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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1129 of 2004

PETITIONER: Kalyan Chandra Sarkar                                         

RESPONDENT: Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav & Anr.   

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/02/2005

BENCH: N.Santosh Hegde & S.B.Sinha             

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO. 10422 OF 2004 IN  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1129 OF 2004

SANTOSH HEGDE, J.         The respondent herein Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav was  in judicial custody. Pursuant to the cancellation of bail by this  Court, he was charged for offences punishable under Section 302  read with Section 120B of the IPC and was to be kept in Adarsh  Jail, Beur, Patna.  

When he was supposedly in such judicial custody this Court  noticed  from Media report that on 4th of May, 2004 he was found   addressing  an election meeting in a place called Madhepura.  Noticing  the same, a report was called for from the concerned  authorities  to apprise this Court  on what authority  the respondent  was found  in Madhepura  on that day and how he was permitted to  address a public meeting.  

The reports were received from Home Secretary, State of  Bihar, the Investigating Agency (CBI) and the Presiding Officer,  Fast Track Sessions Court, Madhepura.

The above reports showed that Fast Track Sessions Court,  Madhepura in a pending trial before it had issued a production  warrant  and pursuant to the said warrant respondent was taken to  Madhepura. Report also stated that the said day  was declared as  holiday, therefore, he was produced before the Jurisdictional  Magistrate  and was remanded back to custody.  The reports did  not, however, indicate on what basis  the respondent was permitted  to address a political meeting while he was still under custody. The  averment in the report filed by the CBI shows that the respondent   in collusion  with the police  authorities  accompanying  him to  Madhepura addressed a public meeting  and the escort  accompanying him took him to various places which the  respondent wanted to visit beyond the scope of the production  warrant.    

The correctness  of the issue of the production  warrant by  Fast Track Court has been directed  by us to be investigated  by the  District & Sessions Judge, Madhepura and  the report of the said  Judge as well as the explanation given by the Presiding Officer,  Fast Track Court is under consideration of this Court and it is not  necessary to deal with the same at this stage. Suffice it to note that  the respondent  had misused  the authority  of the production   warrant  issued by the Madhepura Fast Track Court.

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During the above inquiry, we also came  to know that  pursuant to the order of this Court canceling his bail on 12th of  March, 2004, we  had directed the respondent   to be taken into  custody but in effect the respondent was never taken to the Jail.   When he was arrested after the cancellation  of bail and taken to  Patna very surprisingly an urgent Medical Board was constituted to  examine the respondent  which immediately  on its constitution   and examination of the respondent  directed that the respondent  required  medical treatment  at Patna Medical College, hence,  directed his stay in the said medical college. Though Patna  Medical College Hospital has a separate prisoner cell  for their  treatment,  under the special orders  of  Doctor  concerned  and the  Superintendent  of the hospital, petitioner was  accommodated  in a  special ward. The accommodation provided  was not only for the  respondent but also for his personal staff and others  whose  presence with respondent was unauthorised.  Reply filed by the  Superintendent of Patna Medical College and the concerned  Doctor  who advised his being kept in a special ward is full of  contradiction  as to why and who ordered his treatment in a special  ward.   A separate inquiry is being conducted by this Court in this  regard but for the present  it will  suffice to note that the  respondent has sufficient  clout  or enormous influence  for reasons  whatever it may be  with the administration and staff of the Patna  Medical College who are prepared to go out of the way to help the  respondent  from being kept in the confines of a Jail and in  providing unauthorised  facilities to the respondent.  On coming to know of these  illegal facilities  granted to the  respondent  this Court  directed his transfer to Beur Jail  and to  provide him treatment,  if need be,  in the prisoner’s cell there.  

In the normal course one would have expected an accused  whose bail has been cancelled and who was intending to make an  application for grant of bail to behave  in a manner not to give  any  room for the prosecution to contend that he has been misusing the  facilities available to him in law while he is in Jail. But it seems, it  is not the attitude of the respondent.  

