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PETITIONER: KALYAN SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U. P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/12/1961

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SUBBARAO, K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1962 AIR 1183            1962 SCR  Supl. (2)  76  CITATOR INFO :  F          1963 SC 640  (13)  R          1970 SC1102  (13)  RF         1975 SC  32  (36)

ACT:      Road  Transport-Nationalisation   of  routes- Scheme-Initiation by State Government, if invalid- Cancellation of  permit-Whether can be challenged- Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), ss. 68C, 68D and 68F.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant,  whose permit for plying stage carriage was  shortly to  expire, applied  for its renewal. The  renewal application was published in the Gazette  calling  for  objections.  The  State Government published  a notification  proposing to nationalise the  route. The permit was renewed for three years  for  a  part  of  the  route  but  an endorsement  was   made  thereon  authorising  the appellant to  ply on  the remaining  part  of  the route  for   four  months.  The  appellants  filed objections   to    the   proposed    scheme    for nationalisation. The  objections were heard by the Joint Secretary, Judicial Department, who approved the scheme  with certain modifications. The scheme was  published   in  the  Gazette.  Thereafter,  a notification was  issued under s. 68F of the Motor Vehicles Act  cancelling the  appellant’s  renewed permit. Under  the Scheme  the stage  carriages of the State  Transport Undertaking  could ply on the route without  obtaining  permits.  The  appellant challenged the  validity of  the  scheme  and  the cancellation of his licence. ^      Held, that  the  scheme  was  valid  and  the appellant’s licence was properly cancelled.      Section  68C   of  the   Motor  Vehicles  Act required the  scheme to  be initiated by the State

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Transport Undertaking.  Even though  the scheme in the present  case was  actually initiated  by  the State Government  there was no non-compliance with the provisions  of s. 68C. There was no difference between an  undertaking run by a department of the State  Government   and  that  run  by  the  State Government. In either case the undertaking was run by  the   State  and  it  was  a  State  transport undertaking  within   the  meaning   of  s.   68C. Initiation of  the scheme  by the State Government running  an  undertaking  was  initiation  by  the statutory  authority  i.e.,  the  State  Transport undertaking. The appellant could not be allowed to challenge the validity of the scheme on the ground that the Joint Secretary was not lawfully invested with the  authority  to  hear  objections  and  to approve the  scheme as the point was not raised at the proper stage. 77      Gullapalli Nageswara  Rao v.  Andhra  Pradesh State Road  Transport Corporation,  [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319, applied.      The scheme  having been  validly  promulgated and having become final under s. 68D(3) it had the effect  of   extinguishing  all   rights  of   the appellant to  ply his  stage  carriage  under  his permit and  he could not maintain a petition under Art. 226  of the Constitution. The order passed by the Regional  Transport Authority  cancelling  the appellant’s permit was purely consequential on the scheme and  could not  be challenged if the scheme was valid.  Once the right of the appellant to ply his stage  carriage was  validly  extinguished  he could  not   question  the   right  of  the  State transport authority  to ply  their stage carriages with or without permits.      Abdul  Gafoor,   Proprietor,  Shaheen   Motor Service v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1556, applied.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Civil  Appeal No. 325/61.      Appeal from  the judgment  and  decree  dated March 6. 1961, of the Allahabad High Court in Writ No. 3116 of 1960.                        WITH      Petitions Nos. 180, 181 and 205 of 1961.      Petitions Under  Art. 32  of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.      S.  N.  Kacker  and  J.  P.  Goyal,  for  the appellant (In  C.A. No. 325/61) and the petitioner (In Petn. No. 205/61).      H.N. Sanyal,  Additional Solicitor-General of India,      K.L. Misra, Advocate-General, U. P. H. N. Seth,  J. K.  Srivastva and  C. P. Lal, for the respondents (in  C.A. No. 325/61 and Petn. No. 205 of 1961).      J.  P.   Goyal,  for   the  petitioners   (In petitions Nos. 180 and 181 of 1961).      C. P.  Lal, for the respondents (In Petitions Nos. 180 and 181 of 1961).      1961. December  II. The Judgment of the Court

