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PETITIONER: K. BALAKRISHNA RAO AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HAZI ABDULLA SAIT AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/10/1979

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1980 AIR  214            1980 SCR  (1) 875  1980 SCC  (1) 321

ACT:      The Tamil  Nadu Buildings  (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 as amended by the Amending Act of 1964-S. 30(iii)-Scope of.

HEADNOTE:      In July,  1940 the  plaintiffs father  leased  out  the building of  which he  was the  owner, to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 950 for running a restaurant. Even after the expiry  of  the  period  of  lease  in  July,  1943  the defendant continued  to be in possession of the building. By virtue of  the Madras Non-residential Buildings Rent Control order, 1946  the defendant  became a  statutory  tenant  and under the order fair rent was fixed at Rs. 1680 p.m. In 1949 the 1946-order  was replaced  by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent  Control) Act.  1949. On the death of his father in 1955 the plaintiff became the owner of the building.      The 1949  Act was  repealed and  replaced by  the Tamil Nadu Buildings  (Lease and  Rent Control  ) Act,  1960  (the Principal  Act).   Section  30(iii)  of  the  Principal  Act provided that  it  was  not  applicable  to  non-residential buildings, the  rental value  of  which,  according  to  the assessment of  the Corporation  of Madras,  exceeded Rs. 400 p.m. Even  so the defendant continued to be in possession of the building.  Since the  building was  not governed  by the Principal Act  the plaintiff  issued notice to the defendant to quit  and instituted a civil suit in the City Civil Court on March 2, 1964 for eviction and damages.      In the meantime in June, 1964, by an amendment Act, the exemption contained in s. 30 of the Principal Act in respect of non-residential buildings was withdrawn so that from then on non-residential  buildings with  a monthly  rent  of  Rs. 400/- and above were also governed by the Principal Act. Sec ion 3 of the Amending Act also provided that proceedings for eviction of  the tenants  of such  non-residential buildings instituted in  civil courts  should  be  treated  as  having abated.      In view  of the  amendment in  December 1964  the  City Civil Court dismissed the plaintiff s suit as having abated. Thereupon the plaintiff filed an application under O. IX, r. 9 of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure to  set aside, its order dismissing the  suit as  having abated. This application was

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allowed. The  defendants filed additional written statements in the  City Civil  Court raising the plea that the suit had actually abated  by virtue  of s.  3 of the Amending Act. In the meantime  as a  result of  the plaintiff  s  application under s. 24, Code of Civil Procedure the High Court withdrew the  suit  to  its  file  (on  the  death  of  the  original defendant, defendants  2 to  10 were  impleaded as his legal representatives).      On the  issue whether  the suit  had abated on June 10, 1964 by  virtue of  s. 3 of the Amending Act the trial judge of the  High Court  refused to record a finding and disposed of the suit as if it was a fresh suit after the death of the 876 original defendant.  He passed  a decree  for possession and damages for use and occupation.      On appeal  by the  defendants the Division Bench of the High Court  held  that  from  March  1,  1964  the  original defendant was  a trespasser, that he was not entitled to the benefit of  the Principal  Act, that  with the  coming  into force of  the Amending  Act the  building itself was outside the scope  of the  principal Act,  that s. 3 of the Amending Act did  not apply  to the  suit and  so it did not abate on June 30,  1964  and  that  on  the  death  of  the  original defendant, defendants  2 to  10 were  not  entitled  to  the protection against  eviction  under  the  Principal  Act  as amended in 1973.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: Section  3 of  the Amending Act was applicable to the suit as it was a proceeding instituted in the City Civil Court on  the ground  that the  building was exempt from the provisions of  the Principal  Act by  virtue of  s.  30(iii) thereof although  no express  allegation  was  made  in  the plaint to that effect. [891 B]      1. (a)  The view of the Division Bench that s. 3 of the Amending Act  was not  applicable to this case was erroneous in the  absence of  a contention  by the plaintiff that s. 3 was unconstitutional.  It was  not  for  the  court  to  ask whether there  was any  justification for the legislature to make a  contrary provision  in respect  of the  suits of the present nature.  There was  every justification for enacting s. 3 in order to give protection to the tenants against whom suits for  eviction had been filed for buildings. which were brought within  the scope  of the  Principal ACT by deleting cl. (iii) of s. 30 of the Principal Act. [886G, 887B]      (b) In  the context  in which  s. 3 of the Amending Act was enacted it could not be said that it was not possible to identify the  proceedings to  which that provision referred. In P.  J. Gupta’s  case this  Court held  that a  proceeding which  had  been  instituted  on  the  ground  that  a  non- residential building  was exempt  from the provisions of the Principal Act by virtue of s. 30(iii) and was pending on the date of publication of the amendment in the official gazette would abate  but did  not consider  the type  of cases which would fall  within the scope of 3 of the Amending Act [888A- B, 889G-H]      P. J.  Gupta &  Co. v.  K. Venkatesan  Merchant &  ors. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 401; held inapplicable.      (e) The  words "instituted  on  the  ground  that  such building or  part was  exempt from  the  provisions  of  the Principal Act  by virtue  of cl.  (iii)  of  s.  30  of  the Principal Act"  should be  construed in the context in which they appeared  as referring  to a  proceeding which had been instituted in  the light  of s. 30(iii) of the Principal Act which granted  exemption in  respect of  the buildings refer

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red to  therein from the operation of the Principal Act. Any other construction  would defeat  the object of the Amending Act. [890E-F]      In the  instant case  the original  plaint was filed on the basis  that The  tenancy had been terminated with effect from the  expiry of  February 29, 1964. The plaintiff prayed for the  eviction of  the  defendant  damages  for  use  and occupation and  not the  fair  rent  fixed  under  the  Rent Control law.  The suit  could be  filed only  because of the exemption contained in s. 30(iii) of the Principal Act 877 because in the absence of such exemption no effective decree for ejectment  could be  passed by  the City  Civil Court in view of s. 10 of the Principal Act. [890 G-H]      2. The  original defendant  was  not  a  trespasser  in possession of  the premises after June 10, 1964. He became a statutory tenant  of the  premises and  could not be evicted from them  except in accordance with the procedure specified in the  Principal Act.  The position  would  not  have  been different even  if a  decree for  eviction had  been  passed against him before June 10, 1964 and the decree had not been executed or satisfied in full on that date [894 C-D]      3. (a)  The building  in question was a building within The meaning  of that expression in s. 21’>) of the Principal Act on  the date  when s.  3 of  the amending  Act came into force. [896 F-G]      (b) The  view of  the  Division  Bench  that  the  suit property was  not a "building" within the meaning of s. 2(2) on the  ground that there was no lease in force and hence it was not  let and  that on  that date  the plaintiff  had  no intention to lease it and therefore it was not to be let was erroneous. A definition clause does not necessarily apply in all possible  contents in  which the  word may be found. The opening clause  of s.  2 of  the Principal Act suggests that any expression  defined in  that section  should be  given a meaning assigned  to it therein unless the context otherwise requires. [896 B-C]      4.  The  original  defendant  became  entitled  to  The protection of  the Principal  Act on  June 10,  1964 and  he could be  evicted from  the building only after an order was made by  the Rent Controller. The High Court did not pass an order the suit had abated on June 10, 1964 till the death of the original  defendant on  January 15, 1968. As a result of the proceedings  instituted by  one  or  the  other  of  the parties the  case was  treated as pending although in law it was not open to the Court to proceed with it after 10. 1964. [896G-897A]      5. It  has not permissible for the trial court to treat the  proceeding   which  had  been  instituted  against  the original  defendant  prior  to  June  10,  1964  as  a  live proceeding  which   could  be   converted  into  fresh  suit instituted against defendants No. 2 to 10 after the death of the original  defendant.  An  amendment  of  the  plaint  by inclusion of  a new prayer or by addition of new parties can be made  only where  in the  eye of  law a  suit is  pending before a  Court. When  the suit filed on March 2, 1964 stood terminated with the coming into force of the amending Act on June 10, 1964 there was no plaint in a live suit which could be amended  by the addition of new parties and the inclusion of a  new prayer.  Therefore the  addition of  parties which took place after the death of the original defendant and the amendment of the plaint in 1973 requesting the court to pass a decree against defendants 2 to 10 who were not’ parties to the suit  prior to  June 10, 1964 on a cause of action which accrued  subsequent   to  January   15,  1968  were  without

