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PETITIONER: KALANKA DEVI SANSTHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHARASHTRA REVENUE TRIBUNAL, NAGPURl & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/08/1969

BENCH: GROVER, A.N. BENCH: GROVER, A.N. SHAH, J.C. (CJ) RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  439            1970 SCR  (1) 936  1969 SCC  (2) 616

ACT:     Bombay   Tenancy  and  Agricultural  Lands     (Vidarbha Region)  Act,  1958---S.  2(12) Explanation I,  ss.  36  and 38--Expression  "to  cultivate personally"--Scope  of--If  a Sansthan  or  private religious trust  entitled  to  recover possession of agricultral, land for "personal cultivation".

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant  Sansthan,  a  private  religious  trust, derived  most of its income from endowed agricultural  land. The fourth respondent was a tenant of a part of the land.  A notice  was  served  on him on behalf of  the  appellant  in January  1961  under  s.  38  of  the  Bombay   Tenancy  and Agricultural  Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, to give  up possession  of the land as it was required by  the  Sansthan for  personal  cultivation. As the notice was  not  complied with,  the. appellant made an application under s. 36  which was ’rejected by the Naib Tahsildar.  The S.D.O. as well  as the first respondent Revenue Tribunal, confirmed this order. The appellant thereafter filed a petition in the High  Court under Art. 227 but this was  dismissed.     In  appeal to this Court it was contended on  behalf  of the  appellant that under Explanation I in s. 2(12)  of  the Act  a  person  who is subject to  any  physical  or  mental disability shall be deemed to cultivate the land  personally if it is cultivated by the servants or by hired laborers; as an idol or a Sansthan that would fall within the meaning  of the word "person’ can well be regarded to. b.e subject to  a physical or mental disability and land can be cultivated  on its  behalf  by servants  or hired laborers,  by  virtue  of Explanation  I the idol would be in the same position  as  a minor  and it can cultivate the land personally  within  the meaning of s. 2(12). HELD: Dismissing the appeal,     (i) There was no ’farce in the contention that the  case of  the  appellant fell within Explanation I  in  s.  2(12). Physical  or mental disability as defined by s. 2(22),  lays emphasis on the words "personal labour or supervision".   In other  words the intention  is that the cultivation  of  the land  concerned must be by natural persons and not by  legal

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persons. [939 E]     Shri Kesheoraj Deo  Sansthan,  Karania v. Bapurao  Deoba JUDGMENT:     (ii)   Neither   provisions  of  Berar   Regulation   of Agricultural  Leases  Act,  1951 nor of  the  Bombay  Public Trusts Act could be of any assistance to the appellants.  In the present case it was common ground that the Sansthan  was a  private trust and was not governed by the  provisions  of the Bombay Public Trusts Act.  The manager of the Wahiwatdar of  the  Sansthan  could not,  therefore,  fall  within  the definition of the word "trustee" as given in s. 2 ( 18 )  of the Act. [940 E-F]     Ishwardas  v.  Maharashtra  Revenue  Tribunal  &   Ors., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 441, referred to. 937     (iii)  There  was no force in the  contention  that  the provisions of the Act which had the effect of debarring  the appellant from claiming possession for personal  cultivation were   violative  of  Articles  14  and  19(1)(f)   or   the Constitution.  The Act is rendered  immune from  attack   on these  grounds in view of the provisions of Article  31  (A) of the Constitution. 1941 A-B]     Shri  Mahadeo  Paikaji Kolhe Yavatmal v.  The  State  of Bombay, [1962], 1 S.C.R. 733 and Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The   State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R.  489,  referred to.

&     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeal No. 862  of 1966.     Appeal  by special leave from the order dated  April  8, 1965  of  the  Bombay High Court, Nagpur  Bench  in  Letters Patent Appeal No. 40 of 1965.     W.S. Barlingay, R. Mahalingier  and Ganpat Rai,  for the appellant. M.S.K. Sastri and S.P. Nayar, for respondents’ Nos. 2, 3 and 5. M. Veerappa, for respondent No. 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Grover,  J.  This is an appeal by special leave  from  a judgment  of the High Court of Bombay dismissing a  petition under  Art. 227 of the Constitution which had been filed  by appellant Sansthan.     The  appellant  is a private religious  Trust  which  is managed  by  Laxman  Anant  Mulay who  is   described  as  a Wahiwatdar  (Manager).   The  main  source  of  income   for performing  the several acts including the daily worship  of the family deity (Shri Kalanka Devi) is stated to be derived from  endowed  agricultural land.  Respondent No. 4  is  the tenant in field  survey No.  94 with ,an area of 30 acres  8 gunthas in Mouza Malrajura, district Akola.  ’On January 30, 1961  a  notice  was served on behalf of  the  appellant  on respondent No. 4 under the provisions of s. 38 of the Bombay Tenancy  and   Agricultural  Lands  (Vidarbha  Region)  Act, 1958,  hereinafter called the Act.  It was mentioned in  the notice  that  an earlier notice under s. 9(1) of  the  Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act had been served in the year 1955 that the Sansthan required the aforesaid field for personal  cultivation  and,  therefore, he  should  give  up possession.   Those  proceedings were pending but  a  notice under  s. 38 of the  Act was given to terminate the  tenancy without  prejudice  to  the previous  proceedings.   As  the notice was not  complied  with  an application was filed  on

