainly be  relied upon  as  a  corroborative piece of evidence  which  may  be considered along with 283 other  evidence  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  whether  a particular  public  meeting  was  held  in  connection  with election of the first respondent. We  may  now turn to consider the oral evidence of  the  CID officers  in regard to the specific public meetings held  in connection  with the election of the first respondent.   But before  we  do  so, we may refer to  one  general  criticism levelled  by  the learned Trial Judge for  disbelieving  the oral  evidence of the CID officers.  Whenever a CID  officer deposed  to a public meeting hold by the  first  respondent, which was not to be found in the lists PW 615, PW 7/1 and PW 8/3, the learned Trial Judge promptly rejected the  evidence and refused to accept the public meeting on the ground  that if  such  a public meeting had taken place,  it  would  have certainly  found  a  place in one of  these  lists  and  the absence  of mention of it in these lists  clearly  indicated that  it must not have taken place,.  This approach  of  the learned  Trial  Judge is in our opinion  erroneous.   It  is obvious  that the lists Ex.  PW 6/5, PW 7/1 and PW  8/3  are

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not  exhaustive of all the public meetings held  within  the jurisdiction of the respective police stations.  They  refer only to those public meetings where the police station staff was  sent  for maintenance of law and order.   It  is  quite possible that there might have been other public meetings of which  the police station officers had no notice  and  which might not have been covered by the police station staff  and hence not entered in the registers maintained by the  Police stations.   In  fact, Umesh Chandra stated  in  his.evidence that  in February 1971, twenty four election mectingsa  were held within the jurisdiction of his police station on behalf of  various parties and yet the list Ex.  PW 6/5 shows  only eighteen  public  meetings.   The absence of  mention  of  a public  meeting in the lists Ex.  PW 6/5, PW 7/1 and PW  8/3 cannot,  therefore, be a ground for disbelieving the  testi- mony of an independent and disinterested witness like a  CID officer.   Moreover, it is difficult to appreciate  how  the oral  testimony  of  a  witness can  be  contradicted  by  a negative inference to be drawn from the absence of an  entry in the register or list maintained by another witness,  when that  other witness has not stated in his evidence that  his register or list was exhaustive and no other public meetings were  held It may also be noted that no question was put  to any  of the police station officers on behalf of  the  first respondent  suggesting that the lists Exs.  PW 615,  PW  7/1 and PW 8/3 were exhaustive and no public meetings other than those  shown in these lists were hold within the  respective jurisdictions of their police stations.  The absence of men- tion  of a particular public meeting in the lists  Exs.   PW 615, PW 7/1 and PW 8/3 cannot, therefore, be relied upon  as a  circumstance  for disbelieving the testimony of  the  CID officers  in regard to the holding of such  public  meeting. The  learned  Trial  Judge  also relied  very  much  on  the evidence  of the first respondent and his witnesses  denying the  holding  of the public meetings deposed to by  the  CID officers   but  such  denial  by  partisan  and   interested witnesses  can  have  no meaning in  the  face  of  positive evidence  of  the  CID  officers  supported  by  the   chart furnished  by the Inspector General of Police and no  weight can  attach to it.  As observed by this Court in Rahim  Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed (1): (1)  C.A. 816 of 1973, dec. on August 8, 1974. 284 "Negative  evidence  is ordinarily no good to  disprove  the factum of meetings." Turning to the oral evidence of the CID officers, the  first CID  officer  to whom we must refer in  this  connection  is Umesh Chander (PW 39).  This witness stated that he  covered several    election   meetings   in   Sadar    Parliamentary constituency  during  the  General  Elections  of  1971  and amongst  others,  he attended the public meetings  at  Chowk Chhe  Tooti, Ghanta Ghar, Tel Mandi, Amarpuri Colony,  Chowk Azad Market and near Imperial Cinema.  He could not give the dates of these public meetings from memory, but it is  clear from the chart furnished by the Inspector General of  Police to  the petitioner that these six public meetings were  held on 24th February, 16th February,’1971, 19th February,  1971, 25th February, 1971, 26th February, 1971 and 22nd  February, 1971.  Out of these six public meetings, three, namely,  one at  Chowk  Chhe Tooti on 24th February, 1971, the  other  at Ghanta  Ghar  on 16th February, 1971 and the  third  at  Tel Mandi  on 19th February, 1971 were amongst the twenty  three public meetings admitted by the first respondent.  So far as the  public meeting near Imperial Cinema on  22nd  February, 1971  is  concerned, that was also, according to  the  first

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respondent  included  in the admitted  twenty  three  public meetings.   The contention of the first respondent was  that this  public meeting was the same as the one at Chuna  Mandi on  22nd  February,  1971 admitted by him  and  was  not  an additional  meeting.   This contention appears  to  be  well founded.  It is clear from the report of permissions Ex.  PW 7/3  that  Imperial Cinema is in Chuna Mandi and in  fact  a permission  was  granted  under Ex.  PW 7/3  for  holding  a public meeting in Chuna Mandi in front of imperial Cinema on 17th February, 1971, though it was subsequently cancelled as appearing  from the list Ex.  PW 7/1.  The first  respondent also  stated  in his evidence that there was  a  meeting  in Chuna  Mandi in front of Imperial Cinema on  22nd  February, 1971.   The  public  meeting near imperial  Cinema  on  22nd February,  1971 deposed to by Umesh Chandra was,  therefore, the  same as the public meeting at Chuna Mandi  admitted  by the  first  respondent.  That leaves for  consideration  two public  meetings, one at Amarpuri Colony on  25th  February, 1971  and the other at Chowk Azad Market on 26th  February, 1971.  Both these public meetings were disputed by the first respondent.  But the evidence given by Umesh Chandra (PW 39) supported by the relevant entries in the chart shows  beyond doubt that these two public meetings were hold by the  first respondent.  There was hardly any cross-examination of Umesh Chandra  (PW 39) on this point.  No suggestion was  made  to him  that  he was an interested witness and indeed   such  a suggestion  could not be made as he was a CID  officer.   It was  not even put to him that these two public meetings  did not take place as deposed to by him.  The only question  put to  this witness was as to how he remembered the  places  of the public meetings’ deposed to by him and his frank  answer was that the places of these public meetings were stated  by him from memory.  There is no reason why this witness should be  disbelieved  merely because he gave the  places  of  the public  meetings attended by him from memory.  In  fact,  as pointed out above, the 285 chart  furnished by the Inspector General of Police  clearly supports  his  oral  evidence.   The  learned  Trial   Judge rejected  the evidence of this witness on two grounds.   One ground  was that this witness did not state that the  public meetings  deposed  to by him were Congress meetings  of  the first  respondent.   This ground is fallacious, in  that  it overlooks- the positive evidence given by this witness  that the  first  and  fifth respondents  spoke  at  these  public meetings, though of course; he could not say whether both of them  spoke  in all the public meetings or in only  some  of them.   Moreover,  the  chart  furnished  by  the  Inspector General  of Police shows the names of the speakers at  these public  meetings  and it is evident from  these  names  that those  publicmeetings were "Congress meetings of  respondent No.  I".   The other ground relied on by the  learned  Trial Judge was that the claim of the petitioner in regard to  the public meetings at Amarpuri colonyand Chowk Azad Market  was belied  by the list Ex.  PW 6/5 in which, according  to  the learned Trial Judge, the public meetings at these two places were  stated  to be of political parties  ’other’  than  the Congress  or the Jan Sangh.  This ground is  also  untenable and  for two reasons.  In the first place, the list Ex.   PW 6/5 does not refer to any public meeting at Amarpuri  Colony on  25th  February,  1971  or  Chowk  Azad  Market  on  26th February, 1971 under the heading ’Others’, and none of these two  public  meetings deposed to by Umesh  Chandra  (PW  39) finds  a  place in list Ex.  PW 6/5.  Secondly,  as  already pointed  out above, the heading ’Others’ does  not  indicate

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that  a public meeting under that heading was a  meeting  of arty  individual or political party other than the  Congress or the Jan Sangh.  We must, therefore, hold, on the strength of  the evidence of Umesh Chandra (PW 39), supported by  the chart furnished by the Inspector General of Police, that  in addition to the twenty three public meetings admitted by the first  respondent, two further public meetings were held  in connection with the election of the first respondent, namely one at Amarpuri Colony on 25th February, 1971 and the  other at Chowk Azad Market on 26th February, 1971. The  next witness whose evidence we must consider is  Ranbir Singh. (PW 49), who was at the material time a Sub-Inspector in CID Special Branch.  He has stated that he covered  three or  four  election  meetings of the  first  respondent,  and though he could not remember the sequence, he asserted  that these  election  meetings were at Chowk  Chhe  Tooti,  Clock Tower,  Chowk  Tatoo  Shah Bagichi and  Pahari  Dhiraj.   He further  said that the first respondent spoke at all  these- public  meetings and the fifth respondent also spoke at  one or two of them.  He also gave the names of some of the other speakers  at these four public meetings.  These four  public meetings  also  find a place in the chart furnished  by  the Inspector General of Police and according to that chart, the public  meeting  at  Chowk  Chhe Tooti  was  held on  12th February,  1971,  the  public meeting at  Chowk  Tatoo  Shah Bagichi was held on 15th February, 1971, the public  meeting at  Clock Tower was held on 2nd March, 1971 and  the  public meeting  at Pahari Dhiraj was held on 27th  February,  1971. The  second  and the third of these  publise  meetings  were included in the twenty three public meetings admitted yb 286 the first respondent and the dispute was only as regards the first  public meeting at Chowk Chhe Tooti on 12th  February, 1971 and the fourth public meeting at Pahari Dhiraj on  27th February,  1971.   We will first consider  the  position  in regard  to  the  public meeting at  Pahari  Dhiraj  on  27th February,  1971.   The  learned  Trial  Judge  rejected  the evidence  of Ranbir Singh (PW 49) in regard to  this  public meeting on the ground that the list Ex.  PW 615 showed  this public  meeting  as " a meeting of political  parties  other than  the  Congress  and  the  Jan  Sangh"  and  the   first respondent  had in his evidence denied that any such  public meeting  was held by him.  We do not think that the  learned Trial Judge was justified in taking this view.  In the first place, if we look at the list Ex.  PW 615 it shows a  public meeting  at Pahari Dhiraj on 27th February, 1971  under  the heading  ’Others’.   ’We have already pointed out  that  the heading  ’Others’  does not mean anything  more  than  other meetings  and  merely because a  particular  public  meeting finds  a place under that heading, it does not mean that  it was  not  a meeting of the Congress.  The list Ex.   PW  615 does  not, therefore, in any way contradict the evidence  of Ranbir Singh (PW 49) on this point.  Secondly, the  evidence of Ranbir Singh (PW 49) is supported by the entry at  serial No.  18 in the chart furnished by the Inspector  General  of Police which shows that a public meeting was held in support of  the first respondent at Pahari Dhiraj on 27th  February, 1971  at  which, amongst others, respondents Nos.  1  and  5 were  the  speakers.  Thirdly, there is no  reason  why  an- independent  witness  like  Ranbir Singh (PW  49),  who  has absolutely  no interest in the result of the litigation  one way or the other should be disbelieved.  It is true that the places  of the four public meetings deposed to by  him  were mentioned  in  the summons served upon him and  it  was  for that reason that he could give the names of these places in

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his  evidence, but that does not detract from the  value  of his  evidence, because unless these places mentioned in  the summons were correct, he would not have subscribed to  them in  his evidence.  He would have said "’I do not  remember". But  he  gave evidence in regard to  these  public  meetings because he remembered though his memory was prodded by  what was  stated in the summons.  He even gave the names of  some of the speakers and deposed broadly to the arrangements made at these public meetings.  Not even a suggestion was made to him that the public meeting at Phari Dhiraj was a meeting of some  other political party or individual.  It may  also  be noted  that apart from Ranbir Singh (PW 49),  Kundanlal  (PW 27) and Chunnilal (PW 32) also deposed to the public meeting at  Pahari Dhiraj and there is no reason why their  evidence should not be accepted, particularly when Kundanlal (PW  27) was an independent witness without any political affiliation and  Chunni lal (PW 32) was also a person belonging  neither to  the Congress nor to the Jan Sangh.  We, therefore,  hold that  a  public  meeting  at  Pahari  Dhiraj  was  held   in connection with the election of the first respondent on 27th February, 1971. So  far  as the public meeting at Chowk Chhe Tooti  on  12th February,  1971 is concerned, it is clearly  established  by the evidence Ranbir Singh (PW 49) supported by the entry  at serial  No.  1  in the chart  furnished  by  the  Inspector General of Police.  It may be noted 287 that  Ranbir Singh (PW 49) stated in his evidence  that  the speakers, at the public meeting at Chowk Chhe Tooti were the first  respondent, fifth respondent, Shiv Charan  Gupta  and two or three others.  This statement tallies completely with the  names of the speakers given in the chart  furnished  by the Inspector General of Police against the entry at  Serial No.  1. We do not see any reason why the evidence of  Ranbir Singh (PW 49), who is a wholly independent witness should be rejected  and the denial of the first respondent; who  is  a party  to  the  litigation  or  his  supporters  should   be preferred.   It  is true that there is no  mention  of  this public meeting at Chowk Chhe Tooti in the list Ex.  PW  7/1, but  as  pointed out above, the absence of mention  of  this public  meeting in the list Ex.  PW 7/1 cannot be  a  ground for  disbelieving  the  testimony  of  an  independent   and disinterested  witness like Ranbir Singh (PW 49).  We  must, consequently,  hold  that  a public  meeting  of  the  first respondent  was held at Chowk Chhe Tooti on  12th  February, 1971. We  then  go on to consider the evidence of Daulat  Ram  (PW 42), who was also at the material time Sub-Inspector in  the CID Special Branch.  He said in his evidence that he covered two election meetings of the first respondent, one at  Chowk Bara  Tooti and the other at Hathikhana,  Bahadurgarh  Road. The chart furnished by the Inspector General of Police shows that the public meeting at Chowk Bara Tooti was held on 20th February,  1971,  while the public meeting  at  Hathikhanna, Bahadurgarh Road was held on 26th February, 1971.  So far as the  public  meeting at Chowk Bara Tooti on  20th  February, 1971 is concerned, it was admitted by the first  respondent, but the public meeting at Bahadurgarh Read on 26th February, 1971  was disputed and the first respondent denied that  any such public meeting was held by him.  The evidence of Daulat Ram  (PW 42) in regard to this public meeting  is,  however. very  clear  and  there is no reason why it  should  not  be accepted,  merely  because  he has deposed  to  this  public meeting from memory.  In fact the memory of this witness was severely tested in cross-examination by the first respondent

