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PETITIONER: K. GOPAL REDDY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/11/1978

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1979 AIR  387            1979 SCR  (2) 265  1979 SCC  (1) 355  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC2155  (2,3)

ACT:      Supreme  Court   (Enlargement  of   Criminal  Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,  1970-Appellant acquitted  by trial court on the  ground that two views were possible on the evidence- High Court  convicted and sentenced him-Appellate Court-When can review evidence-      Words and  phrases-  "Proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt" meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant   was  charged   with  the   offence  of committing the murder of his wife. The trial court acquitted him on  the  ground  that  the  prosecution  had  failed  to establish any  motive for  the offence, that the evidence of the prosecution  witnesses was  discrepant, conflicting  and improbable and  that when  two views  were possible  on  the basis of  two divergent  versions given  by  the prosecution and the defence, the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused.      The High  Court reversed  the order  of  acquittal  and convicted and  sentenced the  appellant to  imprisonment for life on  the view  that the  trial court  had magnified  the importance to be attached to the discrepancies which were of a minor nature      In appeal  to this  Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant  that in  all cases  where two  views  of  the evidence were  possible the  accused  was  entitled  to  the benefit of doubt arising from the two views and that on this principle the High Court should not have interfered with the order of  acquittal merely  because another  view  was  also possible.      Dismissing the appeal: ^      HELD :  (1) Where  the trial  court allows itself to be beset with  fanciful doubts,  rejects creditworthy  evidence for slender  reasons and  takes a view of the evidence which is but  barely possible,  it is the obvious duty of the High Court to  interfere in  the interest  of justice,  lest  the administration of justice be brought to ridicule. [370D]      (2) After the decision of this Court in Sanwat Singh v.

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State  of  Rajasthan  (AIR  1961  SC  715)  this  Court  has consistently recognised  the right of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion bearing in  mind the  considerations mentioned  by the Privy Council  in   Sheo  Swarup   v.  Emperor   (61  T.A.   389). Occasionally phrases  like  "manifestly  illegal",  "grossly unjust have  been used  to describe  the orders of acquittal which warrant  interference. But  such expressions have been used  more  as  flourishes  of  language  to  emphasise  the reluctance of the appellate court to interfere with an order of acquittal  than to  curtail the  power of  the  appellate court to  review the  entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In  two other cases it has been held that to the principles laid  down in  Sanwat Singh’s  case may added the further principle that if two 364 reasonable conclusions  could be reached on the basis of the evidence on  record the  appellate court  should not disturb the finding  of the trial court. This principle stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused  is entitled  to the  benefit of  any reasonable doubt. If  two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the  evidence are  possible one  must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But fanciful and remote possibilities must  be left  out of  account. To  entitle an accused person  to the  benefit of  a doubt arising from the possibility of duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him.  If the preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to  claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore essential that,  any view  of the  evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an  accused person  may claim,  must be  reasonable. A reasonable  doubt   does  not   mean   some   light,   airy, insubstantial doubt  that may  flit through  the mind  of  a Judge about  almost anything  at any  time or other, it does not mean  a doubt  begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict, it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reason. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" does not mean proof beyond a shadow  of  doubt  The  law  would  fail  to  protect  the community if  it admitted  fanciful possibilities to deflect the course  of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man  be to  leave only  a remote possibility in his favour which can  be dismissed  with the sentence, "of course it is possible but  not in the least probable," the case is proved beyond reasonable  doubt but  nothing  short  of  that  will suffice. [369A-G]      Sanwat Singh  v. State  of Rajasthan,  AIR 1961  SC 715 applied.      Ramabhupala Reddy & Ors. v. The State of A.P., AIR 1971 SC 460,  Bhim Singh  Rup Singh  v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC  286, Miller  v. Minister of Pensions, [1947] 2 All. E.R. 372; Khem Karam & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., 1974 SC 1567 referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No 133 of 1975.      Appeal from  the Judgment  and order  dated 3-2-1978 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Crl. A. No. 628/73.      R. Nagarathnam for the Appellant.      P. Parmeswara Rao and G. N. Rao for the Respondent.

