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PETITIONER: K. N. BAHL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/10/1978

BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. UNTWALIA, N.L. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1979 AIR  220            1979 SCR  (2)1089  1978 SCC  (4) 336

ACT:      Services   and    dismissals-Abolition   of   post-Post temporary and continued from time to time-Post abolished and incumbent reverted  to parent department--Neither shown that the reversion  was ordered  for a collateral purpose nor for the ostensible  purpose of  abolishing an  unnecessary post- Jurisdiction to interfere under Art. 226 of Constitution.      Administrative Law-Administrative Order-Person alleging mala  fides   to  prove   males   animus-Both   direct   and circumstantial evidence admissible to establish lack of bona fides or bad faith.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant   who  was  an  employee  of  the  State Government in the Horticulture department, was on deputation with the Central Government. In May, 1952 he was selected by the State  Public Service  Commission as Landscape Architect on a  temporary basis. From time to time he sought extension of time  for joining the post and it was granted. Eventually when he reported for duty in June, 1953 he was informed that the offer  made to him stood cancelled as he did not join in time and that the post had been filled by appointing someone else. He therefore rejoined the Government of India. In 1954 the State  Service  Commission  again  advertised  the  post stating that  it was  a temporary  post but  was  likely  to continue. The appellant was selected for the post and joined it on November 6, 1954. His period of probation was extended but he  was not  confirmed in the post. Eventually the State Government  decided   to  abolish   the  post  of  Landscape Architect with  immediate effect  and the appellant reverted to his  substantive post in the State service on November 4, 1958.      The High Court dismissed the appellant’s writ petition.      In appeal  to this Court it was contended on his behalf that (i)  the order  of premature  abolition of the post was male fide  in that it was the result of inordinate hostility of higher  officers towards  him; (ii) the discontinuance of the post  was due  to personal  reasons because  the  higher officers  were   displeased  with   him  for   pointing  out irregularities in  incurring expenditure and (iii) the order abolishing the  post  was  illegal  because  it  denied  the

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benefit of  three  months  notice  for  termination  of  his appointment.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: (1) (a) Although the appellant has based his case almost entirely  on mala  fides, he  has  not  succeeded  in proving the allegation. [1102G]      (b) He  did not  furnish the  necessary particulars for the allegation.  What he  had to prove was not malice in its legal sense  but males  animus  indicating  that  the  State Government was  actuated either by spite or ill-will against him, 1090 or by  indirect or  improper motives.  It was also not shown that his  reversion was ordered for a collateral purpose and not for  the ostensible purpose of abolishing an unnecessary post,  or   by  proving   that  the  ostensible  purpose  of abolishing the  post was  so unconvincing  and absurd  as to lack bona  fides. Both  direct and  circumstantial  evidence were admissible  to establish  lack of  bona  fides  or  bad faith, but  the appellant  has not  succeeded in proving the allegation.                                             [1102 H-1103 B]      (c) It is for the person seeking to invalidate an order to establish  the charge  of bad faith. Such a charge may be made easily  or without any sense of responsibility. That is why courts examine it with care and attention.                                                        [1103 C]      S. Pratap  Singh v.  The State  of Punjab, [1964] 4 SCR 733 at 741; referred to.      (2) It  cannot be  said that  the  post  was  abolished without reason  or justification,  but with the intention of getting rid  of  the  appellant  somehow.  The  post  was  a temporary one  all through.  The question of continuation of the post  was referred  to a special committee presided over by the  Minister and  that committee  came to the conclusion that the  post was  no longer necessary and should therefore be abolished.  The Cadre Committee to which also a reference was made,  made a  similar recommendation.  The  reason  for abolishing the post was that almost all the plans which were needed for  the project  had been  prepared  and  the  Chief Engineer’s Organization would have no difficulty in carrying on the outstanding work. [1097 H, 1097 E-G]      State of  Haryana v. Des Raj Sengar, [1976] 2 SCR 1034; held not applicable.      (3) There  is  nothing  on  record  to  show  that  the appellant’s  alleged   exposure  of  irregularities  in  the expenditure led  to an  adverse decision  against him. While the   controversy   regarding   the   alleged   unauthorised expenditure was  raised in  December, 1954,  the decision to revert him was taken four years later.                                                   [1098 F]      (4) There was no term in the order of appointment given to the  appellant that  he would  be  entitled  to  a  three months’ notice for termination of his appointment. The State Public  Service   Commission  specified   in  the   impugned notification that the post was temporary upto February, 1955 but was likely to continue thereafter. If the appellant knew that the  term of  the post was to expire in November, 1958, he could  not possibly  claim that he should have been given three months’  notice. He  was fully aware of his precarious tenure from month to month. [1099 F-H]      (5) The  earlier order  of  the  Chief  Minister  dated February 13,  1958 in  the appellant’s favour could not give

