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PETITIONER: K. K. CHARI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R. M. SESHADRI

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/03/1973

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. DUA, I.D. ALAGIRISWAMI, A.

CITATION:  1973 AIR 1311            1973 SCR  (3) 691  1973 SCC  (1) 761  CITATOR INFO :  F          1974 SC 471  (7,8,20,23)  E&F        1974 SC 994  (34,37,38,102)  RF         1975 SC2130  (3)  E          1978 SC  22  (14)  RF         1989 SC 162  (6)

ACT: Madras    Buildings   (Lease   and   Rent   Control)    Act, 1960,--Section 10(3)(a)(i)-Bonafide requirement of landlord- Compromise   decree--whether   a   separate   enquiry    and satisfaction apart from the compromise necessary for passing eviction order.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  bought  the suit premises  and  filed  legal proceedings against the respondent, who was a tenant in  the suit  premises,  for eviction on the ground  of  appellant’s bonafide  requirements u/s 10(3) of the Madras Rent  Control Act.  The tenant contested the landlord’s claim inter  alia, on the ground that the appellant’s claim was not bona  fide. At  the trial, the appellant examined himself, and  produced voluminous  documentary  evidence.  The  appellant  was  not cross-examined.   The  appellant  and  the  respondent  then entered  into a compromise in which the tenant gave  up  all his defences and was given three months’ time to vacate  the premises.   A decree for eviction was accordingly passed  by the  Small Causes Court.  The respondent did not vacate  the premises  and  when  the decree was sought  to  be  executed challenged the decree of eviction principally on the  ground that  the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to  pass  a decree only in terms of the compromise decree and that Court had  a duty to independently satisfy itself about  the  bona fide requirement of the landlord.  The High Court held  that the   order   of  the  Small  Causes   Court   was   without jurisdiction. Allowing the appeal, HELD  : (i) The true position is that an order  of  eviction based  on consent of the parties is not necessarily void  if the  jurisdictional  fact, namely, the existence of  one  or more of the conditions mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order.

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Satisfaction  of the Court which is a pre-requisite for  the order  of eviction, need not be by the  manifestation  borne out  by judicial findings.  It at some stage, the Court  was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there  was sufficient material before it before the parties invited  it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the  grounds on  which the order of eviction was based.  In  the  instant case, withdrawal of defences by the tenant expressly amounts to  the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out  his case  regarding his requirement requiring the  premises  for his own occupation being bona fied. [704E] (ii) From the particular facts of this case, it can be  said that  the decree for eviction has not been solely passed  on the  basis of the cornpromise.  The evidence adduced by  the respondent  upto  the  stage at  which  the  compromise  was entered into, was enough to establish the landlord’s claim. Bahadur Singh and another v. Muni Subrat Das [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432,  Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal A.I.R. 1970  S.C.  838, and  Ferozi Lal v. Mannaal and Others A.I.R. 1970 S.C.  794, distinguished on facts. 692 Per Alagiriswami, J. An eviction order based on a compromise where  the landlord has asked for possession on any  one  of the  grounds  on  the  basis  of  which  he  could  ask  for possession, is valid. [708D] Barton  v. Fincham, [1921] 2 K.B., 291, Babu Ram  Sharma  v. Pal  Singh, [1959] P.L.R. 33, Vyas Dev v.  Nikhiram,  A.I.R. 1960 Punjab 514 cited with approval.,

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1971. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  15, 1970 of the Madras High Court in  C.R.P.  No. 797 of 1970, M. C. Setalvad, and K. Jayaram, for the, appellant. V. M. Tarkunde E. C. Agarwala, A. T. M. Sampath and M. M. L. Srivastava, for the respondent. The  Judgment of I. D. DuA and C. A. VAIDIALINGAM,  JJ.  was delivered  by VAIDIALINGAM, J.  A. ALAGIRISWAMI, J.  gave  a separate opinion. VAIDIALINGAM,  J.-The short question that arises for  consi- deration  in this appeal, by special leave, is  whether  the order  dated  March 31, 1969, passed by the Court  of  Small Causes,  Madras,  in H.R.C. No. 983 of  1968  directing  the eviction  of the respondenttenant is a nullity and  as  such not  executable.  The facts leading upto the passing of  the order may be stated The  appellant  was  occupying a premises  in  Madras  as  a tenant.   His landlady filed an application H.R.C. No.  1924 of 1967 seeking eviction of the appellant on the ground that she bona fide required die premises for her own  occupation. At  that  time  the  suit  premises  No.  64,  Lloyds  Road, Royaspettah,   Madras-14  was  advertised  for  sale.    The appellant  for  purposes  of his  occupation  purchased  the premises on October 23, 1967, as per registered document No. 1633  of  1967  in Sub-Registrar’s  Office,  Mylapore.   The respondent was then a tenant of the suit premises under  the vendor.   After the purchase, he attorned in favour  of  the appellant  and has been paying rent.  An eviction order  was passed  by consent against the appellant in H.R.C. No.  1924 of 1967 on January 27,1968.  He was given time till  January 27,  1969,  to  vacate the premises, of  which  he,  was  in

