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PETITIONER: KANTA KATHURIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MANAK CHAND SURANA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/10/1969

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SIKRI, S.M. RAY, A.N. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN

CITATION:  1970 AIR  694            1970 SCR  (2) 835  1969 SCC  (3) 268  CITATOR INFO :  R          1975 SC2299  (138,186,229,230,314,362,690)  RF         1976 SC2283  (34,36,40,41)  RF         1977 SC 682  (3)  R          1984 SC 664  (4)  RF         1992 SC1213  (34)

ACT: Constitution   of   India,  1950,  Art,   191(1)-Office   of profit--office of Special Government Pleader if such office. Retrospective legislation candidate held to be  disqualified because  of  holding  office  of  profit-State   Legislature enacting  that  such  Office not an  office  of  profit  and validating election-Effect of. Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), s.  82(b)-Any other candidate’ against whom corrupt practices are alleged, to be made party.-Scope of.

HEADNOTE: Disputes  between the State of Rajasthan and a company  were referred  to  arbitration and the  Government  Advocate  was appointed  to  represent the State.   Another  advocate  was appointed  to  assist the Government Advocate  but  as  the- advocate was table to appear, the appellant was no appointed under  0.27, r. 8B of the Civil Procedure Code,  as  Special Government  Pleader.  The appellant then stood for  election to the State Legislative Assembly and was declared  elected. The  election  was  challenged and one  of  the  grounds  of challenge  was that the appellant held an office  of  profit within  the  meaning of Art. 191 of the  Constitution.   The High  Court  set aside the election.  While the  appeal  was pending  in this Court, Rajasthan Act 5 of 1969  was  passed declaring  among others that the holder of the office  of  a Special  Government Pleader was not disqualified from  being chosen  or  for  being a member  of  the  State  Legislative Assembly;  and  by s. 2(2), the Act was  made  retrospective removing- the appellant’s disqualification retrospectively. On the questions : (1) Whether the appellant was holding  an office of profit and hence was disqualified; (2) Whether the disqualification  was  removed  by Act 5 of  1969;  and  (3)

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Whether  the election petition was in accordance  with  law, because, another candidate from another constituency,  again t whom corrupt practices were alleged, was not impleaded  as a party, HELD : (1) (Per Sikri, Ray and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ.) :  The appellant was not holding an office of profit. (a)  Before a person becomes subject to the disqualification in  Art.  191(1)  there  must  be  an  office  which  exists independently  of his being the holder of the  office.   The word  ’office’  means an office or employment  which  was  a subsisting,  permanent,  substantive position which  had  an existence  independent  of the person who filled  it,  which went on and was filled in succession by successive  holders; but  if  a person was engaged on whatever terms  to  do  the duties  which  were assigned to him, his  employment  to  do those duties did not create an office to which those  duties were attached.  Hence an office does not come into existence every  time a pleader is asked by the Government to  appeal, in a case on its behalf. [847 F; 848 A-B; 850 G-H] p.Cl/70-8 836 (b)  A  reading  of  s. 2(7) and 0.27, r. 8B  of  the  Civil Procedure Code A shows, that even an advocate who is. acting under  the  directions of the Government  Pleader  could  be deemed   to  be  a  Government  Pleader.    Therefore,   the notification of the appellant’s name under r. 8B as  Special Government  Pleader  did not amount to the  creation  of  an office. [850 F-G] (c)  Assuming  that a Government Pleader is an agent of  the Government  for purposes of receiving processes against  the Government,  the fact that processes could be served  on  an advocate,  would not mean that the advocate was  holding  an office under his client. [851 A-B] (d)  It is not necessary to give a wider meaning to the word ’office’    because,   if   Parliament   thinks    that    a legal"practitioner  who is being paid fees in a case by  the Government should not be qualified to stand for an  election as  a member of the Legislative Assembly, it can  make  that provision  under Art. 191 (1) (e) of the Constitution.  [851 C-D] Great  Western  Railway Co. v. Bater, 8 Tax  Cases  231  and McMillan v.    Guest  (H.   M. Inspector of  Taxes)  24  Tax Cases 190, applied. Mahadeo   v.   Shantibhai   &  Ors.   [1969]2   S.C.R.   422 distinguished. Sakhawat  Ali  v. State of Orissa, [1955]  1   S.C.R.  1004, referred to. (Per  Hidayatullah, C.J. and Mitter, J.  dissenting)  :  The High  Court was right in holding that the appellant held  an office of profit. [842 C] It was not a case of the appellant merely being briefed as a lawyer  and given the Government litigation.  On  the  other hand  an  office,  that of Special  Government  Pleader  was created, and since the office of a Government Pleader is  an office  of profit, the office of Special Government  Pleader will equally be an office of profit.  It was an office which could  be  successively  held, it  was  independent  of  its holder,  it was a substantive position and as  permanent  as other supernumerary offices. [841 FG; 842B] Mahadeo  v.  Shantibhai & Ors. [1969] 2 S.C.R. 422  and  The Statesman (P.) Ltd. v. H. R. Deb & Ors. [1968] 3 S.C.R.  614 applied. McMillan v. Guest, [1942] A.C. 561 and Great Western Railway Co. v.    Bater, 8 Tax Cases 231, 235, referred to. (2)  (By  Full Court) : The Act 5 of 1969  has  removed  the