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jurisdiction. [898A-D]      B. Banerjee  v. Anita  Pan, [1975]  2 S.C.R.  774; held inapplicable.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1172 of 1979.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated 1-2-1979 of the Madras High Court in O.S.A. No. 75/77. 878      G.  Swaminathan,   A.C.  Muthana,  M.  Subramaniam,  K. Rajendra Chowdhary and N.N. Sivam for the Appellant.      P. Chidambaram,  Shakeel Ahmed,  M.N.  Krishnamani  and M.A. Malik for Respondent No. 1.      S.V. Gupte and V. N. Ganpule for Respondent 2, 4-6.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J. The question involved in this case is whether a  suit for  ejectment filed  in respect of any non- residential building  or part  thereof  pending  before  any court on  the date  on which the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and  Rent  Control)  Act,  1960  (Act  No.  XVIII  of  1960) (hereinafter referred to as ’the principal Act’) was amended by  the  Tamil  Nadu  Buildings  (Lease  and  Rent  Control) Amendment Act,  1964  (Act  No.  XI  of  1964)  (hereinafter referred to as ’the Amending Act’) could have been proceeded with  after   that  date.   It  arises   in  the   following circumstances:      Haji Mohamed Hussain Sait, the father of the plaintiff, Haji Abdulla  Sait was  the owner  of a building situated in the city  of Madras.  He leased  it out  in  favour  of  the defendant, K.  Seetharama Rao  under a lease deed dated July 8, 1940  for the  purpose of  Running a  restaurant known as ’Modern Cafe’  in it for a period of three years with effect from July  15, 1940  on a  monthly rent  of Rs.  950/-.  The agreed h  period of  lease expired  in July,  1943  but  the defendant continued to be in possession of the building as a tenant holding  over. On the coming into force of the Madras Non-residential Buildings  Rent Control  order in  1946, the defendant became a statutory tenant of the said building and fair rent in respect of it was fixed under that order in the year 1946  at Rs. 1,680/- per month. The aforesaid order was replaced by  the Madras  Buildings (Lease  and Rent Control) Act. 1949 which was also applicable to the said building. On the death of the landlord Haji Mohamed Hussain Sait in 1955, under a partition amongst his heirs the plaintiff became the owner of  the building.  The protection  which the defendant was enjoying  under the  Act of  1949 came  to an end on the passing of the principal Act by virtue of section 35 thereof which repealed  the Act  of 1949 and section 30(iii) thereof which provided  that nothing  contained in the principal Act was applicable  to any  non-residential building, the rental value of  which on  the date  of  the  commencement  of  the principal Act as entered in the property tax assessment book of the  municipal  council,  district  board,  panchayat  or panchayat  union   council  or  the  Corporation  of  Madras exceeded Rs.  400/-  per  mensem.  The  defendant,  however, continued to  be in possession of the building by paying the rent every month. 879 The plaintiff  issued a  notice to the defendant terminating the tenancy with effect from the expiry of February 29, 1964 and as the building was not governed by the principal Act at that point  of time,  he instituted a suit in Civil Suit No.

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730 of  1964 on  the file of the City Civil Court, Madras on March 2,  1964 for  eviction and  for damages at the rate of Rs. 6000/-  per  month.  The  defendant  filed  his  written statement on  May 2,  1964 before  the City’ Civil Court. On June 10,  1964,  the  Amending  Act  came  into  force.  The relevant part of it is reproduced below:-           "2. Amendment  of section  30, Madras Act XVlII of      1960.-In section  30 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and      Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the      principal Act)-           (i)  in clause (ii) the word "or" occurring at the                end shall be omitted;           (ii) clause (iii) shall be omitted;            (iii) in the Explanation, for the words, brackets                and figures  "clauses (ii)  and (iii)  ", the                word,  brackets  and  figures  "clause  (ii)"                shall be substituted.           3. Certain  pending  proceedings  to  abate.-Every      proceeding in  respect of  any non-residential building      or part  thereof pending  before  any  court  or  other      authority or  officer on the date of the publication of      this Act  in the Fort St. George Gazette and instituted      on the  ground that  such building  or part  was exempt      from the  provisions of  the principal Act by virtue of      clause (iii)  of section 30 of the principal Act, shall      abate in  so far  as the  proceeding  relates  to  such      building or  part. All  rights and privileges which may      have accrued  before  such  date  to  any  landlord  in      respect of any non-residential building or part thereof      by  virtue  of  clause  (iii)  of  section  30  of  the      principal Act,  shall cease and determine and shall not      be enforceable:           Provided that  nothing contained  in this  section      shall be deemed to invalidate any suit or proceeding in      which the  decree or  order passed has been executed or      satisfied in  full before  the date  mentioned in  this      section."      The statement  of objects  and reasons  appended to the Bill which  ultimately  became  the  Amending  Act  read  as follows:-           "The Madras  Buildings (Lease  and  Rent  Control)      Act, 1960  (Madras Act  18 of  1960),  relates  to  the      regulation of 880      the  letting   of   residential   and   non-residential      buildings and  the control  of rents  of such buildings      and the  prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants      therefrom in  the State  of Madras. Under section 30 of      the said  Act, certain  buildings are exempted from the      provisions  of   the  said   Act.  Any  non-residential      building or  part thereof occupied by any one tenant if      the monthly  rent  paid  by  him  in  respect  of  that      building or  part exceeds  four hundred  rupees is  one      such building  or  part  is  exempted  under  the  said      section 30.  It has  been brought  to the notice of the      Government that  the landlords  of such non-residential      buildings, taking  advantage of the exemption, referred      to above,  demand exorbitant  rents from the tenants of      such buildings,  who  mostly  belong  to  the  business      community, and  threaten to  evict the tenants when the      latter do not concede to the demands for such rents. In      order to  provide relief  to such tenants and to ensure      that the  interests of  trade  and  industries  do  not      suffer by  demands of  landlords for  unreasonable  and      exorbitant rents.  the  Government  consider  that  the

