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PETITIONER: K.RAMANATHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/02/1985

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) VARADARAJAN, A. (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  660            1985 SCR  (2)1028  1985 SCC  (2) 116        1985 SCALE  (1)510

ACT:      Constitution of India 1950, Arts 14, 19 (1) (2) (p) and 301       Essential  Commodities Act,  1955, ss. 3 (1) & (2) and 5-Power under  sub-s. (2)-Whether  general in  nature-Sub-s. (2)-Whether confers  any fresh power-Whether illustrative of power conferred  by sub-s  (1)-Cl. (d) of sub-s. (2)-Whether contains specific power-Making of Orders by State Government under cls.  (a) to  (f) of  sub-s. 2-Source of power-Whether flows from  sub-s. (1) - Delegation of-By notification under s. 5       Essential Commodities-Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order. 1982-Cl. 3 (1A). issued by State Government under s.  3 read with Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) Order,  S. R.  800 dt.  June  9  1978-Placing  ban  on transport, movement  or otherwise  carrying of  Paddy out of certain specified  are as  in the Stale-Whether in excess of delegated powers  -Whether violative  of Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) and 301,

HEADNOTE:      Section 3  (2) (d)-Whether  regulating includes  in the context prohibiting.      Interpretation of  statutes-Whether some  words may  be used in different senses in the Same sentence.      Words and  phrases-Regulation  and  Prohibiting-Meaning and scope of.      Due to  failure of  monsoon in the years 1981-82, there was a  steep fall  in production  of  paddy  and  it  became necessary for the State Government of Tamil Nadu to build up its  buffer  stocks  for  distribution  through  the  public distribution   system   throughout   the   State.   ID   the circumstances, the State Government had no other alternative but to  introduce a  monopoly procurement scheme with a view to procure the maximum stock of paddy by banning purchase by traders. This  was in addition to compulsory levy on dealers of paddy  and rice  to the  extent of 50% under cl. 5 (1) of the Tamil  Nadu Paddy  & Rice  (Regulation of  Trade) Order, 1974. 1029      In exercise  of the  powers conferred under s. 3 of the

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Essential Commodities  Act, 1955 read with the Government of India, Ministry  of Agriculture  (Department or  Food) Order GSR 800 dated Juno 9, 1978 issued under s. 5 of the Act with the prior  concurrence of the Government of India, the State Government accordingly  promulgated  the  Tamil  Nadu  Paddy (Restriction on  Movement) Order,  1982 on October 22, 1982. Clause 3 (1A) of the Order prohibited transport, movement or otherwise carrying  of paddy  outside the  State by  road or rail or  otherwise except  under and  in accordance with the conditions of  a permit  issued by  an officer authorised in that behalf.  By GOMS  No. 293  dated May 11, 1982 the State Government introduced  sub-cl. (IA)  to cl.  3 of  the Order which prohibited  transport; movement  or otherwise carrying of paddy  outside places  notified by  cl. 3 of the Order by road or rail or otherwise. Thereafter, on June 20, 1983, the State Government  made a  further  amendment  to  the  newly inserted  cl.  3  (IA)  which  clamped  a  complete  ban  on transport,   movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside the  Thanjavur  District,  Chidambaram  and  Kattumannarkoil Taluks in  South  Arcot  District  and  Musiri,  Kulithalai, Lalgudi  and   Tiruchirapalli  Talulks   in   Tiruchirapalli District.      The appellant  along with  other traders  assailed  the constitutional validity  of cl.  3 (IA)  of  the  Order,  as amended, which  placed a complete ban on transport, movement or  otherwise   carrying  of  paddy  outside  the  Thanjavur district  and  the  aforesaid  Taluks  in  South  Arcot  and Tiruchirapalli districts  as being  violative of  Arts.  14, 19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution The High Court repelled the contentions and dismissed the writ petitions.       In  the  appeal,  the  appellant  contended  that  the impugned cl.  3 (IA)  of the Order was ultra vires the State Government on  two grounds,  namely: (1) The delegation of a specific power  under s  3 (2)  (d)  of  the  Act  to  State Government by  the aforesaid notification dated June 9, 1978 issued by  the Central  Government under  s. 5 of the Act to regulate storage,  transport, distribution, disposal etc. Of an essential  commodity, in relation to foodstuffs, does not carry with  it The  general power  of the Central Government under sub-s.  (1) of  s.  3  to  regulate  or  prohibit  the production, supply  and distribution  thereof and  trade and commerce therein.  And (2)  That the word regulating’ in cl. (d) of  s. 3  (2) of  the Act does not take in ’prohibiting’ and  as   such  there  cannot  be  a  total  prohicition  on transport, movement  or otherwise  carrying of  paddy out of the areas  in question under (d) but only regulation of such activities in  the course  of trade and commerce by grant of licences or permits.       Dismissing the appeal, ^        HELD:   1.  Sub-s  (2)  of  s.  3  of  the  Essential Commodities Act,  1955 offers  no fresh powers but is merely illustrative of  the general  poweres by  sub-s. (1) of s. 3 without exhausting  the subjects  in relation to such powers can be exercised. Although cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 with a  specific power,  the  general  power  to  issue  the impugned 1030 order flows  from the  provisions of sub-s. (1) of s.3 which stands delegated  to the  State Government  by virtue of the notification issued under s. S of the Act. [1042H; 1043B]       Santosh  Kumar Jain  v. The State, [I951] SCR 303, and Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, LR [1945]] 72 IA 241, followed.       Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi v. Collector of Bulsar & Ors. AIR 1981 Guj. 87. approved.