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rise to any right as it was not expressed in the name of the Governor as required by Art. 166 of the Constitution and was not communicated to the appellant. It was only a provisional order  which  was  open  to  reconsideration  by  the  Chief Minister and  did not bind anyone. Nothing could, therefore, turn on  the Chief Minister’s order dated February 13, 1958, when it  was specifically  rescinded by his subsequent order dated October  29, 1958.  There  could  be  no  question  of appellant’s confirmation  as Landscape Architect as it was a temporary post  all through until it was allowed to lapse on November 4, 1958. [1101 G-1102 B] 1091      Bachittar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1962] Suppl. 3 SCR 713; referred to.      (6) This was not really a case of abolition of the post of Landscape  Architect, for  the post  was sanctioned  upto November 4, 1958 and was allowed to lapse thereafter.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1836 of 1978.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  27-5-1963  of  the Punjab and  Haryana High  Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 273/61.      Appellant in Person      R. S. Sodhi and Hardev Singh for Respondent No. 1.      Govind Das,  Badri Das  Sharma and  R. N.  Sachthey for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SHINGHAL J. This case for rehearing the appeal has come up before us in these circumstances.      Appellant K.  N. Bahl  was B.Sc.  (Agriculture) when he was appointed Overseer, Government Archaeological Gardens in Lahore, in  1935. After the partition of the Country, he was employed as Subdivisional Officer (Horticulture) P.W.D.B.&R. (Development) by  the Government  of  East  Punjab.  He  was selected for  appointment  as  Assistant  Superintendent  of Archaeological Gardens  in Delhi by the Union Public Service Commission and  took up  that appointment  in 1950  with the concurrence of  the East Punjab Government. While serving on that post,  he went to U.S.A. for further studies in Harvard and Cornell  Universities in 1951. While he was still there, the Punjab  Government issued  an  advertisement,  in  1952, inviting applications  for the  post of Landscape Architect, Capital Project,  Chandigarh, in  the scale of Rs. 625-1275. He applied  for the  post, and  was appointed  as  Landscape Architect on  a temporary  basis by  an order  dated May 24, 1952. He  returned  after  graduating  M.Sc.  (Cornell)  and becoming  an   Associate  of   the  Institute  of  Landscape Architects, England,  in 1953.  The Punjab Government issued an order  fixing his  pay at  Rs. 825/-.  The Government  of India requested  the Punjab  Government by  a telegram dated May 30,  1953, for  a short extension in the time allowed to Bahl to  join as  Landscape Architect,  Chandigarh.  He  was relieved by  the Government  of India  on June 27, 1953, and reported for  duty at  Chandigarh on  June 30,  1953. He was however not  allowed to  join as the Chief Engineer took the stand that  he was  not in  possession of  the order  of his appointment. The  State Government  in fact  appears to have taken the view that as Bahl had 1092 failed to join the Capital Project by June 1, 1953, the post had been  filled by  another  candidate  and  the  offer  of

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appointment to  him stood  cancelled on  May 30,  1953.  The Punjab  Government   appointed  Harinder   Singh  Dhinsa  as Landscape Architect  by its  order dated July 16, 1953. Even though the  Government of  India sent  a letter on August 8, 1953, explaining  the delay  in relieving  Bahl and pointing out that  it was not due to his fault, he was not allowed to join. The  Punjab Government  wrote back  in reply  that the offer stood  cancelled on  May 30,  1953, and  could not  be revived. Bahl  therefore rejoined the Government of India on September 30, 1953.      It so  happened that  the Punjab  Government once again advertised the  post of  Landscape Architect in 1954 stating that it  was a  temporary post  but was  likely to  continue after February  28, 1955,  and the period of probation would be six  months in  case of  persons  already  in  Government service and one year for direct recruits. The Public Service Commission selected  Bahl for  the post  and  recommended  a starting pay of Rs. 825/- in its letter dated July 13, 1954. The  State   Government  was   requested  to   send  special assessment Reports  on the amount and quality of Bahl’s work in accordance  with the earlier instructions. Accordingly, a letter of  his temporary  appointment as Landscape Architect on a  starting pay  of Rs.  825/- was  issued by  the  State Government on October 21, 1954, requesting the Government of India to relieve him immediately. Bahl joined that post, and a  notification  was  issued  in  the  State  Gazette  dated November 23,  1954, intimating that he had taken over charge as   Landscape    Architect   and   Sub-divisional   Officer (Horticulture Subdivision) on November 6, 1954.      