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but  he  stood the test firmly and was unshaken.   There  is nothing  suggested as to why the testimony of  this  witness should  be rejected.  This witness not only deposed  to  the holding  of  the  public meeting  at  Bahadurgarh  Road  but actually  gave  the  names of the speakers  at  this  public meeting, namely, the first respondent, the fifth respondent, Mir Mushtaq Ahmed and Sardar Wazir Singh.  These names tally completely with the names of the speakers given in the chart furnished by the Inspector General of Police.  We also  find that  the  list  Ex.  6/5 shows that  a  public  meeting  at Bahadurgarh  was  held  on  26th  February,  1971.   It   is undoubtedly mentioned under the heading ’others’ but, as  we have already explained, this does not mean that it could not be  a  meeting of the Congress.  It is significant  to  note that not even a suggestion was made to this witness that the public  meeting at Bahadurgarh was a meeting of  some  other political  party  or individual.  Such  a  suggestion  would obviously  have  been futile, because the evidence  of  this witness was that the only meetings he covered were those  of the Congress and the Jan Sangh and this public meeting 288 political party or individual.  We are, therefore, satisfied beyond   doubt   that  a  public  meeting   at   Hathikhana, Bahadurgarh  Road  was  held  on  26th  February,  1971   in connection with the election of the first respondent. The next witness in this group is Sukhbir Singh (PW 46)  who was  at  the material time a Head Constable in  CID  Special Branch.  He said in his evidence that he covered one meeting of the first respondent in Sadar Parliamentary  constituency and  that was a meeting at Chhoti Masjid, Bara Hindu Rao  on 26th   February,  1971.   The  speakers  at  this   meeting, according  to  him;  were O. P.  Jain,  Mir  Mushtaq  Ahmad, Narendra  Kumar  and  Dada  Ataf-ur-Rahman.   This  evidence clearly  establishes the holding of this public  meeting  by the  first respondent and there is no reason why  it  should not  be accepted, particularly when we find that it has  not been  challenged  at all in cross-examination by  the  first respondent.  It is no doubt true that Subhash Arya (RIW 35), stated  in his evidence that a public meeting was  scheduled to be held at Bara Hindu Rao on 26th February, 1971, but  it was cancelled because he could not arrange for any  speakers at this  public  meeting.  But we fail  to  see  how  this statement  of  Subhash Arya (RIW 35), who was  admittedly  a partisan  witness,  could be preferred to the  testimony  of Sukhbir  Singh  (PW  46)  who  was  wholly  independent  and disinterested,  having  no  interest in the  result  of  the ’litigation.   It may also be noted that an application  Ex. PW  611 for permission to hold this public meeting was  made by  Dr. Roshan Lal on 26th February, 1971, that is,  on  the same day on which this public meeting was to be held and  it is  difficult to believe that such application  ,could  have been made by Dr. Roshan Lal in the morning of 26th February, 1971 without making the necessary arrangements for  speakers at  this  public  meeting  which was to  be  held  the  same evening, The learned Trial Judge rejected the evidence  of Sukhbir  Singh (PW.46) in regard to this public  meeting  on the  ground that this public meeting was shown in  the  list Ex.   PW  6/5  as a meeting  organised  by  other  political parties  and not by the Congress.  But this ground is,  with the greatest respect to the learned Trial Judge, wholly mis- conceived  because  we  do not find any  reference  to  this public  meeting in the list Ex. 6/5 even under  the  heading ’Others’.   Not  only  is  the  evidence  of  this   witness uncontradicted  by any documentary evidence but it  actually finds  support from the entry at Serial No. 16 in the  chart

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furnished  by  the Inspector General of Police where  it  is shown as a meeting held in support of the first  respondent. The  names of the speakers given by this witness also  tally with the names set out against the entry at Serial No. 16 in the chart furnished by the Inspector General of Police.   We must,  therefore, accept the case of the petitioner  that  a public meeting at Chhoti Masjid; Bara Hindu Rao was held  by the first respondent on 26th February, 1971. That  takes us to the evidence of Shyam Singh (PW  45),  who Was  at the material time posted in the CID Special  Branch. He said in his evidence that he covered two public  meetings of  the  first respondent, one at Chowk Nabi Karim  on  26th February, 1971 and the                             289 other  at Chowk Neemwala in Nabi Karim on  2nd  March,’1971. The  second  public meeting at Chowk Neemwala on  2nd  March 1971  was  included  in the  twenty  three  public  meetings admitted  by  the  first respondent, but  the  first  public meeting at Chowk Nabi Karim held on 26th February, 1971  was disputed  by  him and the case of the first  respondent  was that  no  such public meeting was held.  We do not  see  any reason why the evidence of Shyam Singh (PW 45) in regard  to the  public  meeting at Chowk Nabi Karim on  26th  February, 1971  should  not  be accepted.  If we look  at  the  cross- examination  of this witness by the first respondent, we  do not  find  any  challenge at all to the  statement  of  this witness  in  regard to the holding of this  public  meeting. Moreover,  the evidence of this witness is supported by  the statement  of Chunni Lal (PW 32) in  cross-examination  that the Congress held a public meeting inter alia at Nabi  Karim Chowk.  But more than this support from the oral evidence of Chunni  Lal (PW 32) is the corroboration to be found in  the chart  furnished  by the Inspector General of  Police.   The entry  at  Serial  No. 14 in  this  chart  clearly  supplies authenticity and veracity to the evidence of Shyam Singh (PW 45)  that this public meeting did take place as  claimed  by the  petitioner.   The names of the speakers given  by  this witness  in  his  oral evidence find  a  place  amongst  the speakers mentioned in this chart.  There can, therefore,  be no doubt despite the denial of the first respondent, that  a public meeting at the Chowk near the Police Post, Nabi Karim was held by the first respondent on 26th February, 1971. The  petitioner also claimed that two other public  meetings were  held  by the first respondent in connection  with  his election,  one at Chowk Singhara on 18th February, 1971  and the  other  at Tonga Stand, Pahar Gunj on 2nd  March,  1971. These  two public meetings are shown as having been held  in support  of  the first respondent in the entries  at  Serial Nos.  4  and  21 in the chart  furnished  by  the  Inspector General  of Police.  The CID officer who, according to  this Chart,  covered these two public meetings was Umesh  Chandra (PW  39) but since Umesh Chandra (PW 39) was precluded  from refer ring to the reports made by him contemporaneously  for the  purpose of refreshing his memory and required  to  give evidence  only on the basis of what he recalled, he  omitted these  two  public meetings in the evidence  given  by  him. There  was  also no other evidence in support of  these  two public  meetings.   The case of the  petitioner,  therefore, rested  only on the entries at Serial Nos. 4 and 21  in  the chart  supplied by the Inspector General of Police.  But  as pointed  out above, this chart is definitely weak  piece  of evidence  and  it would not be correct to rely  upon  it  as substantive  evidence  for the purpose of  holding,  on  the strength  of  its evidentiary value alone  without  anything more,  that these two public meetings, namely one  at  Chowk

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Singhara  on  18th  February, 1971 and the  other  at  Tonga Stand, Pahar Gunj on 2nd March,1971 were held in support of the election of the first respondent. Then  there were three other public meetings claimed by  the petitioner to havebeen  held  by  the  first   respondent, namely one at 290 Katra Karim on 17th February, 1971, the other at Chuna Mandi near Imperial Cinema on 17th February, 1971 and the third at Tel  Mandi on 19th February, 1971.  There is no evidence  at all to show that these three public meetings were held.  The only  piece of evidence on which the petitioner could  place reliance was the copy of the report Ex.  PW 7/3 which showed the permissions granted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate  to the Congress to hold certain public meetings which  included inter  alia these three public meetings.  But from the  mere factual  of  permission, without any  further  evidence,  we cannot  come  to  the conclusion  that  these  three  public meetings  were held in connection with the election  of  the first  respondent.  The same position obtains in  regard  to three  other  public  meetings claimed  by  the  petitioner, namely,  one  at ’K’ Block, Andha Mughal on  18th  February, 1971, the other at Malka Gurj on 22nd February, 1971 and the third  at  Ghanta  Ghar on 3rd March,  1971.   There  is  no evidence in support of these three public meetings.  What we have are only the applications for permission to hold  these three  public meetings and they are clearly insufficient  to establish  that these three public meetings were  held.   In fact,  the public meeting at Ghanta Ghar on 3rd March,  1971 could  never  have been held because of the  ban  on  public meetings  within  forty  eight  hours  before  the  date  of polling. We  then  proceed  to consider  the  public  meeting  which, according  to the petitioner, was held in Gulabi Bagh.   The only  evidence  in  support  of this  public  meeting  is  a reference  to it in the bill of Agarwal Tent House, Ex.   R- 26.   But, as we shall presently show, this bill of  Agarwal Tent  House cannot be regarded as genuine and it would  not, therefore,  be  correct to base any finding on  a  statement contained in it. in the absence of any Positive evidence  on behalf of the petitioner in support of this public  meeting, the  denial of the first respondent must be  accepted.   We, therefore,  reject the case of the petitioner that a  public meeting was hold by the first respondent at Gulabi Bagh. That  takes us to the public meeting at Pulbangash  on  26th February, 1971.  Ex.  PW 6/1 is the application made by  Dr. Roshan Lal for permission to hold a public meeting at  Chowk Pul  Bangash on 26th February, 1971 and, in the  absence  of any  evidence  to  the contrary, we must  presume  that  the permission  applied for was granted.  The list Ex.   PW  615 shows that a public meeting was held at Pul Bangash on  26th February,  1971.   The reference to this public  meeting  is under  the  heading  ’Others’,  but,  as  we  have   already discussed  this circumstance does not militate against  this public meeting being a meeting of the Congress Then there is the positive evidence of Inder Mohan Bharadwaj (PW 30)  that there was a public meeting of the,, first respondent at  Pul Bangash  on  26th  February, 1971 and when  he  was  passing along,   he   saw  pamphlets,  like  annexure   ’A’,   being distributed  at  this public meeting.  It appears  that  the statement  of this witness in regard to the factum  of  this public  meeting was not challenged in  cross-examination  on behalf 291 of  the  first respondent.  The only challenge  was  to  the

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accuracy  of  what he saw at this public meeting.   When  we turn  to the evidence led on behalf of the first  respondent in regard to this public meeting, we find a very interesting feature  which is eloquent of the truth.  Om Prakash  Makkan (RIW  1) admitted in his cross-examination on 4th  February, 1972 that he went to another meeting of the first respondent and  the place whore this meeting was hold was Pul  Bangash. But his cross-examination was not completed on 4th February, 1972.   It  was continued on 7th February, 1972 and  in  the course  of  the further cross-examination on  that  day,  he seized the opportunity to go back on his previous  admission and  tried to explain it away by saying: "I did not see  any meeting  at Pul Bangash.  I had gone there to see  Tirlochan Singh.  When I went there I saw 20 or 25 people coming back. I  asked  them  whether Tirlochan Singh was  there  and  was informed  that Tirlochan Singh was not there.   Amongst  the people returning was my brother-in-law Dina Nath and he told me that there had been a meeting in some house".  This was a crude  and  clumsy  attempt to  explain  away  an  admission unwittingly made and it cannot deceive us.  The admission of the witness stands unimpaired and there can be no doubt that it  represents  the truth. When Subhash Arya  (RIW  35)  was cross-examined in regard to this public meeting, he admitted that  this public meeting was scheduled to be hold at  Chowk Pul Bangash on 26th February, 1971, but it could not be hold because  he was not able to arrange for any speakers.   This statement  of Subhash Arya (RIW35) clearly implies that  the permission for holding this public meeting was obtained, but the  reason for not holding it was different.  We,  however, find it difficult to believe that this public meeting  could not  be held on account of want of speakers.  It is  a  most unconvincing explanation given by Subhash Arya (RIW 35)  for the  purpose  of explaining away this  public  meeting.   In fact,  the  list  Ex.  PW 6/5 clearly shows  that  a  public meeting  was held at Pul Bangash on 26th February, 1971,  We are, therefore, satisfied from evidence on record that  this public  meeting was held in connection with the election  of the first respondent. The claim of the petitioner in regard to the public  meeting said to have been hold by the first respondent at Sadar Nala Road  on 15th February’ 1971 is, however, not well  founded. There is no evidence at all to show that this public meeting was  held.   The  only  piece  of  evidence  on  Which   the petitioner could rely was the intimation Ex.  PW 6/2  gives. by  the Superintendent of Police, North District,  Delhi  to the  Deputy  Inspector  General of Police,  Delhi  that  the Congress had decided to hold a public meeting at Sadar  Nala Road  on  15th  February,  1971  and  assistance  should  be provided  to the local police in maintaining Law and  order. But  from  this piece of evidence  alone,  without  anything more,  it  cannot  be  concluded  that  the  public  meeting referred  to in this intimation was in fact  hold.   Subhash Arya  (RIW 35) stated in his evidence that a public  meeting was  undoubtedly scheduled to be hold at Sadar Nala Road  on 15th  February, 1971, but it had to be cancelled because  no arrangement  could  be  made in regard  to  speakers.   This statement of Subhash Arya (RIW 35) stands  1255 Sup.  CI/75 292 uncontroverted  by  any positive evidence on behalf  of  the petitioner in regard to the holding of this public  meeting, unlike  the  case  in regard to the public  meeting  at  Pul Bangash  on 26th February, 1971.  We, therefore, reject  the claim  of  the petitioner that any such public  meeting  was hold at Sadar Nala Road on 15th February, 1971.

