“REPORTABLE”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 485 OF 2004

K. Ramachandran ….Appellant

Versus

V.N. Rajan & Anr. ….Respondents

J U D G M E N T

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

1. By  this  appeal  the  appellant-appellant  challenges  the  revisional  

judgment of  the High Court whereby the High court has upset the Trial  

Court’s  judgment  acquitting  the  appellant-appellant  and  has  directed  

reconsideration  of  the  matter  by  the  Trial  Court.   The  High  Court  has  

further directed that such reconsideration would be only on the basis of  

evidence already recorded.

2. The appellant-appellant K. Ramachandran was tried for the offence  

under Section 302 as also under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code on  

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the allegation that he, on 18.02.1995, committed murder of his wife Nalini  

@ Latha by hitting her with a wooden log on her head.  The prosecution’s  

case was that the marriage of the appellant-accused and the said Nalini  

took place in 1992 and right from the beginning their marital life was not  

smooth  as  the  appellant-accused  suspected  her  fidelity.   After  their  

marriage, appellant-accused used to live with his wife in a rented house at  

Avadi.  It was the prosecution’s story that neighbours used to hear wailing  

sounds of Nalini and she had also told PW-5, Belamurthy that her fidelity  

was  suspected  by  the  appellant-accused  and  on  that  account,  the  

appellant-accused was not treating her properly.   During the pregnancy,  

the appellant-accused refused to send Nalini to her parent’s house though  

he was pressurised by PW-5 to send her to the house of her father, PW-1.  

The appellant-accused went on to suggest that he was not the father of the  

child which Nalini was bearing and hence she was brought back by PW-1  

to his house.  Later the appellant-accused and his brother, Pandurangan  

took Nalini back to the appellant-accused’s house.  When Nalini was at the  

advanced stage of pregnancy, PW-1 wanted to take her to his house but  

the appellant-accused did not permit that and said that he will take care of  

the confinement and wanted the child to be born in his house.  However,  

ultimately,  the  appellant-accused relented  on account  of  intervention  of  

Belamurthy, PW-5.   

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3. Ultimately,  a  child  was  born  in  the  house  of  her  father.  But  the  

appellant-accused did not go to see the child.  It was only when the child  

was  seven  months  old  that  the  appellant-accused  and  brother  

Pandurangam took Nalini and the child to their house.  In the month of May  

in the year  1994 it  is  reported that  the appellant-accused cut  the Thali  

chain (ornament worn by a married lady) and threw her out of the house.  

One Krishnaveni, PW-4 had also seen the ill-treatment by the appellant-

accused, of his wife.  One Girija who was the household servant of the  

appellant-accused had also seen that.  On 02.05.1994, Nalini was brought  

back by PWs 1 and 2 to their  house and after  about  two months,  the  

appellant-accused and his brother again came and took back her and they  

continued to live with each other for about 4-5 months.  On 17.02.1995,  

when PWs 1 and 2 had gone to the house of appellant-accused on being  

called  by  Nalini  on  phone.   Nalini  told  them  that  she  was  going  to  

Vikravandi.  On the next day, which was a Saturday, PWs 1 and 2 received  

the news of Nalini’s death at 12:30 p.m. and went to Vikravandi.  They saw  

the dead body of Nalini and the injury on her head, on back and all over  

the body.  The matter was reported to the police.  It was revealed during  

the investigation that on the night of 17.02.1995, when PW-7 was sleeping  

in the tea shop, the appellant-accused came to him and asked for the cot.  

He was then accompanied by Nalini and her daughter.  However, on the  

next day in the morning at 7 a.m., PW-7 heard the news of death of Nalini  

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while lighting stove.  Strangely enough, the matter was reported by the  

appellant-accused himself who claimed in the FIR that Nalini went missing  

and ultimately  died.   On that,  the  policy  registered Crime No.  75/1995  

under Section 174, Criminal Procedure Code.  The police found out the  

body in the well which was brought out and post-mortem was conducted in  

Government hospital by Assistant Surgeon, Dr. Bhoomadhu, PW-19.  As  

many as eight injuries were found on the dead body and it was found that  

Nalini had suffered a scull fracture.   

