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PETITIONER: K. M. MANI ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P. J. ANTONY AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1978

BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1979 AIR  234            1979 SCR  (1) 701  1979 SCC  (2) 221  CITATOR INFO :  R          1981 SC   8  (10)  RF         1986 SC1253  (17)  R          1991 SC1557  (16,28)

ACT:      Representation of  the  People  Act  1951-Sec.  123(7)- Allegation that Police officer addressed an election meeting for  furtherance   of  candidates  election-Whether  corrupt practice.      Practice &  Procedure-Election cuses-Pleadings & Proof- An allegation  of corrupt  practice to be established beyond reasonable doubt-Addressing  meeting-Allegation  of  corrupt practice-No documentary evidence produced-Transcript. speech or contemporaneous record of speech-If should be produced.

HEADNOTE:      Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides, among others, that the obtaining or procuring by a candidate of any assistance (other than giving of vote) for the  furtherance of  the prospects  of that  candidate’s election from any person in the service of the Government is a corrupt practice.      The appellant  in Civil  Appeal No.  99 of 1978 who was declared elected  to  the  State  Assembly  in  the  General Elections of  1977 was a Minister of the State Government at the time  of election.  The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 79 of 1978  was a Police officer belonging to the Indian Police Service posted  as Commissioner  of Police at that time. The first respondent  in  both  cases  was  an  elector  in  the constituency. All the three were Roman Catholics.      In his election petition respondent No. 1 alleged that, at the instance of the first appellant or with his knowledge and consent,  the Police officer assisted the convening of a meeting of  the priests of the various parishes of the Roman Catholic Church  at the  Bishop’s house  which was  presided over by  the Bishop  for the  furtherance of the appellant’s victory in  the election. The Police (Officer was alleged to have exhorted them to work for the appellant’s victory as it was in  the interest  of the Church and community. The first appellant was  also F  alleged to  be at  the  meeting.  The respondent alleged  that this constituted a corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(7) of the Act.

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    The High  Court declared the election void. In addition it declared  that he  Police officer  was guilty  of corrupt practice.      on appeal  the appellant  contended (i)  that the  High Court was  in  error  in  holding  that  the  appellant  had committed a  corrupt practice  within  the  meaning  of  the section  and   (ii)  that  the  election  petition  was  not maintainable for  vagueness of  the pleadings in paragraph 5 of the election petition.      Allowing the appeal: ^      HELD: 1.  There is no direct evidence to prove that the Police officer  went tn  attend the  meeting at the Bishop’s house at  the instance  of the  appellant and spoke there at his instance and as the circumstantial evidence produced was inadequate to reach that conclusion the High Court was wrong in holding that 702 the appellant  obtained and  procured the  services  of  the Police officer  in  furtherance  of  the  prospects  of  his election and  thereby committed  a corrupt practice under s. 123 (7) of the Act.                                                     [721B-C]      2 An  allegation regarding  the commission of a corrupt practice at  an election  is a  very serious matter not only for the  candidate but for the public at large as it relates to the purity of the electoral process.                                                       [712H]      3 (a)  An allegation  regarding  the  commission  of  a corrupt practice  is  in  the  nature  of  a  quasi-criminal proceeding which  has to  be established  beyond  reasonable doubt and not merely by preponderance of probabilities.                                                       [719C]      3  (b)  The  election  petitioner  must  exclude  every hypothesis except that of nature on the part of the returned candidate or  his election  agent. The  trial court erred in basing its finding on a mere probability.                                                       [720F]      R. M.  Seshadri v.  G. Vasantha  Pai [1969] 2 SCR 1019; Bhagwan Datta Shastri v. Ram Ratanji Gupta & Others AIR 1960 SC 200; Balwant Singh v Prakash Chand & Ors [1976] 3 SCR 335 referred to.      4. The  High Court  was right in holding that there was no sufficient  evidence to  substantiate the allegation that the Police  officer went  to the  place of  meeting  at  the appellant’s instance  to assist him in convening the meeting in  furtherance   of  his  prospects  in  the  election.  It therefore rightly  considered the  other question whether he addressed that meeting.                                                     [710F-G]      5. The  High Court  was not  justified in  reaching the conclusion that  the Police  officer intentionally tool; the great risk  of committing  an offence under s. 129(2) and of losing his  job out of fear or favour of the appellant. Even if r;’  all the  premises set  up by  the  High  Court  were accepted as  correct, it  would not  follow that  they would establish a  nexus between  the two, for it may well be that the police  officer did all that at the instance of some one else, or  out of  his own  desire to  curry favour  with the appellant in  the hope  of some  future advantage.  The High Court erred in basing its finding on a mere probability.      Mohan Singh  v. Bhanwarlal  & Ors.  AIR 1964  SC  1366; Samanand N.  Balakrishna etc.  v. George Fernandez & Others. [1969] 3 SCR 603 referred to.      6. It  was established  that  the  Police  officer  was

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present after  the meeting  had commenced and said something there. But  there was no satisfactory evidence to prove that the  Police  officer  spoke  anything  at  the  meeting  for furtherance of  the appellant’s  electoral prospects or that he went there and (" spoke at his instance.                                                 [712H; 719H]      7. Where  an allegation  relates to  a  charge  that  a candidate obtained  the assistance  of a  Police officer for the purpose  of addressing  a meeting  and  exhorting  those present to  work for his victory, it is reasonable to expect that a  transcript of his speech should be made available to the Court in support of the allegation. This would also give the  candidate   an  opportunity   of  meeting   a   precise allegation. Where it is not possible to give a transcript it would be  reasonable to  expect that  the  petitioner  would produce a  contemporaneous record  of the points made in the speech, or at least its substance.                                                     [713A-C] 703      In the instant case, no such record was made available. Even a  gist was not furnished. The allegation may well have been the  impression or  the opinion  of the  petitioner  on hearing what others told him about the speech because he was not present at the meeting.                                                       [713D]      8. A Police officer is a citizen, and an elector and is entitled to  have his own belief that a particular candidate would win  and to  express that belief with- out lending the impression that  it was  meant to assist him in the election in only manner. It would have been open to objection only if the Police  officer had  stated at  the meeting  that it was necessary for  the benefit of the Christian community that a person like  the appellant should win and become a Minister. to save them from the rigour of the Land Reforms Act. [714A- B]      9. Assuming  that the Police officer’s statement in his evidence that he had gone to the place of meeting to consult one of  the priests  on a  personal  matter  was  not  quite satisfactory, his  presence at  the meeting or expression of his personal  views there  could not  possibly amount to the commission of a corrupt practice under s. 123(7). [716H]      10. The  Bishop stated in his evidence that there was a news items  in a  newspaper that  the  Catholic  Church  was silent about  the election, that he (the Bishop) was against the appellant.  and that  some priests  thought that  such a wrong impression  should be  dispelled.  He  said  that  the meeting was  convened by  him for  the purpose of clarifying his position.  That evidence had been corroborated. Clearly, therefore,  the   meeting  was  held  at  the  Bishop’s  own initiative.[712E-F]      11(a) There  was nothing  in the  Bishop’s statement to show that  the Police  Officer exhorted the audience to work for the appellant’s victory. [713H]      11(b) The Bishop stated in his evidence that the Police officer said  that he  would give  up his uniform and job if that was  necessary. This  statement can not be used for the purpose of  proving the alleged corrupt practice. That was a statement regarding,  his future course of action. lt showed that he  realised that  without giving up his job it was not possible for  him to  assist the  appellant in the election. When he  was conscious  of that  limitation, it could not be believed that  he would  throw discretion  to the winds, and then and  there launch  an exhortation  for the  appellant’s success at  the polls.  The fact that no such impression was created will  be clear  from the Bishop’s answer that he did