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We  have discussed the evidence in regard to the  number  of public meetings held in connection with the election of  the first  respondent  in great detail because we are  taking  a view different from the one taken by the learned Trial Judge and,  in all fairness to the learned Trial Judge as well  as to  the  first  respondent, we think it  necessary  that  we should  articulate our reasons fully.  The above  discussion shows  that in addition to the twenty three public  meetings admitted  by  the  first  respondent,  nine  further  public meetings  were  held  at the following  places  and  on  the following dates, namely       1.  Amar Puri Colony on                26-2-1971       2.  Chowk Azad Market on               26-2-1971       3.  Chhoti Masjid, Bara Hindu Rao      26-2-1971      4.   Pahari Dhiraj on                   27-2-1971       5.  Chhe Tooti on                      12-2-1971       6.  Hathi Khana, Bahadurgarh Road on   26-2-1971       7.  Near Police Post, Nabi Karim on    26-2-1971       8.  Multani Dhanda on.                 22-2-1971       9.  Pul Bangash on                     26-2-1971 The  first respondent owned the responsibility for  expenses in  respect of the twenty three public meetings admitted  by him and the only question could be in regard to the expenses of the additional nine meetings above-mentioned.  It was not the  case of the first respondent that any  public  meetings were  hold  in  connection  with  his  election  which  were financed by the Congress or any other individual.  The first respondent in fact admitted in his cross-examination that he "bore  the  expenses  of all the  election  meetings  in  my constituency".   There can, therefore, be no scope  for  the argument  that  the  expenses of any of  these  nine  public meetings  were met by any Organisation or  individual  other than  the  first  respondent.  In any  event,  even  if  the expenses  of  some out of these nine  public  meetings  were incurred  by the District Pradesh Congress Committee or  any other  branch  of  the Congress organisation  or  any  other friend  or  supporter,  such expenses must  be  held  to  be authorised  by  the first respondent, be.  cause  the  first respondent knowingly took advantage of such public  meetings by  participating in them and consented to or at  any  rate, acquiesced in such expenses and, in any view of the  matter, failed  to  disavow  them.   The  question  which  we  must, therefore,  proceed  to  consider is as  to  what  were  the expenses  incurred or authorised by the first respondent  in connection   with  these  twenty  three  plus  nine   public meetings. Now,  the  first  respondent  disclosed  in  his  return  of expenses  only  three amounts, namely, Rs.  180/-,  paid  to Tandon Tent and 293 Furniture House, Rs. 180/- paid to Saini Electric Works  and Rs. 440/- paid to Agarwal Tent House, and his case was  that these were the only three amounts spent by him in connection with his public meetings which were twenty three in  number. Since we have held that nine more public meetings were  held in  addition  to  the twenty  three-admitted  by  the  first respondent,  it  must  follow  that  the  first   respondent suppressed the expenditure incurred or authorised by him  on these  nine  further public meetings.  What  should  be  the approach  of  the Court when the Court  finds  that  certain items of expenses are suppressed by a candidate is a  matter which we shall presently discuss.  But before we do that, we must  examine the question whether the expenditure shown  by the first respondent in connection with twenty three  public meetings  admitted  by  him  is  genuine.   Did  the   first

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respondent spend only three amounts of Rs. 180/-, Rs.  180/- and  Rs. 440/- in connection with these public  meetings  or these  amounts represent a very much lower figure than  what was actually spent by the first respondent.  The expenditure of  these amounts was sought to be supported by the bill  of Tandon Tent & Furniture House, the receipt of Saini Electric Works  and the bill of Agarwal Tent House.  The case of  the first  respondent  was that furnishings in  connection  with twelve  public meetings were supplied by Tandon Tent &  Fur- niture House and electric equipment by Saini Electric  Works and  furnishings and electric equipment in  connection  with the  remaining  eleven  public  meetings  were  supplied  by Agarwal  Tent  House.  However, strangely enough,  when  the first  respondent was asked in cross-examination,  he  could not say as to which were the public meetings to which Tandon Tent  &  Furniture House and Saini Electric  Works  supplied furnishings and electric equipment and which were the public meetings  to which furnishings and electric  equipment  were supplied by Agarwal Tent House.  If in fact, furnishings and electric equipment were supplied by Tandon Tent &  Furniture House,  Saini Electric Works and Agarwal Tent House and  the arrangements with these three firms had been made personally by the first respondent, as claimed by him in his  evidence, it is difficult to understand why the first respondent could not  specify  the public meetings catered by Tandon  Tent  & Furniture  House  and Saini Electric Works  and  the  public meetings  catered by Agarwal Tent House.  Surely, the  first respondent  must  have maintained some records  to  show  to which  public  meetings furnishings and  electric  equipment were supplied by these three firms; otherwise, how could  he have  checked  whether the bills submitted  by  these  three firms  were correct.  The inability to produce  the  records and to particularise the specific public meetings catered by these  three  firms is a factor  which  throws  considerable doubt  on  the  genuineness  of  the  story  of  the   first respondent  that  furnishings and  electric  equipment  were supplied  by these three firms.  It is also  rather  strange that the first respondent could not give particulars of  the furnishings  and  electric equipment  actually  supplied  by these three firms. It  may  also  be  noted that the  bill  of  Tandon  Tent  & Furniture  House  was  sought  to be  proved  by  the  first respondent  by examining Bhagmal Tandon (RIW 14),  the  sole proprietor of that firm as a 294 witness.  But so far as the receipt of Saini Electric  Works and the bill of Agarwal Tent House were concerned, the first respondent  did  not call any representatives of  these  two firms  to  give  evidence and prove the  contents  of  these documents.   Since the correctness and genuineness of  these documents  was challenged on behalf of the petitioner,  the. first respondent ought to have summoned the  representatives of these two firms and led their evidence for the purpose of establishing  that  in fact they  supplied  furnishings  and electric  equipment  and charged no more  than  the  amounts shown  in these documents.  The first  respondent,  however, did  not  choose  to do so and preferred to  rest  his  case marely on his oral testimony which was so vague and  evasive as  not to give even the particulars of the specific  public meetings  at which furnishings and electric  equipment  were supplied by the different firms.  It may also be pointed out that  so far as Saini Electric Works is concerned, not  even the  bill of this firm was attempted to be produced  by  the first  respondent.   The  receipt of  this  firm  which  was produced  from the records of the Chief  Electoral  Officer-

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merely  showed  a sum of Rs. 180/- as having  been  received from  the  first respondent "on account of  loudspeaker  and light  arrangements for the period from 20th February,  1971 to  2nd March,1971".  It did not show where"loudspeaker  and light  arrangements" were supplied, what was the  number  of public  meetings  at  which the supply was  made,  how  many loudspeakers  were  supplied  and what was  the  nature  and extent  of  the lighting arrangements made  at  each  public meeting.    The  rate  at  which  "loudspeaker   and   light arrangements"  were supplied was also not mentioned  in  the receipt.   The  receipt  also did not  refer  to  supply  of microphones and, therefore, presumably, microphones were not supplied by Saini Electric Works and the amount of Rs. 180/- did not cover arty charges oil. that account. The  evidence of Subhash Arya (RIW 35) also exposes the  in- firmities in the case of the first respondent on this point. Subhash  Arya  (RIW 35) in his evidence made  a  distinction between  big public meetings and small public  meetings  and stated  that "for big public meetings respondent No.  I  had instructed  him to place an order with Tandon Tent House  to supply  furniture etc. other than electricity.   Electricity material  was  supplied  by  Saini  Electrical  Works.   For smaller  public  meetings  the furniture  etc.  used  to  be supplied  by Agarwal Tent House".  These were, according  to this  witness, twelve big public meetings and eight  out  of these  big public meetings, were held at Clock  Tower,  Bara Tooti,  Chowk Neemwala, Tel Mandi, Chhe Tooti, Chuna  Mandi, Kasabpura  and  Deputy Gunj, and the he remaining  four,  in Pahar Gunj.  It is clear from the particulars of the  twenty three public meetings admitted by the first respondent  that out  of the aforesaid eight big public meetings referred  to by  this  witness, three were held prior to  20th  February, 1971,  one at Clock Tower on 16th February, 1971, the  other at  Tel  Mandi  on  19th February, 1971  and  the  third  at Kasabpura  on 18th February, 1971.  Now, if  furnishings  at big public meetings were supplied by Tandon Tent & Furniture House,  as claimed by Subhash Arya (RIW 35), it must  follow that furnishings at these three big public meetings held  at Clock 295 also  have been supplied by Tandon Tent &  Furniture  House. But  the  bill of Tandon Tent & Furniture House  shows  that furnishings  were supplied only at "12 public meetings  hold in  the  month 20/2/71 to 2/3/71" and  no  furnishings  were supplied at any public meetings hold prior to 20th February, 1971.   If that be so, Tandon Tent & Furniture  House  could not  possibly  have supplied furnishings at  the  three  big public meetings hold at Clock Tower, Tel Mandi and Kasabpura prior to 20th February, 1971.  This casts grave doubt on the case of the first respondent that furnishings were  supplied by  Tandon Tent & Furniture House at twelve public  meetings held  by the first respondent and irresistibly leads to  the conclusion  that the. bill of Tandon Tent & Furniture  House is,  to say the least, highly suspicious.  The case  of  the first  respondent  in regard to furnishings  and  electrical equipment supplied by Agarwal Tent House, also suffers  from the  same  infirmity.   Agarwal  Tent  House,  according  to Subhash  Arya (RIW 35), supplied furnishings and  electrical equipment at smaller public meetings.  The public meeting at ’P’ Block, Andha Mughal on 1st March, 1971 was admittedly  a small  public  meeting and, therefore, if the  case  of  the first  respondent  were  true,  furnishings  and  electrical equipment at this public meetings should have been  supplied by  Agarwal Tent House.  But the bill of Agarwal Tent  House showed  that  furnishings  and  electrical  equipment   were