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    exemption now available to any non-residential building      or part  thereof fetching a monthly rent exceeding four      hundred rupees  should be  withdrawn. At the same time,      the Government  consider that  there is no need to take      away  the   exemption  available   at  present  to  any      residential building or part thereof fetching a monthly      rent exceeding Rs. 250/-.           The Bill seeks to achieve the above object."      The result  of the  amendment was  that  the  buildings which had  been exempted from the operation of the principal Act under  clause (iii)  of section 30 came within the scope of the  principal Act and the relationship between landlords and tenants of such buildings was to be regulated thereafter in accordance  with the  provisions of  the  principal  Act. Apparently in  order to  give protection  to tenants of such buildings against  whom proceedings  for eviction  had  been instituted in  civil courts,  section 3  of the Amending Act provided that  such proceedings  should be treated as having abated. The proviso to section 3 of the Amending Act however provided that  nothing contained  in that  section should be deemed to  invalidate any  suit or  proceeding in  which the decree or  order passed  had been  executed or  satisfied in full before  the date  mentioned in  that section,  the said date being,  June 10,  1964. This  by necessary implication, section 3  of the  Amending Act  was applicable  even to the case of a building in respect of which a decree for eviction had been  passed but  had not  been executed or satisfied in full before  June 10,  1964. In view of the above provision, the City 881 Civil Court dismissed the suit as having abated by its order dated December 4, 1964. The plaintiff filed two applications before the City Civil Court in March, 1965-one under order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the order dated December  4, 1964 dismissing the suit as having abated and another  under section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act  for condoning delay  in filing  the application,  under order 9, Rule 9  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure.  He also  filed an appeal in A.S. No. 266 of 1965 on the file of the High Court of Madras  against the  order of  the City Civil Court dated December 4,  1964. Both  the above applications were allowed by the  City Civil  Court on  August 3,  1965. On August 13, 1965, the  defendant filed  an additional  written statement before the  City Civil  Court raising the plea that the suit had actually  abated by  virtue of section 3 of the Amending Act. He  also filed two revision petitions against the order passed by the City Civil Court allowing the two applications on August  3, 1965. In the meanwhile, on an application made under section  24 of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure  by  the plaintiff, the  suit was  withdrawn to  the file of the High Court and  it was  renumbered as  C.S. No.  218 of  1965. It should be mentioned here that owing to the alteration of the pecuniary jurisdiction  of the  City Civil  Court, the  suit stood transferred  to the  file of  the High Court on May 1, 1964 itself.  The defendant died on January 15, 1968. He had made will  on  January  7.  1968  appointing  executors  and administrators  in   respect  of   his  assets  and  issuing directions regarding  the manner  in which his assets should be disposed  of. By an order dated July 20, 1970 made by the High Court,  defendants Nos.  2 to 10 who had been appointed executors  an   administrators  were   impleaded  as   legal representatives of the defendant (who was shown as defendant No. 1 thereafter). The two civil revision petitions filed by the defendant! against the order passed on August 3,.1965 by the City  Civil Court  and the  Appeal Suit  No. 266 of 1965

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filed by  the plaintiff  against the order of the City Civil Court dated  December 4, 1964 were disposed of by a Division Bench of  the High Court of Madras by a common order on June 28, 1972, the relevant part or which read as follows:-           "It is  seen from  the foregoing dates that at the      time of  the dismissal of the suit, the lower court had      no jurisdiction  to deal with suit and in that view the      counsel appearing  on both  sides  represent  that  the      order dismissing  the suit  as having abated may be set      aside and the suit may be tried on the original side of      this Court.  We accordingly  allow the  appeal and  set      aside the  order of dismissal of the suit on the ground      that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal 882      with the  same on  the date of dismissal and direct the      suit to  be posted on the original side for being dealt      with."      It may  be mentioned  here that  as stated earlier, the suit had  already been  withdrawn to  the file  of the  High Court under  section 24  of the  Code of Civil Procedure and had been  numbered as  Civil Suit  No. 218 of 1965. In July, 1973, the  plaintiff  sought  an  amendment  of  the  plaint praying for  relief against  defendants Nos.  2 to 10 on the ground that after the death of the original defendant No. 1, they were  not entitled  to continue  in possession  of  the building  as   ’statutory  tenants  and  the  plaintiff  was entitled to  a decree  against them  in that  very suit. The above  contention   was  based  on  the  definition  of  the expression "tenant"  in section 2(8) of the principal Act as it stood  then. After  the amendment  of the  plaint,  fresh written statements  were filed  by defendants  Nos. 2  to 10 raising several  pleas including the pleas which had already been raised in the written statements filed by defendant No. 1  before  the  City  Civil  Court.  On  the  basis  of  the pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:-      "1.  Is the suit maintainable ?      2.   Has  the   plaintiff  given   proper   notice   of           termination of the suit premises ?      3.   Does the suit abate by reason of Act XI of 1964 ?      4.    Are  not the  defendants entitled  to  protection           under  the   Madras  Buildings   (Lease  and  Rent           Control) Act, 1960, as amended by Act 23 of 1973 ?      5.   Whether the tenancy came. to an end upon the death           of K. Seethararma Rao ?      6.    Whether  the defendants have no legal interest in           the  premises   and  consequently   liable  to  be           rejected ?      7.   To what reliefs are the parties entitled ?      At the  conclusion of the trial, the learned Judge held on issue  No. 1 that the suit was maintainable, on issue No. 2 that  the  notice  to  quit  had  validly  terminated  the tenancy, on  issue  No.  4  that  the  defendants  were  not entitled to protection under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960; on issue No. S that the tenancy had come to an end even on March 1, 1964 and on issue No. 6 that the defendants  had no  legal interest  in the premises. He, however, declined to record any finding on issue No. 3 which related to  the question  whether the suit had abated ar not on June  10, 1964  by virtue of section 3 of ,; the Amending Act. The  learned Judge  proceeded to dispose of the suit as if it  was a  fresh suit  instituted after  the death of the original 883 defendant No. 1 on January 15, 1968 even though there was no specific issue  on the  question whether  it cd  be  treated

