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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)   of 913-

PETITIONER: Kanpur Development Authority             

RESPONDENT: Smt. Sheela Devi & Ors. Etc.             

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/11/2003

BENCH: Shivaraj V. Patil & D.M. Dharmadhikari.          

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

SHIVARAJ V. PATIL J.

       Kanpur Development Authority (KDA) has filed these appeals  challenging the correctness and validity of the common order dated  21.5.1997 made by the Division Bench of the High court in Writ  Petitions.

       Three schemes were floated by KDA in September, 1978 with  financial support of ’HUDCO’ "on no profit no loss basis".  The  three Schemes were; (1) For Economically Weaker Section; (2) For  Lower Income Group and (3) Middle Income Group.  Applications were  invited in the prescribed form fixing the last date as 29.9.1978.   The applications were to be made in the prescribed form along with  the earnest money for each category.  A brochure was issued  showing the cost of each house and terms and conditions of the  Schemes.  In these cases, we are not concerned with the houses  constructed in two other schemes which were allotted to the  applicants on the basis of lottery on 25.10.1980 and cost  specified in the brochure and the possession of the houses was  delivered to them.   However, the applicants (respondents herein)  in the Middle Income Group were not allotted the houses and their  applications were kept pending for more than 18 years for no fault  of them.

       As per the terms and conditions mentioned in the brochure in  the MIG Category, the applications were to be made along with the  earnest money by 29.9.1978.  The estimated cost of each house was  specified in the brochure as Rs. 48,000/-.  The persons whose  income was between Rs. 601/- to Rs. 1500/- per month were eligible  for Middle Income Group Houses.  The houses were to be allotted  among the valid applicants by lottery.  After the lottery was  drawn and on receipt of letter of information of allotment, the  applicants had to deposit balance of the 1/4th of the cost of the  house.  Thereafter, physical possession of the houses was to be  delivered to the allottees and the remaining 3/4th of the cost of  the house i.e. Rs.36,000/- was to be paid by the allottees in 48  quarterly installments in 12 years with 11.5% interest as per the  brochure. Since there were only 108 valid applications altogether  for 111 MIG houses, all the applicants could have been allotted  MIG houses when 1/4th cost of the house was deposited by the  applicants as on 31.3.1979, what remained was only to draw a  lottery among the 108 valid applicants for the specific houses to  each one of the applicants.  And thereafter the possession of  specified house was to be delivered to each allottee as the  constructions of 111 MIG houses were completed in 1980.

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       However, KDA chose to include names of some more applicants  after the last date i.e. 29.9.1978, which gave rise to disputes.   Some affected applicants filed suits in 1981/1982.  None of these  respondents were parties in those suits.   

       The court finding fault with the KDA decreed the suit and  directed it to allot the houses to 108 valid applicants keeping 8  houses reserved for the persons who are plaintiffs in those two  suits.  The appeals filed by the KDA against the decree passed by  the trial court were also dismissed.  Instead of complying with  the decree, KDA increased the cost of each houses from Rs.  48,000/- to Rs.2,08,000/- by the notification dated 24.12.1994  stating that each applicant had to deposit a further sum of  Rs.40,000/- and in case of default the name of the applicant would  not be included in the list of lottery for allotment of houses.   In these circumstances, some of the respondents were compelled to  file writ petitions.         The writ petitions were admitted and interim orders were  issued to include the names of 85 general category applicants in  the lottery.  In spite of the interim order dated 4.1.1995, KDA  again issued a notification on 10.1.1995 stating that the date of  lottery had been extended to 17.1.1995.

