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PETITIONER: K.   M. SHANMUGAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE S. R. V. S. (P) LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/02/1963

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. IMAM, SYED JAFFER DAYAL, RAGHUBAR MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1626            1964 SCR  (1) 809  CITATOR INFO :  D          1964 SC 477  (15)  R          1989 SC2138  (99)

ACT: Stage carriage permit--Marking system--Error apparent on the face  of the record--Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4  of  1939), ss. 43A, 47--Constitution of India Art. 226.

HEADNOTE: On  applications  for  permits  made  to  it  the   Regional Transport Authority, applying the markinig system prescribed by  the  Government order issued under s. 43A of  the  Motor Vehicles  Act,  granted  the permit to  the  appellant.   On appeal   by  the  first  respondent,  the  State   Transport Appellate Tribunal recast the marks but in doing so did  not allot  any  mark to the first respondent under the  head  of "residence  or place of business" and thereby  treating  the appellant  and  the  first respondent  as  equal,  gave  the appellant the further advantage of four marks under the head "viable unit".  The first respondent challenged the order of the Appellate Tribunal before the High Court under Art.  226 on  the  ground that the Appellate Tribunal  had  failed  to allot  him any mark in respect of his  admitted  residential qualification  and had thereby committed a breach of  s.  47 (1) (a) and (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act.  This  contention was  accepted by the learned single judge of the High  Court who quashed the order of the Appellate Tribunal and directed it  to  proceed according to law.  On  appeal  the  Division Bench confirmed the issue of the writ.  On appeal by special leave  by the appellant it was contended in this Court  that the  High  Court  has no jurisdiction to  issue  a  writ  of certiorari,  as the error, if any, was one of fact and  that the directions issued by the Government under s. 43A of  the Motor  Vehicles Act being only administrative in  character, order  made in breach thereof did not give rise to an  error of law which could be the subject matter of a writ. Held,  that  the question whether or not there was  such  an error  apparent on the face of the record as to  enable  the High  Court to interfere under Art. 226 of the  Constitution was one to be determined in each case and no particular test

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can or need be laid down as a general rule. 810 Hari  Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, [1955] 1  S.  C.. R..  1104,  Nagendra  Nath Bora v.  Commissioner   of  Hills Division  and  Appeals, Assam [1958] S. C. R.  1240,  Satya- narayan  v. Mallikarjun, [1960] 1 S. C. R. 890, Shri  Ambica Mills  Co. v. S. B. Bhatt, [1961] 3 S.C. R. 220,  Provincial Transport  Service v. State Industrial Court [1963] 3 S.  C. R. 650, Batuk Vyas v. Surat Municipality, A. I. R. 1953 Bom. 133  and  M/s.  Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The State  of  Madras, [1959] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 227, referred to. Held,  further, that though the directions issued  under  s. 43A  of the Act were administrative, they were  intended  to facilitate an objective, judgment of the considerations laid down in s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act and if applying  the directions  to a given case result in the breach of  s.  47, namely, ignoring a relevant consideration, it must give rise to  a  manifest  error  of law  and  furnish  a  ground  for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. M/s.  Raman & Baman  Ltd. v. State of Madras [1959] Supp.  2 S.  C. R. 227, Abdulla Rowther v. State Transport  Appellate Tribunal,  Madras,  A. 1. R. 1959 S. C. R.  896,  Ayyasswani Gounder v. M/s.  Soudambigai Motor Service C. A. No. 198  of 1962  decided on 17-9-62 and Sankara Ayyar v.  Marayanaswami Naidu,   C.  A.  No.  213  of  1960  decided  on   10-10-60, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 697 of 1962. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated March 21, 1962, of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal  No. 154 of 1960. B.   Sen, Ravinder Narain, O. C. Mathur and J.B. Dadachanji, for the appellant. A.   V. Visvanatha Sastri, and R. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent 1. A.   Ranganadham  Chetty  and A. V. Rangam,  for  respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 1963.   February 6. The judgment of the Court was  delivered by 811 SUBBA  RAO  J.-This  appeal by  special  leave  is  directed against  the judgment of a division Bench of the High  Court of  judicature for Madras confirming that a single judge  of that  Court allowing. the petition filed by  the  respondent under  Art. 226 of the constitution and quashing  the  order made  by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal  granting  a stage  carriage  permit  to  the  appellant  for  the  route Tanjore-Mannargudi via Vaduvoor. The  facts  relevant to the question raised may  be  briefly stated.   The Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore,  called for  applications  in  respect of the  issuing  of  a  stage carriage   permit  for  the  route  Tanjore-Mannargudi   via Vaduvoor.  11 persons applied for the permit.  The  Regional Transport Authority, adopting the marking system  prescribed in’  G.O. Ms. No. 1298 (Home) dated April  28,1956,  awarded marks to different applicants : the appellant of the highest number of Marks, viz., 7, and the first respondent got  only 4 1/4 marks, with the result the appellant was preferred  to the  respondent and a permit was issued to him.  It  is  not necessary   to  notice  the  marks  secured  by  the   other applicants before the Regional Transport Authority, for they are not before us.  Total of the said marks secured by  each