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disqualification retrospectively. Per  Hidayatullah,  C.J.  and  Mitter,  J.  :  It  is   well recognised  that Parliament and the Legislature of  a  State can  make  their  laws operate  retrospectively  subject  to limitations, if any, in the Constitution.  Any law that  can be  made  prospectively  may  be  made  with   retrospective operation  except those which cannot operate  retroactively. In  Art.  191  itself,  power  is  reserved  to  the   State Legislature  to  make a declaration that the  holder  of  an office shall not be disqualified and there is nothing in the words of the Article to  indicate  that such  a  declaration cannot   be  made  with  retrospective  effect,   therefore, whatever  may  be the propriety of such  legislation  regard being had to legislative practice and the absence of a clear prohibition, express or implied. the Act must be declared to have retrospective effect. [843 B-C, D-F] 837 Per  Sikri, Ray and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ. :  Parliament  and the State legislatures can legislate retrospectively subject to the provisions of the Constitution.  No limitation on the powers  of the Legislature to make a declaration  validating an  election, effective from an earlier date,  is  expressly stated nor could it be implied in Art. 191(1). ]851 F-G; 852 D-E] The  apprehension that it may not be a healthy practice  and might be abused is no ground for limiting the powers of  the State Legislature. [852 B] The impugned Act does not amend or alter the  Representation of  the  People Act, 1951, in any  respect  whatsoever.   By enacting  the  impugned Act, the  disqualification  if  any, which existed in the 1951 Act has been removed, but that  is what the State Legislature is entitled to do under Art.  191 so  long as it does not touch the wording of the  1951  Act. [852 F-G] (3)  (By Full Court) : The words ’any other candidate’ in s. 82(b)  of  the Representation of the People Act,  1951,  who should  be impleaded, refers to a candidate in the  election for the constituency which is the subject matter of the petition, and not to a candidate  from another constituency. [843 G-H; 853 D-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1869 of 1968. Appeal  under s. 116-A of the Representation of  the  People Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated August 12, 1968 of  the Rajasthan High Court in Election Petition No. 16  of 1967. S.   V. Gupte, M. M. Tiwari, H. K. Puri, Bishamber Lal, M.   K. Garg, K. K. Jain and S. P. Vij, for the appellant. M. C. Chagla and S. M. Jain, for respondent. Niren  De,  Attorney-General,  G.  C.  Kasliwal,   Advocate- General.   Rajasthan  and  K. B. Mehta,  for  the  State  of Rajasthan. The  Judgment  of S. M. SiKRi, A. N. RAY and  P.  JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.was delivered by SIKRI, J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,  C.f. and G. K. MITTER, J. gave a separate opinion. Hidayatullah, C.J. We regret our inability to agree that the appellant  Mrs. Kanta Kathuria was not holding an office  of profit under the Government of Rajasthan when she stood as a candidate for election to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly from the Kolayat Constituency. Mrs.  Kathuria  is an advocate practicing at  Bikaner.   She contested  the  above  election held on  February  18,  1967

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against seven other candidates.  She was declared elected on February 22, 1967.  One of the defeated candidates filed the election petition,  from    which   this   appeal    arises, questioning her election on several     grounds.    We   are concerned only with one of them, namely, that on the date of her  nomination  and  election she was  disqualified  to  be chosen  to fill the seat as she held the office  of  Special Government Pleader, which was an office of profit under  the Government of Rajasthan. 838 Article  191 of the Constitution, which is relevant in  this connection, reads :               "191 : Disqualifications for membership               (1)   A person shall be disqualified for being               chosen  as,  and for being, a  member  of  the               Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of               a State-               (a)   if  he holds any office of profit  under               the  Government of India or the Government  of               any  State  specified in the  First  Schedule,               other   than   an  office  declared   by   the               Legislature  of  the  State  by  law  not   to               disqualify its holder;               Mrs. Kathuria was appointed by the  Government               of Rajasthan as Special Government Pleader  to               conduct   arbitration   cases   between    the               Government  and  Modern  Construction  Company               arising out of the construction of Rana Pratap               Sagar  Dam and Jawahar Sagar Dam.   The  order               was  passed  on June 26, 1965  (Ex.  1).   The               order reads:               "ORDER               Sub:  Construction of R.P.S. Main Dam-Contract               of  M/s.  M.C.C. (Pvt.) Ltd.,  Arbitration  in               disputes arising out of.               In  pursuance of Rule 8 (b) of Order XXVII  of               the  First  Schedule  to  the  Code  of  Civil               Procedure,  1908  read  with  clause  (7)   of               Section 2 of the Code, the Governor is pleased               to  appoint  Smt.   Kanta  Kathuria,  Advocate               Bikaner  as  Special  Government  Pleader   to               conduct the above noted case on behalf of  the               State  of  Rajasthan  alongwith  Shri   Murali               Manohar Vyas, Government Advocate, Jodhpur.                By order,                Sd. D. S. Acharya                26-6-65                (D. S. Acharya)                Joint Legal Remembrancer". By subsequent orders, which we do not consider necessary  to quote here, her remuneration was fixed at Rs. 1501- per  day for  each  date  of hearing, Rs. 75/- per day  for  days  of travel  and dates on which the case was adjourned, and  days spent  on  preparation  of the case.   Mrs.  Kathuria  began appearing  in  the  case  from March 27,  1965.   It  is  an admitted  fact that she was paid for work between that  date and November 28, 1966 a sum of 839 Rs.  26,325/- and again from February 26, 1967 to  March  2, 1967 a sum of Rs. 900/- and that the arbitration proceedings were  continuing on the date of the filing of  the  election petition.  Therefore for over two years she was employed  as Special  Government Pleader and was still employed when  her election took place.  It is also admitted by her that  prior to this employment, she had never paid income-tax in  excess