4. After the necessary investigation, the charge-sheet came to be filed  

against  appellant-accused.   During  investigation,  the  appellant-accused  

had agreed to discover the log with which he had hit Nalini.  The charges  

were framed for offence under Section 302 and 201, IPC.  During the trial,  

number  of  witnesses  came  to  be  examined.   The  Sessions  Judge,  

however,  did  not  accept  the  evidence  of  doctor  and  acquitted  the  

appellant-accused  of  all  the  offences.   The  Sessions  Judge  held  

specifically that it was not proved that the appellant-accused had hit Nalini  

with a log.   

5. This judgment of the Sessions Judge was not appealed against by  

the State.  Instead, father of Nalini filed a criminal revision.  This revision  

seems to have been filed and was admitted by the High Court.  It  was  

pending when the State Government filed an appeal against the acquittal  

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of  the  appellant-accused  which  was  delayed  by  801  days.   Strangely  

enough, that condonation of delay application came to be considered by  

the Division Bench of the High Court and the High Court, by its order dated  

05.03.2003, dismissed the condonation application.  Thereby the appeal  

against acquittal could not proceed. Very strangely, at the time when the  

condontion of delay application in filing the appeal was considered by the  

High  Court,  it  was  not  pointed  out  by  the  Government  advocate  on  

criminal, side who appeared for the State, that a revision had already been  

and was pending against the acquittal, at the instance of father of Nalini.  

Now, in fact the State Government was very much a party in that revision  

and was also served.  After all, the said revision was admitted by the High  

Court.   However,  since the Division Bench was totally unmindful  of  the  

pendency of the said revision it merely dismissed the condonation of delay  

application.  We have seen that order.  That is an order merely refusing to  

condone the delay and there is nothing in the order to suggest that the  

High Court ever considered the merits of the order of the Trial Court.

6. Ultimately, the revision came up before the Single Judge of the High  

Court, who allowed the revision and directed reconsideration of the matter  

on the basis of evidence already on record.  In the impugned order, the  

learned Judge does not seem to have given any further opportunity to the  

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parties for leading any further evidence and that is how this judgment of  

the learned Single Judge is in challenge before us.   

7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused,  

firstly contended that the effect of dismissal of the condonation of delay  

application  was  the  dismissal  of  appeal.   It  was  pointed  out  that  the  

Division Bench which considered the matter had made an observation in  

the order to the effect that the appellant-accused was already acquitted in  

the year 1999 and, therefore, to condone the delay and to admit the appeal  

would  cause  prejudice  him.   The  counsel,  therefore,  urged  that  this  

revision should have been dismissed.

8. Learned  counsel  for  the  complainant,  however,  argues  that  the  

revision was filed prior  in time as compared to the appeal filed against  

acquittal  and  the  said  revision  was  also  admitted  by  the  High  Court.  

Further,  the  High  court  had  no  occasion  to  consider  the  merits  of  the  

matter as it proceeded to dismiss the application for condonation of delay.  

If that was so, there was nothing wrong in learned Judge considering the  

revision  on  its  merits.   Learned  counsel  further  pointed  out  that  the  

question  of  un-tenability  of  the  revision  was  never  pointed  out  to  the  

learned  Single  Judge  by  showing  that  the  appeal  against  the  decision  

could not proceed on account of delay not being condoned by the High  

Court.   Learned counsel  urged that  the complainant  had not  done any  

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wrong in filing the revision which was also admitted by the High Court and,  

therefore, the revision could not be wiped out merely because the High  

court,  without  considering the merits of  the matter,  chose to refuse the  

delay in filing the appeal by the State.

9. We cannot find fault  with the learned Single Judge in proceeding  

ahead with the revision as it was never brought to the notice of the learned  

Single  Judge  that  the  appeal  against  the  same  judgment  which  was  

impugned in the revision had already been filed.   It was for the appellant-

accused to point out that on the date when the revision was heard the fate  

of  the  criminal  appeal  filed  impugning  the  same judgment  was  sealed  

because of the refusal on the part of the Division Bench to condone the  

delay.  In fact, it was up to the Government pleader who was a common  

party in both the revision and the appeal to point out to the learned Single  

Judge about the dismissal of the condonation of delay application.  Very  

strangely, the Government pleader did not do that.  Again we are at a loss  

to understand as to how the criminal revision was left  out and was not  

mentioned before the Division Bench deciding the question of condonation  

of delay in appeal, which was filed against the same judgment.  In this  

appeal,  however,  the first  question which has been raised is about  the  

dismissal of the statutory appeal preferred by the State and its effect on  

the  pending  revision.   The  appellant-appellant-accused,  however,  has  

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conveniently avoided to state in the special leave petition as to when he  