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occupation  as a tenant, by virtue of the said  decree.   On the same day i.e. January 27, 1968, the appellant issued two notices to the respondent, his tenant in respect of the suit premises,  terminating  tenancy  of  the  Respondent   under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and calling upon him  to quit and deliver vacant possession on  February  29, 1968.   The two notices were given because of the fact  that the first notice had 693 asked  for  vacant possession on February 28,  1968  and  to avoid any objection regarding the first notice probably  the second  notice  was  also given  asking  for  possession  on February  29, 1968.  In both the notices, the appellant  had referred to the purchase of the bungalow in question for his own  occupation  and also attributed knowledge of  the  said purpose  to  the  tenant.   There is  a  reference  to  the. appellant  being a tenant of premises No.  2,  Lakshmipuram, 1st street, Madras- 14, and to his having no other house  of his own in the city of Madras except the suit premises.  lit is further stated that in view of the fact that an  eviction order  against him has been passed on January 27,  1968,  in H.R.C.  1924  of  1967,  the  appellant  requires  his   own bungalow,  namely, the suit premises ill the  occupation  of the respondent for his own bona fide use and occupation. As  the  respondent  did not  surrender  possession  of  the premises, the appellant filed H.R.C. No. 983 of 1968 in  the court of Small Causes, Madras, under section 10 (3 ) (a) (i) of  the Madras Buildings: (Lease & Rent Control)  Act,  1960 (hereinafter  referred  to as the Act).  In  this  petition, after  referring  to the purchase of the suit  premises,  as well  as the order of eviction passed against him in  H.R.C. No.  1924 of 1967, the appellant has stated that he  has  no other  house  of  his own any where in the  city  of  Madras excepting  the suit premises of which the respondent is  the tenant.   He has further averred that he has terminated  the tenancy of the respondent by issuing notices on January  27, 1968,  and  that  the tenant has not  vacated  the  premises though  he  has  received  the  notice.   There  is  also  a reference  to  the  fact  that  the  respondent  is  not  in essential  service and that the suit premises is not  exempt tinder  section 30 of ’the Act.  He has further stated  that he requires the house for his bona fide use and  occupation. Accordingly  be prayed-,for eviction of the  respondent  and for possession being delivered to him. The respondent filed two counter-affidavits, one on July 19, 1968 and another on January 14, 1969.  In the former he  has raised  the contention that he is not a tenant of  the  suit premises,  either under the appellant or under the  previous owner of the premises.  According to him, the tenant of  the premises  was and continues to be at the relevant time  M/s. R. M. Seshadri, a partnership firm.  He has further  pleaded that  as  he  was  never a tenant, the  claim  made  by  the appellant  of having terminated his tenancy is  meaningless. Finally  he  has  stated  that  the  application  is ,-tot maintained  against him and prayed for its being  dismissed. In ,the additional counter-affidavit, the respondent pleaded that  the  appellant  does not require  the  house  for  his occupation and that his claim is not bona fide.  He has also controverted  the  claim of the appellant that  an  eviction order had been passed against him 694 in  H.R.C.  No. 1924 of 1967.  In any event,  the  order  of eviction  against  the appellant is a collusive one  and  is only  a devise to evict the respondent.  He further  pleaded that  the  purchase by the appellant itself is  not  lawful.

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Finally he raised a contention that the tenant, M/s.  R.  M. Seshadri, has spent enormous amounts on the house acting  on the  assurance  of its previous owner that the  house  would never be sold and the tenant of the premises would never  be evicted.   Finally there is a challenge also to the  notices determining the tenancy not being in accordance with law. The  enquiry  before the Court of Small Causes.  appears  to have  commenced  on  January 16, 1969.   The  appellant  was examined  on  that day as PW 1 and his evidence  appears  to have  spread over till February 20, 1969.  In the course  of his evidence, he has spoken to him being a tenant of a house of  which one Seethalakshmi Ammal was the landlady  and  to her having filed an application for eviction against him, to his  purchasing  the present suit premises  on  October  23, 1967, for purposes of his own occupation, to the  respondent having  been a tenant against the original landlord  at  the time  of purchase and later attorney to him, to the  payment of  rent by the respondent, subsequent to the purchase  and to  the  notices issued to the  respondent  terminating  his tenancy  under section 106 of the Transfer of  Property  Act and requiring him to deliver possession of the property  for purposes  of  his  occupation.  He has also  filed  a  large volume  of exhibits in respect of the matters spoken  to  by him  ’before the court.  He has particularly  mentioned  the fact  that he purchased the said house for purposes  of  his occupation, as he was under orders of eviction in H.R.C. No. 1924  of 1967 and to’ his having no other house in the  city of  Madras.   The last exhibit (that was filed  by  him  was Exhibit  P. 45, which was a certified copy of the  order  in H.R.C. 1924 of 1967, which showed that an order of  eviction had  been passed against the appellant on January 27,  1968, and  he was given time till January 27, 1969,  for  vacating the premises.  It was no doubt a consent order.  But all the exhibits  filed  by  him cleanly go to  establish  that  his evidence  that he requited the suit premises bona  fide  for his own occupation, was true.  The respondent had not chosen to  cross-examine  the appellant.  On March 31,  1969,  both parties entered into a compromise in the following terms                  "MEMO OF COMPROMISE               The Respondent hereby withdraws his defence in               the aforesaid petition and submits to a decree               for eviction unconditionally.               (2)   The  Respondent  prays  that  time   for               vacating  up to 5th June 1969 might please  be               given and the Petitioner agrees to the same. 695 .lm15 (3)  The Respondent agrees to vacate the  petition  premises and hand over possession of the entire petition premises  to the petitioner on or before the said date viz. 5th June 1969 without  fail under any circumstances and undertakes not  to apply for extension of time. (4)  It  is  agreed by both the parties that  this  Memo  of Compromise is executable as a Decree of Court. Dated at Madras, this the 31st day of March, 1969". The compromise petition was signed by both the appellant and ,the respondent as well as the advocate appearing for  them. The court, after referring to the petition of the  landlord- being  under section 10(3) (a) (i) of the Act on the  ground of his own occupation, passed the following order :-               "Compromise  memo  filed  and  recorded.    By               consent  eviction is ordered granting time  to               vacate till 5-6-1969.  No cost". The  terms of compromise, which have been already  set  out, were also incorporated in the order.

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It   will   be  noted  that  the   respondent   had   raised substantially the following defence to the application filed by the appellant, namely-               (1)  he was not a tenant of the premises  and               that  on  the other hand, the  tenant  of  the               premises   was   M/s.   R,  M.   Seshadri,   a               partnership firm;               (2)  the  claim  of  the  appellant  that   he               requires  the house for the occupation is  not               bona fide-;               (3)  the  purchase  of  the  premises  by  the               appellant is not lawful;               (4)  the  tenant, M/s.  R.  M.  Seshadri,  has               spent  enormous amounts by way of repairs  and               improvements; and               (5) the notice determining the tenancy is  not               in accordance with law, It  was to meet the above defence and also to establish  his claim  of  requiring  the premises bona  fide  for  his  own occupation,  the  landlord-appellant gave the  evidence  and also  produced about 45 exhibits.  It is needless  to  state that the respondent, who is a retired I.C.S. officer and  an advocate,  must have been fully aware of the averments  made by the landlord, the pleas raised in defence as ;well as the nature  of  the evidence led by ,.lie landlord to  meet  his defence.   The  respondent,  apart from  not  having  cross- examined  the landlord, when he gave evidence,- has also  by the com- 696 promise  withdrawn all his defence to the application  filed by  the  landlord  and submitted to a  decree  for  eviction unconditionally.  It is with this background that one has to appreciate the nature of the decree passed ’by the Court  on March 31, 1969. it  is also seen from the records that the appellant paid  a sum  of  Rs. 20,000/- on March 31, 1969, to  the  respondent towards the cost of repairs and improvements effected by him during  his  occupation of the suit premises.  On  the  same date, as the compromise i.e. March 31, 1969, the  respondent passed  a  letter to the appellant.  In  this  letter  after referring  to the compromise filed in the court as  well  as the  order passed thereon, he gave an undertaking to  vacate the   premises  on  or  before  June  5,  1969.    He   also acknowledged the receipt of the sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the landlord towards the cost of repairs and improvements.   The respondent has also further agreed to refund,the sum of  Rs. 20,000/- if he does not vacate the premises within time  and he  has also further agreed to pay an additional sum of  Rs. 10,000/-as  damages.  We are not concerned with this sum  of Rs.  20,000/-or the further agreement of the  respondent  to pay damages.  The respondent has further stated in the  said letter  that  in  the event of his  failure  to  vacate  the premises within time, the landlord is at liberty to  execute the decree of eviction without any further notice to him. The assurance and the undertaking given by the respondent to abide  by the compromise decree and to vacate  the  premises without raising any objection have proved to be of no avail, as  will  be seen from the events that followed.   When  the time  for  delivery  of  property  was  drawing  near,   the respondent’s  son, one S. M. Sundaram, filed a suit  in  the City  Civil  Court,  Madras,  for  a  declaration  that  the purchase,  by the appellant of the suit property  was  void. The  son  also obtained an interim  injunction  against  the appellant  from  executing the order of eviction  passed  in H.R.C.  No. 983 of 1968 and disturbing his possession.   The

