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PETITIONER: KALUMIYA KARIMMIYA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/01/1977

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR  497            1977 SCR  (2) 606  1977 SCC  (1) 715

ACT:             Land  Acquisition Act 1894--Secs. 4, 5A,   6--Reasonable         opportunity   in  inquiry under sec.  5A--Whether  collector         bound to give copy  of  the  report submitted to  Government         to  the owner of land--Effect of not giving the  copy--Delay         between  sec.  4 & 6 notifications  --Effect   of--What   is         unreasonable delay--Vagueness of s. 4 notification.

HEADNOTE:             A notification was issued under section 4(1) of the Land         Acquisition  Act,  1894 on 7.6.1966 intending to  acquire  a         total area of 13,900 sq. yds of land including 474 sq. yards         of the appellant’s land in Surat  City.  After   considering         the  objections under s. 5A a notification under  section  6         was issued on 13.1.1969.   The appellant filed a writ  peti-         tion  in the High Court challenging the  said  notifications         which  was  summarily dismissed.  The High  Court,  however,         granted  a  certificate under Art. 133(1) (b) & (c)  of  the         Constitution on the question of vires of sections 4, 5A  and         6 of the said Act.         Appellant contended:             (1) In spite of the appellant’s request for furnishing a         copy  of the report under s. 5A the Collector did  not  give         him  a  copy and, therefore, he did not  have  adequate  and         proper hearing under s. 5A.             (2)  There was considerable delay between the  notifica-         tion under sections 4 and 6.         (3)  Notification  under s. 4 does not  contain  the  public         purpose as the requirement for "fire station".  The  notifi-         cation   merely mentions" station workshop and parking  pur-         pose."         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD:  (1) Ordinarily there should be no  difficulty  in         furnishing  a copy of the report under s. 5A to an  objector         when  he  asks for the same.  However, it is not  a  correct         proposition  that hearing under s. 5A is invalid because  of         failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion of         the proceeding under the said Act,  [608 F-G]             (2)  A second hearing by the State Government after  the         report  is  furnished  by the Collector  is  not  necessary.         [608-H]             Abdul Husein Tayabali & Ors. v. State of Gujarat &  Ors.

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       [1968] (1) SCR 597, followed.             (3)  Since  other  dags of land  belonging  to  numerous         persons were the subject matter of acquisition and individu-         al objections had to be heard there was no inordinate  delay         in  making the section 6 notification.  Even  the  appellant         has not submitted before the High Court a copy of his  writ-         ten objection.  Nor has the same been produced in this Court         with the result that one  does  not know how much delay  was         caused  by the appellant himself. The delay in  the  present         case  is  about 2-1/2 years and there is not  even  a  clear         statement  of  the appellant about delay to be  attributable         to the Government.  [609 B-D]             (4)  Submission that s. 4 notification does not  contain         the  public purpose is made on the basis of the copy of  the         notification  annexed in the paper book. Even in the  state-         ment  of case the appellant has not raised  this  objection.         On         607         the  other  hand it was conceded that the purpose  was  fire         station,   workshop and parking place and the objection  was         that  the  appellant’s 1 and was     not suitable  for  con-         struction of fire station. [609E-F]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  2731  of         1972.             (From  the  Judgment and Order dated 20-11-1970  of  the         Gujarat High Court in Special Appeal No.. 1247/70).         Vimal Dave and Miss Kailash Mehta, for the appellant.         D.V. Patel and M.N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1.         L.N.  Sinha,  Sol. Genl and Girish Chandra,  for  respondent         No.2.         K.C.  Vakharia, P.H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley,  for  re-         spondent No. 3.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             GOSWAMI,  J.--This appeal by certificate  under  Article         132 (1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution is from the  judgment         of  the Gujarat High Court.  The certificate was granted  on         October 21, 1972,  before coming into force of the Constitu-         tion (Thirtieth Amendment)  Act, 1972.             Mr.  Dave, learned counsel for the appellant,  does  not         press before us the challenge to the validity of sections 4,         5A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.             We  will  now state the facts as will  appear  from  the         statement  of case filed on behalf of the appellant.           A  notification was issued under section 4(1) of the  Land         Acquisition  Act,  1894 (briefly the Act) on June  7,  1966,         intending  to acquire a total area of 13900 sq. yds of  land         including   474 sq. yds. of the appellant’s land in Ward  No         11 of Surat City included in City Survey Nos. 2365 and 2366.         We are informed that only the appellant in raising objection         to the. acquisition and the plan has not yet been implement-         ed  on  account of the pending  litigation.   The  appellant         submitted  his objections under section 5A(1) of the Act  to         the  Collector who gave him a hearing under sub-section  (2)         of  section 5A.  In due course the Collector  submitted  his         report  to the State Government and after  consideration  of         the same the Government issued a declaration under section 6         on  January  15,  1969 that the land was  required  for  the         public  purpose noted in the preliminary notification  under         section 4.         608         The  appellant  in  para 3 of the statement  of  case  while