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supplied by that firm only at eleven public meetings held in the  month  of February, 1971.  It  is,  therefore,  obvious that,  according  to  this bill,  furnishings  and  electric equipment could not have been supplied by Agarwal Tent House at this public meeting held on 1st March, 1971.  The bill of Agarwal  Tent House thus does not fit in with  the  evidence and  it is difficult to accept it as genuine.  The only  way in  which  the  first respondent tried to get  out  of  this rather   difficult   situation  was  by  saying   that   the distinction  made  by  Subhash Arya  (RIW  35)  between  big meetings  and  small meetings was a  distinction  without  a difference   made  under  some  misapprehension   and   this explanation appealed to the learned Trial Judge. But  it is difficult to see how one could explain away  this distinction in such a casual manner, when Subhash Arya  (RIW 35) put forward this distinction deliberately and  advisedly as  part of the case of the first respondent and  there  was nothing  in his evidence to suggest that it was  made  under any misapprehension. Then,again,  it may be noted that,the bill of  Agarwal  Tent House referred to two public meetings one at Gulabi Bagh and the  other  at Sadar Bazar and charged for  furnishings  and electric  equipment said to have been supplied at these  two public meetings.  The first respondent, however, denied that any public meeting was held by him at Sadar Bazar and in the absence  of any positive evidence to the contrary,  we  must accept this denial as correct.  So far as the public meeting alleged  to have been held at Gulabi Bagh is concerned,  the first respondent at one place in his evidence disclaimed any knowledge   as  to  where  Gulabi  Bagh  was  situate,   but subsequently,  in  the course of his  cross-examination,  he unwittingly blurted out that Gulabi Bagh was 296 at  a distance of two or two and a half-miles from the  shop of Agarwal Tend House, which means that he know where Gulabi Bagh was.  Now, according to the list of twenty three public meetings given by the first respondent, there was no  public meeting  at  Gulabi Bagh and yet the bill  of  Agarwal  Tent House  referred  to a public meeting at  Gulabi  Bagh.   The first respondent was, therefore, constrained to put  forward a  rather ingenious explanation in the course  of  arguments that  Gulabi Bagh was in the area known as Andha Mughal  and the  reference  in  the  bill of  Agarwal  Tent  House  was, therefore, to the public meeting in Andha Mughal.  But  this explanation  is  palpably incorrect, because  the  only  two public  meetings out of those admitted by the first  respon- dent  which  took place in Andha Mughal were at  ’P’  Block, Andha  Mughal and ’IC Block, Andha Mughal, and Gulabi  Bagh, Andha  Mughal is clearly and indisputably a  different  area from  ’P’  Block or ’K’ Block.  Andha  Mughal.   There  was, therefore, no public meeting of the first respondent held at Gulabi Bagh.  The bill of Agarwal Tent House which refers to the  public meetings at Gulabi Bagh and Sadar Bazar  cannot, in the circumstances, be looked upon as a document inspiring confidence and no reliance can be placed upon it. There  are also certain other infirmities which stare us  in the  face  if we examine the matter a little  more  closely. The  bill  of Agarwal Tent House showed a lump  sum  of  Rs. 100/-for  carnage  charges and a lump sum of  Rs.  40/-  for labour  charges  in respect of  furnishings  and  electrical equipment  supplied  at eleven public meetings held  by  the first respondent.  That would mean that an aggregate sum  of Rs.  300/was  charged  by Agarwal Tent House  to  the  first respondent  by  way of hire for furnishings  and  electrical equipment  and the rate of hire thus came to about Rs.  27/-

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per  public  meeting.  So far as the bill of Tandon  Tent  & Furniture  House is concerned, it did not make any  separate mention   of  cartage  or  labour  charges  in  respect   of furnishings supplied at twelve public meetings of the  first respondent.  The explanation of the first respondent as well as  Bhagmal  Tandon (RIW 14), the sole  proprietor  of  this firm,  was  that  the rate of Rs. 15/-  per  public  meeting mentioned  in this bill was inclusive of cartage and  labour charges  and that is why these charges were  not  separately shown as in the bill of Agarwal Tent House. obviously,  some such  explanation had to be given by the  first  respondent, because no separate amount in. respect of cartage and labour charges  was  shown by him in his return of  expenses.   But that exposes completely the dubious character of the bill of Tandon  Tent  &  Furniture House.  The  cartage  and  labour charges,  according to the bill of Agarwal Tent House,  were Rs.  13/- per public meeting.  We will assume in  favour  of the first respondent that the cartage and labour charges  in respect  of furnishings supplied by Tandon Tent &  Furniture House  and  the  electrical  equipment  supplied  by   Saini Electrical Works were the same, namely, Rs. 13/- per  public meeting, even though the furnishings supplied by Tandon Tent and Furniture House were in much greater quantity than  those supplied  by Agarwal Tent House.  But even on  that  minimal footing,   the  aggregate  charges  by  way  of   hire   for furnishings  supplied by Tandon Tent & Furniture  House  and electric  equipment supplied by Saini Electric  Works  would come to Rs. 17/- per public meeting.  Is it not strange 2 97 and almost incradible that the hire charges for  furnishings and  electrical equipment supplied by Agarwal Tent House  at small public meetings should be Rs. 27/- per public  meeting while  the hire charges for furnishings supplied  by  Tandon Tent & Furniture House arid electrical equipment supplied by Saini  Electric Works at big public meetings should be  only Rs.  17/- per public meeting.  The furnishings  supplied  by Tandon  Tent & Furniture House,were admittedly much more  in quantity  then  those supplied by Agarwal  Tent  House  and, therefore, the hire charges of Tandon Tent & Furniture House and Saini Electric Works should have been higher than  those of Agarwal Tent House.  But strangely enough they were lower by about Rs. 10/- per public meeting.  It would be straining our credulity to the utmost to accept this fantastic theory. We  may  also point out that it is rather strange  that  the first respondent should have entered into arrangements  with Tandon  Tent  & Furniture House and Agarwal  Tent  House  to supply  fixed  items  of furnishings,  irrespective  of  the nature or size of the public meeting.  Would the nature  and quantity  of the items of furnishings required at  a  public meeting  not  depend on the place or locality in  which  the public  meeting is to be held-whether the audience  expected would  be  large  or  small  ? This  is  of  course  riot  a circumstance  on which we place much reliance but it  cannot be  said to be wholly without significance.  Then  again  it may  be  noted  that the rate of  about  Rs.  27/per  public meeting  by way of hire for furnishings and electric  equip- ment supplied by Agarwal Tent House as also the rate of  Rs. 15/per  public  meeting for furnishings supplied  by  Tandon Tent  & Furniture House and the rate of Rs. 15/- per  public meeting for electrical equipment supplied by Saini  Electric Works-both  the latter rates being inclusive of  labour  and cartage charges-are absurdly low and can hardly be  regarded as  genuine.   It was not the case of the  first  respondent that   the   rates  charged  by  these  three   firms   were confessional rates.  In fact, Bhagnial Tandon (RIW 14),  who

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is  the proprietor of Tandon Tent & Furniture House,  stated in his evidence that the rates charged by him from the first respondent  were the usual market rates.  If we look at  the bills  Exs.  PW 15/1-A, PW 15/1-B and PW 15/1-C produced  by Permod  Kumar  (PW 15), it is clear that  the  market  rates particularly  for  the supply of electrical  equipment  were very  much higher than those shown to have been  charged  by these three firms. We may then examine the evidence of Bhagmal Tandon (RIW 14), who came as a witness on behalf of the first respondent.  He stated  in his evidence that he did not receive  any  orders from  the first respondent to supply furnishings during  the election but it was Subhash Arya (RIW 35) who placed  orders with him "to arrange for furniture for election meetings  of respondent  No. 1".  He deposed that the bill in respect  of furnishings  supplied  by him was submitted by  him  to  the first  respondent and he received payment of the  amount  of the  bill  against the receipt Ex.  R-8.   He  was  severely cross-examined on behalf of the petitioner and in his cross- examination, he admitted 298 that  even during the previous elections he had  worked  for the first respondent who had stood as a candidate on  behalf of  the Congress.  He stated that he maintained only a  bill book,  a ledger and a cash book and he produced these  books of  account  in Court.  The bill book contained  the  carbon copies of the bills issued by the witness during the  period 6th  February, 1971 to 21st March, 197 1. The bill  for  the furnishings supplied to the first respondent bore the number 8170 and a carbon copy of it found a place in the bill book. This bill was for Rs. 180 and it was dated 4th March,  1971. There  were carbon copies of bills Nos. 8167, 8168 and  8169 in  the bill book which all bore the date 4th  March,  1971. The aggregate amount of these four bills, namely, Bills Nos. 8167,  8168,  8169  and 8170, came to Rs.  189.75  and  this aggregate  amount appeared to have been carried to the  cash book  and  entered  on the credit side under  the  date  4th March,  1971  at page 93 of the cash book.   The  particular soft  his entry in the cash book showed that the  amount  of Rs.  189 .75 was credited as representing cash  received  in respect  of bills Nos. 8167 to 8170.  This amount of R.  189 -7 5 was then carried to the ledger at page 15 and  credited in the account headed "Cash Hire in respect of Goods"  under the date 4th March, 1971.  Now if these entries in the  cash book and the ledger are genuine, they would go a long way to support  the genuineness of the bill No. 8170 said  to  have been submitted by Tandon Tent & Furniture House to the first respondent.  But, we do not think we can, with any degree of confidence,  place  reliance on these entries.  It  is  well known  in bookkeeping that it is the cash book which is  the primary book and the ledger is only a subsidiary book  which is always prepared from the cash book at periodic intervals. We  must, therefore, first examine whether the entry of  Rs. 189  .75 in the cash book can be regarded as genuine.   This entry in the cash book shows that the amount of Rs. 189  .75 was received in cash on 4th March, 1971 in respect of  bills Nos.  8167 to 8170.  That would mean that the amount of  Rs. 180/-  in  respect of bill No. 8170 was received  by  Tandon Tent & Furniture House from the first respondent in cash on 4th  March, 1971.  But, if we look at the original bill  No. 8170,  we  find  an endorsement at the  foot  of  that  bill showing that the amount of that bill, namely, Rs. 180/-, was paid  to Tandon Tent & Furniture House on 7th  April,  1971. That  is also borne out by the receipt R-8 dated 7th  April, 1971 said to have been passed by Bhagmal Tandon (RIW 14)  on

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behalf  of  Tandon Tent & Furniture House in favour  of  the first  respondent.  But, if the amount of the bill was  paid by the first respondent to Tandon Tent & Furniture House  on 7th  April,  1971, it is difficult to see how  it  could  be shown in the cash book as having been received on 4th March, 1971.  In fact, if we look at the cash book, it is apparent, even  to the naked eye, that the whole of it seems  to  have been  written out in the same ink at one and the same  time. We have in the course of our experience yet to come across a genuine cash book written with such neatness, uniformly with the  same  pen and in the same shade of ink over  a  hundred pages.   We cannot place any reliance on the entry  of  Rs. 189.75  under  date 4th March, 1971 at page 93 of  the  cash book  and the corresponding entry at page 15 of  the  ledger must also likewise be regarded as unreliable. it is no doubt true that the bill book produced by Bhagmal Tandon (RIW  14) contained a carbon copy of bill No. 8170 alleged 299 first respondent.  But we are not at all satisfied about the genuineness  of this bill.  We have already set out some  of the reasons why we find it difficult to accept this bill  as genuine.   We may add two or three more reasons  for  taking this view.  In the first place, if we look at the bill book, it is evident that this is the only bill which has been made out  in  English.  The rest of the bills are  all  in  Urdu. Secondly, it is apparent from the receipt Ex.  R-8-and  this Bhagmal  Tandon  (RIW  14) was forced  to  admit  in  cross- examination-that the bill number originally written in  that receipt was different and it was struck off and in its place bill  No. 8170 was mentioned.  That raises a certain  amount of  suspicion as to the genuineness of bill No. 8170.   Then again  it  is rather strange that Bhagmal  Tandon  (RIW  14) should  have no record in his possession to show which  were the  public meetings at which furnishings were  supplied  by his  firm  and  what were the dates  on  which  such  public meetings  were  held.  It is also surprising that  bill  No. 8170  submitted  by him to the first respondent  should  not mention the dates and places of the public meetings at which furnishings were supplied by his firm.  Bhagmal Tandon  (RIW 14)  could not even state from memory as to which  were  the places at which the public meetings catered by his firm were hold.   He  said it his evidence quite unwittingly  that  he used  to  receive  chits  or  telephone  calls   "containing requirements for the election meetings of respondent No. 1". But immediately realising that he had slipped into a  rather inconvenient  statement he corrected himself by saying  that the  chits which were received me-rely indicated the  places where  the  material had to be supplied and it  had  already been  agreed  as to what he was supposed to supply  at  each public  meeting.   When  asked to produce  these  chits,  he stated that    they  had not been retained by him  and  were destroyed  as soon as the final account was made up  on  4th March, 1971.  It may be noted that the version of Om Prakash Makkan  (RIW 1) in this connection was a  little  different. He did not support the story of chits, but stated that  "our volunteers  used to go and specify the requirement for  each meeting".   Then  Bhagmal  Tandon (RIW  14)  was  questioned whether  any receipts Were obtained evidencing  delivery  of the   furnishings  to  the  representatives  of  the   first respondent.   He first blundered into the statement that  he maintained copies but immediately resiled from it by  saying that  he maintained a bound book of printed forms and  every time  that  a  thelewala went to deliver  furnishings  at  a public  meeting, he would tear off a printed form from  this bound  book  and  give it to the  thelewala  to  obtain  the