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    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY,  J.- This  appeal has been filed under Section 2(a)  of the  Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate  Jurisdiction)   Act  1970.   The  appellant   was acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions judge, Chittoor of an  offence under  Section 302,  Indian   Penal Code. The acquittal was  reversed by  the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the  appellant was  convicted under  Section 302  Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. 365      The deceased Subhadramma was the wife of the appellant. They were  married about  one and  a half  years before  the occurrence. About  three months  before the  occurrence  the deceased gave  birth to  a female  child in the house of the accused at  Cherlopalle. After  the ninth day the mother and child, according  to customary  practice, were  taken by the mother of  the deceased  to  her  house  at  Krishna  Kalva. Cherlopalle is  about  25  miles  from  Krishna  Kalva.  The accused used to visit his wife and often used to stay in the house of  the deceased’s  mother. After about one and a half months the,  accused asked his mother-in-law and brother-in- law to send his wife to his place. They replied that she had only delivered  a child  recently and that she would be sent to her husband’s house in the fifth month. On 18th December, 1972, according  to the  case of the prosecution the accused once again  requested his  mother-in-law to send his wife to his house.  This time  he also  brought with  him P.W. 8, an elderly gentleman from his village. His mother-in-law P.W. 2 told him  that she would send the girl in the fifth month as she had  not yet  regained her  health after  delivery.  The accused and  P. W.  8 went  away. That  evening the  accused again came  to the  house of his mother-in-law. After dinner all of  them went  to sleep. The house consisted of only one room. The  accused, the  deceased, her  brother P.W.  1, her mother P.W.  2 and her grand-mother P.W. 3 were all sleeping in the  room. In  the middle  of the  night P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 were awakened  by the  cry "Amma"  raised by Subhadramma. On waking up  they saw  the accused  sitting by the side of the deceased with  a knife  in his hand. They found the deceased bleeding profusely  from the  left side of her chest. P.W. 1 put his  foot on  the hand  in which the accused was holding the knife.  The accused  dropped the  knife which  was  then picked up by the grand-mother P.W. 3. Attracted by the cries raised by  the P.Ws. 1 to 3, the neighbourers P. Ws. 4, 5, 6 and others  came there.  They caught hold of the accused and tied him to a pole in front of the house by means of a rope. Some of  the villagers  who had  gathered there  also gave a beating to  the accused P.W.  proceeded to the house of P.W. 9 the  Village Munsif and reported the occurrence to him. P. W. 1  affixed his  thumb impression  on the  report Ex. P. 1 prepared by  P. W. 9. P. W. 9 then proceeded to the house of P.W. 1  where the blood stained knife M.O. 1 was handed over to him. Thereafter, P. W. 9 prepared his own report Ex. P. 4 and sent  it alongwith  Ex. P.  1 and  M.O. 1  to the Police Station at  Renigunta. P. W. 14, the Sub Inspector of Police registered the  First Information  Report at 5 A. M. on 19th December,  1972   and  went   ahead     with   the   further investigation which was later taken over by the Inspector of Police P.W.  15.  When  the  Police  officers  went  to  the village, they 366 found the  accused tied  to a  pole. They  arrested him  and found that  he had  injuries on  his person.  They  got  him examined by  a Doctor.  After holding  the inquest  the dead body  was  sent  for  postmortem  examination.  The  Medical

