09 August 1996
Supreme Court
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K.C. JAI SINGH Vs C.R. GOVINDASWAMY CHETTIAR (DIED) & ORS.


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PETITIONER: K.C. JAI SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: C.R. GOVINDASWAMY CHETTIAR (DIED) & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/08/1996

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCALE  (5)709

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      C.R. Govindaswamy  Chettiar (deceased),  predecessor in interest of  respondents 4  to 6  and C.R. Hariharaputhiran, instituted a  suit before  the City  Civil Court  at  Madras seeking ejectment  of the  appellant from the suit scheduled properly. The  appellant, in  the  written  statement  filed before the  trial court,  took the  following objection with regard to the maintainability of the suit:      1.   The  suit   property  being  a      building  simplicitor   and  not  a      composite   lease,    appellant   -      defendant as  a tenant  of the suit      property   was   entitle   to   the      protection  under  the  Tamil  Nadu      Building (Lease  and Rent  Control)      Act, 1961 (the Act).      2.   That the appellant - defendant      was  an  assignee  from  the  third      respondent herein  or the  right to      an extent  of 1/3rd  share  in  the      income  derived  derived  from  the      lease under  the registered deed of      assignment   Exhibit   B-42   dated      November 21, 1983.      The trial  court decreed  the  suit  and  directed  the ejectment  of   the  appellant.  Appeal  filed  against  the judgment of  the trial   court  was dismissed  by a Division Bench of  the High  Court of  the High Court by the Judgment dated January 21, 1995. This appeal by the tenant is against the judgment of the Decision Bench of the High Court.      Mr. D.D.  Thakur learned  counsel for the appellant has raised the same two contentions which were raised before the trial court  and before  the trial court and before the High Court.       The  main question  before the  High Court was whether the suit  property was  leased out as a running cinema house

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with the fixtures, machinery and furnitures as a part of the lease and  as such  it was  a composite lease within Section 30(ii) of the Act. The High Court upheld the findings of the trial court  that the  lease in  favour the  appellant was a composite lese  and as  such he  was  not  entitled  to  the protection of  the provisions  of the Act. The High Court on elaborate consideration  of the terms and various clauses of the  lease  deed  and  also  on  appreciation  of  oral  and documentary evidence  has come  to the  conclusion that  the leas in  favour of  the appellant  was composite  lease.  No fault can be found wit the reasoning of the High Court which is reproduced hereunder :      In our Opinion, the principles laid      down in  the  above  case  squarely      apply    to     the    facts    and      circumstances of  the case  on hand      We have already discussed the terms      and condition  contained in Ex. A-1      in extenso in paragraphs supra.  As      clearly  mentioned   in  the  lease      deed, the  dominant purpose  of the      lese, the  dominant purpose  of the      lease,  as  the  disclosed  in  the      lease deed Ex. A-1, was for running      a Cinema Theatre and that the lease      should run  the theatre in the name      of Shri  Kothandarama Theatre for a      period  of   13  years   with   the      building,   furniture,   electrical      fittings,  etc.   as  set   out  in      Schedules  A   and  B.   Under  the      agreement, the  lessee has  to  pay      the rent  of the  building and hire      charges   for    the    furnitures,      fittings, etc.  and also  apply and      obtain police permission, etc., for      conducting the  cinema  theatre  or      exhibiting  any   films,  pictures,      etc. The  lessee shall also pay the      electricity  charges,  meter  rent,      etc. Taxes  link  professional  tax      for  the   business  and  also  the      licence fee  for  the  running  the      cinema theatre.  It  is  also  seen      from Clause  2(x) that  the  lessee      shall bear and pay all the charges,      fees etc.  for running  the theatre      as  a   going   concern   and   for      exhibiting any  film  picture,  etc      thus, the  intention of the parties      has been  very clearly spelt out in      the  clause   referred  to   above.      Therefore, we  have  no  hesitation      holding that  the dominant  purpose      of  the  lease  is  for  running  a      theatre as a going concern together      with the  building  in which it was      being  run.  It  would,  therefore,      follow that  the lease is composite      one and  that it is not governed by      the  provisions   of  the   Act  as      contended by the appellant.           It is  also useful to refer to      the commissioner’s  report filed in      I.A. No. 6148/1962 in O.S. NO. 2521

