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CASE NO.: Transfer Case (civil) 25 1998.

PETITIONER: K.  THIMMAPPA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL BD.  OF DIRS.  SBI & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       05/12/2000

BENCH: G.B.Pattanaik, B.N.Aggrawal

JUDGMENT:

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     JUDGMENT

     PATTANAIK,J.

     These  Transferred  Cases from different  High  Courts relate  to  the  common question, namely, in the  matter  of placement  of existing officers in the new grades and  scale in  the  State Bank of India made under State Bank of  India Officers  (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order  1979,  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  The   Service Order),   under   Paragraph  7  of   the  said   Order   is discriminatory  in  nature,  so  far as it  deals  with  the Officers  Grade  I.  The Central Board of the State Bank  of India  in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (1)  of Section  43  of  the State Bank of India Act 1955  made  the condition of Service Order which came into force with effect from 1.10.1979.  Paragraph 7 deals with the placement of the existing officers on the appointed date in the corresponding grades  and  scale as per the table given in Schedule I  and Paragraph  8  deals  with the fitment of the  said  existing officers in the new grade and scale of pay.  Prior to coming into  force of the condition of Service Order, in the  State Bank of India there were different grades of officers in the organisational  structure and so also in other  Nationalised and  Subsidiary  Banks.  In the year 1973 the Government  of India  appointed  a Committee, called Pillai  Committee  for bringing uniformity and standardisation in the conditions of service  of the officers of various Nationalised Banks.  The said  recommendations  of the Pillai Committee was later  on applied  to the State Bank of India and its Associate  Banks with  suitable  modification having regard to their  special features.   So far as the State Bank of India is  concerned, the  entire  re-structuring  of  its officers  was  made  by passing  the  conditions  of Service Order which  came  into force  on  1.10.1979.  Paragraph 6 of the Order  deals  with categorisation.   Paragraph  7  of   Order  deals  with  the placement  of  existing  officer on the  appointed  date  in corresponding  grades  and scales.  Paragraph 8  deals  with

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fitment  in  the  new  scales  of  pay.   The  aforesaid   3 paragraphs are quoted herein-below in extenso:-

     Categorisation   6.   (1)  Having   regard   to   the responsibilities and functions exercisable, every post of an officer  in  the  Bank shall be categorised by  the  Central Board  or the Executive Committee or the competent authority as  falling in any one of the grades or scales mentioned  in paragraph  4  and such categorisation may be  reviewed  from time to time by the Central Board or the Executive Committee or   the   competent    authority.     Provided   that   the categorisation  of  the posts in existence on the  appointed date  shall be done before the expiry of two years from that date  and  shall,  in  respect of the posts  in  the  senior management  and top executive grades, be done by a committee appointed  for the purpose by the Chairman of the Bank.  (2) For   the   purpose  of   categorisation  of   posts   under sub-paragraph  (1), every branch or office of the Bank shall be classified by the Bank in accordance with the criteria to be  approved by the Central Board or the Executive Committee as  small, medium, large, very large or exceptionally  large category.   Placement of existing officers on the  appointed date in corresponding grades and scales.  7.  Subject to the provisions  of paragraph 6, existing officers serving in the grades  and scales of pay mentioned in column 1 of the table given  in Schedule I to this order shall be placed as on the appointed   date   in   the   grade  and   scale   specified there-against  in  column 2 of the said schedule.   Provided that  any difficulties or anomalies arising out of the above placement  shall be referred to a committee of such  persons as  the Chairman of the Bank may appoint and the decision of that  committee  in this regard shall be final.  Fitment  in the  new scales of pay.  8.(1) Every existing officer placed in  any  of the new grades and scales of pay  in  accordance with  paragraph 7, shall be fitted at such stage in the  new scale  of pay corresponding to the existing grade and  scale as  specified  in Schedule II to this order.  (2)Subject  to sub-paragraph  (3),  on being so fitted in the new scale  of pay,  such  officer  shall  be eligible  to  draw  the  next increment, if any, in such new scale on the first day of the month in which he would have been eligible to draw increment in  terms  of  the provisions in this behalf  prior  to  the appointed  date.   (3)Where  two  or  more  officers  having different  seniority in the scales of pay immediately before the  appointed date are fitted at the same stage in the  new scale  of  pay,  different  months  may  be  fixed  for  the eligibility  of such officers for the next increment in  the new  scale  of pay.  (4)the mere fact that on the  appointed date  an officer happens to be posted in a post  categorised as  that of a grade or scale higher than the one in which he is  placed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph  7 will  not  by  itself  entitle that officer  to  any  higher placement or fitment.