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of Rs. 1200/- in any year. On  these facts, the High Court held that Mrs. Kathuria  was disqualified.  Before this appeal came on for hearing before us,  the Governor of Rajasthan by Ordinance  3/68  (December 24, 1968) removed the disqualification retrospectively.  The Ordinance  was  followed by Act V of 1968 (April  4,  1969). The  operative portions of the Act which are the same as  of the Ordinance read               "Prevention of disqualification of  membership               of the State Legislative Assembly-               (1)   It  is hereby declared that none of  the               following  offices,  in so far as  it  is  an’               office  of profit under the State  Government,               shall  disqualify or shall be deemed  ever  to               have  disqualified  the  holder  thereof  from               being chosen as, or for being, a member of the               Rajasthan Legislative Assembly, namely -               (a)   the  office of a Government Pleader  or               Special Government Pleader or Advocate for the               Government, appointed specially to conduct any               particular  suit, case or other proceeding  by               or  against the State Government,  before  any               court,  tribunal, arbitrator or  other  autho-               rity;               (b)   the  office of a Government  Pleader,  a               Special Government Pleader or Advocate for the               State   Government,  appointed  specially   to               assist   the  Advocate   General,   Government               Advocate  or  Pleader, or  Special  Government               Pleader,  or Advocate for Government,  in  any               particular  suit, case or other proceeding  by               or  against  the State Government  before  any               court,    tribunal,   arbitrator   or    other               authority;               (c)   the  office  of a panel  lawyer  if  the               holder  of such office is not entitled to  any               retainer or salary, by whatever named called;               (4)   the  office of a Pradhan or  Pramukh  as               defined in the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis and               Zila Parishads Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 37  of               1959).               840               (2)   Notwithstanding any judgment or order of               any  Court or Tribunal, the aforesaid  offices               shall not disqualify or shall be deemed  never               to  have disqualified the holders thereof  for               being chosen as, or for being, members of  the               Rajasthan Legislative Assembly as if this  Act               had  been in force on the date the  holder  of               such  office  filed his nomination  paper  for               being  chosen  as a member  of  the  Rajasthan               Legislative Assembly." The  Ordinance  and  the Act seem to  have  been  passed  to nullify  the decision in this case.  One of the  contentions of  the  answering  respondent is that  the  Legislature  of Rajasthan    could   not   remove    the    disqualification retrospectively   since   the   Constitution    contemplates disqualifications  existing  at certain time  in  accordance with the law existing at that time.  We shall deal with this matter later. When the Government of Rajasthan appointed Mrs. Kathuria  it bad two courses open to it.  Firstly, Government could  have engaged Mrs. Kathuria to conduct the particular  arbitration case or cases, or even to assist the Government Advocate  in those  cases.   Alternatively  Government  could  create   a

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special  office  of Special Government Pleader  and  appoint Mrs.  Kathuria  or any other lawyer to that office.   It  is obvious  that  Government did not choose the  first  course. There were as many as 26 arbitration cases then pending  and more  were  likely to arise.  Government thought  that  they should  be conducted by the Government Advocate but  as  the work  involved was too much as additional office had  to  be created  and  given to a lawyer.  An office  was  therefore, created and given to Mrs. Kathuria. In  a  recent case (Civil Appeal No.  1832  of  1967-Mahadeo v.Shantibhai  &, Others-s-decided on October 15,  1968),  we held that a panel lawyer engaged to watch cases on behalf of the  Central  &  Western Railway  Administrations,  held  an office of profit.  The duty of the panel lawyer was to watch cases  coming up for hearing against the Railways at  Ujjain and  to  appear in court and ask for  an  adjournment.   The lawyer was paid Rs. 51- for each such adjournment if he  was not  entrusted  with the case later.  In dealing  with  this matter reliance was placed by us on the meaning to the  word ’office’  given  in the Statesman (P) Ltd. v. H.  R.  Deb  & Ors(1)  In  the Statesman case, this Court approved  of  the observations  of Lord Wright in Mcmillan v. Guest(2) to  the following effect :               "The  word ’office is of  indefinite  content.               Its various meanings cover four columns of the               New English               (1)   [1968] 3 S.C.R. 614.               (2)   [1942] A.C. 561.               841               Dictionary,  but I take as the  most  relevant               for purpose of this case the following               ’A  position or place to which certain  duties               are attached, especially one of a more or less               public character."               Our  brother  Sikri has also relied  upon  the               same case and has referred to the observations               of  Lord  Atkin  where  he  approved  of   the               observations  of Rowlatt, J. in Great  Western               Railway Co. v. Baler(1).  Justice Rowlatt said               thus :               "Now it is argued, and to my mind argued  most               forcibly,  that shows that what those who  use               the  language of the Act of 1842  meant,  when               they  spoke of an office or  employment  which               was   a  subsisting   permanent,   substantive               position,  which had an existence  independent               from  the person who filled it, which went  on               and  was  filled in succession  by  successive               holders, and if you merely had any man who was               engaged on whatever terms, to do duties  which                             were  assigned  to him, his  employmen t  to  do               those duties did not create an office to which               those  duties  were attached.  He  hereby  was               employed  to do certain things and that is  an               end  of  it,  and if there was  no  office  or               employment  existing in the case as  a  thing,               the so-called office or employment was  merely               an   aggregate  of  the  activities   of   the               particular man for the time being". We  say  with  profound  respect  for  this  most   succinct exposition, that we entirely agree.  The distinction that we are  making  is  precisely the distinction  which  has  been brought out by Rowlatt, J. If Mrs. Kathuria had been briefed as  a  lawyer  and given all the  Government  litigation  in