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Officer, P.  W. 12  who conducted  the autopsy, found on the dead body  a stab wound over the left axila 6 cms. below the arm pit  1.75 cms  x 0.5  cm. nearly  horizontal.  The  stab injury had  gone through  the third  intercostal  space  and through the  upper lobe  of the  left lung  in an upward and medial direction.  The upper  lobe of the left lung had been cut through  and through,,  and had  collapsed. P. W. 13 the Medical officer  who  examined  the  accused  found  several abrasions and contusions on the person of the accused. There was no  fracture. After  completing  the  investigation  the Police laid  a chargesheet  against the  accused and  he was duly tried.      The plea  of the  accused was  one of  denial.  In  the Committing Court  the accused was content with a bare denial but in  the Court  of Sessions he stated that he went to the house  of  his  mother-in-law  at  about  10  p.m.  On  18th December, 1972.  P. Ws.  1 and  2 taunted him saying "we are maintaining you  and your wife, yet you come at any time you like‘’. They  insulted him. There was an altercation. P.W. 3 hit him  with a  stone near  his left  eye. P. W. 1 beat him with a stick two or three times. He felt giddy and was about to lose consciousness. P. W. 1 came upon him with a knife to stab him.  The deceased  intervened and  interposed  herself between P.W.  1 and the accused. She received a stab injury. Seeing his  wife  injured,  he  fell  down  unconscious.  He regained consciousness next morning.      The Learned  Sessions Judge  held that  the prosecution had failed  to establish any motive and that the evidence of the prosecution  witnesses was  ’discrepant, conflicting and improbable.’ He  thought that  the prosecution  had made  an attempt to  improve its  case which  was originally based on circumstantial evidence  to made  it appear as if P.W. 3 had also seen  the stabbing.  He commented on the failure of the Police to seize the mat or bedding on which the deceased was sleeping. He  referred to  the evidence  of  me  Doctor  who stated that the injury found on the deceased could have been caused even  if she was standing. The learned Sessions Judge thought that when there were two divergent versions given by the prosecution  and the  defence and  when two  views  were possible, the  benefit of  doubt  should  be  given  to  the accused. He, therefore, acquitted the accused.      The High  Court reversed  the finding of acquittal. The learned Judges pointed out that there was no reason to doubt the testimony  of P.  Ws. 1  to 3 and that the discrepancies noticed by the learned Sessions 367 Judge were  of a  minor character.  The High  Court observed that  the     learned   Sessions  Judge  had  magnified  the importance to  be attached  to minor discrepancies. The High Court also  concluded from  the medical evidence that it was more probable  that the  deceased was  stabbed when  she was lying down.  Accepting the  evidence of  P. Ws. 1 to 3 which was corroborated  by the evidence of P. Ws. 4 and 5 who came to the  scene soon  afterwards, the High Court convicted the accused under Section 302 and sentenced him as aforesaid.      In this  appeal the  learned Counsel  for the appellant argued that  the accused  had no motive to kill his wife and that his  version was  more probable than the version of the prosecution. He  submitted that  the version  of the accused that  the  occurrence  took  place  at  about  10  p.m.  was substantiated by  what was  mentioned in Ex. P. 15 the wound certificate given  by P.W. 13 the Medical officer in respect of the injuries which he found on the person of the accused. He urged  that the  knife was not seized by the Police under any seizure  Memo nor was the knife sent to any finger print

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expert. He  urged that  at the  reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge  had not  been met by the High Court. He also contended that  two views  were possible on the evidence and the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt.      We have  perused the  relevant evidence  as well as the judgments of  the Sessions  Judge and the High Court. We are unable to find any substance in the submissions made by the, learned Counsel  for the  appellant. The High Court was well justified in  commenting that the discrepancies on the basis of which  the Trial Court rejected the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2 and  3 were  of a  minor character and that they have been unduly  magnified   by  the   learned  Sessions  Judge.  The discrepancies were in regard to which of them woke up first, where was the lantern and which of the neighbours came first to the scene on hearing their cries. The High Court was also right in  holding that  the medical  evidence supported  the prosecution version  and not  the  defence  version.  Merely because the  Medical Officer  stated that  the victim  could have received  the injury  if she  was standing,  it did not follow that  the injury  could have  been  received  in  the circumstances mentioned  by  the  accused.  The  injury  was inflicted with great force and its direction was upward. The location of  the injury  was 6 cms. below the arm pit on the left side.  According to  the accused  the deceased received the injury  when she  placed herself  between P.  W.  1  and himself. We  do not  think that  an  injury  of  the  nature received by  the deceased  could have  been  caused  in  the manner suggested  by the  accused. The injury must have been caused in the manner suggested by the prosecution that 368 is, when  the deceased  was lying  on her  right side. It is true that  the accused  did not have any deep motive to kill the deceased.  It is obvious that he must have been upset by the persistent  refusal of  the brother  and mother  of  the deceased to  send her  with him  to his  house. He  probably attributed the refusal to reluctance on the part of his wife to accompany him straightaway. We may also refer here to the comment of  the  learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant  that realizing  that   the  motive   would  assume   considerable importance if  the case  was  one  based  on  circumstantial evidence, the prosecution tried to make P. W. 3 depose as if she had  witnessed occurrence.  We do  not  think  that  the comment is  justified. P.W.  3, an  old woman  of 69  years, stated in  her evidence  that she  saw the  accused who  was sitting by  the side  of the  deceased on  the  cot  make  a gesture as  if he  was stabbing  the deceased  and that  the deceased cried  out ’Amma.’  In cross-examination she stated that she  did not  remember if  she had told the Police that the accused  made a  gesture  as  if  he  was  stabbing  the deceased. The  Inspector of Police P. W. 15, however, stated that P.  W. 3  did not  state before  him that  she saw  the accused making a gesture as if he was stabbing the deceased. We do  not think  that we will be justified in rejecting the evidence of  all the  prosecution witnesses  on the basis of this statement  of P.  W. 3.  At the  worst  the  so  called improvement made  by her may be rejected but no more. We are unable to discover any good reason to reject the evidence of P. Ws.  1 to  3 or  the evidence  of P.  Ws. 4 and 5. We are afraid the  learned Sessions  Judge allowed  himself  to  be assailed by  airy and fanciful doubts. We are satisfied that the High  Court was  justified in interfering with the order of acquittal.      The learned  Counsel for  the  appellant  advanced  the usual argument  submitted in  all cases  where an  order  of acquittal is  reversed, namely,  that where two views of the

