REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 356 OF 1994

DR. K. KRISHNA MURTHY & ORS.           … PETITIONERS

                                                VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ANR.                          … RESPONDENTS  

WITH

W.P. (C) NOS. 245 OF 1995 AND 517 OF 2005

J U D G M E N T

K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI  

1.  In  these  writ  petitions,  we  are  required  to  examine  the  

constitutional validity of some aspects of the reservation policy  

prescribed for the composition of elected local self-government  

institutions. In particular, the contentions have concentrated  

on  the  provisions  that  enable  reservations  in  favour  of  

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backward  classes  and  those  which  contemplate  the  

reservation  of  chairperson  positions  in  the  elected  local  

self-government  institutions.  These  provisions  have  been  

challenged as being violative of principles such as equality and  

democracy,  which  are  considered  to  be  part  of  the  ‘basic  

structure’ doctrine.  

2.  The  Constitution  (Seventy-third)  Amendment  Act,  1992  

[hereinafter ‘73rd Amendment’] and the Constitution (Seventy-

fourth) Amendment Act, 1992 [hereinafter ‘74th Amendment’]  

had inserted Part IX and Part IX-A into the constitutional text  

thereby contemplating the powers, composition and functions  

of local self-government institutions, i.e. the Panchayats (for  

rural areas) and Municipalities (for urban areas). In pursuance  

of  objectives  such  as  democratic  decentralization,  greater  

accountability  between  citizens  and  the  state  apparatus  as  

well  as  the  empowerment  of  weaker  sections,  these  

constitutional  amendments  contemplated  a  hierarchical  

structure of elected local bodies. With respect to rural areas,  

Part IX contemplates three tiers of Panchayats, namely those  

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of  ‘Gram  Panchayats’  (for  each  village,  or  group  of  small  

villages), ‘Panchayat Samitis’ (at the block level) and the ‘Zilla  

Parishads’  (at the District  level).  For urban areas, Part IX-A  

prescribed the constitution of ‘Nagar Panchayats’ (for areas in  

transition  from  a  rural  area  to  an  urban  area),  ‘Municipal  

Councils’  (for  smaller  urban  areas)  and  ‘Municipal  

Corporations’ (for a larger urban area).  

3.  To  better  appreciate  the  legislative  intent,  it  would  be  

instructive to refer to the following extract from the Statement  

of Objects and Reasons for the 73rd Amendment:   

“1. Though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have been in  existence for a long time, it has been observed that these  institutions have not been able to acquire the status and  dignity of viable and responsive people’s bodies due to a  number of reasons including absence of regular elections,  prolonged  supersessions,  insufficient  representation  of  weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes  and women, inadequate devolution of powers and lack of  financial resources.   

2. Article 40 of the Constitution which enshrines one of  the Directive Principles of State Policy lays down that the  State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and  

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endow them with such powers and authority as may be  necessary  to  enable  them  to  function  as  units  of  self-government. In the light of the experience in the last  forty years and in view of the short-comings which have  been  observed,  it  is  considered  that  there  is  an  imperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain  basic  and  essential  features  of  Panchayati  Raj  Institutions to impart certainty, continuity and strength  to them.   

3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new Part relating  to Panchayats in the Constitution to provide for, among  other things, Gram Sabha in a village or group of villages;  constitution of Panchayats at village and other level  or  levels; direct elections to all seats in Panchayats at the  village and intermediate level, if any, and to the Offices of  Chairpersons of Panchayats at such levels; reservation of  seats for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in  proportion  to  their  population  for  membership  of  Panchayats and office of Chairpersons in Panchayats at  each level; reservation of not less than one-third of the  seats for women; fixing tenure of 5 years for Panchayats  and holding elections within a period of 6 months in the  event of supersession of any Panchayat; …”  

In the same vein, we can refer to the following extracts from  

the  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons  for  the  74th  

Amendment:  

“1. In many States, local bodies have become weak and  ineffective  on account of a variety of reasons, including  the  failure  to  hold  regular  elections,  prolonged  supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and  functions. As a result, Urban Local Bodies are not able to  perform  effectively  as  vibrant  democratic  units  of  self-government.  

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2. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered  necessary that provisions relating to Urban Local Bodies  are incorporated in the Constitution, particularly for -   (i)  putting on a firmer footing the relationship between  the State Government and the Urban Local Bodies with  respect to –

(a) the functions and taxation powers; and (b) arrangements for revenue sharing  

(ii) ensuring regular conduct of elections; (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession;  

and  (iv)  providing  adequate  representation  for  the  weaker  sections  like  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  and  women.   

3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new Part relating  to the Urban Local Bodies in the Constitution to provide  for –  (a) constitution of three types of Muncipalities:  

(i) Nagar Panchayats for areas in transition from a  rural area to urban area (ii) Municipal Councils for smaller urban areas;  (iii) Municipal Corporations for larger urban areas.  

…  (e) reservation of seats in every Municipality –  

(i)  for  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  in  proportion  to  their  population  of  which  not  less  than one-third shall be for women;  …”   

4. Before outlining and addressing the contentions advanced  

on behalf  of  the  petitioners  and the  respondents,  it  will  be  

useful to survey the constitutional provisions that have been  

called  into  question.  The  rival  contentions  relate  to  Article  

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243-D(4)  and 243-T(4)  which contemplate the reservation of  

chairperson posts,  as  well  as  Article  243-D(6)  and 243-T(6)  

which enable reservations in favour of backward classes. With  

respect  to  the  reservation  of  seats  in  Panchayats,  Article  

243-D reads as follows: -   

243-D.  Reservation of  Seats.  -  (1)  Seats  shall  be  reserved for–  

(a) The Scheduled Castes; and (b) The Scheduled Tribes,

in every Panchayat and the number of seats so reserved  shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to  the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in  that  Panchayat  as  the  population  of  the  Scheduled  Castes in that Panchayat area or of the Scheduled Tribes  in that Panchayat area bears to the total population of  that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to  different constituencies in a Panchayat.

(2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats  reserved under  clause  (1)  shall  be  reserved for  women  belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may  be, the Scheduled Tribes.

(3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats  reserved for  women belonging to the Scheduled Castes  and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to  be filled by direct  election in every Panchayat shall  be  reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by  rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat.

(4) The offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats at  the  village or  any other  level  shall  be reserved for  the  

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Scheduled Castes,  the Scheduled Tribes and women in  such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law,  provide:

Provided that the number of offices of Chairpersons  reserved  for  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the  Scheduled  Tribes in the Panchayats at each level in any State shall  bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the  total number of such offices in the Panchayats at each  level  as the population of  the Scheduled Castes in the  State or of the Scheduled Tribes in the State bears to the  total population of the State:

Provided further that not less than one-third of the  total number of offices of Chairpersons in the Panchayats  at each level shall be reserved for women:

Provided  also  that  the  number  of  offices  reserved  under this clause shall be allotted by rotation to different  Panchayats at each level.

(5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and  the reservation of office of Chairpersons (other than the  reservation for  women)  under  clause  (4)  shall  cease  to  have effect  on the  expiration of  the  period specified in  Article 334.

(6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the Legislature of a  State from making any provision for reservation of seats  in  any  Panchayat  or  offices  of  Chairpersons  in  the  Panchayats at any level in favour of backward class of  citizens.

(emphasis supplied)  

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Similarly, the composition of Municipalities is guided by the  

reservation policy contemplated in Article 243-T:   

243-T.  Reservation  of  seats. –  (1)  Seats  shall  be  reserved  for  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the  Scheduled  Tribes in every Municipality and the number of seats so  reserved  shall  bear,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  the  same  proportion to the total  number  of  seats  to be filled by  direct election in that  Municipality as the population of  the  Scheduled  Castes  in  the  Municipal  area  or  of  the  Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal area bears to the total  population of that area and such seats may be allotted by  rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality.  

(2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats  reserved under  clause  (1)  shall  be  reserved for  women  belonging to the Scheduled Castes or as the case may be,  the Scheduled Tribes.  

(3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats  reserved for  women belonging to the Scheduled Castes  and the Scheduled Tribes) of the total number of seats to  be filled by direct election in every Municipality shall be  reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by  rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality.  

(4) The offices of Chairpersons in the Municipalities shall  be  reserved  for  the  Scheduled  Castes,  the  Scheduled  Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature of a  State may, by law, provide.   

(5) The reservation of seats under clauses (1) and (2) and  the reservation of offices of Chairpersons (other than the  reservation for  women)  under  clause  (4)  shall  cease  to  have effect  on the  expiration of  the  period specified in  Article 334.  

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(6) Nothing in this Part shall prevent the Legislature of a  State from making any provision for reservation of seats  in  any  Municipality  or  offices  of  Chairpersons  in  the  Municipalities in favour of backward class of citizens.   

                                                                (emphasis supplied)  

5.  The  overarching  scheme  of  Article  243-D  and  243-T  is  to  

ensure  the  fair  representation  of  social  diversity  in  the  

composition  of  elected  local  bodies  so  as  to  contribute  to  the  

empowerment of the traditionally weaker sections in society. The  

preferred means  for  pursuing  this  policy  is  the  reservation of  

seats and chairperson positions in favour of Scheduled Castes  

(SC),  Scheduled  Tribes  (ST),  women  and  backward  class  

candidates.  