The probationary period of six months expired on May 5, 1955, but  no action was taken about Bahl’s confirmation. On the other  hand, his  period of  probation was extended upto June 14,  1957. Bahl’s representations for confirmation went unheeded. It has been specifically stated in paragraph 13 of the writ  petition that  there was "further extension of the post upto  February 28,  1958 and the end of March, 1958 and after that  the post was extended monthly but the petitioner was not  paid after  May, 1958,  although the  post had been extended upto November, 1958."      Soon after taking over charge on November 6, 1954, Bahl examined the  statement of  the sanctioned  work  for  which liabilities  were   being  incurred   without  sanction   or estimates, and  made  a  report  thereof  to  the  Executive Engineer on December 3, 1954. He followed that up by another letter dated December 17, 1954, pointing out how 1093 those liabilities were incurred under verbal orders and even without authority involving "large liability". He endorsed a copy of  that letter to the Superintending Engineer, Capital Project Circle,  for requesting the Financial Adviser to ask an Assistant  Accounts Officer  to cheek  the  statement  of unsanctioned work  for  the  month  of  November,  1954.  He himself addressed  a letter  to the Superintendent, Checking Party,  Office   of  the  Chief  Accounts  Officer,  Capital Project,  pointing   out  the   irregularities.  Check   was therefore taken  up, and an interim report was sent on March 23, 1955. It was stated in the report that an expenditure of Rs. 3,49,000/-  was unauthorised  as none  of the  estimated amount had  been technically  sanctioned or administratively approved. The  Finance Secretary  also took up the matter on April 19,  1955, and asked the Chief Engineer to investigate into the  serious  irregularities  and  to  tighten  up  the procedure in  order to  stop the  leakage or waste of public money. Another  letter was  issued on April 19, 1955, by way of reminder,  which contained  a suggestion  for vesting the

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Landscape Architect with powers of Sub-divisional Officer in his field  of work.  The Finance  Secretary also addressed a letter dated September 7, 1955, suggesting the delegation of some  executive   powers  to  the  Landscape  Architect  and providing him with the necessary staff so that he could take charge of  the  Horticulture  sub-division.  The  Accountant General sent  a letter  to the State Government on September 9,  1955,   for  sanctioning  either  an  extension  in  the probationary  period,   or  the  confirmation  of  Bahl.  He followed that  up by  another letter  dated May 15, 1956, by way of a reminder.      Bahl has  placed reliance  on a note dated September 5, 1957  to   show  that   the  Secretary  P.W.D.  (B.&R.)  had recommended  his  confirmation  on  the  temporary  post  of Landscape Architect "which was sanctioned till 28-2-57," and that the  Public Works  Minister had  agreed to  it but  had inquired the  date from  which the  confirmation was to take effect. The  case was  however not  submitted  to  him  till November 15,  1956 when  the Chief Engineer wrote that there was no  necessity for  the post  and Bahl may be served with three  months’   notice  and  reverted  to  the  Agriculture Department. One  S. Vohra  took over  as Secretary,  Capital Project. In his note dated September 5, 1957, he referred to the Chief Engineer’s earlier suggestion that Bahl’s work may be  watched   during  the  extended  period  of  six  months probation upto June 14, 1957 "as a last chance." By then the Superintending Engineer  had written  to the  Chief Engineer that he  was not  impressed by  Bahl’s behaviour towards his colleagues and  he was not "needed for the post of Landscape Architect as  the  work  is  being  done  by  AA/SA  or  for execution of Landscape plans, in view of the 1094 defects of  character that  have repeatedly come to notice." The Secretary  recommended that  Bahl’s services  should  be terminated and he may be sent back to his parent department. He suggested  that that could be done by abolishing the post of Landscape  Architect and  that as  Bahl was likely to get much lesser  pay  there,  that  matter  could  be  taken  up separately with  the Agriculture Department. It appears that the Estimates  Committee of  the  Vidhan  Sabha  recorded  a statement of  Bahl on September 25, 1957, to the effect that proper thought  had not  been given  to plantation  of trees before he  took over. Reference was made in the statement to H. S.  Randhawa, Chairman of the Landscape Committee, and it was stated that while he might have knowledge of trees, that did not mean that he was an expert in landscaping.      Some adverse  entries were  made about Bahl’s work, and he made a representation to the Chief Minister for expunging them on  November 5, 1957. He specifically stated there that he had  already submitted  his application  for  appointment under the  Government of India, and the Union Public Service Commission was  likely to  have his  personal file  in  that connection. For  that reason  he asked  for early  action to expunge the  remarks.  The  Minister  concerned  recorded  a minute on  February 11,  1958, saying  that he had carefully considered the  representation of Bahl and pointing out that the previous  two Ministers  had given  him good reports. He therefore recommended to the Chief Minister that the adverse entries made  against Bahl  should be expunged and he should be confirmed  on completion  of his period of probation. The Chief Minister  recorded his minute dated February 13, 1958, agreeing with the Minister but suggested that he may arrange to assign  the requisite staff to the Landscape Architect so that his  services may  be fully utilised in the preparation and execution  of landscape  plans. Orders  were  issued  on