came to know about the dismissal of the condonation of delay application  

in  filing  the appeal  and how.  We cannot,  therefore,  find fault  with  the  

learned  Single  Judge’s  judgment  who  was  never  appraised  of  the  

dismissal  of  the  condonation  of  delay  application.   Similarly,  since  the  

order refusing to condone the delay is not challenged before us, it will not  

be possible for us to go into that aspect also.  But we must observe that it  

was the duty of the State counsel to point out that a revision was already  

pending against the same judgment which was challenged in appeal but  

which appeal was delayed by more than 800 days at the time when the  

application  for  condonation  for  delay  was  considered  by  the  Division  

Bench.  Since the appellant-accused had not raised the question about the  

continueability  of  the  revision  before  the  High  Court,  we  would  not  

ordinarily  allow the counsel  for appellant-accused to raise that  question  

before us.  Though, we must say that an awkward situation has arisen  

wherein an appeal against the judgment had failed, though only on the  

question of limitation, yet, a revision against the same judgment, however,  

continued and was  allowed  also and all  this  happened because of  the  

casual attitude on the part of the State Government as also the appellant-

accused in not  pointing out  the proper  facts  to the Courts,  both to  the  

Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge.   

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10. The question is undoubtedly important, and hence, though raised for  

the first time before us, we propose to decide the same.  An incongruous  

situation has arisen where,  though the appeal against  the acquittal  has  

been dismissed by not allowing the condonation of delay in filing the same,  

yet, the revision filed against the said judgment by the private complainant  

has not only survived but such revision has also been allowed. We must  

observe that the Division Bench in not allowing the condonation of delay  

has effectively dismissed the appeal in the sense that it has not allowed  

the State Government to proceed with the appeal for which there was a  

provision.  This was a prosecution not based on private complaint but on  

the  police  report.   Therefore,  the  State  Government  had  a  right  under  

Section 378 (2) Cr. P.C. to file appeal and very conspicuously the private  

party did not have that right.   The private complainant,  therefore, could  

only excite the general powers of revision by the High Court.  Firstly, we  

must  clarify  that  when  the  Division  Bench  considered  the  question  of  

condonation  of  delay  in  filing  the  appeal  against  acquittal,  though  

technically, it was deciding the application under Section 378 (3), Cr.P.C.  

It was actually the whole appeal itself which was before it.  In this behalf it  

will have to be seen that the limitation for filing such appeal at the instance  

of the State Government against acquittal is provided by Article 114 of the  

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Limitation  Act.   It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  sub-Section  (3)  specifically  

provides  that  the  appeal  under  sub-Sections  (1)  and  (2)  cannot  be  

entertained  except  with  the  leave of  the  High  Court  and,  therefore,  an  

application for leave in such appeal filed by the State Government is a  

must.  The limitation for filing the appeal is 90 days from the date of the  

order while the same Article provides for 30 days of limitation from the date  

of grant of special leave.  Therefore, what was before the High Court was  

the appeal itself and the petitioner prayed the condonation of delay of 801  

days in filing appeal against acquittal.  When the High Court declined to  

grant that permission, it, in effect refused to entertain the appeal against  

the order of the Trial Court, thus, making it final.  Now, obviously, if the  

judgment was rendered final by the Division Bench of the High Court then  

there could not  be any subsequent order to the contrary by the Single  

Judge even if the effect of the pendency of the revision was not brought to  

the notice of  the Division Bench.   There is no review power  under the  

Criminal Procedure Code to the Criminal Court including the High Court.  

