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PETITIONER: KALYAN DAS ANR.  RAMBIR DAS & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMBIR DAS & ANR.  KALYAN DAS ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/02/1997

BENCH: K. R AMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             AND                CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4173 OF 1983                          O R D E R C.A. NO. 947 OF 1980      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment dated 19th   March,  1980 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad in SA No. 1940 of 1977.      The admitted  position  is  that  one  Hari  Das  owned considerable  properties  situated  in  the  town  Khair  of Aligarh District  which is  part of Schedule ’B’ attached to the Plaint.  He constructed  a temple,  by name  Shri  Jugal Kishoreji Maharaj  Mandir. Therein,  the principal  deity is Lord Krishna  & Radha.  he endowed all his properties to the Mandir. During his life time, he was in-charge of the temple as de  facto trustee  and he did seva (service) and pooja to the deity.  After the abolition of the estate under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition  & Land  Reforms  Act,  1950,  bhumidari right in  the properties  were conferred  on the  deity Lord Krishna and  Radha. Hari Dass left behind him four chelas by name, Narain  Dass, Bansi  Dass, Monhar Dass and his brother Har Govind  Das are  sons of  Ram DAss. Bansi Dass, the last serving chela,  had executed  a will,  Ex. B-19  on 9.2.1955 whereunder he  nominated the  plaintiff and  his brother  as Shebaits of  the Mandir.  During his  life time  by Deed  of Adoption dated  January 6, 1966, Ex. A-45 cancelled the Will and adopted defendant Nos. 1 and 2 as his chelas, Bansi Dass died on  February 3,  1969. Thereafter,  the disputes  arose between the  appellants and  the respondents as to who would be entitled  to succeed to the Shebaitship of the Mandir. It is not necessary to dilate upon the proceedings that went on in the  Criminal Court  and in the suit. Suffice it to state that the  appellant had  sought a  relief of  declaration of succession as  a Shebait  to the  mandir, possession thereof and   consequential   perpetual   injunction   against   the respondents  from   interfering  with  his  Shebaitship  and possession and enjoyment of the property as a Shebait of the temple. The  trial Court  granted the  decree. On appeal, it was confirmed.  In the  second appeal,  the  learned  single judge held that the cancellation of the Will in the Adoption Deed is  valid for  the reason  that Rambir Dass had married

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and thereby  he ceased  to be  a bairagi.  His  brother  Har Govind Dass   having become insane, was disqualified to be a Shebait. The defendants-respondents being minors, nomination in that  behalf is  invalid in  law. As  a consequence,  the property became escheat; he directed the Advocate-General to take action  for possession  of the  properties. Thus,  this appeal by special leave and cross appeal.      The primary  question for consideration is; whether the appellant’s claim to be a Shebait of the Mandir is valid and sustainable in  law? In Tagore Law Lectures - 1936 published in "Hindu  Law   of Religious and Charitable Trust", Justice B.K. Mukherjee,  the former  Chief  justice  of  this  court stated at page 216 as under :      "As  shebaitship  is  property,  it      devolves like  any  other  property      according to the ordinary Hindu law      of inheritance.  If it  remains  in      the founder, it follows the line of      founder’s heirs;  if it is disposed      of  absolutely   in  favour   of  a      grantees,  it   devolves  upon  the      heirs of the latter in the ordinary      way and  if for any reason the line      appointed    by     donor     fails      altogether, shetaiship  (g). In the      matter of appointment of a shebait,      the discretion  of the  founder  is      unfettered. No  Hindu would  indeed      think of  appointing  a  person  as      manager  of  a  temple,  who  is  a      follower of a in law which prevents      hi from  appointing as  shebait,  a      person  of  different  or  inferior      caste."      