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    of 1962  on the  file of  the Third      Assistant City Civil Judge, Madras.      The said  suit was filed by Rukmani      Bai   and   others   against   C.V.      Rajagopal Chetty  and  another.  An      application  for   appointment   of      Commissioner was  taken out  by the      defendants  C.V.  Rajagopal  Chetty      and  another  as  petitioners.  The      Commissioner took  out an inventory      of the various articles kept in the      premises as  per the  directions of      the  Court.  The  commissioner  has      found 21  items in  the auditorium,      five items  on the  switch board on      the   left   side   wall   of   the      auditorium, 59 items of furnitures,      20 items  inside the  cabin and  13      items in  the  rewinder  room.  The      inventory   was    taken   by   the      commissioner on  22.101962.  It  is      seen from  the inventory taken that      all the  items required for running      a cinema  theatre were given to the      lessee for effective running of the      theatre, which  includes furnitures      provided,  loud   speaker,   double      speaker,   etc.   and   all   other      electrical items  except projectors      and their  accessories,  which  the      defendant  C.V.   Rajagopal  Chetty      admitted that  the three projectors      and their  accessories kept  in the      cabin room belong to the plaintiffs      Rukmani Bai and others.           Likewise,   Ex.   B-13   dated      29.11.1963, which is the lease deed      executed    between    C.V.    C.R.      Govindaswami Chettair  on  the  one      hand  and   Rukmani  Bai   and   K.      Viswantha Singh  on the other, also      provides under  Clause (C) that the      lessee shall  use the premises only      as  a   place  of   exhibition   of      cinematograph shows  in the  public      and shall  not use  the theatre for      any  other   purpose  without   the      written consent  of the lessors and      that  the   lessee  shall   not  be      entitled to  sub-lease the premises      to other,  It also further provides      that  the  lessee  shall  take  the      necessary licences  for the running      of the cinematographic shows as per      the Rules  of  Cinematographic  Act      and places  of Public  Resorts Act,      etc.,  for  conducting  the  cinema      shows in  the premises in question.      As per clause (m), the lessee shall      at their own expense and cost being      the   theatre    into   a   working      condition  and   shall   themselves      apply  for   and  obtain  necessary      licences to run cinema shows in the      said theatre  and the lessors shall

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    in  no   way  be   responsible  for      effecting any  repairs, renovations      or improvements to the theatre.           Ex.  B-11  is  the  decree  in      O.S.No. 2521 of 1962 on the file of      the City Civil Court, Madras, dated      21.3.1963 between   the  parties to      the present  action. That  suit was      filed by  the lessee  for  specific      performance of  an agreement  dated      2.11.1961    by    executing    and      registering the  deed of  lease  in      respect of  the  theatre  known  as      Kothandarama Theatre,  and  of  the      furniture  and   electric  fittings      therein described  in  Schedules  A      and B  thereunder in  favour of the      1st plaintiff  Rukmani Bai  and for      other  reliefs.   That   suit   was      decreed and  the defendants therein      were  directed   to   execute   and      register  the   deed  of  lease  in      respect of  the  theatre  known  as      Kathandarma  Theatre,  and  of  the      furniture  and   electric   fitting      therein, more  fully  described  in      Schedules A and B in that decree in      favour of the 1st plaintiff Rukmani      bai  as  per  the  agreement  dated      5.11.1961. schedule  B  relates  to      the   furnitures    and    fittings      provided  by  the  lessors  to  the      lessees.  Sixty   five   items   of      furniture  viz.,   24  single  seat      sofas, 12  double seat  sofas., 125      cushion  chairs,   52  wooden  back      benches, fire  extinguishers,  fire      buckets, electrical  fittings, etc.      were given in Schedule B.           Ex. A-28 is the plaint copy in      copy in  C.S. No. 88 if 1947 on the      file of  this Court.  That suit was      filed  by   Rukmani  Bai   and   K.      Viswantha Singh against the lessors      herein. paragraph  3 of  the plaint      reads  that  the  said  theatre  is      equipped   with    furniture    and      fittings   as    a    cinematograph      exhibition house  and that  the 1st      plaintiff  Rukmani   Bai,  holds  a      lease of  the said  property  where      with  her   own  machinery  runs  a      business      of      cinematograph      exhibitions and  that the  lease in      her favour  is dated. 1.13.1954 and      is in  writing and  registered. Ex.      B-9  is   again  a   memorandum  of      agreement between the same parties,      which was entered into between them      to settle  all their  disputes  and      proceedings now  pending in various      Courts  in   the  manner   provided      thereunder.  Clause   10  of   that      agreement is  relevant. It provides      that the  lease of  the theatre and