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     Atulya  Kumar v. Director of Procurement & Supply, AIR 1953 Cal. 548, approved. _       Tarakdas  Mukherjee v.  State of West Bengal, [1978] 2 Cal. L.J.  398 and  Lila Biswas  v. State  of  West  Bengal, [1918-89] CWN 539, approved.       Sujan  Singh v.  State of  Haryana, AIR 1998 Pun, 363, State of  Uttar Pradesh v. Suraj Bhan, AIR 1972 All. 401 and Bejoy Kumar  Routrai v. State of Orissa AIR [1976] Orr. 138, overruled.            2. The word ’regulation’ cannot have any rigid or inflexible meaning   as  to  exclude  ’prohibiting’.  It  is difficult to  define  the  word  ’regulate’  as  having  any precise meaning. It has different shades of meaning and must take its  colour from the context in which it is used having regard to the purpose and object of the legislation, and the Court must  necessarily keep  in view the mischief which the legislature seeks to remedy. The question essentially is one of degree  and it is impossible to fix any definite point at which ’regulation’  ends and  prohibition’ begins. The power to regulate  does  not  necessarily  include  the  power  to prohibit,  and   ordinarily  the   word  ’regulate’  is  not synonymous with  the word  ’prohibit’. This  is  true  in  a general sense  and in  the sense that mere regulation is not the same  as absolute prohibition. But the power to regulate carries with  it  full  power  over  the  thing  subject  to regulation and  in obsence  of restrictive  words, the power must be  regarded as  plenary over  the entire  subject.  It implies the  power to rule, direct and control and- involves the adoption  of a  rule or guiding principle to be followed or the  making of a rule with respect to the   subject to be regulated. The  power to regulate implies the power to check and  may   imply  the   power  to   prohibit  under  certain circumstances,  as   where  the  best  or  only  efficatious regulation consists of suppression.                                            [1045G-H; 1046E-F       Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, [1960] 2 SCR 361           Slaitery v. Naylor, LR [1888] AC 446 and Municipal Corporation of  the City  of Toronto  v. Virgo, LR [1896] AC 88, Corpus  Juris Secundum,  vol. 76 at p. 611 and Webster s Third New  International Dictionary,  vol  II,  p  1913  and Thorter Oxford  Dictionary, vol.  II,  3rd  edn.,  p.  1784, referred to          State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, [1967] 2 SCR 361, distinguish and limited. 1031       The source of power to issue an order under cl. (d) of sub-s. (2)  of A  s. 3  of the  Act being  relatable to  the general powers of the Central Government under sub-s. (1) of s. 3,  there is  no justification  for giving  a  restricted meaning to  the word  ’regulating,’ in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s.  3 of  the Act  so as  not to take in ’prohibiting’. A word may  be used  in  two  different  senses  in  the  same section. [1050B-C]       The  Act is  a piece of socio-economic legislation and its predominant  object is  to provide  in the  interests of general public,  for the  control of  the production, supply and distribution  of, and  trade and  commerce  in,  certain essential commodities.  Such control  can be  exercised in a variety of ways otherwise than by placing compulsory levy on the producers, for example, by fixing a controlled price for foodstuffs, by placing a limit on the stock of foodstuffs to be held  by a wholesale dealer, commission agent or retailer by placing  sales except  in certain  specified manners etc. All these arc nothing but regulatory measures. Placing a ban on  inter-State   or  inter-State   movement  or  export  of

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foodstuffs is  one of  the ways  to regulate and control and such  ban  prevents  the  spiral  rise  in  prices  of  such foodstuffs   by   artificial   creation   of   shortage   by unscrupulous traders.  The various  Control Orders issued by the Central  Government under  sub-s. (1) of s- 3 of the Act or by  the State  Governments under s. 3 read with s. 5 have introduced a  system of  checks and  balances to achieve she object  of   the  legislation   i.e.  to   ensure  equitable distribution and  availability of  essential commodities  at fair prices.  Special public  interest in  an industry e. g. that it  is engaged in the production of a commodity vitally essential to  the community,  may justify  the regulation of its production,  supply and  distribution and  its trade and commerce, provided  such regulation is not arbitrary and has a rational  nexus with  the object  sought to  be  achieved. [1048C-D; 1047F-H; 1048A]       If one part of the country or of a State is faced with a famine  or even  acute shortage  of foodstuffs.  it is not unreasonable for  the Government  to acquire foodstuffs from the surplus  areas and  distribute the  same in  areas where they  are  most  needed.  Since  there  was  steep  fall  in production of   paddy  due to  failure of monsoons the State Government of  Tamil Nadu was justified not only to reimpose compulsory levy  on the  producers of paddy to the extent of 50% but  also to  introduce a scheme for a monopoly purchase of paddy  by the  Government with  a view  to build  up  its buffer   stock   for   distribution   through   the   public distribution system throughout: the State. [1049E-G]       State  of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone & Ors. [19811 2 SCC 205, C.  K Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu [1975] 2 SCR 715, Krishan Lal  Praveen kumar  & Ors.  v. State  of Rajasthan & Ors., [1981  4 SCC  550, Suraj  Mal Kailash Chand &  Ors, v. Union of  India & Ors., [1981] 4 SCC 554 and Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan  & Ors.  v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 1137, relied on. 1032

JUDGMENT:       CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeal No. 11417 of 1983       From  the Judgment  and Order dated 14. 9. 1983 of the High Court of Madras in W. P. N. 4615 of 1983.          K. Ram Kumar for the Appellant.       A. V. Rangam for the Respondents          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by              SEN,  J. This  appeal by special leave directed against the  judgment and  order of  the Madras  High  Court dated  September   14,  1983   raises  a  question  of  some complexity. The  question is as to whether cl. 3 (IA) of the Tamil Nadu  Paddy  (Restriction  on  Movement)  Order,  1982 issued by  the State  Government under  s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act,  1955 read  with the  Government of  India, Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) Order, a. s. R, 800 dated  June 9,  1978, with  the prior concurrence of the Government of  India, was  ultra vires  the State Government being in  excess of  its delegated  powers. That  depends on whether the  delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of sub-s. (2)  of s. 3 of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by  the Central Government under s. 5 to regulate the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption  of an  essential commodity,  in relation  to foodstuffs, carries  with  it  the  general  powers  of  the Central Government  under sub-s.  (1) of  s. 3 of the Act to