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April 3,  1958, expunging  the adverse  remarks against Bahl for the  period April  1, 1955  to November  20,  1956,  and December 15,  1956 to March 31, 1957. That was followed by a minute of  the Minister  dated August  5, 1958, referring to his earlier note dated July 8, 1958 for confirmation of Bahl and asking  for the  file. He  recorded  another  minute  on August 18,  1958, to  the effect  that the post of Landscape Architect was most essential and stating that Government had ordered Bahl’s  confirmation and provision for staff to him. It was stated further that order of the Government had still to be implemented.      Bahl has  invited our attention to the Chief Engineer’s draft for  the abolition of the post of Landscape Architect, which he  sent to Randhawa on September 20, 1958, and to the note of  the Secretary  dated October  16,  1958,  that  the Committee had  come to  the  conclusion  that  the  post  of Landscape Architect  may be abolished with immediate effect. The 1095 Committee had met under the chairmanship of the Minister and he recorded  his sanction  to that  proposal on  October 19, 1958. The  Secretary prepared  a note  on October  22, 1958, accordingly, stating  that Bahl  should be  reverted to  his parent department.  He also  recommended  that  the  earlier decision to  expunge the adverse entries from Bahl’s service record should  be reviewed  and  those  entries  allowed  to stand. The  Minister  agreed  with  that  recommendation  on October 24/28,  1958. The  Chief Minister passed an order on October 29,  1958, that  it would  not look proper to modify the orders  already passed  by the  previous Minister  about expunging the  remarks with  which he had agreed. He however agreed to  Bahl’s reversion  to his  parent department  with immediate effect.  Orders were  accordingly issued  for  his reversion, and  it is  not in dispute that he stood reverted on November 4, 1958, to the Agriculture Department.      Bahl felt  aggrieved and  filed a  writ petition in the Punjab High  Court on  May 27, 1959. It was traversed by the State Government,  and a  learned Single  Judge of  the High Court dismissed it on September 7, 1961, leaving the parties to bear  their own  costs. Bahl  preferred an appeal, but it was  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  on  May  27,  1963.  A certificate was  however issued by the High Court for appeal to this  Court. It  was heard by a Bench of three judges and was dismissed on February 2, 1972. Bahl filed an application for review  of that  judgment but  it was dismissed on April 16, 1973.  He filed  another  review  petition  and  it  was dismissed on  July 29,1974.  It was restored by this Court’s order dated  September 30,1974,  and a  notice was issued to the respondent  to show cause why the review petition should not be  granted. The matter was then taken up on October 27, 1975,  when  the  Court  allowed  the  review  petition  and directed that  appeal to  be listed  for hearing.  It is  in these circumstances that this appeal has come up for hearing once again.      The arguments which have been advanced by the appellant relate to  mala fides,  and it will be desirable to refer to the allegation  in that respect in the writ petition. He has alleged that  "by his  good and honest work" he had incurred the "displeasure  of his  senior officers  who from the very beginning were averse to his being brought over as Landscape Architect." He has further alleged that "his senior officers were not  happy with him" and the order for the abolition of the post  of Landscape  Architect  was  passed  and  he  was reverted to  his parent department "mala fide, the result of inordinate hostility  of the High Officers of the respondent

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who had  not taken kindly to the petitioner, and who did not like that  the petitioner  should hold the post of Landscape Architect." This  has been  reiterated by  alleging that the post was 1096 abolished "solely  by the  desire to remove the petitioner". It would  thus appear  that the  allegations regarding  mala fides or  bad faith were quite vague and indefinite, and did not contain  any such detail as could enable the other party to answer  them adequately.  Even so,  we have  examined the arguments of the appellant with reference to the evidence on the record.      