It is  further stated  at page  217      thus:      As succession  to shebaitship    is      governed by  the  ordinary  law  of      inheritance, it  scarcely admits of      any doubt  that a woman can succeed      to shebaitship,   the Supreme Court      of India  has  held  very  recently      that  shebaitship   is   ’property’      within the  meaning  of  the  Hindu      Women’s  Right   to  Property  Act;      consequently in a case to which the      Act applies  the widow  and son  of      the last shebait rights held by the      latter. It  has been  held  further      that   even   if   the   expression      ’property’  in  the  Hindu  Women’s      right to  Property in its common or      accepted sense  and is  not  to  be      extended to  any  special  type  of      property    which     ’Shebaitship’      admittedly  is,  as  succession  to      shebaitship follows  succession  to      ordinary   secular   property   the      general  law  of  succession  under      Hindu Law  to the  extent, that  it      has  been  modified  by  the  Hindu      Women’s Right to Property Act would      also be  attracted to devolution of      Shebait rights".      At page 227, it is stated thus:

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    As  there  is  always  an  ultimate      reversion to  the  founder  or  his      heirs, in case the line of shebaits      is extinct,  strictly  speaking  no      question of  escheat arises  so far      as the devolution of shebaitship is      concerned.   But   cases   may   be      imagined where the founder also has      left no  heirs, and  in such  cases      the   founder’s    properties   may      escheat to  the State together with      the    endowed     property.     In      circumstances   like   these,   the      rights of  the State would possibly      be the same as those of the founder      himself, and  it would be for it to      himself, and  it would be for it to      appoint a  shebait for the Debutter      property. It  cannot be  said  that      the  State  receiving  a  dedicated      property but escheat can put an end      to  the   trust  and  treat  it  as      secular property".      In Mayne’s  Hindu Law  & Usage [14th Edn.] at page 965, para 639 on "Entrance into religious order", it is stated as under :      "One who  enters into  a  religious      order severs  his  connection  with      the members  of his natural family.      he  is  accordingly  excluded  from      inheritance.  Neither  he  nor  his      natural relatives  can  succeed  to      each other’s properties. The person      who are excluded on his ground come      under  three   heads,   viz.,   the      Vanaprastha, or hermit; the Sanyasi      or  Yati,   or  ascetic;   and  the      Brahamchri, or  perpetual religious      student. In order to bring a person      under these  heads, it is necessary      to show  an absolute abandonment by      him of  all secular  abandonment by      him of  all secular property, and a      complete and  final withdrawal from      earthly  affairs..  The  mere  fact      that  a   person  calls  himself  a      Hyragi, or  religious mendicant, or      indeed that  he is such does not of      itself disentitle  him to   succeed      to property.  Nor does  any  Sunder      come under  this  disqualification,      unless by  usage. This  civil death      does not  prevent  the  person  who      enters into an order from acquiring      and holding  private property which      will devolve,  not of  course  upon      his    natural    relations,    but      according  to   special  rules   of      inheritance.  But   it   would   be      otherwise  if  there  is  no  civil      death in  the eye  of the  law, but      only  the   holding  by  a  man  of      certain   religious   opinions   or      professions."      In Baba  Kartar Singh  Bedi V/s.  Dayal Das  & Ors.[AIR

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1939 PC 201 AT 207] this Court had held thus:      "It  was   also   argued   by   the      respondent’s counsel that the  word      ’chela’ in  will meant  an  adopted      son. This  contention too, in their      Lordships’ view, is totally without      foundation.   A chela,  as is  well      knowing India,  means  a  disciple.      His different  from an adopted son,      both  in   the   process   of   his      initiation and  in the  purpose  of      his existence. A chela is generally      nominated  by   the  ruling  mahant      during his  lifetime to conduct the      affairs of a religious institution,      or if  he fails to do so, the chela      is  nominated   by  his   principal      followers after  his death, who are      connected  with   the  institution.      There could  be no  analogy between      him and an adopted son, as known to      Hindu  Law.  In  the  case  of  the      latter, it is imperative that on of      his genitive parents must give, and      one of  his adoptive  parents  must      receive him  in   adoption. Without      such a  gift and taking no adoption      can  be   valid.  