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was delivered by      SHAH, J.-The  appeal and  the writ  petitions practically raise the same points and may be 78 disposed of  together.  At  the  outset  we  shall briefly state  the facts  relevant to  each of the said proceedings.      The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 325 of 1961 held a  permit for  plying stage  carriage on  the Kanpur Bela-Bidhuna  route via  Chaubepur, in  the State of  Uttar Pradesh.  The entire  route is  68 miles long,  and a  part of  the route 16 miles in length i.e.,  Kanpur to  Chaubepur, is  a notified route. This part was common between the said route and the  Kanpur-Chaubepur-Sarai Miran route, which was  a   nationalised  route.   A  condition  was, therefore, attached to the appellant’s permit that he would  not be entitled to pick up passengers or drop them between Kanpur and Chaubepur. His permit was to  expire on  June 10,  1960. Before the said date, he applied for renewal of his permit, and on May 20,  1960 it  was published  in the U.P. Govt. Gazette calling  for objections.  On the same day, the State  Government published  a notification in the Gazette  proposing  to  nationalise  the  said route. As the application for renewal could not be disposed of  before the expiry of the period fixed in the permit a temporary permit for the route was granted to  the appellant.  On July  19, 1960  the application for  renewal of the appellant’s permit was   considered   by   the   Regional   Transport Authority, Kanpur,  and his permit was renewed for three years  with effect  from July 23, 1966, only in respect  of a  part of  the old  route, namely, Chaubepur-Bela-Bidhuna; but  under the  directions of  the   Transport  Commissioner,   the  Regional Transport Authority  made an  endorsement  on  the renewed permit  authorizing the  appellant to  ply his vehicle  between Kanpur  and Chaubepur  for  a period of  four months  commencing from  July  23, 1960.  As   regards   the   proposed   scheme   of nationalization, on  June 22,  1960 the  appellant filed his  objections thereto. The said objections were heard by the Joint Secretary, Judicial 79 Department, who  approved  the  scheme  with  some modifications. The  approved scheme  was published in the  Gazette on  October  8,  1960.  Under  the notification  the   scheme  was  to  be  put  into operation from  October 5,  1960 or thereafter. On November 12,  1960, a  notification dated November 4, 1960  was published in the Gazette under s. 68F of  the   Motor  Vehicles   Act   cancelling   the appellant’s  renewed   permit  with   effect  from November  27,   1960.  Under  the  nationalization scheme the  stage carriages belonging to the State Transport Undertaking  could ply on the said route without obtaining  permits. The  appellant filed a petition under Art, 226 of the Constitution in the High Court  of Judicature at Allahabad praying for the following reliefs:-      (a)  That a  writ in  the nature  of mandamus           may issue to command the respondents not           to interfere with the Petitioner’s right           to  ply   on   Kanpur-Bela-Bidhuna   Via