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of the said two parties was arrived at by gadding the  marks given under the following heads: Viable        Work-      Resi-      Experi-   Special   To- Unit          shop       dence      ence      circums-  tal                                               tances. 1             2          3          4         5 K.M.S 4       1          1          1/2       1/4       7 S.R.V.S.      1          1          1         1 1/4     4 It would be seen from the said table of marks that if the  4 marks secured by the appellant under the 812 first column "Viable Unit" were excluded from his total,  he would  have got only a total of 3 marks under the  remaining heads and the first respondent would have got a total of  41 marks  under  the  said  heads.  Under  the  said  G.O.,  as interpreted by this Court, the marks under the first column, i.e.,  those  given under the head "Viable Unit",  would  be counted only if other things were equal; that is to say,  if the  total  number  of  marks  obtained  by  the  said   two applicants under Cols.2 to 5 were equal.  It is,  therefore, obvious  that  on  the marks given  the  Regional  Transport Authority went wrong- in issuing, a permit in favour of  the appellant,  as he should not have taken  into  consideration the 4 marks given under the 1st Column since the total marks secured  by  him  under Cols. 2 to 5 were  less  than  those secured  by  the first respondent.  Aggrieved  by  the  said order, the first respondent preferred an appeal to the State Transport   Appellate  Tribunal,  hereinafter   called   the Appellate Tribunal.  The said Appellate Tribunal recast  the marks  in respect of the said two .parties in the  following manner: Viable      Work-     Resi-      Experi-     Special      To Unit        shop      dence      ence        circums-    tal                                              tances 1           2         3          4           5 K.M.S. 4    2         1          3/4         1/4         8 S.R.V.S.    2         -          1           1           4 It  would  be  seen from the marks given  by  the  Appellate Tribunal  that  the  total  of  the  marks  secured  by  the appellant under Cols. 2 to 5 is equal to that secured by the first  respondent  under  the said  columns,  each  of  them securing  4  marks.  It was contended before  the  Appellate Tribunal that the first respondent was entitled to some mark under  the  column "Residence or place of business"  on  the ground  813 that it had the places of business at Tanjore and Mannargudi and that the Regional Transport Authority had given one mark to  the  first respondent under the said column  ;  but  the Appellate  Tribunal rejected that contention on  the  ground that the first respondent had a branch office at  Kumbakonam and,  therefore, the office at Tanjore or  Mannargudi  could not be treated as a branch office.  Aggrieved by that order, the first respondent filed a petition before the High  Court under  Art. 226 of the Constitution for setting  aside  that order.  Ramachandra lyer, J., who heard the said application allowed it.  The main reason given by the learned judge  for allowing  the  petition  was  that  the  Appellate  Tribunal omitted   to  give  any  mark  in  respect  of   residential qualification, which amounted to refusal to take into consi- deration  the  admitted  fact, namely, the  existence  of  a workshop  at  Mannargudi  and therefore, it  amounted  to  a breach  of s. 47 (1) (a) and (c) of the Motor Vehicles  Act. The  same  idea  was expressed by the  learned  judge  in  a different way thus:

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             It............   in  regard   to   residential               qualification,  it  (the  Appellate  Tribunal)               declined   to  consider  whether  the   office               workshop  at  Mannargudi  are  sufficient   to               entitle the petitioner to any marks under head               for the mere reason that it was a branch of  a               branch office." He  held that the said refusal was an error apparent on  the face of the record; and he accordingly quashed the order and at  the  same time indicated that the result ’was  that  the State Transport Appellate Tribunal would have to dispose  of the  appeal afresh.  The Letters Patent appeal filed by  the appellant  was  heard  by a  division  Bench  consisting  of Anantanarayanan  and  Venkatadri, jj.   The  learned  judges dismissed  the  appeal and the reason of their  decision  is found in the following remarks               "In  essence, the judgment really proceeds  on               the basis that with regard to the claim of the               814               respondent  to  some valuation under  Col.  3,               arising  from  the  existence  of  an  alleged               branch office at Mannargudi there has been  no               judicial disposal of the claim." They also observed               "The  Tribunal  is, of course, at  liberty  to               adopt its own criteria for the valuation under               Col.   2,  provided  they   are   consistently               applied, and based upon some principle." In dismissing the appeal the learned judges concluded               "............ we desire to make it clear  that               we are not in any way fettering the discretion               of  the State Transport Appellate Tribunal  to               arrive at its own conclusion on the claims  of               the   two   parties   irrespective   of    any               observations that might have been incidentally               made by this Court on those claims." The  appellant has preferred the present appeal  by  special leave against the said order. It  will be seen from the aforesaid narration of facts  that the  High  Court issued the writ as it  was  satisfied  that there was a clear error apparent on the face of the  record, namely,  that  the Appellate Tribunal refused to  take  into consideration   the  existence  of  the  branch  office   at Mannargudi for awarding marks under the head "residence"  on the  ground  that  there was another  office  of  the  first respondent at Kumbakonam.  While it gave marks to the  appe- llant  for  his residence, it refused to give marks  to  the first respondent for its office on the aforesaid ground. Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the appellant, raised before us the following points (1) The.  Court has no jurisdiction  to issue a writ of certiorari under  816 Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash an order of a Tribunal on the ground that there is an apparent error of fact on the face  or the record, however gross it may be, and  that,  in the instant case, if there was an error, it was only one  of fact; (2) this Court has held that directions given under s. 43  of  the Motor Vehicles Act are  only  administrative  in character  and  that an order made by a Tribunal  in  breach thereof  does  not confer a right on a party  affected  and, therefore, the Appellate Tribunal’s order made in derogation of  the said directions could not be a subject-matter  of  a writ. The  argument of Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel  for the first respondent, may be summarized thus :

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The  petitioner (appellant herein) -has a fundamental  right to  carry on business in transport.  The Motor Vehicles  Act is a law imposing reasonable restrictions in public interest on  such right.  The Appellate Tribunal can decide,  on  the material placed before it, whether public interest would  be better  served if the permit was given to the  appellant  or the first respondent within the meaning of s. 47 of the said Act.  The Government, in exercise its powers under s. 43  of the said Act, gave administrative directions embodying  some principles for enabling the Tribunal to come to a conclusion on the said point.  The Tribunal had jurisdiction to  decide the  said  question on the basis of the principles  so  laid down  or dehors them.  In either view, it only  decides  the said  question.   The  first respondent  raised  before  the Tribunal  that public interest would be better served  if  a permit  was  issued to it as it had a well  equipped  branch office at Mannargudi.  The said question was relevant. in an inquiry  under s. 47 of the said Act, whether  the  Tribunal followed the instructions given by the Government or ignored them.  In coming to a conclusion on the said 816 question,  the Tribunal made a clear  error of law  inasmuch as  it held that in the case of the first respondent, as  it had  a branch at Kumbakonam, its other branch at  Mannargudi should  be ignored.  This, the learned counsel contends,  is an  error  apparent on the face of the record.   He  further contends  that  the scope of an inquiry under Art.  226  ’is wide  and that it enables the court to issue an  appropriate direction even in a case of an error of fact apparent on the face of the record. It  is  not necessary to express our opinion  on  the  wider question in regard to the scope and amplitude of Art. 226 of the  Constitution, namely, whether the jurisdiction  of  the High  Court  under the said Article to quash the  orders  of Administrative  tribunals is confined only to  circumstances under  which the High Court of England can issue a  writ  of certiorari  or is much Wider than the said power,  for  this appeal  can  satisfactorily and effectively be  disposed  of within the narrow limits of the ambit of the English Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari as understood  by this  Court.   If  it was necessary  to  tackle  the  larger question, we would have referred the matter to a Bench of  5 judges  as it involved a substantial question of law  as  to the  interpretation of the Constitution; and under Art.  145 thereof  such a question can be heard only by a Bench of  at least  5  judges.  In the circumstances a reference  to  the decisions of this Court cited at the Bar, which are  alleged to  have expressed conflicting views thereon, is not  called for.   We shall therefore, confine ourselves to  the  narrow question. Adverting  to  the scope of a writ of certiorari  in  common law,  this  Court,  in  Hari Vishnu  Kamath  v.  Syed  Ahmed Ishaque(1) laid down the following propositions:               (1)   Certiorari will be issued for correcting               errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior               (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104,1121, 1123.                817               Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or               in excess of it, or fails to exercise it.               (2)   Certiorari will also be issued when  the               Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the  exer-               cise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it               decides  without giving an opportunity to  the               parties   to   be  heard,  or   violates   the               principles of natural justice.

