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PETITIONER: K. SANKARAN NAIR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DEVAKI AMMA MALATHY AMMA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       25/09/1996

BENCH: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) BENCH: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) SINGH N.P. (J)

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N I      S.B. Majmudar. J.      The appellants  who are the heirs of deceased defendant no.2, have  challenged the  judgment  and  order  passed  by learned Single  Judge of  the Kerala  High  Court  in  Civil Revision Petition  No.682 of  1980 . The High Court rejected the contention of the original appellant defendant no. 2, in Original Suit No.241 of 1974 by which he claimed status of a deemed tenant  as per  the provisions  of Section  6C of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 as brought on the statute Book by  the   Kerala  Land   Reforms   (Amendment)   Act.   1979 (hereinafter referred  to as  ‘the  Act’).  Having  obtained special  leave   to  appeal   under  Article   136  of   the Constitution of  India the  present appeal has been filed by the original  defendant no.2. The respondents herein are the original plaintiffs in the suit.      A few  relevant facts  leading to these proceedings may be noted  at the  outset. The  respondents-plaintiffs  filed Original Suit  No.241 of  1974 in  the  Court of Subordinate Judge at  Trivandrum for  partition  of  respondents,  5/6th share in  the plaint  schedule properties and for recovering the same from original appellant-defendant no.2 and his wife original appellant-defendant  no. 1  with  past  and  future mesne profits.      The respondent-plaintiffs’  case in  short was that the suit properties  originally belonged  to one  Krishna Pillai Madhavan Pillai.  Said Madhavan  Pillai by a settlement Deed of 1945  (1120 M.P.)  decided that plaint properties A, B, C Schedule were  to remain in possession and enjoyment of Shri Madhavan Pillai,  his wife parvathi Amma and for the benefit of their  children and  said Parvathi  Amma had to remain in possession as  life estate holder. That said Madhavan Pillai died in  1955 and  his  widow  parvathi  Amma  and  his  son Krishnan Nair  succeeded  to  his  properties.  That  Kerala Agrarian Reforms  Act, Act  I of  1964 was  brought  on  the Statute Book  on 1st  April 1964. Said Krishnan Nair died on 4th January 1968. Said Parvathi Amma by a registered deed is

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said to  have leased out her properties on 10th January 1969 to her  son-in-law, deceased  appellant  original  defendant no.2.   Widow of  Shri Krishnan  Nair and her children filed the  aforesaid   suit  as   plaintiffs  nos.1  and  2  to  5 respectively in  the Trial  Court for partition and separate possession of  their 5/6th  share  in  the  plaint  schedule properties  which   were  then  in  possession  of  original defendant no.2   In  the said  suit original  defendant no.2 took up the contention that he was a tenant under the Kerala Agrarian Reforms  Act.   That question  was referred  to the Tenancy Tribunal  under Section  125(3) of  the Kerala  Land Reforms Act  for decision.   The Tribunal held that original appellant-defendant no.2  was not a tenant under the Act and the Lease  Deed in  his favour  was hit by Section 74 of the Kerala Land  Reforms Act  which totally  barred creation  of leases after 1.4.1964.  The case of oral lease in his favour prior to  1.4.1964. was  also found  to be  not established. The Tribunal’s  decision was  confirmed by the High Court on 31st March  1978.   Appellant carried  the  matter  to  this Court.   Special Leave  Petition against  the  High  Court’s judgment was  also dismissed  by this  Court on  28th August 1978. Thus  the question of alleged tenancy of the appellant under the  Lease Deed  of  10th  January  1969  finally  got concluded against  the appellant.  In the meantime the Trial Court passed  preliminary decree  on 30th  March 1976  and a receiver was  appointed who took possession of the suit land from the  appellant.    Final  decree  was  passed  on  27th September 1978.   Pursuant  thereto the respondents obtained possession  from   the  appellant   through  the   receiver. Consequently final  decree remained  to be executed only for mesne profits  and for  that purpose  the  respondent  filed Execution Petition  against the  appellant on 5th July 1979. Pending these execution proceedings for mesne profits Kerala Land Reforms  (Amendment)  Act,  1979  was  brought  on  the Statute Book.   As per Section 1 sub-section (2) thereof the said Amendment Act was deemed to have come into force on 7th July 1979.   By  the  said  Amendment  Act  Section  6C  was inserted in  the Kerala  Land Reforms  Act, 1963.   The said provision reads as under :      "6C. Certain  lessees who have made      substantial improvements,  etc,  to      be         deemed         tenants.-      Notwithstanding anything  contained      in section  74 or  in any contract,      or in any judgment, decree or order      of any  court or  other  authority,      any person  in  occupation  at  the      commencement  of  the  Kerala  Land      Reforms (Amendment)  Act, 1969,  of      the land  of another  person on the      basis  of  a  lease  deed  executed      after the  1st day  of April, 1964,      shall be deemed to be a tenant if-      (a) he (including any member of his      family) did not own or hold land in      excess of  four acres  in extent on      the date  of execution of the lease      deed: and      (b) he  or any member of his family      has made  substantial  improvements      on the land.      Explanation.- For  the  purpose  of      this section  improvements shall be      deemed    to     be     substantial      improvements if  the value  of such