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signature of the person who received the furnishings and the thelewala would bring back that printed form duly signed  by such  person.  No copies of these printed forms  of  receipt were, however, maintained by him and the originals were torn off  by  him after the account was settled  with  the  first respondent  on 4th March, 1971.  He was then  cross-examined with regard to payment of carnage charges to the thelewalas. He stated that he used to pay the thelewalas at the rate  of Re. 1/- or Rs. 1.50 for each one way trip and thus,  accord- ing  to him, the cartage charges came to about Rs.  3/-  per each return trip.  Since the cartage charges of Rs. 3/-  per each return trip would be, a legitimate business expenditure incurred  by him which he would be entitled to claim by  way of deduction in his income 300 tax assessment, he was asked whether it was recorded in  his account  books.   But he was not in a position to  show  any entries  in  the account books relating to  payment  of  the cartage  charges and he was, therefore, constrained  to  say that  he used to make this payment from his pocket  and  did not record it anywhere in his books.  This is an explanation which  is difficult to swallow.  No business man would  fail to show in his account books expenditure incurred by him  in the course of his business which he can claim as a deduction in his income tax assessment.  We are, therefore, not at all satisfied  that furnishings were supplied by Tandem  Tent  & Furniture  House  as  claimed by the  first  respondent  and Bhagmal  Tandon (RIW 14) and we cannot accept bill No.  8170 alleged  to  have been submitted by that firm to  the  first respondent as genuine. Since,  in the view taken by us, the bills of Tandon Tent  & Furniture  House and Agarwal Tent House and the  receipt  of Saini  Electric  Works do not appear to be  genuineness  and they  do  not correctly show the expenses  incurred  by  the first  respondent  in  regard to  the  twenty  three  public meetings  admitted  by him, it becomes necessary for  us  to inquire  what  were the expenses actually  incurred  by  the first respondent in connection. with the twenty three public meetings  admitted  by  him  as  also  nine  further  public meetings  proved  to  have  been  held  in  support  of  his election.   Now, except in case of two public meetings,  one at  Tel Mandi on 19th February, 1971 and the other at  Chuna Mandi on 22nd February 1971 no evidence was led on behalf of the  petitioner to show the actual expenses incurred by  the first respondent in regard to any of these public  meetings. Indeed,  the  petitioner could not possibly  lead  any  such evidence, because what expenses were actually incurred would be  a  matter  within the special  knowledge  of  the  first respondent.  But that does not moan that on the material  on record, the Court cannot arrive at a reasonable estimate  of the  expenses incurred by the first respondent.  It  is  now well settled by the decision of this Court in Megraj Patodia v.  B.  K.  Birla,  (1) that "if  the  court  comes  to  the conclusion  that an item of expenditure has been  suppressed in the return of election expenses, the more fact that there is  no sufficient evidence about the amount that  must  have been spent is not ground foreign ignoring the matter.  It is the duty of the court to assess all expenses as best it  can and  though  the court should not enter into the  region  of speculation or merely try to guess the amount that must have been  spent, it would generally be possible to arrive at  an amount of expenditure oil a conservative basis and, where it is  possible to arrive at any such estimate, such  estimated amount  should be hold as not shown by the candidate in  his election account".  See also P. C. P. Raddiar v. S.  Perumal

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(2).   The  Court  cannot fold its hands  and  surrender  in helplessness because the respondent refuses to cooperate and assist  and  holds  back the  relevant  information  in  his possession.   The Court in such a case is not  powerless  to arrive  at the truth as best as it can.  The Court  can  and must,  as far as possible, assess the amount of  expenditure on  the basis of the material on record when it  finds  that there is suppression of some item of expenditure or the item is  deliberately shown as less than what must have  actually been incurred.  Here in the present case (1) [1971] 2 S.C.R.118. (2) [1972] 2 S.C.R. 646. 301 the  first respondent has not only suppressed the  items  of expenditure  on  nine further public meetings but  also  the items   of  expenditure  on  admitted  twenty-three   public meetings are deliberately shown at a much lesser figure than what must have actually been incurred.  We must,  therefore, examine  whether there is sufficient material before  us  on the basis of which we can arrive at a reasonable estimate of the expenses incurred by the first respondent in  connection with  the  admitted  twenty-three public  meetings  and  the further nine public meetings. Now  the material before us for estimating  the  expenditure which  must  reasonably  have been  incurred  by  the  first respondent in connection with his public meetings is of  two kinds; one consists of documentary evidence in the shape  of Exs.   PW  15/1-A,  PW 15/1-B and PW 15/1-C  and  the  other consists  of oral evidence of witnesses.  Since  documentary evidence  always carries greater weight and  assurance  than oral  evidence  and  it is safer to  rest  a  conclusion  on documentary  evidence  rather than oral evidence  which  may sometimes  be  treacherously  deceptive  and  difficult   of correct  evaluation, we would first examine the  documentary evidence  and  see  how far it helps  us  to  determine  the expenditure   incurred   by  the  first   respondent.    The petitioner  called in evidence Permod Kumar (PW 15) and  the documentary  evidence  in the shape of Exs.  PW  15/1-A,  PW 15/1-B  and  PW 15/1-C was produced by this  witness.   This witness  stated in his evidence that he carried on  business of  hiring out furnishings and electrical equipment  and  in course  of his business he "hired out durries, stage,  loud- speakers  etc.  to  respondent No.  I  during  the  election period".   He produced from his bill book carbon  copies  of three  bills  in  respect  of  furnishings  and   electrical equipment hired out by him to the first respondent.  One was bill  No. 263 dated 20th February, 1971 for Rs.  368/-,  the other  was  bill No. 270 dated 24th February, 1971  for  Rs. 414.50  and the third was bill No. 271 dated 24th  February, 1971  for Rs. 360/- He said that one or two days before  the date of the first bill, the first respondent had come to him accompanied by Sat Prakash Makkan and one other person whose name he did not remember and placed an order with him  "with respect  to  all the three bills" and  the  furnishings  and electric  equipment  mentioned  in these  three  bills  were supplied  by him according to the order placed by the  first respondent  and  the payment of the amounts of  these  three bills  was made to him personally by the  first  respondent. The copies of these three bills were marked Exs. 15/1-A,  PW 15/1-B  and PW 15/1-C.  The first respondent challenged  the genuineness of these three bills and the learned Trial Judge felt  serious  doubt about the authenticity of  these  three bills  and declined to act upon them.  We do not  think  the learned  Trial  Judge  was right in  casting  doubt  on  the genuineness  of these three bills.  There is  absolutely  no

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reason why these three bills should be regarded as  unworthy of  credibility.   Permod  Kumar (PW 15)  who  produced  and proved these three bills is a completely independent witness who  has  no  interest in one side or  the  other.   It  was faintly suggested to him in cross-examination that he was  a member  of  the  Jan  Sangh and  he  worked  for  Jan  Sangh candidates in the elections but this suggestion was  stoutly denied by him and in fact there is nothing 302 to show that he was in any way interested in the Jan  Sangh. It  was  then  put  to him that he  was  a  partner  of  one Padamchand  Goel  who was a member of  the  Delhi  Municipal Corporation on Jan Sangh ticket.  He admitted that there was a  partnership between him and Padamchand Goel entered  into in  1966 but that partnership was dissolved within three  or four  months  after Padamchand Goel became a member  of  the Delhi  Municipal  Corporation.  It does  not  follow  merely because an erstwhile partner of this witness was a member of the Jan Sangh, that he too should be having interest in  the Jan  Sangh.  It would be too much to presume that  a  person without  any political affiliation cannot have any  business relationship  with  a member of a political  party,  and  if there is any business relationship, it must be presumed that both  belong to the same political party.  In fact  we  find from the carbon copies of bills Nos. 296 and 297 in the bill book Ex. PW 1511 that this witness supplied material on hire even  to  the Youth Congress which is  avowedly  a  Congress Organisation.   There is absolutely no reason suggested  why this  witness should have gone to the length of  fabricating false  documents for the purpose of supporting the  case  of the  petitioner.   The carbon copies of the bills  Exs.   PW 15/1-A,  PW 1611-B and PW 15/1-C find place in their  proper serial order in a bound bill-book and it is indeed difficult to  appreciate how they could be subsequently introduced  in the  bill-book unless of course the suggestion be  that  the whole  of  the bill-book was fabricated for the  purpose  of this  case.  This was, however, not the suggestion  made  to the  witness  in cross-examination.  In any  event  we  have carefully  gone through the whole of the bill-book which  is marked Ex.  PW 15/1 and we do not find any indication in  it which  might betray that it is a subsequently got  up  bill- book.   Even  the bill-book for  the  immediately  preceding period was produced by this witness and it is marked Ex.  PW 15/2.   That  bill-book  contains  carbon  copies  of  bills commencing form No. 201 and ending with No. 250 and the bill book  Ex.  PW 1511 starts from carbon copy of bill  No.  251 and  ends  with  carbon copy of bill No.  300.   The  carbon copies  of the bills in both these bill-books appear  to  be quite  natural  and  regular and no valid  reason  has  been suggested  as to why we should regard them  with  suspicion. It  is  no  doubt true that it was elicited  in  the  cross- examination  of  this witness that he did not  maintain  any cash-book  or ledger or any other account book but  that  is not  such an unusual circumstance as to lead us  to  believe that the carbon copies of the bills produced by him were not genuine.   It is not at all improbable that the only  record which  the witness maintained was the bill-book, because  by the very nature of his business, the bill-book would contain a  complete  record of the amount of hire received  by  him. The  carbon copies of the bills not only show the  names  of the parties to whom materials are given on hire but also the dates and the particulars of the items and the hire  charges in respect of the same.  The witness also admitted in cross- examination  that he did not maintain any receipt books  but that is also not at all unusual.  One does not need to  have

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a  regular receipt book.  A receipt can always be  given  on the  bill  submitted  to  the  customer.   Then  some  minor discrepancies  were sought to be shown in the carbon  copies of  one  or two other bills in the bill book.   One  was  in respect  of bill No.256.It  was pointed out to  the  witness that bills Nos. 254 and 255                             303 bore date 15th February, 1971, while bill No. 256 bore  date 14th February, 1971 and he was asked how a latter bill could bear  an earlier date than the earlier bills.   The  witness pointed  out  that was an obvious mistake and  there  is  no doubt that it was so.  It is apparent from the carbon copies of  bills  No. 254, 255 and 256 that bill No.  256,  was  in continuation of bills Nos. 264 and 265, forming part of  one single bill in the name of K. K. Bajaj, and since the  later two  bills bore date 15th February, 1971, the former  should also  have been dated 15th February, 1971, but through  some obvious  error  the  date  came  to  be  mentioned  as  14th February,  1971.   No  point can be  made  of  this  obvious mistake.   Then  the attention of the witness was  drawn  to some bills in the bill books PW 1511 and PW 15/2 which  were shown as cancelled, and there was some cross-examination  of the  witness  on this point.  But we fail to  see  how  this circumstance is of any help to the first respondent.  It  is clear  from  the bill books Exs.  PW 1511 and PW  15/2  that whenever  a bill was cancelled, the original as well as  the carbon  copy were marked "cancelled" or crossed  out.   Now; there is nothing unusual in cancelling a bill if it is found that there is some mistake made while writing it out.   This happens sometimes even to the most careful of men and is not a.  circumstance which should Le regarded in any  manner  as suspicious.   The important thing is that the  originals  as well  as  the  carbon  copies of  the  cancelled  bills  are retained  in  the bill books.  That would show  the  regular manner  in  which  the  bill books  are  maintained  by  the witness.  There are no blank bills in the bill books PW 1511 and PW 15/2 which could have been utilised subsequently  for the  purpose  of fabricating a bill as of an  earlier  date. The  suggestion made in the cross-examination of course  was that  there  were blank bills in the bill book PW  1511  and these  were  utilised for the purpose of  making  out  false bills  in  the  name  of the  first  respondent.   But  this suggestions is wholly’ unwarranted and is not supported  ’by anything  in  the bill book PW 15/1 or PW 15/2.   There  are only  three cancelled bills in the bill book PW 15/1.   They are bills Nos. 253, 269 and 296.  It will be seen that  none of  these three bills is blank.  Each one of them  has  been made out in the name of some party or the other and then  it has been cancelled.  The same position obtains in regard  to bills  Nos.  207, 208 and 229 in bill book PW 15/2.   It  is apparent  in the case of some of these bil’s that they  were cancelled  because of’ some mistake and then new bills  were made  out  in the names of the same parties.   Compare,  for example, cancelled bill No. 229 with bill No. 231, cancelled bill  No. 208 with bill No. 209 and cancelled bill’ No.  253 with bill No. 254.  There is no reason why any blank  unuti- lised  bills should have been allowed to remain in the  bill books.   That  is  not done by  people  who  maintain  their accounts  in the regular course of business.   Permod  Kumar (PW  16) could not have anticipated on 20th  February,  1971 that some blank bills might come in handy at a future  point of time and he should, therefore, leave some blank bills  in the bill books.  It is also difficult to believe that  there should  have  been  a blank bill No.  263  and  again  three continuous blank bills at Nos. 269, 270 and 271.  We find it