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Rajasthan to conduct on behalf, of the Government she  could not have been described as holding an office of profit.  The aggregate  of  her work and her activities  could  not  have created  an  office  nor could she have  been  described  as anything but an advocate.  What happened here was different’ An office was created which was that of a Special Government Pleader.  Now it is admitted that the office of a Government Pleader  is  an  office properly  so-called.   Therefore  an office   going  under  the  names   ’Additional   Government Pleader’,    ’Assistant   Government   Pleader’,    ’Special Government  Pleader’ will equally be an office properly  so- called.  It matters not that Mrs. Kathuria was-to conduct  a group of arbitration cases and against the same party.   For that  matter  Government  is always  at  liberty  to  create offices  for special duties.  They might have  even  created another  office  of  Special  Government  Pleader  for  Land Acquisition cases (1)  8 Tax Cases 231, 235. 842 or  a  group of cases or Railway cases or a group  of  cases arising out of a particular accident and so on and so forth. What matters is that there was an office created apart  from Mrs. Kathuria.  It is in evidence that it was first held  by Mr. Maneklal Mathur another advocate.  It is likely that  if Mrs.  Kathuria  had declined some one else would  have  been found.   Therefore,  there  was an  office  which  could  be successively  held; it was independent of Mrs. Kathuria  who filled  it  was a substantive position and as  permanent  as supernumerary offices are.  Every one of the tests laid down by Rowlatt, J. is found here. We  would, therefore, hold that the High Court was right  in its  conclusion  that Mrs.,Kathuria held an  office.   Since there  is  no dispute that it was for profit and  under  the State, the election of Mrs. Kathuria must be held to be void as she was disqualified to stand for the election. This  brings us to the next question.  Does the Act  of  the Rajasthan    Legislature   remove    the    disqualification retrospectively, in other words; can such a law be passed by the Legislature after, the election is over ? The  first  question is whether the new law is  remedial  or declaratory.   If  it  was  declaratory  then  it  would  be retrospective; if remedial only, prospective unless  legally made  retrospective.   That  it  has  been  made   expressly retrospective  lends  support to its  being  remedial.   Its retrospective  operation depends on its being  effective  to remove a disability existing on the date of nomination of  a candidate   or  his  election.   Of  course,  there  is   no difficulty  in holding the law to be perfectly valid in  its prospective operation.  The only dispute is in regard to its retrospective operation. Our  brother  Sikri  has cited an instance  of  the  British Parliament   from   May’s  well-known  treatise   when   the Coatbridge  and Springburn Elections (Validation)  Bill  was introduced to validate the irregular elections.   Halsbury’s Laws  of England (3rd Edn.  Vol. 14 p. 5) has the  following note : "If  a  person  is  elected  when  disqualified, his  dis- qualification  for  being  a member  of  Parliament  may  be remedied or he may be protected from any penal  consequences by an Act of Validation or indemnity." The position of the British Parliament is somewhat different from  that of the Indian Parliament and the Legislatures  of the  States.  British Parliament enjoys plenary  sovereignty and  the7  Acts  of  the British  Parliament  no  court  can question.  In India the sovereignty of the Indian Parliament

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and the Legislatures is                 843 often  curtailed and the question, therefore, is whether  it is in fact so curtailed. At  the hearing our attention was drawn to a number of  such Acts  passed by our Parliament and the Legislatures  of  the States.   It  seems  that there  is  a  settled  legislative practice  to  make  validation  laws.   It  is  also   well- recognised  that  Parliament  and the  Legislatures  of  the States can make their laws operate retrospectively.  Any law that   can   be  made  prospectively  may   be   made   with retrospective  operation except that certain kinds  of  laws cannot operate retroactively.  This is not one of them. This  position  being firmly grounded we have  to  look  for limitations,  if  any,  in the  Constitution.   Article  191 (which has been quoted earlier) itself recognises the  power of  the Legislature of the State to declare by law that  the holder  of  an office shall not be  disqualified  for  being chosen as a member.  The Article says that a person shall be disqualified  if  he  holds an office of  profit  under  the Government  of India or the Government of any  State  unless that office is declared by the Legislature not to disqualify the  holder.  Power is thus reserved to the  Legislature  of the State to make the declaration.  There is nothing in  the words  of  the  article to indicate  that  this  declaration cannot  be made with retrospective effect.  It is true  that it   gives  an  advantage  to  those  who  stand  when   the disqualification was not so removed as against those who may have  kept  themselves back because the disability  was  not removed.   That  might raise questions of the  propriety  of such  retrospective legislation but not of the  capacity  to make  such  laws.   Regard  being  had  to  the  legislative practice  in  this  country and in the absence  of  a  clear prohibition either express or implied we are satisfied  that the Act cannot be declared ineffective in its  retrospective operation. The  result,  therefore,  is that while we  hold  that  Mrs. Kathuria   held  an  office  of  profit  under   the   State Government, we hold further that this disqualification stood removed  by  the retrospective operation of  the  Act  under discussion. As regards the supplementary point that the petition was bad for non-joinder of Mr. Mathura Das Mathur against whom  cor- rupt  practices  were  alleged in the petition,  we  are  of opinion  that  s. 82 of the Representation  of  People  Act, 1951,  in  its clause (b) speaks of candidates at  the  same election  and  not  persons  who  are  candidates  at  other elections.   As  Mr.  Mathur was a  candidate  from  another constituency he need not have been made a party here. For the above reasons we would allow the appeal but make  no order  about  costs since the election of the  appellant  is saved 844 by a retrospective law passed after the decision of the High Court. Sikri,  J.  This appeal arises out of an  election  petition filed  under section 80 of the Representation of the  People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the 1951 Act, by  Shri Manik  Chand Surana, a defeated candidate,  challenging  the election  of  Smt.  Kanta Kathuria, before the  High  Court. The  High  Court (Jagat Narayan, J.)  allowed  the  election petition on the ground that the appellant held an office  of profit within the meaning of Art. 191 of the Constitution on the day on which she filed the nomination paper and was thus disqualified  for being chosen as a member of the  Rajasthan

