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PETITIONER: KALI KINKOR GANGULY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PANNA BANERJEE AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/08/1974

BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1932            1975 SCR  (1) 728  1974 SCC  (2) 563  CITATOR INFO :  MV         1985 SC 905  (6,10,18)

ACT: Religious  endowment--Transfer of office of  Shebaiti--Which permissible.

HEADNOTE: On the death of B who had the Shebaiti right of the  deities in  a  temple, one of his two widows, carried on  the  sheba puja  and on her death, her brother took possession  of  the temple premises.  The other widow filed a suit and  obtained a decree in her favour declaring her right to be entitled to the  temple  premises and to the right of sheba  puja.   She sold a half share of the temple and the shebaiti right to  G for meeting the expenses of the litigation.  The  appellant, a legatee of G, filed a suit claiming a declaration that  he was  entitled to the shebaiti right, which the  respondents, who are the heirs of ’B’ denied.  The High Court, in  appeal held  against the appellant on the ground that the  transfer to G was invalid. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD  : Although shebaiti right is heritable like any  other property, it lacks the other incident of proprietary rights, namely, capacity of being freely transferred by the  person- in  whom  it  is vested.  The  rule  against  alienation  of shebaiti right has been relaxed in certain decisions of  the High  Courts,  which are classified under  three  heads  (a) where the transfer is not for any pecuniary benefit and  the transferee  is the next heir of the transferor or stands  in the  line  of  succession of shebaits and  suffers  from  no disqualification  regarding the performance of  duties;  (b) when  the  transfer  is made in the interest  of  the  deity itself  and to meet some pressing necessity; and (c) when  a valid  custom  is  proved  sanctioning  the  alienation   of shebaiti  right within a limited circle of  purchasers,  who are  actual or potential shebaits of the deity or  otherwise connected  with  the  family.   In  the  present  case,  the appellant  rested his claim on the second exception  on  the ground  that  the transfer was made in the interest  of  the deity and to meet a pressing necessity.  But, the  appellant cannot invoke the doctrine of transfer of shebait right  for the  benefit  of the deity, because, the transfer  to  G  is

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illegal,  for  the reason, that neither the temple  nor  the deities,  nor the shebaiti right can be transferred by  sale for pecuniary consideration.  The rule of necessity extended only  to  an alienation of the temporality of the  idol  and does  not  and cannot apply to alienation of  the  spiritual rights  and  duties.  The doctrine of  alienability  of  the shebaitship itself on the ground of necessity or benefit  to the deity is based upon a misconception of the  observations of  the  Judicial  Committee.  Such a sale is  void  in  its inception.  An assignment of a religious office by which the alien or gets pecuniary benefit is against public policy and cannot be upheld. [733C-D,H-734C, 735C-F] Prosanna kumari v. Golap Chand 2 I.A. 145 explained. Mahamaya  v.  Haridas I. L. R. 42 Cal. 455,  Khatra  Chandra Ghosh  v. Haridas I.L.R. 17 Cal. 557, Rajah Vurmah  v.  Ravi Burmah  4 1. A. 76, Sundarambal V. Yoganyanagurukkul  I.L.R. 38  Mad.  850,  Rajeshwar v. Gopaswar I.L.R.  35  Cal.  226, Nirmal  Chandra  Banerjee v. Jyoti Prasad 42  C.W.N.  11  38 Nagendra Nath v. Rabindra I.L.R. 53 Cal. 132 and Di-.   B.K. Mukherjea,  Hindu  Law of Religious  and  Charitable  Trust, referred to.                          ARGUMENTS For  the appellant-The alienation in favour of G is in  same terms  as the alienation under which B himself had  acquired rights.  The documents were understood throughout by all the parties  as  a  mere transfer of  the  personal  proprietary interest of a shebait which is ancillary to his duties as  a ministrent of the deity and a manager of its  temporalities. There is no justification for not giving effect to the  true import  and  substance of the document, and, indeed  it  was conceded before the High Court that no claim was being  laid to  either the deity or the temple.  In such  circumstances, the only question which arose for determination was  whether in  the  fact  and circumstances of  the  instant  case  the transfer to G was invalid and could not be given effect to. 729 It is now well settled that in the concept of shebaiti  both the elements of office and property are there.  It has  been held  (vide  Angurbala  v. Devabrata (1951)  SCR  1125  that shebaitship is property within the meaning of Hindu  Women’s Right  to Property Act and was also property in the  general sense and the general law of succession governed  succession to  shebaitship.  It has also been held that a partition  of the  shebaiti right amongst several co-shebait  or  co-heirs can be suitable effected under a scheme allotting  different palas  or terms of worship to the different claimants  (vide I.L.R.  42 Calcutta 445).  If the proprietary interest of  a shebait is both heritable and capable of being  partitioned, there  is no reason why, subject to certain limitations,  it should  not be alienable.  To the general rule,  founded  on the  principle that the elements of office and property,  of duties  and  personal  interests are more  or  less  blended together,  that shebaiti right was inalienable,  there  are, certain notable exceptions, one being that such transfer  is permissible if it was neither contrary to the intentions  of the  Founder  as  expressed  in the  Deed  of  Endowment  or otherwise nor was in any was obnoxious to the principles  of Hindu   Law,   and  subject  always  to   this   fundamental limitation,  a  shebait  can  always  transfer  his  or  her shebaiti  interest  which  was an  amalagam  of  office  and property for the benefit of the idol or the deity or for any legal or pressing necessity. Now  in  the  instant case the following  facts  are  either admitted  or  found  : Either under the  transfer  from  the original founders, or under the transfer to B and also under