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             (3)   The  Court issuing a writ of  certiorari               acts  in  exercise of a  supervisory  and  not               appellate  jurisdiction.  One  consequence  of               this  is  that  the  Court  will  not   review               findings of fact reached by the inferior Court               or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous.               (4)   An    error   in   the    decision    or               determination itself may also be amenable to a               writ  of certiorari but it must be a  manifest               error apparent on the face of the  proceedings               e.g.,  when it is based on clear ignorance  or               disregard of the provisions of law. This  view  was  followed  in Nagendra  Nath  Bora,  v.  The Commissioner   Hills  Division  and  Appeals,   Assam   (1), Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun (2) Shri Ambica Mills Co. v.  S. B.  Bhutt (3) and in Provincial Transport Services v.  State Industrial  Court,  Nagpur  (4 ).  But  the  more  difficult question  is, what is the precise meaning of the  expression "’manifest error Apparent on the face of the proceedings  ?" Venkatarama   Ayyar,  J.,  attempted  to  define  the   said expression in Hari Vishnu Kamath’s Case (5) thus               "Mr.    Pathak   for  the   first   respondent               contended   on   the   strength   of   certain               observations  of  Chagla, C. J., in  Botuk  K.               Vyas v. Surat Municipality (1), that no  error               could  be said to be apparent on the  face  of               the record if it was               (1) [1958] S.C.R. 1240.    (2) [1960] 1 S.C.R.               8140               (3) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 920.  (4) [1963] 3  S.C.R.               650.               (5)  [1955]  1  S.C.R.  1104,1121,  1123   (6)               A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 133.               818               not  self  evident,  and  if  it  required  an               examination or argument to establish it.  This               test  might  afford a satisfactory  basis  for               decision in the majority of cases.  But  there               must  be cases in which even this  test  might               break  down,  because judicial  opinions  also               differ, and an error that might be  considered               by  one judge as self-evident might not be  so               considered by another.  The fact is that  what               is an error apparent on the face of the record               cannot  be defined precisely or  exhaustively,               there  being  an  element  of   indefiniteness               inherent  in its very nature, and it  must  be               left to be determined judicially on the  facts               of each case." It  would  be seen from the said remarks  that  the  learned judge could not lay down an objective test, for the  concept necessarily involves a subjective element.  Sinha,J., as  he then was speaking for the Court in Nagendra Nath Bora’s Case (1), attempted to elucidate the point further and  proceeded to observe at p. 1269-70 thus :               "’It  is  clear  from an  examination  of  the               authorities  of  this  Court as  also  of  the               courts in England, that one of the grounds  on               which  the jurisdiction of the High  Court  on               certiorari  may be invoked is an error of  law               apparent  on the face of the record and  every               error  either  of law or fact,  which  can  be               corrected by a superior court, in exercise  of               its  statutory powers as a court of appeal  or               revision."