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regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution of essential  commodities and  trade and  commerce  therein. There is  a conflict  OF opinion  on this  question  between different High  Courts. Hence  we thought  it fit  to  grant special leave  and heard the appeal on merits. After hearing the parties,  we dismissed  the appeal  by  an  order  dated December  5,   1983  for  reasons  to  follow.  The  reasons therefore are set out below .       Briefly  stated, the  facts are these. In the State of Tamil Nadu,  there has  been a  system of  imposing levy  on purchase of  paddy by  traders in vogue since the year 1970. This was  imposed by  cl. 3  (5) (i) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice  (Licensing, Regulation & Disposal of Stock) Order, 1968 issued  by the  State Government  under s. 3 of the Act with the prior concurrence of the Government 1033 Of India.  Cl. 3  (5) (i)  empowered the State Government to impose A  and collect  upto 50% of the stocks by way of levy on purchases  of  paddy  by  traders  on  payment  of  price specified from  time to time. The said Order was replaced by the Tamil  Nadu Paddy  and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974 issued under s. 3 of the Act with the prior concurrence of the Government of India. Cl. 5 (1) of this Order empowers the State  Government to impose and collect levy upto 50% of the purchase  of paddy  and rice  by the  dealers other than retail dealers  and they  are paid  prices notified  by  the Government. This  clause was  subsequently amended  in 1976. The power  to impose  and collect  levy on  the purchase  of paddy and  rice was  exercised by the State Government under s. 3  of the  Act with  a view  to  procure  the  stock  for distribution of  rice to about 118 lakhs family card-holders throughout the  State through  nearly  17,  800  fair  price shops. A  review of the food situation in the latter half of 1980 and  the beginning  of 1981  revealed that the stock of paddy and  rice with the Government was not adequate to meet the requirements  under the  public distribution system. The State  Government  in  the  Food  &  Cooperation  Department accordingly, decided to enforce the levy on traders by G. O. Ms. No.  33 dated January 1, 1981 and to collect 40% levy on the purchases  of paddy  and rice  by dealers even though it had the  power to impose levy upto 50% at prices fixed by it from time  to time. Thereafter, the Government in the Food & Cooperation Department by G. O. MS. No. 765 dated October 1, 1981 increased  the levy from 40% to 50% from kuruvai season 1981.       There  was a  failure of  monsoon in  the State in the years 1981-82  and the  off take  of rice  in the fair price shops had  increased from  34,000 tonnes  in April to 85,000 tonnes in  December  1982.  Due  to  failure  of  south-west monsoon in  the year  1982 and consequent poor rainfall, the storage level  in the  Mettur reservoir fell. As a result of this there was a steep fall in kuruvai cultivation of paddy. In  Thanjavur   district  alone,   the  acreage   of   paddy cultivation was  reduced from 4. 5 lakhs acres to 2.97 lakhs acres. Added  to this,  the north-east  monsoon in the State also failed  causing a  serious fall  in the  production  of paddy. In  the circumstances,  the State  Government in  the Food &  Cooperation Department  had no other alternative but to introduce  a monopoly  procurement scheme of paddy with a view to  procure the  maximum stock  of paddy by banning the purchases by traders. 1034       In  exercise of the powers conferred under s. 3 of the Essential Commodities  Act, 1955 read with the Government of India, Ministry  of Agriculture  (Department of Food) Order,

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G. S.  R. 800 dated June 9, 1978, with the prior concurrence of the Government of India, the State Government promulgated the Tamil  Nadu Paddy  (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1982 on October 22, 1982. Cl. 3 (1) of the Order provides:                "No person shall transport, move or otherwise      carry or  prepare or  attempt  to  transport,  move  or      otherwise carry,  or aid  or  abet  in  the  transport,      movement or  otherwise carrying  of paddy  outside  the      State by  road/rail or  otherwise except  under and  in      accordance with the conditions of a permit issued by an      authorized officer."       On  January 22,  1983, the State Government Department issued  G.  O.  MS.  No.  42  for  purchase  of  the  entire marketable surplus  of paddy  in Thanjavur  District by  the Government through the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation as an  agent of  the Government.  On February   , 1982,  the State Government  in  the  Food  &  Co-operation  Department issued another G. O. Ms. No. 84 extending the provision made with  regard   to  Thanjavur  district  of  Chidambaram  and Kattumannarkoil taluks  in South  Arcot district and Musiri, Kulithalai,  Lalgudi   and  7   Tiruchirapalli   taluks   in Tiruchirapalli district.       On  May 11,  1983, the  State Government in the Food & Co-operation Department issued G. O. Ms. No. 293 introducing sub-cl. (1A)  to cl.  3 of the Order. The newly inserted cl. (IA) is as follows:                "No person shall transport, move or otherwise      carry or  prepare or  attempt  to  transport,  move  or      otherwise carry,  or aid  or  abet  in  the  transport,      movement or  otherwise carrying  of paddy  outside  the      places notified  under Clause 3 of the Tamil Nadu Paddy      & Rice  (Restriction of Rates) Order, 1974 by road/rail      or otherwise."       Thereafter,  on June 20, 1983, the State Government in the Food & Cooperation Department by G. O. Ms. No 413 made a further amendment  to the  newly introduced  sub-cl. (1A) of cl. 3. The amended cl. (IA) of cl. 3 is follows: 1035                "No person shall transport, move or otherwise      carry or  prepare or  attempt  to  transport,  move  or      otherwise carry,  or aid  or  abet  in  the  transport,      movement or  other wise  carrying of  paddy outside the      Thanjavur  District,  Chidambaram  and  Kattumannarkoil      Taluks in  South Arcot District and Musiri, Kulithalai,      Lalgudi and  Tiruchirapalli  Taluks  in  Tiruchirapalli      District."        These   various  orders  were  issued  by  the  state Government in  exercise of  the powers  conferred by s. 3 of the Act  read with  the Government  of  India,  Ministry  of Agriculture (Department  of Food)  Order, G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 which is set out below: C           "MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURAL AND IRRIGATION                     (DEPARTMENT OF FOOD)                            ORDER                               New Delhi, the 9th June, 1978.       G. S. R. 800-In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 5 of  the Essential  Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), and in supersession  of the  Order of the Government of India in the late Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) No. G. S. R.  316 (E)  dated  the  20th  June,  1972,  the  Central Government hereby directs that the powers conferred on it by sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the said Act to make orders to provide for the  matters specified  in cls. (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h),  (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-s. (2) thereof shall, in relation to  foodstuffs  be  exercisable  also  by  a  State