Such a review power exists only in this Court.  As such, once the High  

Court had passed the order refusing the condonation of delay of appeal  

and thereby awarding the finality to the Trial Court’s judgment, that order  

could  be  considered  and upset  only  by  this  Court  on  a  proper  appeal  

having been filed in this Court by the State Government.  As against the  

State Government,  the order of  the Trial  Court  acquitting the appellant-

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accused had become final.  Therefore, the only course left open then in  

law was to challenge that  order refusing to condone the delay in  filing  

appeal  against  acquittal.   It  is  an  admitted  fact  that  such  appeal  

challenging the order passed by the Division Bench was never filed and  

the order of the Division Bench became final and has remained final till  

today.  Under such circumstances, in our considered opinion, the revision  

against  the  same  order  could  not  have  been  entertained,  much  less  

allowed upsetting the finality of the Trial Court’s judgment, which finality  

was confirmed by the order of the High court by refusing to condone the  

delay in  filing the appeal  against  the same Trial  Court  judgment.   That  

would be the true import of the appellate powers of the High Court.   

An attractive argument is pressed in service by the learned counsel  

for the complainant that this is a case where the complainant’s side was  

not considered at all.

We must express here that considering the history of appeal against  

acquittal and the revisional powers of the High court, the appeal against  

acquittal originally was not there.   That was a general rule in England.  In  

Canada,  such  right  was  recognised  by  Section  584  of  the  Canadian  

Criminal  Code  only  on  the  point  of  law to  the  Court  of  appeal  for  an  

indictable  offence.   In  New Zealand also  vide  Sections  380-382 of  the  

Crimes Act, 1861, there were similar provisions.  In comparison to these  

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strict provisions, in India, however, unlimited and general right was given in  

respect of appeal against acquittals in favour of the State Government.  In  

its 48th Report, the Law Commission cautioned against the unlimited nature  

of the right and prescribed that it was desirable to put some limitation as to  

the nature of cases where the right would be available.  It was also further  

provided  that  regard  must  be  had  to  the  need  of  putting  reasonable  

limitations  on  the  period  for  which  anxiety  and  tension  of  a  criminal  

prosecution  could  be  allowed  to  torment  the  mind  of  the  appellant-

accused.  It  was provided that there is a qualitative distinction between  

conviction  and  acquittal  and  appeals  against  acquittals  should  not  be  

allowed in the same un-restricted manner as appeal against  conviction.  

Before that in its 41st Report, the Law Commission had observed that the  

appeals  against  acquittals  should  be heard by the High Court  to  avoid  

miscarriage of justice and to secure a uniform standard in dealing with  

such appeals.  It was further provided that the right of appeal should be  

confined only to the State and the complainant and cannot be given to  

other interested persons.  Thirdly, it was provided that there no need for an  

express provision to the effect  that  when an appeal by State has been  

dismissed  no  application  for  special  leave  by  complainant  should  be  

competent  since  this  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  dismissal  of   

appeal. (Emphasis supplied). Forthly, it was provided that an appeal from a  

Single Judge to the Bench will not serve any useful purpose, and lastly it  

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was provided there was no justification for extending the time for appeals  

by the State.   

In the Report of Joint Select Committee also it was recommended  

that such appeals shall be entertained by the High Court only if it grants  

leave to the State Government in this behalf.  This is necessary to check  

any  arbitrary  exercise  of  executive  power.   Section  378,  Cr.P.C.,  as  it  

stood then was further amended w.e.f 23.06.2006 by Act No.25 of 2005  

vide  Section  32  while  for  the  first  time  the  appeals  against  acquittals  

recorded by a Magistrate in respect of cognizable and bailable offences  

could be tried by the Court of Sessions also.  But we are not concerned  

with that Amendment.

All this would clearly suggest that once the appeal at the instance of  

the State has been dismissed, the complainant or the state could not ask  

for the revision of the judgment.  In this particular case, we are of the clear  

cut opinion, that since the Trial Court’s judgment was given the effect of  

finality by the Division Bench of the High Court then learned Single Judge  

of that Court could not have reversed that effect and upset that position .  

In this behalf, even sub-Section (6) would, though not directly, support this  

view.  Sub-Section (6) provides as under:

“(6)  If,  in  any case,  the  application  under  sub-section  (4)  for  the  grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused,  

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no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1)  or under sub-section (2).”