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         Chaubepur route  under the  permit  duly           renewed in  his favour  till the  entire           duration of  the permit  viz., till July           22, 1963.      (b)  That a  Writ in the nature of certiorari           may  issue  to  quash  so  much  of  the           Resolution dated July 19, 1960 passed by           the   Regional    Transport   Authority,           Kanpur, as directs imposition of illegal           conditions to  the renewed permit of the           petitioner.      (c)  That a  Writ in  the nature  of mandamus           may issue  to command  respondents No. 2           and 3  not to give effect to the illegal           endorsements made  on  the  petitioner’s           permit on July 23, 1960 and to treat the           petitioner’s  permit   as  having   been           renewed without  the illegal  conditions           attached thereto by the two endorsements           dated  July   23,  1960,  reproduced  in           paragraph 15 of the affidavit. 80      (d)  That a  Writ in the nature of certiorari           may issue  to  quash  the  notifications           dated May  18, 1960 under section 68C of           the  Act,   so   also   the   subsequent           notifications under  section  68D(2)  of           the Act dated September 26, 1960 and the           notification  dated   November  4,  1960           under section  68F (2)  of  the  Act  in           regard to Kanpur-Bela-Bidhuna route.      (e)  That a  Writ in  the nature  of mandamus           may issue directing the respondents Nos.           1  to  3  not  to  give  effect  to  the           notifications  dated   May   18,   1960,           September 26,  1960 and November 4, 1960           in regard to Kanpur-Bela-Bidhuna route.      (f)  That an  interim direction  may issue to           the respondents  Nos. 2  and  3  not  to           interfere with the Petitioner’s right to           ply on  the  entire  Kanpur-Bela-Bidhuna           route   under    the   renewed    permit           irrespective of  the illegal  conditions           attached  thereto   or  of  the  illegal           scheme for  the nationalization  of  the           said route.      (g)  That  costs  of  this  petition  may  be           awarded to  the Petitioners  as  against           the opposite parties. On December  2, 1960    the  High  Court  made  an interim order directing the State of Uttar Pradesh not to interfere with the petitioner operating his vehicle on Kanpur-Bela-Bidhuna route in accordance with  the  terms  of  his  permit.  To  that  writ petition, the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Regional Transport Authority, and the Secretary to Regional Transport Authority,  were made  respondents.  The respondents opposed the petition. On March 6, 1961 a Division  Bench of the High Court, accepting the contentions raised  by the  respondents, dismissed the petition. Hence the appeal. 81      Writ Petition  No. 205  of 1961  is filed  in this Court  by another  operator under  Art. 32 of the Constitution. He was plying his stage carriage

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on the  Jaunpur Shahganj  route in  Uttar  Pradesh under Permit  No. 430,  which was valid upto March 15, The  State Government published in the Gazette dated July  23, 1960 a notification dated July 15, 1960  under   s.  68C  of  the  Act  proposing  to nationalize the  said  route  along  with  another route. The  petitioner and others filed objections against the scheme within the time prescribed. The objections were  heard  by  the  Joint  Secretary, Judicial Department,  who approved the scheme. The approved  scheme   was  published  in  the  U.  P. Official  Gazette   dated   February   25,   1961. Thereafter,  the   Secretary   to   the   Regional Transport   Authority,    Allahabad,   issued    a notification dated  July 29,  1961 wherein  it was stated that  the permits  of the  operators on the said routes including that of the petitioner would stand cancelled  and that  the notification  would come into  force upon  the expiry  of 15 days from the date  of publication of the said notification. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition asking for the following reliefs:-      (a)  A  writ  in  the  nature  of  certiorari           quashing the  notification (Annexures A,           B and C to this writ petition).      (b)  A  writ   in  the   nature  of  mandamus           directing the  respondents not  to  give           effect to the notifications.      (c)  A  writ   in  the   nature  of  mandamus           commanding  the   respondents   not   to           interfere  with   the  rights   of   the           petitioner to  ply his stage carriage on           the aforesaid  route  (Jaunpur  Shahganj           route), due to the aforesaid scheme.      (d)  Award the  costs of this petition to the           petitioner. 82 Writ Petitions  Nos. 180 and 181 of 1961 relate to the route  Robertasgunj-Dudhi-Mamhani.  The  State Government issued  a notification  dated July  13. 1960, proposing  to nationalize the said route and published the  same in  the Gazette  on  July  23, 1960. The petitioners filed objections against the scheme and  the said  objections were heard by the Joint  Secretary,  Judicial  Department,  and  the scheme was  finally approved  by him. The approved scheme was  notified in  the Gazette  on  May  20, 1961.  Under  the  said  notification,  the  State Transport Undertaking  would commence  to  operate its stage  carriage service on the said route from July 15, 1961 or thereabout. Aggrieved by the said scheme, the  petitioners filed  the said  petition for writs  in this  Court for  reliefs similar  to those in the other petition.      Mr.   Kacker,   learned   counsel   for   the petitioner in  Writ  Petition  No.  205  of  1961, raised the  following points:  (1) Under s. 68C of the  Motor   Vehicles  Act,  the  State  Transport Undertaking has  to form its opinion and prepare a scheme for  nationalisation and  publish it in the manner prescribed  thereunder, but  in the present cases the  State Government  initiated the schemes and, therefore, the schemes were not validly made; (2) As  neither  the  objection  to  the  proposed scheme were  heard nor  were they  approved by the