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This  decision  assumes  that the scope of a.  writ  in  the nature  of certiorari or an order or direction to set  aside the  order  of an inferior tribunal under Art.  226  of  the Constitution  is  the same as that of a common law  writ  of certiorari in England we do not express any opinion on  this in this case.  This decision practically accepts the opinion expressed (1)  [1958] S.C.R. 1240.  819 by  this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath’s  Case (1).  The  only addition  it introduces is the anti-thesis it  made  between "’error of law and error of fact" and "error of law apparent on  the face of the record." But the question still  remains in  each case whether an error is one of law or of fact  and that  falls  to be decided on the facts of each  case.   Das Gupta,   J.,  makes  yet  another  attempt  to  define   the expression when he says in Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun  (2), at p.     141 thus :               "An  error  which has to be established  by  a               long  drawn  process of  reasoning  on  points               where  there may conceivably be  two  opinions               can hardly be said to be an error apparent  on               the  face of record.  As the above  discussion               of  the  rival contentions  show  the  alleged               error  in the present case is far  from  self-               evident and if it can be established, it  has.               to be established, by lengthy and  complicated               arguments." The  learned judge here lays down the complex nature of  the arguments  as  a test of apparent error of law.   This  test also may break, for what is complex to one judicial mind may be  clear  and  obvious to another :  it  depends  upon  the equipment  of a particular judge.  In the ultimate  analysis the said concept is comprised of many imponderables : it  is not capable of precise definition, as no objective criterion can  be  laid down, the apparent nature of the error,  to  a large  extent, being dependent upon the subjective  element. So too, in some cases the boundary between error of law  and error of fact is rather thin.  A tribunal may hold that  500 multiplied  by  10,000  is 5 lakhs (instead  of  50  lakhs); another tribunal may hold that a particular claim is  barred by  limitation by calculating the period of time  from  1956 instead  of 1961 ; and a third tribunal may make an  obvious error  deciding  a  mixed question of  fact  and  law.   The question whether the said errors are errors of (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1104,1121, 1123.  (2) [1960]  1  S.C.R. 890. 820 law  or fact cannot be posited on a priori  reasoning.,  but -falls  to be decided in each case.  We do not,,  therefore, propose  to define with any precision the concept of  "error of law apparent on the face of the record"; but it should be left,  as  it has always been done, to be  decided  in  each case. The only question therefore, is whether the State  Transport Appellate Tribunal committed an error of law apparent on the face  of the record.  A look at the provisions of s. 47  and s.  43  of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended  by  the Madras Legislature, will facilitate the appreciation of  the problem.   Under  s. 47, a Regional Transport  Authority  in considering  an application for a stage carriage  permit  is enjoined to have regard, inter alia, to the interests of the public  generally.  Section 43-A, introduced by  the  Madras Legislature  by the Motor Vehicles (Madras  Amendment)  Act, 1948,  says that the State Government may issue such  orders

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and  directions  of a general character as it  may  consider necessary  in  respect  of  any  matter  relevant  to   road transport to the State Transport Authority or to a  Regional Transport Authority and such Transport Authority shall  give effect to all such orders and directions.  It has been  held by  this Court in M/s.  Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The  State  of Madras  (1),  that  s. 43A conferred a power  on  the  State Government to issue administrative directions, and that  any direction issued thereunder was not a law regulating  rights of parties.  It was also pointed out that the order made and the  directions  issued  under s. 43-A  of  the  Act  cannot obviously  add  to,  or  subtract  from,  the  consideration prescribed  under  s. 47 thereof on the basis of  which  the tribunal is empowered to issue or refuse to issue a  permit, as  the  case  may  be.  It is,  therefore  clear  that  any direction given under s. 43A for the purpose of  considering conflicting claims for a permit by applicants can only be to enable the Regional Transport (1)  [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 227.  821 Authority  to discharge its duties, under s. 47 of  the  Act more satisfactorily, efficiently and impartially.  To put it differently,the  directions  so  given  cannot  enlarge   or restrict the jurisdiction of the said tribunal or  authority but  only afford a reasonable guide for exercising the  said jurisdiction.  Concretely stated, an applicant in  advancing his  claim  for a permit may place before the  Authority  an important circumstance in his favour, namely, that he has  a branch office on the route in respect whereof- he seeks  for a  permit.   He  may contend that he has an  office  on  the route,  and that the interests of the public will be  better served, as the necessary amenities or help to meet any even- tuality  in  the course of a trip will be  within  his  easy reach.    The  Government  also  under  s.  43A  may   issue instructions  to the Regional Transport Authority  that  the existence  of  an office of a particular  applicant  on  the route  would  be  in  the  interests  of  the  public   and, therefore, the said applicant should be given a preferential treatment  if other things are equal.  The issue of such  an instruction  only  emphasizes  a  relevant  fact  which   an authority  has  to take into consideration even if  such  an instruction  was  not given.  But if the Authority  under  a manifest   error   of   law  ignores   the   said   relevant consideration,  it  not  only  disobeys  the  administrative directions  given by the Government, but  also  transgresses the provisions of s. 47 of the Act.  The disobedience of the instructions  which  are administrative in  nature  may  not afford  a  cause of action to an aggrieved  party,  but  the transgression of the statutory law certainly does.  What  is the position in the present. case ? The Government issued G. O. No. 1298 (Home), dated April 28, 1956, introducing a marking system for assessing the  merits of  applicants for stage carriage permits.  Column  3  reads thus               "Location of residence or place of business of               the applicant on the route or at the  terminal               :               822               This  qualification not only is in  favour  of               local  enterprise  but also secures  that  the               owner  will pay prompt and frequent  attention               to the service entrusted to him.  One mark may               be assigned to this qualification." Under this instruction the location of the residence or  the place  of business is considered to be in the  interests  of