     In accordance with Paragraph 7 of the Order Schedule I has  been  drawn  up  which indicates the  grade  and  scale immediately  before the appointed date in which the  officer was  there and the grade and scale in which he is placed  on the  appointed  date.  In the case in hand we are  concerned with  officers  described in Items 8 and 9 of the  aforesaid Schedule.  The same is extracted herein-below in extenso:-

     8.Officers  Grade  I confirmed as  Middle  Management such    on    or     before      31.12.1972    Scale     II-

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Scale-Rs.500-40-620-45-755-                 Rs.1200-70-1550- 95-850-50-1050-EB-50-1150- 75-2000.  60-1330.

     9.Other   Officers   Grade   I.    Junior   Management Scale-Rs.500-40-620-45-755-    Grade     Scale    I.-Rs.700- 95-850-50-1050-EB-50-1150     40-900-50-1100-EB-    60-1330. 1200-60-1800.    and   Officers   Grade   II-Scale   Rs.500- 40-620-45-980-50-1030.

     The  grievance of the petitioners, who happened to  be the officers of Grade I, prior to the appointed date is that while those of them who had been confirmed before 31.12.1972 they had been placed in the Middle Management Grade Scale II in  the scale of Pay of Rs.  1200-2000 while the unconfirmed officers  of Grade I prior to 31.12.1972 have been placed in the  Junior Management Grade Scale I in the scale of pay  of Rs.700-1800  along  with officers of Grade II prior  to  the appointed  date.  According to the petitioners, treating the officers  confirmed in Grade I before 31.12.1972 differently from  other officers of Grade I is a hostile  discrimination and  the  so  called  classification made on  the  basis  of confirmation  made  prior  to 31.12.1972,  with  unconfirmed hands  is  not founded on any intelligible  differentia  and further having the cut of date at 31.12.1972 has no rational relation with the object sought to be achieved, and as such, must  be  held to be arbitrary.  According to  the  employer bank,  however, taking into account the period on  probation which  an  officer  of Grade I is required to  undertake  on being  recruited, the successful completion of the period of probation,  after  which  an  employee  is  entitled  to  be confirmed,  the  guidelines  indicated as to the  period  of service,  one  must  have for holding a post in  the  Middle Management Scale Grade II and all other germane factors, the decision  having  been taken on the question  of  placement, that  only those confirmed prior to 31.12.72 will be  placed in  MMG  Grade Scale II, whereas others should be placed  in Junior  Management  Grade  Scale  I cannot  be  held  to  be arbitrary or irrational.

     Mr.   Sanyal,  Mr.   P.P.Rao and  Mr.   R.K.Jain,  the learned  counsel appearing for the petitioners in  different sets   of  Transferred  Petitions,   raised  the   following contentions,  in assailing the legality of Schedule I, drawn in  accordance with paragraph 7 of the Conditions of Service Order,  1979 in relation to Items 8 and 9 quoted earlier  in this judgment.

     (1)   In   the  matter  of  fitment   and   placement, bifurcating  the officers of erstwhile Grade I, on the basis of  their  date  of confirmation is  wholly  irrational  and further,  the date chosen as 31.12.1972 has no basis and  is nothing but an arbitrary and capricious exercise of choosing of  the date and it has no reasonable nexus with the  object sought  to  be  achieved  in the matter  of  placement  and, consequently,  must  be held to be violative of Article  14. (2)  Prior to the appointed date on 1.10.1979, the  officers of  Grade I, having been promoted from the officers of Grade II  and  subsequent to the appointed date, the very fact  of placing some of the officers of Grade I with the officers of Grade  II in Junior Management Grade Scale I, is on the face of  it,  arbitrary and tantamounts to a demotion in case  of those,  who  had  already  been  in Grade  I  prior  to  the