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suit was tried on merits and was ultimately dismissed by the City  Civil  Court on December 12, 1969 with  costs  of  the appellant.   According  to  the  appellant,  this  suit  was engineered by the respondent himself in order to put off his eviction from :the suit property. After  the dismissal of the above suit, the appellant  filed Execution Petition No. 953 of 1969 in the City Civil  Court, Madras  (which  was  the competent  Court  for  purposes  of execution)  to  execute the order of  eviction  against  the respondent in H.R.C. No. 983 of 1968.  The respondent  filed E.  A.  No. 1314 of 1969 objecting to the execution  of  the decree  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  nullity  and   in executable;  and  as  such he prayed  for  the  warrant,  of possession  issued in Execution Petition to be recalled  and to dismiss the Execution Petition itself.  His main plea  in this appli- 697 cation  was  that the decree sought to be executed  was  one based  on  compromise or consent without  the  Rent  Control Court   having   satisfied   itself   by   an    independent consideration  regarding  the bona fide requirement  of  the property by the landlord for his own occupation; and as such the  decree  contravened  section  10  of  the  Act.    This application  was  opposed  by the  appellant  in  a  lengthy counter-affidavit.  In this counter-affidavit, the landlord, after  referring  to the various items of  evidence  adduced before  the court, which have been referred to earlier,  has stated that it was when the respondent found that the  pleas raised by him could not be sustained and that the landlord’s case  was true that he unconditionally withdrew his  defence and submitted to a decree.  ’He has further pleaded that the decree sought to be executed does not suffer any infirmity. The  learned City Civil Judge by his order dated  March  18, 1970, over-ruled the objections raised to the respondent and dismissed  E.  A.  No. 1314 of 1969 and  gave  time  to  the respondent  till April 20, 1970, to vacate and  deliver  the possession  of  the property.  The  respondent  carried  the matter to the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.  797 of  1970.   The High Court by its judgment and  order  dated September 15, 1970, has reversed the order of the City Civil Court and accepted the contentions, of the respondent.   The learned  Judge has held that the decree for  eviction  dated March  31,  1969,  is  solely passed on  the  basis  of  the compromise and the Rent Controller has not applied his  mind to satisfy himself whether the bona fide requirement of  the landlord  hag been established.  It is the further’ view  of the High Court that even if there was enough material before the Rent Control Court, when it passed the order of eviction by  consent, the decree will, nevertheless, be void so  long as the Rent Controller has not given his decision  regarding the  requirement of the landlord being bona fide.  On  this line of reasoning, the learned Judge held that ’the eviction order is a nullity and is not executable. Mr. M. C. Setalvad, learned counsel for the appellant,  ’has urged   that   the  High  Court   has   misunderstood   and, misinterpreted the decisions of this Court hearing on  the point.  He- pointed out that the appellant had  specifically pleaded  that  be required the house bona fide for  his  own occupation, which is one of the circumstances under which  a landlord  can  claim eviction of the tenant under  the  Act. The circumstances under which the house was required by  him were  also spoken to by the landlord when lie gave  evidence and  he  sought  support by filing  as  many  as  forty-five exhibits  before the court.  The respondent had  denied  the plea    of   the   landlord   in   his    counter-affidavit.

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Nevertheless, when the entire evidence was placed before the court by the landlord, the ,tenant ,did not choose to cross- examine him, as be must have felt 698 that  the landlord’s claim would ’be accepted by  the  court and his defence rejected.  It was under ;those circumstances that the respondent unconditionally withdrew his defence and submitted  to  a decree for eviction.  That conduct  of  the respondent clearly establishes that he has accepted as  true the  claim  of the landlord that he bona fide  required  the premises  for his own use and occupation.  The materials  on record also show that the court was satisfied about the bona fide  requirement of the landlord and hence it accepted  the compromise  and  made  it a decree of  court.   Under  those circumstances, the counsel contended that it cannot he  said that  the  decree  is one passed only on the  basis  of  the compromise so as to make it void. Mr.  Tarkunde,  learned counsel for ;the  respondent,  urged that the decree for eviction has been passed exclusively  on the  basis  of the compromise entered into by  the  parties. There  is no indication that the court at any stage  applied its  mind and satisfied itself regarding the premises  being required  by the landlord bona fide for his own  occupation. The relevant provision of the Act, the counsel pointed  out, is quite clear and it makes it mandatory that the court must apply  its  mind  and  satisfy itself  that  the  claim  for eviction falls within one or other of the, provisions  which enables  a landlord to got possession.  He  further  pointed out that if the satisfaction of the court. is not  expressed in the decree, the executing Court has no option but to hold that  the same is void, as laid down by this Court,  and  it cannot  go into the question whether from the  materials  on record the Rent Control Court was satisfied or not.  Such an enquiry,  it  is pointed out, will be asking  the  executing Court also to go into the question whether the landlord  has made  out a case for evictions question which  falls  within the  exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court.   Mr. Tarkunde  finally pointed out that the decision of the  High Court  holding  that  the  decree in  question  is  void  is correct,  as it is in accordance with the decisions of  this Court. It  is now necessary to refer to the material provisions  of the  Act.  Section 10 deals with eviction of  tenants.   The relevant  part of section 10, necessary for our purpose,  is as follows -               Eviction  of tenants.  "10(1) A  tenant  shall               not  be  evicted  whether in  execution  of  a               decree or otherwise except in accordance  with               the provisions of this section or sections  14               to 16 :               x             x             x               2(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions               of clause (d), apply to the Controller for- an               order direct- 699               ing  the  tenant  to,  put  the  landlord   in               possession of the building-               (i)  in case it is a residential  building  if               the   landlord   requires  it  for   his   own               occupation  or for the occupation of  his  son               and  if  he  or his son  is  not  occupying  a               residential  building of his own in the  city,               town or village concerned;               x             x              x               (a)  The Controller shall, if he is  satisfied

