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  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

   CIVIL APPEAL No.2837 OF 2009  (Arising out of SLP(C)No.13576 of 2008)  

K.S.POOMARI                                           .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

A.UMARSHA & ORS.                                      ....RESPONDENT(S)

           O  R  D  E  R

Leave granted. In our view, this appeal has no merit as all the courts below concurrently found that  

the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act has no application in the facts and circumstances of  

the present case.  The same question was decided by this Court in  Mylapore Club Vs.  State of  

T.N.& Anr., (2005) 12 SCC 752, paragraphs 10 and 15 of which are quoted below :-

“10.It was argued that the object of the Parent Act was to ensure that the  expectation of  a tenant,  who has put up a superstructure,  that  he would not be  evicted is not belied, and that pulling down of the superstructure which was the only  option available to a lessee if the lease did not contain a contract to the contrary,  would result in congestion causing serious detriment to public health. This object  would  not  be  subserved  by  exempting  leases  of  lands  belonging  to  religious  institutions or religious charities.  It is a matter for the legislature to balance the  object  of  the  parent  Act  with  the  object  of  protecting  the  rights  of  religious  institutions and religions charities and on the basis of the material available to the  legislature, the decision to exempt the buildings of such religious institutions  and  religious  charities has been taken.  The

power to legislate is a plenary power vested in the legislature and unless those who  challenge the legislation clearly establish that their fundamental rights under the  Constitution are affected or that the legislature lacked legislative competence, they  would  not  succeed  in  their  challenge  to  the  enactment  brought  forward  in  the  wisdom of the legislature. Conferment of a right to claim the benefit of a statute,  being not a vested right, the same could be withdrawn by the legislature which made  the enactment.  It could not be said that the Amendment Act lacked either legislative  competence or that it is unconstitutional.

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15.It is open to the legislature to bring in a law that has  retrospective operation.  That position is not disputed.  When it affects the vested  rights or accrued rights, that question will have to be considered in that context.  But the right to take advantage of a statute has been held to be  not an accrued right.  The matter has been discussed in detail in M. Varadaraja  Pillai Vs. Salem Municipal Council   by the Madras High Court after referring to  Abbot Vs. Minister for Lands and the subsequent decisions.  By Section 3, which  was in pari materia with Section 9 of the Amending Act of 1960, the legislature had  intended that pending proceedings should be affected.  Even otherwise,  once the  applicability of the Act itself is withdrawn, no relief can be granted to a person who  could have been or who was earlier a  beneficiary  under  that  enactment, after  such  withdrawal.  Here, the Section provides that even if  some steps have been taken  pursuant to the claim by the tenant under Section 9 of the Parent Act,the proceeding  cannot be continued in view of the exemption enacted in favour of the institutions.  But the legislature has taken care to save the concluded transactions by providing  that  nothing  contained in  the  Section  shall  be  deemed to  invalidate  any  suit  or  proceeding in which a decree or order passed has been  executed  or  satisfied  in full  before the said date.   Reading Section 3 of the Amending Act 2 of 1966, it could not be said that it is a  legislative intervention with a judicial decision. The proviso has saved concluded  transactions based on judicial adjudications. All that Section 3 does is to make it  explicit  that the amendment is intended to apply to pending proceedings.  In the  context of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, unless it is shown that any right has  accrued to the claimant under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, such a provision  making it clear that the Act could not be applied any more to pending proceedings is  not in any way invalid or incompetent.  Unless the proceedings have concluded and  the rights of the  landlord has passed to the tenant, no right accrues to the tenant.  He is only in the  process of acquiring a right, the process having been set in motion at his instance.  When  pending  proceedings  are  affected  by  an  amendment,  it  is  open  to  the  legislature to provide that the said process cannot continue.   That alone has been  done by Section 3 of  the  Amending Act  of  1996.    As far  as  concluded judicial  proceedings  are  concerned  and  cases  where  orders  for  possession  have  been  executed or decrees satisfied in full before the date of the amendment, they have  been saved by the proviso thereby ensuring that there was no interference by the  legislature with judicial proceedings which had reached a conclusion, even though  that judicial proceeding related to a religious or charitable institution exempted by  the amendment from the purview of the Parent Act.  We are, therefore, not in a  position to find any merit in challenge to Section 3 of the amending Act.”  

Mr.A.T.M.Rangaramanujam,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant-tenant  submits  that  the  super  structure  made by  the  appellant  on  the  disputed  land  

should be allowed to be removed.  On perusal of the orders passed by the Courts below, it appears  

that such order for removal of super structure has already been granted and no further direction  

need to be given.    

Accordingly, we find no merit in this appeal and the same stands dismissed.  There will be no

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order as to costs.

Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, we grant nine months' time  

to the appellant to vacate the premises in question subject to filing of usual undertaking in this  

Court within four weeks from this date.  

                   .............................J.                               ( TARUN CHATTERJEE )

                   .............................J.                               ( H.L.DATTU )

NEW DELHI; APRIL 27, 2009.