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impossible  to  accept this theory of fabrication  of  bills Exs.  PW 15/1-A, PW 15/1-B and PW 15/1-C by utilising  blank bills  in  the bill book Ex.  PW 1611.  Moreover,  there  is inherent  evidence  in  these bills  which  indicates  their genuine- 304 ness.  The charge for a complete stage of 12’ x 10’ size and 5’ height with chadder, durries and carpets is shown in  the bill Ex.  PW 15/1-A as Rs. 40/- per day.  That appears to be quite  reasonable compared to the ridiculously  low  figures given  in  the bills of Tandon Tent &  Furniture  House  and Agarwal   Tent  House.   Similarly,  the  charge   for   one "loudspeaker  service with five units and double  mike  with standby  battery arrangements" is shown in the bill Ex.   PW 15/1-A  as  Rs. 90/- and for one  loudspeaker  service  with eight   units   and  double  mike  with   stand-by   battery arrangements  is  shown in the bill Ex.  PW  15/1-B  as  Rs. 120/-,  while according to the bills of Agarwal  Tent  House and  the receipt of Saini Electric Works, it would  be  only about  Rs.  6/-, because out of Rs. 15/- shown  by  them,  a minimum  amount  of Rs. 3/to Rs. 4/- would be  taken  up  by cartage and labour charges and the hire of four flood lights at  the rate of Re. 1. 50 per flood light would come to  Rs. 6/-.   It is possible to believe that in the year  1971  two microphones-even one, we may assume with five  loudspeakers and  standby battery arrangements coupled with the  services of  an attendant to look after the unit could  be  available for Rs. 6/- for a period of about four hours in the city  of Delhi ? It is an insult to our intelligence to be told  that the  charge would be something as low as Rs. 6/- or for  the matter  of  that,  even Rs. 16/-.  Then  again,  it  may  be noticed that the bills Exs.  PW 15/1-A and PW 15/1-B were in respect  of  hire charges for the material supplied  at  the public  meetings  at Tel Mandi on 19th  February,  1971  and Chuna  Mandi  on  22nd February, 1971.   Both  these  public meetings  were big public meetings which, according  to  the evidence, were attended by more than 2000 people and it  is, therefore, quite reasonable to assume that a large number of durries must have been required at each of these two  public meetings  as mentioned in the bills Exs.  PW 16/1-A  and  PW 15/1-B.   The bill Ex.  PW 16/1-C showing hire  charges  for sets  of  battery operated loudspeakers  for  announcing  on scooter for two days is also quite natural because it is  in evidence  that announcements of public ’meetings  were  made from  scooters and battery operated loudspeakers  must  have been  utilised for the purpose.  It is significant that  the first  respondent has not shown hiring of  battery  operated loudspeakers  from  any  other party.   We  are,  therefore, satisfied beyond doubt that the three bills Exs.  PW 16/1-A, PW 15/1-B and PW 15/1-C are genuine and they correctly  show the expenses incurred by the first respondent. Now  the  bills  Exs.  PW 15/1-A and  PW  16/1-B  serve  two purposes.   They not only show the actual expenses  incurred by  the  first  respondent in  connection  with  the  public meetings at Tel Mandi on 19th February, 1971 and Chuna Mandi on  22nd February, 1971, but also provide reliable  material for making a reasonable estimate of the expenses which  must have  been  incurred by the first respondent  in  connection with   other  public  meetings.   The  actual   expense   in connection  with  the public meeting at Tel  Mandi  on  19th February, 1971 was Rs. 350/according to Ex.  PW 1611 A  and in  connection  with the public meeting at Chuna  Mandi  on 22nd  February,  1971  it was Rs. 400/-  as  appearing  from Ex.PW15/1-B. We may err on the side of conservatism and take the  lesser  of these two figures, namely, Rs. 360/-,  as  a

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basis for making a reasonable estimate of the expenditure in connection with other public meetings.  This would mean that there must have been expenditure                             3 05 of  about  Rs. 350/- per public meeting in  connection  with public meetings of the type which were held at Tel Mandi  on 19th February, 1971 and Chuna Mandi; on 22nd February, 1971. These  were  obviously bigger meetings and for  the  smaller ones,  the  expenditure would be somewhat less  and  we  may reasonably estimate it at Rs. 150/- per public meeting on a. most conservative basis. This  estimation is amply supported by the oral evidence  in the case.  We do not propose to refer to the evidence of all the  witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioner on  this point,  because  a  large number of  them  were  openly  and avowedly supporters of Jan Sangh and it would not be safe to rely  on their uncorroborated testimony for the  purpose  of founding  a  charge of corrupt practice  against  the  first respondent.   But there are a few witnesses  whose  evidence inspires  confidence  and we shall discuss  their  evidence. The first witness we must refer in this connection is Chunni Lal  (PW  32).  He was himself a candidate at  the  election sponsored by Congress (0) and figured as respondent No. 3 in the  petition.  We have gone through his evidence  carefully and  critically  and  he has impressed us as  a  witness  of truth.   It may be noted that though he was a  candidate  at the election, he was not interested either in the Jan  Sangh or  in  the Congress.Being a member  of  Congress(O),he  was opposed  both  to  the  Congress and  the  Jan  Sangh.   The evidence he gave was quite restrained and he did not indulge in   any   exaggerated  statements.    His   frankness   and guilelessness  are  evident  from his  admission  in  cross- examination  that  he was "fond of contesting  election  for parliament,  corporation,  or  metropolitan  council".   His pathetic  statement that all his workers abandoned  him  "on the eve of the day of polling" is also quite eloquent of his sincerity and truthfulness.  He stated in his evidence  that the  public  meetings held by the Congress  were  "shandar". There  used to be stage covered with curries and  chandinis, loudspeakers,  carpets  and  lights.  "The  stage  was  made attractive to attract the people".  He frankly admitted that Jan  Sangh  meetings  had  also  the  same  furnishings  and electrical equipment but stated that "the Jan Sangh meetings were  not  so shandar" as the Congress meetings.   ’He  then deposed  to a public meeting held by him in Bara Hindu  Rao. He  stated  that this public meeting held by  him  was  very small  but even then, it cost him between Rs. 150/- and  Rs. 200/-.   We  are  inclined to accept  this  evidence  as  it appears to us to have a ring of truth.  Now, there can be no doubt that if a small public meeting held by Chunni Lal  (PW 32)  cost him Rs. 150/- to Rs. 200/-, a much more  ’shandar’ public  meeting  held by the Congress would  certainly  cost anything more than Rs. 200/-.  The estimate of Rs. 150/- per public  meeting  can,  therefore, safely be  regarded  as  a reasonable estimate. We  may  also refer to the evidence of  Dharamvir  (PW  66). This  witness  was  also an independent  witness  having  no interest   either  in  Jan  Sangh  or  in  Congress.    When questioned  in regard to his association with Jan  Sangh  he stated emphatically and in clear terms that he was neither a worker  nor a member of the Jan Sangh.  It was suggested  to him that his brother Jagdish was a Secretary of a Mandal  of Jan Sangh to which he replied that to his knowledge, at  any rate, during the 306

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last Six Or seven years, his brother Jagdish had not been  a Secretary  of any Jan Sangh Mandal.  He was also  questioned about  the political affiliation of his brother Jagdish  and his  answer  was that he did not know  whether  his  brother Jagdish was a member of Jan Sangh.  There is nothing to show that  this witness had any interest in Jan Sangh or that  he belonged  to  the political persuasion of’ Jan  Sangh.   His evidence  cannot, therefore, be assailed on the ground  that he  was an interested witness.  Now this witness carried  on business   of  hiring  shamyanas,  furniture  and   marriage accessories.  He stated that he attended a public meeting of the  first respondent at Bara Tooti Chowk on 22nd  February, 1971-  the  date 22nd January, 1971 given by  him  being  an obvious  mistake-and at this public meeting, he saw a  stage big  enough  to  accommodate 25 to  30  persons  covered  by curries,  chandinis  and  2 or 3 carpets,  200  durries  for people  to  sit, two or three microphones,  seven  or  eight loudspeakers  and  about  30 or 35 big  flood  lights.   The stage,  according to him-, must have been made of 24  or  30 takhats and there were three tiers, one above the other,  in which  these  takhats were arranged.  He then  proceeded  to give  the  rates  of durries,  carpets,  chandnis,  takhats, microphones  and  flood lights. He stated  that  the  normal charges  were  Re. 1/- per takhat of the size of 6’ x  3’  x 13’, Rs. 2/- per chandni of the size of 12’ x 9’ Rs. 4/- per carpet of the size of 6’ x 9’ 75 paise per durry of the Size of  1’ X 9’, Rs. 1 .50 to Rs. 2/- for each flood  light  and Rs.  60 or Rs. 70 for the type of make which he saw at  this public  meeting.   He was cross-examine at  length  both  in regard  to  the  furnishings which he  saw  at  this  public meeting  as also in regard to the rates deposed to  by  him, but  his evidence could not be shaken in  cross-examination. He  of course frankly admitted that the rates he  had  given were  of a medium class goods which he kept in his shop  and the  rates  of third class goods could be lower  than  those stated  by  him.  But when he was shown the bill  of  Tandon Tent & Furniture House, he opined in no uncertain terms that the  rates  charged  in that bill were low,  though  it  was always  open to a dealer to charge less if he so wanted.  it may,  however,  be remembered in this  connection  that  the evidence  of  Bhagmal  Tandon (RIW 14) was  that  the  rates charged  by  him  were  normal  market  rates.   There  can, therefore, be no doubt that the charges shown in the bill of Tandon  Tent & Furniture House were not genuine charges  but were  deliberately deflated to suit the convenience  of  the first  respondent.  It may also be noted that the charge  of Rs. 60-/ or Rs. 70-/ for the microphones deposed to by  this witness  was  not at all challenged on behalf of  the  first respondent  in cross-examination nor was the charge  of  Re. 1  .50 or Rs. 2-/ for each flood light.  It  is,  therefore, apparent  from  the  evidence  of  this  witness  that   the expenditure  in connection with the public meeting  at  Bara Tooti Chowk on 22nd February, 1971 could not have been  less than Rs. 250/- and that justifies the reasonable estimate of Rs. 150/- per public meeting. We may also refer to the evidence of O.P. Bharti (RIW 23) in this connection.  This witness was summoned on behalf of the first  respondent and his evidence, therefore  assumes  some importance.   He  was  questioned  in  cross-examination  in regard  to  what he saw at the public meeting of  the  first respondent at Bara Tooti Chowk which 307 he  attended.  He stated that in this public  meeting  there was  a stage 20’ in length, 10’ in width and 5’  in  height. The  stage was covered by durries and chaddars.  There  were

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two microphones.  There were durries on the ground in  front of  the stage.  There were four or five flood lights on  the stage  and  there was electric bulbs hung at three  or  four poles.  Now, in order to make a stage of the size deposed to by  this witness, it would be necessary to have at least  30 takhats of the size 6’x 3’x 1--3/4’ and that would cost  not less  than  Rs.  30/-.  The cost  of  two  microphones  with loudspeakers would easily be in the neighborhood of Rs. 80/- or Rs. 90/-.  Then the flood lights and electric bulbs would also  cost  at least Rs. 15/- even on the basis  that  there were  only 4 or 5 floodlights and electric bulbs hanging  at only  3 or 4 poles; which appears to us to be quite  clearly an underestimate.  There would also be expense in connection with  durries  and Chaddars.  It is true that  according  to this witness; the durries in front of the stage would be  at the  most  20 or 25 but we are not inclined to  accept  this statement  because in a public meeting where there are  more than  2000  people,  there must be many  more  durries  than merely,  20  or 25.  In fact, Daulat Ram (PW 42) who  was  a Sub-Inspector  from the CID Special Branch,  clearly  stated that  "there were a considerable number of durries"  in  the meeting at Chowk Bara Tooti.  The expense in this connection cannot be less than Rs. 26/- to Rs. 30/-.  And added to this would be cartage and labour charges which we may put at  not less  than Rs. 13/-.  That would easily take  the  aggregate expenditure  wall  above Rs. 160/- even on  a  most  minimal basis.   We  do  not,  therefore, think  that  we  would  be unjustified  in  accepting a conservative  estimate  of  Rs. 150/- per public meeting. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner has established that the  first respondent incurred expenditure of Rs.  360/-  on the public meeting at Tel Mandi on 19th February, 1971,  Rs. 400/- on the public meeting at Chuna Mandi on 22nd February, 1971  and  Rs.  350/-  for  two  sets  of  battery  operated loudspeakers  for  announcement on scooter.  So far  as  the other thirty public meetings in connection with the election of  the first respondent are concerned, we think that  on  a very    conservative estimate, the first respondent must  be held  to have incurred expenditure of Rs. 150/-  per  public meeting  and  that  would make a total  expenditure  of  Rs. 4,500/-  in  connection with these thirty  public  meetings. The  aggregate  expenditure incurred or  authorised  by  the first  respondent  in connection with the  total  number  of thirty  two public meetings must, therefore, add up  to  Rs. 5,600/-.  But the first respondent showed only an  aggregate expenditure  of Rs.   800/- in the return of expenses  filed by  him  and  that  would mean  that,  over  and  above  the expenditure  of  Rs.  800/- shown by  him,  he  incurred  or authorised  further  expenditure  of Rs.  4,800/-  on  these thirty-two  public  meetings  held in  connection  with  his election. That  takes us to a consideration of the public  meeting  at Idgah  Road which was addressed by the Prime  Minister.   So far  as  this public meeting is concerned, the  evidence  on record  is not sufficient to establish that the expenses  in connection with it were incurred or authorised by the  first respondent.  There is no reliable evidence "on behalf of the petitioner to show that this public meeting was held by 5- 5--M255Sup.CI/75 308 the  first respondent or that it was a public  meeting  held specifically  in connection with the election of  the  first respondent.  The evidence does not even go so far as to  say that  this  public  meeting  was held  in  the  Sadar  Bazar Parliamentary  constituency from where the first  respondent