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Government subject to the conditions-      (1)      that such powers shall be exercised by a State      Government subject  to such  directions, if any, as may      be issued by the Central Government in this behalf;      (2)      that before  making an  order relating  to any      matter  specified  in the said cls. (a), (c) or (f) or in regard to distribution or disposal of foodstuffs to places outside the State or  in regard  to  regulations  or  transport  of  any foodstuffs, under  the said  cl (d),  the  State  Government shall also  obtain the  prior  concurrence  of  the  Central Government and 1036      (3)      that in making an order relating to any of the      matter  specified   in  the  said  cl.  (i)  the  State      Government  shall   authorize  only   an   officer   of      Government.                                         Sd/-K. Balakrishnan,                     Dy. Secretary to the Government of India                           (No. 3 (Genl) (1)/78-D&R (1) 59)."            The appellant and various other agriculturists of Thanjavur district  and  the  aforesaid  traditionally  rice growing areas  of South  Arcot and Thiruchirapalli districts challenge the  constitutional validity  of cl. 3 (1A) of the Order placing  a complete  ban on the transport, movement or otherwise carrying  of paddy  outside Thanjavur district and the aforementioned taluks of South Arcot and Thiruchirapalli districts by petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High  Court. There were as many as 300 writ petitions in the High  Cort which were disposed of by the judgment under appeal. The  validity of cl 3 (IA) of the Order was assailed on three  main grounds:  (1) Cl. 3 (1A) was wholly arbitrary and  irrational  and  thus  violative  of  Art.  14  of  the Constitution. (2)  Cl. 3 (IA) was in excess of the delegated powers conferred  on the  State Government under s. 3 of the Act by  the aforesaid  G. S. R 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued by the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act. And (3) The total ban  on  movement  of  paddy  from  out  of  Thanjavur district  and  the  aforesaid  taluks  of  South  Arcot  and Thiruchirapalli districts  by cl. 3 (1A) of the Order was an unreasonable  restriction   on  the  freedom  of  trade  and commerce guaranteed under Art. 19 (l) (g) and also infringes the freedom  of inter-State  trade, commerce and intercourse under Art.  301 of the Constitution. The High Court repelled all these contentions.       Shri  P. Govindan  Nair, learned counsel appearing for the  appellant  argued  the  case  with  much  learning  and resource. Learned  counsel with  his usual  fairness did not advance some of the contentions raised before the High Court as they  were apparently  misconceived. He  has confined his submissions to  only two  grounds, namely:  (l)Cl. 3 (IA) of the impugned Order issued by the State Government under s. 3 of the  Act read with G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued by the  Central Government  under s.  5 of  the Act with the prior concurrence  of the  Government of India placing a ban on the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of 1037 paddy from  out of  Thanjavur district,  the two  taluks  of South Arcot  district and the four taluks of Thiruchirapalli district, was  ultra vires  the State  Government  being  in excess of  the  delegated  powers.  It  is  urged  that  the delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s. 3  of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by the Central Government  under s.  5 of  the Act  to regulate the storage,  transport,   distribution,  disposal  etc.  Of  an

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essential commodity,  in relaston  to foodstuffs,  does  not carry with  it the  general power  of the Central Government under sub-s.  (l) of  s.  3  to  regulate  or  prohibit  the production, supply  and distribution  thereof and  trade and commerce therein.  And (2)  The word ’regulating’ in cl. (d) of sub-  s. (2)  of s.  3  of  the  Act  does  not  take  in ’prohibiting’ for  the words  ’regulating’ and ’prohibiting’ denote two  distinct and  separate attributes  of power  and they are  mutually exclusive  Otherwise according to learned counsel, there  was no  point in  the Legislature using both the words ’regulating’ and ’prohibiting’ in sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of  the Act  and the  words ’regulating’ and ’prohibiting’ differently in  various clauses of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is urged that there cannot be a total prohibition on transport, movement or  otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas in question under  cl. (d)  of  subs.  (2)  of  s  3  but  only regulation of  such activities  in the  course of  trade and commerce by grant of licences or permits The learned counsel is fortified  in his  submissions by  the decisions  of  the Punjab, Allahabad  and Orissa  High Courts  in Sujan Singh v State of Haryana,(1) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Suraj Bhan(2) and Bejoy  Kumar  Routrai  v.  State  of  Orissa(3)  and  he questions the  correctness of  the decision  of the  Gujarat High Court  in Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi Collestor of Bulsar& Ors.(4) taking a view to the contrary. We are afraid, we are unable to accept any of the contentions advanced by him.       In  order to  appreciate the  contentions advanced, it would be  convenient  to  set  out  the  relevant  statutory provisions. Sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act is in these terms:                 "3 (1). Power to control production, supply,      distribution etc. Of essential commodities-       (1). AIR [1968] Pun. 363          (2). AIR [.972] Al]. 401          (3). AIR [1976] Orr. 138          (4). [1981] . 87 1038              If the Central Government is of opinion that it      is necessary  or expedient  so to do for maintaining or      increasing supplies  of any  essential commodity or for      securing their  equitable distribution and availability      at  fair   prices,  (or   for  securing  any  essential      commodity for  the defence  of India  or the  efficient      conduct of  military  operations)  it  may,  by  order,      provide for  regulating or  prohibiting the production,      supply and  distribution thereof and trade and commerce      therein."       Sub-s.  (2) of  s. 3  of the Act, insofar as material, lays down:              " 3. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of      the powers  conferred by  sub-s.  (1),  an  order  made      thereunder may provide-      (a) * * * *      (b) * * * *      (c) * * * *      (d)  for regulating  by licences,  permits or otherwise           the storage,  transport,  distribution,  disposal,           acquisition, use  or consumption  of any essential           commodity."       S. S of the Act provides:              "5. Delegation of powers-The Central Government      may, by  notified order, direct that (the power to make      orders or  issue notifications  under s.  3)  shall  in      relation  to   such  matters,   and  subject   to  such      conditions,  if   any,  as  may  be  specified  in  the      direction, be exercisable also by-