•Article 243-D(1) and Article 243-T(1) are analogous since they  

lay down that the reservation of seats in favour of SC and ST  

candidates  should  be  based on the  proportion  between the  

population  belonging  to  these  categories  and  the  total  

population of the area in question. Needless to say, the State  

Governments are empowered to determine the extent of such  

reservations on the basis of empirical data such as population  

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surveys among other methods,  thereby being guided by the  

principle of ‘proportionate representation’.  

•Article  243-D(2)  and  Article  243-T(2)  further  provide  that  

from  among  the  pool  of  seats  reserved  for  SC  and  ST  

candidates, at least one-third of such seats should be reserved  

for women belonging to those categories. Hence, there is an  

intersection between the reservations in favour of women on  

one hand and those in favour of SC/STs on the other hand.   

•With respect to reservations in favour of women, Article 243-

D(3) and Article 243-T(3) lay down that at least         one-third  

of  the  total  number  of  seats  in  the  local  bodies  should  be  

reserved for women. On the face of it, this is an embodiment of  

the principle of ‘adequate representation’. This idea comes into  

play when it is found that a particular section is inadequately  

represented in a certain domain and a specific  threshold is  

provided to ensure that this section of the population comes to  

be adequately represented with the passage of time.

•With regard  to  chairperson positions,  Article  243-D(4)  and  

Article  243-T(4)  enable  State  legislatures  to  reserve  these  

offices in favour of SC, ST and women candidates. In the case  

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of panchayats, the first proviso to Article 243-D(4) states that  

the  aggregate  number  of  chairperson  positions  reserved  in  

favour of SC and ST candidates in an entire state should be  

based on the proportion between the population belonging to  

these  categories  and  the  total  population.  With  all  the  

chairperson positions at each level  of  the panchayats in an  

entire State as the frame of reference, the second proviso to  

Article 243-D(4) states that one-third of these offices should  

be reserved for women. The third proviso to Article 243-D(4)  

lays down that the number of chairperson positions reserved  

under the said clause would be allotted by rotation to different  

panchayats in each tier. This rotational policy is a safeguard  

against the possibility of a particular office being reserved in  

perpetuity. It is pertinent to note that unlike the reservation  

policy  for  panchayats,  there  are  no  comparable  provisos  to  

Article  243-T(4)  for  guiding  the  reservation  of  chairperson  

positions  in  Municipalities.  This  is  a  notable  distinction  

between  the  otherwise  analogous  schemes  prescribed  in  

Article 243-D and Article 243-T.  

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•It is also pertinent to take note of Article 243-D(5) and Article  

243-T(5), both of which provide that the reservation of seats  

and chairperson positions in favour of SC and ST categories  

would operate for the period contemplated under Article 334.  

It must be stressed here that there is no such time-limit for  

the reservations made in favour of women, implying that they  

will operate in perpetuity.  

•Article 243-D(6) and Article 243-T(6) contemplate the power  

of State Legislatures to reserve seats as well as chairperson  

positions in favour of a ‘backward class of citizens’. Unlike the  

fore-mentioned  provisions  that  deal  with  reservations  in  

favour of SC, ST and women candidates, Article 243-D(6) and  

Article  243-T(6)  do  not  explicitly  provide  guidance  on  the  

quantum of reservations. In the absence of any explicit criteria  

or  limits,  it  can  be  assumed  that  reservation  policies  

contemplated under Article 243-D(6) will ordinarily be guided  

by the standard of proportionate representation.  

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6. In light of the submissions that have been paraphrased in  

the  subsequent  paragraphs,  the  contentious  issues  in  this  

case can be framed in the following manner:  

(i).  Whether  Article  243-D(6)  and  Article  243-T(6)  are  

constitutionally  valid  since  they  enable  reservations  in  

favour of backward classes for the purpose of occupying  

seats  and  chairperson  positions  in  Panchayats  and  

Municipalities respectively?  

(ii).  Whether  Article  243-D(4)  and  Article  243-T(4)  are  

constitutionally valid since they enable the reservation of  

chairperson positions in Panchayats and Municipalities  

respectively?    

SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS   

7.  In  W.P.  (C)  No.  356/1994,  Shri  M.  Rama  Jois,  learned  

senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  petitioners  had  

initially challenged the constitutionality of Clauses (2) to (6) of  

Art. 243-D as well as Clauses (2)-(6) of Art. 243-T. These were  

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challenged  in  conjunction  with  some  provisions  of  the  

Karnataka Panchayati  Raj Act,  1993 which provided for the  

reservation of seats and chairperson posts in favour of SCs,  

STs, women and backward classes. The impugned sections of  

that statute reserved 15% of the seats in Panchayats in favour  

of SCs, 3% in favour of STs, 33% in favour of women and 33%  

in  favour  of  other  backward  classes  [Section  5  for  Gram  

Panchayats,  Section  123  for  Taluk  Panchayats  and  Section  

162  for  Zilla  Panchayats].  Chairperson  positions  in  

Panchayats  were  reserved  in  a  similar  proportion,  with  the  

entire pool of chairperson posts in the State as the frame of  

reference [Section 44 for  Gram Panchayats,  Section 138 for  

Taluk  Panchayats  and  Section  177  for  Zilla  Panchayats].  

Subsequently,  the  scope  of  the  challenge  was  enlarged  to  

question  the  reservation  of  seats  and  chairperson  posts  in  

favour of women and backward classes under the Karnataka  

Municipalities Act, 1964 [Sections 11, 14(2)(A) and 352(5) of  

the said Act] and the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act,  

1976 [Section 7 and 10 of the said Act].

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8.  The  petitioners  did  not  object  to  the  proportionate  

reservation  of  seats  in  favour  of  Scheduled  Castes  and  

Scheduled  Tribes,  as  contemplated  by  Art.  243-D(1)  and  

243-T(1) respectively. It was stated that reservations in favour  

of SC/STs were consistent with the intent of the framers of the  

Constitution, since reservations in favour of these groups had  

been provided in respect of the composition of the Lok Sabha  

and the State Legislative Assemblies (under Art. 330 and 332).  

However, the petitioners raised strong objections against the  

other  aspects  of  the  reservation  policy  contemplated  under  

Articles  243-D  and  243-T.  Initially,  they  had  assailed  the  

reservation  of  seats  in  favour  of  women,  which  has  been  

enabled by Art.  243-D(2)  and (3)  with respect to rural  local  

bodies, and by Art. 243-T(2) and (3) with respect to urban local  

bodies.  However,  this  challenge  was  given  up  during  the  

course of the arguments before this Court and the thrust of  

the petitioner’s arguments was directed towards the following  

two aspects:  

•Firstly,  objections were raised  against  Art.  243-D(6)  and  

Art.  243-T(6)  since  they  enable  reservations  of  seats  and  

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chairperson posts  in favour of  backward classes,  without  

any guidance on how to identify these beneficiaries and the  

quantum of reservations.  

•Secondly, it was argued that the reservation of chairperson  

posts in the manner contemplated under Art. 243-D(4) and  

243-T(4) is  unconstitutional, irrespective of whether these  

reservations  are  implemented  on  a  rotational  basis  and  

irrespective of whether the beneficiaries are SCs, STs and  

women.  The  objection  was  directed  against  the  very  

principle  of  reserving  chairperson  posts  in  elected  local  

bodies.  

9.  The  common  thread  running  across  the  petitioners’  

arguments was that these provisions which were inserted into  

the Constitution by way of the 73rd and 74th Amendments, are  

violative  of  principles  such  as  equality,  democracy  and  

fraternity, which are part of the ‘basic structure’ doctrine. The  

decision in I.R. Coelho v. State Tamil Nadu [(2007) 2 SCC 1]  

had clarified that the constitutional amendments which have  

been placed in the Ninth Schedule  after the  Keshavananda  

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Bharati decision  [(1973)  4  SCC 425]  are  not  immune  from  

judicial review. Even though there is some uncertainty as to  

whether  constitutional  amendments can be scrutinized with  

respect to the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III, there  

is no obstruction to their scrutiny on the basis of principles  

such as equality, democracy and fraternity, since all of them  

find a place in the Preamble to our Constitution.  Since the  

petitioner has given up the challenge against the reservation of  

seats  in  favour  of  women,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  

paraphrase the submissions related to that aspect.   

10. It was urged that the reservation policy contained in the  

Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act, 1993 provides for the aggregate  

reservation of nearly 84% of the seats in Panchayats, which is  

excessive and violative of the equality clause. Especially with  

regard to reservations in favour of backward classes, it was  

argued that the same does not meet the test  of  ‘reasonable  

classification’, thereby falling foul of Article 14. Pointing to the  

caste  groups  which  have  been  listed  as  Other  Backward  

Classes (OBCs) in the State of Karnataka, it was reasoned that  

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even  if  they  are  assumed  to  be  backward  in  the  

socio-economic  sense,  there  was  ample  evidence  that  they  

were already well represented in the political space. In fact, the  

findings  of  the  Chinappa  Reddy  Commission  Report  (1990)  

showed that a majority of the Members of Parliament (MPs)  

and the Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) elected  

from  Karnataka  belonged  to  the  OBC  category.  In  such  a  

scenario, there was no intelligible criterion to identify OBCs for  

preferential treatment by way of reservations. An analogy was  

drawn  with  reservations  for  government  jobs  under  Article  

16(4),  which  presupposes  backwardness  as  well  as  the  

inadequate representation of the beneficiary group.  