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Legislative Assembly.  This judgment was given on August 12, 1968.  An appeal was filed in this Court on August 20, 1968. During the pendency of the appeal, the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly Members (Prevention of Disqualification) Act,  1969 (Act No. 5 of 1969) (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act), was passed, which received the assent of the  Governor on April 4, 1969.               The impugned Act inter alia provides :               "2.   Prevention   of   disqualification    of               membership of the State Legislative  Assembly.               (i)  It  is hereby declared that none  of  the               following  offices,  in  so far as  it  is  an               office  of profit under the  State  Government               shall  disqualify or shall be deemed  ever  to               have  disqualified  the  holder  thereof  from               being chosen as, or for being, a member of the               Rajasthan Legislative Assembly, namely :-               (a)   the  office of a Government  Pleader  or               Special Government Pleader or Advocate for the               Government, appointed specially to conduct any               particular  suit, case or other proceeding  by               or  against the State Government,  before  any               court,    tribunal,   arbitrator   or    other               authority;               (b)   the  office of a Government  Pleader,  a               Special Government Pleader or Advocate for the               State   (Government  appointed  specially   to               assist   the  Advocate   General,   Government               Advocate  or  Pleader, or  Special  Government               Pleader,  or  Advocate for Government  in  any               particular  suit, case or other proceeding  by               or  against  the State Government  before  any               court,    tribunal,   arbitrator   or    other               authority;               845               (2)   Notwithstanding any judgment or order of               any  Court or Tribunal, the aforesaid  offices               shall not disqualify or shall be deemed  never               to  have disqualified the holders thereof  for               being chosen as, or for being, members of  the               Rajasthan Legislative Assembly as if this  Act               had  been in force on the date the  holder  of               such   office filed his  nomination  paper for               being  chosen  as a member  of  the  Rajasthan               Legislative Assembly." We may note another fact on which an argument is sought  to; be  made by the learned Counsel for the appellant.   It  was alleged in the election petition that the appellant was  a close  friend  of  one Shri Mathura Dass Mathur  who  was  a Minister  in  the  Slate of Rajasthan at  the  time  of  the election, who contested elections as a  candidate    in    a constituency  different  from that of  the  appellant.  Shri Mathur  visited  the constituency during the  election  very frequently and during these visits the appellant accompanied by  Shri Mathur visited several places in  the  Constituency where.Shri  Mathur in the presence of the appellant  offered and promised to get several works done in those areas if the electors  were to cast votes for the appellant at’ the  said election.    In  spite  of  these  allegations  of   corrupt practice, Shri Mathur was not made a party to the petition. The  learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Gupte,  contends that the High Court erred in holding that the appellant held an  office of profit within the meaning of Art. 191  of  the Constitution.   In  the  alternative he  contends  that  the Rajasthan  Act  No.  5  of 1969  is  retrospective  and  the