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appointed  date  and  this  placement must  be  held  to  be arbitrary.   (3)  In fixing 31.12.1972, as the cut of  date, for  the  purpose of placement and fitment, the same has  no reasonable  nexus  for the differentiation made and  at  any rate  nothing  has  been  indicated by  the  employer,  and, therefore,  even  if a classification would be  permissible, then also such classification would be hit by the provisions of  Article 14 of the Constitution.  (4) Paragraph 7 of  the Conditions  of Service Order is subject to the provisions of paragraph 6.  Necessarily, therefore, categorisation, having been  required  to  be  made in  due  consideration  of  the responsibility  and  functions exercisable, it would not  be permissible  under paragraph 7 to place officers of Grade  I in  two  different grades, some in Middle  Management  Grade Scale  II  and  others in Junior Management  Grade  Scale  I inasmuch,  it  would  contravene the  mandate  engrafted  in paragraph  6.  (5) Confirmation, being one of the inglorious uncertainties  of  Government Service, depending neither  on efficiency  of  the  incumbent nor on  the  availability  of substantive  vacancies,  as has been held by this  Court  in Patwardhans  case,  1977(3) SCC 399, and reaffirmed in  the Constitution Bench decision in Direct Recruits case, 1990(2) SCC  715, if such date of confirmation, cannot be the  basis for  the seniority of the employees in a cadre, there  would be  no  rhyme  and reason to have such confirmation  as  the basis for the placement of the officers when a restructuring takes  place and the basis of placement being the inglorious uncertainty  of confirmation, the order of placement must be held  to  be  invalid  and must be  struck  down.   (6)  The Division  Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of subsidiary banks as well as the Rajasthan High Court in  case  of  the  State Bank of Bikaner, which  also  is  a subsidiary  bank,  having  been  upheld  by  this  Court  in somewhat similar circumstances and the placement and fitment made  in case of subsidiary banks, having been set aside  by the  High  Court, the principles enunciated  therein,  would apply  with equal force to the case in hand, and, therefore, the  placement  of officers of Grade I, those who  have  not confirmed by 31.12.72 in the Junior Management Grade Scale I along  with  the  officers of Grade II, must be held  to  be arbitrary and irrational and must be struck down.

     Mr.   Shanti  Bhushan  and Mr.  Kapil  Sibal,  learned counsel, appearing for the bank, on the other hand contended that  Conditions  of  Service Order, 1979,  is  a  statutory order,   made   in  exercise  of  powers   conferred   under sub-section(1) of Section 43 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955  and  the  said  order   purports  to  rationalise  and standardise  in  restructuring the administrative set up  of the  Management cadres and in process of such restructuring, if  on  consideration  of relevant  and  germane  materials, placement  of the officers has been made, as provided  under paragraph  7  of the Conditions of Service Order, then  such placement  is not liable to be interfered with by a Court of law,  unless a strong case is made out, either on the ground of  mala  fides  or  on  the   ground  of  infraction  of  a constitutional provision.  According to the learned counsel, when  officers  of  a pre-existing Grade are  sought  to  be placed in the different grades, which emanated on account of standardisation  and  re-structuring,  then it  may  not  be possible  in a given situation to put all the officers of  a particular  grade  to be placed in a corresponding grade  or scale  of pay evolved in the process of restructuring.  This being  the position, while grafting of these officers in the