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such. This  appears to  be  so  in  view  of  the  following observations made  by the  trial Judge  in the course of his judgment:-           "Under the  above circumstances,  if the plaintiff      files  a  suit  today  against  the  defendants  he  is      entitled to  get an  executable decree  for  possession      (without the  necessity of  going to  the Rent  Control      Court) inasmuch  as defendants 2 to 10 had never become      ’tenants’ under  the Act.  Therefore even  if the  suit      filed in.  the City Civil Court is held to have abated,      under the peculiar circumstances of this case, I see no      reason why  I should not treat the suit before me to be      a fresh  one. It  is to  be seen  that the  application      under section  24 of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure for      transfer of  the suit  from City  Civil Court  to  this      court was  consented by the defendants. In A.S. No. 266      of  1965,   apart  from  setting  aside  the  order  of      abatement passed  by the  City Civil  Court, this Court      directed that the suit be tried on the original side of      this Court.  Even  if  the  City  Civil  Court  had  no      pecuniary jurisdiction  to deal  with  the  matter  and      record abatement,  the defendants could have pressed in      A.S. No.  266 of  1965 for  an order by this Court that      the suit  had abated. It is need less to point out that      the order  that was  under appeal  was one by which the      City Civil  Court held  that the  suit had  abated.  No      doubt that was passed without jurisdiction, inasmuch as      the pecuniary  jurisdiction  of  that  Court  had  been      reduced. But  it is  open to this Court to have held in      the said  appeal itself  that the  suit had abated. But      the order  was that  the suit  was to  be tried  on the      original side.  The suit  had been  originally filed in      1964, that  is more  than  12  years  ago.  Under  such      circumstances, I  think it  is  wholly  unnecessary  to      drive the plaintiff to a fresh suit."      On the  basis of  the findings  recorded  by  him,  the learned trial  Judge passed  a  decree  for  possession  and damages for  use and  occupation. The quantum of damages was directed to  be determined  under order  20, Rule  12 of the Code of  Civil Procedure.  Defendants Nos.  2  to  10  were, however,  allowed   three  years’  time  to  deliver  vacant possession of  the premises.  Aggrieved by the decree passed by the  trial Court,  the plaintiff  filed O.S.A.  No. 23 of 1977 and  defendant No. 2 filed O.S.A 75 of 1977 on the file of the  High Court  of Madras.  The plaintiff  in his appeal questioned the  decree of the trial court only to the extent it granted  a period  of three  years to  the defendants  to deliver possession 884 of the  premises. Defendant  No. 2  in his appeal questioned the entire  decree. Both  the appeals  came up  for  hearing before a  Division Bench of the High Court. In the course of its judgment,  the Division  Bench formulated  the following points for its consideration:-      "1.  What was  the status  of late Seetharama Rao after           the termination  of the  tenancy-whether he  was a           trespasser or a tenant holding over or a tenant at           sufferance ?       2.   Did  the suit building come within the purview of           the Act  and did  late  Seetharama  Rao  become  a           tenant as  defined in  the Act, on the coming into           force of the Tamil Nadu Act XI of 1964 ?       3.   Whether  the suit  instituted  by  the  plaintiff           abated in  view of section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act           XI of 1964 ?

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     4.   Whether  the "tenancy"  came to  an end  upon the           death of Seetharama Rao ?       5.   Whether  defendants  2  to  10  are  entitled  to           protection against eviction from the suit property           by virtue  of the Act as amended by the Tamil Nadu           Act 23 of 1973 ?"      The  Division   Bench  held  that  the  status  of  the defendant, Seetharama  Rao from  March 1, 1964 was that of a trespasser and  he was  liable to pay profits or damages for use and  occupation to  the plaintiff;  that the  defendant, Seetharama Rao  was not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the principal Act  by the  coming into force of the Amending Act as  the  building  itself  was  outside  the  scope  of  the principal Act and even if the building was within its scope, he was  not a  tenant as  defined in the principal Act; that section 3  of the  Amending Act did not apply to the suit in question and  hence it  did not  abate on  June 10, 1964 and that after  the death  of  the  defendant,  Seetharama  Rao, defendants 2  to 10  were not  entitled  to  the  protection against eviction  under the  principal Act as amended by the Tamil Nadu Act No. 23 of 1973. Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal filed  by defendant  No. 2.  The appeal  filed by the plaintiff was also dismissed as a period of 2.6 years out of the period  of three  years’ time granted by the trial court had  expired   by  the  time  the  judgment  in  appeal  was delivered. Aggrieved  by the  decree passed  by the Division Bench, defendants  2 to 4 and 10 have filed the above appeal by special leave in this Court.      The principal contention urged in support of the appeal before us was that the suit having abated on the coming into force of  the Amending  Act, it  was not  open to  the trial court to  treat the  proceedings before  it as  a  new  suit instituted after  the death of the defendant, Seetharama Rao against defendants Nos. 2 to 10 and to pass a decree. In the 885 instant case,  as noticed  earlier, the  trial court did not decide the  question whether  the suit  abated on the coming into force  of the  Amending Act.  The Division Bench of the High Court  has held  that the  provisions of section of the Amending Act were not applicable to the suit and, therefore, the question of its abatement did not arise.      The undisputed  facts in  this case are: (1) Seetharama Rao  held   the  suit   property  as  a  lessee  before  the institution of  the  suit;  (2)  that  the  lease  had  been terminated by  the issue  of a  notice  in  accordance  with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; (3) that a suit for eviction  of Seetharama  Rao was  filed on March 2, 1964 before the  City Civil  Court, Madras which was competent to try it on the date of its institution; (I) that by virtue of alteration of  the pecuniary  jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and  consequential provisions made in that connection, the suit  stood transferred to the file of the original side of the  High Court with effect from May 1, 1964 and that the suit was, therefore, deemed to be pending in law on the file of the  High Court  on June  10,  1964  on  which  date  the Amending Act  was published  in the  official  Gazette  even though in fact the file was Lying on that date with the City Civil Court.  The other proceedings which have been referred to above  in some detail are not relevant for the purpose of deciding  the  question  whether  the  suit  abated  on  the publication of the Amending Act in the official Gazette.      Section 2  (ii) of  the Amending  Act  repealed  clause (iii) of  section 30  of the principal Act. Consequently any non-residential building,  the rental  value of which on the date of  the commencement of the principal Act as entered in

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the property  tax assessment  book of the municipal council, district Board,  panchayat or panchayat union council or the Corporation of  Madras, as  the case  may be  exceeded  four hundred rupees  per mensem was also brought within the scope of the  principal  Act  and  the  relationship  between  the landlord and tenant of such building came to be regulated by it with effect from June 10, 1964.      Section 3  of the Amending Act consists of three parts. Under the  first part,  it directed that every proceeding in respect of  any  nonresidential  building  or  part  thereof pending before  any court  or other  authority or officer on the date  of the publication of the Amending Act in the Fort St. George  Gazette and  instituted on  the ground that such building or  part was  exempt from  the  provisions  of  the principal Act by virtue of clause (iii) of section 30 of the principal Act abated in so far as the proceedings related to such building  or part.  Under the  second part, it provided that all  rights and  privileges which  might  have  accrued before such  date to  any landlord  in respect  of any  non- residential building  or part  thereof by  virtue of  clause (iii) of section 30 of 886 the principal Act would cease and determine and would not be enforceable. The  proviso to  section 3  which is  the third part of  that section  provided that  nothing  contained  in section 3  should  be  deemed  to  invalidate  any  suit  or proceeding in  which the  decree or  order passed  had  been executed or  satisfied in  full before the date mentioned in that section.      On behalf  of the  plaintiff,  three  contentions  were urged in  the appeal before the High Court in support of his case that  section 3 of the Amending Act was inapplicable to the present  case. They  were (i)  that  section  3  of  the Amending Act  had no  reference to  a suit at all; (ii) that even if  it had any reference to a suit, it did not apply to a suit  of the  present nature  and (iii)  that even  if  it applied to  a suit  of  the  present  nature  still  on  the pleadings  of  the  plaintiff.  the  present  suit  was  not affected by  the said provision. The Division Bench rejected the first  contention of the plaintiff that section 3 had no reference to  a suit  at all but it, however, upheld me case of the  plaintiff on the basis of the other two contentions. Relying upon  the language of section 10(l) of the principal Act which  provided that  a tenant  was  not  liable  to  be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  that  section  or sections 14  to 16 and the decision of the Madras High Court in Theruvath  Vittil Muhammadunny  v. Melepurakkal  Unniri & Anr. and  the decision  of this Court in B.V. Patankar & ors v. C.G.  Sastry, the Division Bench held that it was settled law that  the principal  Act itself  did  not  prohibit  the filing of a suit by a landlord for recovery of possession of the property  from a  tenant but only a decree passed in the said suit  could not  be executed  except in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act and if that was the true legal position  in respect  of the  buildings to  which  the principal Act  applied from  its commencement’  there was no justification whatever for the Legislature making a contrary provision in  respect of  non-residential buildings to which the  principal  Act  became  applicable  by  virtue  of  the Amending Act.  The  Division  Bench,  therefore,  held  that section 3 of the Amending Act was not applicable to the case on hand. We are of the view that the above conclusion of the Division Bench  is erroneous. It is not for the Court to ask whether there  was any  justification for the Legislature to