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disqualification if it existed, cannot now be deemed to have existed  because of this Act.  The last point raised by  him is  that the petition was not in accordance with law as  the respondent,  Shri Surana, had not impleaded Shri  Mathur  as respondent to the petition. The  facts  relevant for appreciating the  first  point  are these The  appellant  was  an  advocate  at  all  material  times. Disputes  arose between M/s.  Modern  Construction,  Company Private  Ltd. and the State of Rajasthan in connection  with some  works relating to the Rana Pratain Sagar  Dam.   These disputes  were referred to arbitration.  Shri Murli  Manohar Vyas, Government Advocate in the High Court of Rajasthan  at Jodhpur  was appointed by the Government to represent it  in these  arbitration  proceedings.   The  Government  Advocate wanted one more advocate to assist him.  On his  suggestion, Shri  Manak Lal Mathur advocate was appointed to assist  the Government  Advocate.  As there was a possibility that  Shri Manak Lal Mathur may not be available to 846 help  the  Government Advocate, the appellant  was,  on  the suggestion  of the Government Advocate, appointed to  assist him  in  the ,absence of Shri Mathur.   This.  proposal  was approved by the Rajasthan Law Minister on March 30, 1965 and on  June 26, 1965, and the Government issued  the  following order :-               "Sub  :-Construction of R.P.S. Main  Dam  Con-               tract of M/s M.C.C. (PVT) Ltd.  Arbitration in               dispute arising out of-               In  pursuance of rule 8 (b) of Order XXVII  of               the  First  Schedule  to  the  Code  of  Civil               Procedure,  1908  read  with  clause  (7)   of               section 2 of the Code, the Governor is pleased               to  appoint  Smt.   Kanta  Kathuria  Advocate,               Bikaner,  as  Special  Government  Pleader  to               conduct the above noted case on behalf of  the               State  of  Rajasthan along with  Shri  Manohar               Vyas, Government Advocate Jodhpur." Later,  on Sept. 3, 1965, the Government laid down the  fees payab le to the appellant.  It was stated in the order dated Sept.  3,  1965  that" Smt.  Kanta  Kathuria  who  has  been appointed  to assist the Government advocate in the  absence of  Shri Mathur will get her share of fee in  proportion  to the  assistance rendered by her out of the daily fee of  Rs. 150/- to Shri Manak Lal Mathur." As Shri Manak Lal Mathur was not able to appear in the case, on  Nov.  18, 1965 the Governor sanctioned  the  payment  of daily  fee  of Rs. 1501- to the appellant  instead  of  Shri Manak Lal Mathur, for days of actual hearing.  The appellant appeared  from March 27, 1965 to November 28, 1966, but  she did  not  appear from Nov. 29, 1966 to Feb. 25,  1967.   She again started appearing in the case from February 26,  1967. The  appellant  claimed  travelling  allowance,   incidental charges and daily allowance, but the Government decided that the  appellant was not entitled to any travelling  allowance or daily allowance in addition to the fees. By  a notification, the Election Commission of India  called upon  the electors of the Kolayat Assembly  Constituency  of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly to elect a member to  the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly and invited nomination papers for  the  elections to be held on February  18,  1967.   The appellant was declared duly elected by the Returning officer on,  February 22, 1967, the appellant having  secured  11926 and the respondent having secured 8311 votes. 847

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             The  relevant  portion of Art.  191  reads  as               follows               191.  (1)  A person shall be disqualified  for               being  chosen as, and for being, a  member  of               the   Legislative  Assembly   or   Legislative               Council of a State-               (a)   if  he holds any office of profit  under               the  Government of India or the Government  of               any  State  specified in the  First  Schedule,               other   than   an  office  declared   by   the               Legislature  of  the  State  by  law  not   to               disqualify its holder;               (e)   if he is so disqualified by or under any               law made by Parliament.               (2)   For  the  purposes of  this  article,  a               person  shall not be deemed to hold an  office               of  profit under the Government of India  or               the  Government of any State specified in  the               First  Schedule  by reason only that he  is  a               Minister  either  for the Union  or  for  such               State. It seems to us that the High Court erred in holding that the appellant  held  an office.  There is no doubt that  if  her engagement   as  Special  Government  Pleader  amounted   to appointment  to an office, it would be an office  of  profit under the State Government of Rajasthan.  The word  ’office’ has  various  meanings  and  we have to  see  which  is  the appropriate  meaning  to  be ascribed to this  word  in  the context.   It  seems  to  us that  the  words  ’its  holder’ occurring in Art. 191 (1 ) (a), indicate that there must  be an  office which exists independently of the holder  of  the office.  Further, the very fact that the Legislature of  the State  has been authorised by Art. 191 to declare an  office of  profit  not  to  disqualify  its  holder,   contemplates existence  of  an office apart from its  holder.   In  other words,  the Legislature of a State is empowered  to  declare that an office of profit of a particular description or name would  not disqualify its holder and not that  a  particular holder of an office of profit would not be disqualified. It  seems  to  us that in  the  context,  Justice  Rowlatt’s definition  in Great Western Railway Company v. Bater(l)  is the  appropriate meaning to be applied to the word  ’office’ in Art. 191 of the Constitution. Justice Rowlatt observed at page 235               "Now it is argued, and to my mind argued  most               forcibly,  that shows that what those who  use               the               (1)   8 Tax Cases 231.               848               language  of the Act of 1842 meant, when  they               spoke  of an office or an employment,  was  an               office  or employment which was a  subsisting,               permanent, substantive position, which had  an               existence  independent  from  the  person  who               filled  it;  which went on and was  filled  in               succession  by successive holders; and if  you               merely  had a man who was engaged on  whatever               terms,  to  do duties which were  assigned  to               him, his employment to do those duties did not               create  an office to which those  duties  were               attached.   He  merely  was  employed  to   do               certain  things and that is an end of it;  and               if there was no office or employment  existing               in  the case, as a thing the so-called  office               or  employment was merely an aggregate of  the