This would mean that if a case is instituted by the complainant and  

such leave is  refused even the  State  Government  would  be  unable  to  

pursue any appeal  under sub-Sections (1)  or  (2)  against  the impugned  

judgment of acquittal.  In effect by sub-Section (6), the finality attained by  

the dismissal of an application for special leave is confirmed by the Court  

then that verdict would operate against the said judgment of acquittal being  

challenged even at the instance of the State Government.  If  this is the  

effect of the finality attained by the judgment, even in case of an offence  

which was tried on the basis of a private complaint, then there would be no  

reason not to give the same effect to the finality attained by the judgment  

of  acquittal  by reason of the order passed in appeal,  filed by the State  

Government.

Again, as we have already pointed out the finality confirmed by the  

Division Bench should not be upset by the judgment of the Single Bench of  

the same Court.  Such incongruous results would follow if we allow the  

revision to be entertained and decided.   In  this  case,  undoubtedly,  the  

revision was not only entertained but also admitted by the High Court.  We  

have only to express that the attitude on the part of the State Government  

counsel as also the appellant-accused was extremely casual.  We also do  

not understand as to why, when appeal was filed along with the application  

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for  condonation of  delay against  the judgment of  acquittal,  the revision  

pending against the same judgment of acquittal was not joined with the  

appeal.   Ordinarily,  that  should have been done.   It  is  all  the result  of  

colossal casualness even on the part of the Registry of  the High Court  

which has resulted in such incongruous situation.  We, however, cannot  

blame the learned Single Judge for proceeding with the revision as he was  

never apprised of the dismissal of the appeal.  

The limitation aspect cannot be such as to be apart or distinct from  

the merits of the impugned judgment.  Therefore, it cannot be said that the  

appeal  was  only  disposed  of  on  the  question  of  limitation.   The result  

would, after all, be the same i.e. impugned judgment gaining finality.

11. However, we find that the revision could not have proceeded and the  

appellant-accused  must  succeed  on  this  plea  alone.   We  have  also  

considered  the  judgment  of  the  learned Single  Judge on merits  of  the  

matter.  In a revision against acquittal preferred by a private party, there is  

a very little scope to interfere.  Here was a case where the learned Single  

Judge dis-approved of the appreciation of the evidence by the Trial Court.  

It is not as if the Trial Court had ignored any important piece of evidence or  

it had chosen not to appreciate the same.  It is again not as if there was  

any piece of evidence which was illegally not permitted to come on record.  

Again, it is also not a case where there was some serious defect in the trial  

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affecting the merits of the matter.  Further, the Court trying the appellant-

accused did not lack the jurisdiction also to try and convict or acquit the  

appellant-accused.   All  that  the  High  Court  has  observed  is  that  the  

appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court was not correct and the Trial  

Court should not have taken the view that it has taken of the evidence.  

This question has been considered in the celebrated judgment of  Akalu  

Ahir  &  Ors.  v.  Ramdeo  Ram  [(1973)  2  SCC  583],  where,  after  

considering the judgments of D. Stephens v. Nosibolla [1951 SCR 284],   

Logendranath Jha v. Polailal [1951 SCR 676], K.C. Reddy v. State of   

Andhra Pradesh [(1963) 3 SCR 412]  and Mahendra Pratap Singh v.   

Sarju Singh [(1968) 2 SCR 287]  this Court came out with categories of  

case which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of  

acquittal in revision:

“(i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the  case,  but  has  still  acquitted  the  appellant- accused;

(ii) Where  the  Trail  Court  has  wrongly  shut  out  evidence  which  the  prosecution  wished  to  produce;

(iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the  evidence which was admitted by the Trial Court to  be inadmissible;

(iv) Where  the  material  evidence  has  been  overlooked only (either) by the Trial Court or by  the appellate Court; and  

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(v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding  of the offence which is invalid under the law.”

Of  course,  these  categories  were  declared  by  this  Court  to  be  

illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could  

also be properly held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court  

could justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.  In this very judgment  

though  in  paragraph  10,  this  Court  did  not  generally  approve  of  the  

appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court Judge and held it  to be not  

perfect or free from flaw and further observed “the Court of appeal may be  

justified in disagreeing with the conclusion, but it does not follow that on  

revision  by  a  private  complainant,  the  High  Court  is  not  entitled  to  re-

appreciate the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and  

then order a re-trial.”  The situation, as we will show further, is identical in  

the present case.