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make a  contrary provision  in respect  of the  suits of the present nature.  It was  not the contention of the plaintiff that section  3 of the Amending Act was unconstitutional. In that situation,  the High  Court had  no option but to apply the provision in question to the case on hand without going 887 into the  question whether  there was  any justification for enacting it.  We are,  however. Of  the  view  that  in  the circumstances in  which the Amending Act came to be enacted, there was  every justification  for enacting  section  3  in order to  give protection to  tenants against whom suits for eviction had  been filed  from buildings  which were brought within the  scope of  the principal  Act by  deleting clause (iii) of section 30 of the principal Act.      The third  contention of  the plaintiff  in support his plea that section 3 of the Amending Act was inapplicable was formulated thus:  The provisions  of the aforesaid section 3 would apply  only when  the three  conditions viz.  (i) that there should be a proceeding in respect of a non-residential building or  part thereof;  (ii) that  proceeding should  be pending before  any court  or other  authority or officer on the date  of the publication of the Amending Act in the Fort St. George  Gazette; and  (iii) that  proceeding should have been instituted  on the  ground that  such building  or part thereof was  exempt from the provisions of the principal Act by virtue  of clause  (iii) of  section 30  of the principal Act, existed.  It was argued that since the present suit did not satisfy  the third  requirement referred to above as the plaintiff had  not referred to clause (iii) of section 30 of the principal  Act in  the plaint, section 3 of the Amending Act should  be held  to be  inapplicable to it. The Division Bench upheld the above contention observing that in order to attract section  3 of  the Amending  Act, there should be an allegation in  the plaint  that the building in question was exempt from the provisions of the principal Act by virtue of clause (iii) of section 30 of the principal Act. In order to arrive at  the above conclusion, it relied upon the decision of the  Madras High  Court in  M/s. Raval  & Co  v.   K.  G. Ramachandran &  Ors. and the decision of this Court in P. J. Gupta   Co. v.  K. Venkatesan Merchant & ors. The passage in the case  of M/s.  Raval &  Co (supra) on which the Division Bench relied was follows:           "It  has  to  be  immediately  conceded  that  the      wording of this section can by no means be described as      happy, or  free from  any cloud of ambiguity. It is not      very clear  how a proceeding could have been instituted      ’on the  ground that  such building  or part was exempt      from the  provisions of  the principal Act by virtue of      clause (iii) of s. 30’, or what is the precise scope of      the rights  and privileges  which  may  accrue  to  the      landlord, and which are to cease and determine." 888      We do  not think that in the context in which section 3 of the  Amending Act  was enacted,  it could be said that it was not  possible to  identify the proceedings to which that provision referred.  In the  case  of  P.  J.  Gupta  &  Co. (supra), the  effect of section 3 of the Amending Act is set out as follows:-           "The obvious result of section 30(iii) of the Act,      as it  stood before  the amendment,  was that,  if  the      rental value of a non-residential building,, as entered      in the  property tax  book of the Municipality exceeded      Rs. 400/-per mensem, a description which applies to the      premises under  consideration before  us  the  landlord      would have  no right  to proceed against the tenant for

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    eviction under  section  10(2)  (ii)  a)  of  the  Act.      Section 3  of the  Amending Act,  on the  face  of  it,      applies  to   two  kinds   of  cases.  Its  heading  is      misleading in so far as it suggests that it is meant to      apply only  to one  of these  two  kinds.  It  applies:      firstly, to  cases  in  which  a  proceeding  has  been      instituted  "on  the  ground"  that  a  non-residential      building  "was   exempt  from  the  provisions  of  the      principal Act"  and is  pending; and secondly, to cases      where "rights  and privileges,  which may  have accrued      before such  date to)  any landlord  in respect of non-      residential building  by  virtue  of  clause  (iii)  of      section 30  of the principal Act" exist. In the kind of      case falling  in the first category, the amendment says      that the  pending proceedings  shall abate.  As regards      the second  kind of  case, the amendment says that "the      rights and  privileges of  the landlord shall cease and      determine shall not be enforceable." Proceeding further, this Court observed:           "It is not necessary, for the purposes of tho case      before us,  to speculate about the types of cases which      may actually fall within the two wings of the obviously      inartistically drafted  section 3  of the Amending Act.      It is  enough for us to conclude, as we are bound to on      the language  of the provision, that the case before us      falls outside it."      The above  observations were  made by  this Court  in a case where  a proceeding  had been initiated before the City Rent Controller in December, 1964 by a landlord for eviction of his  tenant from  a non-residential  building situated in the city  of Madras  which had  been leased at Rs. 600/- per month on  the ground that the building had been sub-let. The City Rent  Controller ordered the eviction of the tenant. In appeal, the Court of Small Causes at Madras allowed the 889 tenant’s appeal  holding that the tenant had the right under the original  lease of  August 21, 1944 to sub-let, and also because even  violation of  a clause of the subsequent lease of April  3, 1963,  prohibiting subletting, did not entail a forfeiture of  tenancy rights  under the  provisions of  the Transfer of  Property Act. Its view was that, in the case of what it  described as "a contractual tenancy" the provisions of the  Transfer of Property Act applied to the exclusion of the remedies  provided by  the principal  Act so that unless the lease  deed itself provided for a termination of tenancy for  sub-letting   in  addition   to  a   condition  against subletting, the  tenancy right itself could not be forfeited or determined  by such  a breach of the contract of tenancy. In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, under section 25 of The  principal Act, the High Court of Madras reversed the judgment and order of the Small Cause Court holding that the rights of  the landlord and tenant were governed on the date of the application for eviction by section 10(2) (ii) (a) of the principal Act which contained a prohibition against sub- letting which involved parting with possession. On appeal to this Court,  the decision  of  the  Madras  High  Court  was affirmed holding  that the  effect of the amendment was that the landlord  acquired a  new right  to evict a tenant under section 10(2)  (ii) a).  This Court  held that  by virtue of section 3  of the  Amending Act,  all rights  and privileges which might  have accrued  before the date of publication of the Amending  Act in the official Gazette to any landlord in respect of  any non-residential  building or part thereof by reason of  clause (iii)  of section  30 of the principal Act alone became  enforceable. But the right to seek eviction of