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the public, for whose benefit the service is entrusted to  a permit-holder.   The first respondent contended  before  the Regional  Transport Authority that he had branch offices  at Tanjore  and  mannargudi and therefore that fact  should  be taken  into consideration and a mark should be given to  him thereunder.  The Regional Transport Authority gave one  mark to  the appellant and also one mark to the first  respondent under  that column.  But the Appellate Tribunal  refused  to give any mark under that column to the first respondent  for the following reasons :               "On  behalf  of the other appellants  and  the               Respondent it is contended that appellant  No.               1 (1st respondent before the Supreme Court) is               a Private Ltd.  Company having its  registered               office at Madras, that their offices at Kumba-               konam  is  only  a  branch  office,  that  the               offices,  if any at Tanjore or  at  Mannargudi               cannot be treated as branch offices, and that,               as  such they are not entitled to any mark  in               column 3 of the mark list.  This contention is               a valid one." In regard to the Tanjore office the said appellate  Tribunal has given an additional reason by holding on the facts  that it was not an office at all.  We can, therefore, ignore  the Tanjore  office for the purpose of this appeal.  So  far  as the  mannargudi  office is concerned, the  decision  of  the Appellate Tribunal was based upon an obvious error.  It took the view that if a company bad a branch office at  823 one  particular  place, it could not have in law  any  other branch office though it had one in fact.  Whatever  conflict there  may be, on which we do not express any opinion, in  a tax  law or the company law, in the context of  the  marking system  and the evaluation of an amenity in the interest  of the public, it is obviously an untenable proposition to hold that even if a company has a well equipped office on a route in  respect of which a permit is applied for, it shall    be ignored  if  the  company has some  other  branch  somewhere unconnected  with that route.  That was what  the  Appellate Tribunal held and in our view it is an error apparent on the face  of the record.  On that erroneous view, the  Appellate Tribunal  did  Dot  decide  the  relevant  question  raised, namely,  whether  the  respondent has  any  such  office  at mannargudi.  Both Ramachandra Iyer, J., at the first  insta- nce,  and Anantanarayanan and Venkatadri, jj.,  in  ’appeal, rightly  pointed  out  this  error.  As  this  is  an  error apparent  on the face of the record, they quashed the  order of  the  Appellate Tribunal and left the question  open  for decision  by it.  In our view, the conclusion arrived at  by the High Court is correct. It  remains  only to notice the decisions  on  which  strong reliance  is placed by learned counsel for the appellant  in support of his contention. In  M/s.  Raman and Raman Ltd. v. The State of  Madras  (1), the  relevant  facts  were  :  the  appellant  and  the  4th respondent therein, along with others, were applicants for a stage  carriage  permit.  The Regional  Transport  Authority granted  the  permit  to  the  appellant  on  the  basis  of instructions issued by the State Government under s. 43A  of the Motor Vehicles Act; on appeal, the Central Road  Traffic Board  set  aside  that  order  on  the  footing  of   fresh instructions issued by the Government; and a division  Bench of  the Madras High Court dismissed the writ petition  filed by the appellant.  It was, (1)  [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 227.