11. Next, it was urged that the reservations in favour of OBCs  

were  solely  on  the  grounds  of  caste,  thereby  violating  the  

anti-discrimination  clause  found  in  Article  15  of  the  

Constitution.  It  was  further  suggested  that  reservations  in  

favour of the already well represented OBC groups would not  

serve the stated objective of empowering the weaker sections  

in society. Shri M. Rama Jois, learned senior counsel drew a  

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distinction between the context of reservations in the matter of  

elections  on  one  hand and  in  the  matter  of  education  and  

employment on the other hand. It was reasoned that persons  

belonging  to  Socially  and  Educationally  Backward  

Communities  (SEBCs)  [in respect of  Article  15(4)  and 15(5)]  

and under-represented Backward Classes [in respect of Article  

16(4)]  are legitimately given reservations since they are in a  

disadvantageous position when they compete for selection to  

educational  courses and government  jobs,  respectively.  This  

disadvantage  is  linked  to  backwardness  in  the  social  and  

economic sense,  owing to which persons belonging to these  

groups may not have the resources or the awareness needed  

to  gain  access  to  higher  education  or  public  employment.  

However, the fact of social and economic backwardness does  

not  necessarily  act  as  a  barrier  to  political  participation.  

Stressing on the distinction between ‘selection’ and ‘election’,  

Shri Jois contended that the OBCs did not need reservation  

benefits because empirical findings suggested that there was  

already a  high degree of  political  mobilization  among them.  

Apart from the fact that OBCs appear to be well-represented in  

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the  legislature,  it  was  argued  that  economic  backwardness  

should not be conflated with political backwardness. This is so  

because  in  the  electoral  arena,  a  candidate  from  a  poorer  

background  is  not  necessarily  at  a  disadvantage  when  

competing with candidates from relatively richer backgrounds.  

12. It was also contended that reserving seats and chairperson  

posts in favour of OBCs was an unjustified departure from the  

intent of the framers of the Constitution. As noted earlier, the  

framers conferred reservation benefits on SCs and STs for the  

purpose of elections to the Lok Sabha and the State Legislative  

Assemblies (under Arts. 330 and 332) which are time-bound  

in  accordance  with  Article  334.  Given this  background,  the  

petitioners contend that the framers had incorporated these  

measures  in  the  nature  of  compensatory  discrimination  to  

address  the  historical  disadvantage  faced  by  SCs  and  STs.  

However, it could not be assumed that OBCs had suffered a  

comparable degree of disadvantage, especially since there were  

no  cogent  empirical  findings  about  the  prevalence  of  

backwardness  and  that  there  were  no  specific  

20

recommendations  for  reservations  in  favour  of  backward  

classes,  as  contemplated  under  Article  340  of  the  

Constitution.  It  was  urged  that  since  the  framers  had  not  

explicitly  provided  for  OBC  reservations  in  1950,  it  was  

untenable  to  introduce  them  by  way  of  constitutional  

amendments in 1993.    

13. Another set of concerns touched on the overbreadth in the  

identification  of  OBCs  for  the  purpose  of  the  reservations  

conferred by the impugned State legislations. It was contended  

that even among the listed OBC groups, one cannot assume  

the same degree of backwardness for the entire group. There  

are bound to be some sub-sections within these groups which  

are  in  a  relatively  better-off  situation.  However,  the  

reservations enabled by Art. 243-D(6) and Art. 243-T(6) do not  

contemplate the exclusion of the ‘creamy layer’ in the manner  

that  has  been  prescribed  for  reservations  in  the  context  of  

higher  education  [under  Arts.  15(4)  and  15(5)]  and  public  

employment [under Art. 16(4), (4A) and (4B)] respectively. The  

non-exclusion of  the creamy layer  creates the  apprehension  

21

that the benefits will be cornered by a limited section of the  

intended beneficiaries, thereby frustrating the objectives of the  

reservation policy in the first place. We were also alerted to the  

possibility  that  State  Governments  could  confer  reservation  

benefits  in  favour  of  particular  OBC groups  as  a  means  of  

garnering  political  support  from  these  groups,  instead  of  

ameliorating backwardness in the social and economic sense.  

In  support  of  this  contention,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  

Karnataka Panchayati  Raj Act had provided for reservations  

that were in excess of the 50% upper ceiling prescribed for  

communal reservations in past judicial decisions. [See:  M.R.  

Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649; Indra Sawhney  

v. Union of India, 1992 Supp 3 SCC 217]    

14. With respect to Chairperson positions in the elected local  

bodies, it was argued that they were in the nature of single  

posts  and  reserving  them  amounted  to  cent-per-cent  

reservation,  thereby  offending  the  equality  clause.  The  

objection  was  against  the  very  principle  of  reserving  

chairperson  posts,  irrespective  of  the  identity  of  the  

22

beneficiaries and even when such posts are reserved by way of  

rotation. This argument was buttressed with references to past  

decisions which have struck down the reservations of single  

posts in the context of public employment [See: Post Graduate  

Institute  of  Medical  Education  and  Research V.  K.L.  

Narasimhan, (1997) 6 SCC 283]. It  was further argued that  

the  chairperson  positions  in  the  Panchayats  and  

Municipalities were executive offices and reserving them would  

set a dangerous precedent that could ultimately lead to the  

reservation of executive offices at higher levels of government.  

It was urged those who occupy the reserved chairperson posts  

are more likely to cater to the narrow interests of their own  

groups rather than working for the welfare of the entire local  

community.  

15. After his extensive arguments which invoked the equality  

clause, Shri M. Rama Jois turned our attention to arguments  

invoking  the  principle  of  democracy.  It  was  argued  that  

excessive reservations placed unfair limitations on the rights  

of  political  participation  of  persons  belonging  to  the  

23

unreserved categories. In particular,  the reservation of seats  

and chairperson positions curtailed the right to vote, the right  

to sponsor candidates of one’s choice and the right to contest  

elections  among other  aspects.  It  was contended  that  such  

restrictions  were  in  conflict  with  the  principle  of  ‘universal  

adult franchise’ (under Art. 326) which also entails that as far  

as possible, there should be parity in the weightage given to  

the votes cast by each individual. In this sense, reservations  

tend to distort the electoral process by giving more weightage  

to the voters and candidates from the beneficiary groups as  

opposed to those from the  general  category.  With regard to  

reservations  of  chairperson  posts,  the  petitioners  have  

described a scenario wherein there may be very few persons  

from  the  reserved  category  in  a  particular  village,  thereby  

forcing voters to re-elect candidates belonging to the reserved  

categories despite dissatisfaction with their performance.

16. Lastly, Shri M. Rama Jois argued that reservations in the  

electoral  arena would  only  lead  to  more  divisiveness  at  the  

level of the local community as well as at the national level. In  

24

the long run, reservations designed on caste lines are likely to  

become instruments of political  favouritism, thereby fanning  

resentment among the people.  This would clearly come into  

conflict with the preambular objective of promoting a sense of  

fraternity among the citizens. In the petitioner’s submissions,  

it  has  been  reasoned  that  the  objective  of  empowering  the  

weaker sections through political  participation will  be better  

served  if  a  larger  number  of  candidates  belonging  to  these  

sections  were  nominated  by  political  parties  to  stand  for  

elections. Based on these submissions, the petitioners in W.P.  

(C) No. 356/1994 have prayed for the striking down of Articles  

243-D(4)  and  243-T(4)  since  they  enable  reservations  of  

chairperson posts in elected local bodies, as well as Articles  

243-D(6) and 243-T(6) which enable reservation of seats and  

chairperson posts in favour of backward classes. In relation to  

the same, the petitioners have also sought the invalidation of  

the impugned State legislations, in so far as they provide for  

excessive reservation in favour of backward classes and the  

reservation of chairperson posts.  

25

17. In W.P. 517/2005, Shri Salman Khurshid, learned senior  

counsel  appearing on behalf  of  the petitioners  has confined  

their contentions to two aspects. With regard to reservations in  

favour  of  OBCs  in  the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh,  it  has  been  

contended that the aggregate reservations should not exceed  

the  upper  ceiling  of  50%.  There  is  no  challenge  to  the  

constitutional validity of Article 243-D(6) and Article 243-T(6)  

since they are merely enabling provisions. However, there is a  

concurrence  between  the  petitioners  in  respect  of  their  

objections  against  the  reservation  of  chairperson  posts  in  

elected  local  bodies.  Hence  the  petitioners  in  W.P.  (C)  No.  

517/2005  have  also  contested  the  constitutional  validity  of  

Article 243-D(4) and Article 243-T(4).  