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not know  what for  the witness mentioned his willingness to give up his job when necessary. [714C-E]      12. Taking an overall view of the evidence on record it must be  held that  the   High Court erred in preferring the statements of the petitioner‘s witnesses to the testimony of the Bishop. [716D]      13. Assuming  that the  appellant was  in or around the place of  meeting and  was attending one or the other of his election meetings,  it would  not necessarily follow that he visited the  Bishop’s house  while the meeting was going on. The election  petitioner did  not venture  to plead that the appellant attended  the Bishop’s  meeting even though such a plea  would   have  helped  him  in  establishing  a  direct connection between  the appellant and the meeting on the one hand and  between the  appellant and  what was  said by  the Police officer on the other. [718D-E] 11-549 SCI/78 704      14. The  argument that  the appellant was driven by the prospect of  defeat to seek assistance of the Police officer openly on  pain of  losing his  success at  the hands  of an elector has  no force.  What a  candidate would do or how he would react in such circumstances essentially depends on his mental make  up and  his reaction in such a matter is really one of  the imponderables of an electoral contest and cannot from the basis of  definite finding one way or the other. At any rate  the appellant  was not  new to the contest. He had won the elections on three earlier occasions.[720G-721A]      15(a) The appellant’s contention that the allegation in paragraph 5  of the  election petition which constituted the subject matter  of the appeal was vague was clearly an after thought and should be rejected. He had not shown that it has prejudiced his defence. [708C-D]      15(b) The law in regard to the verification of election petition is  contained in the proviso to s. 83(1) of the Act which  requires   that  the   affidavit  should  be  in  the "prescribed form".  A reference to r. 94A and Form 25 of the Conduct of Election Rules 1961 shows that it Would be enough for the  election petitioner to say that the statements made in the  petitioner paragraph were true to his "information . The election  petitioner in  the instant case had done this. [708E-F]      Virendra Kumar  Saklecha v.  Jagjiwan and Ors. [1972] 3 SCR 955 inapplicable.      15(c) The  appellant cannot  be heard  to say  for  the first time  in this  appeal that  he was  not answerable for what the  Police Officer  was alleged  to have stated at the meeting and  that his  case should  be judged on the limited allegation that  the Police  officer lent  his assistance to convene  the   meeting.  The   proper  way  to  examine  the controversy was  to consider the substance of the allegation and not  its form.  The allegation should be read as a whole and not in a disjointed way or to tear a line here or a line there, from  the context.  the paragraph  taken as  a  whole relates  to  the  allegation  regarding  the  commission  or corrupt practice under s. 123(7). The allegation was rightly taken in  the trial court to mean that the assistance of the Police officer  was obtained  or procured both for convening and addressing  the  meeting  for  the  furtherance  of  the appellant’s prospects in the election. [709C. H. D. F" G;

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 99 and 79

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of 1978.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  21-12-1977 of  the Kerala High Court in Election Petition No. 17 of 1977.      A.  K.  Sen,  Y.  S.  Chitale,  P.  Surendaran,  P.  B. Dadachanji J.  K. John,  C. K.  Srivashanker Panicker, T. R. Raman Pillai  and Manjul  Kumar, for  the Appellant (In C.A. 99/78).      Y. S.  Chitale, Miss  P. Nambiar  and A. S. Nambiar for the Appellant in C.A. No. 79/78.      P. Govindan  Nair. N.  Sudhakaran, Mathew Zachariah and Mrs. Krishan for Respondent No. 1. (In both the Appeals) 705      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SHINGHAL, J.-These two appeals are directed against two orders of  the Kerala High Court dated December 21, 1977, in the election petition of respondent P. J. Antony, an elector of the  Palai constituency (No. 94) of Legislative Assembly. P. J.  Antony challenged  the election  of K. M. Mani in the general election  of 1977  and prayed for a declaration that the other candidate N. C. Joseph, respondent No. 2, had been duly elected in that election. The High Court held that  K.  M. Mani  "obtained and  procured the services of Joseph Thomas, a  police officer,"  in furtherance of the prospects of his  election and  a corrupt practice was committed under sub-section (7  of section  123 of the Representation of the People Act,  1951, hereinafter  referred to  as the  Act. It therefore  declared   K.  M.   Mani’s  election   from   the constituency to be void, with costs, but rejected the prayer for directing  N. C.  Joseph to have been elected. It made a separate order  the same  day naming  K. M.  Mani and Joseph Thomas as  the  persons  who  were  guilty  of  the  corrupt practice. While  K. M. Mani has filed appeal No. 99 of- 1978 and will  hereafter be  referred to as the appellant, Joseph Thomas has filed appeal No. 79 of 1978.      Polling at the election was held on March 19, 1977, and the result  was declared on March 20. The appellant obtained 39,664 votes.  N.C. Joseph, who was the nearest rival at the election, obtained  24,807  votes  and  the  other  defeated candidate Joseph Cheriyan obtained 521 votes.      The appellant  was a  Roman Catholic and was working as the Finance Minister of the Kerala Government at the time of the election.  He was  the candidate of the Kerala Congress. which had  entered into  some sort  of an  election alliance with some  other parties. N. C. Joseph, who was also a Roman Catholic, was an independent candidate. The contest was thus between Roman Catholics.      The election  of the  appellant was challenged with the allegations that  he had  committed corrupt  practices under sub-sections (1),  (2), (3),  (4) and  (7) of section 123 of the Act. But the election petitioner did not even allege the ground for the commission of any corrupt practice under sub- section (4)  and did  not press  his case  in regard  to the commission of  the corrupt practice under sub-section (3) of section 123.  It is  also not in controversy that he did not find it possible to prove his allegations under sub-sections (1)  and  (2).  The  trial  court  however  found  that  the appellant had  committed a  corrupt    practice  under  sub- section (7) of section 123 and, as has been stated, it named him and Joseph Thomas as the persons who had been proved 706 at the trial to be guilty of that corrupt practice. We shall therefore confine  ourselves to  the question  whether  that corrupt practice  was committed  by the appellant and Joseph Thomas. In doing so we shall refer only to the pleadings and the evidence relating to it.