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             that  the claim of the landlord in bona  fide,               make an order directing the tenant to put  the               landlord in possession of the building on such               date as may be specified by the Controller and               if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall               make an order rejecting the application :               x            x              x               Provided further that the Controller may  give               the  tenant a reasonable time for putting  the               landlord in possession of the building and may               extend  such  time so as not to  exceed  three               months in the aggregate." Section  10(1) places an embargo on the right of a  landlord to  get  a  tenant evicted except  in  accordance  with  the provisions of that section or sections 14 to 16.  We are not concerned with sections 14 to 16 in this case.   Sub-section 2  enumerates certain circumstances under which  a  landlord can  ask for eviction.  We are not also concerned with  that provision.   Sub-section  3 again enumerates  certain  other circumstances  under  which  a  landlord,  subject  to   the provisions  of  clause (d), can ask for  possession  of  the building  from the tenant.  It is accepted by  both  parties that  clause (d) has no application.  Sub-clause (i),  which deals with a residential building,-enables a landlord to ask for possession of a building in the circumstances  mentioned therein.    Under  subclause  (e),  if  the  Controller   is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide he may pass an order of eviction. In  this  case, the landlord has asked for eviction  on  the ground   that  he  requires  the  premises  for   his’   own occupation.  The Controller can pass an order in his  favour only  if he is satisfied that his claim is bona  fide.   The statute  says so and that has to be given full effect.   The question is whether in the case before us, it can be  stated that  the  Controller was so satisfied when  he  passed  the order of eviction on March 31, 1969. Our  attention has been drawn to certain  English  decisions rendered  under  the Rent Restrictions Act, wherein  it  has been  held that though the, court has jurisdiction to  order possession  in favour of a landlord only on-one or other  of the specified statutory 700 grounds, the court may act on an admission made by a  tenant in  that behalf and pass an order of eviction without  being obliged to hear a case out.  It is not necessary for’ us  to refer  to  those decisions as, in our opinion, the  case  on hand  will  have  to  be  decided  in  accordance  with  the principles laid down by this Court. There are three decisions of this Court which require to  be considered.   In Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Muni Subrat Dass  & Anr.,(1)  a  decree for eviction passed on the  basis  of  a compromise between the parties, was held, by this Court,  to be a nullity as contravening section 13(1) of the Delhi  and Ajmer  Rent  Control Act, 1952.  The facts therein  were  as follows :-- The tenant and the son of the landlord referred the disputes between  them to arbitration.  The landlord was not a  party to   this  agreement.   The  arbitrators  passed  an   award whereunder  the tenant was to give vacant possession of  the premises in favour of the landlord within a particular time. This  award was made a decree of court.  The  landlord,  who was  neither  a party to the award nor to  the  proceedings, which  resulted in the award being made a decree  of  court, applied  for  eviction  of the tenant on the  basis  of  the award.   The  tenant resisted execution by  raising  various

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objections under section 47 of the Code of Civil  Procedure. One  of  the objections, was that the  decree  for  eviction based  upon the award was a nullity as being opposed to  the Delhi  and  Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.  This  Court  held that  the decree directing the tenant to deliver  possession of  the  premises to the landlord was a nullity, as  it  was passed  in  contravention of section 13(1) of  the  relevant statute.   After quoting the subsection, this Court  further held  that  the decree for eviction passed according  to  an award,  in  a  proceeding to which the landlord  was  not  a party,  and  without  the court  satisfying  itself  that  a statutory  ground  of eviction existed, was  a  nullity  and cannot be enforced in execution.  It will be seen from  this decision  that the decree was held to be a  nullity  because the  landlord was not a party thereto, and also because  the court  had not satisfied itself that a ground for  eviction, as  required  by the statute, existed.   ’this  decision  is certainly  an  authority for the proposition  that  a  court ordering  eviction  has to satisfy itself that  a  statutory ground  of  eviction has been made but by a  landlord.   How exactly that satisfaction is to be expressed by the court or gathered from the materials, has not been laid down in  this decision, as this Court was not faced with such a problem. In Kaushalya Devi & Ors. v. Shri K. L. Bansal, (2) the ques- _  tion again arose under the same Delhi  statute  regarding the validity (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432. (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048. 701 of  a  decree  passed  for  eviction  on  compromise.    The plaintiff therein filed a suit for eviction of the tenant on two grounds               (a)  the premises were required for their  own               use.: and               (b)  the  tenant  had  committed  default   in               payment of rent. The  tenant  filed a written statement  denying  both  these allegations.    He  disputed  the  claim  of  the   landlord regarding  his requiring the premises for his own  use  bona fide and also the fact of his being in arrears. When   the pleadings of the landlord and the tenant were in this state, both  parties filed a compromise memo in and by  which  they agreed  to the passing of a decree of eviction  against  the tenant.   Representations to the same effect were also  made by  the  counsel  for both parties.  The  court  passed  the following order :-               "In  view  of the statement  of  the  parties’               counsel  and the written compromise, a  decree               is  passed in favour of the plaintiff  against               the defendants. The  tenant  did  not vacate the premises  within  the  time mentioned  as per the compromise memo. , On the other  hand, he  filed an application under section 47,  Civil  Procedure Code,  pleading  that  the  decree  is  void  as  being   in contravention of section 13 of the Delhi statute.  The  High Court  held that the decree was a nullity, as the order  was passed  solely  on  the  basis  of  the  compromise  without indicating  that any of the statutory grounds  mentioned  in section 13 existed.  Following the decision in Bahadur Singh &  Anr.,(1) this Court upheld the order of the  High  Court. Here  again,  it will be seen that the manner in  which  the court’s satisfaction is to be expressed or gathered has  not been dealt with. A similar question came up again before this Court in Ferozi Lal  fain  v.  Man  Mal & Anr. (2)  The  landlord  filed  an