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State Government as they should be under s. 68D of the Motor  Vehicles Act, the schemes were invalid; (3)  The   Regional  Transport   Authority   acted illegally in curtailing the period of renewal-this question  arises  only  in  the  appeal;  (4)  The Regional Transport  Authority had  not applied its mind in  dealing with  the renewal application but mechanically  followed   the  provisions   in  the proposed schemes  and, therefore,  its  order  was bad;  (5)   Even  after   the  approval   of   the nationalisation schemes,  the  State  owned  buses were required  to apply  for and get permits under the Act and plying of buses 83 by the  State without permits was illegal; and (6) The Secretary  to the Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to issue an order under s. 68F (2) of  the Motor  Vehicles Act,  since under  the said section only the Regional Transport Authority had the  power to  do so-this question arises only in Writ Petition No. 205 of 1961.      To  appreciate   the  first  argument  it  is necessary   to   notice   briefly   the   relevant provisions of  Ch. IVA  of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV  of  1939)-hereinafter  called  the  Act. Section   68A(b)    defines    "State    transport undertaking" to  mean "any  undertaking  providing road transport  service, where such undertaking is carried on  by (i)  the Central  Government  or  a State Government......Section 68C reads:           "Where any  State transport  undertaking      is  of   opinion  that  for  the  purpose  of      providing an  efficient, adequate, economical      and  properly   coordinated  road   transport      service,  it   is  necessary  in  the  public      interest  that  road  transport  services  in      general  or  any  particular  class  of  such      service in  relation to  any area or route or      portion thereof should be run and operated by      the State  transport undertaking,  whether to      the exclusion,  complete or partial, of other      persons or  otherwise,  the  State  transport      undertaking  may   prepare  a  scheme  giving      particulars of  the nature  of  the  services      proposed to  be rendered,  the area  or route      proposed  to   be  covered   and  such  other      particulars  respecting  thereto  as  may  be      prescribed and  shall cause every such scheme      to be  published in  the Official Gazette and      also  in  such  other  manner  as  the  State      Government may direct". Section 68D reads:           "(1) Any  person affected  by the scheme      published under section 68C may, within 84      thirty days  from the date of the publication      of the  scheme in  the Official Gazette, file      objections   thereto    before   the    State      Government.           (2)  The  State  Government  may,  after      considering the  objections and  after giving      an  opportunity   to  the   objector  or  his      representatives and  the  representatives  of      the State  Transport undertaking  to be heard      in the  matter, if they so desire, approve or