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    It was  alleged in the election petition that a meeting of the priests of the various parishes of the Roman Catholic Church within the area of the Palai constituency and certain other leaders of the Catholic Community" was convened at the Bishop’s house Palai, on March 12, 1977, at 8 p.m. which was presided over  by the  Bishop and was attended and addressed by Joseph  Thomas who  was an  officer of  the Indian Police Service  and   was  posted   as  City  Police  Commissioner, Trivandrum. As  the entire  allegation in  that respect  has been stated  in para  graph 5  of the  election petition, it will be convenient to extract it here,-           "5. The same meeting was attended and addressed by      Shri Joseph  Thomas, I.P.S.,  City Police Commissioner,      Trivandrum. Addressing  the  meeting  he  exhorted  the      Parish Priests  an(i leaders  of Community assembled in      that meeting to work for the success of Shri K. M. Mani      Ist respondent-  "as it  was in  the  interest  of  the      Church and Community". Shri Joseph Thomas went to Palai      at the  instance of 1st respondent Minister or with his      consent and knowledge to k; assist the convening of the      meeting of  the Bishop  and Priests for the furtherance      of the prospect of the victory of the Ist respondent in      the election.  Shri Joseph  Thomas  actually  addressed      this meeting  exhorting to  work for the victory of the      1st respondent.  The said  Joseph Thomas is a member of      the Police  Force and  a  Gazetted  Officer.  The  said      Police officer  is known  for his antipathy towards the      opposition Parties. Obtaining or procuring his services      for  the  furtherance  of  the  prospects  of  the  1st      respondent’s election  is a  corrupt  practice  falling      within   the   mischief   of   Sec.   123(7)   of   the      Representation of People Act, 1951."      The appellant  filed a  written statement  in which  he traversed the  averments in  the election  petition and,  in regard to  the allegation  in paragraph  S, he  set  up  the following  defence,-           "This respondent denies the averments in para 5 of      the petition.  This respondent  does not  know  whether      Shri Joseph Thomas attended or addressed the meeting as      alleged in  para  S  of  the  election  petition.  This      respondent is  not aware of any exhortation having been      made by Shri Joseph Thomas as alleged in paragraph S of      the petition. This respondent 707      denies that  Shri Joseph  Thomas went  to Palai  at the instance A of this respondent. He has not gone to Palai with this  respondent’s  consent  and  knowledge  to  assist  the convening  of   any  meeting   of  Bishop  and  Priests  for furtherance  of   the  prospect   of  the  victory  of  this respondent in  the election. This respondent is not aware as to whether  Shri Joseph  Thomas actually  addressed the said meeting  exhorting   to  work   for  the   victory  of  this respondent. This  respondent is  not aware  of  Shri  Joseph Thomas having  any antipathy towards the opposition parties. This respondent  has not  obtained or  procured his services for  furtherance  of  the  prospects  of  this  respondent’s election. This  respondent is  not  guilty  of  any  corrupt practice falling  within the  mischief of  s. 123(7)  of the Representation of Peoples Act." A  reply   was  filed   by  Joseph   Cheriyan  substantially supporting the  election petition,  but it has no bearing on the case.      The High  Court  framed  three  rather  general  issues raising the  question: (1) whether the election petition was maintainable, (2)  whether the election of the appellant was

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vitiated by  all or  any of the corrupt practices alleged in the  petition,   an(l  (3)   what  costs  and  reliefs  were admissible to the parties.      The High  Court found  that the  election petition  was maintainable and that Finding has not been challenged before us except  in regard  to the  vagueness of  the pleading  in paragraph 5.      The allegations  about the  commission of  the  corrupt practices were  set out  in paragraphs  4, 5  and 6  of  the election petition.  Although the appellant specifically took the plea  in his  written statement  that the  averments  in paragraphs 4 and 6 were vague, he did not take any such plea in regard  to paragraph 5. This shows that the allegation in paragraph 5,  which constitutes  the subject  matter of  the present appeal,  was not found to be vague and the appellant had no  difficulty in  setting out  his defence  thereto  in paragraph 8  of his  written statement.  Realising that  the appellant had  not found  it possible to raise any objection about the  vagueness of  the allegation  in paragraph 5, his learned counsel invited our attention to paragraph 11 of the written statement  where it was stated that the "allegations in the petition as well as the affidavit are too vague to be accepted and  acted upon,"  and that  "the averments  in the petition and  affidavit are purposely left vague with intent to fish out materials to fill up the lacuna." 708      A reading  of the whole of paragraph 11 shows, however, that it  was essentially  meant for  the purpose  of showing that the  affidavit which  had been  filed  along  with  the election petition did not conform to the requirements of the law and  could not be acted upon, and it was in that context that the  aforesaid averment was made about the vagueness of the allegations  in the  election petition  as well  as  the affidavit. But even if we were to correlate that averment of paragraph 11 to the allegations in the election petition, we have no  doubt that  it could  be said to relate only to the allegations in  paragraphs 4  and 6 of the election petition regarding the  commission of  corrupt practices  under  sub- sections (2),  (3) and  (1) of section 123 of the Act which, as has  been stated,  have not been raised for consideration in these  appeals. There  is therefore justification for the argument of  learned counsel  for the  respondent  that  the argument  regarding  the  vagueness  of  the  allegation  in paragraph of  the election  petition is  an afterthought and should be  rejected as  it has,  at any rate, nat been shown that it has prejudiced the defence.      It has  also been argued that the election petition has not been  properly verified  as it has not been stated which of the  averments in  paragraphs 3 to 6 were true "according to the  information received  by the  petitioner" and  which were "believed" by him to be true. Our attention has in this connection been  invited to  a judgement  of this  Court  in Virendra Kumar  Saklecha v.Jagjiwan  and others(’).  We find that the  only objection  which was  taken  in  the  written statement (paragraph 11) was that the "affidavit filed along with  the   Petition  (was)   not  in  conformity  with  the requirements of  law". The  law in that respect is contained in the  proviso to  section 83(1)  which requires  that  the affidavit  shall  be  in  the  "prescribed  form".  A  cross reference to  rule  94A  and  Form  25  of  the  Conduct  of Elections Rules  1961, shows  that it  was  enough  for  the election petitioner  to say  that the statements made in the relevant paragraphs  (3 to 6) were true to his "information" and that  is what  he has  done. The  decision  in  Saklecha turned on  the Rules of the High Court, but no breach of any