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    the  hiring   of   the   furniture,      fittings,   etc    shall   be   co-      extensive.           Thus, the terms and conditions      stipulated    in     the    various      agreements referred  to and entered      into between  the parties  to  this      action clearly  go to show that the      intention of  the parties is to run      the theatre as a going concern with      the furnitures,  fittings, etc., as      originally provided  by the lessors      and   subsequently    altered   and      provide from  time to  time by  the      lessees.  As   pointed  out   by  a      Division Bench  of this Court in 86      L.W. 65  the question  of intention      of the parties will become relevant      only   if    the   terms   of   the      transaction are  not clear. In this      case, the  terms  are  very  clear,      simple    and    unambiguous    and      therefore, the  intention also  can      be clearly seen and the purpose for      which the  building was taken is to      run the  business  of  the  theatre      with the  fixtures, fittings,  etc.      There can  be no  doubt in  holding      that the  intention of  the parties      was to  enter into a transaction of      lease  of   a  going   concern   of      theatre. So  we have  no hesitation      in  holding   that  Ex.  A-1  is  a      composite  lease.   We  answer  the      point accordingly  and in favour of      the   lessors   and   against   the      lessees.      We agree with the reasons and the conclusion reached by the High Court.      The second contention of the appellant based on Exhibit B-42 assignment -deed dated November 21, 1983 has been dealt with by the High Court as under :      "Ex. B-42  reads that Rs. 25,000 is      to be paid before the Sub Registrar      but admittedly  not paid before the      Sub  Registrar.  The  circumstances      under which Ex. B-42 has  come into      existence are  not mentioned in the      plaint in   No  9075 of  1983.  The      2nd defendant  in O.S.  No. 885  of      1984 has  been made as partly viz.,      2nd defendant  in O.s.  No 9075  of      1983. The  2nd defendant  has  also      given all  the documents to the 1st      defendant for  the purpose of using      them in this case viz., Exs. B-1 to      B-13.    The     2nd    defendant’s      explanation that  he gave  them  to      the mother  of the Ist defendant at      the time  of Ex.  A-1  is  only  an      after thought  and not spoken to by      the  1st   defendant’s  explanation      that he  gave them to the mother of      Ex. A-1  is only  an after  thought      and not  spoken  to  by    the  1st

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    defendant as  D.W.1 says  that they      were in  a box  in a  bundle. It is      the case  of  the  plaintiffs  that      there is  a clear collusion between      the  1st   defendant  and  the  2nd      defendant.           The  2nd   defendant  as  D.W.      states that  he  has  received  Rs.      25,000/-  There   are   no   stakes      involved  for   him,  He  wants  to      support the  1st defendant  somehow      or other. As rightly pointed out by      Mr.T.V.Rakanujam, the 2nd defendant      is pawn  in the  hands of  the  1st      defendant. At  the time  of  cross-      examination, the  1st defendant has      been  exposed   for  having   filed      documents which  should be  in  the      custody of  the 2nd defendant. Even      the office  copy of  the  Execution      Petition Ex.  B-2 is  filed by  the      1st  defendant.  It  is  therefore,      Highly unbelievable  that  the  1st      defendant’s mother would have asked      for   that    document.   The   2nd      defendant  has   given  it  without      consulting the  plaintiffs. The 2nd      defendant  has   given  it  without      consulting the  plaintiffs. The 2nd      defendant has no right to give away      the documents  to third parties. He      has not  even made a demand for the      return of  those documents at least      after  the   death   of   the   1st      defendant’s mother. He has not even      informed the  1st  plaintiff  while      handing  over   charge.  After  the      cross-examination   of    the   1st      defendant, realising  that  it  has      been exposed that the 2nd defendant      has given  the documents to the 1st      defendant  is   no   claiming   any      ownership in  the  Theatre  but  he      only claims  tenancy rights. Hence.      we are  of the  view, that Ex. B-42      in these  proceedings. As  could be      seen, in  Ex. A-8,  the  plaintiffs      and the  2nd defendant has no legal      right to execute Ex. B-42. However,      this  point  is  left  open  to  be      agitated by  the parties  concerned      before  the  proper  forum  at  the      appropriate stage,"      Although the  trial court  came to  the conclusion that document Exhibit  B-42 was not a valid document but the High Court, for justifiable reasons did not go into the merits of the question.  The High  Court has left the point open to be agitated by the parties concerned before the proper forum at the appropriate  stage. We  see no  ground to interfere with the conclusions reached by the High Court.      Mr.  D.D.   Thakur  also  raised  an  additional  point According to him the Act was amended after December 21, 1970 when the  lease was  granted to  the appellant.  The precise contention  is   that  on  the  date  of  the  contract  the provisions of  the Act,  as existed, gave the appellant full

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protection and  appellant could not be ejected from the suit premises except  in accordance  with the  provisions of  The Act. This point was neither pleaded nor raised before any of the courts  below. We are not inclined to permit the learned counsel to raise the point at this stage.      The appeal  is dismissed  with costs.  We quantify  the costs as Rs. 20,000/-.