       The lottery was drawn among the 108 valid applications,  keeping 8 houses reserved to the plaintiffs in the two suits.  In  February, 1995, information of allotment was issued to all the  allottees along with demand for Rs. 24,000/- from each one of them  towards first 6th monthly installment.  The High Court in the writ  petitions stayed this demand.  The KDA filed the counter affidavit  in the writ petitions taking a stand that it was entitled to  escalate the price as per the brochure; the initial price fixed as  the cost of the houses, was only tentative; the delay in drawing  of lottery and allotment of house was on account of the suits  filed and because of the pendency of the cases. According to the  KDA, the action taken by it in increasing the cost of the house to  Rs. 2,08,000/- was quite justified.  The Division Bench of the  High Court, after detailed consideration of the respective  contentions, allowed the writ petitions granting relief to the  respondents by quashing the order dated 24.12.1994 of the KDA  increasing the cost of the houses and directed it to deliver the  possession of the houses to the respondents on the cost fixed in  the brochure.         The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High  Court failed to appreciate that the Vice Chairman of KDA could  determine the cost of the houses and the cost fixed by him was  reasonable and fair; the High court could not have interfered with  such determination of cost.  The High Court should have taken into  consideration the position that the KDA brought out the scheme for  allotment of houses on ’no profit and no loss basis’; the cost  fixed was based on the relevant materials and it was not arbitrary  so as to interfere with the same; it was not open to the High  Court to hold that the price of the house fixed was arbitrary and  unreasonable without going into the method or the basis for  calculating the cost of the house.  The delay in allotment of  houses was not deliberate or intentional; it was because of long  pending litigation in courts. The learned counsel added that KDA  constructed the houses by raising loans under the HUDCO Scheme; it  has paid enormous amount of interest on the loan raised; it had to  pay heavy compensation for acquisition of land.         On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the  respondents argued fully justifying the impugned order. He  submitted that the delay in allotment of houses and delivering the

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possession of the same to the respondents was on account of the  appellant; the respondents complied with the every condition  contemplated in the brochure; the unreasonable stand and conduct  of the appellant was responsible for delay and no blame can be put  on the respondents in that regard.  Two suits were filed in  1981/1982 by eight plaintiffs in all.  Nothing prevented the  appellant from allotting the houses to the respondents keeping  aside eight houses for the eight plaintiffs as they were available  in excess of the applications.  The appellant moved for vacating  the interim order in those suits filed in 1981/1982 only in 1990.   The present respondents were not parties in those suits.  The  appeals filed by the KDA against the decree passed in the suits  were dismissed on 24.5.1994.  The learned counsel further  contended that as per the brochure issued by the appellant,  escalation of cost of houses could not exceed 10%; cost of the  houses should be determined as on the date of completion of the  houses and not on the date of the allotment or delivering the  possession of the houses.  The appellant has tried to prosecute  parallel remedies inasmuch as it filed review petitions before the  High Court and special leave petition before this Court against  the impugned order.  The respondents were salaried employees  having income between Rs.601 to Rs.1500 per month; they had  arranged their financial affairs with a hope to get houses. Had  they been given the possession of the houses immediately after  their completion in 1981, they could have saved money paying by  way of rent to houses where they were staying.  The learned  counsel drew our attention to I.A. Nos. 7-8 of 2003 filed by the  respondents to take action against the appellant under Section 340  read with Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by  ordering an inquiry into the offences committed by the appellant  under Sections 193, 196, 199, 200, 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 471  read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code in respect of  production of false and fabricated documents and giving false  evidence during the proceedings.  In these applications it is  specifically averred that the appellant produced a translated copy  of the brochure (Annexure A-1) alleging the same to contain the  1978 Scheme for allotment of houses in Mohalla Barra Third Phase,  Kanpur.  The correct copy (translated) of the brochure that was  given to the respondents at the time of application for the said  Scheme is filed as Annexure A-2.  The original copy in Hindi was  placed before us during the hearing.  According to the respondents  Annexure A-1 was filed before the High Court by the appellant,  which is fake, fabricated and materially different from the true  translation of the original brochure and that the said document  has been filed by the appellant with oblique motives to  thwart/alter the course of justice.  It is further stated in these  I.As. that the case of the appellant before this Court is based on  the premise that "In the brochure Clause 4 relating to payment of  price, stipulated that the final price shall be determined by the  Vice Chairman of the KDA and that the said price shall be  determined by the Vice Chairman of the KDA and the price would be  binding on the applicants.  The brochure for allotment of houses  under the Scheme also provided that the Vice Chairman of the KDA  is empowered to alter/change the price/shape of the houses shown  in the brochure and it shall be binding on every applicant".  The  prayer is made in these I.As. to order for a preliminary inquiry  into the offences committed by the persons responsible in the  appellant authority during the course of the judicial proceedings  and after recording the findings make a complaint to the Chief  Judicial Magistrate for the prosecution of the accused persons in  accordance with law.  During the course of hearing when the  original brochure in Hindi was produced on behalf of the  respondents the learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute  its correctness and authenticity.           We have carefully considered the respective submissions made