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         (a)  such officer  or authority subordinate to the                Central Government, or           (b)   such  State Government  or such  officer  or                authority subordinate to a State Government.          as may be specified in the direction." 1039              The   infirmity  in the  argument lies  in  the erroneous assumption A that the source of power on authority to promulgate  the impugned  Order was  derived by the State Government under  cl.(d) of  sub-s (2) of s. 3 of the Act by virtue  of   the  delegation   of  powers   by  the  Central Governmnent by  the notification  No G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978  under s  5 of  the Act.  The  source  of  power  to promulgate an order of this description is derived from sub- s. (1  of s.  3 of the Act, According to its plain language, the aforesaid notification No. G. S. R. 800 provides that in exercise of  the powers conferred by s. 5 of the Act, and in supersession of the earlier order of the Government of India in the Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Food, No. G. S R 316  dated June  20, 1972,  the Central Government directs that ’the  powers conferred  on it  by sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act’  to make orders to provide for matters specified in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-s.  (2) thereof shall, in relation to foodstuffs, ’be exercisable also  by  a  State  Government  subject  to  the conditions set  out therein’.  There must be some meaningful effect given  to the  words ’the  Central Government  hereby directs that  the powers conferred on it by sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of  the Act to make orders etc.. shall be exercisable also by a  State Government  subject to  the conditions  set  out therein’. On  a plain  construction, the  first part  of the aforesaid notification  in specific  terms provides  for the delegation by  the Central  Government under s. 5 of the Act of the  powers conferred  on it by sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act. That power is general in its terms and authorises inter alia the  promulgation of any order providing for regulating or prohibiting  the production,  supply and distribution of, and trade  and commerce in, any essential commodity, insofar as it  is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing  supplies   or  for   securing  their   equitable distribution and  availability at  fair prices.  The  second part of  the notification  directs that  the power  to  make ’orders thereunder’  i.e. the power under sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the  Act shall be exercisable also by a State Government, in relation  to foodstuffs,  with respect  to ’such matters’ viz. for  the matters  specified in  clauses (a),  (b), (c), (d), (e),  (f), (h), (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-s. (2) thereof and subject  to  ’such  conditions’  set  out  therein.  The aforesaid notification  G. S.  R. 800  dated  June  9,  1978 issued by  the Central Government was strictly in conformity with s.  5 of the Act. Of the three conditions, the one that is material  for our purpose is condition 2 It provides that before making  an order  under cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act in regard to 1040 distribution or disposal of foodstuffs to places outside the State or  in regard  to  regulations  or  transport  of  any foodstuffs, the State Government shall also obtain the prior concurrence of  the Central  Government. It is manifest on a plain reading  that the  aforesaid notification No. G. S. R. 800 dated  June 9,  1978 was strictly in conformity with the requirements of s. 5 of the Act.       Learned  counsel for the appellant however strenuously con tends  that the  delegation of  powers  by  the  Central Government under  s. 5  of the  Act must  necessarily be  in

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relation to  ’such matters’ and subject to ’such conditions’ as may  be specified  in the notification. The whole attempt on the  part of  the learned counsel is to confine the scope and ambit  of the impugned order to cl. (d) of sub-s ( .) of g. 3 of the Act which uses the word ’regulating’ and take it out of  the purview  of sub-s.  (1) of  s. 3  which uses the words ’regulating  or prohibiting’. That is not a proper way of construction  of sub-ss (l) and (2) of s. 3 of the Act in their normal  setting.   The restricted construction of s. 3 contended for  by learned  counsel for  the appellant  would render the  scheme of  the Act wholly unworkable. As already indicated, the  source of  power to  make an  order of  this description is  sub-s. (l)  of s 3 of the Act and sub-s. (2) merely  provides   illustration  for   the  general   powers conferred by  sub-s. (l).  Sub-s. (2)  of s.  3 of  the  Act commences  with   the  words   ’Without  prejudice   to  the generality of  the powers  conferred by  sub-s. (1)’.  It is manifest that  sub-s. (2) of s 3 of the Act confers no fresh powers but  is merely  illustrative of  the  general  powers conferred by  sub-s. (1)  of s.  3  without  exhausting  the subjects in relation to which such powers can be exercised.      The matter  is no  longer  res  integra.  The  question directly arose  for consideration  by this  Court in Santosh Kumar  Jain   v.  The   State  (1).  There,  the  Court  was considering the  validity of  the Sugar  and sugar  Products Control Order, 1947 issued by the then Provincial Government of Bihar  in exercise  of the powers conferred on it by s. 3 of the  Essential Supplies  (Temporary Powers)  Act, 1946 by virtue of the delegation of powers by the Central Government to make  orders in  relation to  foodstuffs under cl. (j) of sub-s. (2)  of s.  3 of  that Act.  Patanjali  Shastri,  J., speaking for  the Court explaining the relevant functions of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 3 of the Act, said:       (1) [1951] S.C.R. 303. 1041              "It is manifest that sub-s. (2) of s. 3 confers      no fur. A the or other powers on the Central Government      than what are conferred under sub-s. (1), for it is "an      order made  thereunder" that may provide for one or two      other of  the matter  specifically enumerated in sub-s.      (2) which are only illustrative, as such enumeration is      "without prejudice  to the  generality  of  the  powers      conferred by  sub-s. (1)".  Seizure of an article being      thus shown to fall within the purview of sub-s. (l), it      must be  competent for  the Central  Government or  its      delegate, the  Provincial Government,  to make an order      for seizure  under  that  sub-section  apart  from  and      irrespective of  the anticipated  contravention of  any      other order as contemplated in cl. (j) of sub-s. (2)."       The Court drew support for this view from the decision of the  Privy Council in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee.(’) The Federal Court  in that  case held  r. 26  of the  Defence of India Rules  made under  cl (j)  of sub-s (2) of s. 3 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 to be ultra vires, which decision was reversed  by the  Privy Council,  The Court  quoted with approval the  following observations  of Lord Thankerton, J. delivering the judgment of Privy Council:                  "In the  opinion of  their  Lordships,  the      function of  sub s.  (2) is merely an illustrative one;      the rule-making  power is  conferred by sub-s. (1), and      "the rules"  which  are  referred  to  in  the  opening      sentence  of   sub-s.  (2)  are  the  rules  which  are      authorized  by,   and  made   under,  sub-s.  (1);  the      provisions of  sub-s (2)  are not restrictive of sub-s.      (1), as,  indeed  is  expressly  stated  by  the  words