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824 inter  alia,  contended  before this  Court  that  the  ins- tructions given under s. 43A being law regulating rights  of parties,  the appellate authority could not ignore that  law and set aside the order of the Regional Transport  Authority on.  the basis of subsequent instructions.   The  contention was  rejected on the ground that instructions under  s.  43A were  not law, but were only administrative  directions  and that the fact that the appellate tribunal ignored them would not  affect  its jurisdiction if it had come to  a  decision having  regard to the considerations laid down in s.  47  of the  Act.   The question before the tribunal was  whether  a small unit or a large one would be viable or would be in the interest  of  the  public.   There  was  scope,  for  taking different views on the question, and the appellate tribunal, contrary  to the earlier directions, came to the  conclusion that  smaller  units would be more in the  interest  of  the public  than larger ones.  This judgment, therefore,  is  an authority  only for the position that a tribunal in  issuing or  refusing  to  issue a permit to an  applicant  would  be acting within its jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that it  ignored  the  administrative  directions  given  by  the Government under s. 43A of the Act, provided it had come  to a decision on the relevant considerations laid down in s. 47 of the Act. In   Abdulla  Rowther  v.  The  State  Transport   Appellate Tribunal,  Madras  (1),  the  Regional  Transport  Authority issued  a  permit each to the appellant therein and  to  one Gopalan  Nair.  On appeal, the Appellate Tribunal set  aside that  order  and gave the permits to respondents, 3  and  4. Both  the  Regional Transport Authority  and  the  Appellate Tribunal  considered the applications on the basis  of  G.O. No.  1298 issued by the Government of Madras on  April,  28, 1956.  The Regional Transport Authority gave 4 marks each to the  appellant  and Gopalan Nair under Col. 1,  which  dealt with the building (1)  A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 896.  825 strength to viable units, and refused, to give any marks  to respondents 3 and 4 under the said column on the ground that they  were fleet owners; with the result that the  appellant and Gopalan Nair secured more marks than respondents 3 and 4 and  were, therefore, given the permits.  But the  Appellate Tribunal  held that the appellant and Gopalan Nair were  not entitled to claim the benefit of the marks under Col. 1,  as they  had secured less marks than respondents 3 and 4  under Cols.  3 to 5, for they held, on a fair obstruction  of  the said  G.O.,  that  it was only when the  marks  obtained  by applicants under Cols. 2 to 5 were equal, recourse could  be had  to  ’Col.  1. On that  basis,  the  Appellate  Tribunal quashed  the order of the Regional Transport  Authority  and gave  the  permits  to respondents 3 and  4.  The  appellant challenged  the said order by an application under Art.  226 of  the  Constitution for a writ of certiorari in  the  High Court of Madras.  Rajagopalan, J., dismissed the application on  two  grounds, namely, (1) that the construction  of  the G.O.  was not shown to be wrong and (2) that even if the  G. O.  was  misconstrued, it would not justify the issue  of  a writ  of  certiorari,  as  the  said  G.  O.  embodied  only administrative directions.  The Letters Patent Appeal  filed against  the said order was dismissed.  The appeal filed  to this  Court  was also dismissed.  This  Court  followed  the decision  in  M/s.   Raman and Raman Ltd. v.  The  State  of Madras  (1), and held that the -instructions given under  s. 43-A  of  the Motor Vehicles Act  were  only  administrative

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directions  and that, therefore, even if the rule as to  the assignment  of marks was infringed, it was not an  error  of law at all.  This decision only follows the earlier decision and  lays down that instructions given under s. 43A  of  the Motor  Vehicles Act are only administrative  directions  and that a wrong construction of the said instructions would not enable the party affected to apply for a writ of certiorari. The instructions laid down a method of evaluation (1)[1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 227. 826 of the respective claims vis-a-vis ’the considerations  laid down in s. 47 of the Act.  The Regional Transport  Authority and  the  Appellate  Tribunal have borne in  mind  the  said considerations,  in deciding upon the rival  claims,  though they  may have wrongly interpreted one of the  instructions. It  may be pointed out that in that case the  interpretation put  upon  the instructions was a correct one,  though  this Court proceeded on the assumption also that they might  have been wrongly interpreted.  But the decision cannot obviously be   an  authority  for  the  position  that  on   a   wrong interpretation  of the administrative directions  or  dehors the  said  directions, a tribunal can  ignore  the  relevant considerations  laid  down in s. 47 of the. Act  or  on  the basis  of  an error of law apparent on  the  record  wrongly refuse to decide on any of such considerations. To  the  same  effect  is the  decision  of  this  Court  in Ayyaswami  Gounder v. M/s.  Soudambigai Motor  Service  (1). There, the Regional Transport Authority followed the marking system as laid down by the Government of Madras and gave  to the  appellant  (therein) 5 marks and to  the  respondent  6 marks.  Though the respondent got 6 marks, he was not  given the  permit,  as in the view of the said  Authority  he  was guilty of misconduct.  As between the other applicants,  the appellant having secured the highest number of marks, he was given  a  permit.   But on  appeal  the  Appellate  Tribunal reallotted the marks and under the reallotment the appellant got  the highest number of marks; and because of  that  fact and also for the reason that he was a small operator of  two buses,  who  should be given an opportunity to  build  up  a viable unit as quickly as possible, he was given the  permit by  the  Appellate  Tribunal  upholding  the  order  of  the Regional  Transport Authority.  One of the  question  raised there was whether the appellant was entitled to marks  under Col. 2 for repair and maintenance, facilities at Dharapuram- the (1)  Civil Appeal No. 198 of 1962 (decided on 17-9-1962).  827 Appellate  Tribunal found that he had such facilities.   The appellant  filed  a writ in the High Court and  the  learned single  judge thought that some mistakes had been  committed by the Appellate Tribunal in the allotment of marks and that it  acted  in contravention of the directions given  by  the Government under the said G. O., but dismiss the petition on the ground that, as the said instructions are Only executive directions, their contravention did not confer any right  on the parties before the tribunal.  On Letters Patent Appeal a Division  Bench  of that Court set aside that order  on  the ground  that  the Appellate Tribunal had taken  into  consi- deration  the following two irrelevant  considerations:  (i) the   appellant’s  claim  should  suffer  because   of   the punishment  for  his past misconduct, and  (ii)  the  -third respondent  being a small operator, he would be entitled  to better   Consideration   than  the  appellant  who   was   a monopolist.  On appeal, this court followed the decision  in M/s.   Raman and Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras  (1)  and