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on behalf of the parties and to appreciate them, it may be  necessary to refer to the relevant terms and conditions under  different headings contained in the brochure.  In the light of the  controversy as to the translated copies of the brochures produced  by the appellant and the respondents and in view of what is stated  above in relation to them the relevant terms and conditions  contained in translated copy of the brochure (Annexure A-2) filed  along with I.A. Nos. 7-8 on comparison of the same with the  original in Hindi, reads: -          "       Signature (L.N. Tripathi) (Rubber stamp) Head Clerk (Sales) Kanpur Development Authority

BURRA HOUSING CONSTRUCTION SCHEME (financially supported by HUDCO)

Third Phase

(Application Form)

KANPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Price Rs.5/-"

"(Application form for applicant only)

KANPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY No.____ (Without putting adverse effect)

Price Rs.5/-

BARRA HOUSING SCHEME

To:

       Vice Chairman         Development Authority         Kanpur

Sir,

       I/We ___________________ son/wife of  _______________ apply for a house in the  proposed houses under "Barra Grah Nirman  Yogna" of Kanpur Development Authority, the  estimated cost of which is Rs.48,000/- (which  can also exceed upto 10%).................."

"SYSTEM AND RULES OF ALLOTMENT OF HOUSES

8)      The Vice-Chairman can change any rule or can  cancel and can make other rule which shall be

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acceptable to the applicant."

"KANPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY BARRA HOUSING CONSTRUCTION SCHEME Details of House & Rules for Payment

------------------------------------------------------- Sl. Category    Area    Details Monthly Sale  Adv.      31.12.78        31.12.79        Qtly .       Rate No. of house    of land of          income      price amount                    install-     of                 In sq.  house   of family       of      with                    ments   inte rest/                 mt.                  Not        house appli-                            year                                      exceeding which cation                                         can                                                increase                                         upto 10%

------------------------------------------------------- 1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10      11 1.      .............. 2.      .............. 3.   Middle     167.20  2 rooms,        1500    48000   5000    2500    4500    48      11.5 %       Income            drawing       Group             dining, Bath &                         Toilet Room &                         Lounge                                                  "

       In the application form as prescribed by the KDA, it is  clearly mentioned that the estimated cost of the house in MIG  scheme is Rs.48,000/- (which can also exceed up to 10%).  There  was some controversy with regard to the terms and conditions  mentioned in the brochure. It was contended on behalf of the  respondents that there was deliberate misrepresentation by KDA  before the High Court by filing incomplete and incorrect extract  of Brochure. Before us, not only translated copy but original of  Brochure in Hindi itself was produced by respondents and there was  no controversy as to the terms and conditions in relation to the  relevant clauses extracted above.  As rightly contended on behalf  of the respondents there is no clause 4 in the brochure relating  to payment of price on which the appellant claimed that the Vice- Chairman of the KDA has the right to increase the price and fix  the final price that would be binding on the applicants. This  being the position, the very foundation for increase of the price  of houses and justification thereof itself is destabilized and  knocked down.  Clause 4 of the brochure is altogether different,  which reads: - "4)     House category 2 and 3, the interested  applicants to deposit full amount of the house,  will have to deposit balance of the 1/4th of cost  by 31.12.1978.  The information of lottery will  be sent by registered post on the address  mentioned in the application form.  The  remaining 3/4th of the cost of the house will  have to be deposited in cash or by Bank draft in  favour of Development Authority within 60 days  from the information of lottery given by  registered post, otherwise all proceedings  regarding allotment will be cancelled and the  advance money will be forfeited."