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    improvements is more than fifty per      cent of  the value  of the  land on      the date  of execution of the lease      deed."      The original  judgment-debtor defendant  no.2, that is, is original appellant herein, applied on 8th January 1980 in execution proceedings  to get  a fresh reference to the Land Tribunal  for  deciding  his  deemed  tenancy  status  under Section 6C  of the aforesaid Amending Act.  The respondents- decree holders  objected to  the said  application.   By  an order dated  29th January  1980 the Executing Court rejected the claim  of the  appellant for  a fresh  reference to  the Tribunal about his status of deemed tenancy under Section 6C of the  Act on the ground that this contention was barred by principles of  res judicata.    The  appellant  carried  the matter in revision before the High Court. As noted earlier a learned Single judge of the High Court by her decision dated 7th April 1980 rejected the said revision application taking the view that though the contention of the appellant was not barred by res judicata because of the coming into force of a new provision  by way  of Section  6C of  the Act, the Lease Deed in  favour of  the appellant  dated 7th  July 1969  was inoperative in  law as  Parvathi Amma  who was a life estate holder had  no authority  to create such a lease and Chapter II of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 did not apply to the facts of  the present case in view of Section 3(1)(vi) which stated that  tenancies in respect of land or of buildings or of both  created by  persons having  only life  interest  or other limited interest in the land or in the buildings or in both, were  not covered  by Chapter  II  of  the  Act  which included Section  6C. It  is  the  aforesaid  order  of  the learned Single  Judge of  the  Kerala  High  Court  that  is brought in  challenge by  the original  appellant by  way of present proceedings.  Pending this appeal original appellant died and his heirs have pursued this appeal.      A short  question with  which we are concerned in these proceedings is  as to  whether original  appellant defendant no.2 was  entitled to  again claim  the  benefit  of  deemed tenancy as  per Section  6C of  the  Act.  Even  though  the learned Single  Judge  of  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  the impugned judgement  has taken  the view that this contention is not barred by res judicial learned senior counsel for the respondents vehemently  contended that  the decision  of the learned single judge deserves to be confirmed on the plea of res judicata  though even  on merits,  according to his, the said decision  is well  sustained.  In view of the aforesaid contention of  learned senior  counsel for  the respondents, learned senior  counsel for  appellant  Shri  Sukumaran  was called upon  by us  to point out as to how the contention of the appellant  for getting  benefit of  Section 6C cannot be said to  be barred  by res  judicata in  view of the earlier claim of his tenancy rights qua the very same land had stood finally rejected by this Court on 28th August 1978.  Learned senior  Counsel   for  the   appellant  in  this  connection submitted  that  when  earlier  proceedings  got  terminated before this  Court Section  6C was  not on the Statute Book. That it  was brought  on the  statute book subsequently with effect from  7th July  1979.  Consequently the principles of res judicata would not apply so far as this new provision is concerned which  gave a  fresh right  to  the  appellant  to contend that  he was  entitled to  get the  benefit  of  the aforesaid rival  contention.   In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions we proceed to resolve this controversy.      It must at once be stated that if the contention of the appellant for  getting benefit  of Section  6C of the Act is