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application for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he had  sublet  the premises without obtaining his  consent  in writing.  Subletting, without the consent of the landlord in writing,  was one of the grounds under section 13(1) of  the Delhi statute entitling a landlord to ask for eviction.  The tenant  denied  the  allegation  that  he  had  sublet   the premises.   Both the landlord and the tenant entered into  a compromise  and the court, after recording the same,  passed the following order               "As  per compromise, decree for ejectment  and               for  Rs.  165/- with  proportionate  costs  is               passed in favour of the plaintiff and  against               the defendant.  The parties (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432. (2) A.T.R. 1970 S.C.794. 702               shall   be   ’bound  by  the  terms   of   the               compromise.   The terms of the  compromise  be               incorporated in the decreesheet............" As The tenant did not surrender possession of the properties within  the  time  mentioned in  the  compromise  memo,  the landlord levied execution.  It was resisted by the tenant on various  grounds  one  of  which was  that  the  decree  for eviction was a nullity, being in contravention of section 13 of the Delhi statute.  This contention was. accepted by  the execution Court, as well as by the High Court.  This  Court, after a reference to the provisions of section 13, held that a  decree for recovery of possession can be passed  only  if the  court concerned is satisfied that one or other  of  the grounds  mentioned  in  the section  is  established.   This Court, further observed               "From the facts mentioned earlier, it is  seen               that at no stage, the Court was called upon to               apply  its  mind to the question  whether  the               alleged subletting is true or not.  Order made               by it does not show that it was satisfied that               the subletting complained of has taken  place,               nor  is there any other material on record  to               show  that it was so satisfied.  It  is  clear               from  the record that the court had  proceeded               solely on the basis of the compromise  arrived               at ’between the parties.  That being so  there               can be hardly any doubt that the court was not               competent to pass the impugned decree.   Hence               the decree under execution must be held to  be               a nullity". Reference was also made to the two earlier decisions holding such  decrees  to be void.  It is significant to  note  that this  Court in the last mentioned decision referred  to  the facts leading upto the compromise decree, namely, the  basis of  the claim of the landlord, the denial by the tenant  and both  of  them  filing  a memo  of  compromise  without  any reference  to the plea of subletting made by   the landlord. In  the  said  decision  this  Court  has’  held  that   the compromise  decree  is  void, as there could  have  been  no satisfaction   of   this  Court  regarding   the   statutory requirement in view of the following three circumstances :-               (1)  At no stage the Court was called upon  to               apply  its  mind to the question  whether  the               plea of subletting is true or not.               (2) The order made by the Court does not  show               that  it  was satisfied  that  the  subletting               complained of has taken place.               (3)  There was no other material on record  to               show that the court was so satisfied.

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703 The  view  of  this Court further is  that  the  decree  for eviction  has  been  passed  solely  on  the  basis  of  the compromise arrived at between the parties. In the last decision, in our opinion, there is an indication as  to how the satisfaction of a court can be  expressed  or gathered in a particular case.  If a stage had been  reached in  a  particular proceeding for a court to apply  its  mind regarding  the existence of a satutory condition, it may  be held  that  it  was  so satisfied  about  the  plea  of  the landlord.   Again from other material on record, it  can  be inferred that the court was so satisfied. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that the decree for eviction in the case before us has  been passed  solely  on the basis of the  compromise  arrived  at between the parties.  No doubt a reading of the order of the court  dated  March  31,  1969,  isolated  from  all   other circumstances,  may give the impression that the decree  for eviction  is  passed because of the compromise  between  the parties.  It is no doubt true that the order on the face  of it   does  not  show  that  the  court  has  expressed   its satisfaction  that the requirement of the landlord  is  bona fide.   If, the court had expressed its satisfaction in  the order itself, that will conclude the matter.  That the court was  so satisfied can also be- considered from the point  of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to thy relevant question?  Other materials  on record can also be taken into account to  find out  if  the  court was so satisfied.  The  High  Court  has proceeded  on  the  basis that even if  there  was  material before  the court, when it passed the order of  eviction  by consent,  from  which  it can be shown that  the  court  was satisfied  about the requirement of the landlord being  bona fide nevertheless such an order will be a nullity unless the Rent  Controller  has given his decision in  favour  of  the landlord.  In our opinion , this view is erroneous. We  have  very  exhaustively referred to  the  plea  of  the landlord as well as the evidence let in by him regarding his requiring  the  building bona fide for his  own  occupation. There is no controversy that if such a plea is  established, an  order of eviction of the tenant can be obtained  by  the landlord  under  section 10 of the Act.  The  respondent  no doubt at the initial stage denied the claim of the landlord. The   landlord  gave  evidence  on  Various   matters   with particular  reference to his requiring the house  bona  fide for  his own occupation.  He had also filed, as referred  by us  earlier,  as many as 45 exhibits, one of which  was  the order of eviction obtained against him, being Ext. 45.   The respondent  did not cross-examine the appellant.   When  the evidence of the landlord was before the court supported,  as it  was,  by the innumerable exhibits filed by him,  it  can surely be stated that a stage had ’been 704 reached  when  the Controller was called upon to  apply  his mind  to the question whether the plea of the landlord  that he  required  the premises for his own occupation  was  bona fide.  There is the further circumstance that the tenant did not  cross-examine  the  plaintiff.  On the  other  hand  he entered  into a compromise in .and by which he withdrew  his defence   and   submitted   to   a   decree   for   eviction unconditionally.  His withdrawal of the defence, after  the plaintiff  had given evidence and filed exhibits in  support of  his  plea, clearly shows that he accepted  as  true  the claim  of the ’landlord that he requires the  premises  bona fide  for his own occupation.  He has accepted the  position

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that  the landlord has made ,out the statutory  requirement, entitling him to ask for possession of the premises.  It is this  unconditional withdrawal of the defence regarding  the statutory   condition  pleaded  by  the  landlord  and   the ’compromise following it, that wag accepted by the court and a decree  for  eviction  passed  thereon.   Under   those circumstances, when the tenant has accepted the plea of  the landlord,  in  our ,opinion, it is futile to hold  that  the Rent Controller must again ,embark upon an enquiry regarding the  requirement  of  the  landlord  being  bona  fide   and adjudicate upon the same.  Of course ’if there is a  dispute between  the landlord and tenant, the court must decide  the matter and adjudicate upon the plea of the landlord. The  true position appears to be that an order  of  eviction based .on consent of the parties is not necessarily void  if the  jurisdictional ’fact viz. the existence of one or  more of  the  conditions mentioned ’in section 10 were  shown  to have  existed when the Court made the order.’  Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation ’borne out  by a  judicial finding.  If at some stage the Court was  called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was  suffi- cient  material before it, before the parties invited it  to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that .the Court was satisfied about the  grounds on which the order of eviction was based. It  is  no  doubt  true that  before  making  an  order  for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the  truth of the landlord’s claim, if there is,  a  dispute between the landlord and tenant.  But if the tenant in  fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other  of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it  is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for  possession  in favour of the landlord  without  further enquiry.  It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided  on its own facts to find out whether there  is  any material to justify an inference that an admission,  express or implied. bag been made by the, tenant about the existence of one or other of the  705 statutory grounds.  But in the case on hand, we have already referred  to the specific claim of the landlord as  well  as the  fact of the tenant withdrawing his defence.   According to  us, such withdrawal of the defence expressly amounts  to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case regarding his requiring the premisesfor     his      own occupation being bona fide.  In the three decisions of  this Court,  to which we have already referred, the position  was entirely  different.  In none of those cases was  there  any material to show that the tenant had expressly or  impliedly accepted theplea  of  the  landlord  as-true.   Therefore those decisions do not assist the respondent-tenant. For  all the reasons mentioned above, it cannot be held,  in the  particular circumstances of this case, that the  decree for  eviction  has been passed solely on the  basis  of  the compromise  entered into between the parties.  On the  other hand, it is clear from the various matters referred to, that the  court was satisfied about the bona fide requirement  of the landlord.  Therefore, the decree for eviction is neither void nor in executable. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel, contended that if the  execu- tion  Court is to find out whether the court,  which  passed the decree, was satisfied about the statutory requirement in a particular case, it will have to conduct a very  elaborate enquiry.   We are not impressed with this contention.   Once