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newly  created grade and scale, if there is a bifurcation of officers  of  a  particular grade into two, based  on  their period  of  service, experience and other relevant  factors, such  bifurcation  would  not tantamount  to  treating  them discriminately,  and  would  not attract the  provisions  of Article  14 of the Constitution.  It was further urged under paragraph  6  ,  what  was required to be  performed  is  to categorise   the   officers,   on     the   basis   of   the responsibilities  and functions exercisable by such officers whereas paragraph 7 deals with the placement and paragraph 8 deals  with  the  fitment in the new scale of pay  and  this being  the position, notwithstanding paragraph 7 is  subject to  paragraph  6, there would be no bar in  bifurcating  the officers  of  a  particular grade and placing  them  in  two different  grades, as has been done in the present case,  if there   is  any  reasonable   basis  for  such  bifurcation. According   to  the  learned   counsel,  the  provision  for confirmation,  contained in paragraph 16, would not  attract the  mischief  of inglorious uncertainty of confirmation  in the  service  and on the other hand, it is the  satisfactory completion   of   training  of   the  officers,   which   is determinative  of the confirmation in service and failure on the  part  of  the  officer,  who   is  not  found  fit  for confirmation  by  the  Competent   Authority,  would  entail termination  of  service in case of a direct  appointee  and reversion  to  the substantive grade in case of a  promotee. This  being  the position with regard to  confirmation,  the ratio in Patwardhans case as well as Direct Recruits case, on  which reliance has been placed by the counsel, appearing for  the  petitioners,  would have no  application  at  all. According to Mr.  Shanti Bhushan, the judgment of this Court in  Tarsem  Lal Gautam vs.  State Bank of  Patiala,  1989(1) SCC,  182,  fully governs the present batch of cases and  as such, there is no infirmity with the classification that has been  made  amongst the officers of Grade I on the basis  of their  date of confirmation, whether prior to 31.12.1972  or thereafter.   Mr.   Sibal, further urged that it would be  a sound  and  wise  exercise of discretion for the  Courts  to refuse  to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226  in  the case of persons who do not approach  the  Court expeditiously  for relief and who stand by and allow  things to  happen and then approach the Court to put forward  stale claims  and try to unsettle settled matters and in the  case in hand, the placement that was made in the year 1979 is now sought  to be assailed in writ petitions filed in  different High  Courts,  the earliest being in the year 1988  and  the latest  being in the year 1998 and such delay in approaching the  Court  disentitles  the petitioners from  invoking  the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and, therefore, these petitions are liable to  be  dismissed.  In support of this contention,  reliance was  placed  on  the decision of this Court in the  case  of P.S.Sadasivaswamy vs.  State of Tamil Nadu, 1975(1) SCC 152. Before  we  deal  with  the respective  contentions  of  the parties  it would be appropriate for us to notice that  what Article 14 prohibits is class legislation and not reasonable classification  for the purpose of legislation.  If the rule Making  Authority takes care to reasonably classify  persons for  a  particular purpose and if it deals equally with  all persons  belonging to a well defined class then it would not be  open  to the charge of discrimination.  But to pass  the test  of  permissible classification two conditions must  be fulfilled:-  (a) that the classification must be founded  on an  intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons  or things  which  are grouped together from others left out  of

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the  group;   and  (b)  that the  differentia  must  have  a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute  in question.  The classification may be founded  on different  basis and what is necessary is that there must be a  nexus between the basis of classification and the  object under  consideration.   Article 14 of the Constitution  does not  insist that the classification should be scientifically perfect  and a Court would not interfere unless the  alleged classification  results in apparent inequality.  When a  law is challenged to be discriminatory essentially on the ground that  it denies equal treatment or protection, the  question for determination by Court is not whether it has resulted in inquality but whether there is some difference which bears a just  and reasonable relation to the object of  legislation. Mere   differentiation   does   not   per   se   amount   to discrimination  within the inhibtion of the equal protection clause.   To  attract  the  operation of the  clause  it  is necessary  to show that the selection or differentiation  is unreasonable  or  arbitrary;  that it does not rest  on  any rational  basis  having  regard  to  the  object  which  the legislature  has  in view.  If a law deals with  members  of well  defined  class then it is not obnoxious and it is  not open  to  the  charge of denial of equal protection  on  the ground  that it has no application to other persons.  It  is for  the Rule Making Authority to determine what  categories of  persons  would embrace within the scope of the rule  and merely because some categories which would stand on the same footing  as those which are covered by the rule are left out would  not render the Rule or the Law enacted in any  manner discriminatory  and  violative  of Article 14.   It  is  not possible  to exhaust the circumstances or criteria which may afford  a reasonable basis for classification in all  cases. It  depends  on the object of the legislation, and  what  it really seeks to achieve.

