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PETITIONER: KAJORI LAL AGARWAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/12/1965

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. RAMASWAMI, V. SATYANARAYANARAJU, P.

CITATION:  1966 AIR 1538            1966 SCR  (3) 141

ACT: West  Bengal  Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act  (2  of 1948),  8(2)-Application  for reference to  Court-Period  of limitation whether prescribed.

HEADNOTE: The appellant’s lands were acquired under the provisions  of the  West  Bengal Land (Requisition  and  ACquisition)  Act, 1948.  The  Land Acquisition Officer made an  award  on  5th February  1951.   The appellant  accepted  the  compensation amount  on  21st  March  1951, under  protest,  and  on  2nd February  1953, filed an application under s. 8 of  the  Act that a reference should be made to the Court regarding  his, claim  for  a  larger  amount  of  compensation.   The  Land Acquisition  Officer rejected the application on the  ground that  it  was  barred  by time.  The  High  Court,  ’in  its revisional  jurisdiction,  remanded  the case  to  the  Land Acquisition Officer for disposal according to law, with  the observation, that, though no limitation-had been  prescribed for making an application for reference, such an application should  nevertheless  be made Within a reasonable  time  and Chat whether the appellant moved within a reasonable time or not should be determined.  The Land Acquisition Officer held that  the appellant did not move Within reasonable time  and rejected  the  application, and the High  Court  refused  to interfere with- the order’ In appeal to this Court. HELD:     Section 8(2) of the West Bengal Act, read with  s. 18(2)  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  specifically prescribes   the  period  of  limitation  for  making   such applications, and having regard to these provisions, the  by time  It  was  therefore  not  necessary  to  consider   the appellant’s  plea  that the application was  made  within  a reasonable time.[148 B-C] The  fact  that s. 8(1) of the West Bengal  Act  imposes  an obligation on  the Collector to refer the  matter  to  the decision of the Court does not preclude the application of a provision for limitation prescribed in regard to the  making of  an application for reference.  Section 8(2) of the  West

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Bengal  Act’  makes  the  provisions  of  the  Central   Act applicable mutatis mutandis in respect of any reference made to  the court under sub-s. (1).  In the context, the  clause "in  respect  of any reference made to the Court"  does  not mean that the provisions of the Central Act    have to apply only  after a reference is made, but it includes  all  cases where  reference is intended, or proposed, or asked,  to  be made,  and  that  means that if a party  wants  to  make  an application  for  reference,  he is  no  doubt  entitled  to require  the  Collector to make such a  reference,  but  his application in that behalf must be made within the period of limitation  prescribed  by  s. 18(2)  of  the  Central  Act. Further,  the amended s. 8(2) of the West Bengal Act,  which makes s. 18(2) of the Central Act expressly applicable, also uses  the same clause "in respect of any reference  made  to the Court and that also lends support to this view. [144  G; 146 F; 147 G-H] 142 Kajori  Lal  Agarwal v. The Union of India, 59  C.W.N.  936, overruled.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 666 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and order,  dated July  6, 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil  Rule  No. 3886 of 1956. Anoop Singh, for the appellant. D.   N. Mukherjee and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 1. P.   K.  Chatterjee and P. K. Bose, for respondents  Nos.  2 and 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar,  C.J. The appellant Kajori Lal  Agarwal  was the  owner-in-khas of 37.85 acres of land in Mouza  Shibnath Das  J. L. No. 110 and Mouza Kholai Singh J. L. No.  112  in Siliguri Town in the district of Darjeeling.  The said lands were  acquired by the Union of India, and the State of  West Bengal,  respondents 1 & 2 respectively, under the  relevant provisions   of  the  West  Bengal  Land  (Requisition   and Acquisition)  Act, 1948 (No’ 2 of 1948) (hereinafter  called ’the Act) for the Assam Rail Link Project.  Respondent No. 3 is  the  Land  Acquisition Officer,  Darjeeling.   In  those proceedings,  the appellant claimed compensation at  a  flat rate  of Rs. 100 per cottah amounting to Rs.  2,27,100.   He also  put  in  a  claim for Rs.  8,000  on  account  of  the severance and other grounds.  Respondent No. 3 made an award under  s. 7 of the Act on the 5th February,  1951  directing the  payment of Rs. 22,074 to the appellant in lieu  of  his lands at the rate of Rs. 600 per acre.  After the award  was pronounced,  a notice was served on the appellant  under  s. 12(2)  of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (No.  1  of  1894) (hereinafter called ’the Central Act’).  On the 21st  March, 1951, the appellant accepted the said amount as compensation money under protest. Thereafter,  the  appellant  filed  an  application   before respondent No. 3 on the 2nd February, 1953 and claimed  that a reference should be made by him to the Court for  decision of his claim for a larger amount of compensation under s.  8 of  the Act.  The appellant alleged in his application  that having  regard  to  the  market value of  the  land  at  the relevant time, the amount awarded to him by respondent No. 3 was  grossly  inadequate.   Respondent No.  3  rejected  the appellant’s application for reference on the ground that  it was barred by time.