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found to  be barred  by principles  of res  judicata nothing further would survive in these proceedings  and the judgment of the  High Court  will have to be confirmed on this ground alone.   In order  to resolve  this controversy  between the parties it is necessary to note the background facts leading to the  enactment and  introduction of  Section  6C  in  the parent Act.   Relevant  recitals in the Statement of Objects and Reason  for bringing  on the  Statute Book the aforesaid provision read as under:      "Difficulty was  experienced by the      Government in  implementing certain      important provisions  of the Kerala      Land   Reforms    Act,   1963    in      accordance with  their true  spirit      and   the    intention    of    the      Lagislature,  because   of  certain      decisions of the Kerala High Court,      Government   have   also   received      representations from a large number      of  tenants   and   other   persons      pointing out the hardship caused to      them by  the impact  of  the  above      judgments.  In  order  to  overcome      such difficulties  and hardship  it      was considered  necessary to  amend      the   Kerala   Land   Reforms   Act      suitably. It  was also  proposed to      vail of  this opportunity  to  make      certain other amendments which were      found necessary  for the smooth and      speedy   implementation    of   the      provision  of   the   Act.      The      succeeding    paragraphs    briefly      explain  the   scope  of  the  more      important amendments.      2. It  was brought to the notice of      the Government  that inspite of the      provisions contained  in section 74      of   the   Act,   prohibiting   the      creation of tenancies after the 1st      April  1964,   some  persons   have      obtained leases of lands after that      date and  have effected substantial      improvement on  such lands.  It was      considered that  it would  be  very      hard if  such lessees  are  evicted      from  their   holdings.     It  was      therefore necessary  to incorporate      a provision  to give  protection to      such persons."      The aforesaid  Statement clearly  shows that as per the provisions of  Section 74  of the  Act no tenancies could be created after 1st April 1964 and thus there was total bar to creation of  such tenancies.   Consequently  the appellant’s claim to be a tenant of the land as per the registered Lease Deed dated  10th January  1969 had  stood replied  upto this Court.  There cannot be any dispute about the same. In order to infuse life in such void leases Section 6C was brought on the Statute  Book by  the Legislature.  It is of course true that Section  6C starts  with  a  non  obstante  clause  and recites that  notwithstanding anything  contained in section 74, or  in any contract, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, any person in occupation at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 of  the land  of another person on the basis of a lease

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deed executed  after the  1st day  of April,  1964 shall  be deemed to ba a tenant if he satisfies conditions (a) and (b) mentioned in  the said  Section.   It is  also true that for applicability of this Section the concerned person who claim deed  tenancy   statues  must   be  in   occupation  at  the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1969, that is , on 1.1.1970  when that Act came into force and such a person mist have  ben inducted  as a  lessee  under  a  lease  Deed executed by  the lessor  after 1st  April 1964. But the said non obstante  clause in Section 6C can at all have an effect of displacing  any final  judgments or  decree against  such persons if  the substratum  of such judgments was removed by retrospective amendment  of the  Act by insertion of Section 6C.  It is now well settled that Legislature cannot overrule any judicial decision without removing the substratum or the foundation of  that judgment by a retrospective Amendment of the concerned  legal provision.  Section 6C as we have noted above, starts with a non obstante clause and seeks to remove the prohibitive  effect of  Section 74.  If that legislative exercise is  to succeed  effectively then  Section 74 should have  been   either  deleted  form  the  Statute  Book  with retrospective effect  from 1st  April 1964  when the  Kerala Land Reforms  Act, the  parent Act,  came into  force or  at least from 1.1.1970 when the Amendment Act, 1969 came on the Statute Book  and on  which date  the concerned  person  who claimed deemed  tenancy under  Section 6C was required to be in possession  of the  land. However  the Legislature in its wisdom did  not think  it for, while bringing on the Statute Book Section  6C form  7th July  1979,  to  either  five  to retrospective effect  form 1.1.1970, or to delete Section 74 retrospectively at  least  from  1.1.1970  if  not  from  an earlier date  of 1st  April 1964  when the parent Act itself was brought  on the  Statute Book.    Consequently  the  non obstante clause  introduced in  Section 6C for bypassing the final judgments,  decree or  orders of any court against any person  remained   in  the   reals  of  an  abortive  or  an incompetent exercise  on the  part of  the Legislature.   To recapitulate  the  earlier  decision  rendered  against  the appellant could  have  been  effectively  displaced  by  the Legislature by enacting Section 6C if the very foundation or substratum of those earlier judgments was knocked off by the Legislature by  enacting a  competent piece  of  legislation undertaking any of the following exercises: 1.   By retrospectively  deleting Section 74 of the Act from 1.4.1964 or at least from 1.1.1970. 2     Or  alternatively by  making Section  6C retrospective from 1.4.1964 or at least form 1.1.1970.      If any  of the  aforesaid legislative  exercises  which would have  remained within  the competence  of Kerala State Legislature  was  actually  undertaken  then  only  the  non obstinate clause under Section 6C would have effectively and legally operated  for bypassing  the final judgments against such a person who was to be given benefit of Section 6C.  In the absence  of any  of these  eventualities it must be held that  by  enacting  Section  6C  the  Legislature  tried  to legislatively overrule  binding judgments,  against parties, which might  have become  final prior  to 7th  July 1979. As Section 6C  was expressly made operative only from that date with the  result the  legal foundation  of adverse  judgment against the  appellant rendered prior to 7th July 1979 could not be  effectively whittled  down by a sweep of section 6C. It is  now well  settled by  a catena  of decisions  of this Court that  unless the  Legislature by  enacting a competent legislative provision retrospectively removes the substratum or foundation  of any judgment of a competent court the said