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    modify the scheme." Section  68E  provides  for  the  cancellation  or modification of  the scheme by the State transport undertaking and  in that  event the same procedure prescribed for framing a scheme is to be followed.      The effect  of the said provisions, in so far as they  are relevant  to the present inquiry, may be stated thus: The State transport undertaking is an undertaking  providing road  transport  service which is  carried on  by the  State or  any  other corporation or  authority mentioned in s. 68A. The definition creates  a statutory authority distinct from authorities  which run it. This is made clear by s.  68C whereunder  it is  the State  transport undertaking that  will have  to form the requisite opinion. This  is further  elucidated by  the fact that under  s. 68C  of the Act the state transport undertaking is  required to  publish the  proposed scheme in  the Official  Gazette and  also in such other manner  as the  State Government may direct. This  distinction  between  the  two  entities  is further made  clear by  s. 68D(2)  whereunder  the State Government  has to  hear the representatives of  the   State  Transport   undertaking.  Briefly stated, under  the said  provisions,  a  statutory authority called  the State  transport undertaking is created  it is  authorised to initiate a scheme of nationlisation of road transport, the aggrieved parties are  given opportunity  to file objections thereto, and 85 the State Government is empowered to hear both the parties and  approve or  modify the scheme, as the case may  be. Counsel  for the  appellant contends that the  underlying scheme  of the  Act cannot be worked  out   unless  a   clear   distinction   is maintained between the State transport undertaking and the  State Government,  for, if one is equated with the  other, the State Government would become a judge  of its own cause, and that, therefore, it was  incumbent  upon  the  Government  to  form  a separate and  distinct, authority  to enable it to initiate a scheme in accordance with law.      Counsel  for   the  State   contends  that  a transport undertaking run by a State Government is a State  transport undertaking and, therefore, the scheme initiated  by the  State  Government  which runs the  State undertaking  is a scheme initiated by the said undertaking.      It is  true that  the provisions  maintain  a distinction between  a State transport undertaking and the State Government. It is also true that the State Government has to hear the objections of the aggrieved parties  and also the representatives of the State  transport undertaking  before approving or modifying  the scheme,  indicating thereby that the State  Government has  to decide  the  dispute that may arise between the two contestants. Though the functions  of the different bodies are clearly demarcated in  the case  of  undertakings  run  by corporations, there  is overlapping in the case of an undertaking run by a State Government. This may lead to anomalous position, but in practice it can be avoided,  if the  State  Government  creates  a department to  be in charge of the undertaking and

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hears the  objections and approves or modifies the scheme  in   a  manner   without   violating   the principles of natural justice. 86      A State  transport undertaking  means,  inter alia, an undertaking run by a State. The statutory authority created  is  an  undertaking  run  by  a State. The  State  can  only  run  an  undertaking through its  officers; it  may entrust the conduct of the  transport service  to a particular officer or to  a department of the State; in either event, it  is   the  State   Government  that   runs  the undertaking. The  statutory authority, namely, the State  transport   undertaking,  has  to  form  an opinion within  the meaning  of s. 68C of the Act, and the  opinion must  necessarily be  that of the State Government  which  runs  it.  If  the  State Government  running   an  undertaking   forms   an opinion, it  can legitimately  be  said  that  the statutory authority  i. e.,  the  State  transport undertaking, has formed the opinion.      In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road  Transport Corporation  (1) before  the State of  Andhra was formed in November, 1956, the Motor Vehicles (Hyderabad Amendment) Act, 1956 was in force in Telengana area. Under the said Act the State transport  undertaking was  defined to  mean the  road   transport  department   of  the  State providing road  service. After  the Andhra Pradesh State was  formed, that  department initiated  the scheme  and   this  Court   held  that   the  said department clearly  fell within  the definition of state transport  undertaking. This  Court observed in that case:           "The  State  Government  maintained  the      department  for   providing  road   transport      service and  therefore the department clearly      falls  within   the   definition   of   State      Transport Undertaking." If a  state directly  runs an  undertaking, it can only be  through a department. In law there cannot be any  difference between an undertaking run by a department of a State Government and that run 87 by the  State Government. In either undertaking is run by  the State  and that undertaking is a State transport undertaking within the meaning of s. 68C of the Act.      The opinion  must necessarily  be  formed  by somebody to whom, under the rules of business, the conduct of  the business  is  entrusted  and  that opinion, in  law, will be the opinion of the State Government. It  is stated in the counter affidavit that all the concerned officials in the Department of Transport  considered the  draft scheme and the said scheme  was finally approved by the Secretary of   the    Transport   Department    before   the notification was issued. It is not denied that the Secretary of  the said  Department has power under the  rules  of  business  to  act  for  the  State Government in  that behalf.  We,  therefore,  hold that in the present case the opinion was formed by the State transport undertaking within the meaning of s.  68C of  the Act, and that there was nothing illegal in  the manner  of initiation  of the said