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rule of  the Kerala  High Court  has  been  brought  to  our notice.      It has  then been  argued that the allegation regarding the commission of the corrupt practice under sub-section (7) of section  123 was  merely to the effect that Joseph Thomas went to Palai at the instance if the appellant to assist the "convening" of the meeting of the Bishop and priests for the furtherance of  the appellant’s  prospects in  the election, and that  the further  averment in  paragraph 5  that Joseph Thomas "actually  addressed"  the  meeting  exhorting  those present to work for      (1) [1972] 3 S.C.R. 955. 709 the victory of the appellant, was not at the instance of the appellant and  he was  therefore not responsible for it even on the  basis of  the averment made in election petition. We are unable to uphold this argument for two reasons. Firstly, it was not the appellant’s case in the written statement, or during the  course of the trial, that the allegation against him  was  limited  to  Joseph  Thomas’s  assistance  to  the "convening" the  meeting at  the Bishop’s  house and did not extend to  his exhortation  to those present to work for the appellant’s victory  in the  election, and the argument that has now  been addressed  has been  made up subsequently. The appellant cannot  therefore be  heard to  say for  the first time in  this appeal  that he  is not  answerable  for  what Joseph Thomas  is alleged  to have  said at  the meeting and that the  case against him should stand or fall on the basis of the limited allegation that he lent his assistance to the convening of the meeting at the Bishop’s house. Secondly, it is necessary, for the purpose of appreciating an argument of this nature bearing on the contents, nature and extent of an allegation recording the commission of a corrupt practice to read the  allegation as  a whole, and not to disjoint it, or to tear  a line  here or  a line there, from the context. If this test  is applied  to the averment in paragraph 5 of the election petition, it will be quite clear that the paragraph taken as  a whole  relates to  the allegation  regarding the commission of  the corrupt practice under sub-section (7) of section l  23 of  the Act  in  obtaining  or  procuring  the assistance of  Joseph Thomas  not  only  for  convening  the meeting of the Bishop and the priests for the furtherance of the prospects of the appellants in the election but also his addressing that  meeting and exhorting those present to work for  that   purpose.  The  mere  fact  that  the  allegation regarding addressing  the meeting and exhorting the audience is contained  in a  separate sentence  will not  justify the argument that  the allegation in paragraph 5 was confined to "convening" the  meeting and  not to  addressing it. This is borne out  by the  sentences that  precede  and  follow  the allegation about  convening the meeting where it has clearly been stated  that the  police officer’s  services were  also obtained or  procured for  exhorting the priests to work for the  furtherance   of  the   prospects  of  the  appellant’s election. The  allegation was therefore rightly taken in the trial court to mean that the assistance of Joseph Thomas was obtained or  procured both  for convening and addressing the meeting for  the furtherance of the appellant’s prospects at the election.  The proper  way to examine a controversy like this is  to consider the substance of the allegation and not its mere  form. It  may be that a part of the allegation may be made  in a  separate sentence  or sentences,  and it  may also be that it may appear to be disjointed from the earlier allegation because  of inartistic  drafting, but  it is  the substance of the alle-

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710 gation which  is material  and not  its  mere  form.  It  is equally necessary  the allegation  should be read as a whole and construed  properly so  as to understand its true nature and content.  On such  an examination, we have no doubt that there is  no force  in  the  argument  that  the  allegation regarding the  corrupt practice  under  sub-section  (7)  of section 123  oft relate  to the  addressing  of  meeting  by Joseph Thomas.      There is  however justification for the argument of the learned counsel  for the  appellant that  the allegation  in paragraph 5  of the  election petition  is confined  to  the commission of  the corrupt practice by the candidate, namely K. M. Mani, and not by his agent or by any other person with the consent  of K. M. Mani or his election agent. The use of the words  "or with his consent and knowledge" are therefore of no  consequence and  it is in fact not disputed before ns that  the   allegation  is  confined  to  the  obtaining  or procuring of  Joseph Thomas’s  assistance in  convening  and addressing  the   meeting  at  the  Bishop’s  house  by  the appellant himself.      Before examining the controversy on the merits, it will be convenient to make a mention of those facts which are not in controversy before us. lt is thus not disputed now that a meeting was called by Dr. Sebastian Vayalil (P.W. 2), Bishop of Palai  Diocese, on  March 12,  1977, at  8  p.m.  at  his residence. It  was addressed by the Bishop and Joseph Thomas was present there. He was an officer belonging to the Indian Police Service  and  was  posted  as  City  Commissioner  of Police, Trivandrum,  in those  days, so that he was a member of police  forces within  the meaning  of clause (d) of sub- section (7) of section 123 of the Act.      It would  be recalled  that it was alleged, inter alia, in paragraph  S of  the election petition that Joseph Thomas went to Palai at the instance of the appellant to assist the conventing of the meeting for furtherance of the appellant’s prospects in  the election.  The trial  court however  found that sufficient  evidence was  not available to substantiate the allegation,  and it  therefore proceeded to consider the question whether he addressed that meeting as alleged in the election petition. That finding of fact of the High Court is quite correct and has rightly not been challenged before us.      We shall  therefore examine  the evidence  in regard to the other  two allegations  that Joseph Thomas addressed the meeting at  the instance of the appellant and exhorted those present to work for his victory in the election. In order to arrive at  a decision,  it will be convenient to examine why Joseph Thomas  went to  Palai, why  he visited  the Bishop’s house and what exactly he said in the meeting there. 711      lt has  been stated  by Joseph Thomas, and has not been disputed   before us,  that he  was posted  in those days as City Commissioner  of Police, Trivandrum, and no part of the Palai constituency  fell within his jurisdiction. It is also not  in  controversy  that  his  father  was  laid  up  with prolonged illness as all indoor patient in the hospital at y at a distance of there miles from Palai where they belonged. Joseph Thomas’s  statement that  he was  sent on  duty, by a written order,  to Cannanore,  that he  took  a  half  day’s casual leave  on March  12, 1977 on return to Ernakulam from Cannanore and  went to  Y hospital to meet his ailing father via Palai without stopping there and reached the hospital at 2.30 p.m..  has not  been disproved  by any  evidence on the record. On  the other  hand,  we  find  that  Dr.  Sebastian Vayalil (P.W.2),  the Bishop of Palai, has also stated about