It has  been argued  that although  the  appellant  was appointed as Landscape Architect on a temporary basis in the Capital Project, Punjab, on May 24, 1952, he was not allowed to join that post when he reported for duty at Chandigarh on June  30,  1953,  and  had  to  rejoin  his  post  with  the Government of  India on  September 30,  1953. This  has been cited by  the  appellant  as  the  first  and  the  clearest instance of  bad faith  on the part of the State Government, and he  has tried  to trace  his subsequent  misfortune from that initial  episode. We  have gone  through the  order  of appointment dated  May 24,  1952, and  we find  that it  was categorically stated  in paragraph  4 that  if the appellant found the  terms of  his appointment  acceptable, he  should report for  duty to  the Senior  Architect, Capital Project, Simla, ’not  latter than June 30, 1952." That was reiterated in the  subsequent letter  of June  28, 1952.  But  as  will appear from  the reply of the respondents, the appellant did not join  the post  on the  appointed  date  and  asked  for extension  of  the  joining  time.  That  was  allowed  upto November, 1952,  but the appellant returned to India only in January 1953.  He did  not care  to join his post and raised the question of higher pay. He was allowed further extension in the  joining time  upto May  21,  1953,  with  the  clear stipulation that  if he  did not do so his appointment would be considered  as canceled.  He did  not join even then, and again  raised   the  question   of  higher  pay.  The  State Government could not therefore be blamed if it took the view that the  offer of  appointment was  not open to him when he wanted to  take over  charge on June 30, 1953, after a lapse of one  year from the date of the appointment, and appointed H. S.  Dhinse as  Landscape Architect.  An attempt  has been made to  argue that  Dhinse was a favorite of the Government and that  was the  motive for  preventing the appellant from joining the  post, but  that  is  easily  disproved  by  the further fact  that the Government displaced H. S. Dhinse and asked the Public Service Commission soon after, on April 22, 1954, to  recruit a  suitable officer  for the post. Nothing could   therefore   possibly   turn   on   the   appellant’s discomfiture in  missing the  first appointment  for, as has been shown, he himself was to blame for it.      It has  next been  argued that  after the appellant was selected for  appointment  as  Landscape  Architect  by  the Public Service  Commission and  took charge  on November  6, 1954, the post was abolished 1097 prematurely, out  of malice,  simply because the authorities concerned wanted  to terminate  his  services  somehow.  The appellant tried  to  contend  that  the  post  of  Landscape Architect was  meant to  continue even  after November, 1958 because of  the provision  in the  budget estimates  for the year 1958-59. The contention is futile because the appellant has himself  admitted in  paragraph 13  of the writ petition that the  post was  extended upto  February 28, 1958 and the

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end of  March, 1958  and "after  that the  post was extended monthly." It  has further  been stated  that  the  extension continued upto November 4, 1958. There is therefore no force in the argument that the post was abolished prematurely for, as has been held by the High Court, it was merely allowed to lapse on  the expiry  of its  extended term  on November  4, 1958.      The appellant  has tried to argue that the abolition of the post  was a  device to remove him and to punish him, and he has  tried to support his argument by a reference to this Court’s decision  in State  of Haryana v. Des Raj Sanger and another (1)  with the  further contention that the abolition was without  reason or  justification. The Punjab Government has dealt  with this  point in paragraphs 15-17 of its reply and  has  referred  to  the  appellant’s  inability  to  get alongwith his  subordinates and  colleagues as  well as with the senior  officers, and  his habit  of proceeding on leave without  prior   sanction  during   the  plantation  season. Reference has  also been  made to the fact that his post was temporary all  through. It  has been  pointed out  that  the question of  the continuation  of the post was referred to a Special Committee  consisting  of  the  Minister  of  Public Works, M.  S. Randhawa  and Saroop Krishna, Secretary to the Government (Capital  Project). It  has been  stated that the Committee  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  post  of Landscape Architect  was no  longer necessary and decided to abolish it  for that reason. The matter was in fact referred to  the   Cadre  Committee   which  also   made  a   similar recommendation. The  order abolishing  the post  is  on  the record, and it shows that the reason for abolishing the post was that  almost all  the plans  which were  needed for  the project  had   been  prepared   and  the   Chief  Engineers’ organisation could  have no  difficulty in  carrying on  the outstanding work of only Rs. 1.66 lakhs. It cannot therefore be said  that the  post  was  abolished  without  reason  or justification, with  the intention  of getting  rid  of  the appellant somehow  and the appellant cannot find any support from the decision in Des Raj Sanger’s case (supra). 1098      An  ancillary   argument  has   been  raised  that  the abolition of  the post  was in  violation of  the  Rules  of Business of  the State  Government according to which a post carrying a  salary of  Rs. 800/- per mensem or more could be abolished only  by the Council of Ministers. While examining the argument,  the trial  court took notice of the fact that it was  not raised  in the  writ petition,  and examined the relevant government  files for  satisfying itself  that  the final order  was passed  by the  Minister concerned  and the Chief Minister.  