There   are,   in      addition, rituals  such as the are,      in addition,  rituals such  as  the      sacrificial fire,  called "Homa" to      complete      ceremonially      the      transaction of  adoption and lastly      if  may   be  mentioned   that  the      principal function  of a  that  the      principal function of a adopted son      is   to    performs    periodically      sharaddas, or  obsequial  rites  to      his  parents   and   other   souls,      according  to  salvation  of  their      souls, according  to  salvation  of      their  should  according  to  Hindu      sentiment. None  of these incidents      are to  be found  in the  case of a      chela, whose affiliation, if it may      be so  described, is mainly for the      purpose    of     continuing    the      traditional   obligation   of   the      institution   and    holding    and      managing its property for  purposes      incidental   thereto.    His   main      function   is    not   to   perform      obsequial rites  for the benefit of      his ancestors, for in most cases, a      sanysasin  or  a  mahant,  when  he      enters   that    order,   abrogates      (householder),     whose     future      felicity in a post mortem existence      is the  object of solicitude on the      part of his male descendants".      In Parma  Nand V/s. Nihal Chand [65 IA 252 at page 257] Sir   Shadi Lal speaking on behalf of the Judicial Committee held thus :      "In the town of Gujranwala there is      a building  variously described  as

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    Baghichi  Thankaran   or   Gurdwara      Baghichi, and  the main issue which      their Lordship have to determine in      this   appeal   is   whether   that      buildings, together  with the shops      and other  property attached to it,      is the  subject matter  of a  trust      for   a   public   purpose   of   a      charitable or religious nature. The      issue was  raised by the defendants      who,    claiming    to    be    the      representatives of the Hindu public      made an application to the District      Judge under  s.3 of  the Charitable      and  alleging   that  he   Baghichi      Thakaran was a public endowment for      religious and  charitable  purpose,      and called  upon Mahant  Narain Das      who was  described by  them as  the      trustee  of   the   endowment,   to      furnish details  of the  nature and      purposes of  the trust,  and of the      value of  the property belonging to      the   trust, and  also to render an      account   of    the   income    and      expenditure of  the trust property.      Their allegation  were contested by      Narain  Das   and  the  controversy      between the  parties led  to    the      present action,  brought by  Narain      Das for the purpose of obtaining an      authoritative  pronouncement   upon      the nature  of the trust and of the      property attached to it".      In Krishna  Singh V/s. Mathura Ahir & Ors. [AIR 1980 SC 707 at  725] this  Court had pointed out in paras 77 and 89, as regards the rights of a sanyasi, thus:      The  learned  Civil  Judge  in  his      judgment  observes:   The  fact  of      Harsewanand being a sanyasi remains      undoubted’. His finding that he was      not  a   Hindu  sanyasi   law  mere      ’renunciation’ of  the world is not      sufficient. Hence,  he holds that a      Sudra who  renounced the  world and      became sanyasi cannot be said to be      a Hindu  Sanyasi, as  according  to      the  Hindu  Sastras  no  Sudra  can      become a  sanyasi.  The  underlying      fallacy lies  in his  overs looking      that the  question not according to      the orthodox view, but according to      the  usage   or   custom   of   the      particular sect  or fraternity.  It      is  needless   to  stress   that  a      religious      denomination      or      institution     enjoys     complete      autonomy in  the matter  of  laying      down the rites and ceremonies which      are essential.  We must accordingly      hold that  the plaintiff  was   the      validly initiated  chela  of  Swami      Atmavivekanand and  upon his demise      was duly installed as the mahant of      Garwaghat  Math  according  to  the

