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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4154 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP [C] No.13978 of 2004)

K. N. Farms Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. … Appellant (s)

Vs.

State of Bihar & Ors. … Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.

Leave granted. Heard parties.  

This appeal by special leave raises the question whether a tank will  

fall  within  the  definition  of  “land”  under  section  2(f)  of  the  Bihar  Land  

Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act,  

1961 as  applicable  in  the  State  of  Jharkhand (‘Act’  for  short),  extracted  

below :

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“Land” means land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture  of horticulture and includes land which is an orchard, kharhur or pasturage  or  forest  land  or  even  land  perennially  submerged  under  water  or  the  homestead of a land-holder;  

Explanation I.- “Homestead” means a dwelling house for the purpose of  living or for the purpose of letting out on rent together with any courtyard,  compound,  attached garden,  orchard and out-building and includes any  out-building for the purpose connected with agriculture or horticulture and  any  tank,  library  and  place  of  worship  appertaining  to  such  dwelling  house.  

Explanation  II.  –  Land   perennially  submerged  under  water  shall  not  include submerged in the bed of a river.”  

2. The appellant is a land-holder. Proceedings were initiated in the year  

1973 for determination of the surplus land held by it. The appellant filed a  

return  showing the extent  of  land in  its  possession as  379.12 acres.  The  

Circle  Officer  submitted a report  to the Land Reforms Deputy Collector,  

Jamshedpur,  showing the extent of land in the possession of appellant as  

443.09 acres. The appellant filed the objections contending that certain tanks  

which did not fall under the definition of land in all measuring 43.29 acres  

had  been  wrongly  included  in  the  draft  publication.  By  order  dated  

9.10.1982, the Addl. Collector held that the tanks covering an area of 43.29  

acres fell within the definition of “land” and therefore, had to be taken into  

account for determining the surplus area. The challenge to the inclusion of  

the “tank” area was rejected by the appellate  authority on 22.3.1983 and  

upheld by the Board of Revenue on 22.11.1983.

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3. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition (WP No.995 of  

1984),  contending  that  while  “even  land  perennially  submerged  under  

water”  was  ‘land’  for  the  purpose  of  the  ceiling  area,  a  tank  cannot  be  

considered to be land. The appellant contended that only land which was  

arable, that is land which was used or capable of being used for agriculture  

or horticulture could be considered as land for determining surplus land and  

a  tank  which  is  land  covered  with  water  incapable  of  being  used  for  

agriculture or horticulture could not be treated as land for the purpose of the  

Act.  A  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  Patna  High  Court  rejected  the  said  

contention and dismissed the writ petition by order dated 2.3.1993. He held  

that  the  legislative  intent  was  to  include  all  tanks  and  ponds  used  for  

agricultural  purposes,  within  the  definition  of  “land”  by including in  the  

definition “even land perennially submerged under water”.  The appeal filed  

by  the  appellant  was  dismissed  by  order  dated  19.2.2004  affirming  the  

reasoning  and  findings  of  the  Learned  Judge.  The  Division  Bench  also  

noticed the amendment to the Act in the State of Bihar by Act 5 of 2002 by  

which the words 'also the land' were substituted for the words “even land”  

and held that the subsequent amendment showed the legislative intent was  

that 'land' should also include any land perennially submerged under water.

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The  said  order  is  challenged  in  this  appeal,  giving  rise  to  the  question  

whether a tank will be 'land' for purposes of the Act.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Preamble to  

the Act showed that the object of the Act was to provide for fixation of  

ceiling,  restriction  on  sub-letting  and  resumption  of  certain  raiyats  for  

personal cultivation of land, acquisition of status of raiyat by certain under-

raiyats, and acquisition of surplus land by the State and matters connected  

therewith. He submitted that the definition of land shows that it means only  

land which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture.  