It has  also to be remembered that this was not really  a case  of abolition  of the  post of  Landscape Architect for,  as has  been stated,  it was sanctioned upto November 4, 1958, and was allowed to lapse thereafter.      The   appellant   has   tried   to   argue   that   his discontinuance on the post of Landscape Architect was due to personal  reasons   because  the   Chief  Engineer  and  the Superintending  Engineer   were  displeased   with  him  for pointing out certain irregularities in incurring expenditure even though  it was his duty to do so for he might otherwise have  been  held  responsible  for  them.  We  have  made  a reference to  the  developments  that  took  place  in  this connection when  the appellant sent a letter on December 17, 1954, reporting that certain references were untraceable and liabilities had been incurred under verbal orders or without authority involving  considerable amounts and expressing his inability to  submit the  statements without  examining  the

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matter. But  that  could  not  have  created  any  hostility against him  because a  recommendation was all the same made for  his   confirmation  by   the  Separately  concerned  as mentioned in  the copy  of the  note dated September 5, 1957 filed by  the appellant.  Moreover,  while  the  controversy regarding the alleged unauthorised expenditure was raised on December 17,  1954, the decision to revert the appellant was taken after  some four years on October 29, 1958, and we are not persuaded  that there  is any force in the argument that the appellant’s  alleged exposure  of irregularities  in the expenditure led  to an  adverse decision  against him  after such a  long time. It is also significant that it is not the appellant’s case  that any adverse remark was entered in his confidential report  before April  1, 1956.  That would  not have been  so if  the senior  officers were  against him and wanted to  run him  down because  he had  made an allegation regarding the irregularities in incurring the expenditure.      The  appellant  has  in  this  connection  invited  our attention to his statement before the Estimates Committee of the Punjab  Legislature in  which he pointed out the defects in the  earlier planning  and  management,  with  particular reference  to  M.  S.  Randhawa  who  was  Chairman  of  the Landscape Committee. The appellant stated there 1099 that while  Randhawa may  have knowledge  of trees, that did not mean  that he  was an expert in landscaping. It has been urged before  us that it was that statement which proved the appellant’s undoing,  and he  was thrown  out by  Randhawa’s influence. There  is however  no force in this argument also because the  adverse entries  against  him  related  to  the period April 1, 1956 to April 23, 1956 and November 15, 1956 to March  31, 1957,  whereas the  Estimates Committee met in September, 1957.  The other argument that the Chief Engineer went to  the extent  of preparing  the  memorandum  for  the abolition of  the post  of Landscape Architect at the behest of Randhawa who was then Additional Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi, and was not serving the Punjab Government, and that  it was sent for his approval on September 20, 1958 before circulation,  is also  of no  consequence because  he was, all the same, a member of the Capital Project Committee while serving  the Government  of India.  He  was  therefore directly concerned  with the  matter and  there was  nothing wrong in  consulting him  before sending  the memorandum for circulation to the other officers concerned. In fact, as has been stated, it came up for consideration before a Committee under the chairmanship of the Minister, and there is nothing on the  record to  show that there was bad faith on the part of the  members of the Committee including M. S. Randhawa in arriving at  a decision  on October  16, 1958, that the post shall  be   abolished.  Saroop  Krishna  was  the  Secretary concerned, and  the appellant  has not  found it possible to urge anything  against him.  He has also not found any fault with the Minister under whose chairmanship the Committee met and took  the decision which proved the appellant’s undoing. We are  therefore unable  to think  that  the  decision  was brought about by bad faith.      The  appellant   has  argued  further  that  the  order abolishing the post of Landscape Architect was illegal as it denied  him   the  benefit   of  three  months’  notice  for termination of  his appointment  in terms  of paragraph 5 of the notification  which was  issued by  the  Public  Service Commission inviting  applications for the post. Reference in this connection  has been  made to  a Secretariat note dated September 5,  1957. There  is  no  force  in  this  argument because  no  such  term  was  specified  in  the  letter  of