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evidence are  possible,  the  accused  is  entitled  to  the benefit of  the doubt  arising from  the two  views and that where  the  Trial  Court  has  taken  a  possible  view  and acquitted the  accused, the  High Court should not interfere with the  order of  acquittal merely because another view is also possible.      The principles are now well settled. At one time it was thou ht  that an  order of  acquittal could be set aside for "substantial and compelling reasons" only and Courts used to launch on  a  search  to  discover  those  "substantial  and compelling reasons". However, the ’formulae’ of "substantial and  compelling  reasons",  "good  and  sufficiently  cogent reasons" and  "strong reasons"  and the search for them were abandoned as  a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh  & Ors.  v. State  of Rajasthan(1).  In  Sanwat Singh’s case, this Court harked      (1) A.l.R. 1961 S.C. 715. 369 back to  the principles  enunciated by  the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup  v. Emperor(1) and re-affirmed those principles. After Sanwat  Singh v.  State of  Rajasthan, this  Court has consistently recognised  the right of the Appellate Court to review  the   entire  evidence   and  to  come  to  its  own conclusion, bearing  in mind the considerations mentioned by the  Privy  Council  in  Sheo  Swarup’s  case.  Occasionally phrases like  ’manifestly illegal’,  grossly  unjust’,  have been used  to describe the orders of acquittal which warrant interference. But,  such expressions have been used more, as flourishes of  language, to  emphasise the reluctance of the Appellate Court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to curtail  the power  of the  Appellate Court to review the entire evidence  and to  come to its own conclusion. In some cases Ramabhupala  Reddy & Ors. v The State of A.P.(2), Bhim Singh Rup  Singh v. State of Maharashtra(3) it has been said that to  the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh’s case may be added  the further  principle  that  "if  two  reasonable conclusions can  be reached  on the basis of the evidence on record, the  Appellate Court  should not disturb the finding of  the  Trial  Court".  This,  of  course,  is  not  a  new principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle, of our criminal jurisprudence  that the  accused is entitled to the benefit of  any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly  balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily  concede  the  existence  of  a  reasonable doubt. But,  fanciful and  remote possibilities must be left out of  account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a  doubt arising  from the  possibility of  a duality  of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably  probable as  that  against  him.  If  the preponderance  of   probability  is  all  one  way,  a  bare possibility of  another view will not entitle the accused to claim the  benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any  view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable  even as  any doubt,  the benefit  of which an accused person  may claim, must be reasonable. "A reasonable doubt", it  has been  remarked, "does  not mean  some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of  us about  almost anything  at some time or other, it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict;  it means  a real  doubt, a  doubt founded  upon reason"(4).  As  observed  by  Lord  Denning  in  Miller  v. Minister of  pensions(5) "Proof  beyond a  reasonable  doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of a doubt.      (1) 61 I.A. 389.      (2) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 460.

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    (3)  A.l.R. 1974 S.C. 286.      (4) Salmon J. in his charge to the jury in R. V. Fantle      reported in 1959 Criminal Law Review 584.      (5) [1947] 2 All. E.R. 372. 370 The law  would fail  to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities  to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence  is so  strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility  in his  favour, which  can be  dismissed with the  sentence ’of  course it is possible but not in the least probable’  the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but   nothing short  of that  will suffice". In Khem Karan & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.(1)., this Court observed:           "Neither    mere    possibilities    nor    remote      possibilities nor  mere doubts which are not reasonable      can, without  danger to  the administration of justice,      be the  foundation  of  the  acquittal  of  an  accused      person,  if   there  is   otherwise   fairly   credible      testimony".      Where the  Trial Court  allows itself  to be beset with fanciful doubts,  rejects creditworthy  evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it  is the  obvious duty  of  the  High  Court  to interfere   in   the   interest   of   justice,   lest   the administration of  justice be  brought to  ridicule. That is what the  High Court  has done  in this  case. The appeal is dismissed. P. B. R.                                   Appeal dismissed. (1) A.I. R. 1974 S.C. 1567. 371