12. In the impugned judgment, learned Single Judge has pointed out the  

prosecution case that the Court noticed that though the appellant-accused  

was  supposed  to  reach  Vikravandi  in  the  day  time  on  18.02.1995,  he  

preferred to reach on 17.02.1995 at about 2 a.m. and then the appellant-

accused took shelter  in  the tea shop of  PW-7.   Learned Judge further  

noted that at about 5 a.m. in the morning the deceased wanted to answer  

the call of nature and, hence, leaving the child in the tea shop itself, the  

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appellant-accused took the deceased to his lands where there is a well  

and after the deceased answered the nature’s call when she went to wash  

herself  in  the  nearby  well  she  slipped  and  fell  into  the  well  and  was  

drowned.   The  learned  Judge  also  noted  that  the  appellant-accused  

himself reported that at about 11:20 a.m. in the Vikravandi police station.  

Thereafter, some villagers and the police came to the spot of occurrence  

and the further  investigation started.   The learned Single  Judge further  

noted that the prosecution examined 20 witnesses including the relations  

of  the  deceased  as  also  PWs 1  and  2,  who  were  the  parents  of  the  

deceased, PW-3, son-in-law and PW-4 who was the servant maid in the  

house of the appellant-accused.  The learned Judge has then given the  

whole account of each of the prosecution witness in short up to PW-20.

13. While considering the evidence of PW-19, the doctor who conducted  

the post-mortem, following observation was made by the learned Judge:

“In cross examination a specific question was put that if  a person falls down from a high place into a well where  there  was  water,  would  such injury  be  caused.   The  doctor has negatived the suggestion and he was of the  opinion that the said injury could have been caused only  when she had been hit with some weapon and MO No.1  would be such a weapon that could have caused the  injury.”

14. When we see the evidence of Dr. Bhoomadhu, who was examined  

as PW-19, we clearly see the following assertions in paragraph 9 of his  

deposition:

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“I opined that the death should have occurred 28 to 30  hours  earlier.   I  opeined  the  death  could  have  been  caused because of  loss  of  blood  due  to  injuries  and  shock.  Ex.35 is the requisition.  Ex.36 is the report I  had sent.  The Inspector showed the MO No. 1 the log  and enquired me with No.1 the injuries over the body 1  to 5 cold have been possible.”   

15. In  the  cross-examination  this  witness  asserted  that  “8th injury  is  

inside and there was no outward injury to that”(sic).   

16. He admitted in the cross-examination that the injury was very minor  

one and there was no need to cut that.  The depth of injuries 1, 2 and 4  

was 1/4th cms. and they were ordinary external injuries and there was no  

need to  open them and,  therefore,  he  did  not  open them.   He further  

admitted that the Inspector enquired him on 12.06.1997 and he did not  

remember whether the Inspector examined him showing the log, MO No.  

1.  He also could not say whether the blood was beneath would 2, 4 and 5.  

He  then  asserted  that  if  an  individual  falls  from  a  height  there  were  

chances of bruises and injuries and open wounds.  When falling from a  

height  if  head  dashes  against  a  hard  substance,  injury  No.  8  can  be  

caused.  He also admitted that if a blow was given by MO NO.1 on the  

head, external injury can be there.  He further tried to explain that if the  

hitting was light there would be no external injury.   

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17. We have examined the evidence of the doctor almost line by line but  

we do not see any assertion on the part of the doctor which has been  

quoted by the learned Judge in paragraph 10 of his judgment which we  

have quoted above.  Therefore, it is obvious that the High Court has mis-

read the evidence of the doctor.  It will be worthwhile to see that the doctor  

has specifically said that “there was no corresponding outward injury to the  

8th injury suffered by the deceased”(sic) .  If this is so, it is not possible to  

hold that the 8th injury which was only an internal injury would be caused by  

MO No.1, a log.  The doctor, on his external examination found an internal  

fracture.  Injury No.8 was only a Haemorrhage or a blood clot.   