According to him, the  addition of certain categories of land by using the  

words “includes” does not take away or dilute the requirement that only land  

used or capable of being used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, will  

be 'land'. He submits that the additions of certain categories by use of the  

words “and includes land which is an orchard, karhur or pasturage or forest  

land or even land perennially submerged under water or the homestead of  

land holder” merely accentuates the requirement that the land should be used  

or capable of being used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. He points  

out that each of the categories of land referred to in the inclusive definition  

is also land which is used or is capable of being used or incidental to the use

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of land  for agriculture or horticulture; that “orchard” refers to a garden of  

trees devoted to cultivation of fruit trees; “karhur” refers to land producing  

thatching grass or shrubs; “pasturage” refers to land covered with grass or  

herbage and grazed or suitable for grazing by livestock; “homestead of the  

land-holder”  means  dwelling  house  together  with  courtyard,  compound,  

attached garden, orchard and includes any out-building for the purpose of  

connected with agriculture or horticulture and any tank, library and place of  

worship  appertaining  to  such  dwelling  house;  “even  land  perennially  

submerged  under  water”  refers  to  level  land  covered  by  water  which  is  

shallow  (which  retains  the  character  of  land  that  is  capable  of  growing  

certain types of crop or of vegetation trees/shrubs). He therefore contended  

that what was included to the general definition of “land” that is “land which  

is  used  or  capable  of  being  used  for  agricultural  or  horticultural”,  were  

different categories of land which though not directly used for agriculture or  

horticulture,  were capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture or  

which were incidental or necessary for agricultural horticultural activities.  

He  therefore  contended  that  a  “tank”  cannot  be  termed  as  land  for  the  

purpose of the Act.       

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5. The learned counsel for appellant relied upon two decisions of this  

Court  in  support  of  his  contention  that  the  definition  of  'land'  and  the  

provision relating to fixation of ceiling area of the land when read with the  

object of the Act made it clear that the Act is intended to apply only to land  

which is used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture, and  

that a tank which is obviously not capable of being used for agriculture or  

horticulture is not therefore land.  

5.1) The  first  is  the  decision  in  Authorized Officer,  Thanjavur  v.  S.   

Naganatha  Ayyar [1979 (3) SCC 466] where this Court held that the object  

of land ceiling laws is equitable distribution of land to the landless by taking  

over the surplus land by the State from large land-holders. He contended that  

a 'tank' cannot be distributed to the landless and that 'land' with reference to  

land ceiling law can only refer to land which is capable of being used for  

agriculture or horticulture.  

5.2) The second decision relied on by him is S. K. Arsed Ali v. S. K. Fazle  

Hakani [1996 (11) SCC 585] wherein this Court while considering whether  

an area described as 'Matsyasheho Pushkarini'  in a sale deed,  is 'land' or

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'tank' for the purpose of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 196, observed thus  

:

“There  the  land  sold  to  the  pre-emptor  has  been  described  as  “Matsyasheho Pushkarini” which in English means a tank/pond full  of fish. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in relying upon  an earlier decision of that Court in  Niranjan Das v.  Lakshmi Mani  Dasi (1986 CWN 318) has taken the view that 'doba' does not come  within the mischief of the word 'tank' as is apparent from the Wilson's   Glossary  of  Words.  We  have  caused  a  copy  thereof  to  be  placed  before us and we find therefrom that the word 'doba' in Bengali means  immersed, low and swampy of inundated land. The depth of such land  perhaps comes to cause a distinction between a 'doba' and a 'tank'.  Apparently the High Court was of the view that if surface waters be  shallow, then the land even though inundated will retain the character  of the land, bearing at the back of its mind that paddy crop can be  grown in puddled lands. Correspondingly, if the depth is more which  prevents the land being put to agricultural use then it would be 'tank'  for  the  purposes  of  the  West  Bengal  Land  Reforms  Act  and  in  particular Section 2(7) thereof, which defines 'land' to be agricultural  land, tank being an exception thereto. Now here the land has been  described as 'Matsyasheho Pushkarini' which apparently would mean  a pond with sufficient water, abounding in fish and seemingly it was  so described in the deed of sale in favour of the respondent. Thus the  area owned by the respondent did not come within the ambit of the  word 'land' for the purposes of Section 2(7) of the West Bengal Land  Reforms Act, 1995.”