     In  view  of  the submissions of the counsel  for  the parties,  the first question, that arises for  consideration is  whether merely because the officers of Grade I have been placed  in two different newly created grades, on the  basis of  their  confirmation,   would  constitute  discrimination amongst  the same group or not?  The petitioners contention is based upon the observations of this Court in Patwardhans case  as  well as Direct Recruits case, to the  effect  that confirmation  being  one of the inglorious uncertainties  of Government  service,  could  not have formed the  basis  for placement  in  two different grades.  In Patwardhans  case, the  inter  se  seniority between the  direct  recruits  and promotees  was being determined on the basis of the date  of their respective confirmation.  Under the rules in question, a  ratio  between the direct recruits and promotees  to  the cadre  was  being  maintained at  34:66,  and  confirmation, necessarily,  depended upon the availability of the posts in the  cadre in the respective quota.  Further, the  promotees were  to depend on the availability of substantive vacancies and  then  on the arbitrary discretion of the Government  to confirm or not to confirm them in those vacancies.  It is in that  situation,  when the rule of seniority was related  to the  date  of confirmation, the Court had observed that  the confirmation  being  one of the inglorious uncertainties  of Government Service, could not have become a reasonable basis for  determination of inter se seniority.  This decision  in Patwardhans  case was reaffirmed in the Constitution  Bench decision  in  Direct Recruit Class II Engineering  Officers Association  vs.  State of Maharashtra and Others.,  1990(2)

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SCC 715, and the Court reiterated and upheld the decision of the  Court  in  Patwardhan.   But what has  been  stated  in relation to a rule for the purpose of determination of inter se seniority, may not be applicable to all contingencies and it  cannot be said that the confirmation of an employee in a particular  cadre  cannot  form  a rational  basis  for  any purpose  whatsoever.   In  the  case   in  hand,  under  the Conditions  of  Service  Order,  a  person  appointed  as  a probationary officer or a trainee officer, is required to be on  probation for a period of two years.  An employee of the bank  when  promoted as an officer to the Junior  Management Grade  is  required to be on probation for a period  of  one year.   In  accordance  with  paragraph   16  of  the   said Conditions  of  Service Order, such officers  on  probation, shall  be  confirmed  in  the service of the  bank,  if  the Competent  Authority is of the opinion that the employee has satisfactorily  completed the period of probation.  The said Competent Authority also has a right to extend the period of probation,   if  in  his  opinion,   the  officer  has   not satisfactorily   completed  the   probationary  period.   In paragraph  16(3),  on  the end of the period  of  probation, including  the period of extension, if any, if the Competent Authority  is of the opinion that the officer is not fit for promotion,  then  the  service of the  direct  appointee  is liable  to  be terminated and in case of a promotee,  he  is liable  to be reverted to his substantive cadre.  In view of the aforesaid statutory provision, dealing with confirmation and  probation,  the  observation  made  by  this  Court  in Patwardhans  case  or  Direct Recruit case,  will  have  no application.   The  question of inglorious uncertainties  in the  matter  of confirmation, does not arise in the case  in hand,  in  view  of   the  aforesaid  statutory  provisions. Consequently,  the main argument of the petitioner  counsel and  their  reliance  on  the  two  decisions,  referred  to earlier, will have no application and the contention on this score accordingly fails.

     Notwithstanding,  the aforesaid conclusion of ours, it still remains to be examined, as to whether in the matter of placement,  prescribing 31.12.1972, as the cut of date,  can be  referred to any rational basis.  It is too well  settled that  even  if  a classification would be  permissible,  but unless  there  is any rational basis of the same,  the  very basis  would be hit by Article 14.  The stand of the bank is that  taking  into  account  the fact  that  the  period  of probation  is  either  one  year or two  years  in  case  of promotees  or direct recruits and that successful completion of  the  probationary  period entitles the  employee  to  be confirmed  and minimum six years of service in the Grade, is required  for being placed in Middle Management Grade  Scale II,  as  per the guidelines issued and since  placement  was required  to  be made on 1.10.1979, which is  the  appointed date  in  the  Conditions of Service  Order,  the  Competent Authority  of the bank namely the Central Board of the State Bank  of India, has determined the date 31.12.1972.  In view of  the  explanations,  offered by the bank as well  as  the averments  made  in the counter affidavit, we are unable  to hold  that  date 31.12.1972 is an arbitrary date and has  no rational nexus with the placement of the officers of Grade I in  Middle  Management  Grade Scale II.   If  the  Competent Authority  on  relevant  and all germane  factors,  takes  a decision  in the matter of placement or fitment, whenever  a restructuring  of the cadre is made, then the Court will not be  justified  in examining the basis of such  placement  or