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it  is accepted that the question about a decree being  void and  as such not executable on any ground available  in  law can be raised before the executing Court, it is needless  to state that the executing Court will have to adjudicate  upon that  plea and for that purpose the relevant materials  have to be considered.  If that is so, there is no insurmountable difficulty,  as envisaged by Mr. Tarkunde, in  an  executing Court  considering whether a particular decree for  eviction is  void  as being contrary to the relevant section  of  the statute governing the matter. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel, contended that the tenant had disputed  the title of the landlord as well as the  validity of  the notice issued under section 106 of the  Transfer  of Property Act.  As these matters have not been considered  by the  courts below, he requested that the proceedings may  be remanded for this purpose.  We are not inclined to accede to this  request.  The tenant raised these objections  also  in his original plea, but he has unconditionally withdrawn  all his defence.  That means- these pleas also no longer survive for consideration. In the result the appeal is allowed.  The order and judgment dated  September 15, 1970, of the High Court are  set  aside and the order dated March 18, 1970, of the City Civil Court, Madras, will stand restored with costs throughout. 706 ALAGIRISWAMI.,  J.-I  agree with the order  proposed  by  my learned  ’brother,  Vaidialingam,  J.  but  I  think  it  is necessary  to  add a few words of my own.  The law  on  this subject has got into .a labyrinth and I think it is time we, took a hard look at it and laid down the correct position. The  learned  Single  Judge of the Madras  High  Court,  who allowed the respondent’s petition, was mainly influenced  by the judgments, of this Court in Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass(1),  Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal(2) and Kaushalya Devi v.  K. L.  Bansal Before him the cases in Remon v. City  of  London Real  Property  Co.   Ltd.,(4) Thorone v. Smith (  5  )  and Middleton v. Baldock (T.W.) (6) were cited in support of the contention  taken  on behalf of the landlord,  as  also  the decision  in Jagan Nath v. Jatinder Nath(7) and Vas  Dev  v. Milkhi  Ram(8).   In  spite of this he  felt  bound  by  the decisions of this Court and on the ground that the ,order of the Rent Controller on the face of it does not show that  he had applied his mind and was satisfied that there was a bona fide  requirement  of the premises by the landlord  for  his personal ,occupation it was a nullity.  He thought that even if  there  was  ,enough material before the  Court  when  it passed the order of eviction by consent so long as the  Rent Controller  had not applied his mind and given his  decision in the matter as to whether the respondent was bona fide  in requiring the premises for his own occupation, the  eviction order  cannot be held to be an order passed on merits  under section  10(3) of the Act.  He further ’thought that  having due  regard  to  the  decisions of this  Court  it  was  not possible  for  him to accept the contention of  the  learned couns el  for the appellant that a finding on merits in  his favour  had  to  be  implied from  the  order  of  the  Rent Controller  in view of the .,existence of adequate  material before  him to support an implied finding.  He also  thought that even in case where the tenant bona fide admits that the ground of eviction existed, the Rent Controller must  apply his  mind and hold, basing himself on such admission by  the tenant,  that  the ground for eviction put  forward  by  the landlord  existed  and that he- is entitled to  an  eviction order, without solely relying on the compromise.               I am of opinion that in this approach  learned

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             Judge  relied more  on  the  form  than  the               substance  of the matter.  The  true  approach               has  been pointed out by our learned  brother,               Vaidialingam, J. He has pointed out that while               the decision in Bahadur Singh’s(1) case was an               authority for the proposition that a court (1)  [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432. (3)  A.I.R, 1970 S.C. 838. (5)   [1947] I.K.B. 307. (7)   A.I.R. 1961 Punjab 574. (2)  A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794. (4)  [1921] 1 K.B. 49. (6)  [1950] 1 K.B. 657. (8)  A.I.R. 1960 Punjab 514. 707 ordering  eviction  has to satisfy itself that  a  statutory ground  of  eviction has been made out by  a  landlord;  how exactly  that satisfaction was to be expressed by the  court or  gathered from the materials, has not been laid  down  in that decision; that in Kaushalya Devi’s case also the manner in  which  the court’s satisfaction was to be  expressed  or gathered  has not been dealt with; nor has the  decision  in Ferozi  Lal’s  case  given  an  indication  as  to  how  the satisfaction of a court could be expressed or gathered in  a particular  case.  He has pointed out that "if a  stage  had been reached in a particular proceeding for a court to apply its  mind regarding the existence of a statutory  condition, it  may be held that it was so satisfied about the  plea  of the  landlord.  Again, from other material on record it  can be  inferred that the court was so satisfied." He  has  also pointed  out  how  in the particular  circumstances  of  the present  case  as the tenant had withdrawn his  defence  and submitted  to a decree for eviction unconditionally, he  had accepted the claim of the landlord that he required the pre- mises bona fide for his own occupation; that he has accepted the  position that the landlord has made out  the  statutory requirement  entitling  him. to ask for  possession  of  the premises;  that  by  this unconditional  withdrawal  of  the defence  regarding  the statutory condition pleaded  by  the landlord, and the compromise following it that was  accepted by  the  court,  the tenant has accepted  the  plea  of  the landlord,; and it is futile to hold that the Rent Controller must again embark upon an enquiry regarding the  requirement of  the  landlord being bona fide and  adjudicate  upon  the same.   He  has  also pointed out  that  the  true  position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent  of the  parties is not necessarily void if  the  jurisdictional fact,  viz. the existence of one or more of  the  conditions mentioned in section 10 were shown to have existed when  the court  made the order; that the satisfaction of  the  court. which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need  not  be by the manifestation borne out by  a  judicial finding; and that if at some stage the court was called upon to  apply its mind to the question and there was  sufficient material before it before the parties invited it to pass  an order  in  terms  of  their agreement,  it  is  possible  to postulate that the court was satisfied about the grounds  on which  the  order  of eviction was based.   He  has  further pointed  out  that  it the tenant in fact  admits  that  the landlord  is entitled to possession on one or other  of  the statutory  grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open  to  the court  to  act  on  that admission and  make  an  order  for possession  in  favour  of  the  landlord  without   further enquiry.   It  is on these grounds that he has come  to  the conclusion that the facts in this case satisfied these tests