Immediately after cancellation of bail by this Court  respondent had moved a fresh application  before the High Court  for grant of bail which came to be allowed by the order of the High  Court dated 21st September, 2004 and pursuant to the said order of  bail  the respondent came to be released  from Jail.  The said order  of the High Court granting bail was challenged before this Court   by the complainant and the Investigating Agency (CBI) but what  happened  in between is worth noticing, on 26th of September,  2004 when the respondent was out of Jail because of the bail  granted by the High Court, he  instead of getting himself treated  for the ailment which is complaining of, it is alleged  that he was  hosting  a party  for  his co-prisoners in the Jail late in the night of  that day. While the authorities  in the reports submitted pursuant to  the directions issued by this Court did not admit that a party was  given by the accused on 26th of September, 2004 they did admit   that between 9.30 p.m. to 10.00 p.m.  on that night  the respondent  did unauthorisedly  visit the Jail contrary to all restrictions on the  entry to Jail under the Jail manual.  A complaint in regard to this  unauthorised  entry of the respondent  to the prohibited areas of  Jail premises  is registered  and based on the direction issued by  the High Court of Patna an investigation is going on in this regard  and  some of the Jail authorities have been transferred.

On 1-10-2004 this  Court  while entertaining  appeal of the  complainant  against the grant of bail  by High Court directed the  respondent to surrender to custody forthwith.  Consequent to which  he was taken back to custody.

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It has also come on record  that while in judicial custody  the  respondent was using cell phone  which was seized from him and  he was closely interacting with hard core criminals  who were  undergoing Jail sentence or are under trial prisoners.  

       The Respondent No. 1 while was in judicial custody has been  accused of hatching a conspiracy to murder one Dimple Mehta in  relation whereto a First Information Report being Purnea Sadar P.S.  Case No. 159/2004 has been lodged on 28.9.2004 under Section  302/120B/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

       It appears from the order sheet dated 25.2.2003 of the Court  of Addl. Session Judge \026 XI, Patna that the informant Shri Kalyan  Chandra Sarkar had been given the threat by veteran criminals and,  thus, the Senior S.P. of Patna as well as S.P. was directed to make  proper security arrangement for him and his family members.

       Paragraph 3.12 of the report submitted by the Central Bureau  of Investigation in response to this court’s order dated 2nd December,  2004 is as under: "3.12 Investigation further reveals that Shri Dipak  Kumar Singh, IAS, the Inspector-General of Prisons  had on November 1, 2004, forwarded a Report of the  Special Branch dated October 30, 2004 that Shri  Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav was meeting several  visitors in the Administrative Block of Beur Jail (not  the specified meeting place for visitors to the Jail) and  more significantly, that several such visitors, who  entered the Jail under the pretext of meeting him (Shri  Pappu Yadav) were actually meeting other dreaded  hard-core criminals lodged in the Jail.  The Inspector- General of Prisons had also urged the Jain  Superintendent to allow interviews with prisoners in  strict accordance with the provisions of the Jail  Manual."

       It is now beyond any controversy that such visits by a large  number of persons inside the jail is in violation of the provisions of  the Bihar Jail Manual and in particular Rules 623, 626-628 thereof.   Even upon his election as a Member of Parliament from Madhepura  constituency he was not entitled to have such visitors having regard  to Special Rules for Division I Prisoners, Rule 1000 which permits  interviews only once every fortnight and Rule 1001 which debars  political matters being included in the conversation.  These rules  also stand violated.

Thus, the material recorded hereinabove  shows that the  respondent has absolutely  no respect  for rule of law nor he is in any  manner afraid of the consequences of his unlawful acts.  This is clear  from the fact that some of the acts of the respondent recorded  hereinabove have been committed even when his application for  grant of bail is pending. The material on record also shows that the Jail authorities  at  Beur are not in a position  to control the illegal activities   of this  respondent for whatever reasons it may be.  Shri R.K. Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for the  respondent submitted that no fault can be found with the respondent   for his having been found  in Madhepura  because he was   summoned by a court.  But in our opinion, that by itself  would not  absolve the conduct of the respondent  in addressing  a political  meeting.  Even the fact that  the respondent  entered  the Jail on 26th