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the illness of the father of Joseph Thomas for the preceding two or  three years.  The Bishop  was in  a position to know about it  because he  has stated  that Joseph  Vathavayalil, father of  Joseph Thomas,  was  the  legal  adviser  of  the Bishop’s house. He has further stated that he actually asked Joseph Thomas  how his  father was.  Nothing thing  has been brought on  the record  to disprove  the testimony of Joseph Thomas (P.W.  6) and  Dr. Sebastian Vayalil (P.W. 2) in this respect. In  fact as  Joseph Thomas’s  father was  suffering from a  prolonged illness  in the Bharananganam hospital, it was nothing  unusual for  his son Joseph Thomas to visit him off and  on,  and  he  cannot  be  blamed  if  he  took  the opportunity of his presence near Bharananganam to take leave of absence  for a  few hours  and go  and meet  him. Nothing could therefore  possibly turn  on the mere fact that Joseph Thomas was in Palai on March 12, 1977.      The question  which however arises for consideration is why Joseph  Thomas as  went to  the Bishop’s house at a time when a  meeting was being held there at about X p.m. An easy way of  proving the  allegation which  had been made in this connection in  the election  petition was  to establish that the meeting  was convened  at the  instance of Joseph Thomas but, as  has been  stated, the election petitioner failed to establish at  this was  so. The  Bishop (P.W. 2) has in fact left us  in no  doubt that  he himself  decided to  hold the meeting, and that the way from Bharananganam to Palai was by the road  which lay  in  front  of  his  house.  Dr.  Joseph Pallikkaparambil (P.W.  7), who was the Auxilliary Bishop of Palai Diocese,  has also stated that the decision to convene the meeting  was taken  by  the  Bishop.  It  was  therefore imperative for  the election  petitioner  to  establish  the remaining  allegation.   that  Joseph  Thomas  went  to  the Bishop’s house for the purpose of exhorting those present at the meeting  to work  for the  appellant’s  victory  in  the election and that he actually did so. 712      Joseph  Thomas   (P.W.  6)  has  stated  that  he  left Bharananganam hospital  at about  3.30 p.m.  and went to the Bishop’s house to see the Father Chancellor Madathilparambil in connection  with his suggestion regarding the marriage of the sister  of a  priest with his (Joseph Thomas’s) brother. He has  stated further that he met the Bishop and the Father Chancellor together  at  about  3.45  p.m..  because  the  F Chancellor lived  in the  same premises. He left there after 4.15 p.m.  for his  house  at  Palai  and  returned  to  the Bishop’s house  at about  8 p.m. to inform Father Chancellor about his  reaction regarding the proposal for his brother’s marriage and there he learnt that he was in the dining room. He went  there and  found a  number of  persons. He  met the Father Chancellor  and returned  soon after. We shall revert to Joseph  Thomas’s talk  in  the  Bishop’s  house  on  that occasion but  we find  it difficult  to reach the conclusion that he went there for the purpose of exhorting the audience to work  for the appellant’s success at the polls. It may be that Joseph  Thomas’s statement  about the  purpose  of  his visit to  the Bishop’s  house is not very convincing, but it will  not   be  possible   for  us  to  hold  the  appellant responsible for  it in  the absence  of any evidence to that effect on the record.      Bishop Sebastian  Vayalil (P.W 2) at whose instance and at whose  house the  meeting was held. has stated the reason for holding  it Briefly  stated, his  version is  that  news items Ex.  1 appeared  in the  Indian Express  on March  12, 1977, stating  that the  Catholic Church  was silent, and he received some  anonymous letters  saying that he was against

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Mani. As  some  priests  also  thought  that  such  a  wrong impression had been created, he thought it necessary to call the aforesaid meeting to clarify that he was not against the appellant.     This  statement   of  the   Bishop  has  been corroborated by  Father Joseph  Chovvathukunnel (P.W. 7) who was the  Auxilliary Bishop of the Diocese. We have therefore no hesitation  in holding  that the  meeting was held at the Bishop’s own initiative and for the purpose of making the clarification referred to by him. The Bishop has stated that he clarified  that he  was "not  against Mani  or any  other candidate", that the exercise of franchise was important and that all  should use  it prudently.  His statement  to  that effect has  not been shaken in cross-examination and has not been disproved.      It has  been established by the evidence on record that Joseph Thomas  was present  after the  meeting had commenced and said  some thing there. The question is what exactly did he say ?      An allegation  regarding the  commission of  a  corrupt practice at  an election  is ’I very serious matter not only for the  candidate but for the public at large as it relates to the purity of the electoral process. 713 Where therefore  the allegation relates to the charge that a candidate obtained  the assistance  of a  police officer for the purpose  of addressing  a meeting on the eve of the poll and exhorting  these present  to work for his victory. it is reasonable to expect that wherever possible, a transcript of his speech  shall be  made available to the Court in support of the  allegation. Besides  furnishing the precise material relating to the allegation to the election Court, it has the advantage of giving the respondent an opportunity of meeting a precise  allegation. But  it may  be that  this may not be possible in  a given  situation. In  that case  it  will  be reasonable and  fair to  expect that the election petitioner will produce  a contemporaneous  record of  the points  that were made  in the  speech, or at least its substance. But no such record  has been  made available  in this  case. Even a gist of what Joseph Thomas said at the meeting, has not been stated in  the election petition and the election petitioner has contended  himself by  making the cryptic statement that Joseph Thomas  "addressed this meeting exhorting to work for the victory  of the 1st respondent". That may well have been the impression  or the opinion of the election petitioner on hearing what others told him about the speech because he was admittedly not  present at  the meeting.  All the same, some other witnesses  have been examined about the purport of the speech, and we shall examine what they have stated.      Dr. Sebastian  Vayalil (P.W.  2), the Bishop who called the meeting  in his  house, has  stated that  Joseph  Thomas spoke at  the meeting  after his  own speech  was  over  and several priests  and expressed  their opinion.  He said that Bishop had  spoken about  document Ex.  1 and  the anonymous letters and  that "there  is  nothing  much  to  fear."  The witness has  further stated that Joseph Thomas said that his belief was  that K.  M. Mani  will win.  When he  was  asked whether Joseph  Thomas said that for the benefit of migrated Christians who  had lost  their lands on account of the Land Reforms Act, 1964, persons like Mani who loved the Christian community should  win and  become a  minister,  the  witness categorically stated  that  he  "didn’t  say  anything  like that." When  he was asked further whether Joseph Thomas said that he  was prepared to give up his uniform for the sake of Mani’s success,  the witness  stated that what Joseph Thomas said was  that "If it is necessary I will give up my uniform