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143 The  appellant  challenged  the validity of  this  order  by moving   the   Calcutta  High  Court   in   its   revisional jurisdiction (Civil Revision Case No. 676 of 1954).  On  the 16th June, 1955, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court allowed the appellant’s revisional application and sent  the case  to  respondent  No.  3  with  a  direction  that   the appellant’s  application for reference should be dealt  with in accordance with law.  In remitting the case to respondent No. 3, the High Court observed that though, in its  opinion, no limitation had been prescribed for making an  application for reference, such an application must nevertheless be made within a reasonable time.  On that view, the High Court left it to respondent No. 3 to consider whether the appellant had moved  for reference within a reasonable time  (vide  Kajori Lal Agarwal v. The Union of India & Ors.) (1). After  the  appellant’s  application was  thus  remanded  to respondent No. 3, he filed an affidavit on the 27th  August, 1956 and explained in detail the reasons for the delay  made by him in filing his application for reference.  On the 10th September,  1956 respondent No. 3 rejected  the  appellant’s application on the ground that he had neglected to move  for reference within a reasonable time. This  order was challenged by the appellant again by  moving the  Calcutta High Court under Art. 227 of the  Constitution read with s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil  Rule No.  3886  of 1956).  On the 6th July, 1959, this  case  was heard  by  a Division Bench of the said High Court  and  the application  made  by  the appellant was  dismissed  on  the ground  that the High Court saw no reason to interfere  with the  order  passed by respondent No. 3. It is  against  this order that the appellant has come to, this Court by  special leave. On  behalf of the appellant, Mr. Anoop Singh  contends  that the High Court was in error in not reversing the decision of respondent  No.  3; and in support of his argument,  he  has relied  on  the  fact that on the 12th  January,  1953,  the Calcutta  High Court had ruled in the case of Birendra  Nath Ray Sarkar & Another v. Union of India & Another (2)  (Civil Rule  No. 2940 of 1951) that there was no prescribed  period of limitation for an application for reference under s. 8 of the Act, and it was only after the appellant knew about this decision that he was advised to make his present application for reference.  Mr. Anoop Singh argues that this fact should have been taken into account by the Calcutta High Court (1) 59 C.W.N.    1936. (2) 57 C.W.N. 283. 144 and  on  that  ground,  the decision  of  respondent  No.  3 rejecting  the  appellant’s  application  should  have  been reversed. Before we deal with this argument, however, it is  necessary to  consider the basic question as to whether  the  Calcutta High Court is right in holding that no period of  limitation is  prescribed by S. 8 of the Act for making an  application for reference.  If we hold that S. 8 prescribes a period  of limitation,  then the question as to whether  the  appellant moved  respondent No. 3 within a reasonable time,  will  not fall  to be considered; and so, we must first consider  this question.               Section 8 of the Act reads thus               "Reference to Court.               8.    (1) The Collector shall in every case--               (a)   where  any person aggrieved by an  award               made under sub-section (2) of section 7  makes

