IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5648  OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10202 of 2007)

K. Puttaraju                                             …Appellant

VERSUS

A. Hanumegowda     …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J

1. Leave granted.   

2. The respondent/landlord herein filed an eviction petition

under Section 27(2)(r)  read with Section 27(2)(j)  of  the

Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (in short, the “Act”) against the

appellant for eviction in respect of a portion of shop No.

575,  11th Main,  5th Block,  Jayanagar,  Bangalore  –  41,

measuring 12 feet East to West and 8 ½” North to South

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  “said  shop”).   The  said

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eviction  petition  was  filed  before  the  Judge,  Court  of

Small Causes at Bangalore, which came to be registered

as HRC No. 196/2003,  inter alia on the ground that the

respondent required the said shop for his own use and

occupation and for  starting a business for  his  son who

was handicapped.  So far as the ground under Section 27

(2)(r) of the Act was concerned,  the same was allowed

and eviction was directed, but the ground under Section

27(2)(j)  of  the  Act  was,  however,  rejected  and  the

appellant  was  directed  to  vacate  the  said  shop  within

three months  from the  date  of  passing  of  the  order  of

eviction, which was passed on 16th of September, 2006.

The case of the landlord/respondent was that he filed the

eviction petition against the appellant under Section 27(2)

(r)  of  the  Act  on the ground that  he wanted to  start  a

stationary business in the said shop with the assistance

of  his  younger  son  so  as  to  enable  him  to  earn  his

livelihood and the appellant,  being a retired engineer in

the Irrigation Department and a senior citizen, the eviction

petition  should be allowed in  his  favour.   The younger

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son,  for  whom  the  said  shop  was  required,  was/is  a

handicapped person.     

3. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Judge of

the Small Causes Court, Bangalore, the High Court was moved

in revision by the appellant.   The challenge to  the aforesaid

order of the Small Causes Court Judge, directing the eviction

was  that  the  appellant  was  and/or  is  in  possession  of

reasonable,  suitable  accommodation  as  he  is  the  owner  of

shopping malls and other 10 shops in the area in question.   

4. It  may  be  mentioned  that  during  the  pendency  of  the

eviction  petition,  an  application  for  amendment  of  the  same

was filed at the instance of the landlord/respondent praying for

amendment of the petition on the ground that the respondent

also sought to evict the appellant under Section 31 of the Act.

The  High  Court,  by  the  impugned  order,  had  affirmed  the

finding  of  the  learned  Judge  of  the  Small  Causes  Court  at

Bangalore and directed  eviction  of  the  appellant from the

said  shop  also  on  the  ground  under  Section  31  of  the  Act.

Feeling aggrieved by this order of the High Court affirming the

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order  of  eviction  passed  by  the  Small  Causes  Court,  this

Special Leave Petition was filed by the appellant in this Court

which, on grant of leave, was heard in presence of the learned

counsel for the parties.   

5. In  our  view, this  appeal  can be disposed  of  on a very

short point.  As noted herein earlier, initially, the original petition

for  eviction  was  filed  only  under  Section  27(2)(r)  read  with

Section  27(2)(j)  of  the  Act,  out  of  which  the  ground  under

Section  27(2)(j)  of  the  Act  was  negatived  and  eviction  was

ordered only on the ground of bonafide requirement of the said

shop  under  Section  27(2)(r)  of  the  Act,  against  which,  the

revision was moved in the High Court, which also affirmed the

order  of  the  learned  Judge  of  the  Small  Causes  Court,

Bangalore.  It is true that during the pendency of the eviction

petition  before  the  Small  Causes  Court,  the  ground  under

Section 31 of the Act was added in the eviction petition which,

for our purpose, may be reproduced as under :-

“Right  to  recover  immediate  possession  of premises to accrue to a widow – (1) where the landlord is :-  (a) a widow and the premises let out  by  her,  or  by  her  husband;  (b)  a handicapped person and the premises let out by

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him; (c) a person who is of the age of sixty-five years or more an the presmies let out by him, is required for use by her or him or for her or his family or for any one for ordinarily living with her or him for use, she or he may apply to the Court for  recovery  of  immediate  possession  of  such premises.  (2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section  (1)  has  let  out  more  than  one premises,  it  shall  be  open to  him to  make an application under that sub-section in respect of any  one  residential  and  one  non-residential premises each chosen by him.   