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    tenets   of    his    ’Sant    Mat’      Sampradaya.      In the  instant case, the appellant      himself,   of    course,    without      prejudice to his right to challenge      the   right    of   the    original      plaintiff,  Harsewanand,  to  bring      the    suit,     substituted    the      respondent No.1  Harshankarnand, as      his  heir and legal representative,      while disputing  his claim  that he      had been  appointed as  the mahant,      as he  felt that  the appeal  could      not proceed without substitution of      his  name.   In  his   reply,   the      respondent   No.1   Harshankaranand      alleges that  after the  demise  of      mahant  Harsewananad  he  was  duly      installed   as    the   mahant   of      Garwaghat Math  by the  ’Sant  Mat’      fraternity. He further asserts that      he was  in possession and enjoyment      of the  math  and  its  properties.      Thus fact  that he is in management      and control  of he  math properties      is not  in dispute. The issue as to      whether he  was so installed or not      or whether  he has any right to the      office   of    a   mahant,   cannot      evidently   be   decided   in   the      appeal, but  nevertheless, he has a      right to be substituted in place of      the deceased  Mahant Hareswanand as      he is a legal representative within      the meaning  of  S.2  (11),  as  he      indubitably is  intermeddling  with      the estate.  He has  therefore, the      right to  come in and prosecute the      appeal on behalf of the math."      In Sri  Mahilinga Thambiran Swamigal V/s. His Holisness Sri La  Sri Kasivasi  Arulnandi Thambiran Swamigal [(1974) 2 SCR 74 at 88-61], this court had held as under :      "The definition  of "Will"  in  s.2      (h) of  the Indian  Succession Act,      1925 would  show  that  it  is  the      legal declaration  of the intention      of a  testator with  respect to his      property which  he  desires  to  be      carried  into   effect  after   his      death. By  exercising the  power of      nomination, the  head of  a Mutt is      not  disposing   of  any   property      belonging to  him which is to taken      effect  after   his  death.  He  is      simply exercising  a power to which      he is  entitled to  under the usage      of the  institution.  A  nomination      makes  the   nominee  stand   in  a      p[eculiar  relationship   with  the      head of  the  Mutt  and  the  Hindu      community  and   that  relationship      invests him  with the  capacity  to      succeed  to  the  headship  of  the      Mutt. A  nomination takes effect in      presenti. It  is the declaration of

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    the intention  of the  head of  the      Mutt for  the time  being as to who      his successor  would be;  therefore      although it  is said that the usage      in the  Mutt is  that the  power of      nomination is  exercisable by will,      it is really a misnomer, because, a      will in  the genuine  sense of  the      term can be made by deed or word of      mouth.  IN   such   a   case,   the      nomination can  be made  by deed or      word of  mouth. In such a case, the      nomination invests the nominee with      a present status. That status gives      him the  capacity to succeed to the      headship of  the Mutt  on the death      of  the   incumbent  for  the  time      being. If that is the effect of the      nomination when  made  by  deed  or      word of mouth, we find it difficult      to say  that when  a nomination  is      made by  will,  it  does  not  take      effect in presenti, and that it can      be cancelled  by executing  another      will  revoking   the  former  will.      Such, at any rate, does not seem to      be the  concept of  rate  does  not      seem   to   be   the   concept   of      nomination in  the law relating  to      Hindu   Religious   Endowments.   A      nomination need  not partake of the      character of  a will  in the matter      of its revocability, merely because      of power  f nomination is exercised      by a  will.  In  other  words,  the      nature of character of a nomination      does not  depend upon  the type  of      document under  which the  power is      exercised.  If   a  nomination   is      otherwise  irrevocable  except  for      good  cause,  it  does  not  become      revocable  without  good  does  not      become   revocable   without   good      cause, merely  because the power is      exercised by  a will.  If the power      of nomination  is  exercised  by  a      will,  it   is  pro-tanto   a  non-      testamentary instrument. A document      can  be   partly  testamentary  and      partly  non-testamentary.   In  Ram      Nath vs. Ram Nagina [Air 1962 Patna      481], the  head of the Mutt for the      time being  exercised his  power of      nomination more  or   less in terms      of Exhibit  B-1  here,  namely,  by      making   the    nomination   of   a      successor and  providing that he of      a successor  and providing that the      will be owner of the properties and      charities of  the Mutt  and also of      the other properties standing n the      name of  the head  of the Mutt. The      Court  held  that  so  far  as  the      nomination and  devolution  of  the      properties   of   the   Mutt   were