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the tenant  Under section 10(2) (ii) (a) was unaffected even though the sub-letting of the building had taken place prior to the enactment of the Amending Act.      From a reading of he above decision, it is obvious that This Court  held that  the right which the landlord acquired under section  10(2) (ii)  (a) to evict the tenant was a now right and  was not a pre-existing right which could possibly be affected  by section  3  of  the  Amending  Act.  It  is, however, clear from the observations of this Court extracted above that  a proceeding  which had  been instituted "on the ground" that a non-residential building "was exempt from the provisions of  the principal  Act" by virtue of clause (iii) of section  30 of  The principal  Act and was pending on the date of publication of the amendment in the official Gazette would abate.  This Court  did  not,  however,  go  into  the question as  to what  types of  cases would  fall within the scope of  section 3  of the Amending Act. We are of the view that the  identification of  such cases  depends on the true cons- 890 truction of  the said  provision. In this case, we are faced with that question.      It is  appropriate  to  refer  at  this  stage  to  the following passage  occurring in Craies on Statute Law (Sixth Edition) at page 99:-           "In Bratt  v. Bratt  [1926] 3 Addams 210, 216, Sir      John Nicholl  M. R.  said as  follows: "The  key to the      opening of  every law  is the  reason and spirit of the      law; it  is the animus imponentis, the intention of the      law-maker expressed  in the  law  itself,  taken  as  a      whole. Hence,  to arrive  at the  true meaning  of  any      particular phrase  in a  statute, the particular phrase      is not  to be  viewed detached  from its context in the      statute; it  is to  be viewed  in connection  with  its      whole con  text, meaning  by this as well the title and      preamble  as  the  purview  or  enacting  part  of  the      statute."      We have  already referred  to the object with which the Amending Act  was passed and that was to give relief against unreasonable evictions  and demands for unconscionable rates of rents  to tenants  of buildings which had been originally exempted from  the operation  of the  principal Act.  It  is clear that  while doing  so the Legislature gave relief also to persons  against whom suits had been filed. WE think that the words  "instituted on  the ground  that such building or part was  exempt from the provisions of the principal Act by virtue , of clause (iii) of section 30 of the principal Act" should be  construed in  the context in which they appear as referring to  a proceeding  which had been instituted in the light of  section 30(iii) of the principal Act which granted exemption in  respect of  the buildings  referred to therein from the  operation of  the  principal  Act  and  any  other construction would defeat the object of the Amending Act. lt is seen  that in  the instant  case, the original plaint was filed on the basis that the tenancy had been terminated with effect from  the expiry  of February 29, 1964. The plaintiff prayed for eviction of the original defendant and also for a decree for damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 6000/- per  month from  the date of the plaint till delivery of the  vacant possession  on the  assumption that after the termination of  the lease  the original  defendant No. 1 was not a  tenant and was liable to pay damages and not the rent of Rs.  1,680/- per  month which  was the fair rent fixed in respect of  the building  in a  former proceeding  under the rent control  law in  force then. The suit in the above form

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could be filed for the relief referred to above only because of the  exemption granted  by clause  (iii) of section 30 of the principal  Act because in the absence of such exemption, no effective  decree for  ejectment could  be passed  by the City Civil Court in view of section 891 10 of  the principal Act which provided that no tenant could be evicted  from a  building except  in accordance  with the provisions of  section 10  and section 14 to 16 thereof. The plaintiff could not also have asked for a decree for damages at Rs.  6000/- per  month which he had claimed in the plaint but for  such exemption. We are, therefore. Of the view that section 3  of the Amending Act was applicable to the suit in question as it was a proceeding instituted in the City Civil Court on the ground that the building in question was exempt from the provisions of the principal Act by virtue of clause (iii) of  section 30  thereof although no express allegation was made in the plaint to that effect.      In  order  to  get  over  the  inevitable  consequences flowing from section 3 of the Amending Act and the effect of an earlier  decision of  a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in  Moolchand Gupta  v. Madras  Piece Goods  Merchants Charitable Trust  a novel and ingenious contention was urged on behalf  of the  plaintiff, the said contention being that after the termination of the lease with effect from February 29, 1964  by the  issue of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of  Property Act,  the original  defendant became a trespasser and  the premises  in question  ceased  to  be  a building as defined in section 2(2) of the principal Act. On the  above   basis,  it  was  contended  that  the  original defendant  could  not  claim  the  benefit  of  any  of  the provisions of  the  principal  Act  and  section  3  of  the Amending Act.  It was argued that since a contention of this nature had  not been  considered in  the case  of  Moolchand Gupta (supra),  it had  no binding  effect on  the  Division Bench which heard this case. It is appropriate at this stage to set  out the  passage from  the judgment  of the Division Bench of  the High  Court in  which the  binding  nature  of Moolchand Gupta’s case (supra) is considered:-           "In this  context, Mr.  Govind Swaminathan brought      to our  notice a  decision of  a Bench of this Court in      Moolchand  Gupta   v.  Madras   Piece  Goods  Merchants      Charitable Trust  (supra) to  which one  of  us  was  a      party. In  our opinion,  in that decision this question      was not considered. That case also was concerned with a      non-residential building  which did not fall within the      purview of  the Act  because of  section 30(iii) of the      Act. The  tenancy was  terminated on 31st October, 1960      and the  suit in ejectment was instituted on 19-12-1960      which ended  in a compromise decree dated 31st January,      1963. The  decree provided for a direction for eviction      against the quondam tenant, subject to cer- 892      tain terms  thereafter mentioned,  to wit, the landlord      being entitled to take possession of the portion of the      premises in  occupation of one Panchand and the Bullion      Market Post  Office immediately by executing the decree      in so  far as  The said  portion was  concerned and the      quondam tenant delivering possession of the rest of the      portion in  his occupation  on or  before 31st January,      1964 and the quondam tenant paying mesne profits at Rs.      1340/- per  month for the period from 1st November 1960      to 31st  January, 1963 and further mesne profits at Rs.      800/- per  month for  the period  commencing  from  1st      February, 1963  till delivery of possession. The decree

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    also provided  that if  there was default in payment of      the sum  of Rs.  800/- or  the other sum per month, the      landlord  would  be  entitled  to  execute  the  decree      immediately. Time  for vacating was extended and before      the building  was actually  vacated the Tamil Nadu ’Act      11 of  1964 intervened.  The question  was, whether  by      virtue of  the intervention of the Tamil Nadu Act 11 of      1964, the  decree could  be executed. The learned trial      Judge felt that in view of the fact that there had been      a surrender  of a  part of  the holding  by the quondam      tenant’s sub-tenant,  there was  a  disruption  of  the      entire holding  and therefore  the quondam tenant would      not be a statutory tenant within the meaning of section      2(8)  of   the  Act.  The  Bench  disagreed  with  this      conclusion and  held that the quondam tenant would be a      tenant under section 2(8) of the Act as he continued to      remain in  possession of  the property  even after  the      termination of  the tenancy in his favour. No point was      urged before  the Court that the termination of tenancy      having taken  place ?  before Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1964      came into force, the definition of the term ’tenant’ in      section 2(8)  did not  apply to  the quondam  tenant in      that case  and therefore  the said  decision cannot  be      considered to  be an  authority for  the point which is      now raised before us."      From the  facts of Moolchand Gupta’s case (supra) it is clear that  the Division  Bench of the Madras High Court had held that  a tenant  whose tenancy  had been terminated with effect from  October 31,  1960 and against whom a decree for eviction had  been passed prior to the date on which section of the  Amending Act  came into  force was  entitled  to  be treated as a tenant by virtue of the said provision since he had continued  to remain  in possession of the property even after 893 the termination of the tenancy. The only ground on which the Division Bench  which heard  the present case did not follow the ruling  in Moolchand  Gupta’s case  (supra) is  that the effect of  the termination  of tenancy  prior to the date on which Tamil  Nadu Act No. Xl of 1964 came into force had not been considered  in that  case.  The  binding  effect  of  a decision, as  observed by  this Court  in Smt.  Sommavanti & Ors. v.  The Sate  of Punjab  & Ors  does  not  depend  upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that  the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently  advanced was  actually decided.  On  going through the  decision in  Moolchand Gupta’s  case (supra) we are of  the view  that the  appropriate procedure  which the Division Bench  should have  followed in  this case  was  to refer it  to a  full Bench  instead of  bypassing  the  said decision in  the manner  in which  it has  been done in this case. The well-settled practice to be followed in such cases is succinctly  put by Das Gupta, J. in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. The Administrator-General of West Bengal as follows:-           "Before we  part with  this appeal, however, it is      our duty  to refer  to one  incidental matter.  We have      noticed with some regret that when the earlier decision      of two judges of the same High Court in Deorajan’s case      (1953) 58  C.W.N.  64  was  cited  before  the  learned      Judges’ who  heard the  present  appeal  they  took  on      themselves to say that the previous decision was wrong,      instead of  following the  usual procedure  in case  of      difference of  opinion with  an  earlier  decision,  of      referring the  question to  a  larger  Bench.  Judicial      decorum no  less than  legal propriety forms the! basis