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             an  application  requiring the  matter  to  be               referred to the Court;                                     or               (b)   where  there  is any  disagreement  with               regard to the compensation payable under  sub-               section (3) of section 7 between the Collector               and the person to whom possession of any  land               is delivered under section 6 refer the  matter               to the decision of the Court.               (2)   The  provisions of the Land  Acquisition               Act,  1894  (No.  1 of  1894),  shall  mutatis               mutandis  apply  in respect of  any  reference               made to the Court under sub-section (1)". We  have already noticed that when the appellant  moved  the Calcutta  High  Court on an earlier occasion,  the  Calcutta High Court had ruled that no limitation had been  prescribed by  s.  8,  though  it had added  that  an  application  had nevertheless to be made within a reasonable time.  Mr. Anoop Singh naturally supports this decision. It is plain that S. 8(2) makes the provisions of the Central Act applicable mutatis mutandis in respect of any  reference made to the Court under sub-s. (1).  The Calcutta High Court has  held  that the effect of the provisions  prescribed  by this  sub-section is to make the relevant provisions of  the Central  Act  applicable to proceedings  subsequent  to  the making  of the reference.  This view proceeds on  the  basis that  when  sub-s. (2) refers to any reference made  to  the Court, it emphasises the fact that up to 145 the  making of the reference the provisions of  the  Central Act  have  no application.  In other words,  this  provision does  not permit the application of the relevant  provisions of the Central Act in relation to all proceedings which take place  prior  to  the  making  of  the  reference.   When  a reference has been made under s. 8 ( 1 ), a stage is reached for  the application of the provisions of the  Central  Act. This  provision  does  not  allow  the  application  of  the relevant provisions of the Central Act at any stage prior to the  making of the reference.  One cannot  extend  backwards the  said  provisions.   That is how  the  matter  has  been succinctly put by the High Court in holding that the  period of  limitation prescribed by s. 1 8 (2) of the  Central  Act cannot  apply to an application for reference made under  s. 8(1) of the Act.               Section 18 of the Central Act reads thus               "  18. (1) Any person interested who  has  not               accepted the award may, by written application               to  the Collector, require that the matter  be               referred    by   the   Collector    for    the               determination   of  the  Court,  whether   his               objection  be to the measurement of the  land,               the amount of the compensation, the persons to               whom  it is payable, or the  apportionment  of               the    compensation    among    the    persons               interested..               (2)   The   a  application  shall  state   the               grounds  on  which objection to the  award  is               taken               (a)   if  the person making it was present  or               represented  before the Collector at the  time               when he made his award, within six weeks  from               the date of the Collector’s award;               (b)   in other cases, within six weeks of  the               receipt of the notice from the Collector under               section  12,  subsection (2),  or  within  six

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             months from the date of the Collector’s award,               whichever period shall first expire’. There is no doubt that if the provisions of s. 18 (2) can be said to apply to an application made for reference under  s. 8 of the Act, the periods of limitation prescribed by sub-s. (2) of s. 1 8 of the Central Act would be attracted; and  if they  apply, the appellant’s application originally made  to respondent No. 3 for reference is barred by time. In  our opinion, the High Court was in error in reading  the clause "in respect of any reference made to the Court" in s. 8  (2) of the Act as referring to cases where reference  has already been 146 made.   In  the context, what the clause means is  that  the provisions  of the Central Act shall mutatis mutandis  apply in  respect. of any reference intended, proposed, or  asked, to  be  made, and not in respect of  any  reference  already made.   Having regard to the scheme of s. 8,  considered  in the light of the other provisions of the Act, it seems to us clear  that  the  object of the Legislature  in  making  the relevant  provisions  of  the  Central  Act  applicable   to references was to take in all the relevant provisions of the Central Act which had reference to the making of  reference; and naturally, these provisions would begin with s.18 of the Central  Act which is the first section in Part III  of  the Central  Act dealing with reference to Court  and  procedure thereon.  It would,. we think, be unreasonable to hold  that until a reference in made, the said provisions do not  apply and  it  is only after the reference is made that  the  said provisions begin to operate. It is true that S. 8(1) of the Act uses the mandatory  words "the Collector shall refer the matter to the decision of the Court"; but that does not mean that it necessarily  excludes the application of the provision as to limitation.   Section 18(1)  of  the  Central  Act,  though  somewhat  differently worded,  has in law the same effect.  It provides  that  any person  interested  who has not accepted the award  may,  by written  application  to  the Collector,  require  that  the matter be referred by the.  Collector for the  determination of  the  Court.   This  provision  also,  in  substance,  is mandatory.   If an application is made by a person  entitled to make such application, the Collector has no option in the matter;  he  has  to refer it to the Court;  but  even  this provision  is subject to the limitation prescribed  by  sub- section  (2).   The position with regard  to  the  mandatory provision  contained  in  s.  8(1) of  the  Act  is  exactly similar.   Therefore,  the fact that s. 8(1) uses  the  word "shall" and imposes an obligation on the Collector to  refer the  matter to the decision of the Court, does not  preclude the application of a provision for limitation prescribed  in regard to the making of an application for reference.  On  principle,  it seems extremely unlikely  that  the  Act which deals with acquisition and requisition of  properties, could  have  intended to leave it to the sweet-will  of  the parties  to  make an application for reference at  any  time they  like.  The High Court no doubt realised the  anomalies which would result in adopting such a construction; and  so, while it upheld the appellant’s contention that there was no limitation  prescribed for the making of an application  for reference under s. 8 of the Act, it added the corollary that even though no limitation is prescribed, the applica- 147 tion  must  nevertheless be made within a  reasonable  time. In, our opinion, it is unnecessary to invoke such a  general consideration,  because s. 8(2) of the Act, in terms,  makes