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             activities of the particular man for the  time               being.   And I think myself that is sound.   I               am not going to decide that, because I think I               ought not to in the state of the  authorities,               but my own view is that the people in 1842 who               used  this  language  meant by  an  office,  a               substantive thing that existed apart from  the               holder."               This definition was approved by Lord  Atkinson               at page 246.               This   language  was  accepted  as   generally               sufficient  by Lord Atkin and Lord Wright  in-               McMillan  v. Guest (H.M. Inspector  of  Taxes)               (1).  Lord Atkin observed at page 201 :-               "There is no statutory definition of ’office’.               Without  adopting the sentence as  a  complete               definition,   one  may  treat  the   following               expression  of Rowlatt, J., in  Great  Western               Railway  Co. v. Baler, [1920] 3 K.B., at  page               274,  adopted by Lord Atkinson in  that  case,               [1922]  2  A.C., at page 15,  as  a  generally               sufficient  statement  of the meaning  of  the               word  :  an office or employment which  was  a               subsisting,  permanent, substantive  position,               which  had  an existence  independent  of  the               person  who  filed it, which went on  and  was               filled in succession by successive holders."               Lord Wright at page 202 observed               "The  word ’office’ is of indefinite  content;               its various meanings cover four columns of the               New English Dictionary, but I take as the most               relevant   for  purposes  of  this  case   the               following : A position or place to which  less               public   character.   This,  I  think,   rough               corresponds   with   such  approaches   to   a               definition as have               (1)   24 Tax Cases 190.               849               been   attempted   in  the   authorities,   in               particular   Great  Western  Railway  Co.   v.               Abater, [1922] 2 A.C. I...... where the  legal               construction of these words, which had been in               Schedule  E since 1803 (43 Geo. 111,  c.  122,               Section 175), was discussed."               In  Mahadeo v. Shantibhai & Ors.(1)-Mitter  J.               speaking for this Court, quoted with  approval               the  definition of Lord Wright.  In  our  view               there  is no essential difference between  the               definitions  given  by Lord  Wright  and  Lord               Atkin.   The  Court of Appeal in the  case  of               Mitchell  v.  Ross(2), thought that  both  the               noble  and  learned  Lords  had  accepted  the               language  employed by Rowlatt J. as  generally               sufficient.  In Mahadeo’s case(1), this  Court               was dealing with a panel of lawyers maintained               by the Railway Administration and the  lawyers               were expected to watch cases.  Clause (13)  of               the terms in that case read as follows :-               "You will be expected to watch cases coming up               for  hearing  against  this  Railway  in   the               various   courts  at  UJB  and   give   timely               intimation of the same to this office.  If  no               instructions regarding any particular case are               received  by  you,  you will  be  expected  to               appear in the court and obtain an  adjournment

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             to save the ex-parte proceedings against  this               Railway  in the court.  You will be  paid  Rs.               51- for every such adjournment if you are  not               entrusted  with the conduct of the suit  later               on."               That case in no way militates against the view               which  we have taken in this case.  That  case               is  more like the case of a  standing  Counsel               disqualified  by the House of Commons.  It  is               stated  in  Rogers [on Elections  Vol.  [1]-at               page 10 :-               "However,  in the Cambridge case  (121  Journ.               220),  in 1866, the return of Mr. Forsyth  was               avoided  on  the  ground that he  held  a  new               office  of profit under the Crown, within  the               24th section.  In the scheme submitted to  and               approved   by  Her  Majesty  in  Council   was               inserted the office of standing counsel with a               certain  yearly payment (in the scheme  called               ’salary’)  affixed  to it, which  Mr.  Forsyth               received,  in  addition to the usual  fees  of               counsel.  The Committee avoided the return.               It  is urged that there can be no  doubt  that               the  Government  Pleader holds an  office  and               there  is no reason why a person  who  assists               him in the case should also not be treated  as               a holder of               1)    [1969] 2 S.C.R. 422               (2)   [1960] 2 All E.R. 238               850               office,   specially   as   the    notification               appointed the appellant as Special  Government               Pleader.   We  see no force in  these  conten-               tions.               Rule  8B.  of  Order 27, C.P.  Code  reads  as               follows :7-               "In  this  Order  unless  otherwise  expressly               provided ’Government’ and ’Government  leader’               mean respectively-               (a)   in  relation to any suit by  or  against               the  Central  Government or against  a  public               officer in the service of that Government, the               Central  Government and such pleader  as  that               Government  may appoint whether  generally  or               specially for the purposes of this Order;               (c)   in relation to any suit by, or against a               State  Government or against a public  officer               in   the  service  of  a  State,   the   State               Government  and  the  Government  pleader,  as               defined in Clause 7 of Section 2 or such other               pleader  as the State Government may  appoint,               whether   generally  or  specially,  for   the               purposes of this Order."               This rule defines who shall be deemed to be  a               Government  Pleader  for the  purpose  of  the               Order.   ’Government  Pleader’ is  defined  in               Sec. 2 of Clause (7) C.P. Code thus-               "(7) ’Government Pleader’ includes any officer               appointed  by the State Government to  perform               all or any of the functions expressly  imposed               by  this  Code on the Government  Pleader  and               also  any pleader acting under the  directions               of the Government Pleader :"               It  follows from reading Order 27 rule 8B  and               Clause  (7) of Sec. 2 C.P. Code together  that