6. At the outset, we should notice that we are not concerned with the  

validity of the Act or the validity of the definition of 'land' in the Act. We are  

concerned only with the true meaning of the word 'land' as defined in the  

Act.  When  a  particular  word  is  defined  in  an  Act  with  reference  to  its  

ordinary and normal meaning, and then includes certain additional 'meaning'  

which would not  normally follow but for the specific inclusion,  it  is  not

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possible to contend that that the extended meaning is contrary to the general  

or normal meaning and therefore it should be ignored. To put it differently,  

if  a  word is  defined as  A and B and includes  C, D,  E and F,  the  word  

'includes' is used in order to enlarge the meaning of the words 'A' and 'B';  

and when it is so used, those words must be construed as comprehending not  

only what they signify  according to their natural import (that is 'A' and 'B')  

but also those things  which the interpretation clause declares  that they shall  

include (that is C, D, E & F). (See : generally the observations in  Justice   

G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation - 11th (2008) Edition Page  

174-181)

7. Section 3 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall have  

effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law,  

customs, usage or agreement, for the time being in force or in any decree or  

order of any court. Section 4 deals with fixation of ceiling area of land. It  

provides that on the appointed day, the following shall be the ceiling area of  

land for one family  for the purpose of the Act ;

(a) 15  acres  of  land  irrigated  or  capable  of  being  irrigated  by  flow  irrigation work or tubewells or lift irrigation which are constructed,  maintained, improved or controlled by government or its agencies etc,  capable of growing at least two crops in a year (class I land);

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(b) 18 acres of land irrigated by private lift irrigation, or private tubewells  which provide or are capable of providing water for more than one  seaon (class II land); or  

(c) 25  acres  of  land  irrigated  or  capable  of  being  irrigated  by  works  which provide or are capable of providing water for only one season  (class III land); or

(d) 30 acres of land other than those referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c) and  (f)  or  land which is  an orchard or  used for  any other  horticulture  purpose (class IV land); or

(e) 37.5 acres of Diara land or chaur (class V land); or

(f) 45 acres of hilly, sandy, forest land, even land perennially submerged  under water or other kind of land, none of which yields paddy, rabi or  cash crop (class VI land).  

          8. At  the  outset  we  should  clear  certain  red-herrings.  First  is  the  

amendment to the Act in Bihar whereby the words “even land” has been  

substituted  by  the  words  “also  the  land”  in  the  year  2002.  The  said  

amendment cannot be applied or extended to the State of Jharkhand as that  

State has not made such amendment. Secondly, it is not possible to treat the  

said amendment as mere clarification or re-statement of the pre-amendment  

position. There are sufficient indications in the Act to show that the word  

'even' was not used to mean 'also'. The Hindi version of the Act uses the  

words “Barhaon mahine jalmagan Samtal Bhoomi” for the English words  

“even  land  perennially  submerged  under  water”.  The  use  of  the  word  

'Samtal' for 'even' shows the word 'even'  was not intended to mean “also” ,

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but to mean “level surface”. Further, section 4(f) lists “even land perennially  

submerged under water” as one of the categories of land to be considered as  

class VI land along with hilly, sandy, forest land. Therefore, the words “even  

land perennially  submerged under water”  refer  to  “level  land perennially  

submerged under water” as contrasted from river beds covered with water  

or ravines filled with water.

9. The second is the role of the object of the Act while interpreting its  

provisions. It is true that one of the objects of the Act is to take over surplus  

land  from  large  land-holders,  and  distribute  such  excess  land  among  

landless.  But  it  does  not  follow  therefrom that  only  land  that  could  be  

distributed  among  landless  for  agricultural/horticultural  purposes,  can  be  

considered as 'land' and not other lands. The courts, while interpreting the  

provisions of any Act should, no doubt, adopt an object oriented approach  

keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be avoided so long  

as interpretative possibility permits. But at  the same time, the courts will  

have to keep in mind that the object oriented approach, cannot be carried to  

the extent of doing violence to the plain language used in the statute, by re-

writing  the  words  of  a  statute  in  place  of  the  actual  words  used,  or  by  

ignoring definite words used in the statue. (See : the observations of this

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court  in  Commissioner of Income Tax v.  Budhraja and Company – 1994  

Supp.  (1)  SCC  208  and  Justice  G.P.  Singh's  Principles  of  Statutory  

Interpretation -  11th Edition,  Page 116-117).  Therefore the decision in  S.  

Naganatha Ayyar (supra) relied on by the appellant will be of no assistance.

10. The third is the emphasis on the general meaning of the word 'tank'  

and the consequential contention that no one would think of a 'tank' as 'land'.  