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the   transfer   to  the  predecessor-in-interest   of   the plaintiff,  a right of transfer to strangers  was  conferred expressly and each had a right to extinguish and exhaust the line of succession. It  is apparent that the intention of the founders was  that strangers  could  be  taken  in  management  and  power  was expressly given by them in redelegate the authority to  such strangers.   Accordingly, the transfer cannot be said to  be contrary  to the founders’ intentions, and, as the  transfer has been made to a person who was in no manner  disqualified to  discharge  the duties of the office of  a  shebait,  the transfer comes squarely under the exception mentioned above. To  impose  a total ban will be contrary  to  the  principle enshrined  in Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution  and,  in any  case  it cannot be in consonance with  a  sound  public policy  to  ban a transfer to a qualified person even  in  a case  of  dire legal necessity such as presentation  of  the very  existence  of the deities and recover them  and  their abode  from  possession  of  one  who  had  taken   forcible possession. An alienation of shebaiti right for necessity or benefit  of the deity was held justified in the under noted cases 1.   I.L.R. 17 Cal. 557 2.   I.L.R. 35 Cal. 226 3.   42 C.W.N. 1138 4.   8. I.A. 146 (152) 5.   44 I.A. 147 6.   48 I.A. 302 7.   36 I.A. 148. 8.    45  C.W.N. 809 9.    I.L.R. 6 Bom. 298 Therefore, the alienation was wrongly held as invalid. For the respondent-The earlier transfers were not challenged in the suit.  It is well settled that neither the temple nor the   deities  can  be  the  subject  matter  of  any   sale transactions and this proposition has not been contested  by the  appellant.   That  being so, on the  face  of  it,  the impugned  transfer  should fail.  It is submitted  that  the deed should be read as a whole from which the subject matter of the sale is to be ascertained.  That being so, it is  not permissible to consider separately the question of  transfer of  the half share of her shebaiti-right.  It  is  submitted that  the  ’said transfer as a whole should be  held  to  be invalid. Even  assuming  that the question of transfer  of  shebaiti- right can be separated, ,as contended by the appellant,  the transfer of shebaite-right should be held to be 730 invalid.  It has been held in Raja Ravi Varma’s case (4 I.A. 76) and in several other decisions that sale of  shebaitship is  altogether  void.  This subject has  been  dealt  within detail  by Dr. B.K. Mukherjee in his Tagore Law Lectures  on Hindu  Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts  delivered  in 1951  at pages 228 onwards of the Original  Edition.   After considering  the  texts  and Case Law  on  the  subject  the opinion  expressed  by the learned author is  that  although alienation  may be permissible in favour of next shebait  or one  in the line of succession or to a co-shebait  the  same cannot be made in favour of a stranger even on the ground of necessity.  The learned author at page 235 has observed that certain  decisions  of  the Calcutta High  Court  which  hid purported  to uphold the transfer of shabaiti-right  on  the ground  of necessity was of doubtful authority and was to  a great   extent   based  upon  misconstruction   of   certain pronouncements of the judicial Committee.  The editor of the