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and. therefore, the order of the Madras High Court should be set aside.  In so far as it is necessary for the purpose  of this case this is a satisfactory conclusion. 708 Let us, however, consider this question based on principles. The  Rent Controller is a quasi- judicial  tribunal  created for  the purpose of discharging certain functions under  the Act.   Not  being  an  ordinary civil  court  to  which  the provisions  of  section  9 of the Code  of  Civil  Procedure applies  the  Rent  Controller gets  jurisdiction  to  order eviction  of  a  tenant only in case one  or  other  of  the various  circumstances laid down in the Act like,  the  bona fide requirement of the landlord of the building for his own occupation,  wilful  default in the payment of rent  by  the tenant  etc.  are  satisfied.  But once  these  grounds  are alleged  and found to be established no further question  of its  jurisdiction arises.  A quasi-judicial tribunal  acting within  jurisdiction  may  decide  rightly  or  may   decide wrongly.  If it decides wrongly there are provisions in  the Act itself for appeal, revision and ultimately even revision by the High Court under the provisions of section 115 of the C.P.C.  or even under Article 227 of the  Constitution.   Of course,  by  a  wrong decision on a  jurisdictional  fact  a quasi-judicial  tribunal with a limited jurisdiction  cannot confer  jurisdiction  on  itself.   But in  the  case  of  a compromise such a question does not arise.  Where as in this case  the landlord has asked for possession of the  building on  the  ground  that  he wants  it  for  his  own  personal occupation  which is one of grounds for eviction  under  the Act,  the  Rent Controller has, of course, to  be  satisfied that  this requirement is real and bona fide.  In regard  to his  decision on this point, as already pointed  out,  there are  provisions  for  appeal, revision etc.   The  words  in section 10 ’if the Controller is satisfied’ do not have  any special significance.  An ordinary civil court trying a suit either on a mortgage or on a promissory note has necessarily to  be  satisfied about the execution of the  document,  the passing of consideration etc. before it can pass a decree on the  basis  of either the mortgage or the  promissory  note. Therefore, the fact that under section 10 the Controller has to be satisfied that the ground for eviction exists does not mean  that  his  satisfaction cannot be based  on  the  same considerations  on the ’basis of which the civil courts  can be satisfied.  Let us take a suit on a promissory note.  The defendant  can  appear  before  the  court  and  admit   the plaintiffs  The  suit  can be decreed on  that  basis.   The defendant  may be absent and the case may be  set  ex-parte. In such a case the plaintiff lets in the evidence and on the basis  of  that evidence the suit may be  decreed.   Or  the defendant might appear and file a written statement  denying the execution of the Promissory note or denying the  receipt of   consideration  or  even  putting  forward  a  plea   of discharge.   Now in these circumstances the court  will  not pass  a  decree unless it is satisfied that  the  promissory note was executed, that consideration passed and that it had not been discharged.  This does not prevent the defendant at any  stage  of  the suit either submitting to  a  decree  or entering into a compromise consenting to a decree.  The fact that the consent to a decree takes 709 the  form  of a compromise cannot make the consent  any  the less a consent.  Under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure all matters to be decided in a suit can be settled by means of a compromise.  The application of Code of  Civil Procedure  is  not excluded in proceedings before  the  Rent

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Controller  and  in  any case there is no  reason  why  the principle  underlying Order 23, Rule 3 ’should not apply  to those  proceedings.  It is not clear why a tenant should  be treated  as  a minor or as an imbecile.  In the  case  of  a minor  the Order 32, Rule 7 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure specifically  lays down that the court should  be  satisfied before  it sanctions a compromise binding the minor.   There is  no  such provision in the Rent Control  Act.   I  think, therefore, the time has come when a hard look must be  taken on  this  point  and  it should be held  that  there  is  no objection to a compromise consenting to an order of eviction in rent control proceedings. Of  course,  a  compromise can be valid only  if  it  is  in accordance with the Act, i.e. only if the landlord has asked for  possession of the building on one of the  grounds  laid down  in  the Act.  For instance, a landlord merely  on  the ground  that he is the owner of the building cannot come  to the  Rent Controller and ask for possession of the  property and  the  Rent Controller cannot pass a valid  order  merely because the tenant submits to an order of eviction.  Bahadur Singh’s  case  is an instance in point.  In  that  case  the landlord  did  not even apply for eviction.  But  where  the landlord specifically asks for possession on any one of  the grounds  on  the basis of which he is entitled  to  ask  for possession under the provisions of the Act there will be  no objection  to  the tenant either submitting to an  order  of eviction  or  entering into a compromise  submitting  to  an order  of eviction.  There is no magic in the words ’if  the Controller.  is  satisfied’  in section  10  (3)  (e).   The section  would  have been as effective even if  those  words were not there and the section had read as follows               "If the claim of the landlord is bona fide the               Controller  shall make an order directing  the               tenant  to put the landlord in  possession  of               the building on such date as may be  specified               by the Controller; otherwise he shall make  an               order rejecting the application." It is not necessary to refer to the three decisions of  this Court which have, been sufficiently discussed by our learned brother, Vaidialingam, J. I  may now refer to certain English decisions.In  Barton  v. Fincham(1) Lord Scrutton L.J. observed               "If the tenant is willing to go out, I do  not               see why, any order is wanted; let him go;  but               at present (1) [1921] 2 L.K.B. 291 at 298. L761 Suq.CI/73 710               advised I do not see any reason why the  judge               on being satisfied that a tenant is then ready               to  go out (not that he was once  willing  but               has changed his mind) should not make an order               for possession."               Lord Atkin L. J. observed               "If  the parties before the Court  admit  that               one of the events has happened which give  the               Court jurisdiction, and there is no reason  to               doubt  the  bona fides of the  admission,  the               Court  is under no obligation to make  further               enquiry as to the question of fact." In  Thorne v. Smith after referring to the, observations  of Atkin,L.J.  and Scrutton, L.J. (supra), Lord Bucknill,  L.J. pointed out               "But  in  the  present case it  is,  I  think,               reasonably  clear that the tenant, in  effect,