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behalf  of  the  appellant  under  s.  36  of  the  Act  for possession which was opposed by respondent No. 4 938 The  Naib Tehsildar rejected the application on  the  ground that the Sansthan was not a land-holder who could  cultivate the land personally.  His order was confirmed  by  the  Sub- Divisional Officer and by the Maharashtra  Revenue  Tribunal to  whom appeals were taken.  The appellant ultimately filed a   petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution  before  the High Court which, as stated before, was dismissed.     The  only  point which has to be determined  is  whether the   Sansthan  could  take  advantage  of  the   provisions contained in the Act by which possession can be claimed from the  tenant on the ground that it is required  for  personal cultivation.  Section 2(12) of the Act defines the words "to cultivate  personally" in  the following manner:                    S. 2(12) "to cultivate personally"  means               to cultivate on one’s own account--               (i) by one’s own labour, or               (ii)  by  the labour of any  member  of  one’s               family, or                   (iii)  under the personal  supervision  of               one-self  or of any member of one’s family  by               hired  labour or by servants on wages  payable               in cash or kind but not in crop share;                     Explanation I.--A widow or a minor or  a               person  who  is  subject to  any  physical  or               mental disability, or a serving member of  the               armed forces shall be deemed to cultivate  the               land personally if it is cultivated by her  or               his servants or by hired laborer;               Explanation II............  " According  to s. 2(22) the "physical or  mental  disability" means  physical or mental disability by reason of which  the person   subject   to  such  disability  is   incapable   of cultivating  land  by personal labour or  supervision.   The word "tenant" is defined by s. 2(32) as meaning a person who holds land on lease including a person who is deemed to be a tenant  under ss. 6, 7 or 8 and a person who is a  protected lessee or occupancy  tenant.  It is  provided that the  word "landlord"  shall  be construed   accordingly.   Section  38 deals   with   termination  of  tenancy  by   landlord   for cultivating  land  personally.  It says  that  after  giving notice  to  a  tenant in writing at any time  on  or  before February  15, 1961 and making an application for  possession under  s. 36 on  or before March 31, 19611 the landlord  may terminate  the  tenancy other than  an occupancy tenancy  if the landlord bona fide requires the land for cultivating  it person,  ally.  Sub-s. (3) gives the conditions  subject  to which the tenancy can be terminated. 939     Now  it  is  well  known that  when  property  is  given absolutely  for the worship of an idol it vests in the  idol itself as a juristic person.  As pointed out in  Mukherjee’s Hindu  Law of Religious and Charitable Trust at pp.  142-43, this  view  is in  accordance with the Hindu ideas  and  has been  uniformly  accepted  in  a  long  series  of  judicial decisions.   The idol is capable of holding property in  the same  way as a natural person.  "It has a  juridical  status with  the power of suing and being sued.  Its interests  are attended  to by the person who has the deity in  his  charge and  who  is in law its manager with all the  powers   which would,  in such circumstances, on analogy, be given  to  the manager  of  the estate of an infant heir".   The  question, however, is whether the idol is capable of cultivating   the