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temporary appointment  dated October  21, 1954.  Moreover it was specified  in the  notification of  the  Public  Service Commission that  the post was temporary upto February, 1955, but was likely to continue thereafter. So if the term of the post was  to expire  on November 4, 1958, to the appellant’s knowledge, he  could not  possibly claim that he should have been given three months’ notice all the same as he was fully aware of his precarious tenure from month to month. 1100      The appellant  has tried  to argue  that  the  post  of Landscape Architect  was not  continued  after  November  4, 1958, because  the Chief Engineer wanted to recruit Hardayal Singh Johal  on that  post later on. It has been pointed out that it  was for that purpose that the qualifications of the post were  reduced to  M.Sc. (Agriculture)  as Johal did not possess any  higher qualification.  This argument  is  again futile because  while the  post of  Landscape Architect  was allowed to  lapse on  November 4,  1958 it has been admitted before us by the appellant that Hardayal Singh Johal assumed charge as  Executive  Engineer  (Horticulture)  in  January, 1968. The  intervening period  of 10  years is sufficient to show that  there  was  no  ulterior  motive  of  the  nature suggested by the appellant.      Then it  has been argued that it was out of malice that confidential reports  on the  appellant’s work were obtained from R.  N. Dogra, Principal, Punjab Engineering College, by a letter  dated March  11, 1958 for the period April 1, 1955 to March 31, 1956, and a similar report was obtained from P. L. Verma  by a  letter dated  April 9,  1958, for the period November 6,  1954 to  March 31,  1955. The argument is of no consequence because  it is  not unusual,  or out of the way, for the  department concerned  to  complete  the  record  by asking for  missing reports  from officers  who  were  in  a position to supply them and had not retired. At any rate, if it had  been the  intention to run down the appellant, R. N. Dogra or  P. L.  Verma would not have missed the opportunity of entering the adverse reports at the appropriate time.      It is also the grievance of the appellant that although he  had   become  quite  senior  in  his  parent  department (Agriculture), he was reverted to a non-gazetted post in the scale  of  Rs.  100-300  which  virtually  amounted  to  the termination of his services. It has further been argued that even if  it had  been decided  to discontinue  the  post  of Landscape Architect,  there was  no reason why he should not have been  retained on  the post  of S.D.O.  (Horticulture). Here again,  the argument  loses sight  of the fact that the order which  the  Chief  Minister  had  made  was  that  the appellant should  be reverted  to his parent department, and if the  appellant had  cared to  join, there,  it would have been  open   to  him   to  make  a  representation  for  his appointment  on  a  proper  post  with  due  regard  to  his seniority and  service record.  If he  did not  do  so,  and stayed away  from his  parent department,  it is not open to him to  argue that  he was  not given  a proper  post there. While doing  so the  appellant could lay a claim to the post of S.D.O.  (Horticulture)  if  it  belonged  to  his  parent department, and if that was 1101 not so,  there could  be no justification for his asking for appointment to that post.      Considerable reliance  has been placed by the appellant on the  Chief Minister’s  minute dated  February 1, 1958, on the Minister’s  recommendation dated  February 11, 1958. The Minister stated  in his  minute that  he considered that the "adverse entries  made against him (Bahl) should be expunged

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and  he  should  be  confirmed  on  the  completion  of  his probation." That  led to  the following  order of  the Chief Minister dated February 13, 1958,-           "I agree  with R.  M. but he may kindly arrange to      assign requisite  staff to  the Landscape  Architect so      that his  services may be fully utilised by the Capital      Project Administration in the preparation and execution      of Landscape Plans." The appellant  could justifiably  argue that  what the Chief Minister had  agreed to  was not  only the expunction of the adverse entries,  but also  the Minister’s  proposal for his confirmation, and  that an  order should  have  been  issued accordingly. But  the fact remains that order was not issued for his  confirmation and,  on  the  other  hand,  when  the Minister concerned  sent the case back to the Chief Minister on October  24/28, 1958,  with the  proposal to  review  the earlier decision  for expunction of the adverse entries, and to abolish the post of Landscape Architect and to revert the appellant to  his  parent  department,  the  Chief  Minister passed the following order on October 29, 1958,-           "It would  not look  proper to  modify the  orders      already passed by the previous Minister about expunging      of the  remarks, and agreed to by me. I agree regarding      reversion of  Shri  Bahal  to  his  parent  Dept.  with      immediate effect." It is  therefore quite  clear that after the matter had been examined  further   in  consultation   with   the   officers concerned, the  Chief Minister  modified his  earlier  order dated  February  15,  1958  and  passed  an  order  for  the appellant’s immediate reversion to his parent department. It was therefore permissible for the department to issue orders accordingly. At  any rate,  the earlier  order of  the Chief Minister dated  February 13, 1958 could not give rise to any right in  favour of the appellant as it was not expressed in the name  of the  Governor as required by article 166 of the Constitution and  was not  communicated to the appellant. As has been held by this Court in Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab(1) it was only a provisional order which was 1102 open to  reconsideration by  the Chief  Minister and did not bind anyone.  