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    of judicial  procedure. If  one thing is more necessary      in law  than any  other thing,  it is  the  quality  of      certainty. That  quality  would  totally  disappear  if      judges of  co-ordinate jurisdiction  in  a  High  Court      start  overruling   one  another’s   decision.  If  one      Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish      a previous  decision of  another  Division  Bench,  and      holding the  view that  the earlier  decision is wrong,      itself gives  effect to  that view  the result would be      utter confusion.  The position  would  be  equally  bad      where a  Judge sitting  singly in  the High Court is of      opinion that  the previous  decision of  another single      Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to      that view  instead of  referring the matter to a larger      Bench. 894      In such  a case  lawyers would  not know  how to advise      their the  clients and  all courts  subordinate to  the      High Court  would find  themselves in  an  embarrassing      position  of   having  to  choose  between  dissentient      judgments of their own High Court.           As far  as we are aware it is the uniform practice      in all  the High  Courts in  India that if one Division      Bench differs from an earlier view on a question of law      of another  Division Bench,  a reference  is made  to a      larger Bench."      Be that  as it  may, we  are of  the view  that  having regard to our finding that the suit stood abated on June 10, 1964 by  virtue of  the  provisions  of  section  3  of  the Amending Act,  the original defendant, Seetharama Rao became a statutory  tenant of the premises in question and he could not be  evicted from  the premises except in accordance with the procedure  specified in  the principal Act. The position would not  have been different even if a decree for eviction had been  passed against  him before  June 10,  1964 and the decree had  not been  executed or  satisfied in full on that date. The  several decisions on which reliance was placed by the  Division   Bench  for   determining  the  character  of possession of  the original  defendant, Seetharama Rao after the expiry  of the  notice given  under section  106 of  the Transfer of  Property Act  were not relevant for the purpose of this  case because in none of them there was any occasion to consider  the effect  of a provision similar to section 3 of the  Amending Act.  We, therefore,  do not agree with the finding of  the Division  Bench that  the original defendant was a  trespasser in  possession of the premises in question after June 10, 1964.      We also  find it difficult to agree with the finding of the Division  Bench that  the premises in question was not a ’building’ as  defined in section 2(2) of the principal Act. The reason  given by the Division Bench for holding that the building in question was not a ’building’ within the meaning of section  2(2) of  the principal Act was that it was not a building which  was either  ’let’ or  ’to be let’ separately for residential or non-residential purposes. It is necessary to extract  that part  of the judgment of the Division Bench where the above question is dealt with:-      "The definition  of the word ’building’ in section 2(2)      states:           "building’ means  any building or hut or part of a      building or  hut, let  or  to  be  let  separately  for      residential or non-residential purposes ........ 895      Consequently it is not every building that comes within      the scope  of the Act, but only a building let or to be

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    let  separately   for  either   of  the  two  purposes.      Admittedly on  10-6-1964 the  suit building was not let      because the  tenancy came  to an  end by  29-2-1964 and      late Seetharama Rao was not occupying the building from      1-3-1964 as  a tenant,  as found  by us. Therefore, the      only other  question is,  whether the suit building can      be said  to be a building to be let separately for non-      residential purposes  on  10-6-1964.  We  have  already      referred to  the claim of their plaintiff in his plaint      that he  needed the  building for  his own  use and the      contention  of  late  Seetharama  Rao  in  his  written      statement dated 25-4-1964 that the plaintiff was merely      anxious to  extort higher rent and for that purpose had      from time  to time approached him, that although he was      prepared to  pay a  reasonable rent, he was not willing      to pay  anything exorbitant  and that  it is because of      that the plaintiff had instituted the present suit on a      pretence of  requiring it  for his  own business.  With      reference to  the notice  Ex. P-2,  late Seetharama Rao      stated that  notice was  merely  in  keeping  with  the      previous notices  to the  same effect  which  were  not      intended to  be acted  upon. However  before the  trial      Judge the  claim of  the plaintiff that he required the      premises for  his own  need was not put in issue and no      issue was  framed with  reference thereto.  Tho learned      Judge himself states in his judgment:           "On the  relevant date,  undoubtedly there  was no           letting of  the building  and it  is nobody’s case           that the same was to be let."      The correctness of this statement found in the judgment      of the learned Judge, namely, that it was nobody’s case      that the building was to be let has not been challenged      either in  the ground  of the appeal filed before this-      Court or  in the arguments before us. Therefore we have      to proceed on the basis that it was not the case of the      defend  its  that  the  plaintiff  wanted  to  let  the      premises in  question. This  Court  has  construed  the      relevant  expression,  namely,  ’building  to  be  let’      occurring  in  section  2(2)  of  the  Act  as  meaning      ’building intended to be let’ in R. K. Veerappa Naidu &      Anr. v.  N. Gopalan  (1961 1 M.L.J. 223. In the present      case on 10-6-1964 it was not the case of the defendants      that the building was intended to be let and it was not      also their  case  that  at  any  stage  thereafter  the      plaintiff intended to let the 896      suit building.  Therefore, it  follows  that  the  suit      building did  not come within the purview of the Act as      a result of the amending Act 11 of 1964."      The reason given by the Division Bench for holding that the building  in question  was not  a ’building’  within the meaning of section 2(2) of R the principal Act appears to be a strange one.      A definition clause does not necessarily in any statute apply in  all possible  contexts in  which the word which is defined may  be found therein. The opening clause of section 2 of  the principal  Act itself suggests that any expression defined in that section should be given the meaning assigned to it  therein unless’  the content  otherwise requires. The two-fold reasoning  of the  Division Bench  for holding that the building  in question  was not  a ’building’  is that on June 10,  1964 (i)  there was no lease in force and hence it was not  let and (ii) that on that date the plaintiff had no intention to lease it and therefore it was not to be let. We are of  the view  that the  words "any building..... let.. "