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judgment would  remain binding  and  operative  and  in  the absence of  such  a  legislative  exercise  by  a  competent legislature the  attempt to upset the binding effect of such judgments rendered  against  the  parties  would  remain  an incompetent and forbidden exercise which could  be dubbed as an  abortive   attempt  to  legislatively  overrule  binding decisions of  courts.  A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case  of Shri  Prithvi Cotton  Mills Ltd,  and  Anr,  v. Broach Borough  Municipality  and  Ors.  (1970)  I  SCR  388 speaking  through  Hidayatullah,  CJ.,  made  the  following pertinent observations in this connection :      ""When a  legislature sets  out  to      validate a  tax declared by a court      to be  illegal collected  under  an      ineffective or  an invalid law, the      cause   for    ineffectiveness   or      invalidity must  be removed  before      validation  can  be  said  to  take      place  effectively.      The   most      important condition  of  course  is      that the  legislature must  possess      the power  to impose the tax for if      it does  not the  action must  ever      remain  ineffective   and  illegal.      Granted legislative  competence  it      is not sufficient to declare merely      that the  decision in  exercise  of      judicial  power   or  exercise.   A      court’s decision  must always  bind      unless the  conditions on  which it      is  based   are  so   fundamentally      altered that the decision could not      have  been  given  in  the  altered      circumstances."      Another Constitution Bench of this Court in Madan Mohan Pathak and  another etc  etc. v.  Union of  India and others (1978) 2 SCC 50 speaking through Bhagwati,J. for himself and Krishan Iyer  and Desai,  JJ.,  in  para  8  of  the  Report considered the incompetent attempt made by the Parliament in enacting  Life   Insurance  Corporation   (Modification   of Settlement) Act,  1976 by  which a  binding decision  of the Calcutta High  Court issuing  writ of  mandamus of bonus for the year  April 1  1975 to  March 31,  1976 was sought to be nullified.  It   was  held   that  such   an  exercise   was incompetent.      In the  case of A.V. Nachane and Anr. etc etc. v. Union of India  and Anr,  (1982) 1  SCC 205 a three judge Bench of this  Court   referred  the   aforesaid  decision   of   the Constitution Bench  speaking through Bhagwati.J.. in para 12 of the Report.      This very  question was  once again examined by a three member Bench of this Court to which one of us N.P. Singh, J. was a  party and  who spoke  for the  Bench in  the case  of Bhubaneshwar Singh  and Anr.  v. Union  of  India  and  Ors. (1994) 6  SCC 77.  In para  11 of  the Report  the following pertinent observations were made:      " From time to time controversy has      arisen as  to whether the effect of      judicial pronouncements of the High      Court or  the Supreme  Court can be      wiped   out    by   amending    the      legislation   with    retrospective      effect.   Many such  Amending  Acts      are   called    Validating    Acts,      validating the  action taken  under