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said  Edition  of Dr. Mukherjee’s said Tagore  Law  Lectures (Mr.   T. L. Venkatarama Ayyar) has also expressed the  same view.  This being the legal position, it is submitted G  did not  acquire any right of shabaitship of the deities by  the deed of’ sale in his favour.  Accordingly the appellant also derived  no  right  and the High  Court  in  appeal  rightly decided the question raised before it. For   the  Receiver  :  On  behalf  of  the  Receiver   some submissions   were  made  regarding  his  remuneration   and expenses including the salary of his clerk.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1115  of 1973. Appeal from the Judgment & Decree dated the 11th April  1973 of  the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from  Original  Decree No. 52 of 1972. A.  B. M. Sinha, Salil Ganguly and Samir Roy Choudhury,  for the appellant. B. Sen and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents. P.K. Mukherjee, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY,  C.J. This appeal is by certificate from  the  judgment dated  11  April,  1973  of  the  High  Court  at   Calcutta dismissing the appellant’s suit. Two  contentions were advanced on behalf of  the  appellant. First,  a  shebaiti right being both an office  as  well  as species of property can and has been transferred in  certain circumstances.   Such  transfer  is possible if  it  is  not contrary to the intention of the founder as expressed in the deed or any document concerning shebaitship.  Second, it  is permissible for the benefit of the idol or the deity or  any other  pressing necessity to execute a sale deed in  respect of shebaiti right. The  deity  at the premises is popularly  known  as  Firingi Kali.    Ramakanta  Pal  constructed  a  Shiva  temple   and installed  the deity Shiva at the premises.   Ramakanta  Pal became  the  shebait.   In 1820 Kali Prasad  Pal  and  Gouri Prasad.    Pal  the  two  sons  of  Ramakanta   Pal   orally transferred  the temple together with the idol and  shebaiti right  of  the deity to Srimanta  Pandit.   Srimanta  Pandit carried  on the sheba.  He constructed a small  brick  built one  storeyed room thereon.  He installed the deities  Kali, Sitala Manasha and Shaligram Shila.  In 1880 Srimanta Pandit by  a registered deed transferred the temple  together  with the deities and the shebaiti right of the deities to  Shashi Bhusan  Banerjee.   Shashi Bhusan Banerjee  performed  Sheba till, 731 his death on 24 August, 1894.  He left behind him two widows Paripurna  Debi  and Pramila Sundari Debi.   Paripurna  Debi after  the death of Shashi Bhusan Banerjee carried on  sheba puja of the deity.  She died on 10 April 1905.  On her death Rakhal  Chandra  Mukherjee brother of  Paripurna  Debi  took possession of the temple premises and ousted Pramila Debi. On  22  August, 1905 Pramila Debi filed a suit in  the  High Court against Rakhal Chandra Mukherjee for a declaration  of her right in the temple premises and the sheba puja.  On  12 February, 1907 Pramila Debi obtained a decree against Rakhal Chandra  Mukherjee  declaring her to be entitled  to  temple premises and to the right of sheba puja. Meanwhile  on  3 August, 1906 Pramila Debi  along  with  one Chandra  Kumar  Banerjee who was the reversioner  of  Shashi