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scheme.      The second  ground urged  by counsel  for the appellant that  the scheme was invalid because the objections to the scheme were heard and the scheme was approved  by  the  Joint  Secretary,  Judicial Department, who  was not  lawfully  invested  with authority in  that behalf  is for  reasons  to  be presently stated not open to the appellant. By the first sub-section  of s. 68D which we have already set out persons affected by a transport scheme are entitled  to  file  objections  thereto.  By  sub- section (2), the State Government is authorised to approve or  modify, the  scheme after  considering the  objections,  if  any,  and  after  giving  an opportunity of  being heard  in the  matter to the objector   or    his   representatives   and   the representatives    of    the    State    transport undertaking.  Sub-section  (3)  provides  for  the publication of the 88 approved  or   modified  scheme  in  the  Official Gazette  by  the  State  Government  and  on  such publication the  scheme becomes  final. It must at once be  observed that  neither  in  the  petition under Art.  226 of  the Constitution  to the  High Court, out  of which  Civil Appeal No. 325 of 1961 arises, nor  in the  Writ Petition  under Art.  32 (No. 205 of 1961) presented to this Court, was the plea  raised  that  the  Joint  Secretary  to  the Judicial Department was not authorised to hear the objection  and  to  approve  the  scheme.  In  the petition (No.  205 of  1961) under  Art. 32 of the Constitution it  was averred  by the petitioner in para 10  that  "the  petitioner  filed  objections under s.  68D(1) of the Act, against the scheme of the State  Government, and  it also  heard its own representatives in opposition to the petition" and again it was averred in the same paragraph "at the time of  hearing of  the  petitioner’s  objections under section-68-D, Before the State Government it was argued  on behalf  of the  petitioner that the aforesaid scheme  was  bad...."  In  the  petition under Art.  226 of the Constitution it was averred in  paragraph   25  "That   no   State   Transport Undertaking  having  been  constituted  the  State Government initiated  the scheme and heard its own representatives on  13.8.1960. The  petitioner has bonafide belief  that the  Joint Secretary  to the Government of  Uttar Pradesh (Judicial Department) who heard  the objections  acted with bias against the petitioner."  Even in the petition for special leave to  appeal to  this Court, no such objection was raised. There is also no reference to any such contention in  the judgment of the High Court. The validity of the scheme on this ground is sought to be raised  for the  first time in this Court, and, according to  the settled  practice of  this Court the appellant  except in exceptional circumstances and there  are  none  such  in  this  case-is  not entitled to raise this argument for the first time at the  hearing in this Court. It was urged in the course of the 89 argument  that   by  Rule  7  of  the  State  Land Transport Services  Development Rules  1958, which

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at the material time read as follows: "(1) The objections  received shall  be considered      by the  judicial Secretary  to Government  of      U.P. or  an officer  of his  department,  not      below the  rank of  Joint Secretary nominated      by the former for the purpose.      x          x          x          x          x      x          x          x          x          x (5)  After hearing  of such parties as appear, the      officer shall  give a  decision  whether  the      scheme be approved or modified as he may deem      proper", no authority was lawfully conferred upon the Joint Secretary,  and   the  proceedings  of  the  Joint Secretary in purported exercise of powers under s. 68D (2)  were without  jurisdiction. But  this  is another facet  of the  same argument,  and  it  is clear from  a perusal  of the petitions before the High Court  and this Court and the judgment of the High Court that it was never raised.      There is  no doubt  that the  scheme has been duly  published   under  s.   68D(3)  and  if  the objection to  the invalidity  of the scheme on the ground that  the objection  were not  heard by  an authority  competent  in  that  behalf  cannot  be permitted to be raised in this Court for the first time during  the  course  of  the  arguments,  the statutory consequences  prescribed by  s. 68F must ensue.      It is  necessary to  bear certain  facts  and considerations  in   mind  in   dealing  with  the remaining contentions.  By the  scheme (cl. 7) the permit of  the appellant was cancelled. The scheme as approved  was published  in the U.P. Gazette on October 8, 1960, and was to come into operation on October 15,  1960, or  thereafter. A  notification was published on November 4, 1960, under s. 68F(2) 90 of the  Act cancelling the appellant’s permit with effect  from  November  27,  1960.  The  appellant therefore ceased  to have  any right  to  ply  his vehicles on  the route  and he  had  no  right  to object to  the vehicles  of  the  State  transport undertaking plying  on that  route. If  the scheme was validly  promulgated and  became final  within the meaning  of s.  68D(3), it  had the  effect of extinguishing all  rights of  the appellant to ply his vehicles  under his permit. After cancellation of his  permit, he  could not  maintain a petition for  writ  under  Art.  226  because  a  right  to maintain such  a petition  postulates a subsisting personal right  in the  claim which the petitioner makes  and  in  the  protection  of  which  he  is personally  interested.   It  is   true  that  the appellant did at the date of the petition filed in the High  Court hold  a permit  which was to enure till the  27th November,  1960. But  if the permit was validly terminated from the date specified, he will not  be entitled  to relief even if he had on the date  of  the  petition  a  subsisting  right. Ground No. 2 must therefore fail.      Grounds 3  and 4  of the  appellant that  the Regional Transport  Authority acted  illegally  in curtailing the  period of renewal and that, in any event, it  did not  apply its mind in dealing with