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and job."  When the  witness was  clearly asked whether that was said  for the  success of the appellant, he replied that he did  not know  what for.  There is  thus nothing  in  the statement of  the Bishop,  who was  the prime  mover of  the meeting, to show that Joseph Thomas exhorted the audience to work for  the victory  of the  appellant or rendered him any assistance for  the furtherance  of his  prospects  in  that direction. Even a police officer whose assistance has 714 been prohibited  under sub-section (7) of section 123 of the Act, is  nonetheless  a  citizen  and  an  elector,  and  is entitled to  have his own belief that a particular candidate would win,  and to  express that  belief without  lending an impression that  it was  meant to assist him in the election in any  manner. It  would have  been open  to  objection  if Joseph  Thomas  had  stated  at  the  meeting  that  it  was necessary for  the benefit  of the  Christian community that persons like  Mani should  win and become a Minister to save them from the rigour of the Land Reforms Act, but the Bishop has returned a categorical answer that Joseph Thomas did not say any such thing.      The remaining  part of  the statement  of  the  witness relates  to   Joseph  Thomas’s  statement  that  if  it  was necessary he  would  give  up  his  uniform  and  job.  That question was  asked of  the witness  in the  context of  the appellant’s success  in the election but, even so, so reply, as stated  by the  Bishop, cannot  be said  to  be  open  to objection. Accord  that limitation,  it cannot  be  believed that he  would throw  discretion job  if that was necessary. That was  a statement regarding his future course of action, and it shows that Joseph Thomas realised that without giving up his  job it  was not  possible  for  him  to  assist  the appellant in  the election. When therefore Joseph Thomas was conscious of  that limitation, it cannot be believed that he would throw  discretion to  the winds  and  then  and  there launch an  exhortation for  the appellant’s  success at  the polls. The  fact that  no such  impression was  created from what Joseph  Thomas said  at the meeting, will be clear from the Bishop’s  answer that  he did  not  know  what  for  the witness mentioned  his willingness  to give  up his job when necessary. We  have no reason to disbelieve the statement of the Bishop,  and we  are unable to take the view that it can be used  for the  purpose of  proving  the  alleged  corrupt practice of  obtaining or  procuring the  assistance of  the police officer  for furtherance of the appellant’s prospects in the election.      Cherian J.  Kappan (P.W.3)  is another  witness in this connection. He  has no  doubt stated that the person who was mentioned as  City Commissioner  of Police  spoke thrice and said that Mani’s success was a necessity and that if only he won then  it will be possible to exclude the estates planted with rubber  after 1964  from  the  operation  of  the  Land Ceiling Act.  The witness  has further  stated  that  Joseph Thomas said  that it  was  therefore  their  need  that  the appellant should  win and "therefore it does not matter if I lose my  job and  I came  for this." We find however that in all these  respects the  statement of  the witness  has been contradicted by the statement of Dr. Sebastian Vayalil (P.W. 2). Thus the Bishop has not stated that Joseph Thomas spoke, thrice, and 715 he has  categorically stated  that he  did not say that Mani should win  or that  he should  win for  the benefit  of the migrated Christians  with reference to the Land Reforms Act, 1964. As  regards Joseph  Thomas’s offer to give up his job,

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the  version   of  Dr.   Sebastian  Vayallil   (P.W.  2)  is substantially different from that of Cherian J. Kappan (P.W. 3), for  while Cherian  J. Kappan (P. W. 3) has stated as if Joseph Thomas  was prepared  to lose  his job then and there and had  come to address the meeting because of the need for the appellant’s  success, Dr. Sebastian Vayalil (P.W. 2) has merely said  that he  expressed a  desire  to  give  up  his uniform and  job if  that became  necessary in  future.  The overall statement  of Cherian  J. Kappan  (P.W. 3)  has been disproved by  Dr. Sebastian Vayalil (P. W. 2) who has stated that he  did not know whether Joseph Thomas at all spoke for the appellant’s success in the election.      We have gone through the statement of Cherian J. Kappan (P.W. 3) and it appears to us that, to say the least, he was not friendly  with the appellant and had his own reasons for running him  down. The attention of the witness was drawn to document Ex.  P.2 dated  March 15,  1977 which  showed  some rivalry between  him and the appellant, but he was unable to explain it  away. At  any rate we do not find it possible to accept  the  version  of  Cherian  J.  Kappan  (P.W.  3)  in preference to that of Dr. Sebastian Vayalil (P. W. 2).      Father Joseph  Chovvathukunnel (P.W.  4)  is  the  next witness in  this connection. He was a Vicar of the Ramapuram Forane Church  and he  has clearly  stated that  the  Bishop (P.W. 2) asked those present he has meeting to act according to their conscience in the matter of casting votes. When the witness was  asked whose  success  was  the  object  of  the meeting, he categorically stated that the Bishop did not say who among  candidates should  succeed in the election. It is significant that  although the  witness stated that the City Commissioner of  Police.  Trivandrum,  participated  in  the meeting, and  all said  about election  matters, he  was not asked whether  Joseph Thomas  said anything  in the  meeting which could be said to assist the appellant in the election.      Father  Joseph   Pallikkaparambil  (P.W.   7)  was  the Auxiliary Bishop  of the  Palai  Diocese.  He  attended  the meeting for  a while,  but he  was also  not  asked  whether Joseph Thomas  made any speech at the meeting and, if so, to what effect. This omission is also not without significance.      Father George Nellikkattu (P.W. 8) was the Vicar of St. Joseph’s Church, Paika. He has stated that City Commissioner of Police  Joseph Thomas was present at the meeting and that he spoke as if 716 participating in  it. He has said further that he remembered Joseph Thomas speaking about the matter of Agrarian Bill and that he  said that  the presence  of persons  like Mani  was essential in  the Legislative  Assembly to see that the Bill did not  affect  them  adversely.  The  witness  has  stated further that  Joseph Thomas  stood and  spoke three  or four times. We have already pointed out that the statement of Dr. Sebastian Vayalil  (P.W. 2)  shows that there was no mention of the  Agrarian Act  or Bill  in Joseph  Thomas’s talk, and that he  did not  say anything  regarding the  Land  Reforms legislation or  the desirability  of the election of persons like Mani  in that  connection. Moreover the witness has not supported the  version of  Cherian J.  Kappan (P.W.  3) that Joseph Thomas said that it did not matter if he lost his job and that he had come for the appellant’s success.      Taking an  overall view  of the evidence on the record, which consists  mainly of the statements of the petitioner’s witnesses we  have no  hesitation in  saying that  the  High Court erred in preferring the statement of Cherian J. Kappan (P.W. 3) and George Nellikkattu (P.W. 8) to the testimony of Dr.  Sebastian   Vayalil  (P.   W.2)   and   Father   Joseph