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       referring to the notification under section 4(1) of the  Act         averred as follows :--                             "It  was stated in the said notice  that                       the  suit lands were likely to be  needed  for                       fire station, workshop and parking purpose  of                       the Surat Municipality as indicated in Govern-                       ment Notification dated 7-6-1966".             In para 4 of the said statement it was averted "that the         appellant contested the notice by raising an objection  that         the   respondent No. 3--the Corporation--was not in need  of         the  suit land  for  the purpose of the fire station,  etc."         After  the  declaration  under  section 6 of  the  Act,  .as         stated  earlier,  a notice under section 9 of  the  Act  was         served  on the appellant but he did not submit  any   claims         with regard to compensation under that section.  On  Septem-         ber  22,  1970,  the appellant filed  an  application  under         Article  226  of  the Constitution before the High Court  of         Gujarat  challenging the aforesaid notifications  under  the         Act.   The  High Court by its order of  November  30,  1970,         rejected  the  petition.  The High Court,  however,  by  its         order  of  October  21, 1972,  granted   certificate   under         Article  133(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution on the  ques-         tion  of vires of sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Land  Acquisi-         tion Act.             Mr. Dave confines his submissions before us only to, the         following points, which we will deal with seriatim:             First,  that  in spite of the  appellant’s  request  for         furnishing   a copy of the report under section 5A the  Col-         lector  did not grant him a copy.  He complains  that  there         was no  proper  and  adequate heating under section 5A(2) of         the Act.  According to the learned counsel a proper  hearing         would  include  furnishing of a copy of   the  report  under         section  5A.  We are unable to accept this  submission.  Al-         though,  ordinarily, there should be no difficulty in   fur-         nishing  a copy of the report under section 5A to an  objec-         tor,  when   he   asks for! the same, it is  not  a  correct         proposition that bearing under section 5A is invalid because         of failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion         of  the  hearing under the said section.  Unless  there  are         weighty  reasons,  a  report in public  enquiry  like  this,         should   be  available to the persons who take part  in  the         enquiry.   But failure’ to furnish a copy of the  report  of         such an enquiry cannot  vitiate the enquiry if it is  other-         wise  not  open to any valid  objection.   Apart  from  this         solitary  ground, our attention has not been drawn  to   any         infirmity  in the hearing under section 5A.  We are,  there-         fore  unable to hold that the said enquiry under section  5A         was invalid.             The matter would have been different if a second enquiry         were  essential  under the law at the stage when  the  State         Government  was considering the report under section 5A  for         issuing  its   declaration under section 6 of the  Act.   We         are, however, clearly of  opinion that there is no reason to         hold that a second hearing by the  State Government at  that         stage is necessary under section 6 of the Act,         609         (See  Abdul  Husein Tayabali & Ors. v. State  of  Gujarat  &         Ors.(1)  Since that is the position in law, failure to  fur-         nish a copy,  of  the report under section 8A is  innocuous.         The  matter,  again, may be different if there is  a  proper         allegation  of   mala fide  against  the  Collector  or  the         State Government.  There is no such allegation in this case.         The  first submission of the learned counsel is,  therefore,         devoid of substance.             The  learned counsel next contends that there was   con-

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       siderable  delay  between the notification under  section  4         which was issued on June 7, 1966, and the declaration  under         section 6 made on January 13, 1969.  Since numerous dags  of         land  belonging  to  a number of persons  were  the  subject         matter  of acquisition and individual objections had to.  be         heard, we do not think that there has  been  any  inordinate         delay in making the notification.   Even. the  appellant has         not  submitted before the High Court a copy of  his  written         objection  nor  is the same produced before us  to  indicate         when  his objections were actually filed and whether he  was         not also responsible for some delay in the conclusion of the         enquiry.   The delay in this case  is only about 21/2  years         and, as we have said, there is not even a clear statement of         the  responsibility for delay which may  be attributable  to         the Government.  The second submission of the learned  coun-         sel is also of no avail.             Mr.  Dave  lastly submits that  the  notification  under         section 4 did not contain the public purpose as the require-         ment  for  "fire station". The notification,  says  counsel,         mentioned   station,  workshop  and parking purpose.  He  is         able to make this submission from a copy of the notification         in  the  Paper Book at page 20 (Ex. A).  We   are,  however,         unable  to agree with counsel that the  notification   under         section  4 did not in fact contain the purpose as fire  sta-         tion.  Even in the statement of case of the appellant  which         we have set out earlier, no objection was ever taken against         the  so-called vague description of the requirement  in  the         notification.  On the other hand, it was conceded,  therein,         that  the  purpose was fire station,  workshop  and  parking         purpose and the objection was that the appellant’s land  was         not  "suited for the construction of fire  station".   There         is, therefore, no substance in this submission.             This Court rather liberally grants prayers for  dispens-         ing   with statement of case when such requests are made  by         parties.  Indeed, the form in vogue, in which statements  of         case  are  submitted in this Court,  has  perhaps   outlived         its   practical  utility in  hearings before this Court.  If         anything,  besides  being  expensive,  it  causes  delay  in         making appeals ready for hearing.             We,  however, feel, instead of the usual  statements  of         case  by both the parties, a very succinct statement of case         and a list  of dates submitted by the appellant alone.  with         material  facts necessary for deciding the questions of  law         together with the findings of  fact         (1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 597.         610              of  the  court  below and pinpointing  the  only  legal         issues  to  be raised in this Court will be of advantage  in         expeditious disposal of appeals before this Court.         For  once, on occasion, we are able to; say that the  state-         ment of case in this appeal is of use to us in visiting  the         appellant with  the forfeiture of his right to make his last         submission with regard to  the vagueness or ambiguity of the         purpose mentioned in the notification under section 4 of the         Act.         All the submissions having failed, the appeal is  dismissed.         Having  regard to the fact that there was a  certificate  by         the High Court, we will make no order as to costs.         P.H.P.                                                 Appeal dismissed.         611