18. The specific challenge is directed against Sections 11A and  

12 of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 read with the  

relevant rules as well as Sections 6A, 7A, 18A and 19A of the  

Uttar  Pradesh  Kshetra  Panchayat  and  Zilla  Panchayat  Act,  

1961 read with the relevant rules. The grievance is directed  

against the fact that under these State Legislations, 27% of the  

26

seats in panchayats have been reserved for OBCs even though  

empirical  data  indicates  that  nearly  59%  of  the  entire  

population of the State of Uttar Pradesh belongs to the OBC  

category.  It  has been contended that this is a clear case of  

excessive reservations in favour of a community that is already  

in a majority. Akin to the arguments made in respect of the  

State  of  Karnataka,  this  argument  can  be  reasonably  

developed to argue that there is no need for reserving seats in  

elected  local  bodies  for  communities  that  are  already  well  

represented  in  the  political  space  and  do  not  face  serious  

hurdles  in  respect  of  political  participation.  Furthermore,  it  

was contended that there was no provision for the exclusion of  

the ‘creamy layer’ in respect of the reservations for OBCs in  

panchayats.  In this respect,  Shri Salman Khurshid stressed  

on the need for the State legislations to be modified in order to  

ensure  that  the  upper  ceiling  of  50% reservations  was  not  

breached.  It  was argued that  reservation policies  should be  

either in the nature of compensatory discrimination to address  

historical  injustices  or  in  the  nature  of  protective  

discrimination  to  protect  weaker  sections.  However,  they  

27

should  not  be  allowed  to  become  instruments  of  reverse  

discrimination which curtail the rights of persons who do not  

belong to the reserved categories.         

19. However, the main objection was directed against the very  

principle  of  reserving  chairperson  posts,  irrespective  of  

whether  it  is  in  favour  of  SCs,  STs,  women  or  OBCs.  By  

drawing an analogy with solitary posts in public employment,  

it was argued that Art. 243-D(4) and Art. 243-T(4) come into  

conflict  with Art.  16(4)  since  the  latter  did not  contemplate  

reservations  of  single  posts.  With  regard  to  the  aims  and  

objectives of local self-government, it was contended that the  

reservation of chairperson posts placed undue restrictions on  

the rights of candidates belonging to the general category. It  

was reasoned that unlike candidates in elections to the Lok  

Sabha and the State  Legislative  Assemblies  who are  free  to  

contest from different constituencies, candidates in elections  

for local bodies will not ordinarily contest in areas other than  

those where they are registered as voters. If  such migration  

were  to  frequently  take  place,  then  that  would  defeat  the  

28

objectives  of  local  self-government  since  the  overarching  

objective  is  to  empower  elected  representatives  who  are  

sufficiently interested in the welfare of local communities and  

are accountable to them. Hence, the reservation of chairperson  

posts in panchayats can have the effect of unduly preventing  

persons  belonging  to  the  unreserved  categories  from  

contesting these elections. In support of their contentions, the  

petitioners have cited some High Court decisions which have  

struck  down  the  reservation  of  chairperson  posts  in  

panchayats, namely those reported as  Janardhan Paswan v.  

State of Bihar, AIR 1988 Pat 75 and Krishna Kumar Mishra  

v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 Pat. 112.  

20. It  was contended that the ‘reverse discrimination’  which  

takes  place  in  the  context  of  reservations  in  local  

self-government is of a higher degree than what transpires in  

case of education and employment.  It  was reasoned that in  

respect  of  admission  to  educational  institutions  and  

recruitment  to  government  jobs,  the  meritorious  candidates  

who are displaced by reservations at least have alternatives  

29

available to them. However, such alternatives are not open to  

those who want to contest  elections to become members of  

Panchayats in the areas where they reside. In the petitioners’  

view,  this  is  not  only  an  unfair  limitation  on  the  rights  of  

persons belonging to the general category, but also a measure  

that frustrates the pursuit of democratic decentralization.        

21. Shri Salman Khurshid, further submitted that the courts  

have  to  strive  for  a  balance  between  the  often  competing  

considerations  of  ‘justice  to  the  backwards,  equity  for  the  

forwards and efficiency for the entire system’ [M. Nagaraj v.  

Union  of  India,  (2006)  8  SCC  212,  at  para.  44].  In  this  

respect, it was argued that excessive reservations in favour of  

OBCs and the reservation of chairperson posts in panchayats  

disrupts the desired balance between these considerations.  In  

fact  the  petitioners  have  also  urged  us  to  reconsider  some  

earlier decisions of this Court which have dealt with the status  

of the rights of political participation such as the right to vote,  

the  right  to  nominate  candidates  and  the  right  to  contest  

elections. It may be recalled that the right to vote has been  

30

held to be a statutory right and not a fundamental right and  

the same position has been consistently upheld in subsequent  

decisions.  [See  decision  in  N.P.  Ponnuswamy v.  Returning  

Officer,  1952  SCR  218,  which  has  been  followed  in  Jyoti  

Basu v. Debi Ghosal, (1982) 1 SCC 691, Mohan Lal Tripathi  

v. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly, (1992) 4 SCC 80, Rama  

Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1992) 2 SCC 438 and Kuldip  

Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1] This implies that the  

rights of political participation are not absolute in nature and  

are subject to statutory controls such as those provided in the  

Representation  of  People  Act,  1951  among  others.  

Undoubtedly,  reservations  in  elected  local  bodies  do  place  

restrictions on the rights of political participation of persons  

who do not belong to the reserved categories. In this respect,  

the petitioners have contended that this Court should examine  

the  reasonableness  of  such  restrictions  with  regard  to  the  

objective of ensuring ‘free and fair elections’  [as observed in  

Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narain,  1975 Supp SCC 1,  at  Para.  

213] as well as the expanded understanding of  Article 21 of  

the Constitution.      

31

SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS  

22. Since the constitutionality of some clauses in Art. 243-D  

and Art. 243-T have been contested in this case, notices were  

issued to all the State governments which had either enacted  

fresh  legislations  or  amended  existing  legislations  in  

accordance  with  the  mandate  of  the  73rd and  74th  

Amendments.  While  all  of  these  State  Governments  were  

impleaded as respondents in this case, we had the benefit of  

listening  to  the  oral  arguments  presented  by  Shri  Rajeev  

Dhavan,  Sr.  Adv.,  who  appeared  on  behalf  of  the  State  of  

Bihar, Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv., who appeared on behalf  

of the State of Uttar Pradesh, Shri Uday Holla, Sr. Adv., who  

appeared  for  the  State  of  Karnataka  and  

Shri  R.  Shanmugasundaram, Sr.  Adv.,  who represented the  

Union Territory of Pondicherry. Apart from the learned senior  

counsels who represented the various State Governments, we  

were  also  addressed  by  Shri  Gopal  Subramanium,  the  

Additional  Solicitor-General  [now  Solicitor-General  of  India]  

who voiced the views of the Union of India.   

32

23.  The  respondents  have  of  course  defended  the  

constitutional  validity  of  reservations in  favour  of  backward  

classes [as contemplated under Art. 243-D(6) and 243-T(6)] as  

well  as  reservations  of  chairperson  posts  [enabled  by  Art.  

243-D(4) and 243-T(4)] in elected local bodies. For the sake of  

convenience,  we will  first  refer to the submissions made by  

Shri Rajeev Dhavan, Sr. Adv., since the same were adopted by  

most of the other answering respondents. In response to the  

petitioner’s  contention  that  the  impugned  constitutional  

provisions violated elements of the ‘basic structure’ doctrine,  

Shri Rajeev Dhavan contended that the basic structure is not  

co-extensive with the fundamental rights in their entirety and  

hence it would be wrong to scrutinize the validity of Art. 243-D  

and 243-T on the basis of principles which have been evolved  

in relation to the reservation benefits enabled by Articles 15(4)  

and 16(4). A distinction was drawn between a constitutional  

amendment which modifies the scope of fundamental rights  

and an abrogation of the basic structure. Pointing out that the  

nature  and  purpose  of  reservations  in  the  context  of  local  

33

self-government was quite different from that of education and  

employment,  it  was  contended  that  the  objectives  of  Art.  

243-D and Art. 243-T was to pursue the idea of substantive  

equality rather than formal equality in the matter of political  

representation  at  the  grassroots  level.  Beginning  with  the  

premise  that  Constitutional  amendments  represent  the  

popular  will,  it  was  contended  that  classifications  that  are  

made by constitutional provisions deserve a higher standard of  

deference  in  comparison  to  statutory  classifications.  In  this  

case, the test of ‘reasonable classification’ cannot be applied  

mechanically and due regard must be shown to the underlying  

objectives  of  democratic  decentralization  such  as  the  

empowerment  of  weaker  sections,  a  fair  representation  of  

social  diversity  in  local  bodies  and  more  accountability  

between  the  elected  representatives  and  the  voters.  The  

respondents’  submission  is  that  the  provisions  enabling  

reservations  in  panchayats  and  municipalities  are  in  

consonance  with  these  objectives  and  that  the  standard  of  

judicial review over them should be that of proportionality.    

34

24. It was further contended that the equality clause should  

not be viewed in a strait-jacketed manner and that it should  

account for the ‘equality of expectations’ as well as ‘equality of  

outcomes’  in  the  context  of  political  representation  at  the  

grassroots level. This means that while there is an expectation  

of  equal  distribution  of  political  power  in  representative  

institutions, we also have to factor in how the distribution of  

power has a bearing on the substantive outcomes and results  

for  the  electorate.  In  this  case,  we  are  dealing  with  

considerations  of  horizontal  equality  in  a  political  sense.  