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fitment  in  a mathematical scale and would  not  ordinarily interfere  with  such  decision, unless  it  is  established beyond  doubt that the decision is totally arbitrary or  has been  mala  fidely taken.  When we examined the  assertions, made  by the petitioners in their writ petitions, we do  not find  any basis or even any pleadings of mala fides.  In New Bank of India Employees Union and Anr.  vs.  Union of India and  Ors.,  1996(8)  SCC  407, placement of  officers  of  a particular  bank,  after its amalgamation with another  bank was  the  subject matter of challenge and in  that  context, this Court had observed:

     The  legal position is fairly settled that no  scheme of  Amalgamation  can  be fool-proof and a  Court  would  be entitled  to interfere only when it comes to the  conclusion that  either  the scheme is arbitrary or irrational  or  has been framed on some extraneous consideration.

     What  has  been observed in the case of  amalgamation, would  equally apply to a case of restructuring of the cadre and  placement and fitment of the existing employees in  the restructured cadre.  In fact in Tarsem Lal Gautam vs.  State Bank  of  Patiala, 1989(1)SCC 182, this Court was  examining the  legality of classification, based upon their  seniority and  experience for being fitted into two different  grades, though  originally  belong to one grade, as in  the  present case.   While upholding such placement and fitment and while coming  to  the  conclusion  that it  would  not  amount  to discrimination   or   violative  of   Article  14   of   the Constitution,  this  Court had taken note of the  fact  that when  new  categories  of posts and new scales  of  pay  are created,  while  trying to standardise and  rationalise  the management  cadre,  some  criteria have to  be  evolved  and applied  for  the  placement  and fitment  of  the  existing officers  into  the  new  categories  of  posts,  which  may necessitate  the pre-existing cadre of officers to be fitted in two grades and so long as their exists a reasonable basis for   such   bifurcation,  it  would   not  be  a  case   of discrimination,  attracting Article 14 of the  Constitution. Ultimately,   this   Court  held   that  the  principle   of classification  brought  about by the statutory  regulation, cannot  be  said  to  be unreasonable  and  arbitrary.   The aforesaid  dictum,  in  our opinion, would apply  with  full force  to the facts of the present case.  We are,  therefore of  the  considered opinion that placement of  the  existing officers  in the new grades, as provided in Schedule I, made in  paragraph 7 of the Conditions of Service Order, and more particularly, placement made in respect of officers Grade I, confirmed on or before 31.12.1972 in Middle Management Grade Scale  II and others in Junior Management Grade Scale I,  is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

     The  next  question, that arises for consideration  is whether  putting  officers  of  Grade I, who  had  not  been confirmed on or before 31.12.1972 along with the officers of Grade II in Junior Management Grade Scale I, would per se be discriminatory  inasmuch as prior to the new structurisation of  the  management, promotion was being made from  Officers Grade  II  to Officers Grade I?  According to  Mr.   Sanyal, this  tantamounts to un-equals being treated as equals,  and even  demotion  of the officers of Grade I who had not  been confirmed  before 31.12.1972.  We are unable to accept  this submission  of the learned counsel for the petitioners.   It is  no doubt true that prior to the new structurising of the

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management,  persons  from  officers  Grade  II  were  being promoted  to  the  officers  Grade  I.   But  in  suggesting restructure  of  the  entire  managerial  cadre  by  way  of standardisation,  when  less  category of grades  have  been evolved,  necessarily,  there would be merger  of  different pre- existing grades, but such merger will neither amount to demotion  in  any  manner nor would it  amount  to  treating unequals  as  equals.  It is in fact a part of  exercise  of cadre  adjustment  process,  after taking  the  decision  of minimising  the  number of grades and, consequently, such  a decision  having  been  taken by adopting  the  decision  of expertised  body of Pillai Committees Report, it cannot  be said  that  the Central Board of the State Bank of India  in making  the  Conditions of Service Orders 1979, treated  the officers of Grade I, who had not been confirmed on or before 31.12.1972  with  hostile discrimination.  The arguments  on behalf  of  the petitioners on this score, therefore  stands rejected.