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    "without prejudice  to the  generality  of  the  powers      conferred by sub-s (1)."       This  accords with  our view of the purport and effect of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 3 of the Act.        In   Atulya  Kumar   v.  Director  of  Procurement  & Supply(a), the  challenge was to the validity of West Bengal Foodgrains (Intensive  Procurement Order,  1952 issued under s. 3  (1) of  the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 by  virtue of  delegation  of  powers  by  the  Central Government under s. 5 of the Act which was          (1) LR [1945] 72 IA 241.          (2). AIR [1953] Cal. 548. 1042 almost in  identical terms  with s.  5 of the Act. Sinha, J. (as he then was) held that the powers to promulgate the levy order was  derived from  sub-s. (1)  of s  3 of the Act; and that the  power was  general in  terms and  authorized inter alia the  promulgation of any order providing for regulating or prohibiting  the production,  supply and distribution of, and trade  and commerce in, any essential commodity, insofar as it appears necessary or expedient to the State Government for maintaining or increasing supplies or for securing their equitable distribution  and availability at fair prices. The learned Judge  after referring to the Privy Council decision in Sibnath Banerjee’s case and that of this Court in Santosh Kumar Jain’s case, observed :                "Sub-s. (2) of s. 3, commences with the words      "without prejudice  to the  generality  of  the  powers      conferred by sub-s. (1)....etc." This shows that sub-s.      (2) confers  no fresh powers but provides illustrations      of the general powers conferred by sub-s. (1)......" The learned Judge went on to observe:              "This is undoubtedly very incompetent drafting.      But I  think that  the meaning is reasonably clear. The      ’Matters  Specified’  in  sub-s.  (2),  being  "without      prejudice" to the generality of the powers conferred by      sub-s (1)  must be held to include such powers. Thus it      cannot be  said that  the general  powers have not been      conferred upon  the State,  but only those specified in      cls. (a)  to (j)  of sub-s. (2). The only limitation is      with  regard   to  the   kind  of  essential  commodity      concerned. The  State has  been given powers limited to      ’foodstuffs’ only."       Quite  recently, the  Calcutta High  Court in Tarakdas Mukherjee v.  State of  West Bengal(1)  and Lila  Biswas  v. State of  West Bengal  12) following the dictum of Sinha, J. in Atulya Kumar’s case, supra, have held that the delegation of specific powers to issue an impugned order of this nature is derived  from sub-s.  (1) of s. 3 and that the provisions of sub-s.  (2)  thereof  are  merely  illustrative.  It  has further held  that the various clauses of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the  Act cannot  be made  operative independently  by any notification          (1) [1978] 2 Cal. LJ 383          (2) [1978-9] 83 CWN 539 1043 under s.  5 of  the Act  without deriving the general powers under sub-s.  (1) of  s.  3  of  the  Act.  We  are  of  the considered opinion  that the view of the Calcutta High Court accords both  with reason  and principle.  The view  to  the contrary taken  by the  Punjab, Allahabad  and  Orissa  High Courts  in  Sujan  Singh’s.  Suraj  Ban’s  and  Bejoy  Kumar Routrai’s cases,  supra, dose not lay down good law. It must accordingly be  held that  although cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3  of the  Act deals  only with  a  specific  power,  the

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general power  to issue  the impugned  order flows  from the provisions of  sub-h. (1)  of s. 3 which stands delegated to the State  Government by  virtue of  the notification issued under s. S of the Act.       Upon that view, the question as to the construction of the word  ’regulating’ occurring in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of 8.3 of  the Act  does not  really arise.  However, since the question has  been raised  at the  Bar we think it proper to deal with  it. As a matter of construction, Shri P- Govindan Nair, learned  counsel for  the appellant  contends that the words ’regulating’ and prohibiting’ connote two distinct and separate attributes  of power  which are  mutually exclusive and therefore  the word  ’regulating’ used in cl. (d) cannot be given the same meaning as ’prohibiting’. He urges that is A sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to the same  word  occurring  in  different  parts  of  an  Act  of Parliament. For the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of the word ’regulating’ in the context of cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of  s. 3, he has referred to us the different clauses of that sub-section.  A perusal  of the  various clauses (a) to (j) indicates  that while cls. (a), (d) and (g) speak of the power to  prohibit, and  the remaining  cls. (b),  (c), (f), (h), (i),  (ii) and (j) though they do not mention that they are illustrative  of the power to regulate impliedly partake of the  character of  that power.  If the  contention of the learned counsel were to be accepted, it would imply that the Central Government  derives its power under sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of  the Act as the power to promulgate any order providing for regulating  or prohibiting  the production,  supply  and distribution of,  and trade  and commerce  in, any essential commodity insofar as it appears necessary or expedient so to do, for  maintaining or  increasing supplies or for securing their  equitable   distribution  and  availability  at  fair prices. If  the Central  Government were  to make  an  order under sub-s.  (1) in respect of the matters specified in cl. (d), it  may not  only  regulate  or  control  the  storage, transport,  distribution  etc.  Of  an  essential  commodity including the 1044 movement of such foodstuffs by grant of licenses, permits or otherwise, but  also place  a ban  on the  movement of wheat from one  place to  another; but  the State Government under cl. (d) has only a regulatory power in relation thereto i.e. to make  an order  only for regulating the movement of wheat from one  place to another by issue of the permits, licenses or otherwise  as provided for by cl. 3 of the impugned Order but could  not have  issued cl.  3 (IA)  placing  a  ban  on movement of  wheat from  one place  to another.  Although by force of logic one may be driven to that conclusion that the State Government  has  power  to  promulgate  cl  3  of  the impugned Order but not cl. 3 (IA), there is no reason for us to give  such a restrictive meaning to the word ’regulating’ appearing in  cl. (d)  of sub-s.  (2) of s. 3 of the Act. it would seem  that the  rule of construction is clearly y-well recognized that  a word  may be used in two different senses in the same section of an Act.       The  world  ’regulation’  has  not  that  rigidity  of moaning as  never to take in ’prohibition’. I must depend on the context  in which  it is  used in  the statute  and  the object sought  to be achieved by the legislation. For a time different views  were expressed  on the question whether the word  ’regulation’   in  Art.   19(2)  to   19(6)   includes ’prohibition’ till  the Court  in Narendra Kumar v. Union of India(1) answered it in the affirmative.        Shri  P.  Govindan  Nair,  learned  counsel  for  the