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of September, 2004 when he was out on bail contrary to law, cannot  be  denied by the respondent. Since, a criminal complaint  in this  regard is pending consideration. He could not also deny the fact that  on 1st of December, 2004 large number of unauthorized  persons  were found visiting him in the prohibited  area of the Jail but his  answer to this was that  the respondent  being an elected  member of  the Parliament, he had every right to interact with his supporters and  if there is any law contrary to such interaction by an elected  representative  the same should be  declared  ultra vires.  He also  submitted being a member of Parliament he belongs to a superior  category of prisoner, therefore, the normal rules of Jail manual in  regard to right of visitation  does not apply to him. These  submissions of the learned counsel are not supported  by any law, on  the contrary has remained to be an argument without any basis.  The learned counsel then seriously contended a transfer of the  respondent from Beur Jail would violate  his fundamental right as  declared by this Court in the case of  Sunil Batra (II)  vs. Delhi  Administration  (1980 (3) SCC 488), Francis Coralie Mullin  vs.  Administratrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors.  (1981(1) SCC  608) & Inder Singh & Anr.   vs. The State (Delhi Administration)  (1978 (4) SCC 161). We have perused the above judgments which have been  delivered on the facts of those cases.         The fundamental right of an undertrial prisoner under Article  21 of the Constitution is not absolute.  His right of visitations as also  other rights are provided in the Jail Manual.  The Respondent as an  undertrial prisoner was bound to maintain the internal discipline of  the jail.   Such a fundamental right is circumscribed by the prison  manual and other relevant statutes  imposing  reasonable restrictions  on such right.  The provisions of the Bihar Jail Manual or other  relevant statutes having not been declared unconstitutional, the  Respondent was bound to abide by such statutory rules.

       In D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik and Others Vs. State of Andhra  Pradesh and Others [(1975) 3 SCC 185], this Court observed that a  convict has no right to dictate whether guards ought to be posted to  prevent escape of prisoners as the same causes no interference with  the personal liberty or their lawful preoccupations.

Therefore, in our opinion, a convict or an undertrial who  disobeys the law of the land, cannot contend that it is not permissible  to transfer him from one jail to another because the Jail Manual does  not provide for it. If the factual situation requires the transfer of a  prisoner from one prison to another; be he a convict or an undertrial.  Courts are not to be a helpless bystander when the rule of law is  being challenged with impunity. The arms of law are long enough to  remedy the situation even by transferring  a prisoner from one prison  to another, that is by assuming that the concerned Jail Manual does  not provide such a transfer. In our opinion, the argument of the  learned counsel, as noted above, undermines  the authority  and  majesty of law. The facts narrated hereinabove clearly show  that   the respondent has time and again flouted  the law even while he  was in custody and sometimes even when he was on bail.  We must   note herein with all seriousness that the authorities manning the  Beur jail and the concerned doctors of the Patna Medical College  Hospital, for their own reasons,  either willingly or otherwise,  have  enabled the respondent to flout the law. In this process, we think the  concerned authorities, especially the authorities at the Beur Central  Jail, Patna, are not in a position  to control the illegal activities of the  respondent.  Therefore, it is imperative  that the respondent be  transferred outside Bihar.

       The matter relating to inter-state transfer of prisoners is  governed by the Prisoners Act.  Section 3 of the said Act reads, thus:

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"(1) "prison" means any jail or place used permanently or  temporarily under the general or special orders of a State  Government for the detention of prisoners, and includes  all lands and buildings appurtenant thereto, but does not  include \026  

(a)     any place for the confinement of prisoners who  are exclusively in the custody of the police (b)     any place specially appointed by the State  Government under Section 541 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1882; or (c)     any place which has been declared by the State  Government, by general or special order, to be a  subsidiary jail;"