Nothing could  therefore  turn  on  the  Chief Minister’s order  dated  February  13,  1958,  when  it  was specifically rescinded by his subsequent order dated October 29, 1958.  There could in fact be no question of appellant’s confirmation as  Landscape Architect  as it  was a temporary post all  through until  it was allowed to lapse on November 4, 1958.      The  appellant   has  invited  our  attention  to  some developments which  took place  after he  demitted office on November 4,  1958. He  has pointed  out that  the Government reversed the  earlier order expunging the adverse entries by the subsequent  order dated  December 18,  1958, and  it has been argued  that this  was enough  to prove  bad faith. Our attention has  in this connection been invited to the Deputy Secretary’s note  dated August  28, 1959,  that there was no cause for  reversing the earlier order. The respondents have pointed out  that the  Government re-examined the matter and reversed  the   earlier  decision   because  of   subsequent developments. But  even if it were assumed that there was no justification for  restoring the remarks which had once been expunged, that  could not establish bad faith in issuing the order for  the appellant’s  reversion as  it had been passed much earlier.      It appears  that the appellant made a representation to the Governor  of Punjab  on  April  22,  1959,  and  he  has

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reproduced the Governor’s minute dated July 17, 1959 thereon in his  petition of  appeal to  this  Court.  We  have  gone through the  minute and  it  shows  that  the  Governor  has expressed himself  strongly in  favour of the appellant. All the same,  he realised that he was unable to do anything for him; and  it has  not been urged before us that the Governor was in  a position to order the appellant’s reinstatement on the post of Landscape Architect.      It would  thus appear  that although  the appellant has based his  case almost  entirely on  mala fides,  he has not succeeded in  proving the allegation. As has been stated, he did  not   furnish  the   necessary  particulars   for   the allegation,  so   that  it   was  not   obligatory  for  the respondents to  deal with it in details in their reply. Even as the allegation stood, what the appellant had to prove was not malice in its legal sense, for that was not his case. He had therefore  to prove  malus animus  indicating  that  the respondent State  of Punjab  was actuated either by spite or ill will against him or by indirect or improper motives, but no such  particulars were  furnished by  him. The  appellant could also establish lack of bonafide either by proving that his 1103 reversion was  ordered for  a collateral purpose and not for the ostensible purpose of abolishing an unnecessary post, or by proving  that the  ostensible purpose  of abolishing  the post was  so unconvincing  and absurd as to lack bonafide in the  circumstances   of  the   case.  Both  the  direct  and circumstantial  evidence,   as  well   as  the  respondents’ admission and  the surrounding  circumstances of  the  case, were admissible to establish lack of bonafide, or bad faith, but the  fact remains  that, for  reasons already stated, he has not  succeeded in  proving the  allegation. As  has been held by  this Court  in S.  Pratap Singh  v.  The  State  of Punjab(1) it  is for  the person  seeking to  invalidate  an order to  establish the  charge of  bad faith.  It has to be remembered that  such a charge may be made easily or without a sense  of responsibility,  and that is why it is necessary for Courts  to examine  it with  care and  attention. As the appellant failed  in establishing  his case, we find nothing wrong with the impugned judgment of the High Court dated May 27, 1963,  and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.      Before parting  with the  case we will like to say that even though  the appellant has not succeeded in establishing mala fides  or bad faith on the part of the respondent State of Punjab,  it is  apparent that  he was  a highly qualified Landscape Architect  and there  is nothing  on the record to show that  he faked  integrity. The Governor has made strong observations in  his favour  in his  minute dated  July  17, 1959, and  we think  it is  desirable that the government or governments concerned  should make a lump sum payment to him in addition  to any  terminal benefit he might have received already, so that he may be able to find some solace now that he has  attained the  age of  superannuation and cannot look out for  fresh employment. It may also be mentioned that the appellant made  applications  for  the  production  of  some record by the State Governments but we were satisfied, while hearing the arguments, that the State Governments had placed whatever record  was available with them for the disposal of this appeal  and the  appellant cannot  have any  legitimate grievance on  that account.  So far  as we are concerned, we have not found any difficulty in disposing of this appeal on the basis of the material on the record. N.V.K.                                     Appeal dismissed.

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