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    concerned, the  will operated  as a      non-testamentary  instrument.   The      Court said that the condition which      must be satisfied before a document      can be  called a will is that there      must   be   some   disposition   of      property and that the document must      contain  a   declaration   of   the      intention of  the testator not with      respect  to   any  thing  but  with      respect to  his property. According      to  the   Court,  if   there  is  a      declaration   of   intention   with      respect to his successor, it cannot      constitute  a   will  even  if  the      document were  to  state  that  the      nominee will  become the  owner  of      the properties  of the  Mutt  after      the death  of the  executant of the      will as that is only a statement of      the  legal   consequence   of   the      nomination."      At page  88, this  Court, looking  from another  angle, held as under :      "Looking at the matter from another      angle,  we   come   to   the   same      conclusion. We  have  already  said      that the  power of  nomination must      be exercised  not corruptly  or for      ulterior reason  but bona  fide and      in the interest of the Mutt and the      Hindu community.  It then stands to      reason  to  hold  that    power  to      revoke the  nomination must also be      exercised  bona  fide  and  in  the      interest of the institution and the      community.  In   other  words,  the      power to  revoke can  be  exercised      nor arbitrarily,  but only for good      cause  would   be  good   and   the      defendant had  no  case  before  us      that he revoked that nomination for      a good cause.      We hold that a nomination when made      can be  cancelled or  revoked  only      for   a    good   cause   and,   as      admittedly, there was no good cause      shown in this case for cancellation      of the  nomination by  Exhibit B-9,      the cancellation  was bad  in  law.      Therefore, it must be held that the      appellant was holding the status of      the  Elavarsu   of  the  Kasi  Mutt      during  the   life  time   of   the      defendant. Normally,  a court  will      declare  only   the  right  of  the      parties as they existed on the date      o the institution of the suit. But,      in this  case, on  account  of  the      subsequent event, namely, the death      of the  defendant, we have to mould      the  relief  to  suit  the  altered      circumstance. If  the defendant had      been  alive.  it  would  have  been      sufficient if  we had  declared, as

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    the learned  single judge has done,      that the appellant was the Elavarsu      of the Kasi Mutt. Now the defendant      is dead, we make a declaration that      the appellant  was holding the that      the  applellant   was  holding  the      position of the Elavarsu during the      lifetime of the defendant, that the      revocation of the nomination of the      appellant  as   the   Elavarsu   by      Exhibit B-9  was bad,  and that the      appellant was  entitled to  succeed      to the  headship of the Mutt on the      death of the defendant."      Ms. Rachna  Gupta, learned  counsel appearing  for  the respondents, relied  on the passage from Tagore Law Lectures -   1936   delivered by B.K. Mukherjee as published in Hindu Law of  Religious & Charitable Trusts at page 205, para 5.6A and 5.6B which read as under :      5.6A. Shebaitship  remains  in  the      founder  and   his   heirs   unless      disposed  of.    When  a  deity  is      installed, the  shebaitship remains      in  the   founder  and  his  heirs.      "According  to   Hindu  Law",  thus      observed Lord  Hobhouse in Gossamee      Sree   Greedhareejee    vs.   Ruman      Lalljee [L.R.  16  I.A.  137]-  and      this    observation     has    been      reiterated i n numerous cases since      then  -  "when  the  worship  of  a      Thakur  has   been   founded,   the      shebaitship is  held to be vested i      n  the  heirs  of  the  founder  in      default of  evidence that  the  has      disposed of  it otherwise, or there      has  been  some  usage,  course  of      dealing or  some  circumstances  to      slow   a    different    mode    of      devolution." Unless, therefore, the      founder   has   disposed   of   the      shebaitship in  any particular  way      and except  when an usage or custom      of a  different nature is proved to      exist, shebaitship  like any  other      species   of   heritable   property      follows  the  line  of  inheritance      from the founder.      