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appellant however contends that the word ’regulation’ should not   be    confused   with   the   expression   ’reasonable restrictions’  occurring   in  Art.  19(2)  to  (6)  of  the Constitution and  therefore the  view  t-taken  in  Narendra Kumar’s case  is not  applicable. According to him, the word ’regulation’ in cl. (d) of sub-. (2) of s. 3 of the Act does not take  in ’prohibition’.  He seeks  to draw a distinction between prohibition  or prevention  o-certain activities and their regulation  or governance.  It is said that a power to regulate or  govern would  imply continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed; and to be inconsistent with absolute  prohibition. He  therefore submits that cl. 3 (IA)  of  the  Order  was  ultra  vires  because  the  State Government had  only power under cl. (d) of sub-s, (2) of s. 3 of the Act to regulate production, supply and distribution of, and  trade and  commerce in,  essential commodities like foodstuffs by          (1) [1960] 2 SCR 361. 1045 grant   of    permits,    licenses    or    otherwise,    in contradistinction to  the A  power of the Central Government under sub-s.  (1) of  s. 3  to  regulate  or  prohibit  such production,  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade  and commerce in, essential commodities.       Learned  counsel for  the appellant placed reliance on the decision  of the  Allahabad High  Court in  Suraj Bhan’s case which  proceeds Upon  a decision of this Court in State of Mysore  v. Sanjeeviah(1)  holding that  power to regulate does  not   include  power   to  prohibit  or  restrict.  In Sanjeeviah’s case,  the question  arose whether two provisos framed by  the State  Government under  s. 37  of the Mysore Forest Act,  1900 which  empowered the  making of  rules  to regulate the transit of forest produce which placed absolute prohibition against transportation of forest produce between sunset and  sunrise and  a qualified  prohibition in certain circumstances, was beyond the rule-making power of the State Government. The  contention on behalf of the State was. that the  two   provisos  were  regulatory  and  prohibitory-  In repelling the contention, the Court observed:                  "The power  which the  State Government may      exercise is  the power  to regulate transport of forest      produce, and  not the  power to  prohibit  or  restrict      transport. Prima  facie, a rule which totally prohibits      movement of  forest produce  during the  period between      sunset and sunrise is prohibitory or restrictive of the      right to transport forest produce."       These  observations  do  not  lay  down  any  rule  of universal application.        The  word  ’regulation’  cannot  have  any  rigid  or inflexible meaning  as to  exclude ’prohibition’.  The  word ’regulate’ is  difficult to  define as  having  any  precise meaning. It  is a  word of  broad  import,  having  a  broad meaning, and  is very  comprehensive in  scope. There  is  a diversity of  opinion as  to its meaning and its application to a  particular state  of facts,  some Courts giving to the term a  somewhat restricted,  and  others  giving  to  it  a liberal, construction.  The different  shades of meaning are brought out in Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 76 at p. 611:          (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 361, 1046                "Regulate" is variously defined as meaning to      adjust; to adjust; order, or govern by rule, method, or      established mode; to adjust or control by rule, method,      or established  mode, or  governing principles or laws:      to govern  to govern  by rule; to govern by, or subject

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    to, certain  rules or restrictions; to govern or direct      according to  rule; to  control, govern,  or direct  by      rule or regulations.                  "Regulate" is  also defined  as meaning  to      direct; to  direct by rule or restriction; to direct or      manage according  to certain standards, laws, or rules;      to rule;  to conduct; to fix or establish; to restrain;      to restrict."        See   also:   Webster’s   Third   New   International Dictionary, vol.  II, p. 1913 and Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Vol. II, 3rd edn., p. 1784.       It has often been said that the power to regulate does not  necessarily   include  the   power  to   prohibit,  and ordinarily the  word ’regulate’  is not  synonymous with the word ’prohibit’.  This is true in a general sense and in the sense that  mere regulation  is not  the  same  as  absolute prohibition. At the same time, the power to regulate carries with it  full power over the thing subject to regulation and in absence  of restrictive words, the power must be regarded as plenary  over the  entire subject It implies the power to rule, direct  and control,  and involves  the adoption  of a rule or guiding principle to be followed, or the making of a rule with respect to the subject to be regulated. ’the power to regulate  implies the  power to  check and  may imply the power to  prohibit under certain circumstances, as where the best or  only efficacious regulation consists of suppression It would  therefore appear that the word ’regulation’ cannot have any inflexible meaning as to exclude ’prohibition’. let has different  shades of  meaning and  must take  its colour from the  context in  which it  is used having regard to the purpose and  object of  the legislation,  and the Court must necessarily keep  in view the mischief which the legislature seeks to remedy.       The  question essentially  is one  of degree and it is impossible to  fix any  definite point at which ’regulation’ ends  and   ’prohibition’  begins.  We  may  illustrate  how different minds  have differently  reacted as to the meaning of the  word ’regulate’ depending on the context in which it is used and the purpose and object of the legislation 1047 In Slattery  v. Naylor,(l)  the question  arose  before  the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council whether a bye-law by reason  of   its  prohibition  internment  altogether  in  a particular cemetry,  was ultra  vires because  the Municipal Council had only power of regulating internments whereas the bye-law totally  prohibited them in the cemetry in question, and it was said by Lord Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council:                  "A rule  or bye-law cannot be held as ultra      vires merely  because it  prohibits where  empowered to      regulate, as regulation often involved prohibition."       In  contrast in  Municipal Corporation  of the City of Toronto v.  Virgo,(2) where  the question  for decision  was whether a  section or  a bye-law  prohibiting  hawkers  from plying their  trade, was competently and validity made, Lord Davey delivering  the judgment  of the  Privy Council  while laying down that a power to make a bye law to ’regulate’ and ’govern’ a  trade does not authorize the prohibition of such trade, and added:                  "There is  a marked distinction between the      prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation      or governance  of it, and, indeed, a power to regulate’      and ’govern’  seems to imply the continued existence of      that which is to be regulated or governed."       The predominant object of the Act, as reflected in the