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the renewal  application but mechanically followed the  provisions   of  the   scheme  may   now   be considered.      The Regional  Transport Authority  was by the terms of  the scheme  left no  discretion  in  the matter. It was by the scheme that the right of the appellant was  restricted and if the scheme became final and binding the Regional Transport Authority had no  authority to  permit the  appellant to ply his vehicles.  The order  passed by  the  Regional Transport Authority  was purely  consequential  on the scheme,  and if  the scheme  is  not  open  to challenge, orders consequential thereon will not 91 also be  open to  challenge. We  are supported  in this view  by the  observations of  this Court  in Abdul Gafoor: Proprietor, Shaheen Motor Service v. The State of Mysore (1) that:           "It appears  to us  that  when  deciding      what action  to  take  under  s.  68F(1)  the      authority is  tied  down  by  the  terms  and      conditions of  the approved  scheme  and  his      duty is  merely to  do what  is necessary  to      give effect to the provisions of the schemes.      The refusal  to  entertain  applications  for      renewal of permits or cancellation of permits      or modification of terms of existing  permits      really flow  from the  scheme.  The  duty  is      therefore merely  mechanical and  it will  be      incorrect to  say  that  there  is  in  these      matters  any   lie   between   the   existing      operators and  the State Transport Authority.      There  is   no  justification  therefore  for      saying  that  when  taking  action  under  s.      68F(2) is  really independent of the issue of      the permits  under s. 68F(1). Once the scheme      has been  approved, action  under  s.  68F(1)      flows from  it and  at the  same time  action      under s. 68F(2) flows from the same scheme". We are bound by the decision.      We are  not called  upon to  consider whether the State  owned buses  are  being  validly  plied without obtaining  permits under  s. 68F(1) of the Act. If  the right  of the  appellant to  ply  his buses is lawfully extinguished, he is not entitled to maintain an appeal challenging the right of the State Transport  undertaking to  ply  their  buses with or  without permits.  Nor is  any fundamental right of  the appellant  infringed  by  the  State Transport undertaking  plying  its  buses  without permits, and  a petition  under  Art.  32  of  the Constitution  cannot   be  maintained   unless   a fundamental right of the applicant is infringed. 92      Nor  is  there  any  substance  in  the  last contention. The orders passed under. ss. 68F(2)(a) and (b)  flow from  the publication  of the scheme duly approved  and the issue of an order, which is not  quasi-judicial  but  administrative,  by  the Secretary on  behalf  of  the  Regional  Transport Authority is  not open to challenge. It is not the case of  the Petitioner  in W.  P. 209/61 in which alone this  contention is  raised that  the  order unauthorised.  what   is  contended   above   this contention is  raised  that  the  order  is  being

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quasi-judicial,  power   to  make   it  cannot  be delegated. But  for reasons  already set  out  the order  is   not  quasi-judicial;   it  is   purely administrative.      In our  view, therefore,  the appeal  and the petitions must fail, and are dismissed with costs.