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was a candidate.  In fact, Govind Ram Varma (PW 19) admitted that  the  place where this public meeting was held  was  in Karol Bagh constituency.  It also came out in evidence  that this   public  meeting  was  attended  both  by  the   first respondent  and  T. Sohan Lal and it could  not,  therefore, possibly   have  been  a  public  meeting   exclusively   in connection with the election of the first respondent.  If it had  been exclusively an election meeting of the first  res- pondent,  permission  for holding it would in  the  ordinary course have been obtained by Dr. Roshan Lal, but Dr.  Roshan Lal clearly stated in his evidence that he never applied for permission to hold this public meeting.  It is true that the first  respondent  spent a sum of Rs. 35/for  patrol  for  a scooter which his wife and one Miss Abrol utilised for going round  asking  women voters to attend  this  public  meeting which  was going to be addressed by the Prime Minister,  but that does not necessarily mean that this public meeting  was arranged  by  the  first  respondent  or  the  expenses   in connection with it were incurred or authorised by the  first respondent.   It  is  quite possible  that  even  if  public meeting was organised by his political party for the purpose of general party propaganda, the first respondent would make efforts   to  persuade  persons  within  the  area  of   his constituency  to  attend this public meeting as  that  would indirectly  help  in  his election campaign.   But  on  that account  alone,  without any positive evidence  pointing  in that   direction   no  responsibility   for   incurring   or authorising  expenditure  in  connection  with  this  public meeting  could  be fastened on the  first  respondent.   The petitioner  pointed out that the first respondent  had  been shifting  his  stand  from  time  to  time  as  to  who  was responsible for holding this public meeting.  When  Girdhari Lal  Raval (PW 35) was in the witness box, a suggestion  was made  to  him in cross-examination on behalf  of  the  first respondent that this public meeting had been arranged by the District  Congress Committee, Karol Bagh, but later  on  the first respondent changed his stand and came forward with the case   that  the  Delhi  Pradesh  Congress   Committee   was responsible   for  this  public  meeting.   The   petitioner contended that this equivocation and uncertainty on the part of  the first respondent in regard to a matter on which  he, as  the  then Secretary of the Delhi Pradesh  Congress  Com- mittee,   was  bound  to  have  definite   information   and knowledge,  cast  a  grave doubt  on  the  truthfulness  and veracity  of  the  first  respondent  when  he  denied   his responsibility   for   this  public   meeting.    There   is considerable  force in this criticism levelled on behalf  of the petitioner.  It is difficult to understand how the first respondent found himself unable to assert definitely whether this  public meeting was arranged by the  District  Congress Committee,   Karol  Bagh  or  the  Delhi  Pradesh   Congress Committee.   He  was  the secretary  of  the  Delhi  Pradesh Congress  Committee and he must surely have known as to  who arranged  this public meeting. whether it was  the  District Congress Committee, Karol Bagh or the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee.   Then why did the first respondent not come  out with  a  positive case right from the begining?   This  does give rise to suspicion that perhaps the 30 9 first  respondent had something to hide from the Court.   If in  fact  this public meeting was arranged by  the  District Congress  Committee, Karol Bagh, the first respondent  could have easily called the Secretary of that Committee to  prove this fact.  Equally, if the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee were   responsible  for  this  public  meeting,  the   first

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respondent,  who was the then Secretary, could  have  easily produced the records of the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee to show that the expenditure in connection with this  public meeting was incurredby thatorgani- sation.In fact,  the petitioner summonedC. L.Parvana,Permanent Secretary of  the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee, to produce the records  in connection with this public meeting; but this witness stated that  the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee did not  maintain any record of the meetings addressed by the Prime  Minister. if  this  public meeting was arranged by the  Delhi  Pradesh Congress Committee and the expenditure in connection with it was  incurred  by  that Organisation;  it  is  difficult  to believe  that  no record was maintained by  it.   We  cannot escape  the feeling that the record was  being  deliberately kept back from the court by C.L. Parvana who came on  behalf of  the  Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee.  It may  also  be noted  that though C. L. Parvana was cited as a  witness  on behalf  of  the  first respondent at serial No.  28  in  the supplementary list of witnesses filed on 4th February,  1972 and  he  was  summoned  to come  "with  record  relating  to election   meetings  addressed  by  Smt.    Indira   Gandhi, including the meeting addressed in Idgah, Delhi", the  first respondent did not call him in evidence and bring the record of  the  Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee relating  to  this public  meeting  before the Court.   The  first  respondent, thus,  failed  to show that expenditure in  connection  with this  public  meeting  was incurred  by  the  Delhi  Pradesh Congress Committee or the District Congress Committee, Karol Bagh.  That, however, cannot help the petitioner because the burden   is  on  the  petitioner  to  establish   that   the expenditure  in  connection  with this  public  meeting  was incurred or authorised by the first respondent and of  that, unfortunately for the petitioner, there is no evidence.  The expenditure in connection with this public meeting at  Idgah Road  cannot, therefore, be attributed to the first  respon- dent. We  may  now consider the item of  expenditure  representing printing  charges  of hand-bills and posters  paid  to  Sood Litho  Press and the cost of paper required for the  purpose of  printing  these  hand-bills  and  posters.   The   first respondent  admitted  that an expenditure of Rs.  100/-  was incurred  by him in connection with printing of  5000  hand- bills containing appeal of the Prime Minister, by Sood Litho Press and this expenditure was shown by him in his return of expenses.  The controversy, however, was whether this amount of,  Rs. 100/- paid to Sood Litho Press related only to  the charges  for printing the handbills or it covered  also  the cost  of paper required for the purpose.  There was a  ’Bill of  Sood  Litho Press bearing No. 798 dated  27th  February, 1971  in  respect of this amount of Rs. 100/- and  that  was filed  by  the first respondent with the  Returning  Officer along  with his return of expenses.  This bill was  produced in Court by D. B. Bhardwaj, (PW 5) 310 from  the office of the Returning Officer in obedience to  a summons  obtained  by the petitioner.  When  this  bill  was produced,  it bore an endorsement "complete Prtg. etc."  and immediately   below  that,  another  endorsement   "Printing charges  only", but this second endorsement appeared  scored out.  The first respondent did not offer any explanation  in his examination-in-chief as to how and in what circumstances the  second endorsement "Printing charges only"  was  scored out.    In   fact,   he  did  not  say   anything   in   his examination-in-chief  in regard to this bill of  Sood  Litho Press.  It was only in cross-examination that he stated  for

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the  first  time  that the charges mentioned  in  this  bill included  the cost of apaper.  He was, however,  constrained to  admit  that it was not stated in this bill  in  so  many words  that the charges included the cost of paper.  But  he relied  on  the  word  "etc". in  the  first  endorsement  " complete prtg. etc." and contended that this word  suggested that  the  charges  not only related to  printing  but  also covered  the cost of paper and it was for this  reason  that the  second endorsement ’.Printing charges only" was  scored off  as  inappropriate.  When it was put to  him  in  cross- examination  that the second endorsement  "Printing  charges only" was scored off by him after he had received the  bill; he denied the suggestion and stated that the bill came  with this  endorsement  scored  off.   The  case  of  the   first respondent,  therefore,  was  that  the  second  endorsement "Printing charges only" was scored off at the time when  the bill was issued by Sood Litho Press.  But this case was  put forward  for the first time in the cross-examination of  the first respondent.  When Taurus Farber (PW2), the Manager  of Sood Lithe Press, was in the witness box, no suggestion  was made to him that when he issued this bill; he scored out the second endorsement "Printing charges only".  Taufiq  Farooqi had  brought  the  Bill Book of Sood  Litho  Press  for  the relevant period and he stated in his evidence that he  found from a copy of this bill which was in the Bill Book that the bill  was  "in  respect of  500  hand-bills-appeal  of  Smt. Indira  Gandhi, Complete prtg. charges only at the  rate  of Rs.  20/- per 1000 for Rs. 100/-." This statement of  Taufiq Farooqi was not challenged on behalf of the first respondent in  cross-examination  and it must, therefore,  be  accepted that  the copy of this bill in the Bill Book  contained  the second  endorsement ’Printing charges only" and it  was  not scored off.  Now it is difficult to believe that when Taufiq Farooqi  issued  this  bill, he should  have  cancelled  the second endorsement Printing charges only" on the original of this bill, but left it unscarred off in the carbon copy.  In fact no such suggestion was made to Taufiq Farooqi.  It  was not  so  stated  even  by a  single  witness  of  the  first respondent.  No explanation was offered in the evidence  led on  behalf of the first respondent unrevealing  the  mystery surrounding  the  scoring  off  of  the  second  endorsement "Printing charges only".  On this state of the evidence, the conclusion is irresistible that when this bill was issued by Sood  Litho Press; it bore the second endorsement  "Printing charges  only"  as did the carbon COPY  produced  by  Taufiq Farooqi  and this second endorsement was scored off at  some subsequent  stage.   This  conclusion  is  strengthened  and fortified by the fact-that the link of the line scoring  the second endorsement "Printing charges only" is of a different shade  than the ink of the words in the second  endorsement. Then again, there is a 311 very  important circumstance which shows beyond  doubt  that the  second endorsement "Printing charges only"  was  scored off  at some subsequent stage after the issue of  the  bill. This  circumstance  constitutes  a  rather  disturbing   and disquieting  feature  of the case.  The  original  bill  was admittedly filed by the first respondent with the  Returning Officer  along with his return of expenses.  Before  it  was produced  by  D.B. Bhardwaj (PW 5), the  petitioner  applied inter  alia for a certified copy of this bill and he  got  a certified  copy of 16th June, 1971 which showed  the  second endorsement  "Printing  charges  only"  intact  without  any scoring.   The inference is, therefore, inevitable  that  on 16th  June  1971  when a certified copy was  issued  by  the

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office of the Returning Officer. the original bill contained the  second  endorsement "Printing charges  only"  and  this second  endorsement was not scored off.  But when the  first respondent  obtained a certified copy on 3rd  August,  1971, this  certified copy did not contain the second  endorsement at  all, which would mean that in the original bill  it  was scored  off.   There can, therefore, be no  doubt  that  the second  endorsement "Printing charges only" in the  original bill was scored off sometime between 16th June, 1971 and 3rd August, 1971 when the original bill was in the office of the Returning  Officer.  We are not concerned to inquire  as  to who  was responsible for this un-authorised scoring  off  of the  second  endorsement.  That would be a  matter  for  the Returning officer or other appropriate election  authorities to investigate and determine.  But we cannot help mentioning that the scoring off of the second endorsement was certainly advantageous to the first respondent.  The first  respondent contended that the second endorsement limiting the amount of the  bill to printing charges only was inappropriate,  since the word ‘ etc’. in the first endorsement suggested that the amount  of  the bill covered not only printing  charges  but also the cost of paper, but this contention is also  futile. it  is difficult to see how the first  endorsement  complete printing etc."can possibly be construedas including the cost of  paper.. It was precisely in order to stave off  such  an argument  as  this  that the  second  endorsement  "Printing charges  only"  was made in the bill when it was  issued  by Sood  Litho  Press.   It  may denoted and  this  is  a  very important  circumstance-that when Taufiq Forooqi was in  the witness  box,  no question was put to him on behalf  of  the first  respondent requiring him to explain what he meant  by the word ,etc’ and suggesting that this word was intended to include   the  cost  of  paper.   There  is   also   another circumstance which strongly militates against the contention of the first respondent.  If the cost of paper were included in the bill, it would have been shown as a separate item and sales  tax would have been charged on it as in the  case  of the bill of Kapur Printing Press R18 and the estimate  given by Premchand Grover R6. The absence of sales tax in the bill is  a  clear  indication  that the cost  of  paper  was  not included  in the amount of the bill.  We are, therefore,  of the  view  that the amount of Rs. 100/- shown  in  the  bill represented  only printing charges and did not  include  the cost of paper.  The cost of paper utilised in printing  5000 hand-bills  containing  the  appeal of  the  Prime  Minister would, therefore, have to be added to the election  expenses of the first respondent. 312 Now  this item of cost of paper was suppressed by the  first respondent   and  we  would,  therefore,  have  to  make   a reasonable estimate of the expenditure incurred on it on the basis of the material on record.  There is, fortunately  for the  petitioner, evidence on this point which enables us  to make  a reasonable estimate of the cost of paper which  must have been utilised in printing these 5000 hand-bills.   Babu Ram  Sharma (PWl 1) stated in his evidence that  Sarvadeshik Press, of which he was in employee, printed 8000  hand-bills containing  the appeal of the Prime Minister for  the  first respondent  and  these  hard-bills were  like  the  document marked  A/13  which, as deposed to by  Taufiq  Farooqi,  was similar  to  the  hand-bills printed by  Sood  Litho  Press. According  to Babu Ram Sharma, four reams were  utilised  by Sarvadeshik  Press for printing 8000 hand-bills like A/ 1  3 and the cost of paper utilised for this purpose was Rs. 30/- per  ream.   Now, if four reams were utilised  for  printing