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Bhusan  Banerjee  sold certain properties of the  estate  of Shashi  Bhusan  Banerjee to Upendra Nath Ganguli  for  legal necessity.   On 29 January 1907 by a deed Pramila Devi  sold one half share of her full title in the temple and the share of  shebaiti  right  to Upendra  Nath  Ganguli.   The  legal necessity  claimed  in the deed was  incurring  expenses  in connection  with  the  litigation  relating  to  the  temple premises  and  the  shebaiti right  against  Rakhal  Chandra Mukherjee. Upendra  Nath  Ganguli  who  came  into  possession  of  the premises carried on sheba puja till his death in 1925.  On 5 November, 1922 Upendra Nath Ganguli made his first will.  He appointed his brother Pramatha Nath Ganguli as the executor. Upendra Nath Ganguli bequeathed life interest in respect  of temple  premises  to Pramila Debi as shebait and  after  her death to the appellant Kali Kinkor Ganguly.  On 15 February, 1925  Upendra  Nath Ganguli made a second will by  which  he bequeathed to Pramila Debi all his right, title and interest in  the temple premises for her life.  Upendra Nath  Ganguli died  on 30 January, 1925.  On 3 August, 1925 Pramatha  Nath Ganguli  applied for probate before the District  Judge  24- Parganas.   On  12  )December, 1925 Pramila  Debi  filed  an objection  in the probate proceedings.  She  contended  that there was a second will.  The District Judge granted probate to  Pramatha  Nath  Ganguli in respect  of  first  will  and letters  of administration with copy of the will annexed  to Pramila  Debi  in respect of the second will.  By  an  order dated  6 February, 1928 the proceedings relating to  letters of  administration granted to Pramila Debi were remanded  to the District Judge by a Division Bench of the High Court  at Calcutta.  On 17 July, 1928 probate was granted to  Pramatha Nath  Ganguli in respect of both the wills of  Upendra  Nath Ganguli. On  15 September, 1947 Pramila Debi died.  In 1949  Pramatha Nath Ganguli died. The  appellant  filed this suit on 22  January,  1959.   The appellant claimed a declaration that he is the sole owner of premises  No. 244 Bowbazar Street, Calcutta and is the  sole shebait of Firingi Kali and other deities.  The  alternative prayer is a declaration that the plaintiff 732 is entitled to an undivided half share in the said  premises and  to half the pala in the sheba.  The allegations in  the plaint are that the respondents, viz. the Banerjees who  are the  heirs of Shashi Bhusan Banerjee denied the  appellant’s right in the premises and in shebaiti rights. The  trial  court held that the transfer of  half  share  of shebaiti  right by Pramila Debi to Upendra Nath Ganguli  was for  legal  necessity and the transfer was  binding  on  the defendants in the suit.  The trial court passed a decree  in favour of the appellant.  The appellant was entitled to half share  of  the  shebaiti  right  of  the  deities  and   the respondents  were entitled to the other half  in  accordance with the deed dated 29 January, 1907 made by Pramila Debi in favour of Upendra Nath Ganguli. The  High  Court on appeal set aside the decree.   The  High Court  held that the transfer by Pramila Debi in  favour  of Upendra Nath Ganguli is invalid. The  centre  of  controversy in this  appeal  turns  on  the construct’  of  the  deed dated 29  January,  1907  made  by Pramila Debi in favour of Upendra-Nath Ganguli.  By the deed Pramila )Debi sold to Upendra Nath Ganguly for consideration of Rs. 1200/- "one half share of the full title that I  have in the said Kalibati together with the land underneath,  the pucca  building and income etc. (from the Kalibari) that  is

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to  say  /8/- eight annas share in the said Kali  Mata,  Her seba  and pala etc. and in the Kali Mandir and Bati  situate at  244,  Bowbazar Street, Calcutta together with  the  land underneath  the pucca building and in the entire income  and profit therefrom.  From this day share to the extent of /8/- eight  annas  out of the sixteen annas in  right  title  and interest  which I had in the said property, devolves on  you and  you being entitled to the rights of gifts-,  sale  etc. shall  enjoy and possess the said property for ever down  to your  sons or heirs and representatives was  in  succession. To  that, mine or any other heirs or representatives  of  my husband shall not be competent to raise any kind of plea  or objection". The  appellant contended that no one laid any claim  to  the deity or to the temple.  The appellant contended as  follows : The sum and substance of the deed sued upon is that it  is a  mere transfer of the personal proprietary interest  of  a shebaiti which is ancillary to his duties as a ministrant of the deity and the manager of its temporalities.  The concept of shebaiti has both the elements of office and property.  A partition  of shebaiti right amongst several  co-sebaits  or co-heirs can be effected under a scheme allotting  different Palas.  The transfer from the original founders to  Srimanta Pandit  in  1820  or the transfer from  Srimanta  Pandit  to Shashi  Bhusan Banerjee and the transfer from, Pramila  Debi to Upendra Nath Ganguli, the predecessor-in-interest of  the appellant all indicate that the shebaits exercised rights of transfer  to  strangers  and further that  the  shebait  had rights  to  extinguish and exhaust the line  of  succession. These transfers of shebaiti rights indicate that it was  the intention  of the founders that strangers could be taken  in management  and  power was given by them to  redelegate  the authority to such strangers.  Therefore, transfer by Pramila 733 Debi  to  Upendra  Nath  Ganguli  is  not  contrary  to  the founders’ intentions.  Furthermore, Upendra Nath Ganguli was not  disqualified to discharge the duties of the  office  of shebait. Counsel  for  the appellant relied on the decision  of  this Court in Angurhala v. Devabrata 1951 S.C.R. 1125 in  support of  the proposition that shebaitship is property.   Reliance was  also  placed on the decisions in  Mahamaya  v.  Haridas I.L.R. 42Cal. 455 and Kherta Chandra Ghosh v. Haridas I.L.R. 17  Cal. 557 in support of the proposition that a  partition of  shebaiti  right is possible.  A corollary was  drawn  by counsel  for the appellant that if the proprietary  interest of  a  shebati  is  both  heritable  and  capable  of  being partitioned,  there  is  no reason why  subject  to  certain limitations it should not be alienable.  It was said that an alienation  of a shebaiti right for necessity or benefit  of the deity is permissible as well as justified. In  the  Hindu  Law of Religious  &  Charitable  Trust,  1st Edition, being the Tagore Law Lectures delivered by Dr. B.K. Mukherjea  The  statement  of  law at page  228  is  this  : "Although  shebaiti  right  is  heritable  like  any   other property, it lacks the other incident of proprietary  right, viz., capacity of being freely transferred by the person  in whom  it  is  vested.   The  reason  is  that  the  personal propreitary interest which the shebait has got is  ancillary to  and inseparable from his duties as a ministrant  of  the deity, and a manager of its temporalitics.  As the. personal interest cannot be detached from the duties the transfer  of shebaitship  would  mean a delegation of the duties  of  the transferor  which would not only he contrary to the  express intentions of the founder but would contravene the policy of