Owing to  the  complex  patterns  of  inequality  in  our  society,  

there  may  often  be  a  need  to  depart  from the  standard  of  

‘formal  equality’  when  it  comes  to  expectations  about  

distribution of political power. Affirmative action is designed to  

pursue the goal of substantive equality and for this purpose it  

is  necessary  to  take  into  account  the  existing  patterns  of  

discrimination, disadvantage and disempowerment among the  

different sections of society. It was contended that while such  

patterns  of  inequality  were  often  sought  to  be  ascertained  

through empirical  studies,  a  mere emphasis  on numbers is  

35

not  adequate  to  understand  the  implications  of  the  same.  

Hence,  reservations  in  local  self-government  have  been  

introduced to ensure the effective sharing of State power with  

the  previously  marginalized  sections  and  also  to  empower  

them so as to enable a confrontation with the existing patterns  

of social discrimination.           

25.  Proceeding  on  the  basis  of  this  theoretical  formulation,  

Shri Rajeev Dhavan has defended the constitutional validity of  

reservations  in  favour  of  backward  classes  as  well  as  the  

reservation  of  chairperson  posts.  In  response  to  the  

petitioner’s  arguments  that  the  reservations  curtailed  the  

rights  of  political  participation  of  persons  belonging  to  the  

general category, it was contended that we must take a real  

view of democracy which is responsive to the existing patterns  

of social inequality rather than the formal view taken by the  

petitioners. Such a real view of democracy would endorse the  

affirmative action taken to empower the traditionally weaker  

sections. Even though it was conceded that there has been a  

lot of uncertainty in the identification of backward classes for  

36

the purpose of reservation policies in the context of education  

and employment, it was contended that Art. 243-D(6) and Art.  

243-T(6) are merely enabling provisions and cannot be struck  

down  as  being  in  violation  of  the  equality  clause.  It  was  

reasoned that even though these provisions did not contain  

any  guidance  as  to  the  quantum  of  reservations,  it  was  

eventually  up  to  the  State  Governments  to  investigate  the  

existence of backwardness and to confer reservation benefits  

accordingly.  In  that  respect,  this  case  presents  a  good  

opportunity to clarify whether the phrase ‘backward classes’  

which  appears  in  Art.  243-D(6)  and  Art.  243-T(6)  is  

coextensive  with  the  ‘Socially  and  Educationally  Backward  

Classes’ (SEBCs) contemplated under Articles 15(4) and 15(5)  

or  with  the  under-represented  backward  classes  as  

contemplated under Art. 16(4).   

26.  It  was further  contended that  the upper  ceiling of  50%  

reservations  has  been  contemplated  in  judicial  decisions  

dealing with reservations in education and employment. While  

the  considerations  behind  the  same  cannot  be  readily  

37

extended  to  the  domain  of  political  representation  at  the  

grassroots  level,  it  was argued that even if  they were to be  

applied,  the  decision  in  Indra  Sawhney decision  had  

contemplated an exception to the 50% norm in ‘extraordinary  

situations’  [See  1992  Supp  (3)  SCC 217,  at  Para.  810].  To  

support this contention, it was pointed out that reservations in  

excess  of  50%  had  been  permitted  in  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  

Scheduled  Areas  and  more  importantly  the  Legislative  

Assemblies of  some States have reservations that are far in  

excess of  50% of  the  number  of  seats.  With respect  to  the  

State legislations under challenge, it was argued that the 50%  

ceiling would not be crossed under most of them since it is  

only the vertical reservations (i.e. on communal lines in favour  

of  SC/ST/OBCs)  that  are  taken  into  consideration  for  this  

purpose. Even though there is a 33% reservation in favour of  

women in elected local bodies, the same is in the nature of a  

horizontal  reservation  which  intersects  with  the  vertical  

reservations in favour of SC/ST/OBC. In such a scenario, the  

seats occupied by women belonging to  the general  category  

cannot be computed for the purpose of ascertaining whether  

38

the 50% upper ceiling has been breached.   

27. In response to the challenge against the very principle of  

reserving Chairperson posts, it has been contended that the  

same  is  in  the  nature  of  protective  discrimination.  The  

respondents have strongly refuted the petitioners’ submission  

that the chairperson posts in local bodies are akin to solitary  

posts  in  public  employment.  Disputing  this  analogy,  it  was  

contended  that  as  per  Art.  243-D(4),  the  reservation  of  

Chairperson posts is to be done on a rotational basis and the  

frame  of  reference  for  the  same  is  the  entire  pool  of  

chairperson posts in the local  bodies of  the whole State.  In  

such  a  scenario,  it  was  wrong  to  characterise  chairperson  

posts as solitary posts. In response to the suggestion that the  

reservation  of  executive  positions  in  local  self-government  

could prove to be the precursor for  reservation of  executive  

positions in higher levels of government, it was stated that the  

considerations applicable in the local setting are very different  

from those that prevail at the State and the National level. At  

higher levels of government, elected representatives from the  

39

traditionally  weaker  sections  can  rely  on  the  support  of  

mainstream political parties if they face undue pressures and  

prejudices.  However,  at  the  local  level,  the  patterns  of  

disempowerment,  discrimination  and  disadvantage  are  far  

more pervasive and it will be difficult for weaker sections to  

gain an effective say in governance, but for the reservation of  

chairperson positions in Panchayats and Municipalities.    

28.  The  respondent’s  position  was  further  supported  by  

Shri  Gopal  Subramanium  (now  SG).  The  Learned  SG  

responded to the petitioner’s argument that the framers had  

deliberated upon the question of reservations in representative  

institutions and that they had chosen to confine the same to  

SCs and STs (under Arts. 330 and 332). To counter this line of  

reasoning, it was submitted that the provisions incorporated  

by the framers did not preclude the expansion of reservation  

benefits  in  favour  of  backward  classes  by  means  of  a  

subsequent constitutional amendment. It was pointed out that  

even though the 73rd and 74th Amendments enacted in 1993  

had  given  constitutional  recognition  to  the  local  

40

self-government  institutions,  it  could  not  be  asserted  that  

reservations  in  favour  of  weaker  sections  had  not  been  

contemplated before that point of time. To support this line of  

reasoning, the written submissions submitted on behalf of the  

Union  of  India  have  traced  the  evolution  of  local  

self-government institutions from the pre-constitutional period  

to the post-independence period. After referring to the main  

recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee Report  

(1957) and the Ashok Mehta Committee Report (1978) which  

were  in  favour  of  democratic  decentralisation,  it  was  urged  

that  reservations  in  local  self-government  were  intended  to  

enable the adequate representation of previously excluded and  

marginalized groups while also giving them the opportunity to  

play leadership roles. The learned SG further contended that  

the  spirit  behind Arts.  243-D and 243-T  was  akin  to  Arts.  

15(3), 15(4) and 16(4) which have enabled different forms of  

affirmative action in order to pursue the goal of substantive  

equality. In this sense, the learned SG has taken a definitive  

stand by suggesting that the phrase ‘backward classes’ which  

appears in Art. 243-D(6) and 243-T(6) should be coterminus  

41

with the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs)  

identified for the purpose of reservation enabled by Art. 15(4).  

29. Apart from the above, the learned SG has cited numerous  

decisions of this Court which have examined and evolved the  

idea of  ‘substantive  equality’,  which in  turn is  identified as  

part of the ‘basic structure’ doctrine. In this respect, the gist of  

the submission is that the reservation policy enabled by Arts.  

243-D and 243-T  will  enhance the  political  participation  of  

hitherto weaker sections, thereby contributing to their welfare  

in  the  long  run.  In  response  to  the  arguments  about  

limitations on the political participation of persons who do not  

belong to the reserved categories,  it  was reiterated that  the  

right  to  cast  votes  and  to  contest  elections  are  not  

fundamental  rights  and  hence  they  can  be  subjected  to  

statutory controls.       

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF RESERVATIONS IN THE  

CONTEXT OF LOCAL-SELF GOVERNMENT IS DIFFERENT  

42

FROM  THAT  IN  HIGHER  EDUCATION  AND  PUBLIC  

EMPLOYMENT  

30. Before addressing the contentious issues, it is necessary  

to  examine  the  overarching  considerations  behind  the  

provisions  for  reservations  in  elected  local  bodies.  At  the  

outset,  we  are  in  agreement  with  Shri  Rajeev  Dhavan’s  

suggestion  that  the  principles  that  have  been  evolved  for  

conferring  the  reservation benefits  contemplated  by  Articles  

15(4) and 16(4) cannot be mechanically applied in the context  

of reservations enabled by Article 243-D and 243-T. In this  

respect,  we  endorse  the  proposition  that  Article  243-D and  

243-T form a distinct and independent constitutional basis for  

reservations in local self-government institutions, the nature  

and purpose of which is different from the reservation policies  

designed to  improve  access  to  higher  education and public  

employment,  as contemplated  under  Article  15(4)  and 16(4)  

respectively. Specifically with regard to the unviability of the  

analogy  between Article  16(4)  and Article  243-D,  we  are  in  

agreement with a decision of the Bombay High Court, reported  

43

as  Vinayakrao  Gangaramji  Deshmukh v.  P.C.  Agrawal  &  

Ors,  AIR 1999 Bom 142. That case involved a fact-situation  

where the chairperson position in a Panchayat was reserved in  

favour  of  a  Scheduled  Caste  Woman.  In  the  course  of  

upholding this reservation, it was held as follows:  

“…  Now,  after  the  seventy-third  and  seventy-fourth  Constitutional  amendments,  the  constitution  of  local  bodies has been granted a constitutional protection and  Article 243D mandates that a seat be reserved for the  Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe in every Panchayat  and Sub-article (4) of the said Article 243D also directs  that the offices of the Chairpersons in the panchayats at  the village or any other level  shall  be reserved for  the  Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in  such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law,  provide. Therefore, the reservation in the local bodies like  the Village Panchayat is not governed by Article  16(4),  which  speaks  about  the  reservation  in  the  public  employment, but a separate constitutional power which  directs the reservation in such local bodies. …”   

We are of course aware of the fact that some decisions in the  

past  have  examined  the  validity  of  reservations  in  local  

self-government by applying the principles evolved in relation  

to education and employment.  