It is not in dispute that the respondents made applications within

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the time fixed, satisfied the terms and conditions for allotment  of houses and they were not the plaintiff in the suits filed in  1981/1982.  The construction of houses was completed in 1980, the  cost of the house was determined as on 24.12.1994.  Nothing  prevented the KDA from allotting houses to the respondents, when  the houses were ready for allotment.  Particularly, when houses  available were more than the applications received before the last  date.  For no fault of the respondents, they were made to wait for  more than 18 years.  As per the brochure, the houses were to be  allotted through lottery system by drawing lot among the eligible  applicants, who got themselves registered through the prescribed  format within the time fixed and paid required money within time.   In the instant case in MIG scheme, 111 houses were available but  the number of applicants were less including the respondents.   Only 8 persons had filed suits in the years 1981/1982.  There  should have been no difficulty in allotting the houses and  delivering the possession to the respondents immediately on their  completion in 1980.  In that event, the payment of interest on  loan said to have been taken by the authority would not have  arisen. It cannot also be ignored that the respondents were/are  mostly salaried employees having monthly income of Rs.601-1500.  They must also have adjusted and arranged their finances and  affairs to make payment towards the houses.  It may also be kept  in mind that the allottees were expected to pay the remaining  amount after initial deposit and first installment, in 48  installments.  Even having regard to the payment of money in  installments, the estimated cost which was fixed at Rs. 48,000/-  with a clear and express understanding that increase in the cost  of the house could be up to 10% of the cost of the house.  In the  brochure, it is also mentioned that the price of the houses  mentioned is totally approximate and that the final price of the  houses would be determined by the Vice Chairman, KDA, on the  completion of the houses.  Prices of the houses in these cases  were determined as on 24.12.1994 as against the express clause  that the determination of the final price shall be as on the date  of completion of the construction of the houses i.e. in the year  1980. As can be seen from the prescribed form of application and  rules for payment the increase of the cost of the house can be up  to 10%.  Further it is clear from the prescribed form of  application as filled by the respondents that the estimated cost  of the house is Rs. 48,000/- which could exceed up to 10%.  The  argument advanced on behalf of the appellant to the effect that  the Vice Chairman has power to determine the prices of the houses  and the price determined is binding on the respondents, runs  contrary to brochure.  Hence it cannot be accepted.         Further for no fault of the respondents they cannot be  penalized to pay the cost of construction as determined on  24.12.1994 when the houses were ready in 1980.  As can be seen  from the impugned order, the High Court has found thus: - "It was undesirable conduct of the authority  which gave rise to the civil litigation.  There  were no restraints and constraints for the  respondents in drawing the lottery and making  the allotments to the genuine applicants even  during the pendency of the civil suit and appeal  before the District Judge.  There is nothing in  the counter affidavit to demonstrate that the  respondents were under legal obligation to  refuse the allotment of the houses to the  persons or make delay in allotment of the houses  to them.  So in absence of a reasonable and  sufficient justification preventing the  respondents to make allotment in 1979, we feel  that the respondents should be blamed for delay  in making the allotment."