18. After reading the evidence carefully, we are of the opinion that the  

evidence of the doctor has been completely mis-read by the high Court.  In  

paragraph  13  of  the  judgment,  the  learned  Judge  has  referred  to  the  

finding by the Trial Court that the appellant-accused had been ill-treating  

his  wife.   In  paragraph  17,  learned  Judge  has  commented  upon  the  

conduct of  the appellant-accused and has observed that that  appellant-

accused had not come forward with any specific case as to why he took  

his wife on the night of 17.2.1995 to Vikravandi and as to why at 2 a.m.  

when appellant-accused could have gone to his own house, he preferred  

to  stay  in  a  tea  shop.   It  is  then  commented  that  the  story,  that  he  

accompanied the deceased to the field when she wanted to answer the  

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nature’s  call,  was  difficult  to  digest.   It  has  also  come later  on  in  the  

judgment that it was strange that the lady should have gone to the well  

instead  of  a  nearby  pond  to  wash  herself.   In  our  opinion,  these  

observations are speculative.  If the lady had gone to the well in the dark at  

5 O’clock then one wonders how she could have seen the nearby pond.  

Again,  it  has not  been proved that  the field belonged to the appellant-

accused.  There appears to be a lot of confusion on that issue.  The field  

has been described in the R.D.O. report in the Magazar as survey No.  

167/5. It is then further mentioned in paragraph that the said well in the  

Punja survey No. 167/5 in Patta No. 354 to be in the name of Panduramng  

s/o  Kasilingam.   We,  therefore,  fail  to  understand  as  to  how  it  was  

mentioned that the field belonged to the appellant-accused.   

19. Lastly, it is expressed by the High Court in paragraph 19:

“What is more surprising is that there were as many as  8 injuries in the body.  The injury on the head makes it  abundantly  clear  that  she  has  been  assaulted  by  a  weapon.  It  is not the case of the accused that there  was  any stone or  any protruding  material  in  the  well  which could have hit on the head.  It is nobody’s case.  Therefore, it is for the accused to explain as to how all  these things happened.”

20. We do  not  think  that  this  was  a  correct  approach  as  the  above  

observation is not factually correct.  In the whole judgment, it is nowhere  

pointed out as to how and where the Trial Court had gone wrong.  When  

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we see the judgment of the Trial Court, it is seen that the Trial Court has  

awarded the acquittal as according to it in a case based on circumstantial  

evidence, the chain of circumstances has to be complete and in this case it  

was not.  The only two circumstances which were held proved according to  

the Trial Court were that the deceased was last seen accompanying the  

appellant-accused  herein  and  that  her  dead  body  was  found  near  the  

residential  plot  of  the  appellant-accused.   To  the  Trial  court  these two  

circumstances  were  not  enough to  book him much less  for  an offence  

under Section 302, IPC.  The learned Sessions Judge also explained the 8  

injuries noted by the doctor and has appreciated the evidence of PW-19  

and observed that barring injury No.8, which was an internal injury there  

were no other outward serious injuries as those injuries were minor and  

might have been caused by some insect or biting by fish.  He pointed out  

that  the  doctor  was  not  certain  whether  the  injury  Nos.  2,  4  and  5  

suggested that  they were ante-mortem injuries.    He also said that  the  

post-mortem  report  was  inconclusive.   The  Trial  Court  has,  in  detail,  

considered  the  evidence  and  came  to  the  finding  that  the  verdict  of  

conviction was not possible in this case.  We have already pointed out that  

the approach of the learned revisional Court was not correct, after all this  

was a revision against acquittal, at the instance of private party.

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21. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has directed not even  

re-trial but re-appraisal of the evidence which will  be clear from the last  

paragraph of the impugned judgment before us.  We do not think that this  

could  be  the  course  adopted  in  the  matter.   We,  therefore,  allow  this  

appeal and set aside the judgment of the revisional Court and restore that  

of the Trial Court.

………………………J.

[V.S. SIRPURKAR]

………………………J.

[R.M. LODHA]

NEW DELHI

JULY 7, 2009

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Digital  Performa

Case  No.  : Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2004

Date of Decision : 07.07.2009

Cause Title :  K. Ramachandran

Versus

V.N. Rajan & Anr.

Coram :   Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.S. Sirpurkar     Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.M. Lodha

(Vacation Bench)      

C.A.V. On : 28.05.2009

Order delivered by :  Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.S. Sirpurkar

Nature of Order  :  Reportable

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