     Mr.   Sibal,  appearing  for the Bank,  no  doubt  has raised  the  contention that gross delay on the part of  the employees  in filing the writ petition, dis-entitles them to get  any  discretionary relief and in support of  the  same, reliance  has  been placed on the decision of this court  in P.S.Sadasivaswamy  vs.   State of Tamil Nadu, 1975  (1)  SCC 152.   In the aforesaid case, this Court observed that  even though no period of limitation is provided for the Courts to exercise  power  under Article 226, but it would be a  sound and  wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case  of  persons who do not approach it  expeditiously  for relief  and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach  the  Court to put forward stale claims and try  to unsettle settled matters.

     Mr.   Rao,  the learned senior counsel, appearing  for the petitioners, on the other hand, vehemently urged that if the  treatment  meted out to the petitioners is found to  be discriminatory  and  as  such  violates Article  14  of  the Constitution,  then  the  Court  will  not  throw  away  the petitions  merely  on the ground of latches.  In support  of the  contention,  reliance  was placed on  the  Constitution Bench  decision  of  this Court in the  case  of  Ramchandra Shankar  Deodhar  & Ors.  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra  and Ors.,  1974(2)  SCR 216.  In the said case, this  Court  had observed:

     Moreover,  it  may  be  noticed that  the  claim  for enforcement  of  the fundamental right or equal  opportunity under  Article  16 is itself a fundamental right  guaranteed under  Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role  of  a sentinel on the qui vive for protection  of  the fundamental   rights  cannot  easily   allow  itself  to  be persuaded  to  refuse relief solely on the jejune ground  of latches, delay or the like.

     Mr.   Rao  also  relied upon the observation  of  this Court  in  the  case of B.Prabhakar Rao  and  Ors.etc.   vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.  Etc.Etc.  1985(Supp.)2 SCR 573,  wherein  Chinnappa  Reddy, J, speaking for  the  Court observed thus:

     ........the burden of establishing the reasonableness of  a  classification and its nexus with the object  of  the

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legislation   is  on  the   State.   Though  no   calamitous consequences    were    mentioned    in     any    of    the counter-affidavits, one of the submissions strenuously urged before  us by the learned Advocate-General of Andhra Pradesh and  the  several  other counsel who followed  him  was  the oft-repeated  and  now familiar argument of  ’administrative chaos.   It was said that there would be considerable chaos in  the administration if those who had already retired  are now directed to be re-inducted into service.

     A  passage  from  the  judgment  of  Lord  Denning  in Bradbury  and Ors.  Vs.  London Borough of Enfield,  1967(3) All  England  Law  Reports Page 434, was also  pressed  into service  by  Mr.  P.P.Rao, which it is worth-while to  quote hereunder:

     It  has been suggested by the Chief education officer that,  if  an injunction is granted, chaos  will  supervene. All  the arrangements have been made for the next term,  the teachers  appointed  to the new comprehensive  schools,  the pupils  allotted  their places, and so forth.  It  would  be next   to  impossible,  he  says,   to  reverse  all   these arrangements  without complete chaos and damage to teachers, pupils  and  the  public.   I must say  this:   if  a  local authority  does not fulfil the requirements of the law, this Court will see that it does fulfil them.  It will not listen readily  to  suggestions  of  chaos.   The  department  of education and the council are subject to the rule of law and must comply with it, just like everyone else.  Even if chaos should  result, still the law must be obeyed;  but I do  not think  that  chaos will result.  The evidence  convinces  me that the chaos is much over-stated.

     On  consideration  of  the aforesaid  legal  position, though,  we  are  inclined to agree with Mr.   P.P.Rao  that these  cases  should  not  be thrown out on  the  ground  of latches  alone, inasmuch as the placement made on  1.10.1979 was  assailed  in the year 1988 at the earliest and 1998  at the  latest,  yet  the  same   may  not  be  brushed  aside, particularly,  when  we have not been able to find  out  any infraction  of  any fundamental right of these  petitioners, guaranteed under the Constitution.