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The High Court has further observed: -

"It may be mentioned that the petitioners  deposited the installments under the hope and  trust that they will get the houses within the  time schedule advertised at the initial stage.   Much time is elapsed between the registration of  the applications for allotment of the houses and  actual construction and delivery of possession  thereafter.  It is worth mentioning that the  petitioners might be living in the rented house  since 1979 and they might have managed their  financial position in such a manner that after  the deposit of the installments they will get  the house of their own and thereafter they will  be free from payment of house rent and then they  will be shifted from the rented house to the  allotted house, but on account of inordinate  delay in delivery of possession of allotted  house, their financial calculation and  expectation stands frustrated causing various  types of financial loss to them.  On the other  hand, once the authorities made offers and the  same were accepted by the allottees, with the  legitimate exception, the statutory obligation  cast upon the authorities is to complete the  same within the time schedule mentioned in the  offer and if they fail to discharge the same,  they should be held responsible for it and not  the petitioners."                                  The High Court finally concluded that delay in allotting and  in delivering the possession of the houses to the respondents was  caused due to the lapse on the part of the appellant, and,  therefore, in the fairness of things, the KDA should not be  allowed to determine unjust and unfair cost of the houses in an  arbitrary manner.             We have no good reason to take a different view in the light of  what is stated above. We have to note one more submission made on  behalf of the appellant that the appellant works on no loss and no  profit basis and it has raised huge loan under the HUDCO scheme for  construction of houses and it has to pay heavy interest on the  amount of loan raised.  The appellant neither urged nor laid any  foundation for this argument before the High Court. No details and  particulars were given as to the amount of loan raised and the  period for which interest has been paid in respect of the houses  constructed which are to be allotted to the respondents.            Further the final price of the houses had to be determined on  the date of their completion. As found, there was delay on account  of the appellant and if that occasioned payment of interest, the  respondents cannot be held responsible, having regard to the terms  and conditions contained in the brochure.  This apart, no  justifiable case is made out for escalation of price of the houses  in these cases, to say that the appellant could enhance the prices  for the unforeseen or compelling reasons beyond control of  appellants even as against the terms and conditions contained in the  brochure.         The learned counsel for the appellant cited two decisions in  Delhi Development Authority vs. Pushpendra Kumar Jain [1994 Supp.  (3) SCC 494] and Prashant Kumar Shahi vs. Ghaziabad Development  Authority [(2000) 4 SCC 120], in support of his submissions.  In  our view both these decisions do not help the appellant when we  look at the facts of those cases and the views expressed therein.         In the Case of Delhi Development Authority (supra) the facts

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were that Delhi Development Authority (DDA) published a scheme  called "Registration Scheme of New Pattern, 1979 of intending  purchasers of flats to be constructed by Delhi Development  Authority" providing a procedure for allotment of flats.  In the  brochure, clause (11) provided schedule of payment.  Clause (14)  was to the effect that "it may please be noted that the plinth  area of the flats indicated and the estimated prices mentioned in  the brochure are illustrative and are subject to  revision/modification depending upon the exigencies of lay-out,  cost of construction etc.".  The Court took notice that there  were always more applicants than the number of flats available.   The DDA had been adopting the method of draw of lots among the  registered applicants to select the allottees.  The writ petition  was filed by one of the allottees because between the date on  which lots were drawn and the date on which the allotment was  communicated to the respondent, the land rates were revised by the  DDA by the circular dated 6.12.1990, as there has been substantial  enhancement of land rates in the region of about 50 to 70%.  Since  the allotment was made to allottee on January 9/13, 1991, he was  called upon to remit the amount on the basis of revised land rates  as aforesaid.  The Division Bench of the High Court accepted the  plea of the allottee writ petitioner.  This Court, allowing the  appeal filed by the DDA, found fault with two reasons given by the  High Court: (1) Though the draw was held on 12.10.1990, the  allotment-cum-demand letter was issued to the respondent only on  January 9/13, 1991.  This delay was the result of inefficiency of  the DDA, and (2) as the issue of allotment-cum-demand letter was  delayed in the office of DDA, it cannot charge the revised land  rates to the respondent inasmuch as the respondent became entitled  to get the flat on 12.10.1990; the revision of land rates  subsequent to the draw of lots cannot affect the respondent.  This  Court held that there was no legal basis for holding that the  respondent obtained the vested right to allotment on the draw of  lots as the system of drawing of lots was resorted to with a view  to identify the allottee; it was not the allotment by itself.   Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not clothe  the person selected with a legal right to allotment at the price  prevailing on the date of draw of lots.  The scheme did not say so  either expressly or by necessary implication.  On the contrary  clause (14) made provision for modification or revision of cost of  construction, etc.  On facts it was also found that there was no  unreasonable delay or inefficiency on the part of the DDA.   Further, the validity or justification of the revision of land  rates by circular dated 6.12.1990 was not questioned in the writ  petition.  But in the present case the facts are entirely  different.  On facts it is found that there has been unreasonable  and unjustified delay on the part of the appellant in allotting  and delivering the possession of the houses.  The clause in regard  to determination of price is not similar to clause (14) in the  aforementioned case of DDA.  The cost of escalation could not  exceed 10% of the tentative cost.  The cost of construction of  house in these cases on hand was to be determined as on the date  of the completion of the construction of the house and not on the  date of delivering possession of the house.  Unlike in the case of  DDA it was not the case of revision of land rates alone, that too  in the absence of any circular indicating revision of cost of land  before allotment or delivery of possession of houses.         The case of Prashant Kumar Shahi, aforementioned, is also of  no help to the appellant.  It supports the case of the  respondents.  This Court held that if the authority is found to be  responsible for the delay in delivery of the possession of the  plots in terms of the agreement arrived at or according to the  assurance given in the brochure, the allottee cannot be burdened  with the interest on the balance amount not paid by him.  But on  the facts of that case fault was found with the allottee in regard