The argument is sea is not considered as land, river is not land and therefore  

tank also cannot be land. It is pointed out that if the determining factor is  

existence of land or level surface beneath the water to say 'tank' is land, then  

even sea and rivers also will have to be treated as land. It is submitted that  

when land is perennially covered with water, such land cease to be 'land' as  

ordinarily understood, and become water bodies  which may be an ocean,  

sea, river, lake, tank or pond, depending upon the size, situation and nature  

of the water body. Reliance is placed on the decision of  Arsed Ali  (supra)  

where it was held that a pond abounding with fish was not land. But general  

meanings and perceptions, or decisions rendered with reference to statutes  

containing different definitions will not be of any assistance in interpreting a  

word which is clearly, specially and exhaustively defined in the Act itself.  

We will  have to find out  the meaning of  the word,  with reference to its

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definition in the Act. While the object of the Act can be one of the indicators  

used in interpretation, clear and specific words used cannot be ignored. In  

fact the learned Single Judge keeping in view the object of the Act, has held  

that only tanks used for agricultural purposes will be 'land' for purposes of  

the Act and not all tanks in general. Let us now examine the provisions of  

the Act to find out whether a 'tank' used for agricultural purposes is land, as  

held by the High Court, keeping the above principles in view.

11. It is no doubt true that the word 'land' would not have included a tank,  

in the normal sense, but for its definition specifically including “even land  

perennially  submerged  under  water”.  The  word  'tank'  is  defined  in  P.  

Ramanatha  Aiyar's  Advanced  Law Lexicon,  (Third  Edition,  Vol.  4,  page  

4608) as follows :  

“”Tank”. - A pond or pool, or lake; a tank is often of many acres  in extent; an irrigation reservoir, a dammed up ravine or other  suitable place for collecting the water............

All the following three together, namely (i) the  underground or  the  land  underneath,  on  which  water  is  stored  (ii)  the  embankment or the bandh which serves the purpose of keeping  the water confined within its boundary and (iii) the bed or pet of  the tank, is known as tank.  

12. As noticed above, the definition of “land” includes homestead of the  

land-holder. Explanation (I) to section 2(f) defines “homestead” as including

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any  tank  appurtenant  to  the  dwelling house.  If  a  tank appurtenant  to  the  

dwelling  house  is  land,  it  follows  that  any  tank  appurtenant  to  

agricultural/horticultural  land  used  to  irrigate  or  water  such  

agricultural/horticultural land, will also be land.  When tank is specifically  

referred to as land in Explanation-I to the definition of the word 'land' in  

section 2(f), it is not possible to accept the contention that no tank can be  

land.

13. Explanation (II) to the definition of 'land'  states that “land perennially  

submerged under water” shall not include “submerged in the bed of a river” .  

This clearly implies that in the State of Bihar/Jharkhand, all land perennially  

submerged under water, except riverbeds, is land. The apparent legislative  

intention is that not only the land actually used for agriculture or horticulture  

but any or every land which is used incidental or appurtenant to agriculture  

or  horticulture,  is  also  land.  This  is  evident  from  the  definition  of  

'homestead'.  Any  dwelling  house  which  is  situated  in  an  agricultural  or  

horticultural  land,  which  is  intended  for  the  dwelling  of  persons  is  a  

homestead and is included in the definition of land. Further, any outbuilding  

used for the purposes connected with agriculture or horticulture is also part  

of homestead and therefore, land. Any artificial or natural body of water,

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situated  in  private  holdings,  which  irrigates  or  supplies  water  for  the  

agricultural or horticultural purposes is also land. The word 'even land' with  

reference to the land submerged under water shows that what is excluded is  

riverbeds  or  ravines  filled  with  water.  The  use  of  the  words  'even  land  

perennially  submerged under water'  in the definition of 'land'  would thus  

indicate that a tank also is land. What is excluded from the definition of land  

is the riverbed, or a tank which is a dammed ravine. Section 4(f) of the Act  

which prescribes the ceiling area in regard to Class VI lands also reiterates  

that even land perennially submerged under water, is land.   

14. Having regard to the clear and specific words used in the definition of  

'land',  it  is  not  possible  to  exclude  land  perennially  covered  with  water,  

which includes tanks, from the definition of land. We  therefore  agree that  

tanks  meant to provide water for  agricultural/horticultural purposes is 'land'  

for  purposes of  the  Act.  We therefore  find no error  in the  orders  of  the  

learned Single Judge affirmed by the Division Bench and consequently, the  

appeal is dismissed.    

...……………………….J. (R. V. Raveendran)

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New Delhi; ………………………J. July 7, 2009. (J. M. Panchal)