       A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly  go to show that there does not exist any provision for transfer of an  under-trial prisoner.  The prayer for inter-State transfer of a detenu  came up for consideration before this Court in David Patrick Ward  and Another Vs. Union of India and Others [(1992) 4 SCC 154]  where in a preventive detention matter the petitioner therein was  lodged in Naini Jail at Allahabad.  The petitioner made a prayer for  his transfer to Tihar Jail, Delhi inter alia on the ground that the  Consular Officers had the right to visit a national of the sending  State who is in prison or under detention in terms of Article 36 of  the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.  The authorities of  the Naini Jail having indicated that whenever visits are desired by  the officers of the British Consular Relations proper arrangement  therefor would be made, this Court refused to concede to the said  request.  But, this decision is a pointer to the fact that in an  appropriate case, such request can also be made by an undertrial  prisoner or a detenue  and there being no statutory provisions  contrary thereto, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under  Article 142 of the Constitution of India may issue necessary  direction.          While it is true that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction  under Article 142 of the Constitution would not pass any order  which would amount to supplanting substantive law applicable to  the case or ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the  subject as has been held in Supreme Court Bar Association Vs.  Union of India [(1998) 4 SCC 409] but it is useful to note the  following :

"48\005Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any  way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the  same time these powers are not meant to be exercised  when their exercise may come directly in conflict with  what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing  expressly with the subject."

       It may therefore be understood that,  the plenary powers of  this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the  Court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically  conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by  those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes  with a view to do complete justice between the parties\005and are in  the nature of supplementary powers\005[and] may be put on a  different and perhaps even wider footing than ordinary inherent  powers of a court to prevent injustice.  The advantage that is derived  from a constitutional provision couched in such a wide compass is  that it prevents ’clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice.    [See Supreme Court Bar Association (supra)]

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       In Union Carbide Corporation Vs. Union of India [(1991) 4  SCC 584], a  Constitution Bench of this Court stated the law thus :

83. \005Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained  in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or  limitations on the constitutional powers under Article  142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might  embody and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking  into account the nature and status of the authority or the  court on which conferment of powers \027 limited in some  appropriate way \027 is contemplated. The limitations may  not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental  considerations of public policy. Sri Sorabjee, learned  Attorney General, referring to Garg case18, said that  limitation on the powers under Article 142 arising from  "inconsistency with express statutory provisions of  substantive law" must really mean and be understood as  some express prohibition contained in any substantive  statutory law. He suggested that if the expression  ’prohibition’ is read in place of ’provision’ that would  perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that  such prohibition should also be shown to be based on  some underlying fundamental and general issues of  public policy and not merely incidental to a particular  statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly  incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject  to such express statutory prohibitions. That would  convey the idea that statutory provisions override a  constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of  expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under  Article 142 and in assessing the needs of "complete  justice" of a cause or matter, the apex Court will take  note of the express prohibitions in any substantive  statutory provision based on some fundamental principles  of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power  and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not  relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but  only to what is or is not ’complete justice’ of a cause or  matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the  exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction  or of nullity can arise."

       Despite some criticisms at some quarters as regard the  correctness of the decision in Union Carbide (supra), we may notice  that in Mohd. Anis Vs. Union of India [(1994) Supp 1 SCC 145] it  was held that the power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 (1)  cannot be diluted by Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police  Establishment Act, 1946.

       In State of Karnataka Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.  [(2000) 9 SCC 572], this Court held:

"60\005It is also true that Article 142 confers wide powers  on this Court to do complete justice between the parties  and the Court can pass any order or issue any direction  that may be necessary\005"

       In State of West Bengal Vs. Sampat Lal [(1985) 2 SCR 256],  this Court held: "\005In our considered opinion, s. 6 of the Act does not  apply when the Court gives a direction to the CBI to  conduct an investigation and counsel for the parties  rightly did not dispute this position.  In this view\005"

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       Article 142 vests the Supreme Court with a repository of  discretionary power that can be wielded in appropriate  circumstances to deliver "complete" justice in a given case. Only  Bangladesh (Article 104) and Nepal (Article 88(2)) include similar  provisions in their Constitutions.  