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Abdullah  Rowther v. The State Transport Appellate  Tribunal (2) and held that under the said G. O. the Government issued only  administrative directions and that the failure of  the transport  authorities to follow them would not entitle  the respondents to a writ.  As regards the two reasons given  by the High Court, this Court came to the conclusion that  they were not irrelevant considerations, but were  considerations germane  in the matter of issue of permits.  In  the  result this  Court allowed the appeal.  This decision  accepts  two propositions, namely, (1) misconstruction or even  disregard of the instructions, given by the Government does not confer a right upon an aggrieved party to file a writ, for the said instructions are only administrative directions, and (2) the decision implies that if the Tribunal decides on  irrelevant considerations,  the  Court can issue a writ.  But  in  that case  it  came  to the conclusion that  no  such  irrelevant considerations weighed with the Tribunal. (1) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 227 (2) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 896. 828 The  last of the cases relied upon is that in Sankara  Ayyer v.  Narayanaswami  Naidu  (1).   There  too.,  the  Regional Transport  Authority  and  the  State  Transport   Appellate Tribunal  considered  the applications for the  grant  of  a permit  for  anew route on the basis of  the  administrative directions  given  by the State  Government.   The  regional Transport Authority gave the appellant 3 marks on the  basis that  he  was a small operator, but the  Appellate  Tribunal came to the conclusion that he was not entitled to any marks as  a small operator.  A single judge of the High Court  set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it  misconstrued the directions contained in the  Government Order relating to small operators.  But a division Bench  of that  Court in Letters Patent appeal held, relying upon  the earlier  decision  of this Court, that the  said  directions were  only  administrative in nature and that they  did  not confer any legal rights and in that view allowed the appeal. This  Court again following the earlier decisions  dismissed the  appeal  holding that by construing  the  administrative directions  the  Tribunal  did not  take  irrelevant  consi- derations or refused to take relevant considerations in  the matter  of issue of permits.  It is always  a  controversial question  whether the issue of a permit to a small  operator or to a big operator would be in the interest of the  public and a Tribunal is certainly entitled to take either view. It will be seen from the aforesaid decisions that this Court only  laid down that the instructions given under s. 43A  of the  Motor Vehicles Act were only administrative  directions and  that  the  infringement of those  instructions  by  the Tribunal  did not confer any right on a party to apply to  a High  Court for a writ under Art. 226 of  the  Constitution. In   all  those  cases  the  Tribunal  either  ignored   the instructions  or misconstrued them, but nonetheless  decided the question of issue of permits on considerations relevant (1)  Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1960 (decided on 10-10-1960).  829 under  s.  47 of the Act.  They are not authorities  on  the question  whether a writ of certiorari, would lie,  where  a Tribunal  had on an obviously wrong view of law  refused  to decide or wrongly decided on a consideration relevant -under s.  47  of  the Act, whether or not it was  covered  by  the instructions  given under s. 43-A.  For if on the  basis  of such  an  error  of law, it refuses  to  decide  a  relevant question,   the  fact  that  the  Government   also   issued instructions  to  the  Tribunal  to  apply  some   objective

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standards in deciding such a question does not make the said question anytheless a relevant consideration under s.  47 of the Act. That  is  the  position in the present  case.   As  we  have already indicated, on the basis of an error manifest on  the record,  namely, that a company cannot have a branch  office on  the  route  in  question,  if  it  has  another   branch elsewhere, it refused to take into consideration a  relevant fact,  namely, whether the respondent has an office  on  the said  route.   The  High  Court,  therefore,  was  right  in quashing  the order of the Appellate Tribunal and giving  an opportunity  to  the  Tribunal to decide  that  question  on merits. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 830