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to the delay in payment.  As already recorded above, in these  appeals, with which we are concerned, delay was on account of the  appellant authority itself.         The learned counsel for the respondents in support of his  submissions cited the decision of this Court in Indore Development  Authority vs. Sadhana Agarwal (Smt) and others [(1995) 3 SCC 1].   In the facts and circumstances of that case having regard to the  reasons for the increase in the cost no interference was called  for by the High Court.  Further, the High Court was justified in  saying that in such circumstances, the authority owed a duty to  explain and satisfy the court, the reasons for such high  escalation.  The High Court has to be satisfied on the materials  on record that the authority has not acted in an arbitrary or  erratic manner.  In the said decision reference is made to two  earlier decisions of this Court including the case of DDA  aforementioned.  In paragraph 9 it is stated, thus:- "9. This Court in the case of Bareilly  Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh [(1989)  2 SCC 116], had to deal with a similar situation  in connection with the Bareilly Development  Authority which had undertaken construction of  dwelling units for people belonging to different  income groups styled as "Lower Income Group",  "Middle Income Group", "Higher Income Group" and  the "Economically Weaker Sections". The  respondents to the said appeal had registered  themselves for allotment of the flats in  accordance with the terms and conditions  contained in the brochure issued by the  Authority. Subsequently, the respondents of that  appeal received notices for the Authority  intimating the revised cost of the houses/flats  and the monthly installment rates which were  almost double the cost and rate of instalments  initially stated in the General Information  Table. But taking all facts and circumstances  into consideration, this Court said that it  cannot be held that there was a misstatement or  incorrect statement or any fraudulent  concealment, in the brochure published by the  Authority. It was also said that the respondents  cannot be heard to say that the Authority had  arbitrarily and unreasonably changed the terms  and conditions of the brochure to the prejudice  of the respondents. In that connection, it was  pointed out that the most of the respondents had  accepted the changed and varied terms.  Thereafter they were not justified in seeking  any direction from the Court to allot such flats  on the original terms and conditions. Recently,  the same question has been examined in the case  of Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra  Kumar Jain. In respect of hike in the price of  the flats, it was said : (SCC p. 497, Para 8)  "Mere identification or selection of  the allottee does not clothe the  person selected with a legal right  to allotment at the price prevailing  on the date of draw of lots. The  scheme evolved by the appellant does  not say so either expressly or by  necessary implication. On the  contrary, clause (14) thereof says  that ’the estimated prices mentioned  in the brochure are illustrative and