       Article 142 is an important constitutional power granted to  this Court to protect the citizens.  In a given situation when laws are  found to be inadequate for the purpose of grant of relief, the Court  can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of  India.  In Ashok Kumar Gupta and Another v State of U.P. and  Others (1997) 5 SCC 201 at 250], this Court held :

"[t]he phrase "complete justice" engrafted in Article  142(1) is the word of width couched with elasticity to  meet myriad situations created by human ingenuity or  cause or result of operation of statute law or law declared  under Articles 32, 136 and 141 of the Constitution."

       Taking into account the aforementioned legal-framework  surrounding the exercise of powers under Article 142, this Court in  Delhi Judicial Services Association Vs. State of Gujarat [(1991) 4  SCC 406 at p. 462] observed:

"50\005[t]he inherent power of this Court under Article  142 coupled with the plenary and residuary powers under  Articles 32 and 136 embraces power to quash criminal  proceedings pending before any court to do complete  justice in the matter before this Court."

       Furthermore, in Ruchi Agarwal Vs. Amit Kumar Agrawal &  Ors. [2004 (8) Supreme 525], this Court ordered the quashing of an  FIR where there was the continuation of the criminal proceeding  "would be an abuse of the process of the court" [See also Mohd.  Shamim & Ors. v Smt. Nahid Begum and Anr. (2005) 1 SCALE 109  at p. 113]

       In exercise of its powers under this Article, this Court in B.N.  Nagarajan and Others Vs. State of Mysore and others [AIR 1966 SC  1942] has also observed that it can grant relief to "appellants [who]  have not prosecuted their appeals" but who "in order to do complete  justice [\005] should also have the benefit of the judgment given by  [the Court]."  

       In Union of India and Others Vs. M. Bhaskar and Others  [(1996) 4 SCC 416 at p. 423], this Court has even interpreted the  constitutional provision to mean that benefits of a judgment, where  appropriate, can even be extended to all similarly placed persons  irrespective of whether they are party to the proceedings or not. [See  also E.S.P. Rajaram and Ors. v Union of India and Ors., (2001) 2  SCC 186 at p. 193; and, Deb Narayan Shyam v State of West  Bengal, 2004 (10) SCALE 124 at p.145].

       In criminal cases, the Court in Anil Rai v State of  Bihar[(2001) 7 SCC 318 at p.342], albeit not expressly referring to  Article 142, has ruled that a non-appealing accused whose case was  identical to that of the appellants was also entitled to the benefit of  altered conviction and sentence. A similar ruling is discerned from  Dandu Lakshmi Reddy v State of A.P[(1999) 7 SCC 69 at p.76.].

       Finally, as observed from the decisions in Vishaka v State of  Rajasthan  [(1997) 6 SCC 241] and Vineet Narain v Union of India   [(1998) 1 SCC 226], directions issued by this Court under Article  142 form the law of the land in the absence of any substantive law

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covering that field. Such directions "fill the vacuum" until the  legislature enacts substantive law.  

       In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh and Another Vs. State of Gujarat  and Others [(2004) 5 SCC 353], this Court held that the power to  transfer a criminal trial from one State to another is within the  jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Shri Jain also contended  that this Court has no jurisdiction to  initiate a suo moto action to transfer the respondent exercising the  power under Article 142 of the Constitution. Considering this  argument of the learned counsel, we notice that during his long  tenure  in custody, the respondent has violated the law only two or  three times and that he is now a changed man, hence a further  opportunity should be given to him before we decide to transfer him  from Beur jail. Here, we may remind  Mr. Jain  that one of the  incidents leading to threatening   of the  I.G. (Prisons) took place  after we initiated this inquiry. In that background, we do not think  either  the number or the gravity of violations committed by the  respondent would permit us to accede  to such humanitarian plea.          Learned counsel for the respondent contended that if the  respondent is transferred  out of Bihar, it would defeat his right for a  fair trial in as much as he will not be  in a position to attend the  proceedings and instruct his counsel effectively.  He also contended   that respondent has a right in law to be present in the trail against  him. It was his further contention that sending the respondent from  Bihar  would keep him away from his family which would be a  negation of his basic human right.