     So  far as the argument advanced on the interpretation of  paragraph  7,  on the ground that it is subject  to  the provisions  of paragraph 6, we are of the considered opinion that  paragraph  6  of  the   Conditions  of  Service  Order indicates  as to how categorisation has to be made.  In fact on  the basis of the adoption of the recommendations of  the Pillai  Committee,  the officers have been categorised  into four different categories with nine different scales of pay; Top  Executive  Grade with three scales,  Senior  Management Grade  with  three scales, Middle Management Grade with  two scales  and  Junior  Management  Grade with  one  scale  and categorisation  has  to  be  made taking  into  account  the responsibilities  and functions exercisable by the  officers concerned.   After  such  categorisation,   as  provided  in paragraph  6,  the  officers are required to  be  placed  in corresponding grades and scale.  In other words, in the case in hand, Grade I officers, confirmed on or before 31.12.1972 on  being  categorised as Middle Management Grade Scale  II, other officers of Grade I, not confirmed till 31.12.1972 are categorised  into  Junior  Management  Grade  Scale  I,  and further,  on  categorised as Middle Management Grade,  while

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officers  Grade  I are being placed in Scale II thereof  but Staff  Officers,  Grade  III, enumerated in Item No.   7  of Schedule  I are placed in Middle Management Grade Scale III. The  concept of categorisation, placement and fitment in the new  scale of pay are three different concepts, provided  in paragraphs  6,  7 and 8 of the Conditions of Service  Order. If  this  concept  is  borne  in  mind  and  the  provisions contained  in Schedule I is examined, we see no infirmity in placing  officers  Grade I not confirmed till 31.12.1972  in Junior  Management Grade Scale I, nor can it be said that it would  violate  the mandate contained in paragraph 6 of  the Conditions  of  Service Order.  The said contention  of  Mr. Rao, therefore, is rejected.

     The  only  other  contention  that  survives  for  our consideration  is the Division Bench decision of the  Andhra Pradesh  High Court , which was upheld by this Court as well as  the  decision of the Rajasthan High Court in  the  State Bank of Patialas case, which was also upheld by this Court. Both  in  the Andhra Pradesh case as well as  the  Rajasthan High Court case, it was the officers of the subsidiary bank, who had approached the Court for certain relief and no doubt the  observations  made by the learned Judges of the  Andhra Pradesh  High  Court  would support the  contention  of  the petitioners  in this batch of cases to a great extent.   But the  judgment  of this Court, dismissing the  banks  appeal against the same, does not contain any discussion, though it cannot  be  denied  that dismissal was on  merits.   But  it transpires that the earlier judgment of this court in Tarsem Lal  Gautams case, 1989(1) SCC 182, had not been brought to the  notice  of the Court and when a Contempt  Petition  had been  filed for non-implementation, when the Bank asked  for variation  of  the  order and brought to the notice  of  the Court  the judgment in Tarsem Lal Gautams case, 1989(1) SCC 182,  the  Court observed that the judgment in Civil  Appeal must  be confined to its own facts and as such the  judgment of  the High Court has now to be implemented.  What has been observed  by  this  Court  in   disposing  of  the  contempt application,  when  the decision of the Court in Tarsem  Lal Gautams  case  had been brought to the notice, would  apply equally  to the case in hand, more so, as against a detailed discussion  of  law in Tarsem Lal Gautams case,  there  has been  no  discussion  at all, while  dismissing  the  Banks appeal against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court as  well  as Rajasthan High Court.  Consequently, we are  of the  considered opinion that the observations of the  Andhra Pradesh  High Court, while disposing of the writ  petitions, filed  by the officers of the subsidiary banks will not have any  application  to the case in hand, as had  already  been observed,  while disposing of the contempt application, that it  would  only be applicable to the facts of that case  and more  so,  in  the  present   case,  when  we  have  already considered  the  contentions  raised by the  petitioners  in detail, and have not been persuaded to accept the same.

     In the aforesaid premises, all the contentions raised, having  failed,  these  transferred  cases/petitions,  stand dismissed   and  the  writ   petitions  filed  by  different petitioners in different High Courts stand dismissed.

     For   the  grounds  stated  in  the  application   for condonation  of delay in filing the substitution application in  Transfer  Petition  (Civil)   No.   665-668/98,  in  the interest  of  justice,  the  delay   is  condoned  and   the

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substitution    application   is     allowed.    The   Legal Representatives  of  the  deceased respondent  No.   12  are brought on record.