5.6B It  devolves  like  any  other      species  of  heritable  property.--      Where the  founder of  a temple had      died  without  having  appointed  a      shebait, it was held that his widow      on whom  the right  to appoint  had      devolved was  entitled to appoint a      shebait for  the temple,  and  such      appointment was  not open to attach      as an alienation of the office of a      trustee.   And    the   rule   that      shebaitship devolves like any other      species  of   property   has   been      applied to the office or Archaka as      well,   where    emoluments    were      attached to it."      From the  evidence it  is clear that the plaintiffs are

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entitled to  act as  shebaits of  the temple  because in the endowment deed  at Ex.2  late Sri Hari Dass did not lay down the line of succession to the office of Shebait. Further his 4 chelas nominated in this deed did not exercise their power to appoint some shebait and as such it was not open for late Bansi Dass  to appoint  2 chelas belonging to another family of his  own desire.  Since Bansi  Dass  heirs  of  Ram  Dass because Ram Dass and Bansi Dass were real brothers.      The trial  Court decreed  the  suit  holding  that  the plaintiffs are  shebaits or  sarbarkars to  the  temple  Sri Thakur Jugal  Kishorji Maharaj  Birajman Mandir  (Marhi)  in town Khair  and its  debutter property  as shown in schedule ’B’ of  the plaint and for possession over the said property and  also   for  a   permanent  injunction  restraining  the defendant from interfering in the plaintiffs possession over the said property. The defendants are given one month’s time to deliver vacant possession of the disputed property to the plaintiffs failing which the plaintiffs would be entitled to get possession through court.      On appeal,  the appellate  Curt recorded  the  findings thus:      "Hari Dass, the original founder of      the trust  had  not  specified  any      direction  in   the  waqf  deed  of      1.4.20  with   regard   to   future      Shebaitship or  Sarbarkarship after      the  death   of  the   four  chelas      nominated by  him. The  four chelas      were also  not given  any authority      to  nominate   future  shebaits  or      sarbarkars after their death and as      such that  office of Shebaitship of      Sarbakarship   devolved    on   the      plaintiffs as  sons of Ram Dass and      Bansi Dass  though they  were  also      the  disciples   of   Bansi   Dass.      Defendant Nos.1  and 2  were minors      and as  such they could neither act      as chelas  of Bansi  Dass nor could      entitled  themselves   to  act   as      shebatits or  sarbarkars in  law on      any  account   and  the  directions      given in  the adoption  deed  dated      6.6.66 were  illegal  and  void  ab      initio Defendants  4 and  4 had got      fraudulent and  fictitious  entires      made in  Revenue  papers  in  their      favour in collusion with lekhpal as      sub-tenant over certain area of the      temple  land  though  they  had  no      interest or  title at  all  and  as      such Hoti  Lal and Kishore Lal, the      respective fathers and guardians of      the defendants 1 and 2 had no right      to claim  the property  against the      interests of the deity".      It would, thus, be seen that there is no controversy as to whether Rambir Dass became entitled to succeed the temple a shebait  as could  be seen from the evidence; in the light of the  above   legal position,  Hari Dass had not laid down any line  of succession  to his  chelas  to  administer  the debutter estate  of the  temple. He  left  behind  him  four chelas and  admittedly one  of the  chelas,  Ram  Dass,  and married. The appellant and his brother, are the progenies of Ram Dass.  Bansi Dass,  the last  chela had  executed a Will

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under Which  he nominated  Rambir Dass  and his  brother  as Shebait. Admittedly,  he did not reserve any right to cancel their nomination  in the  Will. He  cancelled the Will while executing an  Adoption Deed in favour of the defendants. The question is:  whether he  had the  competence to  cancel the Will having  duly nominated the appellant and his brother as Sehbaits? Since  the brother of the appellant became insane, it is not necessary to go into the question whether he would succeed  after   Rambir  Dass.   The  Will   in  the  normal connotation, takes  effect after the demise of the testator. But in  the case  of nomination of a shebait, the nomination takes effect  from the  date of  its execution  though it is styled as   will.  