       It is true in a normal trial the Criminal Procedure Code  requires the accused to be present at the trial but in the peculiar  circumstances of this case a procedure will have to be evolved it will  not be contrary to the rights given to an accused under the Criminal  Procedure Code but at the same time protest the administration of  justice. Therefore, as held by this Court in the case of State of  Maharashtra vs. Dr.Praful B.Desai, (2003 (4) SCC 601) and  Sakshi vs. Union of India & Ors. (2004 (5) SCC 518), we think the  above requirement of the Code could be made by directing the trial  by video conferencing facility. In our opinion, this is one of those  rare cases wherein a frequent visit from the place of detention to the  court of trial in Bihar would prejudice the security of both the  respondent and others involved in the case. Apart from being a  heavy burden on the State exchequer.. It is in this background the  CBI has submitted that the prisons at Chennai, Palayamkottai  Central Jail, Vellor Central Jail, Coimbatore Central Jail all in the  State of Tamilnadu and Mysore Central Jail in the State of  Karnataka has video conferencing facilities. Therefore the  respondent can be transferred  to any one of those Jails.  

       While it is true  that it is necessary in the interest of justice to  transfer the respondent out of State of Bihar, we  are required to  keep in mind certain basic rights  available to the respondent  which  should not be denied  by transferring  the respondent to any one of  the Jail suggested  by CBI. It will cause some hardship to the wife  and children of the respondent who we are told are normally  residents of Delhi. His wife  being Member of Parliament and two  young children  going to school in Delhi.  Taking into consideration  the overall fact situation of the case, we think it appropriate  that the  respondent be transferred to Tihar Jail at Delhi and we direct the  seniormost officer-in-charge of Tihar Jail to make such  arrangements as he thinks  is necessary to   prevent the reoccurrence   of the activities  of the respondent of the nature referred to  hereinabove and shall allow  no special privileges to him unless the  same is entitled  in law.  His conduct during his custody in Tihar Jail  will specially be monitored and if necessary be reported to this

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Court.  However, the respondent shall be entitled to the benefit of  the visit  of his family as provided for under the Jail manual of  Tihar.  He shall also be entitled to such categorization and such  facilities available to him in law.         We also direct that the trial of the case in Patna shall continue   without the presence of the appellant by the court dispensing  such  presence  and to the extent possible  shall be conducted with the aid  of video  conferencing.  However,  in the event  of the respondent   making any application for his transfer for sole purpose of being  present during the recording of the statement of any particular  witness same will be considered by the learned Sessions Judge on its  merit and if he thinks it appropriate, he may direct the authorities  of  Tihar Jail to produce accused before him for that limited purpose.   This, however, will be in a rare and important situation only and if  such transfer order is made the respondent shall be taken from Tihar  Jail to the court concerned  and if need  be detained in appropriate  Jail at the place of trial and under the custody and charge of the  police to be specially deputed by the authorities of Tihar Jail who  shall bear in mind the factual situation in which the respondent has  been transferred  from Patna to Delhi.         As stated above the respondent shall be entitled for the  visitation rights of his family members as provided under the Tihar  Jail manual.  It shall be strictly  followed  and will be confined to  only such persons who are entitled for such visit.         In compliance of this order, we direct the State of Bihar to  transfer the respondent  from Beur Jail, Patna  to Tihar Jail, Delhi  and hand over the prisoner  to the authorized officer by prior  intimation to Tihar Jail authorities of his arrival in Delhi.  The  authorities escorting the respondent  from Patna to Delhi shall  strictly  follow the rules applicable to the transit prisoners  and no  special privilege should be shown, any such act if proved, will be  taken serious note of.  The respondent  shall be transferred to Tihar  Jail from Patna within one week from the date of this order.  A copy  of this order shall forthwith be communicated  to the Home  Secretary, Government of Bihar, Superintendent of Beur Adarsh Jail  and the Inspector General, Prisons, Tihar Jail.  We further direct all  authorities civil and judicial shall act in aid of this order of this  Court as contemplated under Article 144 of the Constitution of  India.