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             even  if  a pleader who is  acting  under  the               directions of the Government Pleader would  be               deemed  to  be a Government  Pleader  for  the               purpose of Order 27.  Therefore, no particular               significance can be attached to the  notifica-               tion   made  under  rule  8B  appointing   the               appellant  as Special Government Pleader.   We               cannot   visualise  an  office   coming   into               existence,  every time a pleader is  asked  by               the  Government  to appear in a  case  on  its               behalf.   The notification of his  name  under               rule  8B, does not amount to the. creation  of               an Office’.  Some reliance was also placed  on               rule  4 of Order 27 C.P. Code, which  provides               that               "The Government Pleader in any Court shall  be               the agent of the Government for the purpose of               receiving               851               processes  against  the Government  issued  by               such Court." This rule would not apply to the facts of this case  because the  appellant was appointed only to assist  the  Government Advocate in a particular case.  Assuming it applies, it only means  that processes could be served on the appellant,  but processes can be served on an Advocate under Rule 2 of Order XLV  of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.  This does  not  mean that  an Advocate on Record would hold an office  under  the client. The  learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr.  Chagla,  urges that we should keep in view the fact that the object  under- lying Art. 191 of the Constitution is to preserve purity  of public  life and to prevent conflict of duty  with  interest and give an interpretation which will carry out this object. It  is  not  necessary to give a wide meaning  to  the  word "office"   because  if  Parliament  thinks  that   a   legal practitioner  who  is  being  paid fees in  a  case  by  the Government should not be qualified to stand for an  election as  a Member of Legislative Assembly, it can make that  pro- vision under Art. 191 (1) (e) of the Constitution. The case of Sakhawat Ali v. The State of Orissa(1)  provides an instance where the Legislature provided that a paid legal practitioner should not stand in the municipal elections. In  view  of  the  above reasons,  we  must  hold  that  the appellant  was not disqualified for election under Art.  191 of  the Constitution.  But assuming that she held an  office of   profit,   this  disqualification   has   been   removed retrospectively  by  the Rajasthan Legislative  Assembly  by enacting the impugned Act. Mr.  Chagla,  learned Counsel for the  respondent,  contends that  the Rajasthan State Legislature was not competent  ’to declare  retrospectively’  under  Art. 191 (1)  (a)  of  the Constitution.  It seems to us that there is no force in this contention.   It  has been held in numerous  cases  by  this Court  that  the  State  Legislatures  and  Parliament   can legislate  retrospectively subject to the provisions of  the Constitution.   Apart  from  the  question  of   fundamental rights, no express restriction has been placed on the  power of the Legislature of the State, and we are unable to imply, in  the context, any restriction.  Practice of  the  British Parliament   does  not  oblige  us  to  place  any   implied restriction.   We notice that the British Parliament in  one case validated the election : [Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law,      Privileges     Proceedings     &     Usage      of Parliament--Seventeenth (1964) Edition]-

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             "After  the  general election of 1945  it  was               found   that  the  persons  elected  for   the               Coatbridge Division of               (1)   [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1004.                SupCI-9               852               Lanark   and  the  Springbourn   Division   of               Glassgow  were  disqualified at  the  time  of               their  election because they were  members  of               tribunals appointed by the Minister under  the               Rent  of Furnished Houses  Control  (Scotland)               Act, 1943, which entitled them to a small  fee               in  respect  of attendance at a  Tribunal.   A               Select    Committee    reported    that    the               disqualification  was incurred  inadvertently,               and  in accordance with  their  recommendation               the   Coatbridge  and   Springburn   Elections               (Validation)  Bill was introduced to  validate               the  irregular elections [H.C. Deb.  (1945-46)               414,  c.  564-6]. See  also  H.C.  3(1945-46);               ibid. 71 (1945-46) and ibid.92 (1945-46)." We have also noticed two earlier instances of  retrospective legislation,  e.a., The House of Commons  (Disqualification) 1813 [Halsbury Statutes of England p. 467] and Sec. 2 of the Re-election of Ministers Act, 1919 (ibid. p. 515). Great  t  stress  was laid on the word  ’declared’  in  Art. 191(1) (a), but we are unable to imply any limitation on the powers  of the Legislature from this word.  Declaration  can be made effective as from an earlier date. The  apprehension that it may not be a healthy practice  and this power might be abused in a particular case are again no grounds for limiting the powers of the State Legislature. It is also urged that by enacting the impugned Act the State Legislature  has  amended the 1951 Act.  We  are  unable  to appreciate  this  contention.   The  State  Legislature  has exercised  its  powers under Art. 191 to declare  a  certain office  not  to  have ever  disqualified  its  holder.   The impugned  Act does not amend or alter the 1951 Act,  in  any respect  whatsoever.  It is said that under the 1951 Act  as it existed before the impugned Act was passed, the appellant was not qualified to be chosen for this particular election. By    enacting    the   impugned   Act    the    appellant’s disqualification has been removed and the 1951 Act is, so to say, made to speak with another voice.  But that is what the State Legislature is entitled to do, as long as it does  not touch the wording of the 1951 Act.  The answer given by  the 1951-Act  may be different but this is because the facts  on which it operates have by valid law been given a  different garb. It  is further urged that the-impugned Act violates Art.  14 of  the  Constitution because the Central  Government  might have appointed Government Pleaders under rule 8B of Order 27 and  the impugned Act nowhere mentions the  alleged  offices held by 853 them.  No  material has been placed to show  that  any  such offices exist.  We cannot, therefore, entertain this  point. In view of the above reasons We are of the opinion that  the impugned Act is valid and removes the disqualification if it existed before. There  is  force in the third point raised  by  the  learned counsel for the appellant.  Section 82 of the Representation of the People Act, 1 of 1951, reads as follows               "81. A petitioner shall join as respondents to               his petition-

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             (a)   where  the  petitioner, in  addition  to               claiming  a ,declaration that the election  of               all or any of the returned candidates is void,               claims  a further declaration that be  himself               or any other- candidate has been duly elected.               all  the contesting candidates other than  the               petitioner   and   where   no   such   further               declaration  is  claimed,  all  the   returned               candidates; and               (b)   any   other   candidate   against   whom               allegations  of any corrupt practice are  made               in the petition. In this context the words ’any other candidate’ plainly mean a  candidate in the election for the constituency  which  is the subject matter of the petition. In  the  result the appeal is allowed, the judgment  of  the High  Court  set aside and the petition dismissed.   In  the circumstances  of the case the parties will bear  their  own costs throughout. V.P.S.                     Appeal allowed. 854