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land   personally.   The argument raised on  behalf  of  the appellant  is that under Explanation I in s. 2 (12)  of  the Act  a  person  who is subject to  any  physical  or  mental disability shall be deemed to cultivate the land  personally if it is cultivated by the servants or by hired laborer.  In other words an idol or a Sansthan that would fall within the meaning  of  the word "Person" can well be  regarded  to  be subject  to a physical or mental disability and land can  he cultivated  on its behalf by servants  or  hired  labourers. It is urged that in Explanation (I) the idol would be in the same position as a minor and it can certainly cultivate  the land  personally  within  the meaning of s.  2(12).   It  is difficult  to  accept the suggestion that the  case  of  the appellant  would fall within Explanation  (I) in  s.  2(12). Physical  or mental disability as defined by s.  2(22)  lays emphasis  on the words "personal labour or supervision".  As has been rightly pointed out in Shri Kesheorai Deo Sansthan, Karanji v. Bapurao Deoba & Ors.(1) in which  an  identically similar point came up for consideration, the dominating idea of  anything done personally or in person is that the  thing must  be  done by the person himself and not by  or  through some one else. In our opinion the following passage is  that judgment at p. 593 explains the whole position correctly:                      "It   should  thus  appear   that   the               legislative   intent clearly is that in  order               to   claim   a  cultivation  as   a   personal               cultivation  there  must  be   established   a               direct nexus between the person who makes such               a  claim,  and the agricultural  processes  or               activities   carried  on the land.   In  other               words, all the agricultural operations, though               allowed  to be done through hired  labour   or               workers must be under the direct  supervision,               controL, or management of the landlord.  It is               in   that  sense  that  the  words   "personal               supervision"  must  be  understood.  In  other               words, the requirement of personal supervision               under   the   third   category   of   personal               cultivation provid-                (1) [1964] Mah. L.J. 589, 593.               940               ed for in the definition does not admit of  an               intermediary  between  the  landlord  and  the               labourer, who can act as agent of the landlord               for   supervising   the  operations   of   the               agricultural worker.  If that is not  possible               in the case of one landlord, we do not see how               it is possible in the case of another landlord               merely because the landlord in the latter case               is a juristic person". In other words the intention is that the  cultivation of the land  concerned must be by natural persons and not by  legal persons.     It has next been contended that in the provision of  the Berar  Regulation  of Agricultural Leases Act,  1951  public trusts   of charitable nature were included among those  who could   claim  possession  from a tenant on  the  ground  of personal  cultivation.  It is not possible to  see  how  the provisions  of  a repealed statute which was  no  longer  in force,  after  the  enactment of the Act, could  be  of  any avail   to  the  appellant.   The  decision in Ishwardas  v. Maharashtra  Revenue  Tribunal  &  Ors.(1)  has;  also  been referred to by the counsel for the appellant.  In that  case it was said that under s. 2(18) of the Bombay Public  Trusts Act  a trustee has been defined as meaning a person in  whom

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either alone or in association with other persons the  trust property is vested and includes a manager.  In view of  this definition   the  properties  of  the  trusts  vest  in  the managing trustee and he is the landlord under cl. 32 of s. 2 of  the  Act.   As  he is the landlord, he  can  ask  for  a surrender  from  the tenant of the lands of  the  trust  "to cultivate personality".  In the present case  it  is  common ground  that  the  Sansthan is a private trust  and  is  not governed  by  the provisions of the  Bombay  Public   Trusts Act. ’The manager of the Wahiwatdar of the Sansthan  cannot, therefore, fall within the definition of the word  "trustee" as given in s. 2(18) of that Act.  It may be mentioned  that in   Ishwardas, case(1) the court refrained from  expressing any  opinion on the question whether a manager or a  Shebait of the properties of an idol or the manager of the  Sansthan can  or cannot apply for surrender by a tenant of lands  for personal cultivation. The distinction between a manager or a Shebait  of  an idol and a trustee where a  trust  has  been created is well recognised.  The properties of the ’trust in law vest in the trustee whereas in the case of an idol or  a Sansthan they do not vest in the manager or the Shebait.  It is  the  deity  or the Sansthan which  owns  and  holds  the properties.  It  is only the possession and  the  management which vest in the manager.       It  has  lastly  been  contended  that  the   relevant provisions of the Act which have the effect of debarring the appellant    from   ,claiming   possession   for    personal cultivation violate the provisions (1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 441. 941 of  Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.  It is  urged that  discrimination  is  writ  large  between  animate  and juristic persons who fall within the definition of the  word "person".  Such a contention, however, cannot be entertained in  view  of  Art. 31A of the  Constitution.   The  Act  had received the assent of the President and is rendered  immune from  attack  or challenge  on  the round  of  violation  of Articles  14  or 19 of the Constitution.   In  Shri  Mahadeo Paikali  Kolhe  Yavatmal   v.  The State  of  Bombay(1)  the constitutional validity of the Act itself was canvassed  but the challenge failed.  Similarly the validity of the Bombay Tenancy and  Agricultural Lands Amendment Act,  1956    as applied to Vidarbha Region and Kutch  Area was  upheld  in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay(2). The  appeal  consequently  fails and it  is  dismissed  with costs. R.K.P.S.                                  Appeal dismissed. (1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 733. (2) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489. L15Sup./69--22-5-70--GIPF. 1