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Chovvathukunnel (P.W. 4).      In arriving at this conclusion we have not so far taken into account  the statement  of Joseph  Thomas (P.W.  6) who also has been examined on behalf of the election petitioner. He has said while he and the Chancellor Priest were talking, someone from  the laymen asked for his own view about Mani’s election and  he said  that  he  had  heard  that  he  would succeed. He  has further  stated that  when  another  person asked  him  to  say  something  as  he  was  in  the  Police department, he  said that  if anything  had to be said about it, he  will have  to give  up his  cap  and  uniform.  This versian Joseph  Thomas (P.W.  6) is  substantially in accord with the  statement of  Dr. Sebastian  Vayalil (P.W.  2). We have no reason to discard it merely because it emanates from a person  who has  been named  for  the  commission  of  the corrupt practice  in the  order under section 99 of the Act. Joseph  Thomas   was  subjected   to  a   very  long  cross- examination, but  nothing has  been elicited  to  shake  his testimony. It  may be  that his explanation that he happened to be  present at  the meeting  because he had gone there to have a  talk with  the Chancellor  Priest about the proposal for his  brother’s marriage  may not  be quite satisfactory, but his  mere presence at that meeting, or expression of his personal views  there, to  which  reference  has  been  made above, could  not possibly  amount to  the commission  of  a corrupt practice under sub-section (7) of section 123 of the Act by the appellant. 717      This takes  us to  the question  whether Joseph  Thomas went to  attend the  meeting and spoke there at the instance of the  appellant. The  High Court has also addressed itself to it  and has  gone to  the extent  of saying  that it  was perhaps the only real question for consideration.      There is no direct evidence to prove that Joseph Thomas went to  attend the  meeting and spoke there at the instance of the  appellant, and  this fact  has been  noticed by  the trial court.  It has  however arrived  at a decision against the appellant on the basis of the circumstantial evidence on the record.  The court was led to that conclusion because of its finding,  with which  we have  disagreed,  that  in  the meeting which  had been  held at  the Bishop’s  house Joseph Thomas "actively  and vehemently canvassed all assistance on behalf of  the 1st respondent," and has "also found that the explanation given  by P.W.  6  in  that  respect  cannot  be accepted." The  court has  also found that Joseph Thomas was not a  reliable witness  and could  not be  believed when he said that he had gone to Palai to meet his ailing father. In reaching that conclusion the court has gone to the extent of pointing out  that Joseph  Thomas was  not very  careful  in stating the  facts  even  in  the  court,  and  has  made  a reference to  his incorrect assertion in paragraph 21 of his objection petition  dated December  8, 1977 in answer to the notice under  section 99, that he had received the notice on December 3, 1977 when he had received it earlier on December 1, 1977.  That, in  our opinion  could not  be a  sufficient ground for  disbelieving the witness. The counsel for Joseph Thomas had  in fact  filed an affidavit on December 16, 1977 in the  court in  which he  had made it quite clear that the notice was  really served  on December  1, 1977, and that it was inadvertently  stated in  the reply  to the  show  cause notice that it was received on December 3, 1977. At any rate such  a  mistake  could  not  possibly  have  justified  the rejection of the testimony of Joseph Thomas altogether.      The trial  court has  in this  connection referred to a "complaint" of  the election  petitioner that  the priest of

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Lalam Church  could not be examined even though he was named as a  witness and  could give  useful information about what had happened  in the  meeting. It  has gone to the extent of saying that  the conduct  of the  priest of the Lalam Church was somewhat  abnormal,  and  he  has  been  dubbed  as  the "absconding" priest.  Here again,  it is difficult to accept the reasoning of the trial court because there is nothing on the record to show that the priest had been kept away by the appellant or  Joseph Thomas  or that he had absconded. As it happened, his  whereabouts were ascertained after some time, but the  election petitioner  did not  move  the  court  for giving him a chance to examine him as a witness. His evi- 718 dence had  no doubt  been closed by then, but that would not have prevented  the court from allowing his examination. The fact that  priest of  Lalam Church could not be traced at an early date,  could not  therefore lend  credence to the case that Joseph  Thomas went  to the  meeting at the instance of the appellant.      The trial  court has  examined the  activities  of  the appellant on March 12, 1977, in reaching the conclusion that he was  himself present at the meeting at the Bishop’s house on that  day, and has placed reliance on the statement of M. K. Raju (P.W. 5). Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the election petitioner,  has pointed out that the appellant had fixed four meetings in or around Palai on March 12, 1977 and that it  was most  unlikely that  he would  have  left  them unattended and gone to Kottayam for the disposal of official work there,  so that  his explanation  for his  absence from Palai is  quite unsatisfactory  and deserved to be rejected. But even  if it  is assumed  that the  appellant was  in  or around Palai  and was  attending one  or the  other  of  his election meetings,  it would  not necessarily follow that he visited the  Bishop’s house  while the  meeting was going on there.  It  is  significant  in  this  connection  that  the election petitioner  did  not  venture  to  plead  that  the appellant attended  the Bishop’s meeting, even though such a plea would  have helped  him substantially in establishing a direct causal  connection  between  the  appellant  and  the meeting and  between him  and what  was said there by Joseph Thomas.      The  trial  court  has  based  its  finding  about  the appellant’s presence  in the  meeting on the statement of M. K. Raju  (P.W. 5). He was the car driver of Cholikara Mathai Chettan in  those days  and he  claims to  have  driven  his employer there.  He has stated that he did not go inside the Bishop’s house  and went  away to  take coffee after leaving his employer there. He returned at about 12 in the night. He saw the appellant in the Bishop’s courtyard, but did not see him returning.  We have  gone through  the statement of Raju but we  do not  find it possible to accept it in the face of the statement  of Dr.  Sebastian Vayalil  (P.W. 2)  that the appellant did  not come  to that  meeting. On further cross- examination the  Bishop clarified  that if  Mani had come at all, he  would have  come to  know of that fact. Moreover if the appellant  had really  been present  at the meeting, the election petitioner  would have  examined  Cholikara  Mathai Chettan himself,  who was  driven there  by M. K. Raju (P.W. 5), and would not have relied merely on the statement of the driver who did not even go inside the house.      The election  petitioner has examined a number of other witnesses about  what transpired at the meeting, but none of them has  stated that  the appellant was present there. Even Cherian J. Kappan (P.W. 3) 719