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             agreed  to the order because at the time  when               the landlord asked the court to make the order               the-  landlord  by  his  own  statements   had               satisfied  the  tenant  that  he  intended  to               occupy  the house himself and he, the  tenant,               could  not  hope successfully  to  resist  the               claim.  If the tenant had stated this express-               ly  in the court the judge would  surely  have               had  jurisdiction  to make the order  on  that               ground.  I think in the events which  happened               here,  the tenant being  legally  represented,               the judge was entitled to proceed on the  view               that  this  was  the  true  position.   Before               making  an order for possession the  judge  is               under  a  duty to satisfy himself  as  to  the               truth  if there be a dispute between  landlord               and tenant, but if the tenant in effect agrees               that the landlord has a good claim to an order               under   the  Acts,  I  think  the  judge   has               jurisdiction to make the order for  possession               under the Acts, without further inquiry." Lord  Justice  Somervell referred to rule 18 of  the,  rules made  under the Act of 1920, there under  consideration,  to the following effect               "Where  proceedings  are taken in  the  county               court for the recovery of rent of any premises               to which the Act applies, or of interest on  a               mortgage to which the Act applies, or for  the               recovery  of  possession of  any  premises  to               which  the Act applies, or for the  ejectment               of a tenant from any such premises, the  court               shall, before making an order for the recovery               of such rent or interest, or for the  recovery               of  possession  or ejectment,  satisfy  itself               that  such order may properly be made,  regard               being had to the provisions of the Act." 711 and observed:               "Nothing in the decision that we are giving in               any  way,  as it seems to me,  diminishes  the               scope  of that rule.  We are deciding that  on               what happened in this case, the tenant  being,               as  he  was, legally represented,  the  county               court  judge was rightly "satisfied" that  the               order ,could properly be made.               The  other  point arises from the use  of  the               word  consent"  as applied to the  order  made               herein.  The expression "a consent order"  may               suggest  some compromise or arrangement  which               might  be inconsistent with the provisions  of               the  Acts.  When the defendant is agreeing  to               submit  to  judgment because he  is  satisfied               that the plaintiff can establish his right  to               an order under the Acts, it might be advisable               to avoid the use of the word " consent", which               may have a wider meaning and cover cases where               the "consent" was the result of an arrangement               which could not properly be made the basis  of               an order." These  observations  :very clearly show that  the  fact  the Court had to satisfy itself did not prevent a consent order. It  also shows clearly that a compromise or  arrangement  as long  as it is not inconsistent with the provisions  of  the Act would not be objectionable.               In Middleton v. Baldock (supra) it was held

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             "    that  a  landlord  seeking   to   recover               possession  against a tenant protected by  the               Rent Restriction Acts must establish the right               to possession on one of the grounds stated  in               the  Acts, unless, after possession  had  been               claimed on such a ground, the tenant  admitted               facts to support it, in which event the  court               need  not  itself investigate the  matters  of               fact admitted." In  its  decision  in Babu Ram Sharma v.  Pal  Singh(1)  the Division  Bench  of  the Punjab High  Court,  of  which  our learned brother Dua, J. was a member, had this to say on the point at issue :               "According  to  this section the  landlord  is               entitled  to  seek eviction of his  tenant  on               certain  grounds,  and  the  Rent  Controller,               after  giving  notice to the  tenant,  is  em-               powered  to give his own finding and  then  to               pass the necessary order.  In the present case               the  ground on which the landlord  had  sought               eviction  was  non-payment of  rent.   Such  a               ground  is  within  the  express  language  of               section  13  of the aforesaid  Act.   It  was,               therefore, open (1) [1959] P.L.R. 33. 712               to the Rent Controller to determine whether or               not  the allegations of the landlord that  the               tenant had not paid the rent was correct.   It               appears  that the tenant admitted that he  had               not paid the rent as alleged by the  landlord.               In  this view of things, I do  not  understand               how  it  was necessary for the  Controller  to               hold any further enquiry.               After  fully  considering  the  matter  I   am               definitely   of  the  opinion  that   it   the               compromise  decree is based on the grounds  on               which  the landlord could claim a  decree  for               eviction  under section 13 of the East  Punjab               Urban Rent Restriction Act, then it is  within               the  jurisdiction and competence of  the  Rent               Controller  to  pass  such  a  decree  with  a               default clause; it is similarly competent  for               the civil court to execute such a decree  when               default  has  occurred.  The proviso  to  sub-               section  2  of section 13 of the  Act  is  not               attracted in such circumstances as no question               of  extending time granted to the  tenant  for               putting the landlord in possession arises.  In               the  result  my answer to  the  two  questions               referred would be in the affirmative. In  Vas  Dev  v. Milkhi Ram (supra) Justice  Grover  of  the Punjab  High Court (as he then was) after referring  to  the three English cases, already referred to above, observed :               "From  the  above discussion  of  the  English               cases,  the  principle which has  also  ’been               accepted  by the Bench of this Court is  quite               clear  that if the tenant admits after a  suit               for ejectment has been filed that the landlord               is  entitled  to  possession  on  one  of  the               statutory  grounds  the  court  can  make   an               appropriate order or it the landlord has  made               some  representation within the terms  of  the               statute to the tenant and which is one of  the               ingredients  of a ground on  which  possession

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             can  be  ordered and the tenant  accepts               that  representation and submits to an  order,               then also the Court will be fully justified in               making a valid order of eviction.  Each  case,               therefore, will have to be decided on its  own               facts  and  it will have to  be  seen  whether               there is any material to justify an  inference               that  an admission, be it express or  implied,               has  been made by the tenant on the  existence               of one of the statutory grounds.               There   is  a  good  deal  of  force  in   the               submissions  of  the learned counsel  for  the               landlord that enough material and evidence had               come  on  the record to satisfy the  Court  as               well  as the tenant that the grounds on  which               ejectment had been sought would be  ultimately               established 713 and  when  the tenant entered into the  compromise,  it  was implicit  in  the aforesaid circumstances that  he  was  ad- mitting the correctness of the grounds which had been  taken for his ejectment.  I am, therefore, of the opinion that the tests which have been laid down by the authorities have been fully satisfied and it cannot be said that the decree  which was passed on the basis of compromise was a nullity or could not be executed." That is exactly the position here. All  these  decisions amply support the proposition  that  I have  put  forward  that  an  eviction  order  based  on   a compromise  where the landlord has asked for  possession  on any  one of the grounds on the basis of which he  could  ask for possession would be valid.  This would, however, have to be  considered when a proper occasion arises.   The  present appeal is allowed. S.B.W.                       Appeal allowed. 714