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law.  A transfer of shebaitship or for the matter of that of any religious office has nowhere been countenanced by  Hindu lawyers". In  Rajesh  Vurmalh  v. Ravi Burmah 4  I.A.  76  Rajah  paid certain  sum  to the urallers (managers)  of  the  religious foundation  who transferred all their rights to  the  Rajah. The Judicial Committee held that the assignment was void  in law and could not create any rights in favour of the  Rajah. An assignment of religious office for the pecuniary  benefit of  the holder of the office was held to be  against  public policy and contrary to the intentions of the founder.   Such transfer  was  said  to amount to  delegation  of  delagated authority and could not be sanctioned even on the footing of a custom because it would be against public policy. The doctrine in Rajah Vurmah’s case (supra) has been applied on transactions by way of lease or mortgage.  In  Sundramhal v.  Yoganyanagurukkul I.L.R. 38 Mad. 850 one of the  parties alienated  half share in the Archaka right for  a  pecuniary benefit.   It was said that " an alienation of  a  religious office by which the alienor gets a pecuniary benefit  cannot be  upheld  even  if a custom is  set  up  sanctioning  such alienation". The  rule  against  alienation of shebaiti  right  has  been relaxed  by reason of certain special circumstances.   These are  classified  by Dr. B.K. Mukherjea at page  231  in  his Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu 734 Law  of  Religious and Charitable Trust, 1st  Edition  under three  heads.  The first case is where transfer is  not  for any pecuniary benefit and the transferee is the next heir of the  transferor  or  stands in the  line  of  succession  of shebaits and suffers from no disqualification regarding  the performance  of  the duties.  Second, when the  transfer  is made  in the interests of the deity itself and to meet  some pressing  necessity.  Third, when a valid custom  is  proved sanctioning  alienation of shebaiti right within  a  limited circle  of purchasers, who are actual or potential  shebaits of the deity or otherwise connected with the family. In the present case counsel for the appellant rested on  the second exception on the ground that the transfer is made  in the  interest  of  the  deity  and  to  meet  some  pressing necessity. The reason why transfer in favour of the next shebait or one in the line of succession or a co-shebait is permissible  is that  if  anyone of the shebaits intends to get rid  of  the duties the proper thing for him to do would be to  surrender his  office in favour of the remaining shebaits.  In such  a case no policy of Hindu Law is likely to be affected nor can such  transaction be said to be against the presumed  inten- tions of the founder.  A transfer of shebaiti by will is not permitted because nothing which the shebait has can pass  by his  will which operates only at his death (See Rajeswar  v. Gopeswar I.L.R. 35 Cal. 226).  The decisions in Mahamaya a’s case and Khetra Chandra Ghosh’s case (supra) do not  support the  appellant’s  contention of sale of shebaiti  right  for pecuniary  consideration.   A shebait  cannot  delegate  his duties to another person, but he is not bound to accept  his office.  If he renounces his duties the renunciation in  the form  of a transfer in favour of the next heir can be  valid in law. In  Khetra  Chandra  Ghosh’s  case  (supra)  on  which   the appellant  relied in support of the assignment  of  shebaiti right  on the doctrine of benefit to the deity the  question was  whether the Ghoshes who were the shebaits of a  private family endowment could make over the idol together with  the