Explanation  –  I  –  For  the  purposes  of  this section,  “handicapped  person”  shall  mean  a person who is as if  being an assessee entitled for  the time being to  the benefits  of  deduction under section 80U of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Central Act 48 of 1961).

Explanation   -  II  –  The  right  to  recover possession  under  this  section  shall  be exercisable  only  once  in  respect  of  each  for residential and for non-residential use.”

6. At this stage, it would be appropriate if we deal with the

ground under Section 27(2)(r) of the Act as well.  Section 27(2)

(r) reads as under :-

“Eviction  on  Ground  of  Landlord’s  Personal Requirement etc.  

(  r)  that  the  premises  let  are  required, whether in the same form or after re-construction or re-building, by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family if he is the owner thereof,  or for any reason for whose

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benefit  the  premises  are  held  and  that  the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation :

Provided  that  where  the  landlord  has required the premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under this clause  unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition :

Explanation – I – For the purposes of this clause and sections 28 to 31 –

(i) where  the  landlord  in  his  application  supported  by  an affidavit submits that the premise are required by him for occupation  for  himself  or  for  any  member  of  his  family dependent  on  him,  the  Court  shall  presume  that  the premises are so required;

(ii) premises let  for  a particular  use may be required by the landlord for a different use if such use is permissible under law.

Explanation –II – For the purposes of this clause and sections  28 and 31 an occupation  by  the landlord of any part  of a building of which any premises let  out  by him forms a part  shall  not disentitle him to recover the possession of such premises.

Explanation  –III  –  For  the  purposes  of  this clause,  and  section  28  to  31  “owner  of  the premises”  includes  a  person  who  has  been allotted  such  premises  by  the  Bangalore Development  Authority  or  any  other  local authority   by  way  of  an  agreement  of  hire- purchase,  lease or  sub-lease,  even before the full  ownership  rights  accrue  to  such  hire- purchaser,  lessee  or  sub-lessee,  as  the  case may be.”  

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7. Ms.  Suri,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

tenant/appellant submitted before us at the first instance

that if the aforesaid two provisions namely, Section 27(2)

(r) of the Act and Section 31 of the Act are read together,

one must come to the conclusion that the aforesaid two

provisions are not independent of each other and while

dealing  with  eviction  on  the  ground  of  bonafide

requirement, the two provisions must be read together.  It

was further submitted that since the landlord/respondent

is in possession of reasonable, suitable accommodation

to  the  extent  that  the  landlord  is  in  possession  of

shopping malls and 10 shops in the area in question, the

High Court as well as the Court  below were in error in

granting an order for eviction on the aforesaid provisions

of the Act.  It was further submitted by Ms. Suri that the

amendment of the eviction petition was wrongly allowed

by the trial  Court  at  the stage when the evidence was

already completed.  She further argued that the special

provision of  eviction as  made in  Section  31 of  the Act

could not be extended to the respondent as the appellant

had failed to satisfy the court  that Explanation No. II  in

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Section  31  of  the  Act  to  the  extent  that  the  landlord-

respondent  had  not  taken  this  special  provision  even

once earlier. This submission of the learned counsel for

the appellant was hotly contested by Mr. Chahar, learned

senior  counsel  for  the  respondent,  who  submitted  that

although in evidence, the respondent had admitted that

he was having shopping malls and 10 shops but it  has

been  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  Court  that  those

shopping malls and 10 shops are not in possession of the

respondent nor there was any space or room for starting

a  stationary  business  for  his  handicapped  son.   He

brought to our notice that the shopping malls and other

10 shops have already been sold out  and,  therefore,  it

cannot be held that the respondent was in possession of

reasonable,  suitable  accommodation  for  which  no

eviction order could be passed.  

8. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and

taking note of the submissions made by the learned counsel,

we are of the view that in view of provisions under Section 31 of

the  Act,  the  order  of  the  High  Court  as  well  as  the  Small

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Causes  Court,  Bangalore  cannot  be  interfered  with  for  two

simple reasons. One, we are unable to agree with Ms. Suri that

the  provisions  under  Section  27(2)(r)  of  the  Act  and  the

provisions under Section 31 of the Act are not independent to

each other,  and the other, on a reading of the aforesaid two

provisions, there cannot be any doubt in our mind that Section

31 of the Act gives a special right to some particular classes of

landlords. Therefore, in our view, Section 31 of the Act, which

imposes  certain  conditions  on  the  landlord  to  get  order  of

eviction of his tenant, is satisfied and the landlord is entitled to

get  an  order  of  eviction  without  going  to  the  provisions  of

Section 27(2)(r) of the Act. On a plain reading of Section 27(2)

(r)  of the Act and the scheme there under, we are of the view

that  the said provision has been given right  to a landlord to

evict  his  tenant  inter  alia on  the  ground  of  reasonable  and

bonafide requirement if he avers and proves that he reasonably

requires the said shop for his own use and occupation and for

the members of  his family as he is not in possession of the

reasonable, suitable accommodation elsewhere. Therefore, the

reading of  this  provision would clearly  indicate  that  this  is  a

general provision for eviction of a tenant given to the landlord to

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evict  his  tenant.  Whereas  Section  31  of  the  Act  has  been

introduced  by  the  legislature  to  reflect  the  policy  of  the

legislature  for  rendering  speedy  justice  to  the  landlords

belonging to three categories of citizens,  namely, a widow, a

handicapped person and a person who is a citizen of above 65

years.  For  these three categories  of  persons,  the legislature

has  introduced  this  provision  for  the  purpose  of  giving

immediate  possession  of  the  said  premises  to  the  landlord.

Therefore, in our view, the aforesaid two provisions are quite

independent of each other and they can be set in motion in the

individual  fields.   Let  us  now  deal  with  the  question  of

amending the eviction petition at a later stage.  It is true that

the  respondent  filed  the  application  for  amendment  of  the

eviction petition when the evidence was over,  but we do not

find any jurisdictional error of the learned Judge of the Small

Causes Court, whose order was affirmed by the High Court in

revision and we are not inclined to interfere with the orders of

the  Courts  below in  the  exercise  of  our  discretionary  power

under Article 136 of the Constitution allowing the amendment of

the eviction petition under Section 31 of the Act.

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9. Although, the application under Section 31 of the Act was

filed belatedly but it is an admitted position that the ingredients

required for getting an order of eviction under Section 31 of the

Act  were  very  much  present  except  the  requirement  in

Explanation No. 2 under Section 31 of the Act,  requiring the

respondent to plead that they have not availed the opportunity

of  getting  the  order  of  eviction  under  Section  31 of  the  Act

earlier.  Admittedly, the respondent was a senior citizen at the

time  of  filing  of  the  eviction  petition.   In  order  to  bring  the

eviction petition within the purview of Section 31 of the Act, the

respondent  pleaded  even  at  the  belated  stage  that  he  had

sought  for  eviction of  the tenant  on the  ground made under

Section 31 of the Act.  An additional objection was filed by the

appellant to this application for amendment.  It was not pleaded

by the appellant in their written objection that the respondent

had taken this opportunity once before and, therefore, he would

not be entitled to come within the purview of Section 31 of the

Act.  After a close examination of the record of this case, we do

not find that anywhere, either in pleading or in the evidence, the

appellants  have brought to the notice of the Court that there

was any eviction petition filed before it earlier or the respondent

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had taken an advantage of this provision under Section 31 of

the Act. That being the position, we do not find any reason to

interfere  with  the  orders  of  the  Courts  below  allowing  the

application for amendment of the eviction petition.

10. Accordingly, only on the ground under Section 31 of the

Act, we affirm the order of the High Court and we do not like to

interfere with the order of the High Court in the exercise of our

discretionary  power  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of

India.  Accordingly, we do not find any merit in this appeal.  The

appeal is thus disposed of.   

11. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, if

the appellant files an undertaking in the Court within one month

for  giving vacant  and peaceful  possession to the respondent

within nine months from the date of  filing an undertaking  on

payment of the rent at last paid, the appellant shall be entitled

to  remain  in  possession  for  the  aforesaid  period  of  nine

months.  In default, it would be open to the respondent to evict

the appellant in accordance with law.   

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12. With these observations, the appeal is thus disposed of

with no order as to costs.                                

      ……………………….J.                                                   [Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi                                                 ………………………. J. September 15, 2008.                                     [Aftab Alam ]

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