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has not  stated  that  the  appellant  was  present  at  the meeting, and  we have  no doubt that the High Court erred in taking a  contrary view  merely on the basis of the evidence of M.  K. Raju  (P.W. 5)  and the  appellant’s programme  of addressing some meetings in the vicinity of Palai.      A reading of the impugned judgment shows that the trial court could go on further than saying that the version of M. K. Raju  (P.W. 5)  that he  saw the  appellant going  to the Bishop’s house was "quite probable". In taking that view the trial  court   lost  sight   of  the  requirement  that  the allegation regarding the commission of a corrupt practice is in the nature of a quasi criminal proceeding which has to be established  beyond  reasonable  doubt  and  not  merely  by preponderance of  probabilities. In  making the  appellant’s presence at  the meeting a basis of the finding against him, the trial  court therefore committed an obvious error of law which by itself is sufficient to vitiate it.      The  trial   court  has   also  taken  Joseph  Thomas’s activities into  consideration, along with the facts that he was a  police officer  working at Trivandrum, he went to the Bishop’s house  on March  12, 1977  and addressed  a meeting there, and  "openly" canvassed  for the  appellant who was a Minister of  the State  Government at  that time.  The  High Court has  noticed the  further fact  that Joseph Thomas was the seniormost  Superintendent of  Police and  he would  not have been  unaware that  his conduct  amounted to an offence under section  129(2). On  these premises the High Court has built up its finding that as Joseph Thomas took a very great risk, and declared that he was prepared to lose his job, the normal conclusion  would be  that "in all probability P.W. 6 faced the  risk out  of fear  or favour, and either of which could have  emanated only from the 1st respondent because it was the  1st respondent  alone  who  was  benefited  by  the impugned activities  of P.W.  6." To these circumstances Mr. Govindan Nair  has added  the further  argument that  as the Bishop wanted to remove the incorrect impression that he was against the  appellant, it  must follow  that as the meeting was convened  to remove  that impression  it  was  held  for furtherance of  the prospects of the election and any speech delivered by  Joseph Thomas  must be  presumed to  have that object.      But as has been shown earlier, there is no satisfactory evidence to  prove that  Joseph Thomas spoke anything at the meeting  for   furtherance  of   the  appellant’s  electoral prospects or  that he  went there and spoke at his instance. It will be recalled that the Bishop has categorically stated that he  never said  to whom votes should be cast and he did not even intend that votes should be cast for the appellant. 12-549 SCI/78 720 Dr. Joseph  Chovethukunnel (P.W. 4) has also stated that the Bishop did  not even  say who among the candidates (who were all Roman Catholics) should succeed. The trial court was not therefore justified  in reaching  the conclusion that Joseph Thomas intentionally  took the  great risk  of committing an offence under  section 129(2)  and of  losing his job out of fear or  favour of  the  appellant.  But  even  if  all  the premises set  up by  the trial court in this connection were accepted as  correct, it  would not follow, as an inevitable conclusion, that  they would  establish a  nexus between the two, for  it may  well be that Joseph Thomas did all that at the instance  of someone  else, or  out of his own desire to curry favour  with the  appellant in the hope of some future advantage some  time. At any rate that possibility could not be excluded, and the trial court erred in basing its finding

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on a mere probability. It will be enough to make a reference to Mohan  Singh v.  Bhanwarlal  and  others  and  Samant  N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandes and others etc. in this connection. In  Mohan Singh’s case it has been held that the onus of  proving the commission of a corrupt practice is not discharged on  proof of mere preponderance of probability as in  a   civil  suit,  and  it  must  be  established  beyond reasonable doubt by evidence which is clear and unambiguous. In Balakrishna  it has  been held  that while consent may be inferred from  circumstantial  evidence,  the  circumstances must point unerringly to the conclusion and must admit of no other explanation,  for a corrupt practice must be proved in the same  way  as  a  criminal  charge.  Out  of  the  other decisions of  this Court to the same effect reference may be made to  R. M.  Seshadri v.  G. Vasantha  Pai Bhagwan  Datta Shastri v. Ram Ratanji Gupta and others and Balwant Singh v. Prakash  Chand  and  other.  The  election  petitioner  must therefore exclude  every hypothesis  except that of guilt on the part  of the  returned candidate  or his election agent, and the  trial court  erred in  basing its finding on a mere probability.      We have,  in this  connection, taken into consideration the other  argument of  Mr. Govindan Nair that the appellant was in dire need of the help of Joseph Thomas because of the stiff  contest   with  N.C.   Joseph  and   the  facts   and circumstances mentioned  in Ex.  1. What a candidate will do or how  he will  react  in  such  circumstances  essentially depends on  his mental  make up,  and his reaction in such a matter is  really one  of the  imponderables of an electoral contest and  cannot form the basis of a definite finding one way or the other. At any rate 721      the appellant  was not  new to that contest and had won the elections  on three  earlier occasions.  It is therefore difficult for  us to  uphold the  argument that  he  was  so driven by  the prospect  of defeat as to seek the assistance of a police officer openly, on pain of losing his success at the hands  of any  ’elector’  who  may  charge  him  of  the commission of that corrupt practice.      So as  there is no direct evidence to prove that Joseph Thomas went  to attend  the meeting at the Bishop’s house at the instance  of  the  appellant  and  spoke  there  at  his instance, and  as the  circumstantial evidence  referred  to above was  inadequate  to  reach  that  conclusion,  we  are constrained to set aside the finding of the trial court that it was the appellant who "obtained and procured the services of P.W. 6, a police officer, in furtherance of the prospects of the  election of  the 1st  respondent,  and  the  corrupt practice set  out in  sub-section (7)  of section 123 of the Act has  been established  beyond any  doubt." We have given our reasons  for differing  with the  trial court about what was said  by Joseph  Thomas in  the meeting  at the Bishop’s house.      The appeals are allowed with costs, the impugned orders of the High Court dated December 21, 1977, under sections 98 and 99 of the Act are set aside and the election petition is dismissed. N.V.K. Appeals allowed. N.V.K.                                      Appeals allowed. 722