44

31. In this respect, we are in partial agreement with one of the  

submissions made by Shri M. Rama Jois that the nature of  

disadvantages  which  restrict  access  to  education  and  

employment cannot be readily equated with disadvantages in  

the  realm  of  political  representation.  To  be  sure,  

backwardness  in  the  social  and  economic  sense  does  not  

necessarily  imply  political  backwardness.  However,  the  

petitioner’s emphasis on the distinction between ‘selection’ (in  

case of education and employment) and ‘election’ (in case of  

political  representation)  does  not  adequately  reflect  the  

complexities  involved.  It  is  of  course  undeniable  that  in  

determining who can get access to education and employment,  

due  regard  must  be  given  to  considerations  of  merit  and  

efficiency  which  can  be  measured  in  an  objective  manner.  

Hence,  admissions  to  educational  institutions  and  the  

recruitment  to  government  jobs  is  ordinarily  done  through  

methods such as examinations,  interviews or assessment of  

past performance. Since it is felt that applicants belonging to  

the  SC/ST/OBC  categories  among  others  are  at  a  

disadvantage  when they compete through these methods, a  

45

level-playing field is sought to be created by way of conferring  

reservation benefits.  

32. In the domain of political participation, there can be no  

objective parameters to determine who is  more likely to get  

elected to representative institutions at any level. The choices  

of  voters  are  not  guided  by  an  objective  assessment  of  a  

candidate’s merit and efficiency. Instead, they are shaped by  

subjective factors such as the candidate’s ability to canvass  

support,  past  service  record,  professed  ideology  and  

affiliations to organised groups among others. In this context,  

it  is  quite  possible  that  candidates  belonging  to  the  

SC/ST/OBC  categories  could  demonstrate  these  subjective  

qualities  and  win  elections  against  candidates  from  the  

relatively better-off groups. However, such a scenario cannot  

be presumed in all circumstances. It is quite conceivable that  

in  some  localized  settings,  backwardness  in  the  social  and  

economic sense can also act as a barrier to effective political  

participation and representation. When it comes to creating a  

level-playing field for the purpose of elections to local bodies,  

46

backwardness in the social and economic sense can indeed be  

one of the criteria for conferring reservation benefits.  

33.  It  must be kept  in mind that there is  also an inherent  

difference  between  the  nature  of  benefits  that  accrue  from  

access  to  education  and  employment  on  one  hand  and  

political  representation  at  the  grassroots  level  on  the  other  

hand.  While  access  to  higher  education  and  public  

employment  increases  the  likelihood  of  the  socio-economic  

upliftment  of  the  individual  beneficiaries,  participation  in  

local-self  government  is  intended  as  a  more  immediate  

measure of empowerment for the community that the elected  

representative  belongs  to.  The  objectives  of  democratic  

decentralisation are not only to bring governance closer to the  

people, but also to make it more participatory, inclusive and  

accountable to the weaker sections of society. In this sense,  

reservations in local self-government are intended to directly  

benefit the community as a whole, rather than just the elected  

representatives. It is for this very reason that there cannot be  

an exclusion of  the ‘creamy layer’  in the context of political  

47

representation.  There  are  bound  to  be  disparities  in  the  

socio-economic status of persons within the groups that are  

the  intended  beneficiaries  of  reservation  policies.  While  the  

exclusion  of  the  ‘creamy  layer’  may  be  feasible  as  well  as  

desirable  in  the  context  of  reservations  for  education  and  

employment,  the  same  principle  cannot  be  extended  to  the  

context  of  local  self-government.  At the level  of  panchayats,  

the empowerment of the elected individual is only a means for  

pursuing the larger end of advancing the interests of weaker  

sections. Hence, it would be counter-intuitive to exclude the  

relatively better-off persons among the intended beneficiaries  

from  the  reservation  benefits  that  are  designed  to  ensure  

diversity in the composition of local bodies. It is quite likely  

that such persons may be better equipped to represent and  

protect the interests of their respective communities. We can  

now attempt to provide answers to the contentious issues.

(i).  VALIDITY  OF  RESERVATIONS  IN  FAVOUR  OF  

BACKWARD CLASSES   

48

34.  With respect  to the challenge  against  the constitutional  

validity  of  Art.  243-D(6)  and  243-T(6)  which  enable  the  

reservation  of  seats  and  chairperson  posts  in  favour  of  

backward classes, we are in agreement with the respondents  

that  these  are  merely  enabling  provisions  and  it  would  be  

quite improper to strike them down as violative of the equality  

clause. Admittedly, Art. 243-D(6) and 243-T(6) do not provide  

guidance on how to identify the backward classes and neither  

do  they  specify  any  principle  for  the  quantum  of  such  

reservations. Instead, discretion has been conferred on State  

Legislatures to design and confer reservation benefits in favour  

of backward classes. It is but natural that questions will arise  

in  respect  of  the  exercise  of  a  discretionary  power.  The  

petitioners in this case have objected to reservations in favour  

of OBCs to the tune of 33% in the State of Karnataka and 27%  

in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Similar objections can be raised  

with regard to some of the other State legislations as well. The  

gist of the objection is that since most of the OBC groups are  

already  well  represented  in  the  political  space,  there  is  no  

principled basis for  conferring reservation benefits  on them.  

49

Based on this premise, it was contended that the reservations  

in  favour  of  OBCs  do  not  meet  the  tests  of  ‘reasonable  

classification’  and  proportionality.  Furthermore,  

apprehensions were voiced that the reservations in favour of  

OBCs have emerged as an instrument by which incumbent  

State  governments  can  engage  in  ‘vote-bank’  politics  by  

preferring  one  group  over  another.  In  light  of  these  

contentions, it is obvious that the petitioner’s real concern is  

with overbreadth in the State legislations.  

35.  There  is  no  doubt  in  our  minds  that  excessive  and  

disproportionate  reservations  provided  by  State  legislations  

can indeed be the subject-matter of specific challenges before  

the Courts.  However,  the same does not justify  the striking  

down of Art. 243-D(6) and 243-T(6) which are Constitutional  

provisions  that  enable  reservations  in  favour  of  backward  

classes in the first place. As far as the challenge against the  

various State legislations is concerned, we were not provided  

with adequate materials or argumentation that could help us  

to  make  a  decision  about  the  same.  The  identification  of  

50

backward  classes  for  the  purpose  of  reservations  is  an  

executive  function  and  as  per  the  mandate  of  Art.  340,  

dedicated  commissions  need  to  be  appointed  to  conduct  a  

rigorous empirical inquiry into the nature and implications of  

backwardness.  It  is  also  incumbent  upon  the  executive  to  

ensure that reservation policies are reviewed from time to time  

so as to guard against overbreadth. In respect of the objections  

against the Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act, 1993, all that we  

can  refer  to  is  the  Chinnappa  Reddy  Commission  Report  

(1990) which reflects the position as it  existed twenty years  

ago. In the absence of updated empirical data, it is well nigh  

impossible for the Courts to decide whether the reservations in  

favour of OBC groups are proportionate are not. Similarly, in  

the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh, the claims about the  

extent of the OBC population are based on the 1991 census.  

Reluctant  as  we  are  to  leave  these  questions  open,  it  goes  

without  saying  that  the  petitioners  are  at  liberty  to  raise  

specific  challenges against  the  State  legislations if  they can  

point out flaws in the identification of backward classes with  

the help of updated empirical data.  

51

36. As noted earlier, social and economic backwardness does  

not necessarily  coincide with political  backwardness. In this  

respect, the State Governments are well advised to reconfigure  

their reservation policies, wherein the beneficiaries under Art.  

243-D(6)  and  243-T(6)  need  not  necessarily  be  coterminus  

with the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs)  

[for the purpose of Art. 15(4)] or even the Backward classes  

that  are  under-represented  in  government  jobs  [for  the  

purpose of Art. 16(4)]. It would be safe to say that not all of the  

groups  which  have  been  given  reservation  benefits  in  the  

domain of education and employment need reservations in the  

sphere of local self-government. This is because the barriers to  

political participation are not of the same character as barriers  

that limit access to education and employment. This calls for  

some  fresh  thinking  and  policy-making  with  regard  to  

reservations in local self-government.  