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endowed  property  to the predecessors of the  plaintiff  in that  case  on the ground that the Ghoshes  were  unable  to carry  on  the worship of the idol with the  income  of  the Debutter.   Dr.  B.  K. Mukherjea at pages  236-239  in  his Tagore  Law Lectures 1st Edition examined various  decisions on  this aspect. in Khetra Chandra Ghosh’s case (supra)  the Court  relied on the decision of the Judicial  Committee  in Prosanna Kumari v. Golap Chand 2 I.A. 145 where the Judicial Committee  said  that  a  shebait  must,  of  necessity,  be empowered  to do whatever might be required for the  service of  the  idol  and  for  benefit  and  preservation  of  the property.  The ratio in Khetra Chandra Ghosh’s case  (supra) is that all the members of the Ghosh family, for the purpose of  preserving  the  property of  idol  and  preventing  the discontinuance  of  its  worship  gave  the  estate  another direction. In  Rajeswar  v.  Gopeswar  case  (supra)  the  doctrine  of necessity  or  benefit to the deity was  referred  to.   The actual  decision in the case was that a  hereditary  shebait cannot alienate his office by will. 735 In  Nirmal Chandra Banerjee v. Jyoti Prasad 42 C.W.N.  1138. the  transfer of shebaiti rights was not by way of  a  sale, but was found to be conducive to the interests of the  idol. It was held to be valid. Dr. B.K. Mukherjea doubted the propriety of these decisions. Shri  Venkatarama Aiyar as the editor of the Second  Edition of  Dr. B.K. Mukherjea’s Tagore Law Lectures also  expressed the same view at pages 219-220 that even if the transfer  is for no consideration the transfer would be bad if it is  not in favour of those next in the line of succession. Dr.  B.K. Mukherjea in his Tagore Law Lectures  has  pointed out that the decision in Prasanna Kumari’s case (supra)  was that the rule of necessity extended only to an alienation of the temporality of the idol and it does not and cannot apply to  alienation  to  the spiritual rights  and  duties.   Dr. Mukherjea illustrated this with reference to the decision in Nagendra Nath v. Rabindra I.L.R. 53 Cal. 132 and an  earlier decision  in Rajeswar v. Gopeswar (supra).  The doctrine  of alienation  of  shebaitship on the ground  of  necessity  or benefit  to  the  deity is said by Dr. Mukherjea  to  be  of doubtful authority and based upon a misconception of certain pronouncements of the Judicial Committee. In  the  present  case,  the  appellant  cannot  invoke  the doctrine  of transfer of shebaiti right for the  benefit  of the  deity because the transfer by Pramila Debi  to  Upendra Nath  Ganguli  is  illegal for  the  principaI  reason  that neither  the temple nor the deities nor the  shebaiti  right can  be  transferred by sale  for  pecuniary  consideration. ’the transfer by sale is void in its inception. For  these  reasons the appeal is dismissed.  We  may  state here  that we are not in agreement with the various  reasons given by the concurring judgment of the High Court. Some  submissions were made on behalf of the receiver  about his remuneration and expenses including salary of the clerk. At  the time we granted stay of the operation of the  decree of  the  High  Court  we  indicated  that  the  question  of remuneration  and salary of the clerk would be gone into  at the  time of the disposal of the appeal.  The receiver  will be  entitled  to his remuneration for 16 months  during  the pendency  of  the  appeal.  The High  Court  sanctioned  the receiver a remuneration of 130 gold mohurs for 7 months  and salary of the clerk at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month.   The High Court will fix the remuneration of the receiver for the subsequent  months  up to the discharge of the  receiver  on

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passing of his accounts.  The High. 736 Court  will also fix the salary of the clerk because it  was submitted  before  us that the salary of the clerk  was  low considering that lie had to attend the temple every day  for long hours without any holiday. The receiver will submit his accounts and will be discharged on passing of accounts.  The receiver will hand over to  the respondents,  viz., the Banerjees all monies lying with  him after  deducting his remuneration, salary of the  clerk  and all  other  expenses at the passing or the accounts  by  the High Court. The appellant will pay one set of costs to be shared by  the respondents and the guardian-ad-litem.                                      Appeal dismissed. V.P.S. 737