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are subject to revisions/  modification depending upon the  exigencies of lay out, cost of  construction etc’."  Although this Court has from time to time,  taking the special facts and circumstances of  cases in question, has upheld the excess charged  by the development authorities over the cost  initially announced as estimated cost, but it  should not be understood that this Court has  held that such development authorities have  absolute right to hike the cost of flats,  initially announced as approximate or estimated  cost for such flats. It is well known that  persons belonging to middle and lower income  groups, before registering themselves for such  flats, have to take their financial capacity  into consideration and in some cases it results  in great hardship when the development  authorities announce an estimated or approximate  cost and deliver the same at twice or thrice of  the said amount. The final cost should be  proportionate to the approximate or estimated  cost mentioned in the offers or agreements. With  the high rate of inflation, escalation of the  prices of construction materials and labour  charges, if the scheme is not ready within the  time-frame, then it is not possible to deliver  the flats or houses in question at the cost so  announced. It will be advisable that before  offering the flats to the public such  development authorities should fix the estimated  cost of the flats taking into consideration the  escalation of the cost during the period the  scheme is to be completed. In the instant case  the estimated cost for the LIG flat was given  out at Rs. 45,000. But by the impugned  communication, the appellant informed the  respondents that the actual cost of the flat  shall be Rs. 1,16,000 i.e. the escalation is  more than 100%. The High Court was justified in  saying that in such circumstances, the Authority  owed a duty to explain and to satisfy the Court,  the reasons for such high escalation. We may add  that this does not mean that the High Court in  such disputes, while exercising the writ  jurisdiction, has to examine every detail of the  construction with reference to the cost  incurred. The High Court had to be satisfied on  the materials on record that the Authority has  not acted in an arbitrary or erratic manner. "

       We are of the view that each case is to be decided in the  facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the scheme  published/framed and the terms and conditions mentioned in the  Brochure and/or in the prescribed form of application in the  matter of escalation/determination of cost of house/flat. However,  cases where there is limit for fixing the escalation of cost,  normally the price of house or flat cannot exceed the limits so  fixed.  The determination of cost of house/flat or escalation of  cost cannot be arbitrary or erratic.  The authority has to broadly  satisfy by placing material on record to justify the escalation of  cost of a house/flat.  Whether the delay was caused by the  allottee or the authority itself is also a factor which has  bearing in determination of the cost of house/flat.  The

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unforeseen cause or the reason beyond control of the authority in  a given case may be another factor to be kept in view.  We may  also notice that in these cases the tentative cost of houses was  fixed at Rs.48,000/- but final cost was determined at  Rs.2,08,000/-.  This increase is not mere escalation but it is a  multiplication by almost four and half times, although escalation  could not exceed 10% as is evident from the contents of the  Brochure read with prescribed form of application for allotment of  house itself.  Contentions of the KDA run contrary to the contents  of its own Brochure on which the respondents acted adjusting their  financial affairs understanding that the cost of the houses would  be fixed in terms of brochure and that too not exceeding 10% of  the estimated cost fixed initially.         As to the complaint that the appellant having filed review  petition before the High Court seeking review of the impugned  judgment could not prosecute parallel remedy by filing SLP in this  Court, the learned counsel for the appellant was not in a position  to say as to what happened to the review petition filed in the  High Court.  In our view it may be unnecessary to say anything  further on this aspect in the view we have taken and are disposing  of these appeals themselves on merits.  As regards the prayer made  by the respondents in I.As. 7-8 we do not think it necessary to  probe further in these proceedings.  Hence no orders are required  to be passed in these I.As.          Thus having regard to the facts found and in view of what is  stated above, we cannot find fault with the conclusions arrived at  by the High Court in the impugned judgment.  Hence, finding no  merit in these appeals, they are dismissed but with no order as to  costs.