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8000  pamphlets;  it  must  follow  a  fortiorari  that  the printing  of 5000 pamphlets must have required at least  two and  a half reams and, according to the price given,by  Babu Ram Sharma, the cost of these two and a half reams of  paper would  be Rs. 75/-.  It is true that Babu Ram Sharma  was  a witness who was summoned primarily to depose to the printing of various pamphlets and hand bills by Sarvadeshik Press for the first respondent and his evidence on that point was ser- iously challenged on behalf of the first respondent, but  so far  as  the quantity of paper required for the  purpose  of printing  hand bills like A/13 and the price of  such  paper were  concerned, his evidence was not at all  challenged  in cross-examination.   We can, therefore, safely estimate  the cost  of paper utilised in printing 5000 hand-bills by  Sood Litho  Press at Rs. 75/-, being the price of two and a  half reams of parer at the rate of Rs. 30/- per ream. We  must  now refer to the second bill of Sood  Litho  Press which was disputed by the first respondent.  Taufiq  Farooqi produced in his examination-in-chicf a copy of bill No.  785 dated  18th  February, 1971 in the name of "Shri  Amar  Nath Chawla  through  Shri J.P. Gool" for Rs-54/- in  respect  of printing  charges  of posters, hand bill and  kitabat.   The copy of this bill, which was marked Ex.  PW 2/1, carried  at the  foot  of it an endorsement, namely,  "Printing  charges only" and according to the evidence given by Taufiq Farooqi, it  bore  his initial-S.  Taufiq Farooqi admitted  that  the printing  work covered by this bill was undertaken  by  Sood Litho  Press on behalf of the first respondent, but,  in  an attempt  to  support  the first respondent,  he  started  by saying,  almost at the commencement of  his  examination-in- chief,  that  he did not know the first  respondent,  though there  was  no  provocation to him to do  so.   We  are  not prepared  to accept his statement that he did not  know  the first respondent.  It is apparent from his evidence that  he was  out to favour the first respondent.  The petitioner  in fact apprehended this situation and he, therefore,  obtained from  this witness an affidavit dated 17th August, 1971  and in  this  affidavit  the witness stated on  oath  that  "the originals of Annexures ’A’ and ’B’ mentioned in the election petition  and attached to the same were printed  through  us with  our  print line Shri Amar Nath Chawla  accompanied  by Shri  J.  P. Goel had given me the orders for  printing  the said annexures and the manuscript/subject-matter was  handed over to me by the said                             313 Amar Nath Chawla".  When confronted with this affidavit,. he had to% admit that it bore his signatures on both pages  but came  out with art explanation that his affidavit  had  been brought  to him by some Aryasamaji boys headed  by  Mahinder Kumar Shastri and they forced him to sign this affidavit and he  accordingly  signed  it and gave it  to  Mahinder  Kumar Shastri.   This explanation is, to say the  least,  puerile. It  is  difficult to believe that this witness  should  have been forced to, sign this affidavit by some Arya Samaji boys headed by Mahinder Kumar Shastri.  He does not say what  was the force used by these persons and why he could not  resist the  use  of  this  force and  succumbed  to  it.   He  was, according  to his statement in evidence, forced to  put  his signature on this affidavit in his press.  But if that  were true, he would have surely shouted for help because the shop of  Sood Litho Press is situate on the main road  and  there are  quite a few other shops adjoining to it.  Moreover,  he would  have immediately complained to his  employer  Krishan Avtar Agarwal, the proprietor of Sood Litho Press, and  also lodged a complaint with the police, or at any rate addressed

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a  notice to Mahinder Kumar Shastri, but admittedly he  "did not  take any action or make any report to my proprietor  or anybody   else  that  I  have  been  forced  to  sign   this affidavit".  This is most unnatural and clearly exposes the hollowness of the explanation given by the witness.  We have no  doubt  that  this  affidavit was  made  by  the  witness voluntarily and he knew the first respondent as well as  the fifth respondent but deliberately feigned ignorance in order to  support  the  case  of  the  first  respondent.  it  is, therefore, clear from the evidence of this witness that Sood Litho  Press  carried  out printing work  for  the  first  , respondent  as shown in the Bill Ex.  PW 2/1.  There  is  no reason  to doubt his testimony on this point.  If at all  he could,  he  would have tried to help the  first  respondent, but,  obviously.  there being documentary  evidence  in  the shape of Ex.  PW 2/1, in his Bill Book, he was helpless  and he had to depose to it.  The learned Trial Judge refused  to rely  on  the copy of bill Ex.  PW 2/1 on  the  ground  that Taufiq Farooqi, who produced it, was an unreliable  witness. But  he  was  clearly in error  in  adopting  this  approach because,  in the first place, the copy of the bill  Ex.   PW 2/1 was, documentary evidence which did not depend for  its, validity  and  authenticity on the oral evidence  of  Taufiq Farooqi,  and  secondly, Taufiq Farooqi turned  against  the petitioner  and  tried  to help the  first  respondent,  and therefore,.  any  evidence given by him  against  the  first respondent could not be regarded with-suspicion, but was, on the  contrary, more credible.  It may be noted-and  this  is almost  a  conclusive,  circumstances -that  there  was  no cross-examination of Taufiq Farooqi in regard to the copy of the Bill Ex.  PW 2/1.  His evidence on this point was not at all  challenged in cross-examination on behalf of the  first respondent.  It was not even suggested to him that the first respondent  did  not got printing work done  by  Sood  Litho Press  as shown in the copy of the bill Ex.  PW 2/1 or  that the  copy of the bill Ex.  PW 2/1 was false and  fabricated. The  only  question put to Taufiq Parooqi  was  whether  any declaration was taken by him from any one in connection with the  printing  of the hand-bills and  posters  forming  the. subject-matter  of the copy of the bill Ex.  PW 2/1 and  his answer was in the negative.  But that is far from a 314 challenge to the printing work shown in the copy of the bill Ex PW 2/1.  Merely because no declaration was taken by  good Litho  Press from any one in connection with  this  printing work,  it does not necessarily follow that no printing  work was  done by them.  It is riot uncommon to find that  during elections  posters  and  hand  bills  are  printed   without complying with the requirement of section 127A.  The  reason is,  as pointed out by this Court in Rahim Khan v.  Khurshid Ahmed & Ors. (1), that "there is no agency of the law  which takes prompt action after due investigation, with the result that  no printer or candidate or other propagandist  ’during elections bothers about the law and he is able  successfully to  spread  scandal without a trace of the  source,  knowing that nothing will happen until long after the election, when in  a burden-some litigation this question is  raised".   We may   emphasise  once  agair  that  there  should  be   some independent  semi-judicial  instrumentality set up  by  law, which would immediately investigate, even while the election fever  is on and propaganda and canvassing are  in  progress and  the  evidence is raw and fresh how the  offending  hand bills and posters have come into existence, who has  printed them  and  who is responsible for getting them  printed  for "violations  thrive where prompt check is unavailable".   As

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the  evidence,  goes,  there  being  no  challenge  to   the authenticity of the copy of the bill Ex.  PW 2/1 and to  the testimony  of Taufiq Farooqi on this point, we  must  accept the  case  of the petitioner that the first  respondent  got printing  work done as shown in the copy of the bill  Ex  PW 2/1  and  incurred  an  expenditure of  Rs.  54/-  for  that purpose. But  as the endorsement on the copy of the bill Ex.  PW  2/1 shows,  this expenditure of Rs. 54/- was only in  connection with  the printing charges.  The cost of the paper  utilised for  the purpose of printing would also have to be added  in determining  the expenditure incurred or authorised  by  the first  respondent.  Now it is evident from the copy  of  the bill  Ex.  PW 2/1 that the total number of  posters  printed was  3700.  Taufiq Farooqi did not state in his evidence  as to  what were these posters printed by his firm  and  denied that  they were the same as the poster Annexure ’B’  to  the petition.   But  the  poster Annexure ’B’  to  the  petition clearly ,bears the print-line of Sood Litho Press and  since the  first respondent refused to disclose to the Court  what were  the  posters which were got printed by him  from  Sood Litho Press, we would not be unjustified in holding that the posters which were printed by Sood Litho Press for the first respondent  were the same as Annexure ’B’ to  the  petition. Babu  Ram  Sharma (PW II) stated in his  evidence  that  for printing posters of the size of Annexure B’ to the petition, two  reams of paper 1000 would be required and the price  of paper  utilised in the poster Annexure ’B’ to  the  petition was  Rs.  50/- per ream at the relevant time.  To  the  same effect was also the evidence of Chater Sain (PW 55).   There was no cross-examination of either of these two witnesses on this point as regards quantity and price of paper.  We must, therefore, (1)  C. A. No. 816 of 1973-dec. on August 8, 1974.                             315 accept  this evidence and on the basis of this evidence,  we can safely conclude that the total cost of paper utilised in printing 3700 Posters was Rs. 375/- The hand bills shown  to have  been printed in the copy of the bill Ex.  PW 2/1  were 2000  and  again, for the same reasons, we do not  think  we would be wrong in taking the view that they were the same as the hand bill Annexure ’A’ to the petition, because Annexure ’A’ to the petition bears the print-line of Sood Litho Press and   the  first  respondent  suppressed  from   the   Court information  as to what were the hand bills printed by  Sood Litho  Press for him.  Babu Ram Sharma (PW 11)  stated  that half ream would be required for printing 1000 hand bills  of the  size of Annexure ’A’ to the petition and the  price  of paper  used  for Annexure ’A was Rs. 30/- per  ream  at  the relevant  time  and  this statement  was  supported  by  the evidence of Chater Sain (PW 22).  The cost of paper utilised in  printing 2000 hand bills would, therefore, be Rs.  30/-. Thus,  the  aggregate  cost of paper  utilised  in  printing poster  and hand bills as shown in the copy of the bill  Ex. PW  2/1  would come to Rs. 405/- but we may take it  at  Rs. 300/- on a very conservative basis. We  must, therefore, add to the expenditure incurred by  the first respondent, Rs. 75/- being the cost of paper  utilised in  printing 5000 hand bills shown in the admitted  bill  of Sood  Litho  Press, Rs. 54/being the amount of the  bill  of Sood  Litho Press of which the copy is exhibited as  PW  2/1 and Rs. 300/- being the cost of paper utilised for  printing 3700  posters and 2000 hand bills shown in the copy  of  the bill Ex. PW 2/1. It  would thus be seen that the total expenditure proved  to

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have been incurred or authorised by the first respondent, in addition  to  that shown by him in his return  of  expenses, adds  up to Rs. 4,800/-+ Rs. 75+Rs. 54+Rs. 300/-, making  in the aggregate Rs. 5,229.  Now admittedly the expenditure shown by the first respondent  in his  return  of expenses was Rs. 5,415 .62. If  the  further expenditure  of  Rs.  5229/-  is  added  to  this   admitted expenditure  of Rs. 5,415. 62, the total expenditure  proved to have been incurred or authorised by the first  respondent comes to Rs. 10,644. 62, and that would be clearly in excess of  Rs. 10,000/- which is the prescribed limit.  That  would be  sufficient  to  invalidate the  election  of  the  first respondent  on  the ground of corrupt  practice  defined  in section 123(6) of the Act. On this view it is unnecessary for us to consider the  other items  of  expenditure  alleged to  have  been  incurred  or authorised by the first respondent and we do not, therefore, propose  to  discuss  them, particularly as they  are  of  a debatable  character.  We also do not think it necessary  to discuss issues 8 and 9 relating to publication of  Annexures ’A’  and  ’B’ to the petition and oral  repetitions  of  the allegations  contained in Annexure’A’ and’B’to the  petition at  various  public  meetings set  out  in  the  particulars supplied by the petitioner.  There can be no doubt that  the allegations  contained  in Annexure ’A’ and ’B’ to  the  De- tition  related to the personal character of the  petitioner and  they  were  reasonably  calculated  to  prejudice   the prospects of his election, but it is a highly  controversial question whether they were published by the 316 first  respondent  or  his election agent  by  bringing  out Annexure A’ and ’B’ to the petition or orally at the  public meetings and we do not propose to express any opinion on it. It  may  be noted that the learned Trial Judge found,  on  a consideration   of  the  evidence,  that   the   allegations contained  in Annexure ’A’and ’B’to the petition  were  true but  this  finding was seriously attacked on behalf  of  the petitioner  and it was contended that there was no  evidence at all on the basis of which the learned Trial Judge   could arrive at such a finding.  There is prima facie considerable force  in  this contention of the  petitioner,  because  the finding  of the learned Trial Judge that  these  allegations were  true appears to be based primarily on the  reports  of the proceedings in the Parliament which are no proof of  the contents  of  the  allegations made in the  course  of  such proceedings  and  it does seem to be a little  difficult  to sustain  it.   However,  as pointed out  above,  it  is  not necessary to examine the correctness of this finding and  to pronounce upon it. Since we are of the view that the first respondent is guilty of  the  corrupt practice set out in section 123(6)  of  the Act,  we allow the appeal and set aside the election of  the first  respondent.   The first respondent will  pay  to  the petitioner costs throughout. V.P.S, Appeal A11owed. 317