37. In the absence of explicit constitutional guidance as to the  

quantum of reservation in favour of backward classes in local  

52

self-government,  the  rule  of  thumb is  that  of  proportionate  

reservation. However, we must lay stress on the fact that the  

upper ceiling of 50% (quantitative limitation) with respect to  

vertical reservations in favour of SC/ST/OBCs should not be  

breached. On the question of breaching this upper ceiling, the  

arguments made by the petitioners were a little misconceived  

since they had accounted for vertical reservations in favour of  

SC/ST/OBCs as well  as horizontal reservations in favour of  

women to assert that the 50% ceiling had been breached in  

some of the States. This was clearly a misunderstanding of the  

position since the horizontal reservations in favour of women  

are meant to intersect with the vertical reservations in favour  

of SC/ST/OBC, since one-third of the seats reserved for the  

latter categories are to be reserved for women belonging to the  

same. This means that seats earmarked for women belonging  

to the general  category are  not accounted for  if  one has to  

gauge whether the upper ceiling of 50% has been breached.  

38. Shri Rajeev Dhavan had contended that since the context  

of  local  self-government  is  different  from  education  and  

53

employment,  the 50% ceiling for  vertical  reservations which  

was prescribed in  Indra Sawhney (supra.), cannot be blindly  

imported since that case dealt with reservations in government  

jobs.  It  was  further  contended  that  the  same  decision  had  

recognised  the  need  for  exceptional  treatment  in  some  

circumstances,  which  is  evident  from  the  following  words  

(at Paras. 809, 810):  

“809.  From  the  above  discussion,  the  irresistible  conclusion  that  follows  is  that  the  reservations  contemplated  in  Clause  (4)  of  Article  16  should  not  exceed 50%.

810. While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to  put out of consideration certain extraordinary situations  inherent  in the  great  diversity  of  this  country and the  people.  It  might  happen  that  in  far-flung  and  remote  areas  the  population  inhabiting  those  areas  might,  on  account of their being put of the mainstream of national  life  and  in  view  of  conditions  peculiar  to  and  characteristical to them, need to be treated in a different  way,  some  relaxation  in  this  strict  rule  may  become  imperative.  In  doing  so,  extreme  caution  is  to  be  exercised and a special case made out.”

39. Admittedly, reservations in excess of 50% do exist in some  

exceptional  cases,  when it  comes to  the  domain of  political  

representation. For instance, the Legislative Assemblies of the  

54

States of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram  

and Sikkim have reservations that are far in excess of the 50%  

limit. However, such a position is the outcome of exceptional  

considerations  in  relation  to  these  areas.  Similarly,  vertical  

reservations  in  excess  of  50%  are  permissible  in  the  

composition of local self-government institutions located in the  

Fifth Schedule Areas. In the recent decision reported as Union  

of India v.  Rakesh Kumar, (2010) 1 SCALE 281, this Court  

has explained why it may be necessary to provide reservations  

in favour of Scheduled Tribes that exceed 50% of the seats in  

panchayats  located  in  Scheduled  Areas.  However,  such  

exceptional  considerations  cannot  be  invoked  when  we  are  

examining the quantum of reservations in favour of backward  

classes for the purpose of local bodies located in general areas.  

In such circumstances, the vertical reservations in favour of  

SC/ST/OBCs  cannot  exceed  the  upper  limit  of  50%  when  

taken together. It  is obvious that in order to adhere to this  

upper  ceiling,  some of  the  States  may have  to modify  their  

legislations so as to reduce the quantum of the existing quotas  

in favour of OBCs.  

55

(iii). VALIDITY OF RESERVING CHAIRPERSON POSITIONS  

40. The main criticism against the reservation of chairperson  

positions in local self-government is that the same amounts to  

cent-per-cent reservation since they are akin to solitary posts.  

As mentioned earlier, the petitioners have relied upon some  

High  Court  decisions  [See:  Janardhan Paswan v.  State  of  

Bihar, AIR 1988 Pat 75;  Krishna Kumar Mishra v.  State of  

Bihar,  AIR  1996  Pat  112],  wherein  it  had  been  held  that  

reservations of Chairperson posts in Panchayats would not be  

permissible since the same was tantamount to the reservation  

of  solitary seats.  However,  Article  243-D(4)  provides a clear  

Constitutional basis for reserving the Chairperson positions in  

favour of SC and STs (in a proportionate manner) while also  

providing that one-third of all chairperson positions in each  

tier of the Panchayati  Raj  Institutions would be reserved in  

favour  of  women.  As  described  earlier,  the  considerations  

behind  the  provisions  of  Article  243-D  cannot  be  readily  

compared with those  of  Article  16(4)  which is  the  basis  for  

56

reservations in public employment. It is a settled principle in  

the domain of service law that single posts cannot be reserved  

under  the  scheme of  Article  16(4)  and the petitioners  have  

rightly  pointed  out  to  some  precedents  in  support  of  their  

contention. However, the same proposition cannot be readily  

extended to strike down reservations for chairperson positions  

in Panchayats. This is because Chairperson positions should  

not be viewed as solitary seats by themselves for the purpose  

of reservation. Instead, the frame of reference is the entire pool  

of  Chairperson  positions  in  each tier  of  the  three  levels  of  

Panchayati Raj Institutions in the entire State. Out of this pool  

of seats which is computed across panchayats in the whole  

state, the number of offices that are to be reserved in favour of  

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is to be determined  

on  the  basis  of  the  proportion  between  the  population  

belonging to these categories and the total population of the  

State.  This  interpretation  is  clearly  supported  by  a  bare  

reading  of  the  first  proviso  to  Art.  243-D(4).  It  would  be  

worthwhile to re-examine the language of the said provision:  

57

243-D(4)  The  offices  of  the  Chairpersons  in  the  Panchayats at the village or any other level shall be  reserved  for  the  Scheduled  Castes,  the  Scheduled  Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature  of a State may, by law, provide:

Provided  that  the  number  of  offices  of  Chairpersons reserved for the Scheduled Castes and  the Scheduled Tribes in the Panchayats at each level  in  any State  shall  bear,  as  nearly  as  may be,  the  same proportion to the total number of such offices  in the Panchayats at each level as the population of  the  Scheduled  Castes  in  the  State  or  of  the  Scheduled  Tribes  in  the  State  bears  to  the  total  population of the State:

Provided further that not less than one-third of  the  total  number  of  offices  of  Chairpersons  in  the  Panchayats  at  each  level  shall  be  reserved  for  women:

Provided  also  that  the  number  of  offices  reserved  under  this  clause  shall  be  allotted  by  rotation to different Panchayats at each level.  

41. As may be evident from the above-mentioned provision,  

when the frame of reference is the entire pool of chairperson  

positions  computed  across  each  tier  of  Panchayati  Raj  

institutions in the entire state, the possibility of cent-per-cent  

reservation does not arise. For this purpose, a loose analogy  

can be drawn with reservations in favour of Scheduled Castes  

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and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of elections to the Lok  

Sabha and the respective Vidhan Sabhas. Before elections to  

these  bodies,  the  Election  Commission  earmarks  some  

electoral  constituencies  as  those  which  are  reserved  for  

candidates belonging to the SC/ST categories. For the purpose  

of  these  reservations,  the  frame  of  reference  is  the  total  

number of Lok Sabha or Vidhan Sabha seats in a State and  

not the single position of an MP or MLA respectively. Coming  

back to the context of Chairperson positions in Panchayats, it  

is therefore permissible to reserve a certain number of these  

offices in favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  

women, provided that the same is done in accordance with the  

provisos to Article 243-D(4).  

42.  In  the  case  of  urban  local  bodies,  Art.  243-T(4)  also  

enables  reservation  of  chairperson  posts  in  favour  of  

Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  and  women.  However,  

there are no further specifications to guide the reservation of  

chairperson positions in urban areas. While it is not possible  

for us to ascertain the legislative intent behind the same, one  

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can perhaps theorise that there was an assumption that the  

intended beneficiaries are in a relatively better-off position to  

overcome  barriers  to  political  participation  in  urban  local  

bodies, when compared with rural local bodies.   

43.  It  was  also  contended  that  since  chairpersons  of  

Panchayats  and Municipalities  are  entrusted  with  executive  

powers, reserving these posts could prove to be the precursor  

for  reservations  of  executive  offices  at  higher  levels  of  

government.  It  was  even  suggested  that  the  reservation  of  

chairperson  posts  was  akin  to  reserving  the  posts  of  Chief  

Minister and Prime Minister at the State and National level,  

respectively. In our opinion, this analogy with the higher levels  

of  government  is  misplaced.  The  offices  of  chairpersons  in  

Panchayats and Municipalities are reserved as a measure of  

protective discrimination, so as to enable the weaker sections  

to assert their voice against entrenched interests at the local  

level.  The patterns of disadvantage and discrimination faced  

by  persons  belonging  to  the  weaker  sections  are  more  

pervasive at the local level. Unlike elected representatives in  

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the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha who can fall back on the  

support  of  mainstream  political  parties  as  well  as  media  

scrutiny  as  a  safeguard  against  marginalization  and unjust  

discrimination, elected representatives from the disadvantaged  

sections  may  have  no  such  support-structures  at  the  local  

level.  In this respect,  the Union Parliament thought it  fit  to  

enable  reservations  of  Chairperson  positions  in  order  to  

ensure  that  not  only  are  the  weaker  sections  adequately  

represented in the domain of local self-government, but that  

they also get a chance to play leadership roles.       