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    the   particular    enactments   by      removing the  defect in  the statue      retrospectively  because  of  which      the statue  or the  part of  it had      ben  declared   ultra  vires   Such      exercise  has  been  held  by  this      Court   as   not   to   amount   to      encroachment on  the judicial power      of the  courts.   The  exercise  of      rendering ineffective the judgments      or orders  of competent  courts  by      changing   the    very   basis   by      legislation is  a well-known device      of  validating   legislation.  This      Court has  repeatedly  legislation.      This Court  has repeatedly  pointed      out    that     such     validating      legislation which removes the cause      of   the   invalidity   cannot   be      considered to be an encroachment on      judicial power.   At  the same time      any action in exercise of the power      under any  enactment which has been      declared to  be invalid  by a court      cannot   be   made   valid   by   a      validating Act  by merely saying so      unless the  defect is  removed with      retrospective      effect.      The      validating legislation  must remove      the cause of invalidity.  Till such      defect or  the  lack  of  authority      pointed out  by the  court under  a      statute   is    removed   by    the      subsequent      enactment      with      retrospective effect,  the  binding      nature of the judgment of the court      cannot be ignored."      The same  view was  once again reiterated by this Court in the case of Comorin Match Industries (p) Ltd. v. state of Tamil Nadu  (1996) 4  SCC 281.   In S.R. Bhagwat and Ors. v. State of  Mysore (1995)  6  SCC  16,  a  three  judge  Bench speaking through  one of  us, S.B.  Majmudar, J.,  made  the following observations in para 12 of the Report:      "It is now well settled by a catena      of decisions  of this  Court that a      binding   judicial    pronouncement      between the  parties cannot be made      ineffective with  the  aid  of  any      legislative  power  by  enacting  a      provision   which    in   substance      overrules such  judgment and is not      in  the   realm  of  a  legislative      enactment which displaces the basis      or foundation  of the  judgment and      uniformly applies  to  a  class  of      persons concerned  with the  entire      subject sought  to  be  covered  by      such    an     enactment     having      retrospective effect."      In view  of this settled legal  position, therefore, it must be held that Section 6C could not be pressed in service by  the   original  appellant  for  displacing  the  binding judgments rendered  by the  Tribunal the High Court and this Court in  the earlier  tenancy proceedings wherein his claim for tenancy  of the  suit land cane to be repelled and those

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judgments have  become final  and binding and were no in any way legally  displaced by any competent piece of legislation by the  Kerala Legislature:  Those judgments  remained fully operative against  the appellant  and  consequently  on  the principle of res judicata the appellant could not once again re-agitate the question about his tenancy.      However learned  senior counsel Shri Sukumaran, for the appellant tried  to get  over this  difficulty in the way of the appellant  by placing  reliance on  two decision of this Court. In  Mathura Prasad  Bajoo Daiswal and Ors.v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy 1970 (1) SCC 613 a three judge Bench of this Court speaking  through J.C. Shah.J.. took the view that the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure. And that  a decision on an issue of law will be res judicata in a  subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of  action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the  provisions proceeding,  but not when cause of action is different.  He invited  our attention specially to para 7 of the  report where in it is observed that where the law is altered since  the earlier  decision, the  earlier  decision will not  operate as  res judicata  between the same parties and it  was obvious that the matter in issue in a subsequent proceeding was  not the  same as in the previous proceeding, because the law interpreted is different. These observations will have  to be appreciated in the light of the controversy which came  up for  consideration  of  this  Court.  In  the aforesaid case  the tenant  of an open land had tried to get standard rent  fixed under the Bombay Rent Act. At that time the land in question was within the territorial jurisdiction of Civil  Court, Borivli,  Greater Bombay. The learned Civil judge took the view that Rent Act was not applicable to open lands which  were let  for construction  of residential  and business premises.  Therefore, the court had no jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Bombay Rent Act to entertain standard rent application.  Subsequently the Bombay High Court took a contrary view and held on the proper construction of Section 6  of   the  Bombay   Rent  Act  that  open  lands  let  for construction  of  buildings  for  residential  and  business purpose also  were covered by the sweep of Section 6 and the Bombay Rent  Act applied to such lands. Taking clue from the said decision  the tenant once again applied for fixation of standard tent  before the  Court of  Small Causes, Bombay as the land  by that  time  had  come  within  the  territorial jurisdiction  of   the   Small   Causes   Court   exercising jurisdiction over  the Greater  Bombay  area.  Question  was whether such  an application  for fixation  of standard rent was barred by res judicata. This Court, disagreeing with the view taken by the High Court that there was such a bar, held that when question of jurisdiction independent of the rights of parties  was on  the anvil the earlier decision would not be res  judicata.   It becomes  obvious that  the  plea  for fixation of standard rent would furnish a recurring cause of action  and   though  earlier   the  Court  might  not  have jurisdiction under the Bombay Rent Act to fix standard rent, if by  a subsequent  decision of  a competent court the Rent Act was  found applicable  the  subsequent  application  for fixation of  standard rent could not be said to be barred by res  judicata  as  the  cause  of  action  itself  would  be different in  that case  being a  subsequent  and  recurring cause of  action. The  tenant could effectively contend that even though  earlier the  standard rent  could not  have ben fixed by  the Court  which held  that  it  had  no  inherent jurisdiction if  subsequently the  Court  was  found  to  be having such  jurisdiction it could fix the standard rent oat least prospectively from the date of such fresh application.