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preamble is  to provide,  in the  interests of  the  general public, for  the  control  of  the  production,  supply  and distribution  of,   and  trade   and  commerce  in,  certain essential  commodities.  It  is  a  piece  of  socioeconomic legislation enacted  in  the  national  interest  to  secure control over the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and  commerce in,  essential commodities.  The various Control Orders  issued by the Central Government under sub-s (1) of  s. 3 of the Act or by the State Government under s 3 read with  s. 5  have introduced  a  system  of  checks  and balances to  achieve the  object of  the legislation i.e. to ensure equitable  distribution and availability of essential commodities at  fair prices.  Special public  interest in an industry e.g.  that it  is engaged  in the  production of  a commodity,       (1) LR [1888] AC 446          (2) LR [1896] AC 88 1048 vitally  essential   to  the   community,  may  justify  the regulation of  its production,  supply and  distribution and its trade  and commerce,  provided such  regulation  is  not arbitrary and has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.      the power  to  regulate  or  prohibit  the  production, supply and  distribution of,  and  trade  and  commerce  in, essential commodities  may be exercised in innumerable ways. One of the ways in which such regulation or control over the production,  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade  and commerce in,  an essential  commodity like foodstuffs may be exercised by  placing a  ban on  inter Slate  or inter-State movement of  foodstuffs to  ensure that  the excess stock of foodstuffs held  by a  wholesale dealer, commission agent or retailer is  not transported  to places outside the State or from one  district to  another with  a view  to maximize the procurement of  such foodstuffs  from  the  growers  in  the surplus areas  for  their  equitable  distribution  at  fair prices in  the deficit  areas. The  placing of  such ban  on export of  foodstuffs across  the State  or from one part of the State  to another  with a  view to  prevent  outflow  of foodstuffs from  a State  which is  a surplus State prevents the spiral  in  prices  of  such  foodstuffs  by  artificial creation of  shortage  by  unscrupulous  traders.  But  such control can be exercised in a variety of ways otherwise than by placing compulsory levy on the producers, for example, by fixing a controlled price for foodstuffs, by placing a limit on the stock of foodstuffs to be held by a wholesale dealer, commission agent,  or retailer,  by prohibiting sales except in certain  specified manner,  etc. These  are  nothing  but regulatory measures.        We   find  no   lawful  justification  for  giving  a restricted meaning  to the  word ’regulating’  in cl. (d) of sub  s.  (2)  of  s.  3  of  the  Act  as  not  to  take  in prohibiting’. In  State of  Tamil Nadu v. M/S Hind Stone and Ors.(’) Chinnappa  Reddy,  J.  referred  with  approval  the observations of  Mathew, J.  in G.K.  Krishnan v.  State  of Tamil Nadu(2)  laying down that the word ’regulation’ has no fixed connotation  and that its meaning differs according to the nature  of that,  thing to  which  it  is  applied.  The learned Judge also observed:               "In modern statutes concerned as they are with      economic and  social activities,  ’regulation’ must, of      necessity,       (1) [l981] 2 SCC 205          (2) [1975] 2 SCR 715 1049

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                receive so  wide an inter-pretation that in      certain situations,  A it  must exclude  competition to      the public sector from the private sector. More so in a      welfare State.  It was pointed out by the Privy Council      in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South wales      [1949] 2  All. ER  755 (PC)-and  we agree with what was      stated therein-that  the problem  whether an  enactment      was  regulatory   or  something   more  or   whether  a      restriction  was   direct  or   only  remote   or  only      incidental involved,  not so  much legal  as political,      social or  economic consideration and that it could not      be  laid  down  that  in  no  circumstances  could  the      exclusion of  competition so  as to  create a monopoly,      either  in   a  State   or  Commonwealth   agency,   be      justified.’’       In  Krishan Lal  Praveen Kumar  &  Ors-  v.  State  of Rajasthan & Ors.,(l) Suraj Mal kailash Chand & ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,(a) and Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan & Ors. v. State  of U.P.  & Ors.(3)  the  Court  has  held  that  a restriction placed  on movement  of wheat  from one State to another and/on  movement  of  wheat  from  one  district  to another under  cl. (d)  of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act, to be regulatory in character.       Surely  when a  part of  the  country  is  verging  on conditions of  acute shortage or even famine, it is expected of the  government to  procure foodstuffs from surplus areas and transport the same for distribution in deficit areas. [D the State  of Tamil  Nadu like  some other  States, the  two things most  essential for  the sustenance of human life are rice and  paddy. It  is amply borne out from the material on record that  due to  the failure of the southwest and north- east monsoons  in successive  years, and the consequent poor rainfall, there  was a steep fall in production of paddy. In the  circumstances,   the  State  Government  had  no  other alternative not  only to  reimpose compulsory  levy  on  the producers of  paddy to  the extent  of  50%%,  but  also  to introduce a  scheme for  a monopoly purchase of paddy by the Government with  a view  to build  up its  buffer stock  for distribution through the public distribution       (1) 11981] 4 SCC 550          (2) [1981] 4 SCC 554          (3) [1982] I SCR 137 1050 system throughout  the State.  If one  part of  the State is faced with a famine or even acute shortage of foodstuffs, it is not unreasonable for the Government to acquire foodstuffs from the  surplus areas  and distribute  the same  in  areas where they  are most needed. The source of power to issue an order under  cl.. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act being relatable tot  he general  powers of  the Central Government under sub-s.  (1) of s. 3, there is no reason for us to give a restricted  meaning to the word ’regulating’ in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2)  of s.  3 of  the  Act  so  as  not  to  take  in prohibiting’.      For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal must fail.  A.P.J.                                    Appeal dismissed. 1051