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s.  18(2)  of the Central Act applicable, and  there  is  no occasion  to consider whether a particular  application  has been made within a reasonable time or not. It  is somewhat remarkable that if the view accepted by  the Calcutta High Court about the construction of s. 8(2) of the Act is correct, even the amendment subsequently made by  the Bengal  Legislature would be ineffective.  It  appears  that presumably as a result of the decision of the Calcutta  High Court,  s. 8 (2) of the Act has been amended by Act VIII  of 1954.  The amended provision reads. thus :-               "8.  (2) The provisions of sub-section (2)  of               section  18  and of sections 19 to 22  and  of               sections 25 to 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,               1894,  and  the  principles set  out  in  sub-               section  (1) and in clause (a) of  sub-section               (2) of section 7 of this Act, shall, so far as               they  may be applicable, apply in  respect  of               any  reference  made to the Court  under  sub-               section (1)". It  would be noticed that this amended provision  has  taken the,  precaution of expressly referring to section 18(2)  of the Central Act along with other sections as sections  which are  applicable to the proceedings under the  provisions  of the  Act.   Even so, the clause that these  provisions  will apply  "in respect of any reference made to the Court  under sub-section (1)" still occurs in the amended provision;  and if  it  is held that the words "any reference  made  to  the Court" speak about the proceedings that follow the making of the reference, then the same difficulty may arise as to  the application of s. 18(2) of the Central Act to an application made  for reference under s. 8(1) of the Act.  This  amended provision  lends  support to the view that  the  clause  "in respect  of any reference made to the Court" does  not  mean that the provisions have to apply after such a reference  is made,  but  that it includes all cases  where  reference  is intended, or proposed, or asked, to be made; and that  means that if a party wants to make an application for  reference, he  is  no doubt entitled to require the Collector  to  make such a reference, but his application in that behalf must be made  within  the limitation prescribed by s. 18(2)  of  the Central  Act.  In our opinion, in regard to the  application of  s. 18(2) of the Central Act in respect  of  applications made  for reference under s. 8(1) of the Act,  no  amendment was really 148 necessary;  but,  of  course,  the  Legislature  thought  it necessary  to make the amendment in view of the decision  of the  Calcutta  High  Court on the application  made  by  the appellant on the earlier occasion to that High Court. Since  we hold that the application originally made  by  the appellant  to respondent No. 3 under s. 8(1) of the  Act  on the 2nd February, 1953 for reference, was barred by time, it is not necessary to consider the appellant’s plea whether it was made within a reasonable time.  Section 8(2) of the  Act read   with  S.  18(2)  of  the  Central  Act   specifically prescribes  limitation for the making of such  applications; and  there  is  no  doubt that having  regard  to  the  said provisions, the appellant’s application is barred by time. The result is, the appeal fails, and the order passed by the High Court is confirmed, though on different grounds.  There would be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. 149

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