44.  The  other  significant  criticism  of  the  reservation  of  

chairperson  posts  in  local  bodies  is  that  it  amounts  to  an  

unreasonable limitation on the rights of political participation  

of persons who do not belong to the reserved categories. As  

enumerated  in  the  petitioner’s  submissions,  the  rights  of  

political participation broadly include the right of a citizen to  

vote for a candidate of his/her choice and right of citizens to  

contest  elections  for  a  public  office.  In  the  context  of  the  

present  case,  these  would  include  the  rights  of  elected  

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members  to  choose  the  chairpersons  of  Panchayats  and  

Municipalities.  As  outlined  earlier,  it  was  contended  that  

reserving  these  posts  has  the  effect  of  limiting  the  choices  

available  to  voters  and  effectively  discourages  persons  

belonging  to  the  general  category  from  contesting  these  

elections.  Shri  Salman  Khurshid  had  made  the  point  that  

unlike those who contest elections for the Lok Sabha and the  

Vidhan Sabha, it is not viable for those who seek membership  

in  the  local  bodies  to  contest  elections  in  territorial  

constituencies other than those in which they reside. This line  

of  argumentation  was adopted  in  support  of  the  contention  

that  the  reservation of  chairperson posts  is  violative  of  the  

principles of democracy.  

45.  While  the  exercise  of  electoral  franchise  is  an essential  

component of a liberal democracy, it is a well-settled principle  

in Indian law, that the right to vote and contest elections does  

not have the status of fundamental rights. Instead, they are in  

the  nature  of  legal  rights  which  can  be  controlled  through  

legislative means. On this point, we can refer to the following  

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observations made by R.M. Sahai, J. in Mohan Lal Tripathi v.  

District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly, (1992) 4 SCC 80, Para. 2:  

“Democracy is a concept, a political philosophy, an ideal  practised  by  many  nations  culturally  advanced  and  politically  mature  by  resorting  to  governance  by  representatives of the people elected directly or indirectly.  But  electing  representatives  to  govern  is  neither  a  ‘fundamental  right’  nor  a  ‘common  law  right’  but  a  special right created by the statutes, or a ‘political right’  or  ‘privilege’  and  not  a  ‘natural’,  ‘absolute’  or  ‘vested  right’. Concepts familiar to common law and equity must  remain  strangers  to  Election  Law  unless  statutorily  embodied. Right to remove an elected representative, too,  must  stem out  of  the  statute  as  ‘in  the  absence  of  a  constitutional  restriction  it  is  within  the  power  of  a  legislature  to enact  a  law for  the  recall  of  officers’.  Its  existence or validity can be decided on the provision of  the Act and not, as a matter of policy.’    

In  this  respect,  it  may  be  noticed  that  the  Constitution  

empowers  the  Election  Commission  of  India  to  prepare  

electoral rolls for the purpose of identifying the eligible voters  

in elections for the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabhas. This  

suggests that the right to vote is not an inherent right and it  

cannot  be  claimed  in  an  abstract  sense.  Furthermore,  the  

Representation  of  People  Act,  1951  gives  effect  to  the  

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Constitutional guidance on the eligibility of persons to contest  

elections. This includes grounds that render persons ineligible  

from contesting elections such as that of a person not being a  

citizen of India, a person being of unsound mind, insolvency  

and  the  holding  of  an  ‘office  of  profit’  under  the  executive  

among others. It will suffice to say that there is no inherent  

right  to  contest  elections  since  there  are  explicit  legislative  

controls over the same.  

46. The petitioners have asked us to reconsider the precedents  

wherein  the  rights  of  political  participation  have  been  

characterised as statutory rights. It has been argued that in  

view  of  the  standard  of  reasonableness,  fairness  and  

non-discrimination  required  of  governmental  action  under  

Article 21 of the Constitution, there is a case for invalidating  

the  restrictions  that  have  been placed on these rights  as  a  

consequence of reservations in local  self-government. We do  

not agree with this contention.  In this case,  we are dealing  

with  an  affirmative  action  measure  and  hence  the  test  of  

proportionality  is  a  far  more  appropriate  standard  for  

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exercising  judicial  review.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  

reservation  of  chairperson  posts  in  favour  of  candidates  

belonging  to  the  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes  and  

women  does  restrict  the  rights  of  political  participation  of  

persons from the  unreserved categories  to  a  certain  extent.  

However, we feel that the test of reasonable classification is  

met  in  view  of  the  legitimate  governmental  objective  of  

safeguarding the interests of weaker sections by ensuring their  

adequate  representation  as  well  as  empowerment  in  local  

self-government institutions. The position has been eloquently  

explained  in  the  respondents’  submissions,  wherein  it  has  

been stated that ‘the asymmetries of power require that the  

Chairperson should belong to the disadvantaged community  

so  that  the  agenda  of  such  Panchayats  is  not  hijacked  for  

majoritarian reasons.’  [Cited from Submissions  on behalf  of  

the State of Bihar, p. 49]  

47. There have of course been some arguments doubting the  

efficacy of reserving chairperson posts, mostly on the premise  

that  this  does  not  lead  to  the  actual  empowerment  of  the  

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intended beneficiaries,  since they are still  dominated by the  

traditionally  powerful  sections.  Especially  in  the  case  of  

elected  women representatives  at  the  local  level,  it  is  often  

argued that the real power is exercised by the male members  

of their families. We are also alert to the frequent reports of  

instances  where  women  representatives  have  asserted  

themselves,  thereby  inviting  the  wrath  of  the  retrograde  

patriarchial society. However, there are also increasing reports  

about  success  stories  which  show that  enhancing  women’s  

participation  in  local  self-government  has  expanded  social  

welfare.  Irrespective  of  such  concerns  about  the  efficacy  of  

reservations in local self-government, it is not proper for the  

judiciary to second-guess a social  welfare measure that has  

been incorporated by way of a constitutional amendment. In  

light of these considerations, we reject the challenge in respect  

of the constitutional validity of Art. 243-D(4) and 243-T(4).  

CONCLUSION  

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48. In view of the above, our conclusions are:-  

(i) The nature and purpose of reservations in the context  

of  local  self-government  is  considerably  different  from  

that of higher education and public employment. In this  

sense, Articles 243-D and Article 243-T form a distinct  

and  independent  constitutional  basis  for  affirmative  

action  and  the  principles  that  have  been  evolved  in  

relation  to  the  reservation  policies  enabled  by  Articles  

15(4) and 16(4) cannot be readily applied in the context  

of local self-government.  Even when made, they need not  

be for a period corresponding to the period of reservation  

for purposes of Articles 15(4) and 16(4), but can be much  

shorter.

(ii)  Article  243-D(6)  and  Article  243-T(6)  are  

constitutionally  valid  since  they  are  in  the  nature  of  

provisions  which  merely  enable  State  Legislatures  to  

reserve  seats  and  chairperson  posts  in  favour  of  

backward  classes.  Concerns  about  disproportionate  

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reservations  should  be  raised  by  way  of  specific  

challenges against the State Legislations.  

(iii) We are not in a position to examine the claims about  

overbreadth in the quantum of reservations provided for  

OBCs under the impugned State Legislations since there  

is no contemporaneous empirical data. The onus is on  

the executive to conduct a rigorous investigation into the  

patterns of backwardness that act as barriers to political  

participation  which are  indeed quite  different  from the  

patterns  of  disadvantages  in  the  matter  of  access  to  

education and employment.  As we have considered and  

decided  only  the  constitutional  validity  of  Articles  

243-D(6) and 243-T(6), it will be open to the petitioners  

or any aggrieved party to challenge any State legislation  

enacted  in  pursuance  of  the  said  constitutional  

provisions before the High Court.  We are of the view that  

the identification of ‘backward classes’  under Art.  243-

D(6)  and  Art.  243-T(6)  should  be  distinct  from  the  

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identification of SEBCs for the purpose of Art. 15(4) and  

that of backward classes for the purpose of Art. 16(4).    

(iv)  The  upper  ceiling  of  50%  vertical  reservations  in  

favour of  SC/ST/OBCs should not  be breached in  the  

context of local self-government. Exceptions can only be  

made in order  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  Scheduled  

Tribes in the matter of their representation in panchayats  

located in the Scheduled Areas.    

(v)  The reservation of chairperson posts in the manner  

contemplated  by  Article  243-D(4)  and  243-T(4)  is  

constitutionally valid. These chairperson posts cannot be  

equated  with  solitary  posts  in  the  context  of  public  

employment.  

49. With these observations, the present set of writ petitions  

stands disposed of.    

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….…………………… CJI [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN]  

…….……………………J. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN]  

…….……………………J. [D.K. JAIN]  

…….……………………J. [P. SATHASIVAM]  

…….……………………J. [J.M. PANCHAL]   

NEW DELHI  MAY 11, 2010

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