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We fall  to appreciate how that decision can be of any avail to the learned senior counsel for the appellant in the facts of the  present case.   There  is no  question  of  lack  of jurisdiction with  the competent court which earlier decided the plea  of tenancy  under the  very Act  as raised  by the appellant. Not  only the  decision was rendered on merits by competent court  but it  was confirmed  by this  Court.  The cause of  action remained the same, namely status of tenancy of the appellant qua the land and against the plaintiffs. If support of the same cause of action the appellant now wanted to take  advantage of Section 6C which unfortunately for him was having  no retrospective  effect so  as to knock off the substratum of the decisions rendered by the competent courts earlier.   Consequently the  ratio of  the decision  of this Court in  Mathura Prasad’s  case (supra)  cannot be  of  any avail to  the appellant  on the  facts of  the present case. Reliance was  then placed  by learned senior counsel for the appellant on  the decision of this Court in the case of Nand Kishore v.  State of  Punjab (1995)  6 SCC 614. In that case the  provision   under  which   earlier  the  appellant  was compulsorily retired  from service was subsequently found to be unconstitutional.  Question was  whether  thereafter  the challenge to  compulsory  retirement  could  be  effectively levelled  by  the  appellant  or  not  and  whether  such  a challenge was  barred by  the principles  of  res  judicata. Punchhi, J.,  speaking for  a two member Bench of this Court held that  once the  constitutionality of  the provision was gone into  by the  Supreme Court  and once the provision was struck down  the hurdle in the way of the appellant vanished and  consequently   the  suit   filled  by   the   appellant challenging the  compulsory retirement  could not be said to be barred  by the  principles of res judicata. It becomes at once clear  that once  this Court  struck down the concerned rule  permitting   compulsory  retirement  of  a  Government servant the  very basis  of the  earlier judgment  upholding such an exercise got knocked off and was totally obliterated from the  Statute Book.  Consequently the very foundation of the judgment  vanished.  Such  a  judgment  would  obviously become baseless  lacking the  very foundation  on  which  it could operate.   The  very foundation of an earlier judgment can be  displaced by either competent legislature enacting a retrospective provision  for that  purpose or by a competent court deciding  the concerned  legal provision on which such judgment is  based as  ultra vires  and void. In either case the very  foundation and legal substitution of such judgment will vanish  retrospectively. In such an eventuality the law could be  said to  have been totally displaced form the very inception of  enactment of  such a  law and consequently any judgment based  on such  a  non-existing  law  as  found  in retrospect could  obviously lack  efficacy and consequential force of  res judicata.   Learned  senior  counsel  for  the appellant could  have got  effective help from the aforesaid ratio of  this judgment  if any  competent court  had struck down  Section   74  of   the  Kerala  Land  Reforms  Act  as unconstitutional and  had not  resorted to  the  process  of prospective  overruling   if  such   competent  court  could otherwise do  so.  But such are not the facts of the present case.   Section 74  has operated  untouched  form  the  very inception when  it saw the light of the day along with other provisions of  the Act  on 1st  April 1964.   Therefore,  it effectively  supplied  a  valid  legal  foundation  for  the earlier judgments rendered before 1.1.1970 to operate.  That foundation has  remained untouched  and Section  6C has  not tinkered with  it. It  must therefore  be held  that earlier judgment as  confirmed by  this Court  against the appellant

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negativing his  plea under  the Tenancy  Act  have  remained fully operative  and will  constitute a  valid  bar  of  res judicata against the present plea of the appellant centering round Section  6C. The  High Court with respect was in error in taking  the view  that because  of Section 6C the earlier judgment would  not  operate  as  res  judicata.  Once  that conclusion is  reached the  decision of  the High Court will have to  be confirmed on this ground alone.  Consequently on entirely a  different  line  of  reasoning  we  confirm  the judgment of  the learned Single Judge of the High Court.  In that view  of the  matter we  do not deem it fit to consider the further  question whether even if Section 6C operated in favour of  the appellant  on merits he would have no case as the lease  was created  in his  favor  by  a  life  interest holder.   Learned senior  counsel for  the appellant  had  a serious grievance  about the  reasoning adopted  by the High Court on  this aspect.   It  is not necessary for us to rest our judgment  on consideration  of this aspect as no further enquiry in  the matter  survives for consideration in favour of the  original appellant  once the  earlier judgments  are found to  operate as res judicata debarring his from raising such a  contention during execution proceedings taken out by the respondents for fixation of mesne profits.      In  the   result  this  appeal  fails  and  will  stand dismissed in  view of  our aforesaid findings.  In the facts and circumstances  of the  case there will be no order as to costs.