Once it takes effect, the nominee becomes entitled to go into the office as a shebait after the demise of the  last chela  of Hari Dass. Under these circumstances, the shebaitship  being a  property, vests in Rambir Dass and he could  administer the  property and manage the temple for the purpose  of spiritual  and other purpose with which Hari Dass, the  original founder had endowed the property to Lord Krishna and Radha.      The Next  question is;  whether Bansi Dass has power to adopt defendants  1 and  2 and  deprive the appellant of his right of  shebaitship? Having  seen that  Bansi Dass did not reserve any  right to cancel the nomination and that too for valid reasons,  the Will  became operative as soon as it was executed. Thereby, he had no more any power to cancel it and thereby the  right of  adoption would  not be approved of by this Court  as valid in law, as he is a Bairagi and he could not adopt  anyone except  nominating a chela who follows the principles and  precepts the  founder  had  laid  for  being observed.   Unfortunately, there  is no  plea in this behalf nor is  any power  in that  behalf. The only ground on which the cancellation  came to  be made  was that Rambir Dass had married and thereby he became disentitled to be a Bairagi to administer the  debutter estate  as a  shebait. There  is no pleading that  the married  bairagi cannot hold the property nor that  he becomes  a shebait  to administer  the debutter estate endowed  to the  Mandir. It  is to  be seen  that the property stands  vested in the deity, Lord Krishna and Radha and that  anyone who  administers the property, does so as a shebait and administers as  trustee for and on behalf of the deity. It  is true  that the  High court  has disallowed the Well and held that neither party is entitled to shebaitship, The view taken by the High Court is   clearly illegal. It is not the  case that  the appellant was not nominate under the Will executed  by Bansi  Dass, in  the  first  instance  and thereby he was vested with the right to manage, as a Shebait of the  debutter estate belonging to the deity, Lord Krishna and Radha.  There is no plea nor proof that a married person is not  entitled to  be the  shebait. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the became disentitled on account of the marriage is  clearly illegal.  A chela  cannot be adopted be adopted but can be nominated. As a consequence, the adoption of defendants  1 and  2 by  Bansi Dass as chelas is also not legal for  the reason  that they  were minors as on the date when the  claims to  have adopted them elas. Chela nominated must be  one who  is independent and capable to renounce the worldly affairs  or capable  to adopt himself as Bairagi. He cannot adopt  anyone as  his successor by application of the general principles of law. Under these  circumstances, though for different reason, the adoption deed  executed by Bansi Dass in clearly illegal. In consequence, the  estate does  not become  an estate  but it continues to  remain vested  in the  deity and  the  shebait remains incharge  of management  of the  erty.  The right of

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management should go either in the order of succession given by the  original founder  or, in its absence, in the line of intestate succession.  It is  seen that  Ram Dass one of the chelas was  married and  he left behind his son Rambir Dass, the appellant; another chela, Bansi Dass having died without nominating any  chela, necessarily,  the succession would go to the heirs of one of the chelas. In the absence of line of succession indicated by the founder, admittedly, Rambir Dass became entitled  to  succeed  by  inheritance  the  debutter estate as  shebait to  manage the  temple on  behalf of  the deity Lord  Krishna and  Radha and  he  remains  to  be  the trustee and  is entitled to get possession of the properties and manage  the same  for the  purpose for  which and in the manner in  which, it  was    Hari  Dass,  If  there  is  any dereliction of  the duty  in that  behalf by  the appellant, appropriate action would be taken by Endowment Department of Uttar Pradesh Government in accordance with law. But so long as he maintains and administers the property for the benefit and for  the purpose  for which  they were  endowed,  he  is entitled to  manage as  a shebait  for and  on behalf of the deity, Lord Krishna and Radha.      The appeal  is accordingly  allowed. The  judgment  and decree of  the High  Court stands  set aside and that of the trial Court  stands restored.  But,  in  the  circumstances, without costs. CA No. 4173 of 1983 --------------------      In view of the above order, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.