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also refer  to a  building which was the subject matter of a lease which  has been  terminated by  the issue  of a notice under section  106 of the Transfer of Property Act and which has continued  to remain  in occupation  of the tenant. This view receives  support from the definition of the expression ’tenant’ in section 2(8) of the principal Act which includes a person  continuing in  possession after the termination of the tenancy  in his  favour. If  the  view  adopted  by  the Division Bench  is accepted  then it  would not be necessary for a  landlord to issue a notice of vacancy under section 3 of the  principal Act  when a building becomes vacant by the termination of  a tenancy  or any the eviction of the tenant when he  wants to occupy it himself. In law he cannot do so. He would  be entitled  to  occupy  it  himself  when  he  is permitted to  do  so  under  section  3(3)  or  any  of  the provisions of  section 3A  of the  principal Act.  This also illustrates  that   the  view   of  the  Division  Bench  is erroneous. We, therefore, hold that the building in question was a  ’building’ within  the meaning  of that expression in section 2(2)  of the  principal Act  on the  date  on  which section 3 of the Amending Act became operative.      It thus  becomes clear  that the Suit came to an end in the eye  of law  on June 10, 1964 and the original defendant became entitled  to the  protection of the principal Act. He could thereafter  be evicted from the building only after an order  was   made,  by  the  Controller  under  any  of  the provisions of the principal Act which conferred jurisdiction on him  to do  so. As mentioned earlier, no formal order was passed by  the High  Court on its original side stating that the suit  had abated  on June 10, 1964 till the death of the original defendant which took 897 place. On  January 15,  1968. Owing  to certain  proceedings which were  instituted by  one or  the other of the parties, the case  was treated as a pending proceeding on the file of the High Court although in law, it was not open to the court to proceed with it after June 10, 1964.      The next  significant step  that was  taken before  the High Court  was the application made by the appellant in the year 1973  requesting the  Court to  permit him to amend the plaint by  the inclusion  of a prayer for possession against defendants Nos.  2 to  10 on  the basis  that they  were not ’tenants’ as  defined in  section 2(8) of the principal Act. That application  was  allowed.  Defendants  Nos.  2  to  10 thereafter filed  their written  statements and  the  issues framed  in  the  suit  were  recast  in  the  light  of  the pleadings.  The   learned  trial  Judge,  as  stated  above, disposed of  the suit  as a  fresh one as against defendants Nos. 2  to 10  without recording  a finding  on the question whether it  had abated  or June  10, 1964. The learned trial Judge does  not state in the course of its judgment the date from which  the proceeding  was treated  as a fresh suit. In the instant  case, the  suit itself  was originally flied on March 2,  1964. The  original defendant  died on January 15, 1968. Even  if the  proceeding was  treated as  a fresh suit against defendants Nos. 2 to 10, it could be treated as such only from  a date  subsequent to  January 15,  ’968 on which date the  original defendant did since the contention of the plaintiff which  found favour  with the learned single judge and the Division Bench of the High Court was that defendants Nos. 2  to 10 who were legal representatives of the original defendant could  not succeed  to the  tenancy right  of  the original defendant. In the instant case, since the plaintiff based his  claim on  the above  contention in  the year 1973 when he  made the application for 1 amendment of the plaint,

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the date  of the  institution of the fresh suit could not be earlier than the date on which the application for amendment was made  even if  it was  permissible  to  do  so.  By  his judgment the  learned  single  Judge  passed  a  decree  for possession against  defendants Nos.  2 to 10 and for damages to be determined under order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure without  specifying the  date from  which  damages would be  payable. In  the absence  of such - specification, the plaintiff  became entitled  to claim damages under order 20, Rule  12 of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure even from the date of  the suit  i.e. March 2, 1964. The Division Bench by its judgment  affirmed that  part of the decree of the trial court. The  direction for payment, of mesne profits given in the decree  of the trial court without specify the date from which damages  should be computed could not have been passel consistently with  its judgment  in which it had been stated that the  suit was  being treated  as  a  fresh  suit.  This defect, however is of a 3-473SCI/79 898 minor character.  What is  more fundamental  in this case is that it was not permissible for the trial court to Treat the proceeding which  had been  instituted against  the original defendant prior  to June 10, 1964 as a live proceeding which could be  converted into  a fresh  suit  instituted  against defendants NOS.  2 to  10 after  the death  of the  original defendant, Seetharama  Rao. An  amendment  of  a  plaint  by inclusion of  a new prayer or by addition of new parties can be made  only where  a suit is pending before a court in the eye of  law.  On  June  10,  1964,  the  entire  proceedings commenced with  the plaint  filed on  March  2,  1964  stood terminated and  there was  no plaint  in a  live suit  which could be  amended by  the addition  of new  parties and  the inclusion of  a new  prayer. We  are of  the view  that  the addition of  new parties which took place after the death of Seetharama Rao and the amendment of ’ the plaint in the year 1973 and  the passing  of the  decree  by  the  trial  Judge against defendants  Nos. 2 to 10 who were not parties to the suit prior  to June  10, 1964  on a  cause of  action  which accrued subsequent  to January  15, 1968  were  all  without jurisdiction. It  was, however,  argued  on  behalf  of  the plaintiff before  us relying upon the decision of this Court in B. Banerjee v. Anita. Pan that since the parties had gone to trial with open eyes knowing fully that the plaintiff was relying upon  a cause  of action which accrued in his favour after the  death of  the original defendant and on the basis of the  amendment of the plaint in the year 1973, the decree passed by the trial court and affirmed by the Division Bench of the  High Court  should not  be interfered  with  in  the interests of justice and equity. It is no doubt true that in the decision  referred to  above, this Court permitted the t parties  to  file  fresh  pleadings  and  to  prosecute  the proceedings after  the disposal  of the  case by  this Court having regard  to the delay which had already ensued. It was possible for  this Court to do so in that case because there was no  legal impediment  as we have in the present case. To repeat, in the present case, the suit abated by reason of an express provision  in a  statute on  June 10,  1964, the new cause of  action on  which the plaintiff depended accrued on January 15,  1968 i.e. the date of the death of the original defendant, the  plaint itself  was amended  in the year 1973 claiming relief against defendants Nos. 2 to 10 not as legal representatives who  inherited  the  tenancy  right  of  the original defendant  but as persons who had not inherited the said right . It is thus seen that there was no proceeding in the eye  of law  rending after  June 10,  1964, the cause of

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action on  the basis of which relief was claimed was totally different and the persons against whom the relief was sought were also different. Parties could not either by 899 consent or  acquiescence confer  jurisdiction on  court when law had taken it away.      In these  circumstances, we  feel that  the only course which we can adopt is to set aside the findings of the trial court and  of the  Division Bench  on issues relating to the claim of  the plaintiff  to get  possession of  the property from defendants  Nos. 2  to 10  on the ground that they were not statutory  tenants i.e. issues Nos. 4 and 6 and to leave the questions involved in them open reserving liberty to the parties to  agitate them in appropriate proceedings. In view of our  finding on  issue No.  3, we  hold that  the  decree passed by  the trial  court  and  the  appellate  court  are unsustainable.      We accordingly  allow the appeal, set aside the decrees passed by  the trial  court and by the Division Bench of the High Court  and dispose of the suit as having abated on June 10, 1964.  The findings on issues Nos. 4 and 6 are set aside without expressing  any opinion on them reserving liberty to the  parties   to  agitate   the  question   in  appropriate proceedings. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of: the case,  we direct  the parties  to bear  their own  costs throughout. P.B.R.                                       Appeal allowed. 900